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There are a number of reasons to think that one of Kant’s concerns in the Critique of Pure Reason is with the active role the mind must play in organizing the sensory input to enable us to experience objects, and therefore that he thinks... more
There are a number of reasons to think that one of Kant’s concerns in the Critique of Pure Reason is with the active role the mind must play in organizing the sensory input to enable us to experience objects, and therefore that he thinks that something like what is now called perceptual binding is necessary for us to be presented with perceptual particulars. Given the centrality of the notion of synthesis in the Critique, as well as Kant’s claim that synthesis governed by the categories is needed for us to have what he calls ‘relation to an object’, it might be thought that Kant’s notion of synthesis is where we should look for Kant’s account of something like perceptual binding. The aim of this chapter is to argue that this is not the case, and that synthesis plays a much higher-level role in Kant’s account.
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Abstract This paper examines the idea that forgiveness requires, either for its existence or for its justification, the meeting of moral and epistemic conditions which show that resentment is no longer warranted. I argue that this idea... more
Abstract This paper examines the idea that forgiveness requires, either for its existence or for its justification, the meeting of moral and epistemic conditions which show that resentment is no longer warranted. I argue that this idea results in over-intellectualizing and over-moralizing forgiveness, and in failing to accommodate its elective nature. I sketch an alternative account, which appeals to the differences between emotions and beliefs, and the idea that we have more rational optionality with respect to emotions.
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As a result of his central concern with a priori and universal conditions of the possibility of various human phenomena, Kant is sometimes thought not to be concerned with moral psychology, much less empirical, embodied moral psychology,... more
As a result of his central concern with a priori and universal conditions of the possibility of various human phenomena, Kant is sometimes thought not to be concerned with moral psychology, much less empirical, embodied moral psychology, and he is often taken to be disproportionately focused on a priori, ideal features of agency, such as the a priori conditions of practical reason. In contrast, this chapter explores Kant’s detailed account of the flawed nature of actual human agents. He takes all actual human agents to be deeply and systematically flawed, frail, corrupt, opaque to ourselves and often seriously self-deceived and disunified, and arguably takes this to follow from or be part of our situatedness (since it is something we are born into and arises at least partly out of relating to others), as well as from his account of the a priori commitments of practical reason.
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My aim in this chapter is to characterize the change of heart that plays a role in forgiveness—in giving up warranted blaming reactive attitudes. I present this in the context of developing a Kantian account of what forgiveness is and why... more
My aim in this chapter is to characterize the change of heart that plays a role in forgiveness—in giving up warranted blaming reactive attitudes. I present this in the context of developing a Kantian account of what forgiveness is and why we need it, drawing on his moral psychology to characterize the relevant change of heart. I appeal in particular to Kant’s account of human frailty and its relation to his account of human evil. I argue that it is frail and flawed agents who lack an entirely fixed and stable character for whom forgiveness is a live option and a need. For such agents, there may be space to interpret us in the light of better willing than our wrongdoing indicates.
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This is an edited collection devoted to the topic of the role of animals within Kant’s philosophy. It addresses key issues within both his theoretical and practical philosophy. It examines the place of Kant’s model of animal minds in the... more
This is an edited collection devoted to the topic of the role of animals within Kant’s philosophy. It addresses key issues within both his theoretical and practical philosophy. It examines the place of Kant’s model of animal minds in the historical and contemporary contexts. It addresses the question of whether Kant’s philosophy of mind allows for animals to be capable of intentional representations of spatiotemporal objects. It explores how Kant treated the issue of animal nature as it manifests in humans and non-humans alike and questions how Kant’s scientific theory attempted to accommodate animals within his broader Enlightenment worldview. It also addresses traditional worries about the moral status of animals within Kant’s and Kantian moral theory. Kant notoriously denied that we have direct obligations to animals, and the question persists as to whether Kantian moral theory provides the right account of the moral status of non-human animals. Several papers in this collection ...
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This is an edited collection devoted to the topic of the role of animals within Kant’s philosophy. It addresses key issues within both his theoretical and practical philosophy. It examines the place of Kant’s model of animal minds in the... more
This is an edited collection devoted to the topic of the role of animals within Kant’s philosophy. It addresses key issues within both his theoretical and practical philosophy. It examines the place of Kant’s model of animal minds in the historical and contemporary contexts. It addresses the question of whether Kant’s philosophy of mind allows for animals to be capable of intentional representations of spatiotemporal objects. It explores how Kant treated the issue of animal nature as it manifests in humans and non-humans alike, and questions how Kant’s scientific theory attempted to accommodate animals within his broader Enlightenment worldview. It also addresses traditional worries about the moral status of animals within Kant’s and Kantian moral theory. Kant notoriously denied that we have direct obligations to animals, and the question persists as to whether Kantian moral theory provides the right account of the moral status of non-human animals. Several papers in this collection...
