- Biophilosophy, Philosophy of Biology, Complexity, Information Science, Self-Organization, Systems Biology, and 22 morePanexperientialism, Theoretical biology, Alfred North Whitehead, Henri Bergson, Process Philosophy, Charles S. Peirce, Panpsychism, Theodicy, Hans Jonas, Metaphysics, Aristotle, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, History of Landscape Architecture, Philosophy of Psychology, Baroque art and architecture, Neoromanticism, Art Nouveau, Buddhist Philosophy, Organismal Biology, Heinz von Foerster, Process Ontology, and Turing machineedit
- I am Privatdozent (Priv.-Doz. or PD: from an educational point of view similar to Associate Professor in the US) at t... moreI am Privatdozent (Priv.-Doz. or PD: from an educational point of view similar to Associate Professor in the US) at the Institute of Philosophy of the Technische Universität Berlin/Technical University of Berlin, Germany. Between February 2012 and May 2014 I was Visiting Associate Professor and Visiting Scholar at the Department of Anthropology of University of California, Berkeley.
My areas of expertise are in Biophilosophy or Continental Philosophy of Biology (G.Canguilhem, J.v.Uexküll, A.Portmann, H.Jonas), Process Philosophy (A.N.Whitehead, H.Bergson, C.S.Peirce), Classical Metaphysics (Aristotle, Leibniz), Theories of Self-Organization and Complexity, and Systems Biology.
My other areas of interest are in the concept of Intuition in Occidental Philosophy, Criticism of Transhumanism and Posthumanism, History of Biology, Psychotherapy, Theodicy, and Landscape architecture.edit
The chapter pursues two aims: First, to point out some crucial difficulties in understanding teleological end-state directedness and agency in contemporary biology and philosophy of biology. Second, to show how a process-metaphysical... more
The chapter pursues two aims: First, to point out some crucial
difficulties in understanding teleological end-state directedness and agency in contemporary biology and philosophy of biology. Second, to show how a process-metaphysical perspective of the organism, which is based on the philosophies of Alfred N. Whitehead and Henri Bergson and includes fundamental insights from Aristotle’s conception of teleology, can help to overcome these difficulties. For this purpose, a few words about Aristotle’s understanding of organismic teleology and its connection to the idea of the good are said first. The second section deals with the reintroduction of teleological terminology into cybernetics and the
influence of this development on the neo-Darwinian concepts of ‘genetic
program’ and ‘genetic information’ as well as the limits of both concepts
from today’s perspective. In the third section, the focus is, first, on the
currently prevailing view that systems-theoretical mechanisms can provide full explanations of biological end-state directedness, and, second, on the resulting reduction of teleological explanations to a heuristically fertile mode of speaking in contemporary biology and philosophy of biology. For this purpose, the concept of mechanism introduced by the so-called ‘New Mechanical Philosophy’ is presented in detail. The aim of the fourth section is to provide evidence that organismic teleology and agency elude mechanistic thinking. For this purpose, core characteristics of systems biological mechanisms are first analyzed and, in a second step, it is shown that there are significant differences between the dynamics of organisms and mechanisms. The unprecedented intensity of organismic self-transformation is emphasized by the ‘flowing bridge’ metaphor introduced in this section. The critique culminates in the conclusion that the end-state directedness of real organisms transcends the systems-theoretical mechanistic explanation for reasons of principle and that teleology therefore cannot be reduced to a useful mode of speaking alongside mechanisms. In the fifth and final section, organismic teleology and agency are placed in the light of a conception of causality, materiality, and mental activity rooted in a metaphysics radically different from that of contemporary scientific materialism. It is shown that Alfred N. Whitehead’s process metaphysics, supplemented by core ideas of Henri Bergson’s metaphysics, opens up completely new horizons for the understanding of both phenomena. The last section concludes with process-metaphysical reflections on the nature of organismic action, which benefit from Aristotle’s indissoluble connection between biological end-state directedness and the idea of the good.
difficulties in understanding teleological end-state directedness and agency in contemporary biology and philosophy of biology. Second, to show how a process-metaphysical perspective of the organism, which is based on the philosophies of Alfred N. Whitehead and Henri Bergson and includes fundamental insights from Aristotle’s conception of teleology, can help to overcome these difficulties. For this purpose, a few words about Aristotle’s understanding of organismic teleology and its connection to the idea of the good are said first. The second section deals with the reintroduction of teleological terminology into cybernetics and the
influence of this development on the neo-Darwinian concepts of ‘genetic
program’ and ‘genetic information’ as well as the limits of both concepts
from today’s perspective. In the third section, the focus is, first, on the
currently prevailing view that systems-theoretical mechanisms can provide full explanations of biological end-state directedness, and, second, on the resulting reduction of teleological explanations to a heuristically fertile mode of speaking in contemporary biology and philosophy of biology. For this purpose, the concept of mechanism introduced by the so-called ‘New Mechanical Philosophy’ is presented in detail. The aim of the fourth section is to provide evidence that organismic teleology and agency elude mechanistic thinking. For this purpose, core characteristics of systems biological mechanisms are first analyzed and, in a second step, it is shown that there are significant differences between the dynamics of organisms and mechanisms. The unprecedented intensity of organismic self-transformation is emphasized by the ‘flowing bridge’ metaphor introduced in this section. The critique culminates in the conclusion that the end-state directedness of real organisms transcends the systems-theoretical mechanistic explanation for reasons of principle and that teleology therefore cannot be reduced to a useful mode of speaking alongside mechanisms. In the fifth and final section, organismic teleology and agency are placed in the light of a conception of causality, materiality, and mental activity rooted in a metaphysics radically different from that of contemporary scientific materialism. It is shown that Alfred N. Whitehead’s process metaphysics, supplemented by core ideas of Henri Bergson’s metaphysics, opens up completely new horizons for the understanding of both phenomena. The last section concludes with process-metaphysical reflections on the nature of organismic action, which benefit from Aristotle’s indissoluble connection between biological end-state directedness and the idea of the good.
Research Interests: Aristotle, Henri Bergson, Alfred North Whitehead, Georges Canguilhem, Process Philosophy, and 14 moreBiophilosophy, Bergson, Whitehead, Organismal Biology, Memory, Agency, Process Ontology, Process Metaphysics, Mechanism, Mechanistic Models of Explanation, Teleological Thinking, Biophilosophie, New Mechanical Philosophy, and New mechanism
The revolutionary potential and the range of both process-philosophical intuitions and process-philosophical understanding of the nature of intuition and its relationship to scientific thinking only becomes visible against the... more
The revolutionary potential and the range of both process-philosophical
intuitions and process-philosophical understanding of the nature of
intuition and its relationship to scientific thinking only becomes visible
against the background of the long history of the concept of intuition in
Occidental philosophy. Therefore, a brief historical review is provided
first. The second section of the introduction consists of three parts. In the
first part, I give an overview of the basic intuitions in Henri Bergson's
metaphysics, his understanding of the nature of intuition, and the role he
ascribes to philosophical intuition in the study of life. The second part
deals with fundamental philosophical intuitions, on which Alfred N.
Whitehead’s metaphysics and understanding of life are based. In the third
part, the essential differences between the understanding of intuition in the works of Bergson and Whitehead on the one hand and in the history of
Occidental philosophy on the other are presented. Finally, in the third
section of the introduction I present the main ideas of the ten chapters of
this volume, with an emphasis on the process-philosophical intuitions,
from which the thoughts of the authors develop.
intuitions and process-philosophical understanding of the nature of
intuition and its relationship to scientific thinking only becomes visible
against the background of the long history of the concept of intuition in
Occidental philosophy. Therefore, a brief historical review is provided
first. The second section of the introduction consists of three parts. In the
first part, I give an overview of the basic intuitions in Henri Bergson's
metaphysics, his understanding of the nature of intuition, and the role he
ascribes to philosophical intuition in the study of life. The second part
deals with fundamental philosophical intuitions, on which Alfred N.
Whitehead’s metaphysics and understanding of life are based. In the third
part, the essential differences between the understanding of intuition in the works of Bergson and Whitehead on the one hand and in the history of
Occidental philosophy on the other are presented. Finally, in the third
section of the introduction I present the main ideas of the ten chapters of
this volume, with an emphasis on the process-philosophical intuitions,
from which the thoughts of the authors develop.
