This article was downloaded by: On: 20 June 2011 Access details: Access Details: Free Access Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 3741 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Physical Education & Sport Pedagogy Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713674664 Sports coaching, virtue ethics and emulation Alun Hardmana; Carwyn Jonesa; Robyn Jonesa a Cardiff School of Sport, University of Wales Institute, Cardiff, UK Online publication date: 11 October 2010 To cite this Article Hardman, Alun , Jones, Carwyn and Jones, Robyn(2010) 'Sports coaching, virtue ethics and emulation', Physical Education & Sport Pedagogy, 15: 4, 345 — 359 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/17408980903535784 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17408980903535784 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. 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The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. Physical Education and Sport Pedagogy Vol. 15, No. 4, October 2010, 345– 359 Sports coaching, virtue ethics and emulation Alun Hardman∗ , Carwyn Jones and Robyn Jones Cardiff School of Sport, University of Wales Institute, Cardiff, UK (Received 23 July 2008; final version received 15 September 2009) Downloaded At: 08:56 20 June 2011 Background: The argument in this paper is founded on two related premises. First, we claim that the moral imperative of sport is derived not from specific rules or laws associated with it but from its intrinsic nature. As engaging in sporting practices inevitably require us to be pre-occupied with central principles such as fairness (and therefore justice), our encounters with notions of ‘fair play’ and of a ‘level playing field’ provide practical examples of where sport and the moral inherently coexist. Though such encounters are contextualised through particular sporting environments, they nonetheless require sportspersons to acquaint themselves, contemplate and act upon moral principles, and elsewhere challenge and confront those whom they suspect do not. Sport, therefore, provides the context and wherewithal to ‘explore the contours of morally relevant possibilities’ and is why it can be considered a ‘moral laboratory’. The second premise we establish is that the coach plays a central role in influencing the moral terrain within contemporary sports practices. The coaching session, the training field, the changing room, the game, are all environments where children (and older athletes), alongside the presence of the coach, develop and test the moral dimensions of their evolving characters. Purpose: Our argument is that the coach, having a central role in this process, ought to positively influence what is happening, endeavouring to ensure that the moral encounters possible within the coaching context go well rather than badly. Like it or not then, we argue that coaching is to be recognised and conducted as a moral enterprise. Interventions: Drawing on the philosophical principles of virtue ethics we attempt to illuminate and make more explicit what has often been muddy and implicit with regard to the positive moral influence and role of the coach. We do this by identifying three distinct normative questions and suggest some practical implications for coaching practice based on critical reflection. First, we assess what kinds of person a coach should be. Second, we consider how a coach should behave and act. Third, we deliberate on what should be the purpose of coaching. Throughout the article we provide examples to illustrate our arguments. We suggest ways in which change to individual coaching practice and the wider institutional structures in which coaches operate can overcome actual socio-cultural and political barriers that currently prevent a more fruitful sporting environment for all. Keywords: sports coaching; ethics; virtues; emulation Introduction In this paper, we argue that sport provides the opportunity to realise a range of technical, physical and moral excellences. In order for it to do so it is necessary to pay equal attention ∗ Corresponding author. Email: ahardman@uwic.ac.uk ISSN 1740-8989 print/ISSN 1742-5786 online # 2010 Association for Physical Education DOI: 10.1080/17408980903535784 http://www.informaworld.com Downloaded At: 08:56 20 June 2011 346 A. Hardman et al. to both the inherent morality of sports structures and the moral agency of the coach. It means that the coach, as a central actor in the sports milieu, has responsibilities that reach beyond the purely technical and tactical into the moral (Jones, Armour, and Potrac 2004; Jones 2007). Indeed, the coach is centrally implicated in the realisation of the good sporting contest in terms of both constituting and regulating appropriate behaviour. Such moral responsibilities extend beyond policing foul play, teaching good manners and inculcating a raft of ‘fair play conventions’, to the cultivation and fostering of certain virtues which are directly implicated in the realisation of the value of sport. Despite palpable differences between elite level competitive and participatory recreational sport, real noteworthy normative constraints at the heart of the activity provide a ‘contingent universal condition of its practice’ which cut across how each and every coach ought to behave (Morgan 1994, 215). At all levels, therefore, the coach, regardless of his or her professional standing and particular character, is bound by moral obligations that are located by reference to the inherent nature of sport. The ethical arguments underlying this claim are perhaps less familiar and more controversial to coaches (but no less important) than the moral arguments that support formal interventions dealing with specific issues such as child welfare, sexual abuse and performance enhancing drug issues. But our view is that in all matters of central importance, in word and through deed, the coach should behave well, set good examples and be committed to the goods or properties that make sport uniquely valuable. In this paper, we first provide a virtue theoretical account of sport. Following MacIntyre (1985), this depiction highlights both the intrinsic value of practices such as sport and the nature of moral character. In doing so, we outline the specific character qualities required for fully realising sporting and coaching experiences. Second, we outline the way in which the coach’s character is crucial in order to initiate participants into the values of sport. In particular, we discuss the coach as a moral exemplar and the emulative process that such status involves. Finally, we outline key personal and wider socio-political