C i v i l - M i l i ta r y
o cc a s i o n a l pa p e r s
3 / 2 0 11
Situating Police and Military in
conteMPorary Peace oPerationS
Dr B.K. Greener and Dr W.J. Fish
w w w.c i v m i l co e . gov. au
Disclaimer:
the views expressed in this Civil-Military Occasional Paper are those of the
author and do not necessarily relect the position of aPCMCOE or of any
government agency. authors enjoy the academic freedom to offer new and
sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on
key issues.
the content is published under a Creative Commons by attribution 3.0
australia (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/au/) licence. all parts of
this publication may be reproduced, stored in retrieval systems, and transmitted
by any means without the written permission of the publisher.
iSBN: 978-1-921933-15-8
Published 2011.
aBStract
there appears to be a growing convergence between the police
and the military of Western developed states. this has been argued
to be problematic for a number of reasons, including the fact that
this is out of step with current post-conlict peacebuilding efforts
that aim to ensure a strict separation of these two agencies. this
paper investigates the police-military relationship in contemporary
peace operations from a number of different angles. it considers
points of convergence and divergence both in theoretical terms and
in different case studies, and investigates doctrinal developments
that have been undertaken in recent efforts to demarcate these
two roles more clearly. the paper argues that there are continuing
signiicant functional and symbolic differences between these two
agencies. Furthermore, there are practical and normative advantages
to be gained from utilising police and military in distinctive ways in
contemporary peace operations, and more needs to be done to
establish what those appropriate ways for utilising those different
agencies actually are in various security contexts.
Key words: police, military, peace operations, post-conlict
Dr Greener is Senior lecturer in international relations at
Massey University and has published widely on international
security-related matters; her book The New International Policing was
published in 2009. Dr Fish is an associate Professor in Philosophy at
Massey University.
Situating Police and Military in Contemporary Peace Operations
3
Situating Police and Military in
conteMPorary Peace oPerationS
Evidence seems to suggest that there is a growing convergence between the police
and the military of Western developed states (Campbell and Campbell 2010;
Friesendorf 2009; Schmalleger 2008).1 this has been argued to be a problematic
development for a number of reasons, one of which is that it appears to be out
of step with current post-conlict peacebuilding efforts that aim to ensure a strict
separation of these two agencies (OECD 2007). in light of this, there has been an
urgent call for scholars and researchers to undertake further research on what has
been termed ‘third generation civil-military affairs’, and the issue of police-military
cooperation in peace operations is at the heart of this agenda (rosen 2009).2
this paper investigates the police-military relationship in contemporary peace
operations from a number of different angles. We begin by investigating the
different dimensions of what we call the traditional ‘police–military divide’ and
show how the developing roles of these agencies suggest that this divide is
becoming blurred. Following on from this, we go on to focus on the speciic
issue of police-military interactions in peace operations, highlighting some of the
problems that have arisen in particular case studies, before outlining recent UN
and EU doctrinal developments to see how these institutions have attempted
to create a clearer division of labour in efforts to address operational confusion
over police and military roles. these efforts to demarcate a division of labour
are vital as, despite some instances of blurring of the police-military divide, there
are continuing signiicant functional and symbolic differences between these two
agencies. Moreover, this differentiation is critical in that the ongoing differences
between police (in both civilian and constabulary form) and the military help to
provide for a broader range of options in responding to the challenges faced in post
conlict peace operations. there are, therefore, practical and normative advantages
to be gained from utilising police and military in particular and distinctive ways in
contemporary peace operations. the challenge is to establish appropriate and
legitimate uses of police and military agents in each particular case.
4
Civil- Military occasional papers
a Blurring of the Police – Military divide?
the Police – Military divide, we argue, has four main features. the irst is function,
followed by additional differences in terms of main focus, sources of legitimacy and
underlying culture, and these main differences are represented in the table below.3
Table 1: The police-Military Divide
ciVilian police
MiliTarY
core Function
Controlling crime and
maintaining public order by
prevention or, failing that,
through apprehension.
Securing the state against
external threat through
deterrence or, failing that,
military action.
Focus
internal.
External.
source of legitimacy
representatives of the
community / law.
agents of the incumbent
government.
institutional culture
Professional, value-oriented,
individual responsibility high.
Professional, value-oriented,
hierarchical, responsibility
allocated top down.
as shown in table 1, it is clear that there are some instances of similarities and
differences inherent within the main functions of these two agencies. Historically,
police forces were developed to play a security role that militaries were either
unable or unwilling to perform.4 Prominent theorists of police, David Bayley (1990:
18) and allan Silver (2005: 10), identify the same two roles as the cornerstones of
police function: crime prevention and public order maintenance. Military forces, on
the other hand, are war-ighting institutions tasked with protecting the state and its
interests through the use of deterrent effect or lethal force.5
Moreover, although the deinitions in table 1 have both preventive and active
aspects, police work emphasises more proactive forms of prevention in attempting
to detect problems before they arise or before they become more entrenched
as constituting a core policing task. the military is arguably more passive in its
preventive measures in that ‘active’ forms of deterrence such as military exercises
Situating Police and Military in Contemporary Peace Operations
5
may occur but are less integral to the overall raison d’etre of defence forces. Further
generalisations include the notion that police action through apprehension involves
a great deal of constabulary discretion, and is more tailored to context and the
individual crime, whilst military action typically involves a much more complicated,
hierarchical and large-scale response to signiicant threats to the national interest.
admittedly these are highly reductionist principles, but they constitute fundamental
differences at play in the core functions of the police and military. What is more,
this difference in the roles the two agencies are intended to play also has the
consequence that police have a focus internal to the society to which they belong
whilst militaries have come to be seen as the main actors for the protection of a
state’s external sovereignty. there are exceptions under ‘aid to Civil authorities’
arrangements, where militaries do have an internal role in in-extremis support
in counter terrorism operations, but typically these actions require emergency
powers and still require a post-event police investigation. the Navy and airforce
also play signiicant roles in Search & rescue operations, and all Services typically
assist in disaster response.
Sites of legitimacy of the military is founded in their role as agents of the incumbent
government and civil authority, whilst police forces created in the anglo-american
model have typically sought to locate their legitimacy elsewhere, so as to avoid
being seen as an internal political tool. in the civilian policing model, this has been
through a combination of being seen as representatives of the community being
policed and being seen as representatives of the abstract ‘law of the land’, or
enforcing the ‘rule of law’. and, inally, these differences in focus and function in turn
give rise to broadly different institutional arrangements and cultures in the police
and military.
the warighting function of the military has resulted in personnel typically being
utilised as parts of military units ranging from platoons to armies, with a strong
emphasis being placed on leadership, highly structured decision-making processes
and hierarchy within these units (Seiler 2009). this emphasis on hierarchy, and an
accompanying focus on discipline, has been seen to be necessary for a number of
reasons; not least in order to be able to direct individuals to both use lethal force
themselves against an enemy and to follow orders that may result in loss of their
own life. Civilian police, on the other hand, though sometimes lumped in with
6
Civil- Military occasional papers
military forces under the descriptor ‘disciplined forces’ often see themselves more
akin to other civilian emergency services such as ire or ambulance services rather
than ‘little soldiers’ of any sort (discussions with australian and New Zealand
Police 2010/2011). For some police forces, however still in the post-colonial era of
their evolution, the concept of police as another ‘disciplined force’ is the dominant
one. in african states experiencing conlict, for example, the distinction between
police, gendarmerie and military becomes especially blurred. imbued with a sense
of individual responsibility and the key tenet of ‘constabulary discretion’, civilian
police may often have similar values to military personnel (courage, commitment
to the job, desire to contribute to society and some levels of institutional hierarchy)
but, in general terms, the overarching institutional culture of policing is much
less hierarchical with greater emphasis being placed on individual responsibility
and initiative.
