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SHAME AND VIRTUE IN ARISTOTLE
CHRIST OPHER C. RAYMOND
. Introduction
F concepts can claim a greater significance in early Greek ethics than aidōs, or a sense of shame. In Hesiod’s myth of the races,
the collapse of human society is marked by the flight of the goddesses Aidōs and Nemesis (‘righteous indignation’) from the earth
to Olympus. At the conclusion of the Iliad Achilles regains his
humanity when he is moved by aidōs and pity to release Hector’s
body to Priam. And in the collection of didactic verses attributed
to Theognis, we find: ‘There is no better treasure you will lay down
for your children than aidōs, which attends good men, Cyrnus.’
It is against this background that Aristotle presents his systematic
account of the virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics. Yet he introduces
© Christopher C. Raymond
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the th Annual Workshop in Ancient Philosophy, hosted by the University of Texas at Austin, the st Annual
Meeting of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy in New York, and at Bard
College. I am grateful to the participants on those occasions, especially Jay Elliott,
Duane Long, Christopher Moore, and David Riesbeck, for their comments and discussion. Jonathan Dancy, Alexander Mourelatos, Stephen White, and Paul Woodruff offered valuable feedback on previous drafts. I also wish to thank the two anonymous readers for OSAP, and especially the Editor, Victor Caston, for suggesting
a number of ways to improve my argument. Finally, Emilie Houssart and (more recently) Charlie Raymond provided constant love, support, and good humour during
this article’s long gestation.
The standard study of the concept is D. L. Cairns, Aidōs: The Psychology and
Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature [Aidōs] (Oxford, ).
Throughout this paper I shall tend to leave aidōs (and its cognates) untranslated,
though ‘a sense of shame’ or simply ‘shame’ would suit most contexts. Other common translations are ‘modesty’, ‘inhibition’, ‘reverence’, and ‘respect’. As the latter
two indicate, aidōs and its cognates can refer to the positive regard one shows to
others in virtue of their status vis-à-vis oneself (Cairns, Aidōs, –). Thus, in the
Iliad example cited just below, it may be respect for Priam’s status as a suppliant
rather than any feeling of shame that motivates Achilles to relent. The ‘respect’ sense
is much less common by Aristotle’s time, though it may still play a role in his analysis
(especially in his discussions of aidōs in the young).
Op. –.
Il. . ff.; cf. . –.
– (my translation): οὐδένα θησαυρὸν παισὶν καταθήσῃ ἀμείνω | αἰδοῦς, ἥ τ᾿
ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσι, Κύρν᾿ , ἕπεται.
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Christopher C. Raymond
aidōs into his discussion only to deny that it is a genuine virtue.
Although he sees an important role for shame in moral education,
Aristotle suggests that a truly virtuous person will have no need
for aidōs. The focus of this paper will be NE . , where he offers
two different arguments for why aidōs should not be considered a
virtue. The chapter has puzzled readers: both arguments seem to
conflict with things he says elsewhere in the Nicomachean Ethics,
and neither is fully persuasive in its own right. My primary aim is
to show that Aristotle has stronger reasons for denying that aidōs
is a virtue than it initially appears. To do this, I shall draw on the
ancient commentary tradition as well as related passages in the Eudemian Ethics and other parts of the Nicomachean Ethics. Towards
the end of the paper, however, I appeal to Alexander of Aphrodisias’ analysis in the Ethical Problems to argue that aidōs has a significant part to play in the virtuous person’s life after all.
. The first argument of NE . :
aidōs is more like a feeling than a state
In the opening lines of NE . Aristotle argues that aidōs should
not be considered a virtue because it belongs to a different genus
from that of the virtues proper:
περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς ὥς τινος ἀρετῆς οὐ προσήκει λέγειν· πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ
ἕξει. ὁρίζεται γοῦν φόβος τις ἀδοξίας, καὶ ἀποτελεῖ τι τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ φόβῳ
παραπλήσιον· ἐρυθραίνονται γὰρ οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι, οἱ δὲ τὸν θάνατον φοβούμενοι
ὠχριῶσιν. σωματικὰ δὴ φαίνεταί πως εἶναι ἀμφότερα, ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον
ἢ ἕξεως εἶναι. (b–)
Aidōs is not properly spoken about as a sort of virtue, since it is more like a
As Terence Irwin observes, Aristotle ‘thereby rejects a long Greek tradition’
(Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics. Translated, with Introduction, Notes, and Glossary
[NE], nd edn. (Indianapolis, ), ). Aristotle’s position on aidōs is anticipated
by Plato, especially at Chrm. – . See my ‘Aidōs in Plato’s Charmides’, Ancient Philosophy (forthcoming).
On the role of shame in moral education see NE . , b–, along with
M. F. Burnyeat, ‘Aristotle on Learning to Be Good’ [‘Learning’], in A. O. Rorty
(ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (Berkeley, ), –; H. Curzer, Aristotle and
the Virtues [Virtues] (Oxford, ), ch. . In the present paper I shall leave this
issue to one side and focus on Aristotle’s reasons for denying that aidōs is a virtue in
its own right.
I. Bywater (ed.), Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea (Oxford, ), accepting Ross’s
reading of ἀποτελεῖ τι for ἀποτελεῖται at b.
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Shame and Virtue in Aristotle
feeling than a state. It is defined, at any rate, as a sort of fear of disrepute,
and it has an effect comparable to that of the fear of frightening things. For
people blush when they feel ashamed, and when they fear death they turn
pale. Both appear, then, to be somehow bodily, which seems to be precisely
what is characteristic of a feeling rather than a state.
The argument draws on the results of NE . , where Aristotle
had identified the genus of virtue among the three ‘things that
come about in the soul’ (b)––feelings (pathē), capacities
(dunameis), and states (hexeis):
λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀργὴν φόβον θάρσος φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μῖσος πόθον ζῆλον ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἕπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη· δυνάμεις δὲ καθ᾿ ἃς παθητικοὶ
τούτων λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθ᾿ ἃς δυνατοὶ ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσαι· ἕξεις
δὲ καθ᾿ ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀργισθῆναι, εἰ μὲν
σφοδρῶς ἢ ἀνειμένως, κακῶς ἔχομεν, εἰ δὲ μέσως, εὖ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τἆλλα.
(b–)
By feelings I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, enjoyment, love,
hatred, longing, jealousy, pity, and generally whatever is accompanied by
pleasure and pain. By capacities I mean that on account of which we are
said to be susceptible to these feelings—for example, on account of which
we are capable of feeling anger, or pain, or pity. By states I mean the things
on account of which we are well or badly off in relation to feelings—for example, in relation to anger, if we feel it too intensely or too weakly, we are
in a bad state; if we feel it moderately, we are in a good one; and similarly
in relation to the others.
Aristotle uses the term pathos—from the verb paschein (‘suffer’,
‘experience’)—to refer broadly to anything which a subject may be
affected by or undergo, where the change in the subject is generally understood to be temporary. In the above passage, where his
focus is on the human soul, Aristotle narrows the sense of pathē
(translated ‘feelings’) to occurrent episodes of emotion and appetitive desire, which invariably involve changes in the body, and
Unless otherwise noted, translations of the Nicomachean Ethics are based on
C. D. C. Reeve, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics. Translated, with Introduction and
Notes [NE] (Indianapolis, ), substantially modified.
Aristotle is specifically focused on the desiderative part of the human soul (τὸ
ὀρεκτικόν; cf. NE . , b).
On pathē in general see C. C. W. Taylor, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, Books
II–IV. Translated with an Introduction and Commentary [NE –] (Oxford, ),
; Cairns, Aidōs, . Aristotle distinguishes senses of ‘pathos’ at Metaph. Δ ,
b–. For the claim that pathē produce temporary changes see Cat. , b–
, a– (with specific reference to pathē of the soul).
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Christopher C. Raymond
are accompanied by pleasure and pain (οἷς ἕπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη,
b). He goes on to argue that the virtues and vices cannot be
feelings on the grounds that (a) feelings are not the proper objects of
praise or blame (‘for it is not the person who fears or gets angry who
is praised nor the person who simply gets angry who is blamed but,
rather, the one who gets angry in a certain way’ (b–a));
(b) feelings, unlike the virtues and vices, occur ‘in the absence of decision’ (ἀπροαιρέτως, a); and (c) while feelings account for our
being moved or undergoing change (κινεῖσθαι, a), the virtues
and vices account for our being disposed in a certain way (διακεῖσθαί πως, a). As for whether the virtues and vices might be
capacities, Aristotle points out that merely being capable of having feelings deserves neither praise nor blame. It follows that the
virtues and vices must be states—stable dispositions to feel and act
either well or badly.
Aristotle’s strategy at the start of NE . , then, is to show that
aidōs is not a virtue because it is the wrong kind of psychic condition. He first points out that it is defined as a kind of fear (phobos),
itself a straightforward example of a pathos. Like fear, moreover,
aidōs has a characteristic physiological expression: the phenomenon
of blushing suggests that aidōs is episodic, involving a momentary
change, whereas a state endures in the soul over a long period of
On pathē of the soul involving bodily change see DA . , a–. The
claim that pathē of the soul are accompanied by pleasure and pain recurs at EE . ,
b– (though qualified by the phrase ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ––‘usually’ or ‘for the most
part’), and in the definition of pathē at Rhet. . , a–. The precise connection of pathē with pleasure and pain has been the subject of debate. For a thorough
discussion of the issues see J. Dow, Passions and Persuasion in Aristotle’s Rhetoric
[Passions] (Oxford, ), ch. . Dow defends the view that pathē in the Rhetoric
‘simply are states of pain or pleasure (or both)’, and that these pleasures and pains
represent their objects in ways that warrant the pathē in question (). Thus, Dow
argues (against previous commentators) that Rhet. . – offers a distinctive (if not
fully fledged) theory of the emotions. Further valuable treatments of Aristotle on
the emotions include Cairns, Aidōs, –; S. R. Leighton, ‘Aristotle on the Emotions’, in A. O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric (Berkeley, ), –;
W. W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion, nd edn. (London, ), and ‘Aristotle
and Theophrastus on the Emotions’, in id., Aristotle’s Practical Side: On his Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric (Leiden, ), –; A. W. Price, ‘Emotions in
Plato and Aristotle’, in P. Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion (Oxford, ), – at –.
On Aristotle’s notion of hexis see D. S. Hutchinson, The Virtues of Aristotle
(Oxford, ), ch. .
See NE . , b, a–; . , b. For the definition of aidōs see
Plato, Euthph. –; cf. NE . , a–.
