Republic of the Philippines

San Sebastian College of Recolletos - Surigao

Surigao City

EJECTMENT CASE

FINAL REQUIREMENT
FOR LEGAL WRITING

SUBMITTED TO:

Atty. SALVADOR VIRTUDAZO ACEDILLA

SUBMITTED BY:

GONZALES, CHRISTINE MENLOVE L.

LACHICA, PRINCE WINSTON
REY, MARIA JOSELYN C.
SUMAYLO, JASON MANUEL H.
JD-1

August 10, 2020

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS
COVER PAGE 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS 2
COMPLAINT AFFIDAVIT 3
ANNEX “A” - CONTRACT OF LEASE 6
ANNEX “B” - DEMAND LETTER 12
ANNEX “C” - CERTIFICATE TO FILE ACTION 13
SUMMON 14
COUNTER - AFFIDAVIT 16
DIRECT EXAMINATION 18
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT DECISION 22
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DECISION 26
COURT OF APPEALS 27

2
 Republic of the Philippines
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
Branch 3

Surigao City, Surigao del Norte

MICHAEL SCOFIELD,

Plaintiff,
Civil Case No. 20-20
For: EJECTMENT

              -versus-

THEODORE BAGWELL,
Defendant.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -/

COMPLAINT

          PLAINTIFF, by counsel, and unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully

allege: -THAT-

1.   Plaintiff is of legal age, Filipino, with residence and postal address

at Purok Camia, Nueva Extension, Brgy. Taft, Surigao City where
he may be served notices and other court processes;

2.   Defendant is of legal age, Filipino, with residence and postal address

at Purok 4 Proper Canlanipa, Surigao City, where he may be
served summons and other court processes;

3.   Plaintiff is the absolute owner and lessor of that certain townhouse

situated at Block 17 Lot 17 Phase 2 Ceniza Heights Subdivision,
Brgy. Cagniog, Surigao City and now leased and occupied by the
Defendant;

4.   The Defendant leases and occupies the said townhouse from March
1, 2015 until February 28, 2020 as agreed upon between the plaintiff
and the Defendant in the lease contract executed on March 1, 2015
under the express obligation to pay a monthly rental of
P20,000.00; (Contract of Lease attached as Annex “A”)

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 5.   The lease contract of the Defendant for the occupation of the
building has been terminated on February 28, 2020 and has not been
renewed or extended;

6.   During the course of the Defendant’s occupation of the said

townhouse, Defendant has failed to pay his rentals for the months of
June 2019 to February 2020;

7.   Defendant has continued to occupy the said townhouse

notwithstanding the fact that her contract of lease has been
terminated on February 28, 2020 thus depriving the plaintiff from
having the said townhouse leased by other persons;

8.   Several demands to vacate was made by plaintiff to Defendant, both

oral and written (Demand letter attached as Annex “B”), but
Defendant refused to vacate the said townhouse and return
possession to the plaintiff;

9.   Until now Defendant still refuses to vacate and restore possession

and pay her rentals for the months June 2019 to February 2020
during her occupation of the townhouse;

10.       Thus, Defendant is unlawfully withholding possession of the

subject townhouse from the plaintiff despite last and final demand, to
the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff;

11.       Before filing of this complaint, the dispute has been referred to

the Lupong Tagamayapa of Surigao City but the parties failed to
arrive at an amicable settlement; (Certificate to File Action attached
as  Annex “C”)

PRAYER

          WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this

Honorable Court that after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered in
favor of Plaintiff:

1.   For the restitution of the abovementioned townhouse;

2.   For the payment of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (PhP180,000.00)

PESOS, representing the arrears of rent now overdue;

3.   To pay the costs for this suit.

Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed
for.

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Surigao City, Philippines, June 1, 2020.

GONZALES LAW OFFICE

Counsel for Plaintiff
Parkway Bldg., Km. 3 Brgy. Luna,
Surigao City, Surigao del
Norte

By:

Atty. Christine Menlove L. Gonzales

Roll No.: 123456
PTR No: 78910
IBP No.: 2468
MCLE Compliance No.: 11111

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ANNEX “A”
CONTRACT OF LEASE

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

            This Contract of Lease executed and entered into by and between:

 MICHAEL SCOFIELD, Filipino, of legal age, married, with residential

address at Purok Camia, Nueva Extension, Brgy. Taft, Surigao
City, Philippines, hereinafter referred to as the ‘LESSOR’

                                                                  And

          THEODORE BAGWELL, Filipino, of legal age, married, with residential

address at Purok 4 Proper, Brgy. Canlanipa, Surigao City, Philippines,
hereinafter referred as the “LESSEE’

TERMS AND CONDITIONS

1. PREMISES- LESSOR hereby leases to LESSEE and LESSEE hereby leases

from LESSOR approximately 443.03 square meters more or less of total
land area, as is improvement, Door 2, situated in Block 17 Lot 17 Phase
2 Ceniza Heights Subdivision, Brgy. Cagniog, Surigao City which shall be
referred to as the “Premises”.

2. USE OF THE PREMISES- The Lease is for the purpose of operating a

commercial or retail business which the corporation is engaged in.
The LESSEE, at his own expense may put up improvements upon prior
consultation and written approval of the LESSOR within the premises
hereby leased for the purpose of storage, retail, wholesale and
commercial in nature and not for any purpose whatsoever. It is being
expressly agreed that if, at any time during the existence of this lease
and without the previous written consent of the LESSOR, the said
premises are used for the purposes other than what is stated,
the LESSOR has the option of either terminating the lease or collecting

6
 increased rental as deemed appropriate from the date of diversion of
use of the premises or to compel the LESSEE to stop the unapproved
activity.

3. TERM OF THE LEASE- The term of this Lease Contract is for a period
of five (5) years, renewable for an unspecified duration at terms
mutually agreeable to both parties, commencing on March 1, 2015 and
ending at midnight of February 28, 2020, In case of pre-termination by
the lessee, for any reason whatsoever, the LESSOR has the right to
collect any remaining rentals corresponding to the unexpired portion of
the LEASE period, or until such time a new LESSEE comes.