So we ind the traditional police – military divide has (at least) these four
different dimensions – differences in function, differences in focus, differences in
source of legitimacy, and differences in culture. yet in 2001, prior to the events
of September 11, andreas and Price (2001: 32) claimed that “one of the most
important blurrings of traditional boundaries occurring in the post-Cold War era
is that between an internally oriented domestic police sphere and an externally
oriented military sphere”.
this blurring is in part due to the fact that the advent of globalisation has brought a
number of security challenges – such as terrorism, transnational crime and human
traficking – that obscure the distinction between an internal and an external
sphere of operation. Furthermore, the blurring of the police – military divide is
particularly notable in peace operations, where it has been claimed by rosen
(2009: 11) that:
a deining feature of third-generation civil-military relations is the vanishing
difference between military and civil work areas. this could also be
described as the vanishing of the functional differences between military and
other tools of international politics. the vanishing differentiation contrasts
with irst- and second- generation civil-military relations, which generated a
perception of a clash between ‘military’ and ‘non-military’ that sustained the
conceptual distinction between two areas of governance.
Situating Police and Military in Contemporary Peace Operations
7
One key aspect of this blurring is that it is becoming relatively common for the
military to be tasked with components of the police function in peacekeeping
operations. in Panama, for example, “the US military, as the only entity in the
country with the capacity to provide the level of stability required, had to deal with
the lack of a viable and functioning [host nation] security and [law enforcement]
apparatus” (Jayamaha et al 2010: 21) and they dealt with this in the obvious way
– by doing it themselves. in Haiti too, for example UN military personnel were
deployed to ight the organised street gangs in Port au Prince and Cite Soleil,
which resulted in very confrontational but ultimately fairly successful results.
the involvement of the military in traditional policing roles has continued in recent
years, with the US military playing “a key role in law enforcement and related
issues, even if not speciically tasked with a law enforcement mandate” (Jayamaha
et al 2010: xiii) and with undertaking the tasks of police training, mentoring, and
institutional reform (rosen 2009: 11). More recently, however, there has been
a move from merely suggesting that it is possible for the military to undertake
policing tasks, to a suggestion that it may actually be desirable. the early stages
of afghanistan, for example, US army Colonel Kimberley Fields (2002: 3) has
suggested that “if the mainstream military invested energy in gaining a degree of
comfort with [civil-military organisation] issues and in building relationships with
civilian partners, real coordination and power sharing could result in targeted,
eficient, and short-term humanitarian and reconstruction interventions by
the military.” Much of the rationale for the US military role in police training in
afghanistan and iraq is, however, due to the simple fact that the US does not have
a national police force that is mandated to undertake international deployments
(see Perito 2004)
the blurring of the police-military divide has also taken a converse form from
the perspective of police. at the same time as the military have been tasked with
policing roles in peace operations, there has also been an increase in the number of
sworn police oficers deployed in these missions. For example, over 17,000 police
have been mandated by the Security Council to contribute to 14 peacekeeping
operations and 4 peacebuilding operations (UNDPKO 2011). although police
are typically deployed to play policing roles (so their function remains the same),
they are being deployed in an external, as opposed to an internal, environment.
8
Civil- Military occasional papers
So whilst the military are being asked to remain in their “home” environment but
play police roles, police are being asked to play their ‘home’ roles in military space.
this development, it has been argued, challenges the very concept of police being
internal security agents who uphold the rule of law within a domestic setting
(Greener 2009).
What is more, this blurring of focus and function is compounded by two further
features of contemporary peace operations. First is that these missions often
involve concurrent counter-terrorism (typically an effort led by law enforcement
strategies) and counter-insurgency (typically a military task, though again these
are generalisations) operations. indeed, the emphasis on counter-insurgency in
afghanistan has seen Kilcullen (2009: 130) suggest that the military operation is
“less like conventional warfare and more like police work: cops patrolling a beat
to prevent violent crime”.
the second feature of contemporary peace operations is that they may involve
signiicant levels of civil disorder, often involving armed protagonists. the problem
with such scenarios is that a ‘capability gap’ is perceived to exist between civilian
police and the military when it comes to dealing with this kind of situation.
Dziedzic (2003: 2) argues that:
Military forces are ill suited to engage in confrontations with civilians because,
with the exception of constabulary or military police units, they are generally
not trained in the measured use of force, control of riots, negotiating
techniques, or de-escalation of conlict. individual [civilian police] are not
capable of handling such large-scale, strategic challenges, either.
in response to the perception that such a capability gap exists, people have argued
that a force that has elements of both police and military is required: a paramilitary
constabulary force such as the French gendarmerie or the italian carabinieri; forces
which are “characterised by paramilitary organisation and weaponry tailored for
use in internal security and policing operations” (Mendee and last 2008: 18).
in Bosnia in the late 1990s, this led to NatO developing ‘Multinational Specialist
Units’ (MSU) in order to help bridge military and civilian police capabilities. an MSU
consisted of:
Situating Police and Military in Contemporary Peace Operations
9
Police Forces with military status who perform duties including civil
disturbance operations. this type of force focuses on the civilian population,
employs minimum force and often employs small units to accomplish
the mission. However, the MSU is not a replacement for the [Bosnia and
Herzegovna] Police Forces and does not conduct criminal investigation
beyond the scope of the SFOr mandate (NatO 2004).
Further commentary highlights that the experience with the MSU in Bosnia had
knock-on effects even to the point whereby;
international peacekeeping operations have in the past been labelled
constabulary missions, calling for gendarme rather than military capabilities,
although throughout the Cold War they were conducted primarily by
military forces. Since 1996, beginning with the Multinational Specialised Unit
in Bosnia, forces like the italian Carabinieri and the Dutch Marechaussee
have been in demand to deal with the combination of organised crime and
ethnic extremism that complicates protracted social conlicts (Mendee and
last 2008: 18).
