Rob Luzecky

In this chapter, we argue that Walter White’s status as a fictional character in no way precludes our empathizing with him as another subject. Taking our cue from Edith Stein’s concept of empathy, we demonstrate that acts of memory are different from acts of empathy, and that how it is possible to empathize with fictional characters. This analysis is supplemented by Merleau-Ponty’s concept of a phenomenal body, which defines a body as a locus of possible action rather than a thing constituted of a certain material. We then provide an analysis of the potential conflict between empathic concern for (possibly evil) others and our own ethics; although it seems that great differences exist between individuals with respect to moral judgments, our similarities far exceed these differences.

Deleuze's concept of temporality undergoes radical revision with his elaborations of time's expressions in cinema. In Cinema 1: The Movement-Image and Cinema 2: The Time-Image, Deleuze elucidates aspects of Bergson's thought to present a concept of time that is no longer tethered to the movements of entities. Deleuze-in what is perhaps one of the oddest definitions in the history of western philosophy-characterises cinema as attempting to move beyond the representation of the movements of existents to give viewers a 'direct presentation of time' (1997b: 38). In the present chapter, I elucidate Deleuze's tantalising suggestion that cinema, the art form that has moving images as one of its ontic bases, involves a direct representation of a sort of temporality that is conceptually discrete from the movement of existent entities. I further suggest that filmic expressions of time reveal it to be a singularity that enjoys the attribute of radical indeterminacy. Deleuze further suggests that time-as it is presented in film-obtains as that ongoing continuum of variation. My argument progresses through four stages: (1) I will critically assess the suggestion of various commentators that the Cinema texts o er a fraught addition to Deleuze's philosophy of time; (2) I suggest that Deleuze's innovative reading of Bergson's concept of duration is key to understanding how time is expressed in cinema; (3) I observe-through reference to Alain Robbe-Grillet's theory of artistic descriptions-that a direct image of time enjoys nascent expression in the form of 'pure optical and acoustic situations' (i.e., moments of profound change in any of the diegetic elements of a film story); (4) finally-through reference to Deleuze's nuanced reading of Bergson's ontology of virtual and actual modes of existence-I suggest that time gains direct cinematic expression in the peculiar 'crystal-images' that proliferate in post-Second World War cinema. I observe that time's expression in cinema involves

I analyze Deleuze’s concept of temporality in terms of its ontology and axiological (political and aesthetic) aspects. For Deleuze, the concept of temporality is non-monolithic, in the senses that it is modified throughout his works — the monographs, lectures, and those works that were co-authored with Felix Guattari — and that it is developed through reference to a dizzying array of concepts, thinkers, artistic works, and social phenomena. I observe that Deleuze’s concept of temporality involves a complex ontology of difference, which I elaborate through reference to Deleuze’s analyses of Ancient Greek and Stoic conceptualizations of time. From Plato through to Chrysippus, temporality gradually comes to be identified as a form that comprehends the variation of particulars. Deleuze modifies the ancients’ concept of time to suggest that time obtains as a form of ceaseless ontological variation. Through reference to Deleuze’s reading of Gilbert Simondon, I further suggest that Deleuze...

In the present paper, I suggest a modification to some aspects of Ingarden’s analyses of the sound-synchronized filmic work of art. The argument progresses through two stages: (1) I clarify Ingarden’s claim that the work of art is a stratified formation in which the various aspects present objectivities; (2) I elucidate and critically assess Ingarden’s suggestion that the filmic work of art is a borderline case in respect to other types of works of art—paintings and literary works. Here, I identify a problem with Ingarden’s claims about the function of sound in the concretized filmic work’s presentation of its fictive world. Ingarden identifies the presented universe of the filmic work of art as a habitus of reality, but Ingarden seems oddly conflicted with respect to his notion of habitus. I argue that this stems from Ingarden’s conceptualization of the filmic work of art as primarily composed of the stratum of represented “visible aspects” in both the cases of the silent film and ...

I demonstrate that Deleuze's identification of Aion as an empty form (of time) offers a fascinating model of temporality that prioritises variation. First, I suggest that Deleuze's identification of time as an empty form is supported by ancient Greek and Gnostic concepts of the relation of Aion and Chronos. From Plato, through Aristotle, to Plotinus the concept of time undergoes substantive revision, in the sense that temporal measurement becomes removed from the measurement of existent entities (cosmic or sublunar bodies). This gradual untethering of time from movement gives rise to the development of the concept of eternity as an ontologically comprehensive mode of time that is devoid of content (i.e. a movement not indexed to the movement of cosmic or sublunar entities). It is here, with Deleuze's reading of the Platonic cosmology, that we see the first hints of the suggestion that Aion is involved with ontogenesis. Eternity is characterised as: (1) a temporal ‘all’ (...