Research Interests:
Mathematical models applied in contemporary theoretical and systems biology are based on some implicit ontological assumptions about the nature of organisms. This article aims to show that real organisms reveal a logic of internal... more
Mathematical models applied in contemporary theoretical and systems biology are based on some implicit ontological assumptions about the nature of organisms. This article aims to show that real organisms reveal a logic of internal causality transcending the tacit logic of biological modeling. Systems biology has focused on models consisting of static systems of differential equations operating with fixed control parameters that are measured or fitted to experimental data. However, the structure of real organisms is a highly dynamic process, the internal causality of which can only be captured by continuously changing systems of equations. In addition, in real physiological settings kinetic
parameters can vary by orders of magnitude, i.e., organisms vary the value of internal quantities that in models are represented by fixed control parameters. Both the plasticity of organisms and the state
dependence of kinetic parameters adds indeterminacy to the picture and asks for a new statistical perspective. This requirement could be met by the arising Biological Statistical Mechanics project, which promises to do more justice to the nature of real organisms than contemporary modeling. This article concludes that Biological Statistical Mechanics allows for a wider range of organismic ontologies than does the tacitly followed ontology of contemporary theoretical and systems biology,
which are implicitly and explicitly based on systems theory.
parameters can vary by orders of magnitude, i.e., organisms vary the value of internal quantities that in models are represented by fixed control parameters. Both the plasticity of organisms and the state
dependence of kinetic parameters adds indeterminacy to the picture and asks for a new statistical perspective. This requirement could be met by the arising Biological Statistical Mechanics project, which promises to do more justice to the nature of real organisms than contemporary modeling. This article concludes that Biological Statistical Mechanics allows for a wider range of organismic ontologies than does the tacitly followed ontology of contemporary theoretical and systems biology,
which are implicitly and explicitly based on systems theory.
Research Interests:
Die erste und zweite Sektion dieser Studie sind der Darstellung der Visionen des Transhumanismus gewidmet. Sie stellen diese futuristische Richtung und einige wichtige Gegenargumente ihrer Kritiker dar. Alle darauf folgenden Sektionen... more
Die erste und zweite Sektion dieser Studie sind der Darstellung der Visionen des Transhumanismus gewidmet. Sie stellen diese futuristische Richtung und einige wichtige Gegenargumente ihrer Kritiker dar. Alle darauf folgenden Sektionen dienen dem Aufbau eines neuen Argumentes, das auf einer kürzlich vom Autor eingeführten Philosophie des Lebendigen und insbesondere des biologischen Organismus beruht, die als "prozessontologische Biophilosophie" bezeichnet werden kann (S.Koutroufinis, "Organismus als Prozess", Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 2019). In der dritten Sektion wird gezeigt, dass der Transhumanismus verschiedene Dimensionen der menschlichen Freiheit berührt und fest an der Frage des menschlichen Wesens gebunden ist, das unlösbar mit der Freiheit des Menschen verflochten ist. Die Verwirklichung der transhumanistischen Visionen setzt sowohl den umfassenden Einbau komplexer Maschinen in den menschlichen Körper voraus als auch den massiven Einsatz naturwissenschaftlicher Formalismen bei der Planung der Transformation des Körpers mittels unterschiedlicher Eingriffe. Aus diesem Grund wird in der vierten Sektion gezeigt, dass jeder Organismus, somit auch der Organismus des Menschen, eine bestimmte Logik verkörpert, die der Logik aller Maschinen und Formalismen der modernen Naturwissenschaften diametral entgegensteht. Davon ausgehend wird in der fünften und letzten Sektion inferiert, dass der Transhumanismus der Logik der organismischen Seinsweise und somit der Natur des Menschen widerspricht. Dieses Resultat wird auf die Besonderheit des Wesens jedes Menschen und seines zur Freiheit bestimmten individuellen Bewusstseins zugespitzt, um dadurch die eigentliche Bedeutung dieses futuristischen Diskurses und die Herausforderung, die er an die Menschheit stellt, aus einer biophilosophischen Perspektive zu betrachten.
Research Interests:
Life takes many forms. Human beings can be viewed as just one of these lifeforms among others. Although it is certainly true that humans are one biological species among many others, it is also the case that humans are different from all... more
Life takes many forms. Human beings can be viewed as just one
of these lifeforms among others. Although it is certainly true that
humans are one biological species among many others, it is also the case
that humans are different from all the others in quite remarkable ways. We
have produced works of exquisite beauty, sophistication, and enduring
value. And yet at the same time we are threatening to drive ourselves as
well as untold numbers of other species on Earth into extinction. To make
sense of this anthropogenic paradox we first need to understand how we
diverged from the rest of our animal cousins in the course of our evolution.
We need to understand this evolutionary development, both in terms of
how we are continuous with other species and how we differ. 0ere is not
only diversity in the nature of animal and human evolution, but likewise
in the stories we tell about it: a diversity of scientific explanations and
speculative understandings of continuities and discontinuities between
animal and human life.
of these lifeforms among others. Although it is certainly true that
humans are one biological species among many others, it is also the case
that humans are different from all the others in quite remarkable ways. We
have produced works of exquisite beauty, sophistication, and enduring
value. And yet at the same time we are threatening to drive ourselves as
well as untold numbers of other species on Earth into extinction. To make
sense of this anthropogenic paradox we first need to understand how we
diverged from the rest of our animal cousins in the course of our evolution.
We need to understand this evolutionary development, both in terms of
how we are continuous with other species and how we differ. 0ere is not
only diversity in the nature of animal and human evolution, but likewise
in the stories we tell about it: a diversity of scientific explanations and
speculative understandings of continuities and discontinuities between
animal and human life.
Research Interests:
Jakob von Uexküll introduced the concept of Umwelt as meaning the features of an animal’s surroundings, which are meaningful to it. He created a biology of subjects. With respect to human subjectivity Cassirer expanded Uexküll’s Umwelt by... more
Jakob von Uexküll introduced the concept of Umwelt as meaning the features of an animal’s surroundings, which are meaningful to it. He created a biology of subjects. With respect to human subjectivity Cassirer expanded Uexküll’s Umwelt by the component of symbolic forms and defined the human as an "animal symbolicum." According to Cassirer, whereas animals use signs humans communicate with symbols, which are signs with objective meaning. This distinction characterizes the specific difference between human and animal intelligence. Humans not only experience in a radically different way spatiotemporal aspects of Umwelt than animals––they live in a multi-dimensional symbolic Umwelt. We live and act in many intersecting symbolic worlds, one of the most important of which is our ethical Umwelt. However, abstract symbolic systems of contemporary physics, life sciences, technology, and economy enable us to act on other living beings and on the whole planet with an emotional distance, which can be destructive. Against the background of ecological disaster and the uncontrolled accelerating incursion of our financial institutions and biotechnological industry into planetary ecology the term ‘Umwelt’ can no longer simply mean the part of our surroundings that is meaningful to us. I claim that ecologic disaster forces us to reinterpret the term ‘Umwelt’ in order to enhance it with an ecologic-ethical dimension. This requires a view of nature based on Henri Bergson's and Alfred N. Whitehead’s understanding of natural beings as embodiments of intrinsic values. Given the current severe ecological crisis, Cassirer’s idea of an "ethical Umwelt" must also be expanded and our understanding of "Umwelt" or "meaningful environment" must be upvalued to include an ethical imperative. In other words, for us today the meaning of the term "Umwelt" should be synonymous with "the living world to be saved" or "sacred environment."
Research Interests:
After the discovery of the DNA in the 1950´s, 20th century biology focused on the concept of the gene. In the 21st century, however, the concept of organism is regaining its primary role in biological thought. At present there is a... more
After the discovery of the DNA in the 1950´s, 20th century biology focused on the concept of the gene. In the 21st century, however,
the concept of organism is regaining its primary role in biological
thought. At present there is a rapidly growing literature verifying that
living beings are able not only to deeply reorganize themselves but also
to modify their genomes. The emergence of a theory of organism requires, however, first the elaboration of a logic of organismic causality that proceeds from organismic phenomenality. In the following I will attempt to outline what I label "logic of organisms." In order to achieve this aim I will first try to articulate a "logic of mechanisms" because it constitutes a sharp contrast to the "logic of organisms."
the concept of organism is regaining its primary role in biological
thought. At present there is a rapidly growing literature verifying that
living beings are able not only to deeply reorganize themselves but also
to modify their genomes. The emergence of a theory of organism requires, however, first the elaboration of a logic of organismic causality that proceeds from organismic phenomenality. In the following I will attempt to outline what I label "logic of organisms." In order to achieve this aim I will first try to articulate a "logic of mechanisms" because it constitutes a sharp contrast to the "logic of organisms."