Constabulary forces, then, can seem appealing in postconlict situations as they are
seen as capable of performing both ‘cooler’ military and ‘hotter’ police functions
and can be assigned “in either a military or civilian capacity” (Perito 2004: 47).
these kinds of developments in terms of the increasingly complex nature of
operations have led, in turn, to changes in the culture or ethos of police and
military forces. in considering how militaries have been impacted upon, andreas
and Price (2001: 48) draw attention to the fact that, post Kosovo in particular,
“the military [now] faces pressures to treat foreign civilians as individuals with
rights rather than as enemies on a battleield”. Martin Shaw has similarly
emphasised the importance of the criminalisation of war as driven by an emphasis
on rights, legal regulation and excessive litigation. Most importantly Shaw talked of
the fact that criminalising war;
involves treating war like any other human activity, no longer de facto or
even de jure excluded from norms that apply in all other ields. taking “thou
shalt not kill” seriously, in the context of war, does indeed threaten to make
the practice of war very dificult (2004).
10
Civil- Military occasional papers
an emphasis on the ‘criminalisation’ of conlict through making military action
potentially ‘illegal’ and stressing the notion of individual responsibility for conduct
necessitates an understanding and application of the rule of law.
Michael Walzer (1992: 42) says that, whilst soldiers are not responsible for the war
itself, they are responsible for the conduct of it, and that “war is distinguishable
from murder and massacre only when restrictions are established on the reach
of battle” and, more speciically, that “negative intention ought to be required
from soldiers; it is the domestic equivalent of what the lawyers call “due care” in
domestic society” . Because of this, adam roberts has gone so far as to claim that
a ‘humanitarian war’ is “an oxymoron that may yet become a reality” (1993: 429).
in addition to absorbing and responding to these increased legalisation processes,
military forces have in recent years also been subject to a number of other
signiicant processes such as civilianisation, equal opportunity policies, outsourcing
and subcontracting that have impacted upon aspects of traditional military culture
(Caforio 2003). these processes have created more permeability between
the military and civilian worlds, helping to demystify the role of military forces
somewhat, thereby altering how the military is perceived and received by society,
and deemphasising traditional tenets of military life – including hierarchy (Moskos
2000).6 though the military remains a ‘military’ despite civilianisation, and though
the continuing emphasis on hierarchy remains a key point of difference from civilian
police, these sorts of developments also bring military and policing agencies a little
closer together.
at the same time as the military is becoming more civilianised and being required
to adjust to being answerable to the law as well as their commanding oficer,
there have also been concerns voiced in a number of Western liberal democratic
countries from the US, to the UK, australia and New Zealand, that we are seeing
an increased ‘militarisation’ of domestic police services (Kraska and Kappeler 1997;
McCulloch 2001 and 2004; Broad 2010). the creation of various special tactics
groups with increased irepower, more regular police involvement in counterterrorism roles, and an increased willingness to arm police have been cited as
evidence of such militarisation. Moreover, as we have noted, as more police are
being used in international settings there has been a rising reliance on the use of
constabulary-type forces such as gendarmerie or more speciically-tasked Formed
Situating Police and Military in Contemporary Peace Operations
11
Police Units (FPUs) that specialise in public order (Dziedzic and Stark 2006). recent
assessments of FPUs in the UN setting have identiied that the record regarding
use of these FPUs to date has been somewhat mixed (Carpenter 2010) and the
consequences of the default use of these Units remains under-researched.
all of these developments have meant that police and military roles in contemporary
peace operations have often become confused through misinterpretation of roles
or through sheer necessity in requiring the military, in particular, to undertake
policing roles as the main or only capability in situ at the time.
Police – Military interaction in Peace operations
in 2001 Michael Pugh suggested that all civil-military relations in peace operations
had tended to subordinate humanitarian action to military necessity – pointing to
the Western European Union’s draft Civil-Military Cooperation (CiMiC) document
from 1999 that stated CiMiC was to “create civil-military conditions that will offer
the Commander the greatest possible moral, material and tactical advantages” –
but he also noted that alternative CiMiC models were being formulated that were
more balanced in their approach towards coordinating state servants in conlict
zones (2001: 346). indeed CiMiC is now often a priority rather than merely an
afterthought as humanitarian and development agendas have risen to balance
the military imperative. recent UN reports therefore call for an increased focus
on and resourcing of civilian contributions to UN peace operations, symbolising a
changing approach to the balancing of security and development needs in complex
peacebuilding and peace support operations (UN News release 2011).
in assessing how police and military, in particular, operate together in peace
operations, there are some useful models to be considered from past experience
before identifying and assessing contemporary emphases. in early missions, such
as Cambodia in the mid 1990s, there were a number of complaints that the entire
UN mission was overly dominated by the military, and by military imperatives. the
military component in UNtaC was ostensibly there to provide a ‘neutral political
environment’ and key tasks for the military included monitoring the ceaseire,
disarmament, regroupment, and the demobilisation of factional forces. the civilian
police component, on the other hand, was tasked with ‘stabilising the security
12
Civil- Military occasional papers
situation’, and an important part of this particular role was the regulation of existing
police forces in Cambodia. in practice, however, there was a lack of clarity in the
Cambodian case about how these roles could be demarcated from one another in
terms of day to day operations, and the relevant jurisdictions of the two agencies.
this highlighted the dificulties in establishing a clear division of labour between
the two forces, particularly as military affairs tended to dominate to the extent
that military aspects of the mission ‘pervaded almost every aspect of UNtaC’s
mandate’ (Kim and Metrikas 1997: 108). the overbearing emphasis on the military
aspect of the mission also contributed to a lack of planning and preparation for the
civilian police aspect of the operation (Maley 2005: 300).
as was noted above, in 1998 NatO deployed the irst ‘Multinational Specialist
Unit (MSU) in Bosnia to help bridge military and civilian police capabilities. in
response to a disastrous episode involving friction between the MSU and military
Commanders in late 1998, NatO developed the Blue Box / Green Box concept.
this demarcated who was to have precedence in different situations. When public
order was threatened, the on-site MSU commander would command his own unit
and other forces present within what would be designated the ‘Blue Box’ (a particular
area of operations). Forces outside the area of responsibility remained under the
command of the most senior military oficer present to support the constabulary
policing efforts of the MSU within the Blue Box area, and this surrounding area was
the ‘Green Box’ zone (Perito 2004: 164–5).
this operational model relected the need to distinguish whether or not the MSU
or military commander had precedence, and in certain situations gave constabulary
forces the tactical freedom to deal with unrest, including the freedom to decide
whether or not to use force. this highlights the preventative role for police – one
particular study from the US army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations institute,
suggested that the MSU had, by 2000, managed to resolve 261 or 263 interventions
without use of force through deterrence, dissuasion and negotiation (2000: 10)
– and the idea of an MSU was therefore judged to work fairly successfully on a
number of occasions (Friesendorf 2009: 47–8) Similar models were then utilised in
Kosovo – particularly for responding to riots and public disorder – but a number of
problems occurred in this case.
