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Everyday humour and laughter can tell us about children's ability to engage with and understand others. A group of 19 pre‐school children with autism and 16 pre‐school children with Down's syndrome, matched on non‐verbal mental... more
Everyday humour and laughter can tell us about children's ability to engage with and understand others. A group of 19 pre‐school children with autism and 16 pre‐school children with Down's syndrome, matched on non‐verbal mental age, participated in a cross‐sectional study. Parental reports revealed no group differences in overall frequencies of laughter or laughter at tickling, peekaboo or slapstick. However, in the autism group, reported laughter was rare in response to events such as funny faces or socially inappropriate acts, but was common in strange or inexplicable situations. Reported responses to others‘laughter also differed: children with autism rarely attempted to join in others’ laughter and rarely attempted to re‐elicit it through acts of clowning or teasing. Analysis of videotaped interactions also showed no group differences in frequencies of child or adult laughter. However, the children with autism showed higher frequencies of unshared laughter in interactive situations and lower frequencies of attention or smiles in response to others' laughter. Humour is an affective and cultural phenomenon involving the sharing of affect, attention and convention; children with autism show problems in some simple affective and mutual as well as joint attentional and cultural aspects of humorous engagement.
How does humor relate to culture? Some argue that comedy is much more dependent on cultural frames than is tragedy, as cultures vary enormously in their appreciation of attitudes toward playfulness. Humor may be so essential to culture... more
How does humor relate to culture? Some argue that comedy is much more dependent on cultural frames than is tragedy, as cultures vary enormously in their appreciation of attitudes toward playfulness. Humor may be so essential to culture that it is fundamental to the process of the culture in which it is embedded.
This volume explores in depth how infants - perhaps as young as three months - develop the capacity to appreciate, participate in, and create humor. Engagingly written, it synthesizes theories of humor, its subtle complexities, and why it... more
This volume explores in depth how infants - perhaps as young as three months - develop the capacity to appreciate, participate in, and create humor. Engagingly written, it synthesizes theories of humor, its subtle complexities, and why it exists despite seeming to have little survival value. Chapters trace the developing skills in the child’s interactions with parents and others, the roles of verbal and nonverbal behaviors in humor, and related phenomena including absurdity, funniness, laughter, teasing, and play. These diverse perspectives offer rich insights into how the human mind learns from its environment, why humor is funny, and what humor can tell us about being human. This singular text: - Reviews theories and findings on humor and its critical role in social behavior. - Analyzes the challenges of researching humor in infants and young children. - Differentiates among concepts and contexts of humor and playfulness. - Situates humor as a social-emotional as well as cognitive experience. - Details current research on humor in atypically developing children. - Examines the role of culture in humor. Humor in Infants is an essential resource for researchers, clinicians, and graduate students in developmental psychology, infant mental health, social psychology, cognitive science, and pediatrics.
Page 203. Chapter 7 Feeling shy and showing-off: Self-conscious emotions must regulate self-awareness Vasudevi Reddy This paper seeks a re-examination of the nature and development of self-conscious emotions. It argues ...
Laughter and its close cousin, humor, are unique and important mammalian responses that may have evolved to strengthen social bonds and thereby enhance survival. For human infants, laughter and humor appear in the first six months of life... more
Laughter and its close cousin, humor, are unique and important mammalian responses that may have evolved to strengthen social bonds and thereby enhance survival. For human infants, laughter and humor appear in the first six months of life and reveal their sensitivity to social and emotional cues, and their cognitive radar for incongruity. Understanding why infants engage in humorous interactions not only teaches us about infants, but about also about human experience in general.
Humor rises up between and among others. Caregivers’ earliest attempts to amuse infants involve wildly absurd, novel behavior paired with emotional cues that convey joy and safety. Infants’ earliest attempts to create humor follow suit.... more
Humor rises up between and among others. Caregivers’ earliest attempts to amuse infants involve wildly absurd, novel behavior paired with emotional cues that convey joy and safety. Infants’ earliest attempts to create humor follow suit. Before the end of the first year, infants tease and tell non-verbal “jokes”, revealing what they know about the social rules of engagement and the minds of those whom they amuse.
What are we to make of it when humor is missing, either in the environment or in the infant herself? Humorlessness may reveal a typical temperamental characteristic, an atypical developmental trajectory like that of the autism spectrum,... more
What are we to make of it when humor is missing, either in the environment or in the infant herself? Humorlessness may reveal a typical temperamental characteristic, an atypical developmental trajectory like that of the autism spectrum, or an environmental aberration like severe neglect.
A fundamental fact about human minds is that they are never truly alone: all minds are steeped in situated interaction. That social interaction matters is recognized by any experimentalist who seeks to exclude its influence by studying... more
A fundamental fact about human minds is that they are never truly alone: all minds are steeped in situated interaction. That social interaction matters is recognized by any experimentalist who seeks to exclude its influence by studying individuals in isolation. On this view, interaction complicates cognition. Here, we explore the more radical stance that interaction co‐constitutes cognition: that we benefit from looking beyond single minds toward cognition as a process involving interacting minds. All around the cognitive sciences, there are approaches that put interaction center stage. Their diverse and pluralistic origins may obscure the fact that collectively, they harbor insights and methods that can respecify foundational assumptions and fuel novel interdisciplinary work. What might the cognitive sciences gain from stronger interactional foundations? This represents, we believe, one of the key questions for the future. Writing as a transdisciplinary collective assembled from ac...