questions the coach ought to consider and reflect upon in order to develop in their capacity as a professional best able to contribute positively to the sporting experience of those they coach. Sport, coaching and ‘initiation’ into social practice Coaching practice, both in relation to the ethical conduct of coaches and the development of the character of athletes, can be informed greatly by Aristotelian virtue ethics. At the forefront of a renaissance in moral philosophy, virtue ethics provides a rich and informative resource for understanding both the nature of the practice of coaching and of the agents involved. Indeed, the work of the neo-Aristotelian philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre (1985) has been used extensively in the sports ethics literature to conceive of sport as a social practice (Morgan 1994; McNamee 1995; Jones 2001, 2003). Although the trend has been criticised (McFee 2004) there is much to be gained from embracing some of the key tenets of MacIntyre’s (1985) work. MacIntyre’s conception of a social practice contains both normative and descriptive elements. His carefully articulated normative framework provides a robust and ethically powerful critical resource. To understand sports as practice in a MacIntyrian sense reveals some important and necessary normative expectations of coaches. When referring to practices, MacIntyre means something very specific: By a ‘practice’ I mean any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that activity are realised in the course of Physical Education and Sport Pedagogy 347 Downloaded At: 08:56 20 June 2011 trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partly definitive of, that form of human activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended. (MacIntyre 1985, 187) Practices then include such activities as science, agriculture, tennis, soccer and art. Alternatively, constituent activities like preparing slides, ploughing, serving, shooting or mixing paint are not practices. Practices by their very nature have significant degrees of complexity but more importantly and fundamental to their distinctiveness is an appreciation of those goods which are internal and, thereby, definitive of them. The notion of goods internal to practices such as sport provides the cornerstone of a normative, rather than a descriptive, theory of a practice. They represent the raison d’etre of practices in terms of both their ends and means. Internal goods represent the goals of participation, but also by implication specify limited technical and normative ways of achieving these goals. These internal goods are the precious gems of sport participation. They are what make sports unique and special. The strength, poise, tactical acumen, agility, dexterity, speed of thought and movement required of the volleyball player, for example, represents, at the same time, what is strived for and what is valuable. On the basis of MacIntyre’s understanding of sport as a practice, the initiation of persons into sport and to the achievement of its internal goods should be the main priority of the coach. The coach must aim at assisting and encouraging his or her charges in appropriate ways to attain these goals or goods to their fullest potential. Achieving these goods in volleyball (and all sports) demands that volleyball be played in a particular way. For example, dexterity and anticipation are futile if the ball is not spiked cleanly over the net. The player must have courage to play the shot taking into account the possible risks (being blocked, missing the target, sustaining an injury and so forth), strike the ball cleanly and honestly (it is possible that an illegal ‘carry’ may advantage the spiking player) thus preserving the just nature of the contest. To win a point by a poor or illegal technique is not to fully experience the satisfaction of the internal goods. It may, of course, be the case that a player gains satisfaction from winning the point by fair means or foul, but such a player is not displaying the virtues of honesty or justice and the source of their satisfaction cannot, we argue, be the internal goods. Exercising qualities such as speed, endurance and technique, without the cultivation and exhibition of particular virtues, or qualities of moral character such as perseverance, patience, magnanimity in victory and grace in defeat, is to fall considerably short of achieving fully the standards of sporting excellence. Similarly, purely instrumental actions aimed primarily at winning, (such as those associated with the deliberate professional foul) may be technically and tactically skilful, but lack the exhibition of requisite virtues (particularly those of honesty and fairness) required for achieving the internal goods (Fraleigh 1984; Simon 1991; Morgan 1994). To help explain this tension, MacIntyre (1985) claims that, in addition to internal goods of a moral and non-moral kind, there are other goods associated with the practice of sport, particularly high level elite sport, namely external goods. External goods are scarce and though the paradigm example is prize money, such rewards come in various commodified forms such as fame, celebrity, reverence and esteem. A common derivative of each is attendant political power, cultural capital and social privilege. The coach clearly has a role in helping the athlete procure money, fame, trophies and so forth, even though the existence and appeal of such goods is potentially corrupting. The temptation of money, fame and fortune according to MacIntyre (1985) leads to shortcuts, cheating, deception, and a win-at-all-costs attitude. The virtues mentioned above play an important role in Downloaded At: 08:56 20 June 2011 348 A. Hardman et al. staving off these corrupting external influences. The list of virtues need not be limited to justice, courage and honesty. In sport, developing integrity, fairness, magnanimity, humility, cooperation, and loyalty are all candidates for a well-rounded athlete. The coach then, in assisting athletes to fulfil their potentialities within sport, has a responsibility to foster a strong character who is just, honest and courageous enough to withstand the temptations that arise through commercial excess. Care is needed with regards to understanding how a virtue ethics based critique is to be understood in the context of the broader socio-political panorama in which commercialised sport emerges. Morgan (2006) argues that from the very start, roughly around the middle of the nineteenth century, modern sport has always been bound up with neo-liberal logics of free market capitalism. This ideological backdrop presents any