Situating Police and Military in Contemporary Peace Operations
13
two main problems arose in Kosovo with respect to police-military relations
and operations. the irst was that a signiicant predicament arose in terms of
duplication of function and intelligence sharing problems between the MSU which
consisted of 300 members from italy, France and Estonian EStPatrOl military
police, and UNMiK’s Special Police Units (SPUs). the mandates for the SPU and the
MSU were overly similar and UNMiK in particular complained that MSU did not
share intelligence (Friesendorf 2009: 97). as a general rule the SPUs were generally
used for static facility and protective security roles with the MSUs focusing on riot
control and high risk policing functions (Perito 2004). in addition to this overlap, the
US too used their military police as a constabulary type force, further complicating
the mix of actors and functions available. though originally tasked with traditional
roles such as military trafic control, area security and prisoner of war operations,
the roles of US MPs increased to encompass: deterring looting and other crimes;
running police stations and detention centres; facilitating the return of refugees;
and maintaining a great deal of responsibility for law and order in particular sectors
(Jayamaha et al 2010: 115).
another problem emerged with respect to a lack of comprehensive planning for
less than lethal force. With regards to NatO’s strategic and operational planning
for dealing with Kosovo, thomas Mockaitis (2004: 31–1) argues that:
KFOr entered Kosovo prepared for only two scenarios, neither of which
occurred: a ighting entry to expel the yugoslav army and paramilitaries,
and a peaceful hand over of the province. instead a power vacuum opened
between the retreating army and the occupying force.
KFOr was therefore “faced with an atypical crisis in which crowd behaviour had
become a key component” (assembly of the WEU 2006). Serbian paramilitaries
burned and looted albanian homes as KFOr troops stood by and watched, and
later returning albanians attacked Serbian homes and property in retaliation, again
without response from KFOr which was ill equipped to deal with such instances
of public disorder as opposed to organised warighting. British troops increased
foot patrols a la Northern ireland to decrease the intensity and frequency of such
occurrences, whilst French Gendarmerie were deployed to set up a battalion tasked
with preventing crimes and offences and maintaining public security (though not law
enforcement). later planning for violent public disorder intended that the Kosovo
14
Civil- Military occasional papers
Police Force (KPS) riot police would be the front line; then UNMiK; then the MSU;
then the military Kosovo Force (KFOr), but again it transpired that there was not
enough foresight with regards to how to effectively deal with large-scale riots as
demonstrated by the poor response to the 2004 riots (Friesendorf 2009: 102).
in light of the dificulties faced on the ground in previous years, a number of states,
regional and international institutions have begun to develop much stronger
guidelines and doctrine regarding police-military interaction and roles in peace
operations. the UN, in particular, has taken up a more strategic outlook in recent
years, concerned by the adverse effects of the previous ad hoc approach to
providing security in post-conlict settings. the developments at the UN represent
efforts to identify and attribute a clear division of labour between police and
military personnel, whilst the EU’s policy development has also explicitly considered
the role of the new European gendarmerie force.
codifying Police – Military interaction: doctrinal development
UN guidelines for its peace operations state that both troop Contributing
Countries (tCC) and Police Contributing Countries (PCC) should be guided by
the tasks assigned by the Security Council mandate, the concept of operations
(CONOPS) and accompanying mission rules of Engagement (rOE) for the
military component, and the Directives on the Use of Force (DUF) for the police
component in order to establish a suitable police-military operational relationship
(UN 2008: 14; UN 2009: 25).
rOE and DUF should clearly outline the different levels of force that can be
used in various circumstances, how each level of force should be used, and any
authorisations that must be obtained by Commanders, and mission leadership
should ensure that these rOE and DUF are well understood by all relevant
personnel in the mission and are being applied uniformly such that the “credibility
and freedom of action” of the UN ield mission is upheld in the implementation of
its mandate (UN 2008: 35). these rOE and DUF evolve out of separate military
and police CONOPS which are strategic planning documents which outline the
“key security objectives, requirements and tasks” of military and police as per
their role in fulilling the UN mandate, which are developed predominantly by
Situating Police and Military in Contemporary Peace Operations
15
the Military Planning Service and the Police Division of DPKO, and which may
be augmented by additional documentation such as a Military Operations Plan
(‘Operation Order’) (UN 2009: 26).
it is signiicant to note that separate CONOPS exist because:
Military and police use force for different purposes in peacekeeping
operations. the military uses force to deter or remove a security threat
from armed forces or groups, while the police use force to arrest civilians
and address criminal behaviour. the use of force by military and police
are therefore also governed by different sources of law (the military
is governed by humanitarian law and the police by human rights and
domestic criminal law) (UN 2009a: 64)
More explicitly, the UNDPKO (2002: 2) has a speciic Civil-Military Coordination
Policy that provides guidelines to “ensure that the military and civilian police
components can concentrate on their primary task of security but, where needed,
can contribute in the most effective manner to non-security tasks, speciically
those related to humanitarian and development activities”. the policy emphasises
that military or civilian police are supposed to be used only for the pursuit of
peace and security whereas humanitarian relief and development activities are
to be performed by civilians – though it provides potential for military and civilian
police to be involved in these tasks if: they are consistent with the mandate; don’t
interfere with or compromise security related tasks; and are coordinated fully
within the mission (further constraints include that this would only occur if the
capability required is unique, unable to be provided in a timely manner by civilians
and a last resort) (UN 2002: 3).
in terms of command and control, military and civilian police remain under
established command and control – namely the Secretary General’s Special
representative / HOM must approve the use of military and civilian police for
non-security related tasks, although efforts to plan and coordinate with regards
to humanitarian needs rests with the Humanitarian Coordinator (UN 2002:
5). More speciically, the Head of Military Component (HOMC) exercises ‘UN
operational Control’, may delegate ‘UN tactical Control’ of military personnel
to subordinate military commanders, and may also be the HOM in ‘traditional’
16
Civil- Military occasional papers
missions. the Head of Police Component (HOPC) similarly exercises ‘UN
Operational Control’, may delegate speciic authority to individual oficers and to
FPUs through their commanding oficer, and is ‘normally appointed’ as the mission
Police Commissioner (UN 2009a: 42). Signiicantly, recent UN peacekeeping
training material stresses the importance of military, police and civilian personnel
all understanding the “main tasks and functions of the different components in a
mission” (UN 2009a: 46). the main tasks of military and police, the training material
suggests, can be described as follows:
Table 2 Military, police and civilian Tasks in contemporary
Un peace operations7
Military component
traditional PK Operations
Multi-dimensional
Operations
police component
civilian component
Monitor or supervise military
arrangements that parties to
a conlict have agreed upon.
Create a secure and stable
environment for other
elements of the peace
process to be implemented.
Can be deployed either
as individual UNPOl or
as Formed Police Units
to either traditional or
multi-dimensional peace
operations.
Play a role in establishing
public safety and preventing
crime as well as facilitating
role of law.
limited number in traditional
peace operations but
more in multidimensional
operations.
Have roles in political affairs,
civil affairs, human rights,
gender, public information
etc. Provide logistical and
administrative support too.