This LEASE shall not be deemed extended or renewed beyond the

period time above-mentioned for any cause or reason whatsoever and
unless the parties agree in writing to extend or renew or enter into a
new Contract to Lease upon such terms and conditions acceptable to
them, the possession of the Premises by the LESSEE or any persons
claiming rights through the LESSEE, after the expiration of the term
thereof, shall be illegal.
            Any renewal or extension of this Contract must be expressly
agreed upon by the LESSOR and LESSEE in writing and under no
circumstances can such renewal or extension be considered as having
made impliedly.
            For this purpose, the LESSEE shall notify the LESSOR to the
latter’s office in writing, of this intent to renew or extend the Contract at
least sixty (60) calendar days prior to the expiration of the Leased
period, or any extension or renewal thereof, provided, however, that the
notice as aforesaid does not in any way vest unto the LESSEE the right
to demand for such extension or renewal of the Lease Period or any
renewal or extension thereof.

4. RENT- The monthly rental shall be scheduled as follows, inclusive of

the twelve percent (12%) Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT)
adjustable corresponding to the subsequent and substantial tax policy
changes by the local or national government, with an escalation of five
(5) percent after two (2) years as illustrated below. All payments must
be made only through cash/check. Without necessity of demand, the
LESSEE shall pay the monthly rental within the first five (5) days of each
calendar month, at the office of the LESSOR.

SCHEDULE OF RENTAL RATES

15th Day of the Month  Php. 20,000.00 / Month

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 a)    PENALTIES- Payment made after the said date shall be subject to a
penalty charge of 5% per month.

b)    WITHOLDING TAX- The LESSEE shall furnish the LESSOR with the

original and two copies of its certificate of creditable income tax
withheld at source BIR Form 2307, not later than 5 days after the end
of each month. Failure to submit the documents shall authorize
the LESSOR to automatically add amount to the billing.
c)    BOUNCING CHECKS- Issuance of checks with no sufficient funds for
three (3) instances shall compel the LESSEE as having pre
terminated the contract and as such the security deposit shall be
considered forfeited in favor of the LESSOR.
d)    NON-PAYMENTS OF RENTS- Failure of the LESSEE to pay the
rentals herein agreed upon for two (2) consecutive months shall be
ground for termination of this Contract of Lease and upon which the
LESSEE obligates itself to vacate and clear the premises in such
tenantable conditions without need of notice from LESSOR.

5. SECURITY DEPOSIT and ADVANCE- upon signing of the Contract of

Lease, the LESSEE shall make a Three (3) months deposit and Three
(3) month advance rental in the total amount of Sixty Thousand
Pesos (Php 60,000.00)   Philippine Currency for the full and faithful
performance of each and every term, provision, covenant, and condition
of this lease, except that said deposit shall not constitute or substitute
payment of any rent.

The deposit, which is non-interest bearing, shall remain intact during

the entire term of this lease and shall not be applied as payment for any
monetary obligations of the LESSEE under this contract, and shall be
refunded to the LESSEE upon completion of the lease.
a)         The amount deposited shall answer for any unpaid accounts of
the LESSEE at the expiration of the contract as well as for any
damages which the LESSOR or any of its employees, agents or
guests might suffer by reason of the wrongful acts or actuation,
negligence, and or malfeasance of the LESSEE. It shall not be
applied to pay for the last months of occupancy of the premises.
b)     Any unappropriated  amount of such deposit shall be
refundable to the LESSEE within sixty (60) days from the
termination of the contract.
c)         In the event that the LESSEE terminates its contract before its
term expires, the deposit shall be deemed forfeited and

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 refundable, regardless of the reason for its pre-termination and
whether a sixty-day notice was given or not.
d)         The LESSEE shall pay an advance payment equivalent and
applicable to the twelve (12) months with post dated check
dated every 15th of the month of the lease starting May 15,
2020 or 75 days after signing of contract. The one (1) month
advance rental is applicable on the 12th month of the year of
contract. Subsequent post-dated check payments shall be
collected by the LESSOR on an annual basis on the first month
of the next subsequent year.

6. SUBLEASE AND OR TRANSFER OF RIGHTS- The LESSEE shall not

directly or indirectly assign, sublease, sell, transfer, convey, mortgage,
demolish or in any manner dispose of or encumber its right under the
contract in whole or in part or any interest thereto be conferred on
anyone.

7.    RIGHT TO INSPECT LEASED PREMISES- The LESSOR or its authorized

agent shall, by previous notice to the LESSEE, have the right to enter the
leased premises at any reasonable hour of the day to examine the leased
premises.
8.  CARE OF THE LEASED PREMISES- The LESSEE shall examine the
Leased Premises before taking possession thereof, and LESSEE’s entry
into possession shall constitute conclusive evidence or admission by
the LESSEE that as of the date thereof, the said Premises were in  good
order and satisfactory tenantable condition. The LESSEE hereby binds
itself to keep and maintain the same in such condition as a prudent
person shall do under the circumstances, ordinary wear and tear
expected. The LESSEE shall at its own expense, improve and maintain
the Leased Premises clean and free from rubbish and dirt at all times,
store all trash and garbage in proper containers and not burn any trash
and garbage in or about the Leased Premises or anywhere within the
Premises.
9.    SECURITY & SANITATION- The LESSOR shall ensure the security of
the premises and provide a security guard for the whole commercial
establishment where the leased premises are located. The LESSOR must
also ensure regular collection of garbage through the barangay garbage
collector or any private entity which shall be to the account of LESSOR.
The LESSOR also agrees to make the septic tank of the leased premises
bigger in order to accommodate more waste volume in anticipation of
more customers using the toilet.
10.  INSURANCE TAKEN BY THE LESSEE- The LESSEE shall be required to
insure at his own account any LESSOR approved permanent structure
or structures constructed within the premises with the LESSOR as co-
benefactor against fire or total loss of property. The LESSEE although

9
 not required, is also allowed and authorized to insure its own property
taken inside the leased premises, provided that the LESSOR shall be
notified in advance of any and all kinds of insurance over the property
therein.