moral critique with two fundamental obstacles. On the one hand, evaluation needs to combat the view that as sport and money have always been inextricably linked, sport can offer nothing by way of moral insight. It is a view which accepts without reservation that sport is wholly reducible to the market forces. The second, more damaging and surreptitious view facing a sports moralist is the historically false and ill-conceived perspective that the salvation of sport lies in recapturing a ‘golden-age’ when sport had status as a morally commendable practice. Such an ideal is commonly presented through the notion of amateurism – a view that sport was better off when money had no place in it. Morgan is quick to remind us that not only is the idea of a time when money and sport were separate is an untruth, but more seriously, it is a myth which has been actively encouraged by those who stand to gain most from the commercial potential of sport. He argues (2006, 53) that amateurism is an ‘afterthought’ of professional sport – a ‘belated invention’ which sporting entrepreneurs and owners have used to subvert the normal narrative of classbound labour relationships (and their disputes) at the heart of early, mature and late capitalism’s industrial relations. Nowhere better is this seen than in the way that many sports such as rugby union, athletics and other Olympic sports resisted long and hard the presence of salaried athletes on the grounds that being paid to play invalidated the entire (moral) project of sport. A more discerning examination of recent sport history however, may suggest that the realities of amateurism did not represent the moral antithesis of professionalism, but rather involved an obfuscating propaganda which long prevented the development of a more realistic and poignant moral critique of capitalist sport. Instead of looking towards the past of amateurism for the critical tools needed to examine developments within modern sport, the rise of sports professionalism provides the very grounds immanent upon which a virtue ethics critique of sport is best launched. The ideal of sporting professionalism and the language of sporting virtues, internal goods and admirable narrative traditions, go hand-in-hand as the basis for an effective ‘immanent’ critique of sport (Morgan 1994, 188– 200). Such a critique accepts, rather than denies, the symbiotic relationship between money and sport. But in order to present itself as a moral one, the critique must also argue, as a primary point of principle, that external rewards should not be conferred capriciously. McNamee (1995, 78) contends that such rewards as money and trophies, along with public recognition, are legitimate goods of sport when justly conferred. The point is, when one wins in the right way, by adhering to the spirit of the game, one deserves to be rewarded. When one wins in the wrong way, by cheating, one does not deserve to be rewarded. Therefore, what is centrally misguided about popular conceptions of modern professional sport is not that professionalism as opposed to amateurism leads to moral decline, but that the moral failings of sport, where they do occur, are because sport is not professional enough. Downloaded At: 08:56 20 June 2011 Physical Education and Sport Pedagogy 349 A few examples from elite professional sport help demonstrate this point. It is now the norm for coaches and players to be increasingly bitter and sore when losing with the televised post-match interviews being little more than post-mortem examinations of officials’ performances. Blame for losses is often apportioned to the officials’ inability to discern genuine from disingenuous attempts to play fairly without any recognition of how the complicity of athletes and equivocation of coaches is responsible for muddying the waters. So when Premier League football manager Joe Kinnear describes a top-level official as a ‘Mickey Mouse referee’ (Ley 2008) for giving what he thought was an undeserved penalty, he takes for granted the radical instrumental view that the rules are nothing more than obstacles to be manipulated for one’s own self- interests. It is a view which takes for granted that, for many aspects of the game, it is the officials alone, rather than players and coaches collectively, who have responsibility for ensuring fair play. Humility and magnanimity, and a contrite sense of one’s own responsibilities towards the role of the rules, and standing of the officials might limit the hypocrisy that is tarnishing much professional sport. Coaches then, could set good examples rather than bad ones, but rarely do so. The important point here is that although the dominant coaching ideology may be one which often rides roughshod over moral concerns, such an ideology can only be seen as contingent upon, rather than logically necessary, to coaching. This argument is particularly relevant when responding to the claim suggested by some (e.g. Burke 2001) that practices such as coaching may be inherently corrupt. Though sports’ detractors may point disapprovingly at modern elite sport practices as evidence of selfish instrumentalism, even here acts of great integrity and virtue provide reformers with hope. For example, again from professional football, much praise, though perhaps not enough reward (a mere £5000) has been made of the efforts of individuals such as Dario Gradi, former coach to the English League Championship side Crewe Alexandra. Gradi reflected on winning the Bobby Moore fair play trophy for the sixth time during an eight-year period by stating that good discipline is not just a matter of etiquette but is also a mark of professionalism: We just feel it’s in the best interests of the football club to try and get the least number of players suspended as possible. We teach the players, at every level from youth team upwards, the benefits of not giving away unnecessary free kicks and cautions. I read Sir Clive Woodward’s book, and in it he talks about how he doesn’t understand why so many players make enemies of referees – and I can see his point. He thinks players should be trying to make referees their friend and I agree. (Clarkson 2007) The important implication of MacIntyre’s account is that moral character virtues remain central to realising the essential value of sporting practices for, without them, sports are reduced to radically impoverished instrumental activities. Character We have argued that moral virtue is central to the authentic sport experience. Fostering such virtue, however, is by no means a straightforward task and such difficulties reflect doubts and misgivings about deriving secure grounds for acting and intervening for