Ernst von Glasersfeld

In vielerlei Hinsicht weist das Werk von Friedemann Schulz von Thun konstruktivistische Züge auf. Er selbst negierte das. Diese Bachelorarbeit jedoch zeigt den Mittelweg zwischen Realismus und Radikalem Konstruktivismus auf – und konstatiert, dass Schulz von Thuns Denken eine Dialektik aus beiden Erkenntnistheorien verfolgt, die ferner von der Humanistischen Psychologie und der Systemtheorie durchdrungen ist.

Говорить об ошибке в когнитивной эволюции Homo позволяет наблюдаемая в прогнозе реальность и многовековой опыт жизнедеятельности человечества: ни обширное научное знание, ни фундаментальные духовные учения, ни гуманистическая технологизация не изменили взаимоотношений человека с окружающей реальностью и метавоздействия на действительность.  Пока что наша когнитивная эволюция носит характер стихийного бедствия, которое терпит человечество и среда его обитания, как результат прямого воздействия человека, уже более 5 столетий к ряду (становление классической науки).

Design thinking is not thinking about design, but rather a re-focus on the way we think, about the world in general, and in this cybernetic process the real self can be brought into being. Gramma/topology is the social structuration of a theory-as-ontology framework with the ability to function as a design educational model that could enrich the teaching and learning of design in all its diverse applications. To paraphrase and deconstruct Derrida, I shall call this model gramma/topology; since such a peculiar field-of-knowing does not exist, in any particular form, before the model is used, no one can say with certainty what the outcome would be, but it has a right to existence, a place staked out in advance for both designer-Dasein and design-Dasein.

The book „Radical Constructivism. A Brief Introduction” concisely introduces the reader to the history and lines of argumentation of a particular type of constructivism, the founders of which are, among others, Ernst von Glasersfeld and Heinz von Foerster. It turns out that the view according to which we do not have access to an independent
reality is present in the Western philosophical tradition since the presocratics,
and it finds its fullest expression in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. In the following parts of the book, the author presents the components of the concept of autopoiesis by Humberto R. Maturana, which as a theory of the organization of life, is the starting point of constructivist epistemology. The concept of the brain as a self-referential
system, which constructs the world known to consciousness solely on the basis of reactions to its own states of excitation, is derived from Maturana’s concept which is the part of the long development of systems theory.
Later in the book, the author outlines the constructivist concept of communication that emerges from the model of how the brain and mind work. He recalls the views of the classics of constructivism, indicating that communication is based on the parallelization of the structures of the brain’s operation, leading to the creation of a virtual consensual space.

My commentary has three aims. Firstly, to provide additional support to Konrad Werner’s correct insight that radical constructivism is based on a radical distinction between experienced reality and ontological reality. This is a strong metaphysical statement. Secondly, that radical constructivism is implicitly rooted in Cartesian ontological dualism. Thirdly, that Whitehead’s process ontology provides a fruitful foundation for Werner’s thesis that perceptions are metaphysically significant.

I set out a possible framework for a designerly theory of knowing, called gramma/topology, a framework that is simultaneously a framing action in real time; it is a means towards an end. However, this model-of-knowing-and-exploring, projected onto the world, becomes a unique construction that may look the same (to an observer), but differs in use from person to person like fingerprints. The main part deals with the theoretical and philosophical inputs that provide the core of what can become gramma/topology, an argumentative theory in search of both epistemological and ontological ways of knowing. After a short summation, and as an example of my own gramma/topological reasoning I discuss the structure of a cybernetic design conversation, including Heidegger’s notion of the ontology of equipment, and end with Aristotle’s defense of arguing to first principles.

RESUMEN Este trabajo busca encontrar una caracterización integral y contextualizada del constructivismo de Niklas Luhmann. El análisis persigue cuatro interrogantes: ¿cuál es el objetivo de su indagación constructivista?, ¿cómo se relaciona con su teoría sociológica?, ¿cómo se posiciona frente a las distintas corrientes filosóficas que se observan en el constructivismo?, y ¿cuál es su rasgo distintivo en la discu-sión más amplia de la epistemología constructivista? Las interpretaciones aquí ofrecidas caracterizan al programa de Luhmann como interesado por la teoría cognitiva, defensor de una concepción social y coherentista del conocimiento, y basada en el predominio de la diferencia como principio orientador de su enfoque. Es desde estas posiciones que dialogamos con la bibliografía especializada.