11.  BUSINESS PERMITS, TAXES, AND COMPLIANCE AND GOVERNMENT

REGULATIONS- The LESSEE shall be responsible for securing all the
necessary governments permits and licenses for the operation of its
business and all costs thereof shall be its sole account. Copies of the said
permits and licenses or any renewal date thereof shall be furnished to
the LESSOR not later than fifteen (15) days from the start of
the LESSEE’s business and every renewal date thereof as required by
law.
12.  INTRODUCTION OF PERMANENT IMPROVEMENTS- No permanent
or fixed improvements shall be introduced by the LESSEE on the leased
premises unless with prior written consent and approval of the LESSOR.
Any such permanent structures, if approved and allowed, shall be upon
the option of the LESSOR registered under the co-ownership of
both LESSEE and LESSOR. Furthermore, the LESSEE shall bear the full
cost of the annual real estate taxes of such structures until expiry of
lease contract and full cost of transfer of ownership to LESSOR upon
termination of contract;
13.  UTILITIES AND SERVICES- The LESSEE shall be responsible for the
installation and maintenance costs of its own electric current,
telephone, water, security and other utility services in the Leased
Premises for the duration of the lease. The LESSEE shall also clear all
accounts with all concerned utility companies upon pre-termination or
expiration of contract.
14.  REVISION OF LEASE CONTRACT- Both parties may revise this lease
contract after six (6) months to one (1) year in the event that LESSEE
assigns the business with a newly-registered business name.

LESSOR:                                                                                LESSEE:

MICHAEL SCOFIELD                                                THEODORE BAGWELL

                                                                          
         
Signed in the presence of:

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LINCOLN BURROWS                    BRAD BELLICK

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the Cities and Province of
Surigao del Norte this 1st of March 2015 at Surigao City personally
appeared.

Name                                 ID/Comm. Tax Cert. No.                  Date & Place

MICHAEL SCOFIELD     PRC ID/123 01/01/15-SURIGAO CITY

THEODORE BAGWELL   COMPANY ID/456 02/01/15-SURIGAO CITY

Known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed

the foregoing Contract of Lease consisting of 7 pages including this page of the
acknowledgement and they acknowledge to me that the same is their free and
voluntary act and deed.

WITNESS MY HAND AND NOTARIAL SEAL on the date and in the place
first above written.

Atty. Christine Menlove L. Gonzales

Roll No.: 123456
PTR No: 78910
IBP No.: 2468
MCLE Compliance No.: 11111

Doc No. 1;

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Page No. 2;
Book No. 3;
Series of 2015.

ANNEX “B”

Purok Camia, Nueva Ext., Brgy. Taft, Surigao City

May 1, 2020

Theodore Bagwell

Purok 4 Proper Canlanipa, Surigao City

Dear Theodore Bagwell,

Re: Blk17 Lot17 Phase 2 Ceniza Heights, Brgy. Cagniog, Surigao City

Formal demand for overdue rent.

I am writing to advise you that it appears from my records that your rent is
currently overdue as follows:

Outstanding Rent: [June 2019 - February 2020]

Due: [May 15, 2020]

I therefore kindly request that the outstanding balance be paid immediately.

I take this opportunity to advise you that unpaid arrears could result in court
action being taken against you.

If the arrears are not cleared, an application could be made for possession of
the property, for which you may become liable for legal costs.

If you would like to discuss this matter, please contact me urgently.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

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Yours faithfully,

Michael Scofield

ANNEX “C”

Republic of the Philippines

City of Surigao

Barangay Cagniog

MICHAEL SCOFIELD,

(Complainant) Barangay Case No. 50

For: EJECTMENT
              -against-

THEODORE BAGWELL,
(Respondent)

CERTIFICATE TO FILE ACTION

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT:

1. _____________ There has been a personal confrontation between

parties before the Punong Barangay but mediation failed;

2. _____________ The Punong Barangay set the meeting of the parties for
the constitution of the Pangkat;

3. ______x______ The respondent willfully failed and/ or refused to

appear without justifiable reason at the conciliation proceedings before
the Pangkat, and;

4. ______x______ Therefore, the corresponding complaint for the dispute

may now be filed in court. NO SETTLEMENT HAS BEEN MADE.

Therefore, the corresponding complaint for the dispute may now

be filed in court.

This 30th day of May, 2020 at Barangay Cagniog Lupon

Tagapamayapa Office, Surigao City.

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 Fernando Sucre
Pangkat Chairman

Alexander Mahone John Abruzzi

Pangkat Secretary Pangkat Kagawad

Republic of the Philippines

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
Branch 03

Surigao City, Surigao del Norte

MICHAEL SCOFIELD

Plaintiff,
Civil Case No. 20-20
For: EJECTMENT

              -versus-

THEODORE BAGWELL
Defendant.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -/

SUMMONS

TO: THEODORE BAGWELL

Purok 4 Proper, Canlanipa
Surigao City 8400

GREETINGS:

You are hereby required, within ten (10) from receipt of this Summons,
to file with this Court and serve on plaintiff, your verified Response to the
attached Statement of Claim. The form of the required Response is attached
hereto.

You are required to submit with your Response certified copies of

14
documents as well as affidavits of any witness to stand as your evidence in
this case. You must present the original document/s on the day of hearing.

A motion to dismiss is prohibited and shall not be entertained. Any

ground for dismissal should be included in your Response.

Your failure to respond within the 10-day period AND TO APPEAR AT

THE HEARING OF THIS CASE will authorize the Court to render judgment.

Witness my hand under the seal of this Court, this 11th day of June,

2020, at Surigao City, Philippines.