Research Interests:
Platons Timaios berichtet von der Erschaffung der Zeit durch den göttlichen Gestalter der Welt den, Demiurgen: "[S]o sann er darauf, ein bewegliches Abbild der Ewigkeit (αἰών, Äon) zu gestalten" (Timaios, 37 d). Im vorliegenden Essay wird... more
Platons Timaios berichtet von der Erschaffung der Zeit durch den göttlichen Gestalter der Welt den, Demiurgen: "[S]o sann er darauf, ein bewegliches Abbild der Ewigkeit (αἰών, Äon) zu gestalten" (Timaios, 37 d). Im vorliegenden Essay wird auf der Basis der Prozessphilosophien von Henri Bergson und Alfred North Whitehead ein Weg der Befreiung dieses Gedankens von dem Vorurteil einer zeitlosen, unwandelbaren, in sich erstarrten Ewigkeit skizziert. Es wird gezeigt, dass Bergson und Whitehead der Idee der Ewigkeit die Lebendigkeit zurückgeben, die ihr vorsokratische Denker und griechische Dichter zusprachen, indem sie "Äon" als Leben verstehen. Aus der Perspektive der beiden Prozessdenker ist die quantifizierte teilbare Zeit unserer wissenschaftlichen Abstraktionen – frei nach Platon und Bergson gesprochen – das bewegliche Schattenbild der lebendigen Ewigkeit.
Research Interests:
The creation of a process ontology for biology is one of the most ambitious and important projects of current philosophy of biology. Process ontology is usually seen as opposing mechanistic ontology which currently dominates biology.... more
The creation of a process ontology for biology is one of the most ambitious and important projects of current philosophy of biology. Process ontology is usually seen as opposing mechanistic ontology which currently dominates biology. However, the terms 'process' and 'mechanistic' are not always clearly defined in current debates. In this paper I provide a new definition of 'mechanism' and 'mechanistic ontology' based on the most abstract definition of 'machine'—von Foerster's 'non-trivial machine' that is related to Turing machine. I argue that the main methods of modeling used in systems biology rest upon the implicit assumption that organisms abide by the non-trivial or Turing machine logic. By showing that organisms and machines obey two incompatible logics of causality I demonstrate the limits of this assumption. The paper concludes by introducing an organism centered concept of process and arguing that Whitehead's process metaphysics offers a way of understanding organisms as exemplifications of a specific category of process.
Research Interests:
In the last few decades, several biologists and philosophers of biology have claimed that organisms may be considered teleological entities, spurring on a movement that is often celebrated as the renaissance of teleological thinking and... more
In the last few decades, several biologists and philosophers of biology have claimed that organisms may be considered teleological entities, spurring on a movement that is often celebrated as the renaissance of teleological thinking and that I describe as ‘neo-teleologism’. Neo-teleological approaches have been provided by cyberneticists, neo-Darwinists, theorists of self-organization, and some philosophers of biology. In Aristotle’s work Physics the term ‘telos’ has a double meaning: final state on the one hand and purpose, aim, or goal on the other. In all neo-teleological approaches the concept of ‘telos’ is understood as final-state-directedness, but here the final state of a material process is considered to be achieved by blind, deterministic, non-mental factors alone. Philosophy of biology gives to all neo-teleological approaches great credit for providing interpretations of ‘purpose’ and ‘aim’ without any reference to mental or psychical factors. According to Aristotle, in contrast, organismic final-state-directedness is the result of striving factors. This does not, however, mean that Aristotle ascribes a human-like conscious mentality to biological processes. Aristotle’s concept of striving may be interpreted in terms of non-conscious proto-experiential agency, as it was introduced by Alfred North Whitehead. I will claim that his metaphysics offers to biophilosophy a modern basis for a re-conception of genuine Aristotelian insights concerning ‘telos’ and biological organism.
Research Interests:
In the first half of the 20 th century the attempt was made to banish all teleological thinking from biology. In the last few decades, several biologists and philosophers of biology have claimed that organisms may be considered... more
In the first half of the 20 th century the attempt was made to banish all teleological thinking from biology. In the last few decades, several biologists and philosophers of biology have claimed that organisms may be considered teleological entities, spurring on a movement that can be described as 'neo-teleologism.' However, while biologists and philosophers of biology talk about 'teleology', it is not always clear what they mean by this term. This paper introduces the central ideas of the most influential neo-teleological approaches and compares them with the metaphysical fundaments of Aristotle's teleology. The main aim of the paper is to make clear that neo-teleologism and Aristotelian teleology are based on entirely different metaphysical assumptions. The latter, in contrast to the former, exemplifies the idea that living beings have an intrinsic nature and value.
Research Interests:
Cassirer’s philosophy of symbols is applied to Uexküll’s concept of “Umwelt” (meaningful environ- ment). I argue that the vast domain of human symbolism extends the human Umwelt far beyond the Umwelts of animal species. We humans live and... more
Cassirer’s philosophy of symbols is applied to Uexküll’s concept of “Umwelt” (meaningful environ- ment). I argue that the vast domain of human symbolism extends the human Umwelt far beyond the Umwelts of animal species. We humans live and act in many inter- secting symbolic worlds, one of the most important of which is our ethical Umwelt. I claim that against the background of ecological disaster and the uncontrolled accelerating incursion of our financial institutions and biotechnological industry into planetary ecology, the term “Umwelt” can no longer simply mean the part of our surroundings that is meaningful to us. Given the current severe ecological crisis, Cassirer’s idea of an “ethical Umwelt” must also be expanded, and an ethical impera- tive must be integrated into our understanding of “envi- ronment.” In other words, for us today the meaning of the term “Umwelt” or “meaningful environment” should be synonymous with “the living world to be saved” or “sa- cred environment.”
Research Interests:
My commentary has three aims. Firstly, to provide additional support to Konrad Werner’s correct insight that radical constructivism is based on a radical distinction between experienced reality and ontological reality. This is a strong... more
My commentary has three aims. Firstly, to provide additional support to Konrad Werner’s correct insight that radical constructivism is based on a radical distinction between experienced reality and ontological reality. This is a strong metaphysical statement. Secondly, that radical constructivism is implicitly rooted in Cartesian ontological dualism. Thirdly, that Whitehead’s process ontology provides a fruitful foundation for Werner’s thesis that perceptions are metaphysically significant.
Research Interests:
Die Entwicklung des Phänotypus eines Organismus beziehungsweise dessen Embryogenese galt als die zentrale Problematik des biologischen Denkens bis zur Entwicklung der Evolutionstheorie Charles Darwins und wurde in verschiedenen Epochen... more
Die Entwicklung des Phänotypus eines Organismus beziehungsweise dessen Embryogenese galt als die zentrale Problematik des biologischen Denkens bis zur Entwicklung der Evolutionstheorie Charles Darwins und wurde in verschiedenen Epochen sehr unterschiedlich erklärt. Mit dem Aufkommen der mechanistischen Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft im 17. Jahrhundert begann der Siegeszug der Vorstellung, dass die Embryogenese auf materielle deterministische Vorgänge zu reduzieren ist. Im 20. Jahrhundert wurde diese Idee von der Vorstellung des Gens verkörpert. Das sogenannte "Zentraldogma der Molekularbiologie", das 1970 von Francis Crick seine endgültige Formulierung bekam, besagt, dass die Information für den Aufbau des Phänotypus immer von den Genen zu den Proteinen weitergegeben wird, so dass sie niemals von einem Protein zum anderen oder von den Proteinen zu den Genen übertragen werden kann. Die Vorstellung der einseitigen Richtung des Informationsflusses führte zur Reduktion der Entwicklung eines Organismus auf den Ablauf eines sogenannten "genetischen Programms", in dem die phänotypische Form des Organismus kodiert sei. In den letzten Jahrzehnten wurde die Vorstellung, dass die Gene den Organismus formen, stark kritisiert. Zudem hat die Integration systemtheoretischer Denkweisen der Selbstorganisations- und Komplexitätstheorie in die Biologie zusätzlich die Idee des genetischen Programms untergraben. Bedeutende theoretische Biologen und Philosophen der Gegenwart betrachten Organismen als besonders komplexe dynamische physikochemische Systeme, die sich aus Interaktionen zwischen Genen und Proteinen selbstorganisieren.
Die Philosophie der Biologie sollte diese Entwicklungen ernst nehmen und ihre Grenzen kritisch beleuchten, um mögliche negative Folgen zu antizipieren und ihnen entgegen zu wirken. So befürchte ich, dass viele Kritiker der neodarwinistischen genzentrierten Biologie unbewusst dabei sind, das biologische Denken des 21. Jahrhunderts auf eine physikalistische Grundlage zu stellen.
