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While some take Gadamer’s Truth and Method to be a departure from epistemological questions and concerns, author Carolyn Culbertson reads Gadamer’s work as offering a valuable reflection on the nature of understanding—one that is deeply... more
While some take Gadamer’s Truth and Method to be a departure from epistemological questions and concerns, author Carolyn Culbertson reads Gadamer’s work as offering a valuable reflection on the nature of understanding—one that is deeply resonant with the recent social turn in epistemology. Like social epistemologists, Gadamer worries about the epistemic irresponsibility that we encourage when we treat an attitude of objectivity, wherein the inquirer lacks any awareness of their social and historical situation, as an epistemic ideal. Like social epistemologists too, Gadamer argues that understanding that one is socially and historically situated does not mean believing that one is fated to simply repeat traditional ideas without critique or modification—a concern frequently raised in response to critiques of Enlightenment epistemology. By developing such parallels, Gadamer and the Social Turn in Epistemology offers seasoned readers of Gadamer a new context in which to appreciate his discussion of understanding in Truth and Method and readers unfamiliar with Gadamer a productive point of access into his major work.
Words Underway offers the first full account of the important contributions the Continental tradition has made to the philosophy of language. The book examines the vital work of a range of thinkers, including Heidegger, Gadamer, Blanchot,... more
Words Underway offers the first full account of the important contributions the Continental tradition has made to the philosophy of language. The book examines the vital work of a range of thinkers, including Heidegger, Gadamer, Blanchot, and Kristeva. In it, I argue that Continental theorists are particularly helpful in recognizing our unique potential for becoming alienated from some discourse. At the same time, I argue that Continental philosophy of language tends not to treat the alienated relationship to language as something absolute. For most Continental theorists, at least, language is a living system, that is, a system maintained by undergoing constant expansion and transformation by language users. The book goes on to explore the attention Continental theorists have given to the way that forms of political power, for example gender dynamics in communication, can sometimes thwart this process and thus reinforce alienation. This book will transform the reader’s sense of what the philosophy of language is about and will attract the attention of students and scholars of both philosophy of language and the Continental tradition.
This chapter presents Gadamer's conception of language and of its role in the process of understanding. The chapter begins by explaining what Gadamer means when he says that language is characterized by an essential "self-forgetfulness"... more
This chapter presents Gadamer's conception of language and of its role in the process of understanding. The chapter begins by explaining what Gadamer means when he says that language is characterized by an essential "self-forgetfulness" [Selbstvergessenheit] and how this relates to his account of the fore-structure of the understanding. Next, it explains what it means to conceive of a linguistic presentation (e.g., a poem or a lecture) as a hermeneutic event and
This chapter presents a conception of understanding where understanding emerges out of the joint experience of conversation. On this conception, understanding requires more than the pre-reflective acquisition of shared social meanings – a... more
This chapter presents a conception of understanding where understanding emerges out of the joint experience of conversation. On this conception, understanding requires more than the pre-reflective acquisition of shared social meanings – a conception of understanding historically highlighted by existential phenomenologists. Beyond this, it requires what occurs in genuine conversation, namely, that one put one’s pre-reflective social meanings at risk in the process of critical self-reflection. Drawing from the hermeneutic phenomenology of Hans-Georg Gadamer, I argue that conversation is that joint experience that gives rise to such critical self-reflection and that it is conversation’s play-structure in particular that makes it a source of understanding in this sense.
This article takes up the work of Judith Butler in order to present a vision of ethics that avoids two common yet problematic positions: on the one hand, the skeptical position that ethical norms are so constitutive of who we are that... more
This article takes up the work of Judith Butler in order to present a vision of ethics that avoids two common yet problematic positions: on the one hand, the skeptical position that ethical norms are so constitutive of who we are that they are ultimately impossible to assess and, on the other hand, the notion that we are justified in our commitment to any ethical norm that appears foundational to our identity. With particular attention to the trajectory of Butler’s project from The Psychic Life of Power to Giving an Account of Oneself, the article discusses the shortcomings of these two positions and the virtues of the alternative account that Butler develops during this period.
In Rinrigaku, Watsuji Tetsurō criticizes Martin Heidegger's Being and Time for taking as its starting point the standpoint of the individual “I.” For Watsuji, this “I” is an abstraction, and starting from it leads the phenomenologist to... more
In Rinrigaku, Watsuji Tetsurō criticizes Martin Heidegger's Being and Time for taking as its starting point the standpoint of the individual “I.” For Watsuji, this “I” is an abstraction, and starting from it leads the phenomenologist to neglect the more fundamental standpoint of the person who is deeply engaged in social activities. In this paper, I explain that Watsuji's criticism is helpful in shedding light on Heidegger's failure to connect hermeneutic phenomenology to ethics in Being and Time. In particular, it is helpful in understanding the shortcomings of Heidegger's account of authenticity, which in Being and Time is juxtaposed with Dasein's immersion in social relations. I go on to argue, however, that Heidegger had made a more significant connection between hermeneutic phenomenology and ethics earlier, in his 1924 Marburg lectures on Aristotle (Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy), where his treatment of being-with-one-another resonates with Watsuji's later account of betweennness (aidagara).
In cases of depression where linguistic meaning has collapsed, there is good reason to believe that a long-term strategy for recovery must include rehabilitating the depressive person's capacity for meaningful speech. This requires that... more
In cases of depression where linguistic meaning has collapsed, there is good reason to believe that a long-term strategy for recovery must include rehabilitating the depressive person's capacity for meaningful speech. This requires that the patient participate actively in interpreting her own pain. In this essay, I argue that medical diagnosis can tempt patients, particularly women, to circumvent this process of interpretation. To explain this danger, I draw on Julia Kristeva's clinical analyses of depression and recent studies on the correlation between depression and self-silencing.
This is a review of Johanna Oksala's 2016 book that I published in Human Studies, Volume 40 (2017).
This is the syllabus I designed for my Contemporary Moral Issues class in 2021 at FGCU.
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This is the syllabus I designed for my Philosophy of Art course at FGCU in 2020.
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This is the syllabus I designed for my Philosophy of Human Communication course at FGCU in 2019.
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This is the syllabus I designed for my Ancient Philosophy course at FGCU in 2020.
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This is the syllabus I designed for my Feminist Philosophy course at FGCU in 2019.
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