I demonstrate that Deleuze's identification of Aion as an empty form (of time) offers a fascinating model of temporality that prioritises variation. First, I suggest that Deleuze's identification of time as an empty form is supported by ancient Greek and Gnostic concepts of the relation of Aion and Chronos. From Plato, through Aristotle, to Plotinus the concept of time undergoes substantive revision, in the sense that temporal measurement becomes removed from the measurement of existent entities (cosmic or sublunar bodies). This gradual untethering of time from movement gives rise to the development of the concept of eternity as an ontologically comprehensive mode of time that is devoid of content (i.e. a movement not indexed to the movement of cosmic or sublunar entities). It is here, with Deleuze's reading of the Platonic cosmology, that we see the first hints of the suggestion that Aion is involved with ontogenesis. Eternity is characterised as: (1) a temporal 'all' (i.e. generality) that is non-reducible to the determinacy implied by any particular temporally localised existent or temporal series (i.e. a succession relation of temporally discrete moments); (2) that which tends towards a diversity of possible states of affairs. Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects in the long history of Aion is that-in the ancient world-it was used in magical incantations. For the Gnostics and Oracles, Aion was a deity, and a potent one at that. From the Gnostic papyri, we get a vision of Aion as a force which enjoys eternal realisation. I suggest that the papyri conjure an image of Aion as a deity that is liberated from time, in the sense that it enjoys a neutrality with respect to the movements of any particular entity or group of entities-a form,

In the present paper, I suggest a modification to some aspects of Ingarden's analyses of the sound-synchronized filmic work of art. The argument progresses through two stages: (1) I clarify Ingarden's claim that the work of art is a stratified formation in which the various aspects present objectivities; (2) I elucidate and critically assess Ingarden's suggestion that the filmic work of art is a borderline case in respect to other types of works of art-paintings and literary works. Here, I identify a problem with Ingarden's claims about the function of sound in the concretized filmic work's presentation of its fictive world. Ingarden identifies the presented universe of the filmic work of art as a habitus of reality, but Ingarden seems oddly conflicted with respect to his notion of habitus. I argue that this stems from Ingarden's conceptualization of the filmic work of art as primarily composed of the stratum of represented "visible aspects" in both the cases of the silent film and the sound-synchronized film, and his restriction of the role of phonetic content in the latter. I suggest that were we to reconceptualise the role of aurally presented phonetic content in the concretized sound-synchronized film, we could better understand how film has the seeming magical capacity to transfix us.

I analyze Deleuze’s concept of temporality in terms of its ontology and axiological (political and aesthetic) aspects. For Deleuze, the concept of temporality is non-monolithic, in the senses that it is modified throughout his works — the monographs, lectures, and those works that were co-authored with Félix Guattari — and that it is developed through reference to a dizzying array of concepts, thinkers, artistic works, and social phenomena. I observe that Deleuze’s concept of temporality involves a complex ontology of difference, which I elaborate through reference to Deleuze’s analyses of Ancient Greek and Stoic conceptualizations of time. From Plato through to Chrysippus, temporality gradually comes to be identified as a form that comprehends the variation of particulars. Deleuze modifies the ancients’ concept of time to suggest that time obtains as a form of ceaseless ontological variation. Through reference to Deleuze’s reading of Gilbert Simondon, I further suggest that Deleuze tends to conceive of temporality as an ontogenetic force which participates in the complex process of individuation. A standout feature of this dissertation involves an analysis of how Deleuze’s concept of temporality is modified in his works on cinema. In Cinema 1: The Movement-Image and Cinema 2: The Time-Image, temporality comes to be characterized as something other than the measure of the movement of existents. In his detailed analyses of Bergson — in Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, and Bergsonism — Deleuze suggests that time involves an actualization of aspects of a virtual past as contemporaneous with the lived present. While not an outright denial of the relation of temporal succession, Deleuze’s claim implies a diminishment of this relation’s significance in an adequate elaboration of the nature of temporality. Further, I observe —through reference to Deleuze’s readings of Marx, Kierkegaard, and Spinoza — that (the explicitly temporal) change of societal forms of economic organization is non-reducible to that suggested by linear evolution. The claim is that putatively discrete modes of economic organization do not enjoy temporal displacement with respect to one another. This suggests that linear evolutionary models of societal development are inadequate. This further implies that temporality is non-reducible to the relation of temporal succession. In concrete terms, societal change is characterized as immanent temporal variation. Taken together, these analyses yield the conclusion that Deleuze tends to conceive of the nature of temporality as involving the ongoing realization of multiple — non-identical, sometimes contrary — aspects of a stochastic process of creation that is expressed in ontogenetic circumstances, social evolution, literary works, and filmic works.