In this chapter I attempt to tease apart the meanings of various terms sometimes confusingly used in understanding the importance of second-person engagements in infant social cognition. Engagement itself may be a continuum rather than a... more
In this chapter I attempt to tease apart the meanings of various terms sometimes confusingly used in understanding the importance of second-person engagements in infant social cognition. Engagement itself may be a continuum rather than a category, may occur in a multiplicity of modes and dimensions rather than a singularity, and may occur with things as well as people. Nonetheless, the difference between second and third-person engagements is crucial for the development of infant social cognition (and possibly for social cognition through the lifespan). I discuss the importance of the second-person by looking at four attentional and intentional engagements in the first year—coy responses to attention, clowning and showing off, anticipatory adjustments to being picked up, and compliance with directives. Such phenomena portray early and fundamentally emotional involvement, requiring more than explanations of ostensive cues, child-directedness, or joint engagement occurring after joint...
This electronic file may not be altered in any way. The author(s) of this article is/are permitted to use this PDF file to generate printed copies to be used by way of offprints, for their personal use only. Permission is granted by the... more
This electronic file may not be altered in any way. The author(s) of this article is/are permitted to use this PDF file to generate printed copies to be used by way of offprints, for their personal use only. Permission is granted by the publishers to post this file on a closed server which is accessible to members (students and staff) only of the author’s/s’ institute, it is not permitted to post this PDF on the open internet. For any other use of this material prior written permission should be obtained from the publishers or through the Copyright Clearance Center (for USA: www.copyright.com). Please contact rights@benjamins.nl or consult our website: www.benjamins.com
Infants show strikingly different reactions to incongruity: looking or smiling. The former occurs in response to magical events and the latter to humorous events. We argue that these reactions depend largely on the respective experimental... more
Infants show strikingly different reactions to incongruity: looking or smiling. The former occurs in response to magical events and the latter to humorous events. We argue that these reactions depend largely on the respective experimental methodologies employed, including the popular violation of expectation (VOE) paradigm. Although both types of studies involve infants’ reactions to incongruity, their literatures have yet to confront each other, and researchers in each domain are drawing strikingly different conclusions regarding infants’ understanding of the world. Here, we argue that infants are sensitive to and constrained by several contextual differences in the methodologies employed by incongruity researchers that afford one or the other reaction. We apply De Jaegher and Di Paolo’s participatory sense-making framework to further understand what infants are sensitive to in these paradigms. Understanding infants’ reactions to incongruity (i.e., VOE) is necessary to clear up cla...
In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that underlie social encounters are only beginning to be studied and could – paradoxically – be seen as representing the “dark... more
In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that underlie social encounters are only beginning to be studied and could – paradoxically – be seen as representing the “dark matter” of social neuroscience. Recent conceptual and empirical developments consistently indicate the need for investigations that allow the study of real-time social encounters in a truly interactive manner. This suggestion is based on the premise that social cognition is fundamentally different when we are in interaction with others rather than merely observing them. In this article, we outline the theoretical conception of a second-person approach to other minds and review evidence from neuroimaging, psychophysiological studies, and related fields to argue for the development of a second-person neuroscience, which will help neuroscience to really “go social”; this may also be relevant for our understanding of psychiatric disorders construed as d...
From early infancy, structures are created in engaging with the world. Increasingly complex forms of self, other, and world emerge with shared rhythms, affective patterns and interpersonal routines, cultural norms, concepts and symbols,... more
From early infancy, structures are created in engaging with the world. Increasingly complex forms of self, other, and world emerge with shared rhythms, affective patterns and interpersonal routines, cultural norms, concepts and symbols, and so on. These open up an increasing number of possibilities for new kinds and levels of engagement and for further developing a world together. However, these same structures, becoming more rigid, salient, and perhaps reified with time, may obscure or obstruct engagement and constrain development. We explore this paradoxical relationship between structure and openness to engagement and attempt to understand the process of formation and change of structures in self and its relations to the world.
This chapter argues that the emotions are a constitutive part of the development of social understanding and therefore that it is deeply problematic to conceptualize emotion as psychologically separate from the emergence of our... more
This chapter argues that the emotions are a constitutive part of the development of social understanding and therefore that it is deeply problematic to conceptualize emotion as psychologically separate from the emergence of our understanding of persons as subjects. In other words, the authors argue that emotion should not be seen as an “independent variable” in the development of social understanding. Emotions conceived more broadly as vitality affects are inevitable qualities of all actions and are categorically different from what are typically called “mental states.” Further, others’ emotions are rarely experienced in a spectatorial manner; they are more typically experienced in participation and involvement. The tendency to conceive of emotions as independent variables in the development of social understanding is an unfortunate instantiation of the traditional division in psychology between cognition, conation, and affection. The thrust of this chapter is a challenge to this tr...