moral reasons in civic society in general. A good starting place for surmounting such difficulties is to recognise that the focus of ethical reflection and evaluation of both athletes and coaches is to develop character. What are needed are (morally) good coaches and (morally) good athletes. Developing good character, for both athletes and coaches, is a complex process that includes education, training, instruction, reflection, practice experience and emulation. Downloaded At: 08:56 20 June 2011 350 A. Hardman et al. It is a complex process because character is complex. Character includes habits of perception, cognition, emotion and action. Doing the right thing involves much more than knowing the right thing. Moral perception implies a certain sensitivity or level of attention to particular morally salient features. This sensitivity is not innate neither can it be an a priori or assumed human faculty. Sensitivity is a learnt, and to a degree, a contextually relative disposition. Similarly, knowing the good from the bad, the right from the wrong, the fair from the unfair, involves learning about human relationships, social conventions, moral rules, as well as professional and role-specific obligations. But this knowledge in itself, as we have already mentioned, is insufficient, and some may argue, not even necessary for moral action. Learning to feel a certain way, for example, about a certain act is a crucial precursor for moral action. Where unfortunate cases of bullying in sport have taken place both coaches and athletes ought to feel outraged, for appropriately morally educated persons should register some form of emotional disturbance in light of such dubious behaviour. Action in the face of moral indiscretion is more likely if the indiscretion registers on the emotional radar. These processes linked to recognition, however, are not fully exhaustive of our character either. Often the appropriate moral responses demand action or intervention. This is neither easy nor safeguarded by perception, knowledge or emotion. If one is pusillanimous, the tendency might be to turn a blind eye or to take the path of least resistance when faced with a problem. Similarly, fear, anxiety, lack of self- confidence, wanting to defend our ego may all hamstring our best intentions. It might, however, be our judgment that is flawed. Coaches might simply get it wrong and do something insensitive when, in fact, their intention was to be the opposite. Their judgment in this case, therefore, is deficient, and they can be considered poor judges of what counts as the ‘right’ thing to do. An example of the moral complexities that surround the coaching process can be seen in the case of the UK’s former national swimming performance director, Bill Sweetenham, who was cleared of bullying allegations in 2005 (BBC 2006). Despite the outcome, the case prompted much reflection in sport as a whole as to the limits of coaches’ actions in the pursuit of improved performance. The preceding account indicates that a crucial task for the coach is to realise there is a moral dimension to sport, which is innate, and difficult to master. By doing so, coaches should focus greater attention on the ethical implications of their coaching values and actions and in particular how such values and behaviours are recognised, understood and impact upon those they wish to influence. Sport coaching and emulation Being at the centre of sporting experience, the coach is uniquely situated to influence and set examples. While significant others, such as fellow participants, officials, parents and peer group play an important role in establishing one’s overall moral point of view (often in harmonious conjunction with, but sometimes in contrast to, the values and ethics of the coach), the coach controls and largely directs the ethical agenda and sets the moral outlook. As such, it is an inescapable fact that coaches are role models (Carpenter and Morgan 1999; Guivernau and Duda 2002; Morgan and Carpenter 2002; McNamee, Jones, and Duda 2003). This entails that the coach will be emulated by children and may see this as a deliberate aspect of their practice, particularly with regard to mirroring the technical and tactical dimensions of sport – players will be anxious to follow their coach’s instructions, game plan and technical expectations. However, the coach may have very little control over which aspects of their behaviour or character register with children and so emulation may mean that children will copy unintended and unappealing behaviours Downloaded At: 08:56 20 June 2011 Physical Education and Sport Pedagogy 351 which may, in turn, come to be habits of character. The coach, in executing their professional role cannot, therefore, be separated from the character of the person in that role. In other words, ‘at every working moment the teacher [read coach] is indirectly sending out a moral message’ (Kristjansson 2006, 38). Coaches who constantly berate their players for mistakes should not be surprised that, when errors occur, their players begin to display the same modus operandi towards one another. Similarly, to operate inconsistently or to send the ‘do as I say not as I do’ are risky strategies; risks that good coaches should not take. Notwithstanding the benefits of adaptable practice, a coach must ceteris paribus strive for good and consistent exemplification of fairness, magnanimity, justice, honesty and so forth. If we want children to develop virtues like magnanimity, honesty and fairness, the coach must embody these virtues in their actions. The moral exemplar, in this case the coach, should help their charges develop an articulate conception of what is valuable, a sense of what is worth striving for, and help them find realistic means to that end. The palace of reason, as Aristotle argued, is entered through the courtyard of habit, and good coaches will recognise and seize upon the heterogeneity of opportunities to show, tell, discuss and habitually exemplify good character. Given the plasticity of character and the incredible influence authority figures have been shown to be able to exert (Milgram’s [1974] infamous research being one powerful illustration), advocating emulation can be a double-edged sword. Authentic emulation, Kristjansson (2006, 41) argues, is not simply a copy-cat process whereby a simulacrum of virtues rather than their genuine inculcation is pursued. Unquestioned and uncritical emulation will not suffice. Crucial to the development of good character is the ability to discern which characteristics are worth emulating. Here, children must ‘. . .learn to value the ideals embodied in role models because