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time and is difficult to alter or remove. Since aidōs is more like a
feeling than a state, and virtue is a kind of state, aidōs should not be
counted among the virtues.
As it stands this line of argument is unpersuasive, because it overlooks an important distinction—namely, between aidōs as an occurrent feeling or emotion, and aidōs as an emotional disposition.
Compare the distinction in English between feeling shame at a particular moment and having a sense of shame. The two standard
Greek words for shame, aidōs and aischunē, could be used in either
an occurrent or a dispositional sense. In the former sense, aidōs
is clearly a pathos; but it was also common for aidōs (and less often
aischunē) to refer to something like a character trait—the quality of
being disposed to feel shame when appropriate. But in the opening lines of NE . Aristotle appears to focus exclusively on the
occurrent sense of the term. The conclusion that aidōs is not a virtue because it is more like a feeling than a state therefore seems
unjustified.
In fact, an earlier passage of the Nicomachean Ethics makes use of
this very distinction between occurrent and dispositional senses of
aidōs. In . Aristotle provides an outline of the individual virtues of character, classifying each as a ‘mean’ (μεσότης) between
two vicious extremes. Following his sketch of the virtues proper,
he writes:
εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι καὶ περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότητες· ἡ γὰρ αἰδὼς ἀρετὴ
μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὃ μὲν λέγεται
On the stability of hexeis see Cat. , b–; NE . , a. On blushing see
Cat. , b–, –.
See S. Broadie and C. Rowe, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics. Translation, Introduction, and Commentary [NE] (Oxford, ), ; cf. Cairns, Aidōs, –.
Cairns, Aidōs, –, draws a further distinction between the general disposition to feel an emotion (e.g. a sense of shame), and a more specific emotional disposition such as being ashamed of one’s ancestry (which does not imply that one always
feels occurrent shame in regard to one’s ancestry). Only the former kind of disposition is relevant to the present discussion, since only it can be reasonably construed
as a character trait.
On dispositional aidōs see Cairns, Aidōs, –; on dispositional aischunē see
ibid. n. . I further discuss Aristotle’s use of aidōs and aischunē in NE .
in sect. below.
It is the pathos (specifically aischunē, but see a) that Aristotle makes the
subject of his study of shame in Rhet. . . The term aidōs appears in the list of pathē
at EE . (b–), but not in the list at NE . (b–). The fact that aidōs
commonly denotes a character trait is presumably why Aristotle considers it worth
asking whether aidōs is a virtue in the first place.
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Christopher C. Raymond
μέσος, ὃ δ᾿ ὑπερβάλλων, ὡς ὁ καταπλὴξ ὁ πάντα αἰδούμενος· ὁ δ᾿ ἐλλείπων ἢ
μηδὲν ὅλως ἀναίσχυντος, ὁ δὲ μέσος αἰδήμων. (a–)
But there are also means in the affections and concerned with feelings. For
aidōs is not a virtue, yet the aidēmōn [sc. the person with proper aidōs] is
praised as well. And in these cases, in fact, one person is said to be in the
mean position, whereas another is said to be excessive (as in the case of a
bashful person, who feels aidōs at everything). Someone who is deficient
[sc. in aidōs] or does not feel it at all is shameless. And a person in the mean
position is said to be aidēmōn.
Here Aristotle identifies a mean related to feelings of shame while
denying that aidōs itself is a virtue. The aidēmōn is someone who
feels aidōs in the appropriate way, and is praised on that account.
Aristotle does not give the relevant mean a name, but the natural
choice would be simply aidōs. Consider the parallel passage in the
Eudemian Ethics:
αἰδὼς δὲ μεσότης ἀναισχυντίας καὶ καταπλήξεως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδεμιᾶς φροντίζων δόξης ἀναίσχυντος, ὁ δὲ πάσης ὁμοίως καταπλήξ, ὁ δὲ τῆς τῶν φαινομένων
ἐπιεικῶν αἰδήμων. (. , b–)
Aidōs is a mean between shamelessness and bashfulness. The one who respects no one’s opinion is shameless. The one who respects everyone’s alike
is bashful. The one who respects the opinion of those who appear decent
is aidēmōn.
Note that Aristotle goes on to refer to nemesis (‘righteous indignation’), the other
praiseworthy non-virtue, as a mesotēs at b. Perhaps in the case of aidōs he wants
to avoid the awkwardness of saying that to have aidōs, the mean, is to be disposed
to aideisthai in the right way. He does not encounter this difficulty with nemesis because the emotion verb he uses in this context is not nemesan but lupeisthai. (In his
analysis of the relevant pathos in Rhet. . he uses the verb nemesan instead of the
noun nemesis, except at b.)
R. R. Walzer and J. M. Mingay (eds.), Aristotelis Ethica Eudemia (Oxford,
).
Translations of the Eudemian Ethics are based on B. Inwood and R. Woolf,
Aristotle: Eudemian Ethics (Cambridge, ), substantially modified. See also the
table of means at . , a, as well as the parallel passage in the Magna moralia
(. , a– Susemihl): ‘Aidōs is a mean between shamelessness and bashfulness, and it has to do with deeds and words. For a shameless person is one who
says and does anything on any occasion or before any people; but a bashful person
is the opposite of this, who is afraid to say or do anything before anybody (for such
a person—one who is bashful about everything—is incapable of action); but aidōs
and the aidēmōn are a sort of mean between these. For he will not say and do anything under any circumstances, like a shameless person, nor, like a bashful person,
be afraid on every occasion and under all circumstances, but will say and do what he
ought, where he ought, and when he ought’ (Revised Oxford Translation, modified:
αἰδὼς δ᾿ ἐστὶ μεσότης ἀναισχυντίας καὶ καταπλήξεως, ἔστιν δὲ περὶ πράξεις καὶ λόγους. ὁ
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Whereas the NE passage defines the mean in relation to the
things about which a person feels aidōs (cf. ὁ πάντα αἰδούμενος,
. , a), the EE passage defines it in relation to the audience before whom the emotion is felt. But in both instances the
aidēmōn is someone who is praised for being disposed to feel aidōs
in the right way. If we follow Aristotle’s own threefold division
of the ‘things that come about in the soul’ (NE . , b–),
it appears that such a disposition would have to be a state––since
neither feelings nor capacities are suitable objects of praise or blame
(b–a, a–). His argument at the start of NE .
is therefore all the more puzzling.
There is, however, a related and more promising line of argument
open to Aristotle, which can be pieced together from other passages
in his ethical works. Even if aidōs (in the dispositional sense) belongs to the same genus as the virtues, it may fail to satisfy the other
criteria specified in his definition of virtue. A virtue is a state of the
soul on account of which a person is praised, but it does not follow
that every praiseworthy state is a virtue. In NE . Aristotle gives
his full definition of virtue of character as follows: ‘a state that issues
μὲν γὰρ ἀναίσχυντός ἐστιν ὁ ἐν παντὶ καὶ πρὸς πάντας λέγων καὶ πράττων ἃ ἔτυχεν, ὁ
δὲ καταπεπληγμένος ὁ ἐναντίος τούτῳ, ὁ πάντα καὶ πάντας εὐλαβούμενος καὶ πρᾶξαι καὶ
εἰπεῖν (ἄπρακτος γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος, ὁ πάντα καταπληττόμενος)· ἡ δὲ αἰδὼς καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων
μεσότης τις τούτων. οὔτε γὰρ ἅπαντα καὶ πάντως, ὡς ὁ ἀναίσχυντος, καὶ ἐρεῖ καὶ πράξει,
οὔτε ὡς ὁ καταπλήξ, ἐν παντὶ καὶ πάντως εὐλαβηθήσεται, ἀλλὰ πράξει καὶ ἐρεῖ ἐν οἷς δεῖ
καὶ ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε δεῖ).
Rhet. . discusses both the kinds of things (ποῖα) one is ashamed of and the
types of people in relation to whom (πρὸς τίνας) one is ashamed. The passage from
the Magna moralia quoted in the previous footnote also deals with both.
Cairns, Aidōs, , observes that aidōs is only ever explicitly referred to as a
pathos and never as a hexis. He also points out () that dispositional aidōs, strictly
speaking, cannot be a hexis because every state is either a (perfect) virtue or a vice
(Phys. . , a–). But this assumes that aidōs is not a virtue, which has yet to
be shown. If indeed aidōs is not a virtue, we are left with two possibilities: either
there are some hexeis that are not virtues or vices, or there are some praiseworthy
dispositions that are not hexeis. Pursuing the latter possibility, Cairns gives lengthy
consideration (–) to whether dispositional aidōs might be a dunamis, based on
the characterization of dunameis at EE . , b– (where Aristotle treats being
aischuntēlos as a dunamis). His conclusion is that ‘the alternative conceptions [in the
EE and the NE] of what it is to be a dunamis seem unable to capture the essence of
aidōs as a developed trait of character’ (). In the end, he decides that Aristotle
should have recognized dispositional aidōs as a hexis (–). This may be compatible with Aristotle’s view that every hexis is a virtue or a vice if we take dispositional
aidōs to be an aretē in a loose sense, similar to enkrateia (see EE . , b–;
cf. NE . , a–, b, with Cairns, Aidōs, n. ). For aidōs as an aretē in
this loose sense see NE . , a–, and my discussion in sect. below.
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in decisions [ἕξις προαιρετική], consisting in a mean that is relative to
us and that is determined by a rational account, in the way in which
a practically wise person [ὁ φρόνιμος] would determine it’ (b–
a). A virtue is not any kind of state, but a ‘prohairetic’ (prohairetikē) state, or one that ‘issues in decisions’. To form a prohairesis, or decision, in Aristotle’s sense, is to choose a course of
action as the result of deliberation about how to achieve some desired end. The virtues of character, as Hendrik Lorenz writes, are
states that ‘render their bearers capable of, and suited to, making excellent decisions’. Aristotle’s definition further specifies that the
virtuous mean is determined in the way a phronimos, or practically
wise person, would determine it. This adumbrates his view, stated
elsewhere, that full virtue of character requires the intellectual virtue of phronēsis, or practical wisdom (and vice versa). It follows
that even if aidōs can be understood as a state and as a mean, two
further conditions must be met for it to count as a virtue. First, it
must be a ‘prohairetic’ state, or one that issues in decisions; second,
it must dispose a person to make practically wise decisions. For the
moment I shall leave the second condition to one side, and take up
the question of whether aidōs, understood as a state of character,
would be a state that issues in decisions.
