Unjustified Enrichment

The paper discusses the history of the English law doctrine according to which the mistake of law (error iuris) is a bar for restitution. The author seeks to analyze the premises of mistake that led to recovery of the payment. Since the adjudication of the leading case Bilbie v. Lumley (1802) it was settled by the courts that he who had paid while operating under mistake of fact could demand restitution. On the other hand the one who acted under mistake of law could not. Over the last two centuries, until the ground-breaking decision in Kleinwort Benson Ltd v. Lincoln City Council (1999), the distinction into mistake of law and mistake of fact was very important in cases of undue payment. The author ventures whether there are any foundations for the promotion of the thesis that the aforementioned distinction might be an example of the reception of continental doctrines by the English legal system.

Se examina  de manera sistemática el tratamiento que se da en el Código Civil chileno a las "condictiones", en cuanto que acciones personales que proceden en ciertos supuestos específicos, que habilitan para repetir aquello que se retiene sin causa ("causa retinendi").  Estos supuestos, tradicionalmente han generado discusiones en la doctrina y jurisprudencia, y han dado lugar a soluciones discutibles o contradictorias..

Especial atención se presta al pago de lo no debido como supuesto de la "condictio indebiti", y a todos aquellos supuestos que originan una acción para exigir el precio de una cosa ajena enajenada, v. gr. en sede de acción reivindicatoria (art. 898), de comodato (art. 2187) y de depósito (art. 2231), llamada desde época muy tardía como "condictio pretii" o "condictio de pretio". También se examina un supuesto vinculado a la llamada "condictio furtiva",

El tratamiento de todas las materias tiene en cuenta no sólo la doctrina sino, muy especialmente, la jurisprudencia de los tribunales superiores de justicia. Así en esta obra se contiene una exposición actualizada y al día de los problemas prácticos a que dan lugar las "condictiones", sus soluciones y, en muchos casos, la crítica a ellas.

This essay challenges the view, held by Peter Birks amongst others, that unjust enrichments and contracts are structurally similar events. They are similar, Birks held, because an unjust enrichment, like a contract, logically determines the duty or 'response' to which it gives rise (to make restitution, to perform the contract) and, further, because like a contract (but not a tort) it is a unified concept: all unjust enrichments are unjust for the same reason-because they lack a legal basis. Against this view, it is argued that unjust enrichments are structurally closer to torts than contracts. As is true of torts and damages (but not contracts and contractual obligations), the relationship between unjust enrichments and restitution is normative rather than logical. The duty to make restitution, like the duty to pay damages, is thus distinct from the event that, as a matter of law, gives rise to it. Further, the normative structures of the unjust enrichment/restitution and tort/damages relationships are similar: although an unjust enrichment is not a wrong, it is, like a wrong, a problem, and the restitutionary duty to which it gives rise is, like the duty to pay damages, a duty to remedy that problem. (One way this is shown is by considering why courts never award damages for failing to make restitution; the answer is the same as the answer to the question why courts never award damages for failing to pay damages, namely that the relevant duty is a duty to make things right, not a duty to not make things wrong.) Finally, it will be suggested, though more tentatively, that the similarities between unjust enrichments and torts should cause scholars to think carefully before agreeing with Birks that all unjust enrichments are unjust because they lack a legal basis. The essay is a chapter in a forthcoming collection from Oxford University Press entitled Philosophical Foundations of Unjust Enrichment.

A discussion of the question if English law should shift to an absence of basis approach from a critical German perspective. Was published in:in: Restitution of Overpaid Tax,  Steven Elliott, Birke Häcker and Charles Mitchell (eds) Oxford: Hart 2013, p. 213-237

El autor realiza un análisis comparativo sobre la tutela restitutoria frente al enriquecimiento injustificado. Sobre el particular, afirma que, en el Código Civil peruano, los distintos supuestos de esta acción no han sido objeto de una regulación uniforme. Igualmente, refiere que las restituciones por enriquecimiento injustificado afrontan en nuestro país, al igual que otros remedios de naturaleza civil, el riesgo de su "administrativización", debido a la presencia de su lógica en una serie de sanciones administrativas, como las aplicadas por el INDECOPI. Asimismo, expone los presupuestos y problemas operativos del enriquecimiento injustificado en el Perú, a la luz de las tendencias jurisprudenciales, y propone algunas directrices para su aplicación actual y para una futura reforma de su régimen.