ABSTRACT This article aims for a comprehensive, contextualized characterization of Niklas Luhmann's constructivism. The analysis poses four questions: What is the objective of his constructivist inquiry? How is it linked to his sociological theory? How is it positioned vis-à-vis the different philosophical currents in constructi-vism? What distinguishes it in the broader discussion of constructivist episte-mology? The interpretations offered here characterize Luhmann's program as interested in cognitive theory; one that defends a social conception of knowledge that seeks to make it coherent; and based on the predominance of difference as the main guide for its approach. It is from these positions that the author dialogues with the specialized literature.

In 2010, upon Ernst ‘s suggestion, we started working on a joint essay on the centrality of human experience and the emergence of consciousness. A first draft was completed a week before his passing (and can be found in the publication section).  In this personal note (for the inauguration of the EvG Archive, Innsbruck, 2013)  I wish to revive a few moments in our kitchen-table conversations that moved both of us out of our comfort zone, and became an occasion for mutual enrichment. At the heart of Ernst's scholarly contribution, as i see it,  laid what I'd coin a rationalist’s views on questions too hard to be tackled by rationality alone. My master’s stance on human experience often seemed voluntarily "contained" , excluding any form of ideation that couldn’t be opened to linguistic or empirical scrutiny (spelled out). And yet, the “Spielraum” at the edge of this edifice was looser around the kitchen-table, when Ernst himself delighted in reconciling the scientist, the poet, the bricoleur, the trickster, and the ”buongustaio” within. His greatest gift to me was to indulge in mindful musings on the more un-reasonable facets of human experience while, at the same time, not excluding their potential relevance for the very serious essay we were writing.  Below, four moments of breakthrough in areas where our views differed—so they didn't quite make it into the paper !

Context: Constructivist epistemology is not a doctrinal set of clear and consistent theses and assumptions but a movement full of tensions, with minimally integrated lines of discussions. Problem: This situation explains why it is so difficult to come up with a general definition of constructivist epistemology that could serve as a starting point to study its several research programs systematically and comparatively. Method: We compare the constructivist epistemologies of Jean Piaget, Ernst von Glasersfeld, Humberto Maturana, and Niklas Luhmann regarding tensions between knowledge/reality and individual/society. Results: Our comparison leads to a general definition of constructivist epistemology as a heterogeneous movement problematizing certain dualities - such as subject/object, knowledge/reality, or individual/society - that have been shown to be central for epistemological inquiry. We argue that such dualisms can be used as dimensions for critical analysis, comparison, and discussion among the different research programs, and that, at the same time, they would allow us to analyze the general strategies characterizing such programs. The comparative and critical analysis of the programs by way of the aforementioned tensions results in an organized presentation highlighting their convergences, divergences, and singularities.

Wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis wohnt der Nimbus der unantastbaren Unfehlbarkeit inne. Wissenschaftliche Theorie, so wird angenommen, basiert auf objektiv feststellbaren Tatsachen, die mithilfe objektiver Methoden einer ebenfalls objektiv erfassbaren Wirklichkeit abgewonnen werden. Als mutmaßlich neutrale Beobachter sind Wissenschaftler (Subjekt) scheinbar imstande, die in der Realität vorkommenden Phänomene (Objekte) mithilfe einer geschulten Wahrnehmung und einer theoriegeleiteten Argumentationsstruktur zu erklären. Oft wird dabei indes übersehen, dass jeder Prozess des Erkennens an die Instanz des Erkennenden gebunden ist. Objektivität wird Sachverhalten folglich von Seiten eines Subjekts, bspw. dem Wissenschaftler, zugeschrieben, dem wiederum die Fähigkeit unterstellt wird, selbst ein objektives Urteil über den Sachverhalt fällen zu können. Doch ein Subjekt bleibt in seiner Meinung stets subjektiv. Wahrheit ist daher auch im wissenschaftlichen Diskurs eine Mär – diese These ist konstruktivistisch.