Let us begin by returning to the passage where Aristotle first suggests that aidōs is a praiseworthy mean but not a virtue. In NE . ,
as we have seen, he distinguishes aidōs as well as nemesis (‘righteous
indignation’) from the virtues proper on the grounds that they are
My translation.
See also EE . , b. For this translation of hexis prohairetikē see H.
Lorenz, ‘Virtue of Character in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics’ [‘Character’], Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy, (), – at –. Lorenz’s causal reading
is supported by EE . , a–, where Aristotle says that by calling virtue ‘prohairetic’, he means that it ‘makes [ποιεῖ] everyone choose for the sake of something,
and this “something for the sake of which” is what is fine’ (my emphasis).
See NE . , a–; EE . , b–a. My interpretation of prohairesis follows Lorenz, ‘Character’, –. The correctness of a decision, crucially,
is not just a matter of how well one reasons instrumentally, but also a matter of desiring the right end for the right reasons.
Lorenz, ‘Character’, . According to Jessica Moss, ‘virtue is a hexis prohairetikē in that it provides the goal for the deliberation that yields a decision, not the
whole process’ (‘Was Aristotle a Humean? A Partisan Guide to the Debate’, in R.
Polansky (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge, ), – at n. ). See EE . , a–; cf. NE . (EE . ),
a–; NE . (EE . ), a–.
See NE . (EE . ), b–a.
I return to the relation between aidōs and practical wisdom in sect. below.
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‘in the affections and concerned with feelings’ (ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι καὶ
περὶ τὰ πάθη, a). It is not at all obvious what contrasts Aristotle has in mind, either between pathēma and pathos or between en
and peri. The noun pathēma occurs only here in the Nicomachean
Ethics, and in other works it is often interchangeable with pathos.
a– (εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι καὶ περὶ τὰ πάθη) has been rendered several different ways. Irwin translates: ‘There are also means in feelings and about
feelings’ (NE, ad loc.). Reeve translates: ‘There are also medial conditions in feelings and concerned with feelings’; he comments: ‘The mean is in pathēmata but
concerned with pathē. The distinction, if one is intended, seems to be between inner feelings that do not necessarily result in deliberately chosen actions, and those
that do result in such actions’ (NE, ad loc. and –). But he provides no evidence
supporting this distinction. Taylor translates: ‘There are also means in episodes and
kinds of feeling’; he comments: ‘Aristotle distinguishes between pathēmata (translated “episodes (of feeling)”) and pathē (rendered here “kinds of feeling”), saying
that the means in question are “in” (en) the former and “concerned with” (peri) the
latter. Since the two terms are often used interchangeably, it is not easy to see what
distinction is being drawn’ (NE –, ad loc. and ). Rowe translates: ‘There are
also intermediates in the affective feelings and in relation to things that happen to
people’; and Broadie comments: ‘Here Ar. introduces two examples of a new sort of
triad, consisting of excessive, deficient, and intermediate responses to things that befall people. One example consists in responses to things involving oneself, the other
in responses to the fortunes of others. It is strange that he classes these triads as
affective feelings (i.e. affections), as they seem to be dispositions’ (NE, ad loc. and
). Rowe appears to treat the pathēmata in this passage as equivalent to the pathē
discussed in . (and contrasted with dunameis and hexeis). He takes the pathē at
a, with which aidōs and nemesis are concerned (or ‘in relation to’ which they
stand), to be ‘things that befall’ oneself. This seems very unlikely, though, since
Aristotle conceives of aidōs principally as a response to things one does (or might
do); see NE . , b–. In Rhet. . he treats things people suffer as a subclass of the causes of shame (a–). Finally, Gauthier and Jolif render the key
phrase (in my translation): ‘in the emotions, by which I mean in the domain of the
emotions’ (‘dans les passions, je veux dire dans le domaine des passions’); they comment: ‘The form παθήμασι occurs often in Aristotle; as for the expression περὶ τὰ
πάθη, it designates the matter in which the means are realized, and it has exactly the
same meaning as ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι’ (‘La forme παθήμασι est fréquente chez Aristote;
quant à l’expression περὶ τὰ πάθη, elle désigne la matière dans laquelle se réalisent les
justes milieux, et elle a exactement la même signification que ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι’: Aristote: L’Éthique à Nicomaque. Introduction, traduction et commentaire [L’Éthique],
vols. in pts. (Louvain and Paris, –), ii/. ).
The classic study is H. Bonitz, Aristotelische Studien, v. Über πάθος und πάθημα
im Aristotelischen Sprachgebrauche [Studien V] (Vienna, ). Bonitz, responding
to Jacob Bernays’ analysis of pathēmatōn in the definition of tragedy at Poet. ,
b– (‘Grundzüge der verlorenen Abhandlung des Aristoteles über Wirkung
der Tragödie’, Abhandlungen der historisch-philosophischen Gesellschaft in Breslau,
(), –), concludes that there is no systematic distinction between the two
terms, and that in many cases they appear interchangeable (). There are cases,
however, where the difference seems to be more than stylistic. For example, at DA
. , a, pathēmatōn follows an appearance of pathē in the previous sentence,
and seems to refer to external provocations as opposed to the feelings (pathē) pro-
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It may just be a stylistic variation, but that still would not explain
the difference between the prepositional phrases. One possibility is
that Aristotle intends to draw a contrast between emotional dispositions or tendencies (here called pathēmata) and the kinds of things
listed in . (b–), occurrent emotions and appetitive desires
(pathē). In the lines that immediately follow, then, being aidēmōn
or being bashful would be examples of pathēmata, which are ‘concerned with’ (peri) the feeling of aidōs (a pathos). Aristotle’s claim,
on this reading, is that there are means (and excesses and deficiencies) ‘in’ (or perhaps ‘among’) emotional dispositions as well.
But if the non-virtuous means are ‘concerned with feelings’ (περὶ
τὰ πάθη), why should that distinguish them in any way from the
means that Aristotle regards as virtues? After all, virtue of character was defined in NE . as being ‘concerned with feelings and
actions’ (περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις, b–; cf. b–):
οἷον καὶ φοβηθῆναι καὶ θαρρῆσαι καὶ ἐπιθυμῆσαι καὶ ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἐλεῆσαι καὶ
ὅλως ἡσθῆναι καὶ λυπηθῆναι ἔστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, καὶ ἀμφότερα οὐκ εὖ· τὸ
δ᾿ ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ᾿ οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὓς καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ, μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον,
ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς. (b–)
duced by them (I thank Victor Caston for this example). In the Eudemian Ethics, by
contrast, Aristotle consistently uses pathēmatōn as the genitive plural of pathos (in
place of pathōn); see . , b–; . , a–. (No other forms of pathēma
occur in that work.) The dative plural pathēmasi occurs elsewhere only at Meteor.
. , a, and . , a, and at Pol. . , b. The rarity of the form
might suggest that it is not a mere stylistic choice in the NE . passage, but rather
is supposed to mark a substantive contrast (note that the dative plural pathesi occurs
twelve times in the Nicomachean Ethics).
In fact, this is close to how Bernays distinguishes the terms in the essay to which
Bonitz is responding in Studien V (see previous note): ‘Now a comparison of those
passages in Aristotle where a relaxed use [of pathos or pathēma] is impossible yields
the following contrast: a pathos is the condition of a paschōn and designates the unexpected outbreak and overflow of an emotion; a pathēma, on the other hand, is the condition of a pathētikos and designates the emotion as inherent in the affected person,
ready to break out at any time. Briefly, a pathos is a feeling, a pathēma a disposition
to feel. Aristotle’s lost explanation of catharsis will have indicated this in something
like the following words: “I mean by pathēma the condition of the pathētikoi”’ (‘Aristotle on the Effect of Tragedy’, trans. J. Barnes, in A. Laird (ed.), Ancient Literary
Criticism (Oxford, ), – at ). Bernays appeals to Pol. . , a–,
where Aristotle says that catharsis is needed for those who are prone to pity or fear,
or those who are generally pathētikoi. Here the adjective pathētikos seems to refer
to a person who is excessively prone to certain feelings, and Bernays claims that the
same dispositional sense is in play in the Poetics (see also Aristotle’s use of pathētikē
poiotēs in Cat. , b–a). While Bonitz argues convincingly against his general
thesis about pathos and pathēma, Bernays’ distinction may still apply in particular
cases.
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For example, it is possible to feel fear and confidence, appetite, anger, pity,
and pleasure and pain generally, both too much and too little and in both
ways not well. But to feel such things when we should, about the things we
should, in relation to the people we should, for the sake of what we should,
and as we should is a mean and best and precisely what is characteristic of
virtue.
Aidōs, understood as a mean, would be the disposition to feel occurrent shame (aidōs or aischunē) at the right times, about the right
things, and so on. Nemesis would be the disposition to feel indignant
at another’s success in the appropriate way (e.g. when the success
is undeserved). So why should they not count as virtues?
One possibility is that Aristotle takes aidōs and nemesis to be concerned only with feelings and not with actions, whereas the genuine
virtues are concerned with both. Initially this reading may seem implausible, since clearly shame and indignation can motivate a person
to act. But it is supported by the earliest surviving commentary on
the Nicomachean Ethics. On NE . , a–, Aspasius writes:
μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λέγει μεσότητας εἶναί τινας ἐν ψιλοῖς τοῖς πάθεσιν, ἐπαινετὰς μέν,
ἀρετὰς δ᾿ οὐ λέγων εἶναι. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις, οἷον ἀνδρεία
περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀγωνίζεσθαι καὶ πράττειν τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα. αἱ δὲ λεγόμεναι νῦν μεσότητες ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς πάθεσι μόνον εἰσίν,
οὐκ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν, οἷον αἰδὼς καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων μέσος, καταπλὴξ δὲ ὁ ἅπαντα
αἰδούμενος ὑπερβάλλων τις τῷ πάθει, ὁ δὲ ἐλλείπων τῷ αἰδεῖσθαι ἀναίσχυντος.
(In EN . – Heylbut)
Next he says that there are certain means in the bare feelings, and while he
says that they are praiseworthy he denies that they are virtues. For virtue
is concerned with feelings and actions––for example, courage is concerned
with fears and confidence, but also resides in competing over and performing the deeds of a courageous person. What are here called means are only
in the feelings themselves, not in the actions. For example, aidōs and the
aidēmōn are the mean, but someone who feels aidōs at everything and is
In . courage is characterized as being ‘concerned with’ fear and confidence
(a), temperance with pleasures and pains (b–), and mildness with anger
(a–).