1. L'alterità strutturale e funzionale di restituzione e risarcimento. - 2. L'uso di un bene o di un servizio altrui. - 3. Il concorso dell'azione generale di arricchimento senza causa con quella di risarcimento del danno. - 4.La restituzione dei profitti.

"The Bristol Law Journal launched its first edition in 2012. The Journal is composed of academic articles written by either current or alumni students of the University of Bristol. Contributors were asked to submit articles on ‘Law Reform’, in any area of their choice and this broad mandate has produced a richly diverse range of reading. Topics as varied as the criminalisation of possessing ‘violent pornography’ to unlawful distributions of capital at an undervalue, adorn the pages of this first edition.


Foreword

• The Rt. Hon The Baroness Hale of Richmond, DBE, PC, LLD (Bristol, 2002), FBA Justice of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, Chancellor of the University of Bristol (2004).


Editors in Chief

• Hena Sial, LLB Hons (Bristol 2011), Student of Gray’s Inn

• Sahar A. N. S. Farooqi, LLB Hons (Bristol 2009), Barrister of Gray’s Inn


Academic Editors

• Nasrul Ismail, LLB Hons (Bristol 2007), Visiting Research Fellow, School of Law, University of Bristol.

• Charlotte L. Bendall, BA Juris (Oxon), Msc (Bristol 2011), Barrister of Lincoln’s Inn

• Zoe Godolphin, LLB Hons (Bristol 2002), LLM (Bristol 2003), PhD (Bristol 2003- present), Tutor, School of Law, University of Bristol.


Submissions

1. Nagi, M. – ‘What the Criminal Justice System Can Learn From a Human Rights Perspective in its Response to Domestic Violence’ Bris LJ [2011] 5

2. Davies, H. – ‘Reform of expert evidence: the need to dispel the ‘real rape’ myth’ Bris LJ [2011] 12

3. McGuigan, J. – ‘The Good, The Bad And The Ugly: An Assessment of the Labour Government’s Treatment of Privacy within the Family Justice System’ Bris LJ [2011] 19

4. Krishnan, R. – ‘My Mate’s a Primate – The ADI Decision and Parliamentary Democracy’ Bris LJ [2011] 29

5. Fox, J. – ‘To what extent, if at all, should UK law allow corporations to sue media outlets for defamation?’ Bris LJ [2011] 37

6. Ekaratne, Chehani S. – ‘L’Oreal Reformed: What ‘Free-riding’ might look like with a Harm Requirement’ Bris LJ [2011] 46

7. Edmondson, J. – ‘In light of the House of Lords decision in R v JTB and the reasoning behind it, is it time to raise the age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales?’ Bris LJ [2011] 57

8. Reeve, L. – ‘What would be the most effective solution for remedying the problems caused by parliamentary privilege in defamation proceedings where a member of the legislature initiates the proceedings?’ Bris LJ [2011] 69

9. Evans, S. – ‘A Legitimised Evil? Parental smacking of children as a primary factor in violent criminal behaviour’ Bris LJ [2011] 79

10. Evans, B. – ‘Regulation of Financial Markets in the EU: Mutual Recognition vs Harmonisation? The Role of Regulatory Competition in light of the recent Financial Crisis’ Bris LJ [2011] 91

11. Pereira, D. – ‘Pleasure Politicised: The Relevance of Morality in the Regulation of Extreme Pornography’ Bris LJ [2011] 102

12. Barnes, A. – ‘Do we have a Legal right to break the Law?’ Bris LJ [2011] 115

13. Hayes, L. – ‘Discriminatory low pay: A challenge to the concept of equal pay’ Bris LJ [2011] 127

14. Bradley, A. – ‘Two systems: one answer. Are the civil and common law so very different?’ Bris LJ [2011] 134

15. McGoldrick, C. – ‘Clarifying the Law on Unlawful Distributions: Transfers at an Undervalue – Objective or Subjective Approach?’ Bris LJ [2011] 140

© 2011 University of Bristol Law Club (UBLC). All Rights Reserved. The articles and/ or opinions contained in this publication do not represent those of the UBLC, The University of Bristol Law Department, The University of Bristol, The Bristol Law Journal, their respective staff, editors or members. No reproduction of design or article content without prior consent from both the Editors in Chief is permitted. Duplication strictly prohibited."