Die Philosophie der Biologie sollte diese Entwicklungen ernst nehmen und ihre Grenzen kritisch beleuchten, um mögliche negative Folgen zu antizipieren und ihnen entgegen zu wirken. So befürchte ich, dass viele Kritiker der neodarwinistischen genzentrierten Biologie unbewusst dabei sind, das biologische Denken des 21. Jahrhunderts auf eine physikalistische Grundlage zu stellen.
Research Interests:
We argue that a critical difference distinguishing machines from organisms and computers from brains is not complexity in a structural sense, but a difference in dynamical organization that is not well accounted for by current complexity... more
We argue that a critical difference distinguishing machines from organisms and computers from brains is not complexity in a structural sense, but a difference in dynamical organization that is not well accounted for by current complexity measures. We propose a measure of the complexity of a system that is largely orthogonal to computational, information theoretic, or thermodynamic conceptions of structural complexity. What we call a system’s dynamical depth is a separate dimension of system complexity that measures the degree to which it exhibits discrete levels of nonlinear dynamical organization in which successive levels are distinguished by local entropy reduction and constraint generation. A system with greater dynamical depth than another consists of a greater number of such nested dynamical levels. Thus, a mechanical or linear thermodynamic system has less dynamical depth than an inorganic self-organized system, which has less dynamical depth than a living system. Including an assessment of dynamical depth can provide a more precise and systematic account of the fundamental difference between inorganic systems (low dynamical depth) and living systems (high dynamical depth), irrespective of the number of their parts and the causal relations between them.
Research Interests:
This essay may be read as an application of one of the most central ideas in Whitehead's work: that the main task of metaphysical schemes of thought is to criticize scientific abstractions or, more specifically, to criticize the confusion... more
This essay may be read as an application of one of the most central ideas in Whitehead's work: that the main task of metaphysical schemes of thought is to criticize scientific abstractions or, more specifically, to criticize the confusion of something abstract with something concrete in different sciences. This will be discussed in the context of a classical topic of natural philosophy, the equifinality of an organism's generation. This is a problem which has not adequately been considered by philosophers in recent decades. Instead, they focused their attention on supposedly more interesting issues, such as the evolution of the species, the generation of life and above all the nature of consciousness. Unfortunately, the choice of focus ignored the fact that the metabolism of even the simplest bacterium is more than just a very complex physicochemical system.This essay is divided into two parts. The aim of the first part is to show that thinking embryogenesis only in terms of efficient causation, which operates on the basis of the theory of nonlinear dynamical systems, poses serious problems. Failing to recognize this would be a clear case of Whitehead's "fallacy of misplaced concreteness," meaning the confusion of the abstract with the concrete. In an attempt to overcome this problem, the second part of the article presents an alternative approach to teleology which I call "mentalistic teleology."
Research Interests:
In this introduction of the volume "Life and Process. Towards a New Biophilosophy," first I will explain why I believe it is necessary to differentiate between biophilosophy and the philosophy of biology. Second, I will review some of the... more
In this introduction of the volume "Life and Process. Towards a New Biophilosophy," first I will explain why I believe it is necessary to differentiate between biophilosophy and the philosophy of biology. Second, I will review some of the shortcomings of today's biology and philosophy of biology and demonstrate how a biophilosophy grounded in a process-oriented metaphysics can overcome them. Third, I will provide a summary of Whitehead's process ontology, emphasizing those fundamental ideas from this paradigm that play essential roles in the present book. Finally, I will briefly describe the main ideas presented in subsequent chapters.
Research Interests:
Due to its long development since classical antiquity, biophilosophy is able to exhibit different naturalistic understandings of life in general and of the organism in particular which transcend the physicalistic metaphysics of most... more
Due to its long development since classical antiquity, biophilosophy is able to exhibit different naturalistic understandings of life in general and of the organism in particular which transcend the physicalistic metaphysics of most biologists. One central problem for the biosciences, namely, whether or not the concept of teleology has any legitimacy in biological explanation — a notion which has been discussed extensively since antiquity — exemplifies the central philosophical differences between the major representatives of the philosophy of biology and the more metaphysically open-minded considerations of the nature of life carried out by the biophilosophers. Yet, even inside current philosophy of biology, there are widely varying understandings of teleology. In this paper, I will show how a recently suggested model of pre-cellular organization introduces a new form of teleology that has important consequences for our understanding of biological naturalism.
Research Interests:
Der Organismus-Begriff ist ein biologischer Basisausdruck. Neuere Ergebnisse der Ontogenese-, Kognitions- und Evolutionsforschung haben diesen Begriff wieder ins Zentrum der Aufmerksamkeit gerückt. Die Begründung des organismischen... more
Der Organismus-Begriff ist ein biologischer Basisausdruck. Neuere Ergebnisse der Ontogenese-, Kognitions- und Evolutionsforschung haben diesen Begriff wieder ins Zentrum der Aufmerksamkeit gerückt. Die Begründung des organismischen Verständnisses im Abendland kann erst den Vorsokratikern und nach ihnen hauptsächlich Hippokrates und Aristoteles zugesprochen werden, aber das Wort „Organismus“ entsteht erst im 18. Jahrhundert als ein wissenschaftlich reflektierter Begriff. Der Organismus-Begriff bezieht sich auf die Struktur, d. h. die Elemente und die zwischen ihnen herrschenden Relationen, der Körper von Lebewesen.
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The development of organisms shows an end-state-directedness at various levels of organization. The concept of „self-organization”, arising from the study of physico-chemical processes, has been used for the understanding of the nature... more
The development of organisms shows an end-state-directedness at various levels of organization. The concept of „self-organization”, arising from the study of physico-chemical processes, has been used for the understanding of the nature and causality of this specific characteristic of organismic development. Based on that concept it is currently attempted to develop computational models of complex biomolecular systems. We believe, however, that essential differences exist between physico-chemical and biological systems, which must be taken into account for future theoretical work. We discuss, e.g., the relationship between static and dynamic quantities, which limits the feasibility of mathematical modeling of the dynamics of organismic development. To grasp the logic of the organismic causality we outline a post-physicalistic concept of organisms based on the idea of an intrinsic nature, which is not static, but rather the process of the production of information.
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Unter "Bioprotopsychismus" verstehe ich eine Sonderform des Panpsychismus. Es gibt zwei Versionen des Bioprotopsychismus: Die schwache und die starke. Während erstere nur Organismen, die mit Nervensystemen ausgestattet sind,... more
Unter "Bioprotopsychismus" verstehe ich eine Sonderform des Panpsychismus. Es gibt zwei Versionen des Bioprotopsychismus: Die schwache und die starke. Während erstere nur Organismen, die mit Nervensystemen ausgestattet sind, Erlebensfähigkeit zuweist, spricht letztere allen Organismen psychische Aktivität und Teleologie zu. Ich plädiere für die starke Version des Bioprotopsychismus wegen des prinzipiellen Unvermögens naturwissenschaftlicher Systemtheorien, überzeugende Modelle selbst von den einfachsten Organismen zu liefern. Ich zeige, dass Emergentismus und Bioprotopsychismus in der Philosophie des Lebendigen eine fruchtbare Synthese eingehen können. Ersterer kann sich auf den modalen und letzterer auf den aktualen Aspekt des Organismus beziehen. Das protopsychische Subjekt, das die innere Seite des Organismus ausmacht, trifft permanent Entscheidungen zwischen physikochemisch gleichwertigen Möglichkeiten und verwirklicht einige von ihnen, die biologisch sinnvoll sind. Die Prozessphilosophien von Bergson und Whitehead bieten dem Bioprotopsychismus das nötige ontologische Instrumentarium, um organismische Subjektivität mit Prozessualität zu verbinden.
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Der Panprotopsychismus ist eine besondere Form des Panpsychismus und kann in Abhängigkeit von der Interpretation der Termini „Psychismus“, „pan“ und „proto“ sehr unterschiedliche Bedeutungen haben. Es gibt mindestens zwei Versionen des... more
Der Panprotopsychismus ist eine besondere Form des Panpsychismus und kann in Abhängigkeit von der Interpretation der Termini „Psychismus“, „pan“ und „proto“ sehr unterschiedliche Bedeutungen haben. Es gibt mindestens zwei Versionen des biologischen Panprotopsychismus: Die schwache und die starke. Letztere weist psychische Aktivität und Teleologie allen Organismen zu und besteht auf die ungebrochene Einheit von Leben und der inneren Seite der Erfahrung. Ich plädiere für die starke Version des Panprotopsychismus wegen des prinzipiellen Unvermögens naturwissenschaftlicher Systemtheorien, überzeugende Modelle selbst von den einfachsten Organismen zu liefern. Emergentismus und Panprotopsychismus können in der Philosophie des Lebendigen eine fruchtbare Synthese eingehen. Ersterer kann sich auf den modalen und letzterer auf den aktualen Aspekt des Organismus beziehen. Das protopsychische Subjekt, das die innere Seite des Organismus ausmacht, trifft permanent Entscheidungen zwischen physikochemisch gleichwertigen Möglichkeiten und verwirklicht einige von ihnen, die biologisch sinnvoll sind.