See Taylor, NE –, : ‘Since every virtue and vice is concerned with feelings (as well as with actions), Aristotle’s thought must presumably be that shame and
the other feelings mentioned in the following lines do not prompt to action; hence
in these cases the mean is concerned with feelings exclusively. If that is his thought,
it is not true; as well as exhibiting shame by such reactions as blushing, one may be
motivated by shame e.g. to run away and hide. Similarly, indignation and its contrasted vices may motivate action.’ For an example of acting from aidōs within the
Nicomachean Ethics see . , a– (discussed in sect. below).
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excessive in the feeling is bashful, whereas one who is deficient in feeling
aidōs is shameless.
In place of Aristotle’s ‘in the affections and concerned with feelings’
(ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι καὶ περὶ τὰ πάθη), Aspasius writes simply ‘in the
bare feelings’ (ἐν ψιλοῖς τοῖς πάθεσιν, . ). By the end of the passage it is evident that by ‘bare’ feelings Aspasius means feelings by
themselves, or apart from actions. The genuine virtues, he suggests,
are concerned with feelings and actions: courage consists not only
in feeling appropriate fear and confidence, but also in performing
certain characteristic deeds. The non-virtuous means, aidōs and
nemesis, consist in having the right feelings alone. To be praised
as aidēmōn, it is enough to be neither excessive nor deficient ‘in the
feeling’ (τῷ πάθει, . ) of aidōs. There are no characteristic deeds
for a person to perform in order to be credited with the mean.
If we follow Aspasius’ reading, we do not have to saddle Aristotle with the view that aidōs and nemesis, in contrast to the genuine
virtues, do not motivate people to act. Rather, in saying that these
means are concerned with feelings as opposed to actions, Aristotle
is making a subtle point about the basis on which such character
traits are ascribed. In support of this interpretation, we may turn
to the parallel discussion of non-virtuous means in Eudemian Ethics . . Having completed his analysis of the particular virtues of
character—courage, temperance, mildness, generosity, greatness of
soul, and magnificence—Aristotle writes:
σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστα τῶν περὶ τὸ ἦθος ἐπαινετῶν καὶ ψεκτῶν τὰ
μὲν ὑπερβολαὶ τὰ δ᾿ ἐλλείψεις τὰ δὲ μεσότητές εἰσι παθητικαί. οἷον ὁ φθονερὸς
καὶ ἐπιχαιρέκακος. καθ᾿ ἃς γὰρ ἕξεις λέγονται, ὁ μὲν φθόνος τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ
τοῖς κατ᾿ ἀξίαν εὖ πράττουσιν ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐπιχαιρεκάκου πάθος ἐστὶν αὐτὸ
ἀνώνυμον, ἀλλ᾿ ὁ ἔχων δῆλός ἐστι τῷ χαίρειν ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις. μέσος δὲ τούτων ὁ νεμεσητικός, καὶ ὃ ἐκάλουν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι τὴν νέμεσιν, τὸ
λυπεῖσθαι μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις καὶ εὐπραγίαις, χαίρειν δ᾿
ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀξίαις . . . (b–)
Pretty much every other praiseworthy and blameworthy thing having to do
Translation based on D. Konstan, Aspasius: Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics –
, – [Aspasius] (London, ), substantially modified. Unfortunately Aspasius’
commentary breaks off just before the longer treatment of aidōs at NE . and picks
up again at book .
Konstan’s punctuation is misleading on this point: ‘For virtue concerns emotions and actions—for example courage concerns fears and confidence—but also
resides in competing over and performing the deeds of a courageous person’ (Aspasius, ad loc.).
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with character—whether excesses, deficiencies, or means—is affective [παθητικαί]. Take, for example, the envious person and the spiteful person. In
terms of the states [ἕξεις] after which these are named, envy is being pained
at those who deservingly succeed; the feeling belonging to one who rejoices
in others’ misfortune does not have a name, but the person who possesses
this reveals himself by rejoicing at undeserved failure. The mean of these is
the one prone to feel righteous indignation; what the ancients called nemesis
is being pained at failures or successes that are undeserved, and rejoicing
at those that are deserved . . .
Here Aristotle distinguishes the non-virtuous means (as well as
non-vicious excesses and deficiencies) from the genuine virtues
(as well as vices) by saying that they are ‘affective’ (παθητικαί,
b). The means placed in this category include not only
aidōs and nemesis, but also three character traits that Aristotle
regards as genuine virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics: friendliness
(φιλία), truthfulness (ἀλήθεια), and wit (εὐτραπελία). Aristotle
gives the examples of the envious, spiteful, and righteously indignant types in order to clarify what makes a state of character
‘affective’. His thought seems to be that we attribute such qualities as envy, spitefulness, and nemesis to people based on their
tendency to be affected in certain ways—to be pained by or rejoice
at the fortunes of others—rather than on the things they do (cf.
NE . , a–b). A spiteful person may of course act out of
At NE . , b, Aristotle uses epichairekakia for the character trait opposed
to envy and nemesis.
The same term was translated ‘susceptible to feelings’ in NE . , b–
(see above), where Aristotle says that the dunameis of the soul make people pathētikoi.
There the point is that dunameis make people capable of having certain feelings,
rather than disposing them to have feelings of some sort or other. Here I have
chosen the more neutral ‘affective’, though I take Aristotle to be contrasting the
pathētikai means with the ‘prohairetic’ means that are genuine virtues. So an alternative (though tendentious) translation would be ‘issuing in feelings’, to parallel the
translation of hexis prohairetikē as ‘state that issues in decisions’. On the interpretation of -ikos adjectives (esp. in NE (EE )) see Lorenz, ‘Character’, –.
EE . also includes dignity (σεμνότης), which is absent from the analysis of
means in the Nicomachean Ethics. For discussion of the so-called ‘questionable’
means see W. W. Fortenbaugh, ‘Aristotle and the Questionable Mean-Dispositions’
[‘Questionable’], in id., Aristotle’s Practical Side, –. For the unorthodox view
that the Nicomachean Ethics does not treat the questionable means as full virtues
either see T. Engberg-Pedersen, Aristotle’s Theory of Moral Insight [Moral Insight]
(Oxford, ), –.
Note that Aristotle explicitly refers to the excess and deficiency related to
nemesis as ‘states’ (ἕξεις, b), and later describes wit as a ‘most decent state’
(ἐπιεικεστάτη ἕξις, a). So he should have no trouble also speaking of aidōs as
a hexis.
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spite—for example, by throwing a lavish party when his virtuous
neighbour’s house burns down and not inviting him. But it is
his feeling of joy itself rather than anything he does that reveals
his character (cf. ὁ ἔχων δῆλός ἐστι τῷ χαίρειν, b–). Likewise, a bashful person shows his character by feeling aidōs—by
being pained at the thought of disrepute—in an excessive way.
An aidēmōn person feels aidōs always and only when appropriate,
whereas a shameless person shows his character by failing to feel
it at all. In each case, Aristotle suggests, the mean or extreme is
expressed by the relevant pathos (or revealed by its absence).
Perhaps Aristotle would say that this does not apply to the states
he regards as virtues proper. Though a courageous person is disposed to feel fear or confidence on the right occasions and in the
right amount, his courage is expressed not through fear or confidence, but rather—as Aspasius suggests—through acting well in
threatening situations. Though a temperate person is well disposed
with respect to bodily pleasures, he displays his virtue not through
feelings of pleasure or pain, but through acting well in the face of
temptation. Thus the genuine virtues are also ‘concerned with
feelings’ (περὶ τὰ πάθη), but in Aristotle’s view they are essentially
dispositions to act. And while the other praiseworthy means may
result in action, they are essentially dispositions to have feelings of
certain kinds. Again, Aristotle’s point is that aidōs and nemesis (and
the other ‘affective’ means) can be ascribed to people based on their
emotional tendencies alone.
It is a further question whether the other non-virtuous means and their excesses can be adequately characterized this way (see Fortenbaugh, ‘Questionable’,
; Taylor, NE –, ). If not, this may give us reason to think that the NE account, which treats friendliness, truthfulness, and wit as genuine virtues, is a revision
of the EE analysis. Since aidōs and nemesis are the only means that Aristotle treats
as ‘affective’ in both works, I leave consideration of the other ‘questionable’ means
to one side. Unfortunately we lack Aristotle’s fuller treatment of nemesis, which may
have originally followed the discussion of aidōs in NE . .
The case of mildness (πραότης), the mean concerned with anger, is more difficult. In parallel with the above examples, we could say that although a mild person is
well disposed with respect to anger, he shows his virtue not simply by feeling anger
in the right way, but by acting appropriately in response to slights that are inconsequential or unintended. This case already indicates that the distinction between
‘affective’ means and virtues proper may be hard to justify (see the end of this section).
Note that pathē are not mentioned in Aristotle’s definition of virtue at NE . ,
b–a.
In a similar vein, Fortenbaugh (‘Questionable’, ) defends Aristotle’s classification of aidōs on the grounds that the emotion of shame is insufficiently practical
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We are now in a position to answer our earlier question: whether
aidōs, understood as a state of character, would be a ‘prohairetic’
state, or one that ‘issues in decisions’—in accordance with Aristotle’s definition of virtue in NE . . The above analysis suggests
that it would not be, if aidōs is essentially a disposition to have feelings and only incidentally to act. That is because prohairesis is the
‘starting-point’ (ἀρχή), or the efficient cause, of action. So if aidōs
were a state that issues in decisions, it would also be one that disposes people to act in certain ways. As we have seen, however, Aristotle seems to deny precisely that. Presumably he would say that
when a person does act from one of the non-virtuous means, the efficient cause of the action is not a prohairesis but the relevant pathos
(e.g. occurrent aidōs or aischunē). In that case, aidōs would not be a
state that issues in decisions even incidentally.
