Estoppel

The article discusses the issues of evolution and premises of the applying of English concept known as promissory estoppel. In the present paper the development of the legal doctrine referring to the aforementioned problems is illustrated with the examples of several leading cases such as that of High Trees (1947) and Combe v. Combe (1951). In these cases it was lord Denning who was a decision maker. The author of the paper analyzes the general principles on which the promissory estoppel might be invoked. He draws our attention to the fact that in the course of litigation it is necessary to prove the existence of a promise on the basis of which a promisee (the person who was promised something), while reasonably relying on this promise decided to do something or to refrain from doing it, and simultaneously it would be inequitable if a promisor (the person making a promise) could call off what he had promised. The author of the paper made an effort to answer a question whether the abuse-of-right clause provided for in Art.5 of the Civil Code may be regarded as the Polish equivalent of promissory estoppel.

After the High Court's decision in Sidhu v Van Dyke, Australian proprietary estoppel is no longer fettered by the minimum equity principle in deciding quantum of relief. This estoppel may offer monetary compensation reflecting market value in informal land contracts cases. Informal contracts are rendered unenforceable by the Statute of Frauds, meaning contractual damages are not available. In this regard post-Sidhu proprietary estoppel appears to be a blow to the Statute of Frauds. This article argues that the estoppel does not completely undermine the Statute of Frauds. That is because the estoppel does not compensate for loss of profits as contractual damages do. Contractual damages and equitable compensation are measured by two different sets of mechanisms and oriented by different criteria. The amount awarded by post-Sidhu proprietary estoppel may lie somewhere between pre-Sidhu proprietary estoppel and contractual damages. Although post-Sidhu proprietary estoppel has commercial significance, it is still not as good as contractual damages in monetary terms. In this regard, post-Sidhu proprietary estoppel may still be fettered by the minimum equity principle in a more hidden way.

O presente estudo foca-se na evolução do princípio de estoppel, desde sua epigênese no direito da Common Law até sua inclusão na seara dos princípios gerais do direito internacional, devido a atuação judicante da Corte Internacional de Justiça (CIJ). Primeiramente analisa-se de que modo tal princípio é aplicado pela CIJ, perscrutando sua jurisprudência. Em seguida, analisa-se como o Mercosul observa tal princípio quando invocado frente a tribunais ad hoc latino-americanos. Por derradeiro, ressalta-se a importância para o Direito Internacional de uma interpretação consistente sobre o estoppel, que ponha fim a interpretações dissidentes. Fez-se uso de revisão documental de decisões da CIJ e do Tribunal Permanente de Revisão do Mercosul, bem como de bibliografia especializada no estudo do princípio de estoppel.

The body of law in a State consists of two parts, substantive and adjective law. The former prescribes those rules of civil conduct which declare the rights and duties of all who are subject to the law. The latter relates to the remedial agencies and procedure by which rights are maintained, their invasion redressed, and the methods by which such results are accomplished in judicial tribunals.

An Estoppel is a rule of evidence.

An estoppel is a bar that prevents one from asserting a claim or right that contradicts what one has said or done before or what has been legally established as true.
It is a bar that prevents the re-litigation of issues.
It is an affirmative defense alleging good-faith reliance on a misleading representation and an injury or detrimental change in position resulting from that reliance.

“Estoppe” says Lord Coke, comes from the French word estoupe, from whence the English word Stopped; and it is called an estoppel or conclusion, because a man’s own act or acceptance stoppeth or closesth up his mouth to allege or plead the truth.
Estoppel may also be defined to be a legal result of conclusion arising from an admission which has either been actually made, or which the law presumes to have been made, and which is binding on all persons whom it affects.
In using the term estoppel, one is of course aware of its kaleidoscopic varieties. One reads of estoppel by conduct, by deed, by latches, by misrepresentation, by negligence, by silence and so on. There is also an estoppel by judgment and by verdict: there, however, obviously involve procedure. The first named varieties have certain aspects in common. But these aspects are not always interpreted by the same rules in all courts. The institution seems to be flexible.