those values are essentially valuable, not merely because the values are enacted by the role models’ (Kristjansson 2006, 41). Consequently, following Aristotle, emulation is defined as a complex emotional virtue requiring intellectual acumen and moral discernment. When considered in terms of a virtue, emulation relates to the ability ‘to see, feel and judge correctly’ (Kristjansson 2006, 45). Judging correctly in relation to values or virtues is neither easy nor straightforward. Nevertheless, a strong sense of the value of sport in terms of its internal goods provides a reasonable starting point for discerning what is worthwhile and appropriate to emulate. Good coaches, through the way they express their care and attention toward the pursuit of sport’s core goods and values, provide a clear indication for others of the substantive qualities on which the emulative process can be built. We should take note of coaches who make explicit compliments about players’ qualities and skills as well as their characters and personalities. For example, after a recent heavy defeat to Manchester United, Fulham Football Club’s manager, Roy Hodgson made the following comments: Over the 90 minutes they were the better team and fully deserved to win. We can’t even complain about the margin of victory. What impressed me was that there is not a player who is not comfortable on the ball and not composed. For us, it was a learning experience. All I can do is congratulate Manchester United on an outstanding performance. (Sanghera 2009) Coaching behaviour of this kind is particularly commendable for not only does it avoid highlighting the shortcomings of one’s own players which may have contributed to defeat, but also enables coaches to point out to their charges a model of excellence upon which they can critically reflect. The approach can work as a more constructive way of motivating players to rededicate their efforts towards improving their own practice and performance. 352 A. Hardman et al. Sports coaching and virtue ethics: practical implications Given the need for virtue in the realisation of the values of sport and the central claims we make about the coach’s character, a number of important implications follow. The coach is likely to confront a number of key issues which can be expressed in terms of three crucial questions. The first relates to the notion of personhood and involves asking what kind of a person a coach should be in terms of their character, personality and disposition. The second focuses on the question of agency and asks how a coach should act and behave. The third and final question involves questioning the goals and values of coaching and, in particular, entails clarifying the moral values and aims that shape sport itself. Downloaded At: 08:56 20 June 2011 What kind of person should a coach be? A virtue theoretical approach to coaching suggests that those who coach are individuals who, at their core, conduct their lives consciously as moral agents. Central to this notion of personhood is the idea that as embodied beings, coaches do not exist as compartmentalised technicians whose role is deliberately and consciously adopted in specific bound times and places. Instead, the division between who they are as a person and what it means to be a coach should be self-consciously ambiguous (Carr 1998). It is a notion recently examined in Jones, Armour, and Potrac’s (2004) work with elite coaches. Here, a portrait of coaches emerged as committed, caring and conscientious practitioners who invested high levels of energy and time into their work. In this respect, they appeared to live out their coaching roles vicariously, realising their ‘selves’ within it. It was sentiment best expressed by Lois Muir, former coach of the world netball championship winning Silver Ferns (the New Zealand national team); ‘. . .you’ve got to give everything. . .a total commitment of your energy’ (Jones, Armour, and Potrac 2004, 87). A holistic self-understanding of the coach as principally a moral agent is derived from two claims. The first is that the coach needs to understand that part of their character is rooted in their physical and historical environment. A coach’s genetic inheritance – their biology, where and when they were born, their own experiences in sport, how they were coached themselves (if at all) and who or what inspired them to become a coach – all matter. Everything that a coach thinks and does is tethered to their lived historicity – an amalgam of biological, sociological and cultural influences and experiences. Consequently, coaches should develop a self-understanding of their own personal sporting narratives as it will assist them to recognise and acknowledge how various physical influences have either constrained or broadened their lives. Drawing on one’s sporting inheritance provides a well-spring for reflecting on one’s coaching preferences, biases and basic philosophy (Cassidy, Jones, and Potrac 2004). The second claim is that coaches should recognise how their ideas, hopes and desires, together with their emotional and psychological state of being, all affect their personality, character, and self-identity. Self awareness of one’s social-psychological make-up affect how coaches act and behave and, in particular, influence the degree to which they come to recognise themselves as autonomy-seeking moral agents. By doing so, they may understand that while they are clearly embedded within, and influenced by, contextual social and cultural forces, their involvement in sport provides freedom to choose from a number of different courses of action (Jones 2000). The upshot of this conscious self-awareness holds the potential to instil within coaches a sense of moral responsibility with regard to their actions. This holistic perspective of the coach differs somewhat from its historical predecessors. The generally accepted account has seen the coach in terms of a purveyor of a broad set of Downloaded At: 08:56 20 June 2011 Physical Education and Sport Pedagogy 353 skills focused narrowly on the capacity to increase tactical and technical know-how aimed at improving competitiveness (Jones 2000). In practical terms, the implication of this traditional way of thinking is often reflected in a fragmentary approach to the professional development of coaches with progress being measured in terms of the acquisition and application of disciplinary subject specific knowledge (Jones and Wallace 2005). This ‘skills’ approach to defining a coach often translates into ‘person specifications’ where the correct mix of relevant physiological, psychological, biomechanical or pedagogical ingredients are given