Collaborate closely with
civilian components such as
human rights, judicial and civil
affairs and corrections.
Situating Police and Military in Contemporary Peace Operations
17
Even more speciically, military functions and activities have been denoted as:
security sector involvement and provision of secure environment (through
patrolling, establishing and operating checkpoints, securing major routes to
facilitate mobility, securing key facilities such as hospitals and power plants)
(UN 2009a: 57). Police functions and activities have been described as: restoration
of the rule of law; reform of host country police services; vetting, training and
mentoring of host police; providing public order and responding to public security
challenges (through static guards and close protection for dignitaries; preventive
patrols and checkpoints; tactical support for high risk operations and security for
demonstrations); and provision of executive policing when an established national
police force is not present (UN 2009a: 57).
Similar doctrine has been developed in other institutions as efforts to coordinate
the different actors required for multi-dimensional or complex peace operations
or statebuilding and peacebuilding exercises – whatever the term that relects the
complexity of modern operations may be at the time – have increased in intensity
and focus. Most signiicantly, the EU has developed some interesting practices as it
has increasingly focused on civilian-heavy security operations.
in response to demands arising throughout the 1990s that saw European states
deploy police, military and constabulary forces in attempts to quell challenges to
peace and security in the Balkans in particular, the EU agreed to create a pool of
5,000 police oficers, with 1400 of these deployable within 30 days. Central to this
idea was the creation of a European Gendarmerie Force (EUrOGENDFOr). EU
documents reinforce the notion that the gendarmerie forces of participating states
are police with military status; at home the Gendarmeria, Carabinieri and Guardia
Civil are civilian police forces that fall under the authority of interior Ministries and
that are internal security forces as opposed to military police who are responsible
for discipline within the armed forces (assembly of the WEU 2006: 10).
the use of police and the EUrOGENDFOr for crisis prevention, crisis
management and other peace operations supports the EU’s 2008 Civilian Headline
Goal. this sets out the EU’s main tasks and objectives, where it is explicitly stated
that the EU must be able to deploy civilian capabilities as well as military means
at the outset of the operation, and that these civil capabilities must be deployable
either autonomously, in close cooperation with or even jointly with military
18
Civil- Military occasional papers
operations. in terms of police involvement, it is envisaged that the EU may deploy
civilian police for: preventive roles (to advise local police in area in crisis); alongside
military intervening force to stand in for local police, to provide for public security
and law and order; peacekeeping roles where military are deployed whereby the
range of tasks will be broad and varied depending upon mandates; and lastly in
reconstruction or stabilisation phases as expert advisors.
according to its Declaration of intent (2004), the EUrOGENDFOr is to be
“operational, pre-organised, robust and rapidly deployable, in order to perform
police tasks” to help “facilitate the reactivation of security facilities, particularly during
the transition between the military and the civilian operational environment”. the
EUrOGENDFOr can deploy 800 oficers in 30 days, and given its nature “can
carry out all types of missions in crisis management operations, taking part in the
military phase of a crisis, acting during the transition period from a military to a
civil operation, and participating in prevention missions” (Ministeria de Defensa de
Espana n.d). in particular, EUrOGENDFOr’s police function can “be developed
under civilian or military chain of command”, whereby: during the initial phase of the
operation the EGF could “enter the theatre along with the military force in order
to perform its police tasks”; during the transitional phase could “continue its mission
alone or together with a military force, facilitating co-ordination and co-operation
with local or international police units”; and during the military disengagement phase
could “facilitate the handing over of responsibilities to civilian authorities and agencies
taking part in the co-operation efforts, if necessary” (EUrOGENDFOr 2004).
Signiicantly, then, at an operational level, during a phase being conducted under
military responsibility the EGF is incorporated into the military chain of command,
whilst during a phase under civil responsibility the EGF Headquarters will “establish
a procedure for coordinating” with the Secretariat of the EU Council (or equivalent
body if an international organisation is in charge). at a tactical level, the EGF Force
Commander will command operations in either a civilian or military chain of
command, though if carrying out an autonomous police operation the Commander
would be answerable to the highest civilian authority (assembly of WEU 2006: 16).
the development of these models and policies for coordinating military and policing
efforts in peace operations highlight a number of things. First of all they underscore
the increasing importance of utilising a comprehensive approach to the security
Situating Police and Military in Contemporary Peace Operations
19
aspects involved in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Secondly they recognise the
increased role of police (including gendarmerie) in peace operations. thirdly, they
represent an effort to identify a clear division of labour between police and military.
this inal point is vital as it brings us to the argument that fundamental divisions
between police and military still do exist, as argued above, and, moreover, that
these divisions are in fact very useful in the ield.
normative questions: differences Still?
in recent years, a number of analysts (in the US in particular) have begun to argue
that, when there are inadequate numbers of international or domestic police, then
international military forces may have to undertake policing activities (Mockaitis
2004; Jones et al 2005; Jayamaha et al 2010; Keller 2010). this recommendation
usually comes with the additional caveats such as: not only should such military
forces respect judicial principles when undertaking such activities, but they should
also hand over all law enforcement responsibilities to the police as soon as it is
viable to do so.
However, signiicant concerns regarding the use of military in law enforcementtype tasks remain as, whilst they may be in situ with useful capabilities, policing
activities are not the core business of the military. For example, Michael Pugh (2001:
350) has argued that it is “not the military’s job to empower those vulnerable to
abusive states or warlords”. Partly because policing is not the military’s core role,
there are also institutional reasons for not utilising the military in policing activities.
For example, the military experience in afghanistan has demonstrated that some
basic skill sets simply are not in situ with the military being “seen to be especially
weak in the areas of monitoring, procedures, and record-keeping or continuity”,
whilst institutional problems such as bureaucratic heaviness, rapid staff turnover and
security restrictions bedevilled military efforts to engage in non-military activities
(Fishstein 2010: 28 and 45–7).
Such considerations have led Colonel Charles J. Dunlap Jr. to claim that there are
“surprisingly few synergies between law enforcement and military missions”, and
suggest that “using military forces for tasks that are essentially law enforcement
requires a fundamental change in orientation” (2005: 790–1). likewise General
Wesley Clark contends that “experience in peace operations has proven that
20
Civil- Military occasional papers
good soldiers, no matter how well equipped, trained, organised and led cannot
fully perform police duties among local populations” (cited in Smith 1999:
a17). these claims are further supported by a recent american study, which
considered the difference between street cops and combat troops.