That this is in fact his view is confirmed by a separate passage
in EE . , where Aristotle explains why the means he has just described are not genuine virtues:
πᾶσαι δ᾿ αὗται αἱ μεσότητες ἐπαινεταὶ μέν, οὐκ εἰσὶ δ᾿ ἀρεταί, οὐδ᾿ αἱ ἐναντίαι
κακίαι· ἄνευ προαιρέσεως γάρ. ταῦτα δὲ πάντ᾿ ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς τῶν παθημάτων
διαιρέσεσιν· ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν πάθος τί ἐστιν. (a–)
Though all these means are praiseworthy, they are not virtues, nor are their
opposites vices, since they do not involve decision. They all fall under the
classifications of the affections, since each of them is a certain feeling.
and goal-directed: ‘Shame . . . differs from practical emotions such as anger and fear
in that it does not necessarily involve action. There is no class of actions with which
shame is always connected; there is no goal for which ashamed men regularly act. Indeed, when a man is ashamed of some past deed, there may be no way to undo what
has become an accomplished fact. The ashamed man may find himself unable to do
anything. He simply suffers some kind of disturbance (tarachē, [Rhet. . , b])
and perhaps turns red ([NE . , b]). Shame, therefore, is not a practical emotion and [aidōs] is not related to an emotion which regularly involves goal-directed
action. [Aidēmones] do not choose to turn red on the right occasion. They do not
choose at all. Rather they are overcome or suffer or are disturbed as the situation
demands.’ I consider the plausibility of this understanding of aidōs towards the end
of this section.
NE . (EE . ), a: πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις. See EngbergPedersen, Moral Insight, –. Does it follow that an action which is caused by
a pathos is not really a praxis? No, because elsewhere Aristotle uses prattein and its
cognates for akratic action, which is contrary to decision. So here he must be using
praxis in a narrower sense.
The passage continues (a–): ‘But because they are natural they contribute to the natural virtues. As will be discussed in what follows, each virtue in a
way exists both naturally and, in conjunction with practical wisdom, otherwise’ (διὰ
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Aristotle again muddies the waters by saying that each of the nonvirtuous means is a certain pathos or feeling. It would have been
clearer to repeat the claim that they are ‘affective’ means (παθητικαί, b), or dispositions to have feelings of a certain sort. In
any case, the key point is that the other praiseworthy means are
not virtues because ‘they do not involve decision’ (ἄνευ προαιρέσεως). Given that feelings occur ‘in the absence of decision’ (ἀπροαιρέτως, NE . , a), according to Aristotle, it is reasonable
for him to infer that any disposition to have feelings must share
this characteristic. Each of the means discussed in EE . , then, is
praiseworthy but not ‘prohairetic’ (προαιρετική). Since every virtue
is ‘prohairetic’, as Aristotle has stated, these praiseworthy means
cannot be virtues.
Let us now return to the opening lines of NE . , where Aristotle
argues that aidōs is not a virtue because it is more like a feeling (πάθος) than a state (ἕξις). His conclusion appeared to depend on treating aidōs exclusively as an occurrent emotion, whereas aidōs could
also refer to an emotional disposition. In the latter sense, however,
aidōs is most naturally understood as a state, and so the argument is
unpersuasive. We have now seen that there is a more cogent line of
argument open to Aristotle. Our reading of NE . (based on Aspasius), along with the analysis of non-virtuous means in EE . ,
suggests that the class of praiseworthy states can be divided into
two further kinds: those that are ‘affective’ and those that are ‘prohairetic’. Instead of saying that aidōs is not a virtue because it is
δὲ τὸ φυσικὰ εἶναι εἰς τὰς φυσικὰς συμβάλλεται ἀρετάς· ἔστι γάρ, ὥσπερ λεχθήσεται ἐν
τοῖς ὕστερον, ἑκάστη πως ἀρετὴ καὶ φύσει καὶ ἄλλως μετὰ φρονήσεως). Aristotle goes on
to say that aidōs contributes to temperance, ‘which is why people define temperance
within this genus’ (διὸ καὶ ὁρίζονται ἐν τῷ γένει τούτῳ τὴν σωφροσύνην, a–; cf.
Plato, Chrm. –). Aristotle discusses the ‘natural virtues’ more fully in EE
. (NE . ). There he suggests that the natural virtues (which would include
aidōs) are actually innate: ‘for from the moment we are born, we are just and in a way
temperate and brave’ (b–). Aristotle says that the natural virtues become true
virtues through the acquisition of nous (b–), since true virtue cannot occur
without practical wisdom (ἄνευ φρονήσεως, b). Aristotle’s theory of natural
virtues introduces difficulties that cannot be addressed adequately in this paper. On
the problem of viewing aidōs as innate see Cairns, Aidōs, –. Cairns also argues
that the claim that aidōs contributes to sōphrosunē conceives of it too narrowly, because aidōs ‘is quite generally concerned with the aischron and kalon across the range
of words and deeds’ (; cf. MM . , a–). I discuss the relation between
aidōs and phronēsis in sect. below.
See EE . , a: πᾶσα ἀρετὴ προαιρετική; cf. a. See also . , a;
. , b; . , a.
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more like a feeling than a state, Aristotle could have argued that it
is the wrong kind of state. It is a disposition to have certain feelings, whereas a virtue, according to the definition in NE . , is a
state that issues in decisions. As we saw, this reading coheres with
Aristotle’s claim in NE . that aidōs, understood as a mean, is ‘concerned with feelings’ (περὶ τὰ πάθη, a) as opposed to actions.
The point, once again, is not that aidōs never motivates a person to
act, but that unlike the virtues proper, it is essentially a disposition
to have feelings of a certain sort, and only incidentally to act.
It is a further question, however, whether this reconstructed
version of Aristotle’s opening argument—even if it accurately represents his views—is philosophically plausible. In particular, one
might doubt that aidōs is adequately characterized as a disposition
to be affected by feelings, rather than to decide and act for an end.
This seems to imply that all actions that arise from shame are
impulsive, since they do not involve prohairesis. Recall that at the
start of NE . Aristotle takes aidōs, understood as the fear of disrepute, to manifest itself primarily through blushing (b–).
But if we conceive of aidōs as the disposition to avoid disrepute
more broadly, we can also see it being expressed in decisions.
Imagine that a person takes ‘I should avoid disrepute’ as the major
premiss in a practical syllogism, recognizes a situation as one that
will bring disrepute, deliberates about how best to avoid it, draws
a conclusion, and acts accordingly. In such a case, it seems that
one would be acting from aidōs but on the basis of a decision. So
why suppose that aidōs is essentially a disposition to have feelings,
and only incidentally to decide and act? It appears that Aristotle’s
view that aidōs is an ‘affective’ rather than a ‘prohairetic’ mean
depends on an overly narrow conception of the sense of shame.
My analysis might help explain why Aristotle initially says that aidōs is ‘more
like’ a feeling than a state. Perhaps he saw that his earlier tripartite division of the
‘things that come about in the soul’ into feelings, capacities, and states (. , b–
) was unable to account for aidōs and nemesis, understood as emotional dispositions. But instead of making a further division within the class of states (as I suggest
he should have done), he conceives of aidōs as straddling the border between feelings
and states, though leaning towards the former. (I am grateful to Victor Caston for
this suggestion.)
I thank Victor Caston, Duane Long, and Stephen White for separately pressing this objection. For an example of non-impulsive action based on aidōs see my
discussion of Hector’s decision to face Achilles in sect. below.
Indeed, the verb ἀποτελεῖ (b) may suggest that Aristotle here conceives of
blushing as the proper telos, or goal, of aidōs. Compare the analysis in Fortenbaugh,
‘Questionable’, , quoted in n. above.
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So perhaps, instead, what makes aidōs an ‘affective’ mean is that
a person can act from aidōs in the absence of decision. But that
also would not differentiate aidōs from the virtues proper, since
Aristotle plainly denies that every action that expresses virtue must
follow from a prohairesis. A person may do the courageous thing
‘all of a sudden’ (ἐξαίφνης), from a courageous disposition, without
deliberating about how to achieve the desired end. In that case,
Aristotle’s distinction between aidōs and the ‘prohairetic’ means,
or the genuine virtues, looks untenable.
How might Aristotle respond to these difficulties? One option would be to distinguish between ‘affective’ and ‘prohairetic’
varieties of dispositional aidōs. The first would be an emotional
tendency—expressed through blushing, averting one’s eyes, covering one’s face, and related behaviours—that a person shows before
developing the capacity to engage in prohairesis. Thus we might
say that young children are ‘bashful’ or ‘bold’, without implying
that they exhibit habituated states of character. A child who tends
towards neither of these extremes would be properly aidēmōn.
The second (‘prohairetic’) kind of aidōs would be a disposition to
have feelings and to decide and act, just like the virtues proper, and
it would be present only in adults. Of course, if Aristotle were to
embrace this distinction, his opening argument in NE . would
See NE . , b–; . , a–; EE . , b–.
See also Cairns, Aidōs, n. : ‘if the proper disposition towards anger
(praotēs) can be with [prohairesis], so presumably could the proper disposition towards aidōs, even if occurrent aidōs, like occurrent anger, is itself without [prohairesis]’.
This analysis fits with the claim in EE . that aidōs is a ‘natural virtue’, specifically the one that contributes to temperance (a–; see n. above). J. A.
Stewart connects the EE passage to NE . , a–, and comments: ‘αἰδώς and
νέμεσις, being πάθη, are not μεσότητες in the strict sense; but are here called μεσότητες, as it were by anticipation, because they represent tendencies which can be easily
cultivated into ἀρεταί’ (Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (Oxford, ),
). Stewart denies that aidōs can be a ‘mean’ strictly speaking because Aristotle
calls it a pathos and not a hexis. He adds: ‘Perhaps we may say that αἰδώς is a παθητικὴ μεσότης, or a φυσικὴ ἀρετή, when (in the young) it takes the fixed form of a
παθητικὴ ποιότης, as distinguished from a mere πάθος’ (). On this last suggestion
see my next note.
A parallel distinction seems to apply in the case of mildness (πραότης). Aristotle regards mildness, the mean ‘concerned with anger’, as a genuine virtue—the
mean between irascibility (ὀργιλότης) and a nameless deficiency of anger (NE, . ,
b–). At Cat. , b–a, however, he suggests that a quick-tempered person is called ‘irascible’ (ὀργίλος) on the basis of an ‘affective quality’ (παθητικὴ ποιότης). The latter would be a kind of orgilotēs that does not constitute a full vice, so
Aristotle should also recognize a kind of mildness that is not yet a virtue. It would
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be beside the point. For it would show only that ‘affective’ aidōs
is not a virtue, not that it is altogether mistaken to speak of aidōs
as an aretē. But such a concession on Aristotle’s part would not be
fatal to his overall claim in the chapter, since he immediately goes
on to offer a second argument for why aidōs is not a virtue—one
that is logically independent of the first. Aristotle’s new argument,
significantly, applies to aidōs whether it is conceived narrowly as
an affective tendency in children, or as a developed disposition in
adults to feel, decide, and act. As we are about to see, the second
argument has proven no less puzzling than the first, so again it will
take some reconstructive work to get Aristotle’s position in view.