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Landscape architecture is a design profession with unique potential for stimulating dialogue with contemporary cultural issues of change, open-endedness, and complexity. An inspiring metaphor for this dialogue is the concept of the fold... more
Landscape architecture is a design profession with unique potential for stimulating dialogue with contemporary cultural issues of change, open-endedness, and complexity. An inspiring metaphor for this dialogue is the concept of the fold as interpreted by Gilles Deleuze in his 1993 book, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque. He traced the concept back to the Baroque— when some transformations to garden art had already been made—and concluded that a contemporary interpretation of the fold, which emphasizes the transmutation of formal objects into temporal unities, could be of similar inspiration today. Peter Eisenman and Laurie Olin’s Rebstockpark in Frankfurt am Main and Charles Jencks and Maggie Keswick’s Garden of Cosmic Speculation are two endeavors that have made the transition from concept to project in distinct, but formalistic and limited ways. Alternate models within contemporary landscape architec- ture show the potential of the discipline for working with the fold in a more rigorously conceptual way through continually infolding and unfolding events as opposed to designing static forms.
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Das Ziel dieses Beitrags ist es, die Eignung der Prozessontologie Alfred North Whiteheads für eine bio-und bewusstseinsphilosophische Fragestellung zu zeigen. Dabei wird ein Weg vorgestellt, wichtige Gedanken Whiteheads mit der modernen... more
Das Ziel dieses Beitrags ist es, die Eignung der Prozessontologie Alfred North Whiteheads für eine bio-und bewusstseinsphilosophische Fragestellung zu zeigen. Dabei wird ein Weg vorgestellt, wichtige Gedanken Whiteheads mit der modernen Theorie dynamischer Systeme, von der die Theoretische Biologie gegenwärtig beherrscht wird, zu verbinden. Dies erfordert jedoch eine kurze Einführung in das biologische Teleologie-Verständnis und in grundsätzliche Begriffe und Arbeits-weisen der modernen Theorie dynamischer Systeme, die für jede formale Reduktion organismischer Vorgänge unerlässlich sind.
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Der Whiteheadsche Kosmos präsentiert sich als eine unaufhörliche Transformation von Geflechten der Intersubjektivität, deren Knoten spontane und kreative Verschmelzungen von Erfahrungsrelationen sind. Aufgrund dieser umreduzierbaren... more
Der Whiteheadsche Kosmos präsentiert sich als eine unaufhörliche Transformation von Geflechten der Intersubjektivität, deren Knoten spontane und kreative Verschmelzungen von Erfahrungsrelationen sind. Aufgrund dieser umreduzierbaren Kreativität kann man die Entwicklung des Kosmos, im Gegensatz zum geistlosen Werden, als Geschichte verstehen. Auf der Basis der Grundbegriffe „Erfahrung“ und „Geschichte“ und durch die Betonung der Spontaneität und Endlichkeit der primären Entitäten errichtet Whitehead eine philosophische Kosmologie jenseits der alten Metaphysik-Konzepte, die hinter jedem Wandel nach zeitlosen Wesenheiten suchen. Die Whiteheadsche Ontologie erlaubt, eine Alternative zu einer eng an die Erkenntnisse der Biowissenschaften angelehnten Biophilosophie zu entwerfen. Biophilosophie ist nicht automatisch als Philosophie der Biologie zu verstehen – sie kann auch um die Dimension einer zeitgemäßen Naturphilosophie des Lebendigen ergänzt werden.
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Das Ziel dieses Beitrags ist es, die Eignung der Whiteheadschen Prozeßphilosophie für eine zeitgemäße teleologische Auffassung der organismischen Ontogenese zu demonstrieren. Zu diesem Zweck wird eine Möglichkeit der Verbindung der... more
Das Ziel dieses Beitrags ist es, die Eignung der Whiteheadschen Prozeßphilosophie für eine zeitgemäße teleologische Auffassung der organismischen Ontogenese zu demonstrieren. Zu diesem Zweck wird eine Möglichkeit der Verbindung der Whiteheadschen Prozeßphilosophie mit der aktuellen Form systemischen Denkens, das in der Theoretischen Biologie gegenwärtig maßgebend ist, vorgestellt. Die Gründe der Beschäftigung mit alternativen Ontologien, wie der Whiteheadschen, hängen mit den Problemen des systemischen Denkens zusammen, die aufgrund der enormen Komplexität schon der einfachsten Organismen auftreten. Die Erläuterung dieser Thematik setzt eine kurze Vorstellung des biosystemischen Ansatzes und seiner Grenzen voraus. Das verlangt seinerseits nach gewissen physikalisch-systemtheoretischen Vorkenntnissen, die für jede formale Reduktion von Organismen unerläßlich sind. Daher bietet ein vorsichtiges Studium des ersten Teils, das eine Einführung in grundsätzliche Begriffe und Arbeitsweisen der modernen Theorie dynamischer Systeme leistet, eine gute Vorbereitung für die Beschäftigung mit dem biophilosophischen Teil dieses Beitrags.
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Für Deleuze ist „das Kriterium oder der operative Begriff des Barock die Falte“. Anders als die griechische Falte, die die Perfektion des Endlichen anstrebt, will die Falte der barocken Kunst das Unendliche andeuten, weswegen sie nicht... more
Für Deleuze ist „das Kriterium oder der operative Begriff des Barock die Falte“. Anders als die griechische Falte, die die Perfektion des Endlichen anstrebt, will die Falte der barocken Kunst das Unendliche andeuten, weswegen sie nicht in eine Perfektion des Endlichen aufgehen kann. Die barocke Falte ist allerdings bestimmbare, d.h. rationale, Unendlichkeit. Leibniz – auch ein Kind seiner barocken Zeit – breitet vor uns eine Metaphysik der Unendlichkeit aus. Das Universum, ein unendlich wunderbares Kunstwerk, ist unendlich, und jedes seiner Teile ist bis ins unendlich Kleine strukturiert. Die Tatsachen der erschaffenen Welt sind in Falten eingefaltete Falten, die von Gott, der zentralen Monade des Universums, planvoll geordnet wurden.
Der fürstliche Barock, in seiner gesamteuropäischen Erscheinungsform, zeichnet sich durch den Wunsch aus, gottähnlich Neues aus dem Nichts zu schaffen, durch Liebe zur Geometrie und Absonderung von den Hauptstädten. Barocke Schlösser und Gartenlandschaften werden als „Schatullen des Absoluten“, wie Deleuze treffend sagt, aus dem Nichts erschaffen. Neue Stadtanlagen, die gemacht werden sollten, anstatt zu wachsen, wurden in einem Stück entworfen. Schlösser und Gärten wurden als riesige Kulissen eines Schauspiels der Selbstverherrlichung der Souveräne geschaffen, die bestrebt waren, die Barriere zwischen Illusion und Wirklichkeit niederzureißen.
Der barocke Garten ist ein Gesamtkunstwerk, das als Abbild der Schöpfung und des Paradieses gedacht war, das der Natur folgen, sie aber auch übersteigen sollte. Als verbesserte Natur wurde diejenige empfunden, die ihre innere eingefaltete Ordnung, welche der barocke Mensch für durchsichtig hielt, deutlicher zum Vorschein brachte. Der fürstliche barocke Garten könnte, zumindest unbewußt, einen Eindruck von der bis ins unendlich Kleine hineinreichenden rationalen Ordnung, die in den Lebewesen eingefaltet sei, vermitteln wollen.
Der fürstliche Barock, in seiner gesamteuropäischen Erscheinungsform, zeichnet sich durch den Wunsch aus, gottähnlich Neues aus dem Nichts zu schaffen, durch Liebe zur Geometrie und Absonderung von den Hauptstädten. Barocke Schlösser und Gartenlandschaften werden als „Schatullen des Absoluten“, wie Deleuze treffend sagt, aus dem Nichts erschaffen. Neue Stadtanlagen, die gemacht werden sollten, anstatt zu wachsen, wurden in einem Stück entworfen. Schlösser und Gärten wurden als riesige Kulissen eines Schauspiels der Selbstverherrlichung der Souveräne geschaffen, die bestrebt waren, die Barriere zwischen Illusion und Wirklichkeit niederzureißen.