Kinds of Estoppels

Estoppels are many kinds, namely,
• Administrative collateral estoppel.
• Assignee estoppel.
• Assignor estoppel.
• Collateral estoppel.
• Equitable estoppel.
• Estoppel by conduct.
• Estoppel by Contract.
• Estoppel by deed.
• Estoppel by election.
• Estoppel by inaction
• Estoppel by judgment.
• Estoppel by latches.
• Estoppel by misrepresentation.
• Estoppel by negligence.
• Estoppel by record.
• Estoppel by representation.
• Estoppel by silence.
• Estoppel by standing by.
• Estoppel by verdict.
• Estoppel by warranty.
• Estoppel in pais.
• Estoppel on the record.
• File wrapper estoppel.
• Judicial estoppel.
• Legal estoppel.
• Marking estoppel.
• Promissory estoppel.
• Prosecution history estoppel.
• Quasi estoppel.
• Technical estoppel.

There is also another kind of estoppel which is called the Proprietary Estoppel.
In Re: Basham (dec’d) Mr. Edward Nugee (sitting as High Court judge) set out the principle of proprietary estoppel, in its broadest form, in the following terms:
“Where one person, A, has acted to his detriment on the faith of a belief, which was known to and encouraged by another person. B, that either has or is going to be given a right in or over B property. B cannot insist on his strict legal rights if to do so would be in consistent with a belief.”

Good faith is insufficient in bringing about a multilateral public order. An international community that applies the principle of good faith effectively does not exist. Arguably, rather than a robust juridical mechanism, good faith represents common sense in international law. However, an effective and functioning multilateral public order needs more than that. This becomes all the more palpable in respect of issues such as external sovereign debt, where public international law is inchoate.

“While the doctrine of proprietary estoppel achieves just outcomes in individual cases, the basis for the doctrine itself is far from clear. Because different courts have apparently decided different cases on different bases it is difficult for individual litigants to know their rights.”

Human Being is a diversed and an amazing creation of God, having dissimilar taste of liking and disliking, however, the consistency in words or assertion, naturally, is the only commonality expected by every individual from other. Law, being will of people, detests the provision of uneven statements given by a person, to the court. Estoppel, sharing traits in common in Sharī'ah and Conventional law, is, notwithstanding, different when studied in minute detail in both disciplines. The present work is an attempt to probe into similarities and differences of estoppel in Islamic and Conventional law. In this article, the concept of estoppel is explicated, keeping the Classical jurists' of Sharī'ah in view, on three levels, i.e.; Philosophical level; Rules; and its present application in courts. Moreover, it has been found in the study that estoppel in Islamic law has more comprehension than conventional law, for instance, it is applied in Evidence law as well as in Procedural law. Being a Social Science research of qualitative category, the content analysis method of secondary data has been used herein. Introduction:

"This chapter considers the restrictive vision of proprietary estoppel put forward by Lord Scott and Lord Walker in the House of Lords in Yeoman’s Row v Cobbe [2008] UKHL 55. It explains that the impact of taking their arguments seriously would be the elimination (or, at least, the severe restriction) of one of the three distinct principles subsumed within proprietary estoppel, ie the promise principle stated by Lord Kingsdown in Ramsden v Dyson. The chapter suggests that, although the approach in Cobbe runs counter to the current of equitable development over the last forty years, it does highlight important issues of principle surrounding the scope of proprietary estoppel. Despite the tendency to downplay the role of promise within the doctrine, the pre-Cobbe version of proprietary estoppel ventures into the territory of the law of contract, doing so only in respect of promises related to land/property (without any convincing justification as a matter of principle for this restriction). Rather than seek to deal comprehensively with the very large question as to the merits or otherwise of Lord Kingsdown’s promise principle, this chapter seeks to address a more modest set of questions. First, it points out that the particular concern which seems to have animated the judges in Cobbe – that it is wrong to allow C to succeed on the basis of a promise which C knows is binding only in honour – can be accommodated within the conventional modern understanding of proprietary estoppel, without any need to eliminate or severely curtail Lord Kingsdown’s principle. Secondly, the chapter addresses the seductive suggestion that a distinction should be drawn between the commercial and the domestic contexts, with the restriction upon proprietary estoppel suggested in Cobbe applying only in the commercial context. It concludes on the basis of a number of different arguments, that this suggestion does not represent a desirable avenue of development for the law. One of the points made against any application of a mistake requirement in the context of the promise principle is that this requirement makes sense only in the context of the acquiescence principle; the suggestion that it should be applied more broadly appears reminiscent of attempts in the past to apply the probanda to all proprietary estoppel cases.

