Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Studies have documented a gender bias in intrahousehold resource allocations in developing countries. Combining a field experiment allocation task and a household survey conducted in Bangladesh, we examine the association between parental... more
Studies have documented a gender bias in intrahousehold resource allocations in developing countries. Combining a field experiment allocation task and a household survey conducted in Bangladesh, we examine the association between parental gender bias and investment in children’s health and education. The task was designed to circumvent the problem in which children’s education attainment and health status or parents’ expenditure on their children would affect allocation decisions; the outcome did not directly affect the subjects themselves or their own children. The task measures systematic bias arising possibly from sociocultural and religious norms. Biased parents allocate resources in a discriminatory manner. Boy-biased parents are more likely to enrol boys and to spend more on boys’ education. They are less likely to seek formal treatment and to spend less when a girl is sick. Girl-biased parents do not seem to differentiate between sons and daughters with respect to education o...
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Evidence suggests approximately 50% of givers are to some extent motivated by warm glow. The question remains, are these individuals giving to look good to themselves (self-image) or because they want to look good to others... more
Evidence suggests approximately 50% of givers are to some extent motivated by warm glow. The question remains, are these individuals giving to look good to themselves (self-image) or because they want to look good to others (social-image). Our design seeks to determine the importance of self- and social-image with respect to charitable giving.
We conduct a laboratory experiment to study the role of gender on social welfare outcomes in a strategic commitment game of incomplete information. In our baseline treatment, players simultaneously commit to either a Hawkish action, which... more
We conduct a laboratory experiment to study the role of gender on social welfare outcomes in a strategic commitment game of incomplete information. In our baseline treatment, players simultaneously commit to either a Hawkish action, which leads to a private payoff, or a Dovish action, which can enhance social welfare. We add a sequential and an endogenous move treatment, where in the former, the first mover is exogenously selected and in the latter, players self-select the order of play. The two additional treatments relax the commitment constraint for the second mover. We find that (i) social welfare is significantly improved in the last two treatments and (ii) the outcome in the endogenous move treatment is mainly driven by gender. Men are willing to play the risky Dovish action more often than women.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
An influential result in the literature on charitable giving is that matching subsidies dominate rebate subsidies in raising funds. We investigate whether this result extends to “unit donation” schemes, a popular alternative form of... more
An influential result in the literature on charitable giving is that matching subsidies dominate rebate subsidies in raising funds. We investigate whether this result extends to “unit donation” schemes, a popular alternative form of soliciting donations. There, the donors’ choices are over the number of units of a charitable good to fund at a given unit price, rather than the amount of money to give. Comparing matches and rebates as well as simple discounts on the unit price, we find no evidence of dominance in our online experiment: the three subsidy types are equally effective overall. At a more disaggregated level, rebates lead to a higher likelihood of giving, while matching and discount subsidies lead to larger donations by donors. This suggests that charities using a unit donation scheme enjoy additional degrees of freedom in choosing a subsidy type. Rebates merit additional consideration if the primary goal is to attract donors.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research on altruistic behaviour and associated anticipatory beliefs, as well as related gender differences, is limited. Using data from Chowdhury and Jeon, who vary a common show-up fee and incentivize recipients to anticipate the amount... more
Research on altruistic behaviour and associated anticipatory beliefs, as well as related gender differences, is limited. Using data from Chowdhury and Jeon, who vary a common show-up fee and incentivize recipients to anticipate the amount given in a dictator game, we find that the show-up fee has a positive effect on dictator-giving for both genders. While female dictators are more generous than males, male recipients anticipate higher amounts than the amount male dictators give. As the show-up fee increases, the female dictators become a more generous social type, whereas males do not show this effect. There is no gender difference in anticipation about dictator social type by the recipients.
Research Interests:
Parental bias toward children of a particular gender has been widely observed in many societies. Such bias could be due to pure gender preference or differences in earning opportunities and concern for old-age support. We conduct a... more
Parental bias toward children of a particular gender has been widely observed in many societies. Such bias could be due to pure gender preference or differences in earning opportunities and concern for old-age support. We conduct a high-stakes allocation task (subjects allocate the equivalent of one day's wages between male and female school-aged students) in rural Bangladesh to examine parental attitudes toward male and female children. Parents, either jointly or individually, allocated freely or restricted endowments for the benefit of anonymous girls or boys at a nearby school. We examine whether there is any systematic bias among fathers and mothers and, if so, whether such bias differs when they make the decision individually or jointly. The results suggest (1) bias both for and against boys or girls but no systematic bias by either parent; and (2) no significant differences in individual and joint decisions.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
ABSTRACT This paper revisits the experimental test of the warm glow giving hypothesis reported by Crumpler and Grossman (2008). In all treatments, each participant is presented with the opportunity to contribute from her own endowment to... more
ABSTRACT This paper revisits the experimental test of the warm glow giving hypothesis reported by Crumpler and Grossman (2008). In all treatments, each participant is presented with the opportunity to contribute from her own endowment to a charity of her choice. We use a 2x3 design to vary the choice set (give to charity or take from charity) and the source of the endowment (house money, earned endowment, or earned charity endowment). The experiment is designed so that a pure altruist has no incentive to donate or take. These design choices have been shown to reduce giving in dictator experiments. We find that giving persists when the endowment is earned, and when participants are given the option to take. The results are consistent with a warm glow motivation for giving.
ABSTRACT This paper revisits the experimental test of the warm glow giving hypothesis reported by Crumpler and Grossman (2008). In all treatments, each participant is presented with the opportunity to contribute from her own endowment to... more
ABSTRACT This paper revisits the experimental test of the warm glow giving hypothesis reported by Crumpler and Grossman (2008). In all treatments, each participant is presented with the opportunity to contribute from her own endowment to a charity of her choice. We use a 2x3 design to vary the choice set (give to charity or take from charity) and the source of the endowment (house money, earned endowment, or earned charity endowment). The experiment is designed so that a pure altruist has no incentive to donate or take. These design choices have been shown to reduce giving in dictator experiments. We find that giving persists when the endowment is earned, and when participants are given the option to take. The results are consistent with a warm glow motivation for giving.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
... impose uniformity with regard to many major state expenditure functions; and/or uniformity imposed by the Commonwealth Grants Commission's funding formulas ... ap-proach is that conditions in other countries may be... more
... impose uniformity with regard to many major state expenditure functions; and/or uniformity imposed by the Commonwealth Grants Commission's funding formulas ... ap-proach is that conditions in other countries may be sufficiently different as to negate their relevance to Australia. ...
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
ABSTRACT We conduct a field experiment in conjunction with a direct mail fundraising campaign to test the effect of different forms of subsidies – rebates or matching subsidies – on charitable donations. Previous studies cannot... more
ABSTRACT We conduct a field experiment in conjunction with a direct mail fundraising campaign to test the effect of different forms of subsidies – rebates or matching subsidies – on charitable donations. Previous studies cannot distinguish whether donors are aware of the offer of a subsidy: here donors must check a box on the pledge form in order to receive the subsidy, thereby identifying donors who ignored or rejected the offer. This allows more accurate estimates price elasticities of giving, and more valid comparisons to lab-generated data. We find that donors accept matching more often than rebate offers (73% vs. 39%), and that “checkbook” giving (not adjusting for subsidies) is higher for those who accept a subsidy offer. Match and rebate subsidies have similar effects on checkbook giving; therefore a matching subsidy has a much larger impact on total donations than an equivalent rebate subsidy.