La dottrina italiana ha proposto interpretazioni sempre più aggressivamente critiche nei confronti della sussidiarietà in astratto dell’azione generale di arricchimento senza causa, giungendo a prospettare una sua più o meno radicale relativizzazione, se non una sorta di abrogazione di fatto dell’art. 2042 c.c. Tale tendenza trova riscontro dal punto di vista storico-comparatistico. Si deve pertanto ritenere che la vittima di un atto illecito possa pretendere da colui che lo ha commesso la restituzione dell’arricchimento senza causa ovvero il risarcimento del danno (concorso alternativo). L’eventuale prescrizione dell’azione risarcitoria non gli precluderà pertanto di esercitare quella restitutoria. Resta invece fermo che l’art. 2042 c.c. pone un divieto di concorso cumulativo.

A fronte dell’utilizzo abusivo dei dati personali e comportamentali condotto dal titolare e/o responsabile del trattamento in violazione dei doveri di lealtà, correttezza e trasparenza posti dal GDPR 679/2016 attraverso l’elusione o l’aggiramento delle regole in tema di archiviazione, di aggregazione a fini statistici e di profilazione e rispetto al quale il GDPR prevede il rimedio risarcitorio, può ammettersi che i profitti illegittimamente lucrati attraverso la cessione a terzi a titolo oneroso delle informazioni e che superino la perdita subìta dal fruitore restino ascritti al patrimonio del danneggiante?
Ragionando in questa direzione, individuati i presupposti e le ragioni delle pretese da parte del fruitore dei servizi in Internet, si vuole dimostrare l’inadeguatezza del rimedio risarcitorio in chiave compensativa a rispondere al principio secondo il quale non può trarsi profitto dall’illecito; si apre, pertanto, la riflessione ai rimedi c.d. “ultracompensativi” andando ad individuare i principi e le norme in forza dei quali giustificare la restituzione dei profitti al danneggiato.

Failure ofconsideration can be either total or partial. In this paper the author examines the doctrine ofaccrued rights and the role it plays in relation to total failure ofconsideration in the contractual context. The doctrine of accrued rights is well established in Australian contract law. Rights that accrue prior to termination of a contract survive termination and can therefore be enforced after termination. The author argues that when there is a totalfailure ofconsideration the doctrine of accrued rights operates to create a debtfm' the amount that is the subject of the total failure of consideration. The obligation to pay the debt arises within the law of contract. This conclusion will be contrasted with those who argue that an action for recovery, and the corresponding
obligation to make payment, are independent of contract.

Դատական պրակտիկայում անհիմն հարստացման վերաբերյալ ամենահաճախ վկայակոչվող որոշումներից մեկն է Գասպարյան v Սիմոնյան թիվ ԵԱՔԴ/0455/02/08 գործով վճռաբեկ դատարանի 13.02.2009-ի որոշումը։ Դրա պատճառաբանական մասում առկա են մի շարք էական թերություններ, որոնք ոչ միայն խեղաթյուրում են անհիմն հարստացման ինստիտուտի էությունը, այլ նաև բազմաթիվ իրավիճակներում անհնարին դարձնում անհիմն հարստացմանը վերաբերող ՀՀ քաղաքացիական օրենսգրքի դրույթների կիրառումը։

This Article explores two mysteries surrounding the theory of enrichment without cause that still bedevil scholars and the courts—the theory’s foundation and its scope of application. Part I examines the history, characteristic features, and underlying principles of enrichment without cause as a source of obligations and a special expression of the more general principle of unjustified enrichment. Part II applies this historical and comparative information in an attempt to decipher the precise scope of application of enrichment without cause in Louisiana law, in hopes that this contribution will prompt a more general discussion on the formulation of a coherent Louisiana model of enrichment without cause.

El presente artículo plantea que la accesión no es un modo de adquirir el dominio sino un modo de extinción de este. Adicionalmente, propone que la construcción en suelo ajeno es una hipótesis de enriquecimiento injustificado y que, desde esa perspectiva, la idea dogmática que subyace al inc. segundo del art. 669 del Código Civil es la aquiescencia de la mejora por parte del dueño del terreno, lo que justifica el deber de pagar el valor total de la obra

This paper introduces to a civilian audience Kerr v. Baranow, the Supreme Court of Canada’s leading judgment on unjust enrichment in the context of unmarried cohabitation, decided under the common law. It highlights the judgment’s boldness in the common law. Then, having noted ways in which Quebec judges have drawn from the Court’s earlier equitable jurisprudence, it explores ways in which they might integrate insights from Kerr into Quebec civil law.