In terms of the future development of the law of estoppel, what is needed is a willingness to separate out for analysis the distinct principles which have, for historical reasons, been grouped together under the heading of proprietary estoppel. The emphasis on ‘unconscionability’ and ‘synthesis’, encouraged by the overrated judgment of Oliver J in Taylor Fashions, have contributed to the current confused state of the law. Following the debacle represented by Cobbe, it is time for a somewhat more reflective approach."

The principle of estoppel is an important concept of the law of evidence. It is related to
conduct. It does not allow behaving in one way at a time and in another way at other
times. There is no place of contradicting a thing said in the law of evidence.

Contemporary private law theory proceeds on the basis that we can make sense of the nature and structure of private law wholly in terms of substantive rights and duties. Private law theorists largely account for private law and private law ordering in terms of the right-duty relations they find in property, contract and tort law. This paper broadens the horizons of private law theory to take account of norms of private law procedure. This paper identifies estoppel as a powerful private law idea concerned with the integrity of our declarations about how things stand between us, as a matter of private right. It argues that a principle of estoppel is a central component of a decentralized form of public administration, in which private rights-holders— alongside of judges and other public officials— participate in forming and stabilizing the private law order.

Sobre preclusiones procesales en el derecho chileno en tiempo de reformas. Ensayo de una teoría general desde un enfoque valorativo jurídico hasta las aplicaciones particulares de la preclusión. Estudio se enfoca en los principios y en los procesos escritos y orales.

El 8 de marzo de 2022 vencerá el plazo que la CIJ otorgó a Guyana para presentar su memoria en el diferendo que ésta tiene con Venezuela. Guyana deberá, para ese día, haber fundamentado por qué la CIJ debiera declarar válido y vinculante el laudo arbitral de 1899, que delimita la frontera entre los dos países. Venezuela, por su lado, tendrá un año adicional para fundamentar por qué el laudo sería nulo e írrito, así como para sustentar su supuesto derecho soberano sobre el valle Oeste del río Esequibo.
La zona del Esequibo representa aproximadamente dos tercios del territorio de Guyana pero además es una de las zonas más ricas del mundo. Esto hace que la controversia, además del componente jurídico, esté invadida por un componente político. Ambos componentes son abordados en este artículo.

The book attempts to analyze the status of several Anglo-American legal doctrines referred to as equitable estoppel, promissory estoppel, and proprietary estoppel. It examines the English, American and Australian law from the 18th century onwards. The book draws analogies to legal devices detectable in continental civil law and characterized by the goal similar to that performed by various types of estoppel. Among these devices there may be listed those found in the European harmonization projects (PECL, DCFR, CESL) as well as those found in the national civil codes, and specifically such as principle of good faith and fair dealing or the prohibition on the abuse of rights.
Common law jurisdictions recognize a number of specific estoppel doctrines. The latter prevent the negative effects of an inconsistent conduct of the other party and counteract the occurrence of detriment or other negative consequences (often referred to by a vague notion of "unconscionability") resulting from the party’s reliance on the other party's inconsistent conduct.
Estoppels are used today as "safety valves" in almost all fields of Anglo-American private law. The courts apply them to settle accounts for the expenditures made on someone else's property and also to protect the addressees of formally defective promises (made in breach of the statute of frauds) as well as to protect the parties to the negotiations that did not lead to the contract's conclusion. Estoppels can also be found in family-law relations as a device to settle the accounts of former cohabitants or to modify the partition of the deceased’s estate.
Despite the broad scope of its application, the law on estoppels is far from being settled. Significant differences occur in its interpretation under various jurisdictions. While in English law the promissory estoppel might be used only as a defence (“a shield”), the American and Australian law recognize it as an independent cause of action (“a sword”). There are many controversies and disputes that are currently taking place both in the courts and in the scholarship. They lead to legal uncertainty and unpredictability of decisions. The book attempts to discuss these issues and sometimes point to potential solutions.