In this thesis I have explored some of the ways in which the contexts of epistemology, ethics and designing architecture are each concerned with undecidable questions (that is, with those questions that have no right answers). Drawing on design research, second‐order cybernetics and radical constructivism, I have understood this undecidability to follow in each case from our being part of the situation in which we are acting. This idea is primarily epistemological (being part of the world we observe, we cannot verify the relationship between our understanding and the world beyond our experience as it is impossible to observe the latter) but can also be interpreted spatially and ethically. From this starting point I have developed connections between questions in architecture, epistemology and ethics in two parallel investigations. In the first, I have proposed a connection between design and ethics where design is understood as an activity in which ethical questioning is implicit. Rather than the usual application of ethical theory to practice, I have instead proposed that design can inform ethical thinking, both in the context of designing architecture and also more generally, through (1) the ways designers approach what Rittel (1972) called “wicked problems” (which, I argue, have the same structure as ethical dilemmas) and (2) the implicit consideration of others in design’s core methodology. In parallel to this I have explored the spatial sense of the idea that we are part of the world through a series of design investigations comprising projects set in everyday situations and other speculative drawings. Through these I have proposed reformulating the architectural theme of place, which is usually associated with phenomenology, in constructivist terms as the spatiality of observing our own observing and so as where the self‐reference of epistemology (that we cannot experience the world beyond our experience) becomes manifest.

Starting from Carl Rogers hypothesis, that if therapy can activate coping capacities of the clients, same methods could improve in generell teaching-learning situations, the author defines requirements for scientific grounded "Rechtsdidaktik". In a second part he shows the practical implications of his theoretical approach.

A rather impressive proportion of solid scientific theories of consciousness has developed (Nagel 1974, 1986; Jackson 1982, 1986; McGinn 1991; Block 1995; Chalmers 1996; Crick & Koch, 1999; Edelman, 2004; Sokolov, 2004), capable of initiating reasonable changes in modern human actuality. However, the evolution of Homo sapiens is aggravated by a flawed interaction in the noosphere and anthroposphere. Before giving an answer we must ask the right question — what is capable of combining the results of human cognition with personal cognition in such a way that it provides ecological reflection (has attributes of the ecology of the mind). And we need to start the search with the general that is present in all the theories and fields of knowledge. Since, one way or another, this is the only available cognitive evolution that we comprehend and it happened to a human, around a human and was initiated by a human, then we will talk about the system-forming core of human substance. My goal is to isolate this substance, determine the mechanisms of its functioning and the conditions under which the substance transforms into a new quality, causing a general cognitive shift in the living system. Consequently, the study should result in the development of a cognitive model.

In this paper, I argue that radical constructivists shall refrain from using formulations such as " We can only experience our constructed world but never reality as it is in itself ". Ernst von Glasersfeld's claim that knowledge in principle cannot reflect reality is symptomatic in this respect (von Glasersfeld 1981, 95). The problem is that many radical constructivists take these formulations and the idea behind it for granted – although they are self-contradictory. To resolve this problem, I propose that constructivists are well advised to adopt Richard Rorty's " antirepresentationalist particularism ". In this way we do not answer the problem of self-contradiction in an argumentative way, but we lose interest in making such problematic statements. As I take it, after we freed ourselves from the ensnarement of such statements forced upon us by philosophical tradition, radical constructivism becomes even more fascinating and enchanting. 2