ATTY. PRINCE WINSTON LACHICA

BRANCH CLERK OF COURT

NOTE: FOR INQUIRIES, CALL TEL. # 086 826-9258

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 Republic of the Philippines
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
Branch 03

Surigao City, Surigao del Norte

MICHAEL SCOFIELD

Plaintiff,
Civil Case No. 20-20
For: EJECTMENT

              -versus-

THEODORE BAGWELL
Defendant.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -/

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT
(In re: Summon, Received on June 12, 2020 )

The DEFENDANT THEODORE BAGWELL, by counsel, respectfully states:

I. ANSWER

1. Paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Complaint are admitted.

2. Paragraph 5 is denied, the impression of automatic renewal of the
contract is assumed.
3. Paragraphs 6 and 7 are denied for there was an understanding
between Plaintiff’s brother, Mr. Lincoln Burrows, to allow the

16
 defendant to skip the monthly payments of rentals and instead issue
a promissory note.
4. Paragraphs 8 to 10 are denied for lack of knowledge and sufficient to
form a belief that the demands are communicated. The new oral
agreement are they can still stay in the premises as long as there is
no new lessee.

II. SPECIAL AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

5. The title to and ownership in fee simple over the subject property is
in the name of Dr. Sara Tancredi, its registered owner, and not the
plaintiff.
6. The alleged Deed of Conditional Sale between the GSIS and the
plaintiff is not annotated on the title on the property.
7. Although Dr. Tancredi has given the plaintiff the right of possession
of the property under Par. 4 of the Conditional Sale, the plaintiff
knew or was supposed to know or was deemed by law to be
obligated to know and to investigate the fact that at the time of her
purchase of the property, the xxx Family were in possession of the
property and that it had a vested, beneficial and equitable right
thereto by reason of Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed in
1975 between its original purchaser
8. The defendant had answered the demanded letter, dated xxx 2011, of
the plaintiff through a letter, dated xxx 2011, of defendant’s counsel,
a copy of which is attached as Annex “4” hereof. It requested
plaintiff’s lawyer for a special conference to discuss a serious
extrajudicial compromise, without admission of guilt on the part of
the defendant. It was not formally answered by the plaintiff.

III. COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM

9. By reason of the abuse of right committed by the plaintiff and by

reason of the instant precipitate and unfounded suit, the defendant
was constrained to hire the services of a lawyer to defend his rights
and interests for a professional fee of P20,000.00 plus P3,000.00 per
court appearance;
10. Similarly, the plaintiff’s unfounded suit has caused the defendant
mental anguish and suffering and public humiliation and
embarrassment, for which the defendant claims moral damages of
P100,000.00.

IV. PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the

parties be given ample time to reach an amicable settlement before the Surigao
City Mediation Center; and that in case of a failure thereof, and after trial, the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and the defendant’s compulsory

17
counterclaim be granted.

The defendant respectfully prays for such and other reliefs as may be
deemed just and equitable in the premises.

Surigao City, June 15, 2020

SUMAYLO AND CO. LAW OFFICES

Counsel for Defendant
804 Nueva Extension
Brgy. Taft, Surigao City 8400

ATTY. JASON MANUEL H. SUMAYLO

Republic of the Philippines

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
Branch 03

Surigao City, Surigao del Norte

MICHAEL SCOFIELD

Plaintiff,

Civil Case No. 20-20

For: EJECTMENT
              -versus-

THEODORE BAGWELL
Defendant.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -/

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF MICHAEL SCOFIELD

APPEARANCES? ATTY. SUMAYLO for the Prosecution honor, we are ready

your honor.

May we call to the witness stand, the complainant, MICHAEL SCOFIELD.

Gonzales: (administering the oath to the witness)

Q. Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth and nothing but the whole truth
before this Honorable Court?

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A. Yes, I do.
Q: Please state your name, age, nationality and residence.
A: I am Michael Scofield, 25 years old, Filipino and a resident of Purok
Camia, Nueva Extension, Brgy. Taft, Surigao City.

1. Q: How are you Michael?

A: I am fine, sir.
2. Q: Do you know is Theodore Jose?
A: Theodore is Theodore Bagwell, the accused in this case sir.
3. Q: Is Theordore Bagwell present in this courtroom today?
A: Yes, sir.
4. Q: Can you point Theodore Bagwell to us?

A: Yes, sir. That is Theodore Bagwell. [pointing to accused]

[ Your honor, may the record reflect that the witness pointed to the accused,
Theodore, as the Theodore Bagwell he was referring to.
Proceed.]

5. Q: Why do you know him?

A: He is my tenant.

6. Q: What do you mean tenant?

A: He leases and occupies my townhouse.

7. Q: How long have he been staying?

A: 5 years as agreed upon.
8. Q: You mentioned being he did not pay rentals since June 2019 to
February 2020?
A: Yes, sir.
9. Q: When do you think he was not able to pay?

A: I am not sure sir. He did not mention anything.

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10. Q: You mentioned that he did not vacate the area even after
several attempts of informing him?

A: Yes, sir.

11. Q: Can you tell us what happened last February 28, 2020?
A: I tried to inform him personally to vacate the area for he was not
able to pay the rent for 8 months from June 2019 to February 2020
because someone else will be occupying the place.
12. Q: And then what happened?
A: He still refused to vacate the place sir even after several
attempts of informing him and I’ve been informing him orally and
made written demands as to his actions. I have tried my best to
inform him but he refused to so I let the new people to occupy the
place.
13. Q: What did he tell you after?
A: He said “Bayaran nako ang kadtong walo ka bulan pahawaa lang
ang uban.”
14. Q: And then what is your reply?
A: I said, pay me the rent and leave this place or vacate this place.
15. Q: What did Theodore said?
A: I will still not leave this area.
16. Q: How did you feel after what happened?
A: I was really mad and said I will file a case against him for
illegally occupying the place.
17. Q: What happened then?
A: I leave and went back home and call my attorney.
18. Q: Mr. Witness, do you remember having executed a lease of
contract?
A. Yes sir.
19. Q. If such contract will be shown to you, will you be able to
recognize it?
A. Yes sir.