This Article argues that that issue preclusion might be considered as a part of res judicata, however not its essential element, since many legal systems do not attribute issue preclusive effect to rendered judgements. The Article defines the scope of issue preclusion and meaning of some terms that are used to name this phenomenon in countries with developed issue preclusion doctrine. The paper shows that Ukrainian procedural laws tend to be narrowly interpreted by courts that give preclusive effect only to the findings on issues of fact, but not issues of law contained in a judgement’s reasons. The Article argues that conditions for issue preclusive effect can be specified with better precision and established in procedural laws and jurisprudence. Instead of a vague requirement of facts to be “directly examined and found by the court” in order to have preclusive effect, the jurisprudence might adopt more specific conditions, such as materiality for the judgement, i. e. the facts have to be relevant and material for the judgement in the case where they were found for them to have preclusive effect in subsequent proceedings. The Article also contains analysis of other requirements for issue preclusive effect of a rendered judgement, in particular requirements to identity of participants in cases, proper litigation and attribution of preclusive effect upon the respective motion of a party invoking issue preclusion. The attribution of the issue preclusive effect to a judgement is considered in this Article as a process with subsequent stages, some of them are to be performed by the court ex officio, and the others need to be initiated by the respective party. The Article also argues that the jurisprudence in cases with non-identical parties needs to be changed: instead of current approach according to which the limited issue preclusive effect can be invoked not only against the party to the first case, but also by the party to both cases, and the party that did not participated in the first case has the right to provide evidence to disprove the established facts which establishes rather a refutable presumption, the opposite approach needs to be adopted – the issue preclusive effect can be invoked only against the party to the first case.
Key words: burden of proof, collateral estoppel, fact preclusion, issue preclusion, preclusive effect of judgments, res judicata.

У статті розкрито співвідношення доктрини преюдиціальних фактів та принципу res judicata. Досліджено властиві різним правовим системам підходи до питання про обов’язковість встановлених судовим рішенням в іншій справі фактів. У статті показано різні підходи до преюдиції, від обмеження її до рівня спростовної презумпції факту, до найбільш широкого трактування, яке охоплює не тільки питання факту, а й обов’язковість висновків суду стосовно юридичного значення встановленого факту. Проаналізовано судову практику у вирішенні питання про умови, за яких встановленим рішенням суду в іншій справі фактам може бути надано преюдиціальне значення в господарській справі. З посиланням на напрацювання у країнах з розвиненою доктриною преюдиції або побічного естоппеля сформульовано пропозиції до виокремлення у практиці вітчизняних судів умов, за яких встановлені в інших справах факти можуть набувати значення преюдиціальних. Особливу увагу приділено віднесенню до умов преюдиціальності умови про належність встановленого у більш ранній справі факту до предмету доказування у цій справі. У статті зроблено наголос на стадійності вирішення питання про преюдиціальне значення факту, яке суд здійснює за заявою учасника, який несе тягар доведення. Розмежовано дії, які суд у цьому процесі зобов’язаний вчинити ex officio, і ті, які повинні бути ініційовані відповідним учасником. Стаття також вказує на необхідність приведення практики надання преюдиціального значення фактам у справах з неідентичним складом учасників до тих підходів, які властиві правовим системам з розвиненою доктриною преюдиції: замість закріпленої зараз можливості визнання преюдиціально значення фактів, встановлених в одній справі стосовно учасника, за заявою цього ж учасника у наступній справі з можливістю іншого учасника наступної справи, який не брав участі у розгляді першої справи, спростувати ці факти, слід перейти до практики надання можливості посилатися у наступній справі на встановлені у першій справі стосовно учасника обох справ обставини як на преюдиціальні тільки учаснику другої справи, який у першій справі участі не брав.
Ключові слова: естоппель, звільнення від доказування, предмет доказування, преюдиціальний факт, res judicata.