a check-mark. While this picture of the coach has some merit, it is incomplete and a little misdirected (Jones 2007). We advocate a shift of emphasis from thinking about the coach as a repository of theoretical and applied knowledge to one that emphasises a person’s behavioural qualities. As a result, rather than considering coaches as performance technicians, they might be better seen as persons who define themselves by their values, integrity and character (Cassidy, Jones, and Potrac 2004). This altered conception of a coach has particular relevance with regard to the sets of values and moral norms that influence professional life. The argument then is that although coaching (or any other role one adopts) may involve a change in social circumstances, core qualities of character and behaviour should remain the same in order to best make sense of how different facets of a life connect with each other in a coherent and integrated way. What persons are apt to look for is stability and connectivity in light of change and disruption, rather than a life comprised of a series of disconnected events. While complexity, flexibility and variability in life experiences and roles are inevitable, at the same time, what is sought in such circumstances are those bedrock elements that make us who we are in the face of potential fragmentation (MacIntyre 1985). For example, accepting the need for flexibility and individualisation within coaching, these should only occur within a bounded morally-aware framework. In this way, sensitivity to nuance and consistency of purpose and principled action are protected. In practical terms a virtue ethics approach to coaching also suggests that the hiring and firing of practitioners may need to be based on a more eclectic perspective than is the norm at present. The commonplace notion of what makes a good coach is often based on two primary qualities – that they have expertise because of their own sporting achievements, and that in exchange for financial numeration they provide a service (McNamee 1998). On this count, a good coach will have achieved all that is possible as a player and be primarily interested in pleasing whoever pays his or her wages. A broader virtue based account of coaching considers that the careful evaluation of the coach’s character is also a central aspect of their employability. In practical terms, this may mean that it is not enough to consider the facts and figures of a coach’s curriculum vitae, their won/loss record or to base a view solely on the evidence of a coach’s chosen referees. Instead, there should be scope to involve not only the views of other stakeholders (e.g., players), but also who the coach ‘is’. This is not in terms of what the prospective coach says but who they appear to be in terms of how they interact with others and their basic engagement with the various roles of coaching. This of course leads us to question of how should coaches act; which is where we turn next. How should a coach act and behave? This question relates to the appropriate recognition by the coach of the value of sport, and how a coach can initiate access to these values through the cultivation of virtues. At a certain level, coaching can be perceived as a time-bounded activity, having a clear start and finish largely constituted by forms of activity which emerge in formal settings (i.e., Downloaded At: 08:56 20 June 2011 354 A. Hardman et al. the duration of the game or practice session). Within this ‘normalised’ perspective, certain patterns of behaviour are seen as constitutive of the coaching process. Periods of verbal instruction, visual demonstration, observation, feedback and so on are constitutive of certain pedagogical ‘episodes’ which make up the repertoire of recognised coaching behaviours deemed appropriate and particular to the role. A dominant approach to coaching has evolved from this view – one that involves interventions prompted on the basis of evaluating the degree of discrepancy between the technical or tactical aspects of a performance produced and a perceived performance ideal (Jones 2007). To a large extent, such interventions aim to consolidate good performance, or else provide the basis for improving performances that fall short of expectations. Though this causal account is helpful, coaching should also include an understanding of the sporting process which is more focused on the athlete as a person than on the end performance itself. A more holistic, value-based approach to coaching begins with the idea that each athlete has a unique character. In this regard, advocating a coach-athlete relationship which sees each performer as an individual person is common to many coaching philosophies. However, as such relationships are often driven by an imperative to analyse physical movements in order to evaluate and assess a player’s performance, such relationships are impoverished. An athlete’s character is not about technical and tactical strengths and weaknesses, and can never be wholly revealed in an ability to ‘cope’ with the rigors and demand of competitive sport. Instead, understanding character involves discerning such things as an individual’s hopes and fears, their aptitudes, skills and abilities, as well as what kind of perceptions they have about possibilities and constraints. So, in addition to a parade of mechanistic motor performances, a coach should pay heed to those qualities within athletes that emerge because of their character. We, therefore, contend that a key coaching quality should involve the capacity to listen to and engage with an athlete’s personal attempt at selfconstruction and representation. Mindful of Burke’s (2001) critique of the development of ‘trust’ as a coaching virtue, the cultivation of an appropriate coach-athlete relationship ought to avoid the extremes of over-paternalistic dependence on the one hand and disinterested neglect on the other. A virtue based approach to coaching involves finding out who the unique individual behind the athlete is, and what makes him or her ‘tick’, primarily because such a view prioritises persons as ends in themselves and not just as a means to a (sporting) end. Such an approach may provide a better way of responding to the particular needs of ‘troubled’ sportspersons such as George Best, Paul Gascoigne, Jennifer Capriati and Marcus Trescothick. Armed with the knowledge that different players in different circumstances require contrasting kinds of interventions allows coaches to perform at their best. Similarly, it is vitally important that coaches do not lose sight of the idea that athletes have an infinitely greater range of intervention buttons which