Der barocke Garten ist ein Gesamtkunstwerk, das als Abbild der Schöpfung und des Paradieses gedacht war, das der Natur folgen, sie aber auch übersteigen sollte. Als verbesserte Natur wurde diejenige empfunden, die ihre innere eingefaltete Ordnung, welche der barocke Mensch für durchsichtig hielt, deutlicher zum Vorschein brachte. Der fürstliche barocke Garten könnte, zumindest unbewußt, einen Eindruck von der bis ins unendlich Kleine hineinreichenden rationalen Ordnung, die in den Lebewesen eingefaltet sei, vermitteln wollen.
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In seinem Buch „Das Rätsel der Vergangenheit“ weist Ricoeur der Problematik des Gedächtnisses, insofern „ [...] das, was auf dem Spiel steht, der Vergangenheitscharakter der Vergangenheit ist“ auch eine ontologische Dimension zu. Die... more
In seinem Buch „Das Rätsel der Vergangenheit“ weist Ricoeur der Problematik des Gedächtnisses, insofern „ [...] das, was auf dem Spiel steht, der Vergangenheitscharakter der Vergangenheit ist“ auch eine ontologische Dimension zu. Die Hauptintention des vorliegenden Beitrags ist es, durch den Vergleich der Ausführungen Bergsons über die Konzeptionen von 'Gedächtnis', 'Zeit', 'Vergangenheit', 'Bild' und 'Spur' mit einigen der entsprechenden Analysen Ricoeurs Wege der gegenseitigen Befruchtung aufzuzeigen. Dies erfordert eine zusammenfassende Rekapitulation des Weges Bergsons von der Zeit-Ontologie zur Gedächtnis-Theorie.
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Ausgehend von zwei zentralen und gegensätzlichen Zugängen zur Zeit-Problematik --- der scientistisch-chronometrischen und der lebensphilosophisch-geisteswissenschaftlichen --- wird die Relevanz dieses antagonistischen Verhältnisses für... more
Ausgehend von zwei zentralen und gegensätzlichen Zugängen zur Zeit-Problematik --- der scientistisch-chronometrischen und der lebensphilosophisch-geisteswissenschaftlichen --- wird die Relevanz dieses antagonistischen Verhältnisses für die Denkmalpflege herausgearbeitet. Der Autor plädiert für die Erweiterung des Selbstverständnisses der Denkmalpfleger um die Dimension der Interpretation von Denkmälern, für die er eine interdisziplinäre Kooperation vorschlägt. In Anbetracht der modernen Wissenschaftstheorie und in Abgrenzung vom Positivismus wird zugunsten eines hermeneutischen Zugangs argumentiert, vor dessen Hintergrund die interdisziplinär gewonnene Interpretation und die zu pflegenden materiellen Gegebenheiten in einem Verhältnis der gegenseitigen Bedeutungsvariation stehen. Der Autor schlägt schließlich eine klare Unterscheidung zwischen den Begriffen "Konservieren" und "Bewahren" vor. Während der Konservator gegen den physischen Verfall des Denkmals ankämpft, pflegt der Denkmal-Bewahrer, mittels der interdisziplinären Interpretationskultur, das geistig-soziale Wachstum des Denkmals.
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In the philosophical tradition, the problem of evil was primarily thought of in connection with the idea of negation, more precisely, privation, i.e. a lack of being. Thus, a shifting of this issue to the realm of reflection on the basic... more
In the philosophical tradition, the problem of evil was primarily thought of in connection with the idea of negation, more precisely, privation, i.e. a lack of being. Thus, a shifting of this issue to the realm of reflection on the basic metaphysical structure of the world took place. The ethically evil, such as wickedness and guilt, and the physical evil, such as pain and suffering, were seen to have their roots in metaphysical evil. This conception corresponds to the conviction found in a variety of religions that evil is inherent only to the limited (begrenzt) of God’s creatures, namely as a direct consequence of their limitedness; evil does nothing but evidence the separation of the creature from the absolute being of God. This appears to contradict the conception found in many religions (Zoroastrism, Manicheism, medieval Christianity, Satanism) of an independent principle of Evil (Ahriman, the Antichrist, Satan, Mephistopheles) operating actively and purposefully alongside and against God. But this conception cannot always be clearly distinguished from the first because limitation, as a lack of being, must operate with destructive intent in order to, in the broadest sense of the word, preserve its “limitedness”. The elevation of evil to a separate principle, as is seen occurring above all in monotheistic religions, but also the conception that evil only inheres to the creatures, sharply distinguishes the notion of God from that of metaphysical deficiency. According to this view, God is pure goodness, the absolute positivity. This, however, has not remained uncontradicted within philosophy.
Several significant contributions to the understanding of the concept of evil were provided by Socrates, Plato, Plotin, Mani, Augustin, Leibniz, Kant, de Sade, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Freud, Sartre Jonas and Whitehead.
In the 19th and 20th centuries, evil was linked to the notion of a lack of meaning and sense. Various scientific insights were then interpreted to mean that everything that exists manifests no deeper meaning. The elementary experience of shock, expressed above all in existentialism, is the contingency of all beings, i.e., everything that is could just as well not be, and so is perceived as meaningless. The radical loss of meaning and sense in our view of the world and man was further intensified by the two World Wars. The inconceivable barbarity of the last great war would never have been possible without the loss of meaning in our view of man as a result of the physicalistic-biologistic and economistic faith in science and the global colonialization of feeling and thinking by the secondary virtues of the industrial work ethic. Since the 18th century, the view of the world and man has been struck dead by an abbreviated naturalism that attempts to explain everything purely in a deterministic fashion and therefore denies nature and man all meaning. The 20th century, however, presented us with the discovery of the limitations of the mechanistic paradigm. Today, we again stand before the irreducible, elementary spontaneity of nature. Moreover, the Western world is becoming more and more closely acquainted with the philosophical and religious views of East Asia. It is to be expected that in the the 21st century, these developments will lead to a reconsideration of the traditional philosophical notions of good and evil. The examination of Buddhist philosophy could, above all, transform the traditional conception of evil as a lack of being, for the Buddhist teaching of universal consciousness as “emptiness” is based on other conceptions of “nothingness” and “privation” than those found in the West. It is desirable that the abstract, theoretical nihilism of the West, which plays the central role in the concept of evil, be transformed by the tranquility and wisdom of the mystical nihilism of the East.
Several significant contributions to the understanding of the concept of evil were provided by Socrates, Plato, Plotin, Mani, Augustin, Leibniz, Kant, de Sade, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Freud, Sartre Jonas and Whitehead.
In the 19th and 20th centuries, evil was linked to the notion of a lack of meaning and sense. Various scientific insights were then interpreted to mean that everything that exists manifests no deeper meaning. The elementary experience of shock, expressed above all in existentialism, is the contingency of all beings, i.e., everything that is could just as well not be, and so is perceived as meaningless. The radical loss of meaning and sense in our view of the world and man was further intensified by the two World Wars. The inconceivable barbarity of the last great war would never have been possible without the loss of meaning in our view of man as a result of the physicalistic-biologistic and economistic faith in science and the global colonialization of feeling and thinking by the secondary virtues of the industrial work ethic. Since the 18th century, the view of the world and man has been struck dead by an abbreviated naturalism that attempts to explain everything purely in a deterministic fashion and therefore denies nature and man all meaning. The 20th century, however, presented us with the discovery of the limitations of the mechanistic paradigm. Today, we again stand before the irreducible, elementary spontaneity of nature. Moreover, the Western world is becoming more and more closely acquainted with the philosophical and religious views of East Asia. It is to be expected that in the the 21st century, these developments will lead to a reconsideration of the traditional philosophical notions of good and evil. The examination of Buddhist philosophy could, above all, transform the traditional conception of evil as a lack of being, for the Buddhist teaching of universal consciousness as “emptiness” is based on other conceptions of “nothingness” and “privation” than those found in the West. It is desirable that the abstract, theoretical nihilism of the West, which plays the central role in the concept of evil, be transformed by the tranquility and wisdom of the mystical nihilism of the East.
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The paper deals with the modern philosophical concept of process from the view of its application on some aspects of dynamic psychiatry Günther Ammon's. Firstly some fundamental positions of the contemporary process philosophy are... more
The paper deals with the modern philosophical concept of process from the view of its application on some aspects of dynamic psychiatry Günther Ammon's. Firstly some fundamental positions of the contemporary process philosophy are explained. The author will propose his own understanding of the process opposed to such concepts like ”movement” and “change”. Starting from these suggestions, some views Ammon's about the development of identity, creativity, dream, and group are discussed.