in their assessment of the difference between soldiers and police in a US context,
Campbell and Campbell (2010: 338) suggest that policing and police work are
best captured by the role of the generic entry level street cop position, whilst the
core military role is captured by the private soldier. they therefore compared the
key attitudes, skills and roles of Police Oficer i and Combat rile Crew member
categories, and some of their indings are summarised in the following table:
Table 3 acquiring skills and acquiring attitudes: comparison of role
orientation and role Demands source: campbell & campbell 2010
Dimension
Traditional
policing role
Traditional WarFighting role
attitudes
•
•
•
protect/prevent
low or last resort
mostly benign
•
•
•
overwhelm/pacify
high or irst resort
typically hostile
•
•
•
high/ongoing
high/relevant
high/necessary
•
•
•
moderate/sporadic
moderate/less
relevant
low/less frequency
•
•
•
high/frequent
high/necessary
high/relevant
•
•
•
moderate/infrequent
low/less relevant
low/less relevant
•
•
•
orientation to job
orientation to use
of force
orientation to work
environment
conceptual skills
•
•
•
importance of
discretionary
judgement
importance of
problem solving skills
importance of
investigative skills
communicative skills
•
•
•
importance of
negotiation skills
importance of
communication skills
importance of
persuasive skills
Situating Police and Military in Contemporary Peace Operations
21
in considering issues arising in this study of police versus military roles, Campell and
Campbell (2010: 339) suggest the core difference between the two jobs lies in the
types of judgements required by the jobholders and the cognitive demands placed
on them. they note that:
although both jobs are in protective service occupations, they differ
signiicantly in terms of speciic tasks and expectations. While police oficers
patrol and investigate wrongdoing, combat rile crewmembers destroy
or capture enemies; while police oficers inspect, warn and arrest; rile
crewmembers fortify, camoulage, and repair weapons; while police oficers
report hazards, disperse unruly crowds, and write daily activity reports,
rile crew members place antitank mines and ire machine guns, and so on
(2010: 339)
it is due to these differences in training and ethos that the authors also argue
that when military units are required to undertake policing roles that they focus
primarily on developing relevant skills, whilst police taking on more military oriented
tasks tends to focus less on skill development and more on attitude adjustment
(2010: 343).
these considerations suggest that there remain dificulties for the military in
undertaking active policing roles. yet there are also reasons to be wary of the
military’s playing a wider role in training and mentoring police forces too. Overly
militarised approaches to training local police forces (including the mentoring of
police oficers by members of the military) can lead to the police force itself taking
on militaristic features and militaristic priorities (Sedra 2006: 95; Bayley and Perito
2010: 4). training by the military is likely to be “oriented towards the elimination
of an enemy threat and inherently engenders a much more militaristic attitude
in civilian police bodies” (Campbell and Campbell 2010: 331).
this can lead to disconnection between the police force and the community
that it is supposed to serve – particularly if such training is geared towards the
security interests of external actors. in iraq, for example:
any iraqi policeman will tell you that the iraqi people are not satisied
with security provision; and the strength of the militias is at least in part a
response to the failure of the state to provide security. the key mission of
22
Civil- Military occasional papers
the iraqi police is seen as ighting terrorism. this may seem reasonable to
an outsider, but it is essentially a state-centric priority established with the
occupying coalition (Martin and Wilson 2008: 90)
in iraq the focus on counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency as emphasised by
the Department of Defence-sourced training they have received has resulted in
a skewed approach to internal security.8 However, as Perito and Bayley (2010:
83) have argued, police contributions to security in these situations should
prioritise enlisting the cooperation of the public and legitimating government, not
‘ighting terrorism’. indeed, as iraqi police are accustomed to a centralised chain
of command and more military-oriented traditions than those in the West, it
has been claimed that the police-military divide needed to be much more clearly
circumscribed (Pfaff 2007: 6) and that “direct and deep relationships between
international military forces and the domestic police in post-conlict countries are
unhealthy” (Friesendorf 2009: 157–8).
Similar indings have been reported in the case of afghanistan. For instance, an
international Crisis Group report (2007: 15) noted:
it is counter-productive to treat police as an auxiliary ighting unit in battling
the insurgency, as has been happening with increasing frequency in the
troubled south. afghanistan, like any other democracy, requires police
service more than police force.... in countering an insurgency, the police are
the irst line of defence as the interface with the community. they have
powers of stop and search, arrest and detention, and since they observe
daily comings and goings, should be aware of the irst signs of illegal activity.
yet, as the interior minister rightly said, “it is not the responsibility of the
police to ight [the insurgency]. the police are responsible for implementing
the law, and we should not train our policemen with an inclination for war”.
the above case studies highlight some of the dificulties with the suggestion that
the military might increasingly be involved in wider types of ‘policing activities’, such
as training and mentoring:
Providing police forces with military training, equipment and intelligence may
militarise domestic police, send the wrong signal to post-conlict countries
and undermine efforts to create police forces guided by democratic norms.
Situating Police and Military in Contemporary Peace Operations
23
Citizens in post-conlict countries have usually suffered from abusive, corrupt
and militarised security forces. Fostering public trust in civilian policing thus
depends on limiting the role of the military in internal security (Friesendorf
2009: 17; see also Mobekk 2005)
Despite recent claims as to the democratic beneits of US professional military
education in terms of positive impacts upon other militaries (ruby and Gibler
2010: 339–364), much of the literature deplores the involvement of military
forces in police training and reform, yet this involvement is still occurring and being
encouraged. this is in large part capability-driven, in that the military tends to have
the capabilities or the funds to undertake such a mammoth task, but unless there
were signiicant changes to military forces – changes which would inevitably have
a negative impact upon their ability to play their core roles – there will remain a
reason to maintain the police – military divide both at home and in operational
contexts. However, given the security gap issue that commonly arises in postconlict situations, it seems plausible that some military roles might usefully be
played in support of law enforcement. Potential roles include: static and personnel
protection; security perimeters; checkpoint / dismantling illegal checkpoints;
detaining of suspects for police; intelligence provision; seize assets; assisting police
with raids; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDr) and demining.
One branch of the military, the military police, might also potentially be able to
undertake some constabulary roles, though this would need to be well thought
through before military police are unquestionably offered up as the solution to the
problem as there are not insigniicant institutional differences between CivPOl
and MPs. in particular, the primary task of Military Police is to ‘police’ the military,
and in this they are more internal enforcers of discipline and behaviour, rather than
protectors of community safety and rule of law.
24
Civil- Military occasional papers
conclusions
there are a number of arguments that suggest that the police–military divide
is blurring, particularly in the international sphere. However we believe that
fundamental differences remain. Moreover it is clear that strategic planning and
doctrine has improved in terms of moves to develop a clearer understanding of
an appropriate and workable division of labour between the two in undertaking
various roles in contemporary and future peace operations.
these recent developments serve to reinforce the continuing existence of
differences between police and military and are, for us, normatively important
because of the underlying need to demilitarise and deescalate situations in
post-conlict peace operations. there is a worrying trend in the literature,
particularly in america, to admit that using military for policing roles is not ideal, but
should be pursued simply because that is where most capabilities and resources are
vested. We consider it plausible that there may be some roles that military could
potentially undertake but what would be the broader or more symbolic issues
raised by such involvement?
in an accompanying paper that considered irst principles in policing and military
spheres, for example, we argued that use of military personnel to perform policing
functions is a more overtly political statement than using police and, in post-conlict
environments in which these functions are played by outsiders, the regular use
of the military in frontline policing runs the risk of making the population feel as
though they are under occupation (Fish and Greener 2011). the use of military
personnel also suggests that the country is still in a state of conlict or hostilities.
as noted both in that paper and in this one, the ability of military personnel to
perform policing functions remains limited.