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In this paper I respond to Fricker’s paradigm-based account of forgiveness, which aims to integrate two seemingly different versions of responses to wrongdoing—conditional forgiveness (what Fricker calls ‘Moral Justice Forgiveness’) and... more
In this paper I respond to Fricker’s paradigm-based account of forgiveness, which aims to integrate two seemingly different versions of responses to wrongdoing—conditional forgiveness (what Fricker calls ‘Moral Justice Forgiveness’) and unconditional forgiveness (what Fricker calls ‘Gifted Forgiveness’)—into one explanatory order, as well as, she argues, showing the second to be derivative and parasitic on the basic functioning of the first, and more contingent. My aim is to endorse and draw on Fricker’s paradigm-based strategy and the way it enables us to present a unified account, to endorse her view that both gifted and conditional forgiveness are versions of one loosely unified phenomenon, but to argue for the reverse account of the order of conceptual priority. I will argue that gifted forgiveness is the paradigm, and that once we understand what it is and its role we can see why and how forgiveness also makes sense as something offered in response to a wrongdoer’s remorse, but...
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Abstract After a long period of comparative neglect, in the last few decades growing numbers of philosophers have been paying attention to the startling contrast presented between Kant’s universal moral theory, with its inspiring... more
Abstract After a long period of comparative neglect, in the last few decades growing numbers of philosophers have been paying attention to the startling contrast presented between Kant’s universal moral theory, with its inspiring enlightenment ideas of human autonomy, equality and dignity and Kant’s racism. Against Charles Mills, who argues that the way to make Kant consistent is by attributing to him a threshold notion of moral personhood, according to which some races do not qualify for consideration under the categorical imperative, I argue that Kant cannot be made consistent on race, and that rather than trying to make him so, we should use the example of Kant’s racism to tell us something about the nature of racism. I argue that Kant’s own moral philosophy and moral psychology in fact give some materials for thinking about his racism, and about racism.
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In 'Freedom and Resentment,' Strawson argues that we cannot separate holding people morally responsible for their actions from specific emotional responses, which he calls reactive attitudes, which we are disposed towards in... more
In 'Freedom and Resentment,' Strawson argues that we cannot separate holding people morally responsible for their actions from specific emotional responses, which he calls reactive attitudes, which we are disposed towards in response to people's actions. Strawson's ...
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Interpretations of Kant's transcendental idealism have been dominated by two extreme views: phenomenalist and merely epistemic readings. There are serious objections to both of these extremes, and the aim of this paper is to develop a... more
Interpretations of Kant's transcendental idealism have been dominated by two extreme views: phenomenalist and merely epistemic readings. There are serious objections to both of these extremes, and the aim of this paper is to develop a middle ground between the two. In the Prolegomena, Kant suggests that his idealism about appearances can be understood in terms of an analogy with
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Research Interests: Sociology, Philosophy, Kant, African Philosophy, Poverty, and 12 moreEgalitarianism, Disabilities, Race, Educational Inequality, Animals, Intelligibility, Epistemic Injustice, Hermeneutical injustice, Non Human Animals, The Philosophical Quarterly, Relational Egalitarianism, and Workplace Inequality
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Kant has a number of harsh-sounding things to say about beggars and giving to beggars. He describes begging as “closely akin to robbery” (6:326), and says that it exhibits self-contempt. In this paper I argue that on a particular... more
Kant has a number of harsh-sounding things to say about beggars and giving to beggars. He describes begging as “closely akin to robbery” (6:326), and says that it exhibits self-contempt. In this paper I argue that on a particular interpretation of his political philosophy his critique of giving to beggars can be seen as part of a concern with social justice, and that his analysis makes sense of some troubling aspects of the phenomenology of being confronted with beggars. On Kant's view, without absolute poverty relief, the poor persons' external freedom is subject to the arbitrary choices of those who have means. But the legitimacy of the state is based on ensuring that no one's basic freedom is subject to the arbitrary choices of another. This means that in a legitimate state public structures must ensure that there is unconditional poverty relief. Having your basic needs met through private charity wrongs you. Kant's analysis is that when you encounter someone in a...