. The second argument of NE . :
shame is not characteristic of a decent person
Aristotle’s initial strategy in NE . was to show that aidōs is not
a virtue because it is the wrong kind of psychic condition. We have
seen that his argument, as presented, is unconvincing, but that it
points to a related and more cogent line of reasoning. That argument, in turn, depends for its plausibility on Aristotle’s classification of aidōs as an ‘affective’ rather than a ‘prohairetic’ mean, which
also seems dubious at best. In the rest of NE . , however, Aristotle takes a different tack, and argues that aidōs is not a genuine
virtue because it is praiseworthy only in a qualified sense. A truly
virtuous person, he suggests, would have no need for aidōs.
Here is the second argument in full:
οὐ πάσῃ δ᾿ ἡλικίᾳ τὸ πάθος ἁρμόζει, ἀλλὰ τῇ νέᾳ. οἰόμεθα γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς τηλικούτους αἰδήμονας εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶντας πολλὰ ἁμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς δὲ
κωλύεσθαι· καὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν τῶν μὲν νέων τοὺς αἰδήμονας, πρεσβύτερον δ᾿ οὐδεὶς
ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν ὅτι αἰσχυντηλός· οὐδὲν γὰρ οἰόμεθα δεῖν αὐτὸν πράττειν ἐφ᾿ οἷς
ἐστὶν αἰσχύνη. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσχύνη, εἴπερ γίνεται ἐπὶ τοῖς φαύλοις
(οὐ γὰρ πρακτέον τὰ τοιαῦτα· εἰ δ᾿ ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν κατ᾿ ἀλήθειαν αἰσχρὰ τὰ δὲ κατὰ
δόξαν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐδέτερα γὰρ πρακτέα, ὥστ᾿ οὐκ αἰσχυντέον)· φαύλου δὲ
καὶ τὸ εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πράττειν τι τῶν αἰσχρῶν. τὸ δ᾿ οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστ᾿ εἰ
πράξαι τι τῶν τοιούτων αἰσχύνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ᾿ οἴεσθαι ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι, ἄτοπον·
ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις γὰρ ἡ αἰδώς, ἑκὼν δ᾿ ὁ ἐπιεικὴς οὐδέποτε πράξει τὰ φαῦλα.
εἴη δ᾿ ἂν ἡ αἰδὼς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἐπιεικές· εἰ γὰρ πράξαι, αἰσχύνοιτ᾿ ἄν· οὐκ ἔστι
be ‘affective’ rather than ‘prohairetic’, just like the two kinds of aidōs I have distinguished above.
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δὲ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. εἰ δ᾿ ἡ ἀναισχυντία φαῦλον καὶ τὸ μὴ αἰδεῖσθαι τὰ
αἰσχρὰ πράττειν, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττοντα αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπιεικές.
οὐκ ἔστι δ᾿ οὐδ᾿ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἀλλά τις μικτή . . . (b–)
The feeling suits not every age, but only youth. For we think that young
people should be aidēmōn because they live by their feelings and so make
many errors, but are held back by aidōs. And though we praise those among
the young who are aidēmōn, no one would praise an older person for being
prone to shame [αἰσχυντηλός], since we think that he shouldn’t do anything
that calls for shame [ἐφ᾿ οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνη]. Indeed, shame is not characteristic of a decent person, if in fact it is occasioned by base actions. (For
such things should not be done; and if some are shameful in reality and
others according to opinion [τὰ μὲν κατ᾿ ἀλήθειαν αἰσχρὰ τὰ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν],
it makes no difference, since neither should be done, and so one should not
feel ashamed.) Rather, it is characteristic of a base person even to be such
as to do anything shameful. But to be disposed so as to feel ashamed were
one to do any such thing [τὸ δ᾿ οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστ᾿ εἰ πράξαι τι τῶν τοιούτων αἰ
Irwin’s translation adds a gloss that ascribes the phrase κατὰ δόξαν to the decent
person himself: ‘If some actions are really disgraceful and others are base [only] in
[his] belief, that does not matter, since neither should be done, and so he should
not feel disgrace’ (NE, ad loc.). Presumably Irwin wants to avoid the implication
that the virtuous person is a slave to convention (cf. Stewart, Notes, ), since the
κατ᾿ ἀλήθειαν/κατὰ δόξαν distinction is standardly read as a contrast between what
is truly shameful and what the public merely thinks to be shameful (cf. Rhet. . ,
b–, –; . , b–). But Irwin’s reading is even more problematic,
since it implies that the virtuous person may act according to false beliefs about the
aischron, which his phronēsis ought to preclude. On the standard reading, by contrast, the virtuous person will act with knowledge of what merely seems shameful
to others. He will avoid doing such things not because he wrongly thinks they are
really shameful, but because he knows that others regard them as such. The standard reading is supported by the Anonymous commentary on NE –, dated to the
late nd cent. (for the dating see E. Eliasson, ‘The Account of the Voluntariness
of Virtue in the Anonymous Peripatetic Commentary on Nicomachean Ethics –’,
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, (), – at –): ‘By shameful
“in reality” he means things like indiscipline, while by “according to opinion” he
means things like eating in the agora; for the latter are [shameful] in the preconception of the many and because of custom and are thought to be shameful’ (. –
Heylbut, my translation and emphasis: κατ᾿ ἀλήθειαν αἰσχρὰ ὡς ἡ ἀκολασία, κατὰ δόξαν δὲ ὡς τὸ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐσθίειν· ἔστι γὰρ ταῦτα τῇ τῶν πολλῶν προλήψει καὶ διὰ τὰ ἔθη καὶ
αἰσχρὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι). The point seems to be that an activity such as eating in the agora—
unlike activities that express the vice of akolasia—is shameful only by convention. It
will be accepted in some societies and condemned in others, and a virtuous person
will respect the norms of whatever society he finds himself in. This need not make
him a slave to public opinion, because if custom required him to do something truly
shameful, he simply would not do it. As long as there is no moral cost, however,
Aristotle’s virtuous person will avoid acting in ways that invite censure, whether or
not he shares the public’s view. Contrast the attitude of Diogenes the Cynic, who
shows disdain for mere convention: ‘Once he was reproached for eating in the agora,
and said: “Well, it was in the agora that I got hungry” ’ (D.L. . , my translation;
cf. . ).
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σχύνεσθαι], and to think oneself decent on that account, is absurd; for aidōs
is occasioned by voluntary actions, and a decent person will never voluntarily do base things. Aidōs might be a decent thing conditionally speaking,
in that if one were to do such a thing, one would feel ashamed; but that does
not apply to the virtues. And even if shamelessness is something base, as
is failing to feel aidōs at doing shameful things, it no more follows that it
is decent for the one who does such things to feel ashamed. Self-control is
not a virtue either, but a sort of mixed state . . .
As in the opening argument, Aristotle appeals to his general account of virtue from book , in particular the claim that the virtues
are the proper objects of praise (. , a–). Whereas in NE
. he had said that the aidēmōn person is praised, he now adds the
qualification that only the young are praised for their aidōs. But if no
one would praise an adult for being disposed to feel ashamed—even
when the feeling is appropriate—then aidōs cannot be a virtue. An
adult is expected not to do anything shameful in the first place, so
he should never have any reason to experience shame. Nor is the absence of aidōs, in a well-behaved adult, any sort of deficiency, since
it is not the case that he fails to feel something that he ought to feel.
Of course, if an adult were to act disgracefully, it would be better
for him to feel ashamed than not; but that does not make aidōs any
more an excellence of character in its own right.
Here, too, commentators have charged Aristotle with overlooking
an important distinction—in this case between retrospective shame
and shame as a prospective, inhibitory emotion. He appears to
say that aidōs does not merit praise in adults because the feeling
of shame depends on a person’s having done something shameful.
Again, the thought seems to be that a ‘decent’ (epieikēs) person has
no need of dispositional aidōs since there will never be an occasion
for him to feel occurrent shame. The problem with this argument is
that it ignores the fact that shame can inhibit action: it can prevent a
person from doing what he might otherwise do. The experience of
this prospective shame, by definition, does not depend on already
having done something shameful. So if we conceive of aidōs as a
disposition to feel this emotion in the appropriate way, it no longer
follows that it is a decent thing only ‘conditionally speaking’ (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, b–), and therefore not a virtue.
Some readers have tried to pin the argument’s weakness on a
My translation.
I am grateful to Victor Caston for this point.
See e.g. Irwin, NE, ; Taylor, NE –, –.
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conflation of the terms aidōs and aischunē. The claim is that at
most Aristotle manages to show that aischunē, the retrospective
emotion, is uncharacteristic of a decent person, but this proves
nothing about aidōs, the inhibitory disposition. As a purely linguistic matter this analysis cannot be right, since in the fourth century aischunē (and its cognates) could also refer to prospective
shame. In the Rhetoric, for instance, Aristotle defines aischunē as
‘a certain pain or disturbance in regard to bad things, whether present, past, or future, that have the appearance of bringing one into
disrepute’. So we should not think that in the second argument of
NE . he is simply confusing his terms.
Nonetheless, it may be fair to charge Aristotle with conflating two
See Gauthier and Jolif, L’Éthique, ii/. –; W. K. C. Guthrie, Aristotle:
An Encounter (Cambridge, ), ; Irwin, NE, : ‘Aristotle’s argument . . .
seems to depend on the identification of aidōs with aischunē.’ See also Taylor, NE
–, : ‘The lack of a distinction between the backward-looking reactive attitude
and the forward-looking sense of restraint is reflected in Aristotle’s treatment of the
term aidōs as interchangeable with aischunē.’ Taylor traces the objection back to the
Anonymous commentator on NE –: ‘Anon. correctly distinguishes the backwardlooking attitude (aischunē) from the forward-looking (aidōs) as follows: “it seems that
aidōs differs from aischunē in this way, that aischunē is for bad things that have been
done, but aidōs is a fear of disgrace at the thought of disgraceful deeds,” adding that
Aristotle fails to attribute the latter attitude to the virtuous agent because he shifts
from discussing aidōs to discussing aischunē (. –).’ But Taylor’s quotation of
the Anonymous commentator misconstrues the text (δοκεῖ δὲ ταύτῃ διαφέρειν αἰδὼς
αἰσχύνης, ὅτι ἡ αἰσχύνη ἐπὶ πεπραγμένοις γίνεται κακοῖς, ἡ δὲ αἰδὼς φόβος ἐστὶν ἀδοξίας ἐπ ᾿ αἰσχρῶν ὑπόνοιᾳ (. –)). As the immediately preceding lines make clear
(. –), the word huponoia, which Taylor translates ‘thought’, refers not to the
agent’s anticipation of his own shameful deeds, but to the suspicion of others that
one is acting shamefully. Anon.’s point is that a virtuous person will still need to
be on guard against the implication of aischra even if he is in fact blameless—and
that aidōs is precisely this sense of caution, whereas aischunē is a response to things
one has actually done. (In sect. I discuss a similar argument found in Alexander of
Aphrodisias’ Ethical Problems.) In any case, Anon.’s sharp distinction between aidōs
and aischunē is anachronistic with respect to Aristotle.