Perhaps most importantly, though, the question of legitimacy is critical when it
comes to the likelihood of a local police force persisting in situ, and therefore
to the ability of interveners to exit from peace operations. if this legitimacy is
threatened by a confusion of military and policing roles and functions in a postconlict society, by either or both the interveners and the host government, the
chances for a lasting and sustainable peace are considerably diminished. recent
policy efforts by the UN and EU have begun to sketch out appropriate generic
Situating Police and Military in Contemporary Peace Operations
25
roles for police and military personnel in peace operations and these constitute
important contributions to the ield. However, more detailed planning needs to
take into consideration how military forces might support policing efforts within
clearly circumscribed boundaries, and how police may be better supported to carry
out international roles, in order to avoid the current push to use military forces in
policing type roles when they are not suited to the task at hand. in particular, more
work needs to be done in asking how military police may also it into the equation.
More therefore, needs to be done to consider how to achieve an appropriate and
legitimate division of labour between police and military in the different contexts
within which international actors engage their efforts.
endnotes
26
1
For example, Campbell and Campbell, p330 point out that SWat teams have gone beyond hostage
situations etc “into a range of activities normally handled by traditional police and tactics” and that
military involvement in constabulary activities and in police training has also increased. they suggest
on p331 that “such collaborative involvement is not limited to the development and transfer of
useful military skills, tactics and procedures but also often involves the transfer of military attitudes
and orientations”.
2
rosen claims that we are in a 3rd generation of civil-military relations: the irst was a domestic
debate about the military and the soldier’s role in relation to the state; the second was the
literature on issues surrounding the military contribution to humanitarian interventions or complex
humanitarian emergencies; and the third is a deeper look at the multiagency roles played in
international operations.
3
although we could include additional categories such as ‘skill sets’ or ‘attitudes’ these are largely
derivative of these broader categories, having developed to play these roles and function well
enough within these institutions. Much of this work was developed through an earlier paper by W.J.
Fish and B.K. Greener, ‘First Principles in Situating Police and Military’ (unpublished manuscript 2011).
4
We note that the idea of ‘the military’ masks differences in the proiles of different services and
branches. the role of military police, of infantry, naval seaman and jet pilot will differ. this is an issue
that we will consider in more depth elsewhere, but to note, we do consider there to be enough
similarity here too to allow us to make these calls (for example naval oficers have been deployed
to afghanistan villages to run Provincial reconstruction teams and even Special Ops teams are
increasingly subject to increased oversight and scrutiny). the role of Military Police, in particular, is
of signiicance but is explicitly not addressed in this paper in any great detail as it will be addressed
in later work.
Civil- Military occasional papers
5
the roles of military forces are clearly stated in various country acts which legislate the existence
and use of armed forces (such as the New Zealand Defence Act 1990, or the Australian Defence Act
1903 and its various amendments).
6
the contributors to Charles Moskos’ book discuss how a number of armed forces around the
world were being subject to such processes such that militaries were becoming less ‘masculine’
and hierarchical and more accepting of difference. More recent literature notes the impact of an
increased use of reservists in military operations and this has further closed the distance between
military and civilian spheres (on this phenomenon see the contributions to the a Special issue of
Armed Forces and Society 37 (2) 1 april 2011).
7
adapted from material from United Nations, UN Peacekeeping PDT Standards, Core Pre-Deployment
Training Materials, 1st Edition (New york: UN, 2009), Unit 2 – Part 2: How UN Peacekeeping
Operations Function, pp47–56.
8
this was compounded by confusion on the ground between different US agencies involved in
recreating iraq’s security agencies. robert Perito, ‘US Police in Peace and Stability Operations’,
USIP Special Report, #191, august 2007, pp10–11 points out that Justice Department oficials sought
to create a lightly-armed police force with an emphasis on community policing, whilst at the same
time the US military were creating ‘heavy police units’ made up of former soldiers (Public Order
Battalion, Mechanised Police Unit and Emergency response Unit composed of unvetted Sunnis
with military weapons and counterinsurgency training) that were merged in 2006 to create the
iraqi National Police (iNP) and which was engaged in death squad activities.
Situating Police and Military in Contemporary Peace Operations
27
reFerenceS
andreas, P & Price, r. (2001). From War-ighting to Crime Fighting: transforming
the american National Security State, International Studies Review, 3 (3) Fall , 31–52.
assembly of Western European Union. (2006). ‘the role of the European
Gendarmerie Force’, Interparliamentary European Security and Defence Assembly
Fifty-Second Session Report, 21 June Document a/1928.
Bayley, D. (1990). Patterns of Policing: A Comparative International Analysis Newark NJ:
rutgers University Press.
Bayley, D.H. & Perito, r.M. (2010). The Police in War: Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism
and Violent Crime, Boulder CO: lynne rienner.
Broad, H. (2010). the Debate about arming Police, NZPolice Website, 7 July.
http://www.police.govt.nz/blog/2010/07/14/debate-about-arming-police/24684.
[accessed april 2011].
Caforio, G. Ed. (2003). Handbook of the Sociology of the Military, New york:
Kluwer academic.
Campbell, D.J. &. Campbell K.M. (2010). Soldiers as Police Oficers / Police Oficers
as Soldiers: role Evolution and revolution in the United States, Armed Forces and
Society, 36 (2) 2010, 327–350.
Carpenter, a (2010), UN Police Peacekeeping: Its Different from the Day Job,
Powerpoint Presentation. www.docstoc.com/docs/49053445/Un-policepresentation. [accessed april 2011].
Dunlap Jr, C.J. (2005). the thick Green line: the Growing involvement of Military
Forces in Domestic law Enforcement, in tim Newburn (Ed). Policing: Key Readings,
(pp786–796). Devon and Portland: Willen Publishing.
Dziedzic M. (2003). ‘the Public Security Challenge and international Stability
Police Units’, Perceptions, 8 December 2003. http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/
Volume8/ December2003/mDziedzicbasimicin.pdf. [accessed april 2011].
28
Civil- Military occasional papers
Dziedzic M, & Stark, C. (2006) ‘Bridging the Security Gap; the role of the
Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) in Contemporary
Peace Operations’, USIPeace Brieing, June. http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_
brieings/2006/0616_coespu.html.
Eronen, O. (2008) ‘Prt Models in afghanistan: approaches to Civil-Military
integration’, CMC Finland Crisis Management Studies vol 1 Number 5.
EUrOGENDFOr (2004). Declaration of Intent, 17 September. retrieved from
http://www.eurogendfor.org/egfpages/faq.aspx.
Fields, K. (2002). Civil-Military relations: a Military Civil affairs Perspective
Harvard University Carr Centre for Human Rights Policy Working Paper October
2002. retrieved from http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/Use%20of%20Force/
october%202002/Field_inal.pdf.