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Leibniz und Whitehead können als diejenigen Denker genannt werden, die in der abendländischen Ideen-Geschichte weitestgehend die Überzeugung vertraten und beeindruckend vertieften, die belebten und unbelebten Teile der Welt würden aus... more
Leibniz und Whitehead können als diejenigen Denker genannt werden, die in der abendländischen Ideen-Geschichte weitestgehend die Überzeugung vertraten und beeindruckend vertieften, die belebten und unbelebten Teile der Welt würden aus letzten, nicht teilbaren Entitäten, aus Individuen, bestehen. Die offensichtliche Verwandtschaft zwischen den Systemen beider Denker liegt darin, daß Monaden und 'actual entities' Subjekte und Individuen, d.h. Atome sind, für die es keine unwesentlichen akzidentellen Bestimmungen gibt.
Es werden zwei zentrale Differenzen, die sich nicht aufeinander zurückführen lassen, unterschieden:
1) Leibniz ist ein Substanzontologe und Whitehead ein Prozeßmetaphysiker. Die Monaten Leibniz's wurden als von Gott geschaffene Substanzen konzipiert, während die 'actual entities' Whitehead's als sich selbst bestimmende Prozesse, für die Gott und die Objekte der Welt nicht determinierend sind. Monaden haben – weil substantiell – nur eine Art der Relationalität zur Welt: Perzeption und Appetit. Die 'actual entities' haben als Subjekte die Relationalität des Erfassens und als Objekte die der perspektivischen Aktualisierung in Raum und Zeit.
2) Die Körper der Monaden und ihre Raum-Zeit sind kontinuierlich, deshalb teilbar und somit phänomenal, denn nur Individuen sind wirklich. Die Aktualisierungen der 'actual entities' und die dazugehörige Raum-Zeit sind real und atomar. Die 'actual entitiy' lebt als Subjekt nur bis zu ihrer Aktualisierung.
Es werden zwei zentrale Differenzen, die sich nicht aufeinander zurückführen lassen, unterschieden:
1) Leibniz ist ein Substanzontologe und Whitehead ein Prozeßmetaphysiker. Die Monaten Leibniz's wurden als von Gott geschaffene Substanzen konzipiert, während die 'actual entities' Whitehead's als sich selbst bestimmende Prozesse, für die Gott und die Objekte der Welt nicht determinierend sind. Monaden haben – weil substantiell – nur eine Art der Relationalität zur Welt: Perzeption und Appetit. Die 'actual entities' haben als Subjekte die Relationalität des Erfassens und als Objekte die der perspektivischen Aktualisierung in Raum und Zeit.
2) Die Körper der Monaden und ihre Raum-Zeit sind kontinuierlich, deshalb teilbar und somit phänomenal, denn nur Individuen sind wirklich. Die Aktualisierungen der 'actual entities' und die dazugehörige Raum-Zeit sind real und atomar. Die 'actual entitiy' lebt als Subjekt nur bis zu ihrer Aktualisierung.
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The author argues that Guenter Ammon’s “Dynamic Psychiatry” displays a process-philosophically oriented image of man in psychotherapeutic perspective. Ammon describes psychic-physical health as a process of the creation and development of... more
The author argues that Guenter Ammon’s “Dynamic Psychiatry” displays a process-philosophically oriented image of man in psychotherapeutic perspective. Ammon describes psychic-physical health as a process of the creation and development of dimensions of experiencing the world and the self. One of these is the dimension of time and the experience of time. This and other positions of “Dynamic Psychiatry” offer to be examined in the light of Henri Bergson’s process-ontology, because the source of his philosophy is the time theory which he gained from the analysis of time experience. Bergson’s work is suited as a starting point for this because the essence of Ammon’s psychology shows remarkable affinities to Bergson’s understanding of time.
Der Autor sieht eine beachtenswerte Nähe des Ammonschen Verständnisses von Zeiterleben zu dem der Lebens- und Prozeßphilosophie Bergsons. Zunächst entfaltet er die Kritik letzteren an die Zeitontologie der klassischen Physik, und vor deren Hintergrund den berühmten Bergsonschen Begriff der Dauer, der psychologisch konzipiert wurde. Danach behandelt er die Grundmerkmale des im Ammonschen Sinne krankhaften Erlebens von Zeit. Es kann gezeigt werden, daß die dynamische Psychiatrie Ammons der pathogenen Erfahrung von Zeit solche Attribute zuschreibt, die stark mit denjenigen korrespondieren, die Bergson der abstrakten und erstarrten Zeitlichkeit zuordnet, was auch auf die Bedeutung des Konzepts der Dauer bezüglich der konstruktiv gelebten Zeit hinweist. Abschließend geht der Autor der Frage nach, was die menschliche Fähigkeit erklären könnte, zwischen abstraktem Zeiterleben, das manchmal notwendig ist, und künstlerisch- kreativer Dauer, balancieren zu können.
Der Autor sieht eine beachtenswerte Nähe des Ammonschen Verständnisses von Zeiterleben zu dem der Lebens- und Prozeßphilosophie Bergsons. Zunächst entfaltet er die Kritik letzteren an die Zeitontologie der klassischen Physik, und vor deren Hintergrund den berühmten Bergsonschen Begriff der Dauer, der psychologisch konzipiert wurde. Danach behandelt er die Grundmerkmale des im Ammonschen Sinne krankhaften Erlebens von Zeit. Es kann gezeigt werden, daß die dynamische Psychiatrie Ammons der pathogenen Erfahrung von Zeit solche Attribute zuschreibt, die stark mit denjenigen korrespondieren, die Bergson der abstrakten und erstarrten Zeitlichkeit zuordnet, was auch auf die Bedeutung des Konzepts der Dauer bezüglich der konstruktiv gelebten Zeit hinweist. Abschließend geht der Autor der Frage nach, was die menschliche Fähigkeit erklären könnte, zwischen abstraktem Zeiterleben, das manchmal notwendig ist, und künstlerisch- kreativer Dauer, balancieren zu können.
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Many life scientists implicitly assume a materialistic metaphysics that is based on the worldview of the 19th century. This sort of reductionistic metaphysics does not do justice to the complexity of biological phenomena, leaving many... more
Many life scientists implicitly assume a materialistic metaphysics that is based on the worldview of the 19th century. This sort of reductionistic metaphysics does not do justice to the complexity of biological phenomena, leaving many features of living processes unexplained. The authors of this book explore the viability of process metaphysics to advance our understanding of fundamental biological concepts such as organism, ontogeny, agency, teleology, environment, and normativity. Based on the metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead and other process thinkers, the authors ascribe subjective interiority to all living beings, from unicellular organisms to the most complex animals. This book highlights the uniqueness and intrinsic value of living beings. It presents a new approach to essential dimensions of the phenomenon of life with the aim of opening up new horizons in the thinking of philosophers, philosophers of biology, life scientists, and environmentalists.
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Although it is certainly true that humans are one biological species among many others, it is also the case that humans are different from all the others in quite remarkable ways. We have produced works of exquisite beauty,... more
Although it is certainly true that humans are one biological species among many others, it is also the case that humans are different from all the others in quite remarkable ways. We have produced works of exquisite beauty, sophistication, and enduring value. And yet at the same time we are threatening the extinction of ourselves as well as untold numbers of other species. To make sense of this anthropogenic paradox we first need to understand how we emerged from but diverged from the rest of our animal cousins in the course of our evolution. There is not only a diversity in the nature of animal and human evolution, but likewise in the stories about it: a diversity of scientific explanations and science-extended understandings of continuities and discontinuities between animal and human life.
The aim of our book is to provide a dynamic hub where different angles, modes, and contents of these stories could merge and be discussed. A frame for the book’s perspective is set by the question how the capacity of using symbols marks a unique outcome and an influential factor in human evolution. The book examines the core dimensions of conditio humana in the light of Whiteheadian process philosophy. Emphasis will be put on the role of those dimensions in the relation of the human to biosphere. The following questions frame the chapters of the book:
– How have human activities influenced the selective forces on human evolution?
– How did the usage of symbolic thought shape the evolution of human brain and mind?
– How do our symbolically constructed spiritual and metaphysical belief systems influence human rationality and morality?
– How has our moral experience influenced human rationality?
– How do our unique forms of power relations distinguish humans from other species?
– How should we respond to the trends toward transhumanism and bio-technocracy?
A central issue of the book is the different conceptions of the future of human evolution (transhumanistic, biological, spiritual, ecological etc.) and the possible approach of spirituality and science.