I. La restituzione dell'arricchimento senza causa in forma specifica e per equivalente. - II. I fatti costitutivi ed impeditivi dell'azione. - III. La determinazione dell'indennità pecuniaria. - IV. La cosiddetta sussidiarietà dell'azione (art. 2042 c.c.). - V. L'arricchimento senza causa della Pubblica Amministrazione

1. La natura giuridica dell'azione di ripetizione. - 2. Il fondamento giuridico. - 3. La legittimazione attiva e passiva: regole generali. - 4. Segue: regola speciali. - 5. La fattispecie: la prestazione eseguita. - 6. Segue: la mancanza del titolo. - 7. Segue: lo stato soggettivo dell'accipiens. - 8. I tipi di pagamento dell'indebito: oggettivo. - 9. Segue: soggettivo ex latere accipientis (al terzo). - 10. Segue: soggettivo ex latere solventis.- 11. Segue: c.d. soggettivo misto. - 12. L'adempimento di un'obbligazione naturale. - 13. I fatti preclusivi: contrarietà della prestazione al buon costume. - 14. Gli effetti giuridici: la restituzione di cose determinate.- 15. Segue: impossibilità della loro restituzione. - 16. Segue: a) perimento o deterioramento. - 17. Segue: b) alienazione da parte dell'accipiens. - 18. Segue: la restituzione di somme di denaro o cose fungibili. - 19. Segue: la restituzione dei frutti e il pagamento degli interessi. - 20. Segue: la restituzione delle prestazioni di fare. - 21. Segue: le restituzioni reciproche basate sui contratti a prestazioni corrispettive. - 22. La limitazione di responsabilità dell'accipiens incapace. - 23. La ripetizione dell'indebito nei rapporti con la P.A. - 24. L'onere probatorio e la prescrizione. - 25. Profili processuali. - 26. Diritto internazionale privato.

Diese Studie stellt den Tatbestand der condictio ob rem vom Kopf auf die Füße. Seit langem wird das in § 812 Abs. 1 S. 2 Alt. 2 BGB kodifizierte »Rechtsgeschäft« nur noch als Anhängsel des Schuldvertragsrechts marginalisiert oder gar als systemwidrig bezeichnet. Dagegen können historisch-genetische Analysen und dogmatische Rekonstruktionen zeigen, dass der Rechtsgrund der condictio ob rem einen verpflichtungsfreien Kausalvertrag mit konditionaler Verknüpfung eigener Art bildet. Durch Kritik einer von Schuld und Markttausch beherrschten Rechtsdogmatik zeigt Christoph Sorge eine eigenständige Bedeutung der condictio ob rem innerhalb des Verkehrs- und Vermögensrechts auf.

Ausgezeichnet mit dem Fakultätspreis der Juristischen Fakultät der Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Universität Hannover sowie mit dem Wirtschaftspreis Recht 2018 der Kanzlei Schickerling von Bismarck, Notar und Anwalt GbR.

Rezensiert von Albrecht Götz von Olenhusen, in: Zeitschrift Integrativer Europäischer Rechtsgeschichte: http://www.koeblergerhard.de/ZIER-HP/ZIER-HP-10-2020/SorgeChristoph_VerpflichtungsfreierVertrag.htm

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This study turns the facts of the condictio ob rem upside down. The concept of “legal transaction”, codified in Section 812 (1) sentence 2 alt. 2 of the German Civil Code (BGB), has long been marginalised as a mere appendage to the laws governing contractual obligations and even called anti-systemic. Contrarily, historical-genetic analyses and dogmatic reconstructions show that the legal basis of the condictio ob rem constitutes a non-binding, causal contract with conditional links of its own. Through critiquing a legal doctrine dominated by debt and market exchange, Christoph Sorge points out an autonomous meaning of the condictio ob rem within exchange and property law.

Awarded with the "Fakultätspreis" by the Law Faculty of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Universität Hannover and with the "Wirtschaftspreis Recht 2018" by the the law firm Schickerling von Bismarck, Notar und Anwalt GbR.