Resumen: Entre las distintas hipótesis sobre el origen de la doctrina de los actos propios, muy extendida en el Derecho occidental a través de distintos medios, destaca su vinculación con el texto recogido en D. 1,7,25 pr. (Ulp. 5 opin.). Con la finalidad de arrojar luz sobre esta posible conexión, se lleva a cabo un análisis global y exhaustivo del citado pasaje.
Abstract: Among the different hypotheses about the origin of the doctrine of "one's own acts", very widespread in Western law through different means, It has to be underlined its connection with D. 1,7,25 pr. (Ulp. 5 opin.). In order to shed light on this possible connection, a global and comprehensive analysis of the passage is carried out.

Given that continental civil law scholarship applies the concept of good faith in either a subjective (honesty in fact) or objective sense (good faith and fair dealing), the present article focuses on the latter one. The traditional view in England and Wales discards the recognition of a general principle of good faith and fair dealing in English law. English courts have adopted a piecemeal solutions approach (as shown by the judicial decisions issued in Interfoto Picture Library (1987) and Walford v. Miles (1992)). Meanwhile, the principle in question, along with the concept of the freedom of contract, is one of the most important principles of the continental civil law tradition (cf. art. 1104 of the French Civil Code, § 157, § 242 of the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, art. 2 (1) of the Swiss Zivilgesetzbuch, art. 6:2 Burgerlijk Wetboek, art. 5 of the Polish Civil Code, art. 2 (1) Common European Sales Law, art. 1:201 Principles of European Contract Law, art. III1:103 Draft Common Frame of Reference). The current work analyzes recent English case law (in particular Yam Seng (2013)), which seems to acknowledge the principle of good faith and fair dealing while rejecting the traditional view mentioned above. The comparative approach — references to American, and Commonwealth law, as well as to that of particular European states — is taken into account. The author claims that hostility to the concept of good faith in an objective sense in English law is superficial. One may expect that in the near future courts in England and Wales will follow the path taken by courts in the United States (§ 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981)), Australia (Renard Constructions (1992)) and Canada (Bhasin v. Hrynew (2014)), and they will finally recognize good faith as an underlying principle.

Most scholarly works on res judicata rest on two long-established assumptions: (i) the scope for the preclusive effects of previously rendered judgments upon subsequent proceedings is rather narrow in civil law systems compared to the extensive approach that characterizes the common law tradition especially in its U.S. epiphany; (ii) the very idea of issue preclusion is generally said to be absent or rejected in the civil law world. Accordingly, this alleged divergence has over time discouraged the development of a meaningful dialogue between common lawyers and civil law scholars on res judicata.
This Article confronts these assumptions and aims to yield new critical insights into the topic by comparing Italian and U.S. law. This idea stems from a path-breaking line of decisions by the Italian Supreme Court that has significantly extended the scope of res judicata to gradually open to some form of issue preclusion. Indeed, irrespective of a long dogmatic tradition, these “grands arrêtes,” together with few critical scholarly voices, have prompted a reconceptualization of res judicata, pointing out a potential rapprochement between the Italian and American solutions. By placing this hermeneutic evolution within a wider comparative context, it is possible to challenge the traditional narrative propounding issue preclusion as a preserve of the common law world and to unveil new common grounds for discussion on res judicata within the Western legal tradition.

In recent years, as illustrated by Thorner v Major (2009) UKHL 18, the law of proprietary estoppel has become more favourable to claimants in the inheritance context. Focusing on two recent English Court of Appeal decisions, Suggitt v Suggitt (2012) EWCA Civ 1140 and Bradbury v Taylor (2012) EWCA Civ 1208, this article questions whether the courts are being too generous – both in terms of the type of representation that can form the basis of a claim and in terms of the extent of the remedy afforded to a successful claimant. The article also reflects on the role of the appellate courts in cases of this nature.