Fish. W.J. & Greener, B.K. (2011) First Principles in Situating Police and Military,
unpublished manuscript.
Fishstein, P. (2010). Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship Between Aid
and Security in Afghanistan’s Balkh Province. Boston Ma: Feinstein international Center.
Friesendorf, C. (2009) The Military and Law Enforcement in Peace Operations: Lessons
from Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo, Geneva: DCaF.
Greener B.K. (2009). The New International Policing, Houndsmills: Palgrave.
international Crisis Group. (2007) Reforming Afghanistan’s Police, asia report #138,
30 august. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5052&l=1. [accessed
april 2011].
Jayamaha, D., Brady, S., Fitzgerald B., & Fritz, J. (2010). Lessons Learned From
US Government in International Operations, Carlisle Sa: Strategic Studies institute
US army War College.
Jones, S.G, Wilson, J. M., rathmell, a, & riley, K.J. (2005) Establishing Law and Order
After Conlict, Santa Monica: raND.
Keller, D.E. (2011) US Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The
Least Worst Option to Fill the US Capability Gap Carlisle Sa: Strategic Studies institute
US army War College.
Situating Police and Military in Contemporary Peace Operations
29
Kilcullen, D. (2009). The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of the Big
One. New york: Oxford University Press.
Kim, C. & Metrikas, M. (1997) ‘Holding a Fragile Peace: the Military and Civilian
Components of UNtaC’. in Michael W. Doyle et al (Eds.). Keeping the Peace;
Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador, (pp107–133).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kraska, P. & Kappeler, v. (1997). Militarizing american police: the rise and
normalisation of paramilitary units. Social Problems 44(1) 1997, 1–18.
Maley, W. (2005) ‘international Force and Political reconstruction: Cambodia, East
timor and afghanistan’. in a. Schnabel & H-G Ehrhart (Eds.) Security Sector Reform
and Post-Conlict Peacebuilding, (pp297–312). tokyo: UN University Press.
Martin, a & and Peter Wilson, (2008). ‘Security Sector Evaluation: Which locals?
Ownership of What?’ in t. Donais (Ed). Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform.
(pp83-104) Geneva: DCaF.
McCulloch, J. (2001). Blue Army: Paramilitary Policing in Victoria. Carlton: Melbourne
University Press.
-----. (2004). Blue armies Khaki Police and the Cavalry on the New american
Frontier Critical Criminology for the 21st Century, Critical Criminology, 12, 309–26.
Mendee, J. & last, D. (2008). Whole of Government responses in Mongolia:
From Domestic response to international implications, The Pearson Papers, 11 (2)
Fall 2008.
Ministeria de Defensa de Espana, ‘European Gendarmerie Force’. http://www.mde.
es/en/politica/seguridad-defensa/contexto/fuerzas/gendarmeria/.
[accessed april 2011].
Mobekk, E. (2005). Identifying Lessons in United Nations International Policing Missions.
Policy Paper No. 5. Geneva: DCaF.
Mockaitis, t.J. (2004) Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations:
The Case of Kosovo, Carlisle Sa: Strategic Studies institute US army War College.
Moskos, C. Ed. (2000). The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
30
Civil- Military occasional papers
NatO, (2004) ‘Multinational Specialist Unit’, SFOR Factsheet, august 2004.
http://www.nato.int/sfor/factsheet/msu/t040809a.htm. [accessed april 2011].
OECD DaC (2007). Handbook on Security Sector Reform (SSR); Supporting Security
and Justice, Paris: OECD.
Perito, r. (2004) Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for
a Postconlict Stability Force. Washington DC: USiP.
Perito, r. (2007) US Police in Peace and Stability Operations, USIP Special Report,
#191, august.
Pfaff, t. (2007) Development and Reform of the Iraqi Police Forces, Carlisle Sa:
Strategic Studies institute US army War College.
Pugh, M. (2001). ‘the Challenge of Civil-military relations in international Peace
Operations’, Disasters, 25 (4), 345–357.
roberts, a. (1993). Humanitarian War: Military intervention and Human rights’,
International Affairs, 69 (3), 429–449.
rosen, F. (2009). Third Generation Civil-Military Relations and the ‘New Revolution in
Military Affairs’, DiiS Working Paper 2009:03. Copenhagen: Danish institute for
international Studies.
ruby, t.Z & Gibler, D. (2010) ‘US Professional Military Education and
Democratization abroad’. European Journal of International Relations, 16 (3),
339–364.
Sedra, M. (2006). Security Sector reform in afghanistan: the Slide towards
Expediency’, International Peacekeeping, 13 (1) March, 94–110.
Shaw, M. (2004). ‘risk-transfer Militarism and the legitimacy of War after iraq’.
The Global Site. http://www. theglobalsite.ac.uk/press/402shaw.htm.
[accessed april 2011].
Seiler, S. (2009). ‘the impact of team Structure, Organization, and Communication
Flow on Problem-Solving activities in Working Groups: a Comparison
Between Military and Civilian task Forces’. in P. Greener & J. Stauffer (Eds.).
Decision-Making: International Comparisons. (pp85-100). Kingston ON: Canadian
Defence academy Press.
Situating Police and Military in Contemporary Peace Operations
31
Silver, a. (2005). the Demand for Order in Civil Society. in t. Newburn (Ed).
Policing: Key Readings (pp.7–24). Portland: Or, Willan Publishing.
Smith, r.J. (1999), ‘Marines Kill another Gunman in Kosovo’, Washington Post,
June 26, pa17
UN News release. (2011). ‘Nimbler UN, Global Partners Needed to Build Stability
in Post-conlict States’, UN News Release March 7 2011.
UN DPKO. (2002). Civil-Military Coordination Policy. http://pksoi.army.mil/doctrine_
concepts/documents/Un%20policy%20Documents/DpKo_cMcoorD_
policy.pdf. New york: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
[accessed april 2011].
UN DPKO. (2008). United Nations Peacekeeping Operations; Principles and Guidelines.
New york: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
UN DPKO. (2009). UN Peacekeeping PDT Standards, Core Pre-Deployment Training
Materials, 1st Edition, Unit 2 – Part 1: Establishment and Operationalization of
Security Council Mandates in PKOs. New york: United Nations Department of
Peacekeeping Operations.
UN DPKO. (2009a). UN Peacekeeping PDT Standards, Core Pre-Deployment Training
Materials, 1st Edition, Unit 2 – Part 2: How UN Peacekeeping Operations Function.
New york: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
UN DPKO. (2011) UN Police Magazine 6th Edition, January. New york: United
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
Walzer, M. (1992). Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations,
2nd Edn, New york: Basic Books.
32
Civil- Military occasional papers
Situating Police and Military in Contemporary Peace Operations
33
34
Civil- Military occasional papers
Situating Police and Military in Contemporary Peace Operations
35
w w w.c i v m i l co e . gov. au