are likely to have a more influential impact if pushed than a narrow range of technical and tactical performance points. As a result, coaches not only need to develop disciplinary expertise but also to understand the general disposition and well-being of their athletes. By listening to, and observing individuals, significant clues emerge as to how a coach can best respond. One approach towards developing such an understanding is through encouraging parents to be more involved with their child’s sports experience. All too often, the routine is for parents to drop off and pick up their children from games and practice. The dominant idea underpinning this ethos, as suggested earlier, is based on the idea that the coach is the expert and the parent the proxy consumer. Things go awry when there is disagreement on both these issue – some parents will claim to be more ‘expert’ than the coach, or else be displeased when the results from the service do not match expectations. A different approach would be to Downloaded At: 08:56 20 June 2011 Physical Education and Sport Pedagogy 355 invite parents to become involved in the developmental process in some form or other, either by supporting the technical development of their child through helping with ‘homework’ drills, or else contributing their skills and enthusiasm with regards to a number of administrative and managerial duties, such as taking registers, providing refreshments, or volunteering as welfare officers. The account of coaching we have argued for looks beyond the narrow compartmentalised version of the practice. Instead, we have suggested that the embodied nature of personhood, and the significant educative role of emulation, establishes an account of coaching which means that the coach is never ‘off-duty’. This is not to say that there are practical temporal and spatial boundaries to coaching practice, but that it is wrong to radically separate the role of the coach from a coach’s character. Such a dichotomy is unhelpful as it suggests that coaches may develop an entirely different persona tailored to the coaching environment from the one which is otherwise a more accurate representation of the self. It is what Goffman (1959) referred to in discussing the merger between the self-as-performer and self-as-character. This may mean that though the coach must understand, adapt and take on social conventions that are particular to coaching, at its best, the experience is never felt as an alienating one. The upshot for coaches is that how they behave and what they say outside immediate coaching contexts may be just as influential as technical and tactical information imparted during a coaching session. Coaches need to recognise that the impact they may have on players extends into a much greater range of situations than they might think. Thus, informal interactions with parents, players, and officials are all included in the store of interactions on which one’s overall personality and character as a coach is presented and judged. Consequently, not only will the coach need to consider those actions and behaviours intended to have a transforming effect, but also those actions which may have unintended consequences. In a stark example of this, consider Spanish national team manager Jose Luis Aragones’ attempt to motivate one of his players in an open training session before a game against neighbours France. Referring to France’s Thierry Henry he said: Tell that negro de mierda [black shit] that you are much better than him. Don’t hold back, tell him. Tell him from me. You have to believe in yourself, you’re better than that negro de mierda. (Lowe 2004) Coaches who care about sports and exemplify their concern through their actions and behaviour are more likely to ensure that young players will also value the pursuit of particular kinds of goods and virtues of sport (Jones 2009). The coach, therefore, has an important role in identifying and clarifying what kinds of values, aims and objectives should be pursued by young athletes as well as illustrating and articulating the means of achieving them. When athletes themselves begin to appreciate and place importance on acquiring the core qualities of the practice, they themselves start to take ownership and responsibility for developing a ‘thick’ understanding of the practice, its goods and its particular traditions. The importance of cultivating good habits is vital to the fostering of behavioural change. Thus, good coaching may often involve engaging in practices which are crucial to the formation of dispositions in athletes which lead to (morally) appropriate behaviour. A coach’s attempt to habituate particular forms of behaviour in players is best started early. The importance of repetition and the inculcation of (morally) good practice conventions may be furthered through re-structuring the outcomes of sporting activities. For example, presenting competitive games in ways that emphasise the importance of good and proper play rather than winning or losing help to establish the acquisition of moral goods and values Downloaded At: 08:56 20 June 2011 356 A. Hardman et al. as essential features of participation. This might entail that in addition to technical and tactical concerns, one’s coaching goals also aim at impacting the character of players, their standards of behaviour, dispositions towards the goods of the game, and respect for one’s opponents. The coach, therefore, will need to develop skills in identifying what constitutes each individual athlete’s character and moral disposition. They will need to be aware and address whether, for example, a team player needs to be more or less selfish in their play in order to develop greater responsibility or less egotism respectively. This means that in addition to knowing drills that challenge players’ technical and tactical abilities, coaches will need to now how to provide opportunities that challenge aspects of moral behaviour in ways that inculcate and develop desirable traits and virtues. The account of holistic coaching behaviour we have suggested emphasises that the development of good practice is somewhat dependent on players spending significant time engaged in their sport. Oftentimes the various demands placed on athletes, particularly the young, mean that there are limits to which the individual can be fully immersed into the practice. Consequently, a key pre-requisite for the coach, who has the development of meaning and habituation as his or her goal, is to ensure that players are inspired and engaged when they practice and play rather than being superficially distracted. Coaches who provide a more holistic understanding