The study of the emergence of pretend play in developmental psychology has generally been restricted to analyses of children’s play with toys and everyday objects. The widely accepted criteria for establishing pretence are the child’s... more
The study of the emergence of pretend play in developmental psychology has generally been restricted to analyses of children’s play with toys and everyday objects. The widely accepted criteria for establishing pretence are the child’s manipulation of object identities, attributes or existence. In this paper we argue that there is another arena for pretending—playful pretend teasing—which arises earlier than pretend play with objects and is therefore potentially relevant for understanding the more general emergence of pretence. We present examples of playful pretend teasing in infancy before and around the end of the first year, involving pretend communicative gestures, mis-labelling and almost non-compliance with prohibitions. We argue that the roots of pretence not only lie earlier in human infancy than generally acknowledged, but also are rooted in playful emotional exchanges in which people recognise and respond to violations of communicative gestures and agreements.
Humour is a fundamentally cultural process, beginning in the I-Thou interactions of early infancy. Humorous engagements in infancy thus offer a unique insight into the origins and meanings of funniness, a potential diagnostic tool for... more
Humour is a fundamentally cultural process, beginning in the I-Thou interactions of early infancy. Humorous engagements in infancy thus offer a unique insight into the origins and meanings of funniness, a potential diagnostic tool for assessing infant ‘typicality’ and powerfully exemplify the process of culture. Three important aspects of cultural process are its dialogicality, its particularity and its precariousness. All three are strongly evident in humorous interactions in early infancy and different aspects of infant humour are discussed to illustrate them. Infants are active participants in the cultures of humour which seek to draw them in, and contribute through humour creation and playfulness, both to their maintenance and their change.
The question of the relation between the collective and the individual has had a long but patchy history within both philosophy and psychology. In this chapter we consider some arguments that could be adopted for the primacy of the we,... more
The question of the relation between the collective and the individual has had a long but patchy history within both philosophy and psychology. In this chapter we consider some arguments that could be adopted for the primacy of the we, and examine their conceptual and empirical implications. We argue that the we needs to be seen as a developing and dynamic identity, not as something that exists fully fledged from the start. The concept of we thus needs more nuanced and differentiated treatment than currently exists, distinguishing it from the idea of a ‘common ground’ and discerning multiple senses of ‘we-ness’. At an empirical level, beginning from the shared history of human evolution and prenatal existence, a simple sense of pre-reflective we-ness, we argue, emerges from second-person I-you engagement in earliest infancy. Developmentally, experientially and conceptually, engagement remains fundamental to the we throughout its many forms, characterized by reciprocal interaction an...
Drawing on research from conversation analysis and developmental psychology, we point to the existence of “supporters” of morally responsible agency in everyday interaction: causes of our behavior that we are often unaware of, but that... more
Drawing on research from conversation analysis and developmental psychology, we point to the existence of “supporters” of morally responsible agency in everyday interaction: causes of our behavior that we are often unaware of, but that would make good-enough reasons for our actions, were we made aware of them.
Although it is a welcome and timely idea, the behavioural constellation of deprivation (BCD) needs to explain how the development of personal control, trust, and perception of future risk is mediated through relationships with parents.... more
Although it is a welcome and timely idea, the behavioural constellation of deprivation (BCD) needs to explain how the development of personal control, trust, and perception of future risk is mediated through relationships with parents. Further, prioritising the present over the future may not be the essence of this constellation; perhaps not quite being, either in the present or in the future, is a better depiction.
How does humor relate to culture? Some argue that comedy is much more dependent on cultural frames than is tragedy, as cultures vary enormously in their appreciation of attitudes toward playfulness. Humor may be so essential to culture... more
How does humor relate to culture? Some argue that comedy is much more dependent on cultural frames than is tragedy, as cultures vary enormously in their appreciation of attitudes toward playfulness. Humor may be so essential to culture that it is fundamental to the process of the culture in which it is embedded.
Sensing the humorous is a complex psychological process at which infants are surprisingly adept. Early studies focused on what infants and young children found amusing—i.e., on their perception of humor, while more recent research has... more
Sensing the humorous is a complex psychological process at which infants are surprisingly adept. Early studies focused on what infants and young children found amusing—i.e., on their perception of humor, while more recent research has begun to focus on their creation of humor and on how such young infants are able to be humorous so early in development. Controversies abound regarding whether infants truly have the cognitive skills to detect humor, or whether in fact they need them.
Laughter and its close cousin, humor, are unique and important mammalian responses that may have evolved to strengthen social bonds and thereby enhance survival. For human infants, laughter and humor appear in the first six months of life... more
Laughter and its close cousin, humor, are unique and important mammalian responses that may have evolved to strengthen social bonds and thereby enhance survival. For human infants, laughter and humor appear in the first six months of life and reveal their sensitivity to social and emotional cues, and their cognitive radar for incongruity. Understanding why infants engage in humorous interactions not only teaches us about infants, but about also about human experience in general.

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