On aidōs and aischunē see D. Konstan, The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature [Emotions] (Toronto, ), –. Konstan
traces the distinction between prospective aidōs and retrospective aischunē to the
th-cent. Christian bishop Nemesius of Emesa (ibid. ).
. , b– (my translation and emphasis): λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς
ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν, ἢ παρόντων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων. Cf. a.
See Cairns, Aidōs, : ‘In ordinary Greek aidōs and aischunē are synonyms,
except when the latter refers to a disgraceful state of affairs rather than the individual’s reaction to that state. . . . Aristotle’s moves from aidōs to aischunē, then, are
not in any way underhand—ordinary language, in fact, goes further than he does in
this passage, in so far as it treats the two as synonyms.’ Cairns goes on to say that
NE . uses aischunē ‘in an exclusively retrospective sense’ (), but I think that is
far from clear (e.g. at b– and b).
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distinct concepts of shame. The problem, once again, is that he appears to argue that shame (whether aidōs or aischunē) is not characteristic of a decent person by focusing on only one kind of shame,
namely the retrospective kind that depends on having done something shameful. In his commentary on NE – C. C. W. Taylor
puts the objection as follows:
[T]he claim that shame is not appropriate in older people, or in good people
generally, since they should not (and in the case of the latter do not) do anything of which they should be ashamed, assumes that shame is exclusively a
reactive attitude to one’s own past misdeeds, thereby neglecting the notion
of aidōs as a sense of shame. . . . Aristotle is right to say that the reactive
attitude cannot be a characteristic of someone who is by his standards completely good. But aidōs as a sense of shame is not that attitude; rather, it is a
sense of restraint inhibiting possible future action, a sense that one would
be ashamed to do something like that. Since sensitivity to what it would be
fine or noble to do necessarily involves comparison with what it would be
disgraceful or shameful to do, Aristotle’s insistence on that sensitivity as
central to the motivation of the virtuous person ought to lead him to give a
correspondingly prominent place to a sense of shame in that sensitivity.
Taylor agrees that by his own lights Aristotle ought to deny that a
virtuous person could be disposed to feel retrospective shame. But
the notion of aidōs that is a suitable candidate for being a virtue is
the disposition to avoid acting disgracefully because one would be
ashamed to act that way. According to Taylor, this sense of inhibition is integral to the psychology of virtue, because the virtuous
person often knows to do the fine or noble (καλόν) thing by perceiving what it would be shameful (αἰσχρόν) to do and acting otherwise.
One might suppose, then, that the virtuous person never has any
occasion to feel retrospective shame in part because her prospective
sense of shame is always effective. In that case, it may be that the
only justification Aristotle has for excluding aidōs from his list of
Taylor, NE –, . See also K. Inglis, ‘Philosophical Virtue: In Defense of
the Grand End’ [‘Grand End’], in Polansky (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, – at n. ; cf. Irwin, NE, : ‘Aristotle is
concerned here with retrospective shame at actions we have done, and, reasonably
enough, denies it to the virtuous person. He does not consider the anticipatory shame
of a, where I am properly ashamed when I even think of the possibility of doing a wrong action. He need not be rejecting that type of shame here, since it will
apparently be a motive for the virtuous person (though not one of his virtues).’ Irwin does not explain why the latter type of shame may be a motive for the virtuous
person but not one of his virtues. In sect. I explain Aristotle’s reasons for thinking
it is neither.
I raise some doubts about this in sect. below.
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virtues is that it plays a role in all of them. Far from being uncharacteristic of a virtuous person, aidōs might instead turn out to
be fundamental and unifying––not one of the virtues, but a way of
conceptualizing virtue itself.
Some support for Taylor’s view can be drawn from NE . ,
where Aristotle says that the virtue of courage has only to do with
certain kinds of fear:
φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά, οἷον ἀδοξίαν πενίαν νόσον ἀφιλίαν θάνατον,
ἀλλ᾿ οὐ περὶ πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι· ἔνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν,
τὸ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρόν, οἷον ἀδοξίαν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φοβούμενος ἐπιεικὴς καὶ αἰδήμων, ὁ
δὲ μὴ φοβούμενος ἀναίσχυντος. (a–)
Now we certainly do fear all bad things (for example, disrepute, poverty,
disease, friendlessness, and death) but they do not all seem to be the concern of a courageous person. For there are some we should in fact fear,
where fearing is fine and not fearing shameful—for example, disrepute. For
a person who fears this is decent and aidēmōn, whereas one who does not
fear it is shameless.
Here Aristotle describes the aidēmōn, the person who is disposed to
feel aidōs in the appropriate way, as ‘decent’ (ἐπιεικής)—the same
adjective used in NE . for someone who never has any reason to
feel ashamed. Notice that he does not qualify this remark by adding
that aidōs is admirable only in the young, or in adults merely in
a conditional sense. This suggests that Aristotle would allow for a
type of shame that is simply praiseworthy, in which case the second
argument of NE . appears to miss the mark. While it might show
that being disposed to feel ashamed is not necessarily indicative of
virtue, it does not seem to establish the stronger claim that shame
is a mark of a ‘base’ (φαῦλος) character.
In the next section I shall argue that Taylor’s objection is misplaced, and that Aristotle has reasons to think that neither type of
shame—prospective or retrospective—is characteristic of the virtuous person. According to Taylor, the sense of shame that anticipates and inhibits shameful actions is ‘integral to the virtuous
person’s standing motivation to do things because it would be fine
to do them or disgraceful not to’. On this account, there is no real
distinction to be made between acting for the sake of the fine (or in
order to avoid the shameful) and acting from prospective aidōs. But
See Broadie and Rowe, NE, : ‘every specific excellence . . . involves its own
kind of sensitivity and concern for what is fine and disgraceful in its sphere’.
Taylor, NE –, .
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we shall see that Aristotle draws precisely such a distinction, and
that aidōs lacks the role in the virtuous person’s actions that Taylor
attributes to it. That is because aidōs, as Aristotle conceives it, is
not the fear of acting shamefully but the fear of ‘disrepute’ (adoxia,
NE . , b; cf. . , a). On Aristotle’s view, a virtuous
person and a person who acts from aidōs—even when they perform
the same actions—do what they do for the sake of different ends.
. Shame, virtue, and practical wisdom
Before I attempt to reconstruct Aristotle’s second argument, two
points should be made in support of Taylor’s objection. First,
Taylor is surely right that sensitivity to what is shameful will
be integral to the disposition to act finely. It is too demanding a
conception of virtue to require that a virtuous person simply recognize the appropriate thing to do without imagining alternatives.
Someone might envision a course of action and reject it on the
grounds that it would be shameful, and this need not imply any
temptation to do the wrong thing. Second, it is also true that we
sometimes express our convictions about how to act in the language
of shame: ‘I would be ashamed not to vote in the election’; ‘It would
be shameful not to do all we can to help’. I take it that examples
like these are what Taylor has in mind when he claims that a sense
of shame is central to the virtuous person’s motivation. Such expressions are common in ancient Greek literature, and again, they
need not imply any temptation on the part of the speaker to choose
the shameful course of action.
But even if one allows that a virtuous person must be attentive
to what is shameful, and that she would be ashamed to act in such
a way, it is quite another thing to say that shame is what motivates
her actions. To say that you would be ashamed not to vote in the
election is not (necessarily) to say that you are voting out of a sense
of shame. Indeed, the emotion of shame might not figure in the
explanation of your action at all. Citing shame as a motive for acting seems to imply more than that you were simply convinced that
See Critobulus’ remark at Xen. Mem. . . . –: ‘I would be ashamed, Socrates . . . to contradict that; for I would say things that were neither fine nor true’
(ἀλλ ᾿ αἰσχυνοίμην ἄν . . . ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀντιλέγων τούτοις· οὔτε γὰρ καλὰ οὔτε ἀληθῆ
λέγοιμ᾿ ἄν). Cf. Plato, Prot. –.
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voting was the right thing to do. For Aristotle, it suggests that you
voted at least in part because you were afraid of how you would look
in others’ eyes.
Thus I think that we should take Aristotle’s claim that ‘shame is
not characteristic of a decent person’ to be pointing to a real psychological distinction. A virtuous person avoids doing the shameful
thing because it is shameful (or because of its shameful-making features), not because she is afraid of disrepute. In the rest of this section I reconstruct Aristotle’s position in two different ways. First, I
show that prospective, inhibitory aidōs can cause a person who lacks
a well-developed character to do the fine thing. Second, I show that
aidōs can cause a person with a generally well-formed character to
act unwisely. This division corresponds to the two sides of Aristotle’s theory of virtue: virtue of character and phronēsis or practical
wisdom. Although they are mutually entailing, by treating them separately we can get a clearer picture of how aidōs and the psychology
of virtue come apart.
(a) Aidōs without virtue of character
The core objection to the second argument of NE . , as we saw,
is that it focuses only on retrospective shame for things one has
already done, and so neglects the sense of aidōs as an inhibitory disposition. But in fact, Aristotle begins the passage with a reference to
inhibitory aidōs. The young, he says, are praised for being aidēmōn
‘because they live by their feelings and so make many errors, but
are held back by aidōs’ (διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶντας πολλὰ ἁμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ
τῆς αἰδοῦς δὲ κωλύεσθαι, b–). Aristotle is clearly talking
about prospective shame: aidōs is praised in the young because it
The now commonplace idea that one can experience shame before oneself,
without regard to others, was available to Aristotle via Democritus. See B DK:
‘One should not feel aidōs before other people to any greater extent than one does
before oneself, nor should one do wrong if no one is going to know any more than if
everyone is. One should feel aidōs before oneself above all, and let this be established
as a nomos in one’s soul, so as to do nothing inappropriate’ (trans. Cairns, Aidōs, :
μηδέν τι μᾶλλον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους αἰδεῖσθαι ἑωυτοῦ μηδέ τι μᾶλλον ἐξεργάζεσθαι κακόν,
εἰ μέλλει μηδεὶς εἰδήσειν ἢ οἱ πάντες ἄνθρωποι· ἀλλ ᾿ ἑωυτὸν μάλιστα αἰδεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦτον νόμον τῇ ψυχῇ καθεστάναι, ὥστε μηδὲν ποιεῖν ἀνεπιτήδειον). Cf. B and ; for
analysis see Cairns, Aidōs, –. Aristotle would presumably treat this as a special
case, in which the object of aidōs happens to be oneself––not as revealing something
central to aidōs itself. Aristotle’s view of aidōs as an essentially social emotion is controversial; for the contemporary debate see n. below.