20
 20. Q. I am showing you this contract consisting of 3 pages, please
examine if this is the contract you mentioned. (Is this the one….?)
A. Yes sir, this is the one.
21. Q. On page 3 of your affidavit, there is a signature impressed
above the name Michael Scofield, whose signature is it?
A. Mine sir.

[ we respectfully request your honor, that the name and signature of the
witness be marked and bracketed as our exhibit “__”.]

22. Q. Likewise, on the same page, there is a signature impressed

above the name ATTY. Sumaylo, whose signature is that?
A. Your signature sir.
23. Q. In prosecuting this case, as stated in this affidavit, you have
engaged the services of a private lawyer, do you confirm this?
A. Yes sir.
24. Q. How much did you contract with his services?
A. At least Php20,000 professional fee plus Php3,000 per
appearance as reflected on the Prayer for his appearances.
25. Q. In filing this case, you incurred expenses and asking for
damages as stated in your affidavit?
A. Yes sir.
26. Q. Will you affirm and confirm the contents of your affidavit are
true and correct?
A. Yes sir.
27. Q: Do you have anything else to say to this honorable court?
A: Yes. I hope that this court sees it just to make Theodore Bagwell
pay for everything he did.

[PROS: Thank you Mr. Michael. That is all your honor. I have no more
questions.]

21
Republic of the Philippines
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
Branch 3

Surigao City, Surigao del Norte

MICHAEL SCOFIELD, herein

Represented by CHRISTINE MENLOVE L. GONZALES,

Plaintiff,

CIVIL CASE NO. 20-20

-versus-

FOR

THEODORE BAGWELL., EJECTMENT

Represented by JASON MANUEL H. SUMAYLO,

Defendants.

x----------------------------------------------------------x

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DECISION

This is an action for Ejectment tried under the Summary Rule.

Before this court with Prayer for Payment of One Hundred Eighty
Thousand Pesos (180,000) representing the arrears of rent now overdue
and for the Restitution of that certain townhouse situated at Block 17
Phase 2 Ceniza Heights Subdivision, Brgy. Cagniog, Surigao City now
leased and occupied by the defendant filed by the lessor Michael Scofield,
seeking for a favorable judgement from the damages and prejudice
thereof, signed and promulgated on July 20, 2020, by respondent.
Plaintiff Scofield is the absolute owner and lessor of the townhouse
aforementioned. Several demands to vacate were made by him to the
defendant, both in oral and writing. But defendant refused to vacate the
said townhouse and return possession to the plaintiff.
Defendant Bagwell, leases and occupies the said townhouse from
March 1, 2015 to February 28, 2020 as agreed in a lease contract executed
on March 1, 2015. The lease contract for the occupation of the building has
been terminated on February 28, 2020 and has not been renewed or
extended.
During the course of the occupation of the said townhouse, defendant
has failed to pay his rentals for the month of June 2019 to February 2020.
However, Defendant continued to occupy the said townhouse
notwithstanding the fact that the contract of lease has been terminated.
Finding that a complaint was filed on June 1, 2020 with the Contract of
Lease attached as Annex “A” and a Demand letter attached as Annex “B,
with Certificate to File Action attached as Annex “C”. The Defendant is
unlawfully withholding possession of the subject townhouse from the
plaintiff despite last and final demand, to the damage and prejudice of the
plaintiff.
Respondent THEODORE BAGWELL filed an Answer on July 2020 and
by counsel, respectfully states that the impression of automatic renewal of
the contract is assumed; and that there was an understanding between
Plaintiff’s brother, Mr. Lincoln Burrows, to allow the defendant to skip the
monthly payments of rentals and instead issue a promissory note.
Accordingly there was lack of knowledge and insufficiency to form a belief
that the demands are communicated. Also that the new oral agreement is
invalid and that the defendant can still stay in the premises as long as
there is no new lessee.
As a defense, Respondent assailed that the admission of the title to and
ownership in fee simple over the subject property, is in the name of Dr.

23
Sara Tancredi, its registered owner, and not the plaintiff, which was
inadvertently not attached as part of the said exhibits, which the Court
granted.
The alleged Deed of Conditional Sale between the GSIS and the plaintiff
is not annotated on the title of the property. Although Dr. Tancredi has
given the plaintiff the right of possession of the property under Par. 4 of
the Conditional Sale, the plaintiff knew or was supposed to know or was
deemed by law to be obligated to know and to investigate the fact that at
the time of her purchase of the property, the xxx Family were in
possession of the property and that it had a vested, beneficial and
equitable right thereto by reason of Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
executed in 1975 between its original purchaser. The defendant had
answered the demanded letter, dated xxx 2011, of the plaintiff through a
letter, dated xxx 2011, of defendant’s counsel, a copy of which is attached
as Annex “4” hereof. It requested plaintiff’s lawyer for a special conference
to discuss a serious extrajudicial compromise, without admission of guilt
on the part of the defendant. It was not formally answered by the plaintiff.
On the same day or on July_____ 2020, the legal counsel of THEODORE
BAGWELL requested for photocopies of all pleadings, orders, and notices
in the record of the case at bar. On July ___ 2020, a Direct Examination was
held. Thus, this case presented in this honorable court for a decision to be
rendered.
Moreover, the court agrees with the Plaintiff that the Defendant is
unlawfully withholding possession of the subject townhouse from the
plaintiff.
Notwithstanding, that a titled property even under a rightful owner not
the plaintiff, still and all Dr. Tancredi has given the plaintiff the right of
possession of the property under Par. 4 of the Conditional Sale. It found
that the occupants had a contract of lease pertaining to the aforesaid
townhouse, with the plaintiff himself and not with the said Dr. Tancredi. In
which the defendant is bound to the terms and conditions they both
agreed upon.
Hence, On the basis of the foregoing, the court finds that the complaint
is valid and meritorious.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered IN FAVOR of the Plaintiff

[MICHAEL SCOFIELD] and against the [occupant] and ordering the latter
to peacefully vacate the townhouse in question situated at Block 17 Phase
2 Ceniza Heights Subdivision, Brgy. Cagniog, Surigao City.