of the practice, through embedding their coaching with iconic reference points, by describing the excellences of the greatest players and the excitement and awe from witnessing memorable games, end up telling their players that this game is more than a hobby or a pastime, but a way of life. So when a young cricketer comes home from a coaching session having been told by his coach that he spun the ball like Warne, it creates in that player a desire to find out just who Shane Warne is (or was), developing an intrinsic engagement with cricket. As with other coaching skills, one’s ability as a moral pedagogue is a developmental process and is prone to both progress and regress (Cassidy, Jones, and Potrac 2004). Thus, continuous attention and repetition is vital as such dispositions are not going to be established overnight. The coach should continually develop mechanisms to understand, appreciate and facilitate the process of moral learning itself. Through doing so, coaches can heighten their own awareness that the challenging situations that athletes face are often moral ones, thus developing in their athletes the desire to treat moral deliberations with greater care and attention. An increased emphasis on character development as a core goal for sport may prompt greater import as to how such matters can be coached more effectively. Coach development programmes may need to place such matters at the heart of their long-term athlete development pathways, from which other psychomotor performance matters may take their cue (Cassidy, Jones, and Potrac 2004). What should be the purpose of coaching? The third and final question contained here turns to consider matters of ultimate value for the coach. If the cultivation of virtue and the development of moral character through sport take centre stage, sound reasons need to be produced as to why such ends should constitute the coach’s ultimate goal. Other goals clearly have competing merit. For example, the coach may still find that improving technical skills and tactical knowledge will conflict with attending to moral development goals. To overcome such tensions, sports administrators may be required to create a competitive sporting environment where there is an absence, or minimisation of what Kretchmar (2004) calls ‘necessity’ – that is an instrumentally driven context which downplays outcomes in terms of consequences that are both extrinsic and immediate. Physical Education and Sport Pedagogy 357 Kretchmar (2004) supports this idea with the anthropological argument which holds that experiences of what he calls ‘deep play’ are often more in accord with our embodiment, with who we fundamentally are. When we find ourselves in deep playgrounds he suggests: Downloaded At: 08:56 20 June 2011 It becomes a part of who we are and perhaps even more important who we are in the process of becoming. We can have fun experimenting with tennis, for example. It can be enjoyable to hit the ball in the center of the racket, to see it fly over the net and land in the opponent’s court, to compete, and to win. (Kretchmar 2004, 151) In a deep-play environment the means-end coaching relationship is conjoined and the coach need not work towards any other external thing. This should not mean that in ‘deep-play’ matters are taken any less seriously. On the contrary, the focus of such sobriety is aimed at walling out those external influences that may lead to not playing to one’s potential. When sports is given due gravitas, the coach’s ultimate focus should be on the internal goods and requisite virtues that are inherent and unique to the practice – those goods and values that provide such activities with their appeal in the first place. Absent from such a focus is a concern with the extrinsic – the external goods which are often advanced and prioritised by sporting institutions. While the contemporary organisational make-up of sport means that coaches will inevitably need to be mindful of both the internal and external goods and values of sport, at the same time, an emphasis on ‘deep-play’ provides the wherewithal to assign to each their appropriate place. Thus coaches, if they are serious about their sport, should try to wall-out the corruptive influences of other social spheres that potentially distort and skew its unique appeal (Walzer 1984). Practically, this means that coaches should attempt to create a play environment where the ultimate goal is the shared pursuit of sporting excellence. As such, excellence can only be achieved once we see how all who share deep-play intentions are mutually dependent. By doing so, we are more likely to see our competitors, for example, as persons who facilitate rather than thwart our sporting aims. At the heart of the coaching enterprise then, is the idea that those we encounter and share time and space with in sport are our fellow playmates, and, like ourselves, demand to be respected and treated first and foremost as moral beings, as ends in themselves, rather than means to our exclusive ends. Conclusion The preceding account of virtue ethics suggests that coaching entails, or ought to entail, an outlook that embraces sensitivity towards moral obligations. In adopting such a stance, we have argued for a multi-dimensional and highly nuanced understanding of coaching as a process of moral development of persons. Our case has been that the development and cultivation of morality in sport, set within the philosophical framework of virtue ethics, transcends divisions between the structures of sport and the individual agents who are engaged in its practices. We have argued that sport practices require attention to the pursuit of particular kinds of goods that necessarily demand the exercise of judgments that are of a moral nature and, thereby, provide its practitioners with the opportunity to cultivate particular kinds of moral virtues. When such behaviours are habituated over time through repetition, and refined and adjusted through reflection, the formation of one’s sporting character is likely to take shape. Emulation of moral exemplars play a crucial role in this process and, as coaches are central to the contemporary sporting experience, they have a pivotal role to play in the moral education of those who come under their care. 358 A. Hardman et al. Downloaded At: 08:56 20 June 2011 References BBC. 2006. Sweetenham is cleared of bullying. http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/other_sports/ swimming/4580822.stm Burke, M. 2001. Obeying until it hurts: Coach-athlete relationships. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 28, no. 2: 227–40. 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