Reviewed by Albrecht Götz von Olenhusen, in: Zeitschrift Integrativer Europäischer Rechtsgeschichte: http://www.koeblergerhard.de/ZIER-HP/ZIER-HP-10-2020/SorgeChristoph_VerpflichtungsfreierVertrag.htm

A trustee commingles multiple innocent beneficiaries’ funds in an account and dissipates these funds to a level at which the total remaining is insufficient to satisfy all claims. In these circumstances, the court finds itself having to answer a difficult question: how should these remaining funds be distributed? Several approaches to distribution have arisen in England and Wales jurisprudence. These can be categorised as the first in, first out method, pari passu and the rolling charge. The 2018 Singapore High Court case of Pars Ram Brothers (Pte) Ltd v Austrian & New Zealand Banking Groups Ltd offers useful insight into the debate as to the correct approach, and from this several tenets of discussion can be synthesised. This paper submits that the uncertainty surrounding the correct method of distribution is unacceptable in the contemporary commercial context of trust law, and that courts must therefore alight on a settled approach to resolving contests between rival beneficiaries. Following this, the three alternative methods will be analysed against the Pars Ram discussion points. The paper will conclude that, although not always practicable, the rolling charge is the most appropriate approach to adopt as default in England and Wales and should be incorporated moving forward. The pari passu approach should be used where the rolling charge is inappropriate, whilst the first in, first out rule should be formally recognised as redundant in this context.

1. Introduzione. - 2. Precisazione dell'interesse giuridicamente protetto. - 3. Immagine e beni giuridici immateriali. - 4. Riconoscibilità del ritratto. - 5. La raffigurazione di cose. - 6. La c.d. maschera scenica. - 7. Il sosia di personaggio celebre. - 8. Forme di circolazione della raffigurazione. - 9. Le cause di libera circolazione. - 10. Lo sfruttamento pubblicitario del ritratto altrui. - 11. Rilevanza di onore e reputazione. - 12. Presupposti dell'azione inibitoria e legittimazione attiva. - 13. La tutela cautelare in generale: presupposti dell'art. 700 c.p.c. - 14. Provvedimenti collaterali all'inibitoria c.d. cautelare. - 15. Il sequestro in particolare: problemi di costituzionalità. - 16. Conclusioni

Though historically recent, a European law of unjustified enrichment is already
existing and embraces both contractual and extra-contractual restitution, which however are governed by different rules and shall not therefore lose their own specificity. In contractual restitution, the remedy is based on the general principle of unjustified enrichment (both in civil and in common law by now) and has a very large field of application: unlike the German model followed by the DCFR, distinguishing between avoided and terminated contracts is not necessary from the point of view of restitution of performances rendered by the parties (as demonstrated by the CESL), nor is convenient elaborating further sets of rules for the case of contractual voidness or withdrawal. In extra-contractual restitution, the Directive 2004/48/EC relating to the protection of intellectual and industrial property has provided for two different
remedies (against infringement). The first, i.e. the payment of a lump sum equal to reasonable royalties or fees, is but a restitution of unjustified enrichment according to the general principle of law (though English courts have regarded it as relating to damages). The second, i.e. account and disgorgement of profits gained by the wrongdoer, however, is not properly based on the same general principle of law, because such profits can by definition exceed the claimant’s expenses: nevertheless, this restitutionary remedy, which is definitely established in English common law, can be granted by civil law as well, since it is but the action against the negotiorum gestor which has been foreseen by Roman tradition.

1. La contestazione delle c.d. pene private nel pensiero di C. Massimo Bianca. - 2. Le pene private e il risarcimento del lucro cessante. - 3. La restituzione del profitto ingiustificato. - 4. La restituzione dell'arricchimento senza causa (c.d. prezzo del consenso). - 5. Il risarcimento del danno non patrimoniale e del danno morale soggettivo.

The paper discusses Fibrosa S.A. v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd (1942), the case considered as one of several landmark cases in English law of restitution. What was at stake in litigation before the House of Lords was whether a Polish plaintiff should recover a prepayment transferred pursuant to a contract that had become frustrated because of the outbreak of war in 1939. The lords had to decide on the application of two potentially dissonant doctrines – the frustration and the total failure of consideration. But what made Fibrosa case famous was an obiter dictum delivered by lord Wright. This eminent judge declared that English law should provide remedies for unjust enrichment. That is the very reason why the case is still being cited by the lawyers today.