The [occupant] are further ordered to pay the following, to wit:

24
 The amount of P180,000.00 for arrears of rent overdue as reasonable
monthly compensation for the use of the property of [MICHAEL
SCOFIELD] also including the amount from the date of the filing of the
complaint until [the occupant] shall have actually vacated and turned over
the townhouse of their possession to [MICHAEL SCOFIELD];

The amount of P20,000.00 as litigation expenses and P20,000.00 as

reasonable attorney[']s fees; and

The cost of suit.

Counterclaims of the [occupant] are hereby ordered DISMISSED for

lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
Surigao City,
July 31, 2020

Atty. Maria Joselyn C. Rey

Presiding Judge

Copy furnished:

1. MICHAEL SCOFIELD, plaintiff

2. THEODORE BAGWELL, defendant
3. Atty. CHRISTINE MENLOVE L. GONZALES
4. Atty. JASON MANUEL H. SUMAYLO

25
 RTC

26
 Republic of the Philippines
COURT OF APPEALS
Manila
Special Eleventh (11th) Division

THEODORE BAGWELL., CA-G.R. SP No.

126173

Petitioner, Members:
DICDICAN, I.
P.,Chairperson,
-versus- *REYES-CARPIO,
A. and
PAREDES,
V. I. A.,JJ.
MICHAEL SCOFIELD,. Promulgated:

Respondent. August 10, 2020

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PAREDES, J.:

27
 The Case

THIS IS A PETITION FOR REVIEW filed by petitioner THEODORE

BAGWELL which seeks to annul and set aside the Order2 dated April 27,
2012, granting the application of respondent MICHAEL SCOFIELD, petitioner
below, for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 20-
20 for Referral to Arbitration and Injunction with prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and TRO, and the Order dated July 13, 2012, which, inter alia,
denied THEODORE BAGWELL motion for partial reconsideration and affirmed
the grant of the writ of preliminary injunction, both issued by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 30, Surigao City (the “court a quo”).

THE ANTECEDENTS

On April 27, 2012, Judge Cleto R. Villacorta III (JudgeVillacorta) of the

court a quo issued an Order disposing of the pending incident regarding the
application of MICHAEL SCOFIELD for a writ of preliminary injunction, as
follows:

WHEREFORE, petitioner [now, respondent] MICHAEL

SCOFIELD’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction is
granted in part. Upon the posting by petitioner and approval by this
Court of a bond in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(100,000), executed to respondent [now, petitioner] to the effect
that petitioner will pay this amount to THEODORE BAGWELL for
damages it may sustain by reason of this injunction if this Court
should finally decide that petitioner is not entitled to it, issue the
writ of preliminary injunction prayed for.

For the duration of this case before this Court until a decision is
reached, respondent [now petitioner] THEODORE BAGWELL, its
subsidiaries, officials, employees, agents and other third-parties
are restrained from committing any act tending to wrest control
and/or possession of the said Property, i.e. townhouse situated at
Block 17 Phase 2 Ceniza Heights Subdivision, Brgy. Cagniog,
Surigao City, or portions thereof, from petitioner, including any
forceful occupation and/or ejectment from the leased premises
and/or award of the rights in the Property to a new entity.

SO ORDERED.

28
The parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the court a
quo's disposition, which were resolved 5 in the July 13, 2012 Order of Judge
Cecilia Corazon Dulay- Archog (Judge Archog),thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered:

a) Petitioner's (MICHAEL SCOFIELD) “Urgent Motion to Resolve

the Petition to Compel Arbitration” is granted. THEODORE BAGWELL is
directed to submit itself to the pending arbitration proceeding
docketed as PDRCI Case No.60-2012.

b) Petitioner's (MICHAEL SCOFIELD) “Motion for Partial

Reconsideration of the 27 April 2012 Order” is granted in part only with
respect to dispensing with the pre-trial and trial in this case. As to the
injunctive relief per Order dated April 27, 2012 mandating an injunction
bond in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS ONLY
(100,000.00), the same is affirmed. Petitioner is given thirty (30)
days from receipt of this Order to post the injunction bond for the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction; and

c) Respondent's (THEODORE BAGWELL) “Motion for Partial

Reconsideration dated May 23, 2012 is denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

MICHAEL SCOFIELD alleges that as early as the second year of their contract,
THEODORE BAGWELL already manifested its inability to sustain its financial
obligations such that it asked MICHAEL SCOFIELD to defer payment of the
annual rentals for March 1, 2015 to February 28, 2020. Thereafter, a schedule
for installment payment of the rentals for March 2015 to February 2020, was
made. However, THEODORE BAGWELL still delayed the payment of its lease
rentals claiming force majeure. THEODORE BAGWELL refused to
acknowledge the reason for the delay; this, too, was violated by MICHAEL
SCOFIELD. MICHAEL SCOFIELD emphasizes that, aside from its default in the
payment of lease rentals, THEODORE BAGWELL committed other breaches of
its contract:

(a) operation in violation of the Building Code and squatting in the

townhouse; (b) unsanitary activities within the area

Thereafter, MICHAEL SCOFIELD served a written notice/demand to

29
 arbitrate. On the same day, MICHAEL SCOFIELD filed a complaint against
THEODORE BAGWELL before the Philippine Dispute Resolution Center, Inc.
(PDRCI) for the amendment of certain provisions of the Lease Agreement, or
in the alternative, the rescission of the Lease Agreement. On January 24,
2012, MICHAEL SCOFIELD filed with the Surigao City Regional Trial Court an
Urgent Verified Petition for the Issuance of Interim Relief by way of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and to Compel to Arbitrate. The case was raffled to
RTC-Branch 7 and docketed as Civil Case No. 7561-R. Meanwhile, the
Executive Judge of RTC Surigao City issued a 72-hour TRO against
THEODORE BAGWELL, which was extended by RTC-Branch 7 for another 17
days. The parties were scheduled to be heard on the matter of the
application for preliminary injunction of THEODORE BAGWELL. At the
hearing on February 27, 2012, the parties agreed to maintain the status quo
to allow the judge to resolve the pending incident, and the parties were
directed to submit their respective memoranda. At the hearing set on April
18, 2012, the presiding judge of RTC-Branch 7, Judge Tabora, inhibited
herself; and the case was re-raffled on April 26, 2012 to RTC-Branch 6, the
court a quo, presided over by Judge Villacorta. On April 27, 2012, Judge
Villacorta issued the assailed Order granting MICHAEL SCOFIELD application
for a writ of preliminary injunction. On April 30, 2012, the court a quo issued
a Notice of pre-trial scheduled on June 1, 2012. On July 13, 2012, the court a
quo issued the second assailed Order denying THEODORE BAGWELL's
motion for partial reconsideration, directing THEODORE BAGWELL to
arbitrate, and affirming the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction.

Hence, MICHAEL SCOFIELD's petition for review with the grounds rose, as
follows:

1. THEODORE BAGWELL COMMITTED INCURABLE MATERIAL BREACHES

OF ITS CONTRACT WITH MICHAEL SCOFIELD AND THEREFORE HAS NO
CLEAR OR POSITIVE RIGHT TO REMAIN IN POSSESSION OFTHE LEASED
PROPERTY.

2. THERE IS NO MATERIAL OR SUBSTANTIAL INVASION OF THEODORE

BAGWELL RIGHTS TO BE ENJOINED.

3. THERE IS NO URGENT NECESSITY FOR THE WRIT. THEODORE BAGWELL

WILL NOT SUFFER ANY GRAVE OR IRREPARABLE INJURY IF INJUNCTION IS
NOTGRANTED.

4. IT IS MICHAEL SCOFIELD THAT IS SUFFERING GRAVE AND IRREPARABLE

30
INJURY FROM THEODORE BAGWELL CONTINUING POSSESSION OF THE
LEASE PROPERTY WITHOUT PAYMENT OF RENT.

The Issue

At the heart of this petition is the issue of whether or not the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by Judge Villacorta and affirmed by Judge
Archog, is with basis.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is not meritorious.

MICHAEL SCOFIELD filed the petition for preliminary injunction as a main

case pursuant to Section 14 of RA 876 or the “Arbitration Law” which,
provides as follows:

SECTION 14. Subpoena and Subpoena Duces Tecum. — Arbitrators shall

have the power to require any person to attend a hearing as a witness.
They shall have the power to subpoena witnesses and documents when
the relevancy of the testimony and the materiality thereof has been
demonstrated to the arbitrators. Arbitrators may also require the
retirement of any witness during the testimony of any other witness. All of
the arbitrators appointed in any controversy must attend all the hearings
in that matter and hear all the allegations and proofs of the parties; but an
award by the majority of them is valid unless the concurrence of all of
them is expressly required in the submission or contract to arbitrate. The
arbitrator or arbitrators shall have the power at any time, before
rendering the award, without prejudice to the rights of any party to
petition the court to take measures to safeguard and/or conserve any
matter which is the subject of the dispute in arbitration (Underscoring
supplied).

Petitioner questions the Orders of the court a quo on the ground that
MICHAEL SCOFIELD failed to meet and prove the requirements for the grant
of preliminary injunction, i.e. (1) applicant must have a clear and
unmistakable right to be protected that is a right in esse; (2) there is a
material and substantial invasion of such right; (3) there is an urgent need for
the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and (4) there is no
other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction
of irreparable injury.

MICHAEL SCOFIELD resorted to the court for the grant of an interim

measure in arbitration, the requirements of which are elaborated in Section
28 of Republic Act 9285 or the “Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004”,

31
which provides, that:

SECTION 28. Grant of Interim Measure of Protection.--

(a) It is not incompatible with an arbitration agreement for a party to

request, before constitution of the tribunal, from a Court an interim
measure of protection and for the Court to grant such measure. After
constitution of the arbitral tribunal and during arbitral proceedings,
a request for an interim measure of protection, or modification
thereof, may be made with the arbitral tribunal or to the extent that
the arbitral tribunal has no power to act or is unable to act
effectively, the request may be made with the Court. The arbitral
tribunal is deemed constituted when the sole arbitrator or the third
arbitrator, who has been nominated, has accepted the nomination
and written communication of said nomination and acceptance has
been received by the party making the request.

(b) The following rules on interim or provisional relief shall be

observed:

(1)Any party may request that provisional relief be granted against

the adverse party.

(2)Such relief may be granted

(I) To prevent irreparable loss or injury;

(ii) To provide security for the performance of any obligation;

(iii) To produce or preserve any evidence; or

(iv) To compel any other appropriate act or omission.

(3) The order granting provisional relief may be conditioned upon the
provision of security or any act or omission specified in the order.

(4) Interim or provisional relief is requested by written application

transmitted by reasonable means to the Court or arbitral tribunal as the case
may be and the party against whom the relief is sought, describing
inappropriate detail the precise relief, the party against whom the relief is
requested, the grounds for the relief, and the evidence supporting the request.

(5) The order shall be binding upon the parties.

(6) Either party may apply with the Court for assistance in implementing or
enforcing an interim measure ordered by an arbitral tribunal.

32
(7) A party who does not comply with the order shall be liable for all
damages resulting from noncompliance, including all expenses, and
reasonable attorney's fees, paid in obtaining the order's judicial enforcement.