The idea to write this essay sprang up in a casual conversation that led to the question of how the word “experience” would be translated into German. Distinctions between the German “Erleben” and “Erfahren,” and their intricacies with “Erkennen” and “Anerkennen,” soon led to the conviction that this was a thread worth pursuing.  And indeed, much has been written about the nature of experience! Yet, to this day, there is little consensus on  the role of consciousness in the process of experiencing. While Radical Constructivism acknowledges the significance of tacit or sensorimotor knowledge in the individual’s practical operating, it cannot admit it as a basis to the formation of conceptual structures .  Drawing from our backgrounds in epistemology and psychology, and a shared interest in Piaget’s psychogenetic approach, we investigate the origins and development of human experience, in this case the mastery of space, time, causation, and object-permanency. We focus on how “noticeable encounters” are gauged, reflected upon, and ultimately worked through, consciously or unconsciously, by the “experiencer.”  A child’s abilities to enact a certain action pattern in a given situation no more demonstrates a representation of the pattern than does recognition in the case of objects. In his studies with children, Piaget has shown that the Kantian categories of space, time, object, and causation are co-constitutive of the child’s own [loco]motion– and its felt impact – as a means to make the world cohere. Of importance here are the concepts of “effective causality,” felicitous encounters, and agency. Understanding the circumstances under which some “lived” events, whether self-initiated or striking as if out of nowhere, become noticeable and able affect a person’s life is a daunting task. This joint essay is no more than a conversation-starter and an invitation to further explore the intricacies between agency and causation, sensation and cognition,—and, yes, motions and emotions— in the emergence of consciousness itself.

The article describes the timeline of 50 years of publications by von Glasersfeld, an anecdote about a connection between Ceccato and the University of Zurich in the 60s, the attempt to present Ceccato’s ideas as compatible and complementary with the neuroscience discourse in 1985, von Glasersfeld’s opinion about this attempt, and this attempt’s potential influence on the emergence of a new concept in neuroscience, “EEG microstates.”

Purpose: Radical Constructivism has been subject to extensive criticism and denigration such as that it is a naturalized biologism which supports an “anything goes” philosophy of arbitrarily constructed realities. In an extreme case RC is equated with intellectual silliness. These accusations are to be refuted. Approach: Based on the concept that cognition can work only with experiences, we investigate the question of where their apparent order comes from. Arguments are presented that favor the amorphousness of the “external” world. To support the idea of “internal” order we review results in formal network research. Findings: The properties of networks suggest that order arises without influence from the outside. Conclusions: RC based on network models (a) does not need any empirical support and is therefore no biologism nor naturalism, (b) forgoes arbitrariness, and (c) goes beyond narrative (armchair) philosophy.

Is von Glasersfeld’s constructivism actually radical? In this article, I respond
to this question by analyzing von Glasersfeld’s main works. I argue that the
essential theoretical move of radical constructivism – namely the assertion that
reality is the construction of a human mind that only responds to the subjective
perception of ‘what fits’ – results in a conservative vision of reality, knowledge,
and education. To the extent that the friction with, and the challenge of, reality is
eliminated, knowledge remains only a subjective affair and the world is reduced
to a living tautology. In this way, von Glasersfeld constructs a theory of ethical
disengagement in which personal responsibility is de facto denied. Thus, to the
extent that education entails (and, in a sense, is) responsibility, change, and
comparison, radical constructivism is a theory that is unsuitable for education.
I also attempt to argue that the equivalence between radical constructivism and
relativism and nihilism that many support is incorrect; relativism and nihilism,
indeed, stem from a strong moral stance; thus, they may be educationally
promising.

Este ensayo tiene como propósito responder a la pregunta: ¿Cómo se presenta la reflexividad sociológica desde una perspectiva constructivista? Este ejercicio de evaluación sobre la reflexión de carácter retrospectivo sobre la propia ciencia social, entre otros aspectos, se desenvolverá con la intención de remarcar que la reflexividad se plantea como una cuestión necesaria para realizar una suspensión de prejuicios y cargas culturales. En este sentido, se puede valorizar que parte de la cientificidad del trabajo de investigación social, en el campo del constructivismo, está determinada por estos ejercicios de auto reflexión. El hecho de ir más allá de supuestos científicos objetivistas, es posiblemente, uno de los atributos que la reflexividad sociológica ofrece al enfoque constructivista y la ciencia social en general.