Il contributo affronta il tema dell’impossibilità di restituzione delle azioni di una società holding posta in liquidazione. L’analisi muove dalla disciplina degli artt. 2037 e 2038 cod. civ. sull’indebito di cosa determinata, per verificarne l’applicabilità alla problematica oggetto dello studio. Dopo una breve ricostruzione del fenomeno della surrogazione reale, di cui un esempio viene individuato nell’art. 1259 cod. civ., relativo al perimento (anche giuridico) della cosa da rendere, ci si sofferma sulle dottrine del commodum repraesentationis e del tracing, per trarre un rapido confronto tra i due sistemi restitutori. Non vengono tralasciate le soluzioni del diritto uniforme (CISG) e dal diritto comune europeo (PECL, CESL, DCFR). La soluzione proposta all’esito dell’indagine consiste nella restituzione del “surrogato” della holding estinta, costituito dai “residui giuridici” della holding stessa, cioè le partecipazioni delle società controllate.

RESUMO: A partir da análise do acórdão proferido pela Terceira Turma do STJ no julgamento do REsp. 1.335.624/RJ, o presente trabalho busca expor parâmetros que auxiliem na definição dos contornos do enriquecimento sem causa e da responsabilidade civil, especialmente no que diz respeito ao enquadramento dogmático do lucro da intervenção no direito brasileiro e, por fim, à sua distinção face ao dano patrimonial na modalidade de lucros cessantes.

ABSTRACT: From the analysis of the judgement by the Brazilian Supreme Court of Justice (STJ) in the case identified as REsp. 1.335.624/RJ, the current work seeks to present some parameters that may aid in the definition of the outlines of unfair enrichment and civil liability, especially in what concerns the dogmatic classification of intervention profits in Brazilian law and, finally, their distinctions in relation to the patrimonial damages known as ceasing profits.

The rules governing impaired transfers are widely thought to lie at the core of unjust enrichment law. This essay defends two propositions about these rules. First, there is no duty, in the common law, to make restitution of benefits obtained as the result of an impaired transfer (for example, a transfer made by mistake or as a result of fraud or compulsion). Rather than imposing duties to make restitution, or indeed duties of any kind, the rules governing impaired transfers impose only liabilities, in particular liabilities to judicial rulings. The only legal consequence of a mistaken payment is that the recipient is liable to be judicially ordered to repay a sum of money equal to the payment. Second, it matters that the law governing impaired transfers imposes only liabilities, and not duties, because, inter alia, explaining and justifying liabilities is different from explaining and justifying duties. In particular, certain well-known objections to attempts to explain impaired transfer law can be avoided once it is recognized that this law is concerned exclusively with liabilities. In summary, this essay argues that the distinction between duty-imposing and liability-imposing rules has important implications for understanding the foundations of the law governing impaired transfers.

1. L'obbligo di protezione previsto dalla disciplina continentale della gestione di affari. - 2. Il raffronto con l'esperienza anglosassone dell'account of profits. - 3. La restituzione dell'arricchimento senza causa e quella del profitto ingiustificato. - 4. Il requisito soggettivo della mala fede

The paper discusses the history of the English law doctrine according to which the mistake of law (error iuris) was a bar for restitution. The author seeks to analyze the premises of mistake that led to recovery of the payment. Since the adjudication of the leading case Bilbie v. Lumley (1802), it was settled by the courts that he who had paid while operating under mistake of fact could demand restitution. On the other hand, the one who acted under mistake of law could not. Over the last two centuries, until the ground-breaking decision in Kleinwort Benson Ltd v. Lincoln City Council (1999), the distinction into mistake of law and mistake of fact was very important in cases of undue payment. The author ventures whether there are any foundations for the promotion of the thesis that the aforementioned distinction might be an example of the reception of continental doctrines by the English legal system. The English language version of the paper has been already published in Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis (2014, vol. 82).

This paper studies four family judgments decided by the Supreme Court of Canada: Kerr v. Baranow, on unjust enrichment and unmarried cohabitants; Schreyer v. Schreyer, on bankruptcy and provincial family law; and L.M.P. v. L.S. and R.P. v. R.C., both concerning the weight of agreements on variation of spousal support. Each of the judgments under consideration reveals a mixture of boldness and bashfulness. For example, the judges minimized their inventiveness in Kerr. The Court’s concept of the joint family venture in that judgment does not fit comfortably within unjust enrichment.