The aim of our book is to provide a dynamic hub where different angles, modes, and contents of these stories could merge and be discussed. A frame for the book’s perspective is set by the question how the capacity of using symbols marks a unique outcome and an influential factor in human evolution. The book examines the core dimensions of conditio humana in the light of Whiteheadian process philosophy. Emphasis will be put on the role of those dimensions in the relation of the human to biosphere. The following questions frame the chapters of the book:
– How have human activities influenced the selective forces on human evolution?
– How did the usage of symbolic thought shape the evolution of human brain and mind?
– How do our symbolically constructed spiritual and metaphysical belief systems influence human rationality and morality?
– How has our moral experience influenced human rationality?
– How do our unique forms of power relations distinguish humans from other species?
– How should we respond to the trends toward transhumanism and bio-technocracy?
A central issue of the book is the different conceptions of the future of human evolution (transhumanistic, biological, spiritual, ecological etc.) and the possible approach of spirituality and science.
Research Interests:
The present study was written with the intent of opening up new ontological dimensions to the debate concerning the nature of the organism, which broaden the horizons of contemporary biological science. Various traditions from the... more
The present study was written with the intent of opening up new
ontological dimensions to the debate concerning the nature of the
organism, which broaden the horizons of contemporary biological
science. Various traditions from the natural sciences and Naturphilosophie
are further developed and synthesized into a novel theory of
the organism. Organismic genesis is contemplated in light of the process
of individual ontogenesis and its most dramatic phase, embryogenesis.
The ontogenetic theme also gives rise to the problem of organismic
self-maintenance, which exists both for multicellular and
unicellular life. In the synthesis here proposed, foundational principles
of Alfred North Whitehead’s and Henri Bergson’s process ontologies
find new integration in the concept of the organism. From the
unicellular to the most highly-developed of organisms, subjective interiority
is awarded in degrees to all life forms, wherein experience is
granted a central role in the ontogeny and self-maintenance of the
organism. Finally, a vision for a future process metaphysics is
sketched in which essential elements of the ontologies of both thinkers
are brought together.
Die vorliegende Untersuchung wurde verfasst, um der Diskussion
zum Wesen des Organismus neue ontologische Dimensionen zu eröffnen,
die den weltanschaulichen Horizont der gegenwärtigen Biowissenschaften
erweitert. Unterschiedliche naturwissenschaftliche
und naturphilosophische Traditionen werden weitergedacht und zu
einer neuen Theorie des Organismus synthetisiert. Organismisches
Werden wird in Bezug auf die Ontogenese des Individuums und vor
allem ihre dramatischste Phase, die Embryogenese, betrachtet. Zur
ontogenetischen Thematik gehört zwangsläufig auch die Problematik
der Selbsterhaltung des Organismus, die auch für einzellige Lebewesen
besteht. In der hier vorgeschlagenen Synthese werden Grundgedanken
der Prozessontologien von Alfred North Whitehead und
Henri Bergson auf eine neue Weise in die Idee des Organismus integriert.
Von den Einzellern bis zu höchst entwickelten Organismen
wird jedem Lebewesen in abgestufter Form subjektive Innerlichkeit
zugesprochen, wobei dem Erleben eine zentrale Rolle für die Ontogenese
und Selbsterhaltung des Organismus zukommt. Überdies wird
eine zukünftige Prozessmetaphysik skizziert, in der essentielle Elemente
der Ontologien beider Denker miteinander integriert werden.
ontological dimensions to the debate concerning the nature of the
organism, which broaden the horizons of contemporary biological
science. Various traditions from the natural sciences and Naturphilosophie
are further developed and synthesized into a novel theory of
the organism. Organismic genesis is contemplated in light of the process
of individual ontogenesis and its most dramatic phase, embryogenesis.
The ontogenetic theme also gives rise to the problem of organismic
self-maintenance, which exists both for multicellular and
unicellular life. In the synthesis here proposed, foundational principles
of Alfred North Whitehead’s and Henri Bergson’s process ontologies
find new integration in the concept of the organism. From the
unicellular to the most highly-developed of organisms, subjective interiority
is awarded in degrees to all life forms, wherein experience is
granted a central role in the ontogeny and self-maintenance of the
organism. Finally, a vision for a future process metaphysics is
sketched in which essential elements of the ontologies of both thinkers
are brought together.
Die vorliegende Untersuchung wurde verfasst, um der Diskussion
zum Wesen des Organismus neue ontologische Dimensionen zu eröffnen,
die den weltanschaulichen Horizont der gegenwärtigen Biowissenschaften
erweitert. Unterschiedliche naturwissenschaftliche
und naturphilosophische Traditionen werden weitergedacht und zu
einer neuen Theorie des Organismus synthetisiert. Organismisches
Werden wird in Bezug auf die Ontogenese des Individuums und vor
allem ihre dramatischste Phase, die Embryogenese, betrachtet. Zur
ontogenetischen Thematik gehört zwangsläufig auch die Problematik
der Selbsterhaltung des Organismus, die auch für einzellige Lebewesen
besteht. In der hier vorgeschlagenen Synthese werden Grundgedanken
der Prozessontologien von Alfred North Whitehead und
Henri Bergson auf eine neue Weise in die Idee des Organismus integriert.
Von den Einzellern bis zu höchst entwickelten Organismen
wird jedem Lebewesen in abgestufter Form subjektive Innerlichkeit
zugesprochen, wobei dem Erleben eine zentrale Rolle für die Ontogenese
und Selbsterhaltung des Organismus zukommt. Überdies wird
eine zukünftige Prozessmetaphysik skizziert, in der essentielle Elemente
der Ontologien beider Denker miteinander integriert werden.
Research Interests: Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Biology, Dynamical Systems, Complexity Theory, Self-Organization, and 15 moreSystems Biology, Henri Bergson, Alfred North Whitehead, Process Philosophy, Biophilosophy, Cell Biology, Theoretical biology, Entropy, Organismal Biology, Naturphilosophie, Non-Linear Dynamics, Process Metaphysics, Information Theory, Entropy, Theoretical Biology, A.N. Whitehead, and Embryogenesis
The Cartesian metaphysical background of most contemporary bioscientists limits their ability to understand the uniqueness of biological processes. This book aims to contribute to the foundation of a new direction in biophilosophy which... more
The Cartesian metaphysical background of most contemporary
bioscientists limits their ability to understand the uniqueness of biological processes. This book aims to contribute to the foundation of a new direction in biophilosophy which goes beyond many of the core metaphysical assumptions of contemporary mainstream biology. All of the co-authors of this volume treat central metaphysical questions about the nature of life from the perspective of Whitehead's process philosophy. These questions are crucial for the biosciences, but cannot be addressed by them since they touch on metaphysical issues. The authors of this volume explore the viability of process ontology for increasing our understanding of core concepts of biology such as organism, evolution, and teleology. The book presents a new philosophical approach to several dimensions of the phenomenon of life.
bioscientists limits their ability to understand the uniqueness of biological processes. This book aims to contribute to the foundation of a new direction in biophilosophy which goes beyond many of the core metaphysical assumptions of contemporary mainstream biology. All of the co-authors of this volume treat central metaphysical questions about the nature of life from the perspective of Whitehead's process philosophy. These questions are crucial for the biosciences, but cannot be addressed by them since they touch on metaphysical issues. The authors of this volume explore the viability of process ontology for increasing our understanding of core concepts of biology such as organism, evolution, and teleology. The book presents a new philosophical approach to several dimensions of the phenomenon of life.
Research Interests:
Dieses Buch soll zur Erneuerung der naturphilosophischen Betrachtung des Lebendigen beitragen. Ziel der Autoren ist, dazu beizutragen, die Diskussion zum Verständnis des Lebendigen um neue ontologische Dimensionen, die außerhalb... more
Dieses Buch soll zur Erneuerung der naturphilosophischen Betrachtung des Lebendigen beitragen. Ziel der Autoren ist, dazu beizutragen, die Diskussion zum Verständnis des Lebendigen um neue ontologische Dimensionen, die außerhalb bioszientistischer Selbstverständlichkeiten stehen, zu vertiefen. Denn Biophilosophie ist nicht automatisch als Philosophie der Biologie zu verstehen – sie kann auch um die Dimension einer zeitgemäßen Naturphilosophie des Lebendigen ergänzt werden. Zu diesem Zweck behandeln alle an diesem Projekt beteiligten Autoren, ausgehend von der Prozeßphilosophie Whiteheads, zentrale Fragen der Problematik des Lebendigen, die im Rahmen biowissenschaftlicher Diskurse nicht erschöpfend diskutiert werden können.