In granting the preliminary injunction, Judge Villacorta reasoned that

THEODORE BAGWELL will suffer grave and irreparable injury should
MICHAEL SCOFIELD be allowed to take over the leased premises before the
resolution of their dispute in arbitration. The court a quo stated that the
issues arose due to MICHAEL SCOFIELD's act of not giving THEODORE
BAGWELL a chance to remedy its alleged breaches of the RMOA and the notice
of termination required in their agreement. Based on this finding, the court a
quo ruled that THEODORE BAGWELL has a clear right to invoke judicial action
prior to its being ejected in the leased premises, pertinent discussion on the
matter reads, thus:

I believe that the injury to be sustained by petitioner [now respondent]

unless THEODORE BAGWELL is restrained would be both grave and
irreparable. The amount of damages cited in its request for arbitration is
for the rescission (or resolution) of the lease contract after arbitration
proceedings. Here, there are yet preliminary issues to be settled, which
would become moot if THEODORE BAGWELL were to take over the Leased
Property at once. For instance, what happens to the opportunity to correct
breaches, before a unilateral take-over can proceed? What price can one
tag if these requisites were violated, if such violation were to occur and be
proved? What about the referral to arbitration? When a party contests
the existence of an alleged breach, is that not a dispute or a controversy
that should be brought to arbitration for resolution and relief? If the take-
over were to happen now, before answers to these questions are reached,
what standard of compensation can this Court use to determine with
reasonable accuracy the amount to be given? Will it only be petitioner's
losses? Balancing the interests involved, it is best to enjoin any act that
would give rise, or even so tend, to these uncertainties.

Petitioner asserts that MICHAEL SCOFIELD has not established a clear

right and an irreparable injury for the grant of preliminary injunction.
Respondents asserts that under the agreement, it has the right to enforce the
same considering that THEODORE BAGWELL has been in breach of their
agreement and in this manner suffers for the failure to fulfill its obligations,
specifically, pay rentals to MICHAEL SCOFIELD. We agree with petitioner.

In the case of Heirs of Melencio Yu vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, the

matter of the issuance of a preliminary injunction was again explained, as
follows:

33
 A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action
or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a
court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It may
also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it
shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. To justify the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, it must be shown
that: (1) the complainant has a clear legal right; (2) such right has been
violated and the invasion by the other party is material and substantial;
and (3) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse,
or a right which is merely contingent and may never arise since, to be
protected by injunction, the alleged right must be clearly founded on or
granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. As this Court opined in
Dela Rosa v. Heirs of Juan Valdez:

A preliminary mandatory injunction is more cautiously regarded

than a mere prohibitive injunction since, more than its function of
preserving the status quo between the parties, it also commands the
performance of an act. Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction is justified only in a clear case, free
from doubt or dispute. When the complainant's right is doubtful or
disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is improper.

While it is not required that the right claimed by applicant, as basis

for seeking injunctive relief, be conclusively established, it is still
necessary to show, at least tentatively, that the right exists and is not
vitiated by any substantial challenge or contradiction. Thus, a
preliminary mandatory injunction should only be granted "in cases of
extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where considerations
of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant's favor; where
there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right against his
protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one; and
where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to re-establish
and maintain a pre-existing continuing relation between the parties,
recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to
establish a new relation. In the case at bar, the court a quo, in granting
the preliminary injunction, held that MICHAEL SCOFIELD's right to the
issuance of the injunction stemmed from the questions of whether
THEODORE BAGWELL deprived MICHAEL SCOFIELD of its right to
receive a notice of termination and a chance to remedy its alleged
breaches of contract. To the mind of this Court, the questions being
pointed out by the court a quo do not establish the willful and unlawful

34
invasion of MICHAEL SCOFIELD's right which is to be remedied by a
writ of preliminary injunction. THEODORE BAGWELL asserts that it
acted pursuant to their agreement and this renders naught MICHAEL
SCOFIELD's assertion of a violation of its right. MICHAEL SCOFIELD
does not have a right in esse to remedy its breaches of contract as: (1)
it is precisely the issue to be resolved in arbitration; and (2) a contract
is basically consensual, and there must be a meeting of the minds or an
agreement from the parties thereto. Hence, its “right” is, truly, merely a
proposal subject to an agreement from THEODORE BAGWELL.

Secondly, the court a quo's ruling that MICHAEL SCOFIELD will

suffer grave, irreparable injury because as it is, the damages that it will
suffer can only be determined after the issues are resolved in
arbitration, does not fall under the requirement of grave and
irreparable injury contemplated for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction. The lack of clarity of MICHAEL SCOFIELD's allegations that
it will suffer grave and irreparable injury is apparent because the court
a quo has to pose questions as to what damage MICHAEL SCOFIELD
will suffer in the event that an injunction is not issued. Stated
otherwise, MICHAEL SCOFIELD has not positively shown that it will
suffer grave and irreparable injury so much so that the court a quo had
to speculate on the damages MICHAEL SCOFIELD will suffer if the writ
is not issued.

Finally, the records of the case reveal that the factual allegations of
the parties already refer to the merits of the controversy between
them, which is the alleged breach of their RMOA. These issues are best
threshed out in the appropriate arbitration proceedings. Verily, the
trial court must not delve into the primary issues raised in the main
action in the hearing for the issuance of an injunctive writ. The grant of
an injunctive writ, being an ancillary remedy, which could result in a
premature resolution of the case – or will grant the principal objectives
of the parties - before the merits can be passed upon, is proscribed, and
the prayer for the relief will be properly denied.

It bears emphasis that the parties in this case have been directed to
submit their controversy to arbitration, with due stress on the policy of
the Supreme Court to encourage arbitration as an alternative method
of dispute resolution for, as decided in Home Bankers Savings and
Trust Company v. Court of Appeals and Far East Bank & Trust Co.,
Inc.17, that: Aside from unclogging judicial dockets, it also hastens
solutions especially of commercial disputes. The Court looks with
favor upon such amicable arrangement and will only interfere with

35
 great reluctance to anticipate or nullify the action of the arbitrator.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. The

Order dated April 27, 2012, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, while the Order
dated July 13, 2012, both of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Surigao City in
Civil Case No. 20-20, is AFFIRMED with modification that the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction is declared void and, therefore, LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

VICTORIA ISABEL A. PAREDES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ISAIAS P. DICDICAN AGNES REYES-CARPIO Associate Justice

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified

that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

36
 ISAIAS P. DICDICAN

Associate Justice Chairperson,

Special Eleventh Division

37