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    Tonny Lybek

    This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards (or monetary policy committees) across countries. We discuss the possible determinants of a board’s size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined... more
    This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards (or monetary policy committees) across countries. We discuss the possible determinants of a board’s size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards
    Several emerging market central banks in Europe deployed asset purchase programs (APPs) amid the 2020 pandemic. The common main goals were to address market dysfunction and impaired monetary transmission, distinct from the quantitative... more
    Several emerging market central banks in Europe deployed asset purchase programs (APPs) amid the 2020 pandemic. The common main goals were to address market dysfunction and impaired monetary transmission, distinct from the quantitative easing conducted by major advanced economy central banks. Likely reflecting the global nature of the crisis, these APPs defied the traditional emerging market concern of destabilizing the exchange rate or inflation expectations and instead alleviated markets successfully. We uncover some evidence that APPs in European emerging markets stabilized government bond markets and boosted equity prices, with no indication of exchange rate pressure. Examining global and domestic factors that could limit the usability of APPs, in the event of renewed market dysfunction we see a potential scope for scaling up APPs in most European emerging markets that used APPs during the pandemic, provided that they remain consistent with the primary objective of monetary policy and keep a safe distance from the risk of fiscal dominance. As central banks in the region move towards monetary policy tightening, the tapering, ending, and unwinding of APPs must also be carefully considered. Clear and transparent communication is critical at each step of the process, from the inception to the closure of APPs, particularly when a large shock hits and triggers a major policy shift.
    This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards (or monetary poliy committees) across countries. We discuss the possible determinants of a board’s size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined... more
    This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards (or monetary poliy committees) across countries. We discuss the possible determinants of a board’s size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards.
    This paper argues that better governance practices can reduce the costs, risks and uncertainty of financial intermediation. Our sample covers high-, middleand low-income countries before and after the global financial crisis (GFC). We... more
    This paper argues that better governance practices can reduce the costs, risks and uncertainty of financial intermediation. Our sample covers high-, middleand low-income countries before and after the global financial crisis (GFC). We find that net interest margins of banks are lower if various governance indicators are better. More cross-border lending also appears conducive to lower intermediation costs, while the level of capital market development is not significant. The GFC seems not to have had a strong impact except via credit risk. Finally, we estimate the size of potential gains from improved governance. JEL Classification Numbers: A13, G21, G38, K42
    The International Monetary Fund (IMF) supports central bank autonomy and accountability, since it facilitates price and financial sector stability, which are conducive to sustainable economic growth. In the literature, autonomy is... more
    The International Monetary Fund (IMF) supports central bank autonomy and accountability, since it facilitates price and financial sector stability, which are conducive to sustainable economic growth. In the literature, autonomy is sometimes preferred to the frequently used term independence, as autonomy entails operational freedom, while independence indicates a lack of institutional constraints. A central bank must have clearly defined and prioritized objectives, sufficient authority to achieve these objectives and be autonomous to remain credible. At the same time, it must be accountable for the authority delegated to it to ensure checks and balances. Reforming the legislative framework for a central bank—often after a crisis—can help boost the credibility of monetary policy. This reduces the perceived inflation bias and thus the real interest rate, which advances sustainable economic growth. However, a consistent reform of the legislative framework must be supported by commitment...
    Abstract This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers... more
    Abstract This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments,and to further debate.
    ... development of parallel markets, which led to the hoarding of foreign currencies. ... economic policy management and performance were undermined, thereby adversely affecting real incomes ... These reforms were designed to replace... more
    ... development of parallel markets, which led to the hoarding of foreign currencies. ... economic policy management and performance were undermined, thereby adversely affecting real incomes ... These reforms were designed to replace direct instruments with indirect instruments of ...
    Research Interests:
    Macroprudential policy in Europe aligns with the objective of limiting systemic risk, namely the risk of widespread disruption to the provision of financial services that is caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system... more
    Macroprudential policy in Europe aligns with the objective of limiting systemic risk, namely the risk of widespread disruption to the provision of financial services that is caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system and that can cause serious negative consequences for the real economy.
    ... development of parallel markets, which led to the hoarding of foreign currencies. ... economic policy management and performance were undermined, thereby adversely affecting real incomes ... These reforms were designed to replace... more
    ... development of parallel markets, which led to the hoarding of foreign currencies. ... economic policy management and performance were undermined, thereby adversely affecting real incomes ... These reforms were designed to replace direct instruments with indirect instruments of ...