The Inter-American Human Rights system continues to be one full of surprises. On the one hand, there are State official agencies that see no distinction between the system itself and any defense in a typical criminal case, and on the other hand, there is an Inter-American Court that only exceptionally rescues the judicial internal system of the States. That was exactly what occurred in the Massacre of Santo Domingo v. Colombia case involving a tragic event where 17 civilians were killed and 27 were injured while a violent fight took place between the Colombian military and the FARC. The first part of this manuscript will feature the inconsistencies of the State –the only entity with standing before the Court– which resorted to a defense that assailed its own Judicial Branch by both denouncing an alleged fraud on the part of the Prosecutor’s Office and by dismissing the decisions made by the criminal and administrative judicial instances. Ironically enough, this strategy could well b...

In the present case, no petition under Section 13-B of the Act has been filed. The petitioner wants for a decree in divorce suit under Section 13 of the Act, in view of compromise dated 10.10.2014, as this compromise would operate as estoppel against the respondents. Rule of estoppel is a rule of evidence. There can be no estoppel against statute. Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Project Uchcha Vidya, Sikshak Sangh, (2006) 2 SCC 545, held that it is now well known, the rule of estoppel has no application where contention as regards a constitutional provision or a statute is raised.. Section 13-B itself gives liberty for second thought to the parties. The consent must continue during the interregnum period and after this period the parties should again confirm their consent before the Court. As held by Supreme Court in various cases cited above, the parties can withdraw their consent during this period. As such Rule of estoppel has no application in a petition under Section 13-B of the Act.
Case :- MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 7414 of 2015
Petitioner :- Ashish Kumar Srivastava
Respondent :-Smt. Ankita Srivastava
Hon'ble Ram Surat Ram (Maurya),J.
Dated;Order Date :- 8.4.2016

טענת ההשתק (Estoppel)
שימשה פעמים רבות את המשפט הישראלי על מנת לחייב מזונות בן זוג או מזונות ילדים, גם במקרים שבהם לא היה חיוב מכח החוק.

כידוע, היום ישנו חיוב אי שיווני בעליל על אבות יהודים (גילאי 0-6) ועל אבות מוסלמים (גילאי 0-18) בכל הקשור למזונות ילדים.

תיזת מאמר זה היא ששימוש בטענת ההשתק יאפשר לאבות לטעון שהאם מנועה מלטעון את טענת החיוב האבסולוטי מכח הדין הדתי ברוב המכריע של המקרים. דבר זה יביא יותר צדק לפתחו של בית המשפט לענייני משפחה, ומשם אולי המגמה תחלחל גם לבתי הדין הרבניים.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3151771

"    Using Arkansas insurance law with an outlined suggested by Spencer Kimball's classic insurance law text, this article provides a basic primer in insurance contract law. It summarizes high points in several law review articles published on a range of basic insurance law topics. The annotation includes state-specific updates to the articles, with a national application but with a focus on Arkansas state law. The article is marked by running commentary and organization by the editor that places primary insurance law principles in context. The article is a compilation effort by a teacher of insurance law and her students, with a table of contents and focused guidance for additional reading."

What was formerly ‘tried’ by the method of force or the mechanical following of form is now tried by the method of reason. Thayer At the start of Shakespeare's Richard II Bolingbroke and Mowbray, Duke of Norfolk, are called before the King ‘to appeal each other of high treason’. Each of the disputants is anxious to defend his honour and to prove the other a traitor in the lists. Before they come before him, Richard asks Gaunt if this dispute is based on ancient malice or ‘worthily, as a good subject should, on some known ground of treachery in him’. Gaunt replies that, ‘as near as I could sift him on the argument’, there is no inveterate malice, but apparent danger to the King. Richard responds: Then call them to our presence; face to face And frowning brow to brow, ourselves will hear The accuser and the accused, freely speak. Only after they have had their say and Richard and others have failed to persuade them to make up, does he reluctantly agree to let … your swords and lances arbitrate The swelling difference of your settled hate. They reassemble at Coventry ready for battle, but the King intervenes at the last moment to stop the fight and to banish both disputants, a classic example of a disastrous attempt at peaceful dispute-settlement. We need not here concern ourselves with the detailed accuracy of Shakespeare's account of the proceedings, nor with whether this mode of dispute-settlement can appropriately be said to have involved a ‘trial’, political or otherwise.