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This paper compares Kant's transcendental idealism with three main groups of contemporary anti-realism, associated with Wittgenstein, Putnam, and Dummett, respectively. The kind of anti-realism associated with Wittgenstein... more
This paper compares Kant's transcendental idealism with three main groups of contemporary anti-realism, associated with Wittgenstein, Putnam, and Dummett, respectively. The kind of anti-realism associated with Wittgenstein has it that there is no deep sense in which our ...
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This paper argues that forgiveness is not best understood in terms of waiving a requirement of justice, and, specifically, that forgiveness is distinct from mercy. I question some reasons philosophers have given for distinguishing... more
This paper argues that forgiveness is not best understood in terms of waiving a requirement of justice, and, specifically, that forgiveness is distinct from mercy. I question some reasons philosophers have given for distinguishing forgiveness and mercy, but argue that the difference ...
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This paper argues that our primary concern in responding to wrongdoing should be distinct from our concern with the just distribution of wealth: retributive justice serves an important moral end that is independent of the promotion of... more
This paper argues that our primary concern in responding to wrongdoing should be distinct from our concern with the just distribution of wealth: retributive justice serves an important moral end that is independent of the promotion of welfare. I proceed by comparing retributive justice to restorative justice, because the latter offers a paradigm often aimed at replacing retributive justice, and
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(Online publication September 28 2011)
Research Interests: Philosophy and Kantian
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The last few years have seen dramatic progress in the development of HIV pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP). These developments have been met by ethical concerns. HIV interventions are often thought to be ethically difficult. In a context... more
The last few years have seen dramatic progress in the development of HIV pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP). These developments have been met by ethical concerns. HIV interventions are often thought to be ethically difficult. In a context which includes disagreements over human rights, controversies over testing policies, and questions about sexual morality and individual responsibility, PrEP has been seen as an ethically complex intervention. We argue that this is mistaken, and that in fact, PrEP does not raise new ethical concerns. Some of the questions posed by PrEP are not specific to HIV prophylaxis, but simply standard public health considerations about resource allocation and striking a balance between individual benefit and public good. We consider sexual disinhibition in the context of private prescriptions, and conclude that only unjustified AIDS-exceptionalism or inappropriate moralism about sex supports thinking that PrEP raises new ethical problems. This negative conclusion is significant in a context where supposed ethical concerns about PrEP have been raised, and in the context of HIV exceptionalism.
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A widely accepted explanation of the dramatically high rates of HIV infection in sub-Saharan Africa appeals to a supposedly distinct model of sexual partnering, referred to as 'multiple concurrent... more
A widely accepted explanation of the dramatically high rates of HIV infection in sub-Saharan Africa appeals to a supposedly distinct model of sexual partnering, referred to as 'multiple concurrent partnerships' or 'concurrency.' We discuss two problems with the concurrency explanation, and argue that it does not contribute to understanding the unusual rates of HIV infection in the region. We argue that there is no single 'concurrency hypothesis,' and the term 'concurrency' is imprecise and does not pick out an explanatorily distinct form of sexual behavior.
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... Langton offers a novel interpretation of Kant's distinction between things as they are in themselves and appearances. She argues that Kant's distinction is between two types of property: intrinsic and extrinsic properties.... more
... Langton offers a novel interpretation of Kant's distinction between things as they are in themselves and appearances. She argues that Kant's distinction is between two types of property: intrinsic and extrinsic properties. ... She leaves idealism out of Kant's position. ...
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All but two of the essays collected here were presented, in a previous incarnation, at a conference on equality at the University of Cape Town in August 2014. Cape Town, like most South African cities, is a site of extreme, highly visible... more
All but two of the essays collected here were presented, in a previous incarnation, at a conference on equality at the University of Cape Town in August 2014. Cape Town, like most South African cities, is a site of extreme, highly visible forms of inequality—as also of less visible, but no less insidious, forms. Several of the essays bear traces, in the examples offered and problems discussed, of this South African context. Philosophy cannot hope to solve the socio-political problem of inequality on its own. But it can attempt to articulate the variety of wrongful forms of inequality, and frame concepts, arguments and principles on which policy-makers and activists may constructively draw to address them. My thanks to the contributors, and to the two anonymous reviewers of the collection. Thanks also to Jana Hodges-Kluck, Della Vache, Kari Waters and Rachel Weydert at Lexington Books, and Anita Singh at Deanta Global Pubblishing Services, who oversaw the project with patience and ca...