In Thorner v Major, the House of Lords upheld the proprietary estoppel claim of a Somerset farmer who had worked without pay on his cousin’s farm on the strength of oblique assurances that he would inherit the property. The decision raises complex issues relating to the requirement of a representation in the law of proprietary estoppel. In addition, Thorner is of wider significance in that it appears to indicate a retreat from the restrictive approach to proprietary estoppel favoured by the House of Lords in Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd v Cobbe in 2008. However, in Thorner, Lord Scott did not explicitly resile from the views he had expressed in Cobbe and, in fact, made certain observations on the relationship between proprietary estoppel and ‘the remedial constructive trust’ which appear likely to create further confusion.

In Chapter 10 of the Tale of Genji entitled Sakaki or "the Sacred Tree," Retired Emperor Kiritsubo passes away, apparently without realizing that Prince Reizei, the heir apparent to the throne, is not his son, but is a son of Genji. In recent years, technological progress in DNA testing has undermined the foundation of such blissful ignorance to a significant extent. Interestingly, however, this does not mean that a "child" is deprived of his or her legal status as a child whenever it is established that he or she is actually not a child of the "parent." Under what circumstances, then, should a putative child, after being discovered not to be a biological child of the putative parent, be nevertheless legally treated as his or her child? This article will first introduce two cases, one from the United States and the other from Japan, both of which address this important question, and explain what happened in each case. It will then compare the requirements to be met in order for a non-biological, non-adoptive parent-child relationship to be formally recognized under each law. This discussion will show that, although there are a number of distinctions between U.S. and Japanese case law, parenthood that is not based on a genetic connection and which is different from adoption is occasionally considered legitimate in both countries, and that the recognition of such a parent-child relationship can be seen as an example of how significant one's intent and another person's reliance on that intent are in each legal culture. The emphasis on intent and reliance in this context is best understood as a reflection of modern legal consciousness, which generally attaches great importance to personal autonomy. An individual is deemed to be capable of making a well-considered, rational decision for himself or herself; accordingly, the law holds him or her responsible when another individual has reasonably relied on his or her statement. This individualistic image of family relations may have multiple implications for the future of family law, especially as it relates to issues concerning bioethics and law, such as gestational surrogacy.

This paper analyses the various roles which expectation could play in relation to the determination of proprietary estoppel remedies. It argues, by a process of eliminating the various alternatives, that the only appropriate role for expectation is as a cap on a remedy determined on the basis of other factors. The first possible approach to be analysed is that the remedy would invariably be determined by reference to the expectation. It is pointed out that this runs into difficulties in the context of countervailing benefits and also requires a willingness, in certain cases, to grant a remedy which is disproportionate to the detriment suffered by the claimant. The second approach, supported by Jennings v Rice [2002] EWCA Civ 159, is that the fulfillment of the expectation should be the prima facie remedy, to be granted unless such a remedy would be disproportionate to the detriment suffered by C. The paper argues that such an approach does not stand up to close scrutiny and leads to demonstrably illogical results. It then looks at the possibility of treating the expectation as one factor in the determination of the remedy, as appears to be advocated by Gardner; the possibility of regarding the fulfilment of the expectation as a proxy for erasing the detriment, as argued by Robertson; and the possibility of linking the expectation and the detriment by reference to a bargain, as suggested by Robert Walker LJ in Jennings v Rice. By way of conclusion, some observations are offered in respect of the possible future development of equity's approach to proprietary estoppel remedies.