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prevents them from acting on their wayward desires. Elsewhere
he says that the young are inclined to obey their bodily appetites,
pursuing whatever strikes them as pleasant and avoiding pains.
Aidōs (in the occurrent sense) is also a feeling, according to Aristotle, but one that generally inhibits the pursuit of base pleasures.
If young people are aidēmōn, or disposed to feel aidōs in the appropriate way, their fear of disrepute (especially in the eyes of parents
and other authority figures) will tend to overrule their inclinations
and keep them on the right path. Aristotle goes on to say that no
one would praise an older person for being ‘prone to shame’ (aischuntēlos), ‘since we think that he shouldn’t do anything that calls
for shame [ἐφ᾿ οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνη]’ (b–). While it is true that
here he shifts from aidōs to aischunē, and in the rest of the passage
seems to focus on shame felt at things one has already done, the context implies that adults should not be disposed to feel prospective
shame either. Aidōs is praised in the young only because they are
naturally inclined to do shameful things, and their fear of disrepute
holds them back. A mature adult, however, should not have such
base inclinations in the first place, and so should not need aidōs to
keep him on track.
The key point, on this reading, is that Aristotle thinks that aidōs,
understood as the fear of disrepute, can be an effective motive for
someone who, in some sense, wants to act shamefully. But virtue of
character disposes a person to desire to do the fine thing because it is
fine. Thus, when Aristotle says that ‘shame [αἰσχύνη] is not characteristic of a decent person’ (b–), we should take his claim to
cover both prospective and retrospective shame. Indeed, the passage as a whole suggests that he regards both kinds of shame as aspects of a single disposition. In each case, according to Aristotle,
According to Cairns, the phrase τὸ μὴ αἰδεῖσθαι τὰ αἰσχρά towards the end of the
passage (b–) is also ‘clearly prospective’ (Aidōs, n. ).
See e.g. NE . , b–. See also the characterization of the young at Rhet.
. , a–.
See NE . , b–.
See Pol. . , a–b.
I take the phrase ἐφ᾿ οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνη to be ambiguous between prospective and
retrospective shame. At Plato, Chrm. –, being aischuntēlos is treated as synonymous with having aidōs.
See Cairns, Aidōs, : ‘We must assume . . . that the mature adult, if he is
“decent”, is no more prone to prospective aidōs than to retrospective.’
See also D. J. Riesbeck, review of Reeve, NE, in Bryn Mawr Classical Review
() <http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu//--.html>.
See Cairns, Aidōs, –; Konstan, Emotions, –. Rhet. . likewise treats
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what causes someone to refrain from acting shamefully or, having
already erred, to blush or hide oneself away is the fear of disrepute.
On the above interpretation, it is no surprise that Aristotle mentions self-control (ἐγκράτεια) at the close of the chapter, remarking
that it is not a virtue either but ‘a sort of mixed state’ (b–).
In NE . we are told that the self-controlled person is one who,
‘knowing that his appetites are base, does not follow them, because
of his reason [διὰ τὸν λόγον]’ (b–). The self-controlled person makes the correct decision and acts on it, but has to struggle
against the part of him that wants to do what reason forbids. For
Aristotle, to say that someone acts from self-control is to say that although he does the fine thing, he finds shameful things pleasant, and
so his character is in some way defective. His account of the selfcontrolled person therefore parallels his account of the young person’s aidōs: both types can be counted on to do the fine thing even
though they lack virtue of character. And yet, there is a crucial difference between the two dispositions. Whereas the self-controlled
person acts on a rational judgement, the aidēmōn is motivated by
concern for his reputation in others’ eyes, which means that he may
not grasp the reason why his action is fine. As we are about to see,
Aristotle thinks that aidōs can even motivate a person to act contrary
to rational judgement—even someone with a generally well-formed
aischunē as a unitary phenomenon (see again b–). This conception of shame
is shared by Joseph Butler, though he views the prospective kind as more fundamental: ‘the original tendency of shame is to prevent the doing of shameful actions;
and its leading men to conceal such actions when done is only in consequence of their
being done, that is, of the passion’s not having answered its first end’ (‘Upon Human Nature’ (), in Five Sermons, ed. S. L. Darwall (Indianapolis, ), –
at ).
See NE . , b–a: ‘For both a self-controlled person and a temperate one are the sorts of people to do nothing contrary to their reason because of
bodily pleasures. But a self-controlled one has base appetites, whereas a temperate
one does not, and a temperate one is the sort not to feel pleasure contrary to his reason, whereas the self-controlled one is the sort to feel such pleasure but not be led
by it’ (ὅ τε γὰρ ἐγκρατὴς οἷος μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ποιεῖν καὶ
ὁ σώφρων, ἀλλ ᾿ ὃ μὲν ἔχων ὃ δ ᾿ οὐκ ἔχων φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ ὃ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ
ἥδεσθαι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ὃ δ᾿ οἷος ἥδεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄγεσθαι).
Note that it makes sense for Aristotle to introduce self-control at this point, as
another example of a mixed state, only if prospective aidōs is still in view by the end
of NE . .
Compare Aristotle’s remark in Rhet. . that the young tend to be aischuntēloi,
‘because they do not yet understand other fine things, but have been educated by
convention alone’ (οὐ γάρ πω καλὰ ἕτερα ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ἀλλὰ πεπαίδευνται ὑπὸ τοῦ
νόμου μόνον, a–).
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character, who lacks the shameful desires of the base or the young.
This brings us to the second main way in which aidōs and virtue
come apart.
(b) Aidōs without practical wisdom
The second way is best illustrated by Aristotle’s account of ‘civic’
(πολιτική) courage in NE . . By this point in the discussion, Aristotle has argued that a courageous person is one who, while not being entirely unaffected by fear, stands firm in the face of dangers
(above all the threat of dying in battle) in pursuit of noble goals.
The courageous person, he says, ‘will endure [frightening things]
in the way he should, in the way reason prescribes, and for the sake
of the fine [τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα], since this is the end [τέλος] characteristic of virtue’ (b–). In . he sharpens his analysis of
courage by contrasting it with several qualities for which it is often
mistaken. The kind that comes nearest to true courage is typical of
citizens fighting on behalf of their polis:
δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους οἱ πολῖται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπιτίμια
καὶ τὰ ὀνείδη καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμάς· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνδρειότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι παρ᾿
οἷς οἱ δειλοὶ ἄτιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἔντιμοι. τοιούτους δὲ καὶ ῞ Ομηρος ποιεῖ, οἷον
τὸν Διομήδην καὶ τὸν Ἕκτορα·
Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει·
καὶ [Διομήδης]
Ἕκτωρ γάρ ποτε φήσει ἐνὶ Τρώεσσ ᾿ ἀγορεύων·
“Τυδείδης ὑπ᾿ ἐμεῖο . . .”.
ὡμοίωται δ᾿ αὕτη μάλιστα τῇ πρότερον εἰρημένῃ, ὅτι δι᾿ ἀρετὴν γίνεται· δι᾿
αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὄρεξιν (τιμῆς γάρ) καὶ φυγὴν ὀνείδους, αἰσχροῦ ὄντος.
(a–)
For citizens seem to endure dangers because of the penalties prescribed by
the laws, because of people’s reproaches, and because of the honours involved. And that is why the most courageous people seem to be in places
where cowards are dishonoured and courageous people honoured. Homer
too depicts people of this sort—for example, Diomedes and Hector: ‘Polydamas will be first to heap disgrace upon me’, and ‘For some day Hector
See also EE . , a–; MM . , a–.
See also a–: ‘As we said, then, courage is a mean concerned with things
that inspire confidence and fear in the circumstances we have described, and courage
makes choices and endures things because it is fine to do so or shameful not to [ὅτι
καλὸν . . . ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή].’
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will say openly before the Trojans: “The son of Tydeus, [running] before
me . . .”.’ This is most similar to the sort we previously discussed [sc. true
courage], since it comes about because of virtue; for it comes about because
of aidōs and because of a desire for what is fine (since it is for honour), and
to avoid reproach, as something shameful.
Aristotle finds a paradigm for civic courage in the heroes of the
Iliad. In the lines quoted, Diomedes and Hector express their desire to engage in combat in terms of the fear of what others might
say about them should they retreat. Once again, the type of shame
at issue is the prospective, inhibitory kind that does not depend on
having done something shameful. It is striking that Aristotle attributes this motive to their ‘virtue’ (aretē), which he then seems
to equate with their aidōs and desire for honour. This may look
like further evidence for Taylor’s view that Aristotle should regard
prospective aidōs as a virtue after all. And yet, the very point of the
passage is to explain why the Homeric heroes’ disposition is not the
genuine virtue of courage. Here Aristotle must be using aretē in
a loose sense, in order to differentiate Hector and Diomedes from
those who fight merely out of fear of being punished by their cities
or commanders. The latter sort, he goes on to say, ‘are worse to
the extent that they do what they do not because of aidōs but because
of fear [οὐ δι᾿ αἰδῶ ἀλλὰ διὰ φόβον], avoiding not the shameful [τὸ αἰσχρόν] but the painful’ (a–). Their fear of violent retribution
for fleeing the enemy outweighs their fear of whatever pains they
might suffer on the battlefield—perhaps because the consequences
of fighting are more distant and uncertain. In contrast to those who
fight because of aidōs and a desire for honour, the latter are ‘compelled’ (ἀναγκάζουσιν, b) to endure frightening things. ‘Yet one
should be courageous not because of compulsion, but because it is
fine’ (δεῖ δ ᾿ οὐ δι ᾿ ἀνάγκην ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι, ἀλλ᾿ ὅτι καλόν, b–).
For Aristotle, then, the fear of disgrace that spurs the Homeric
The Iliad quotations are from . (Hector) and . – (Diomedes). All
translations of the Iliad are from R. Lattimore (trans.), The Iliad of Homer (Chicago,
), slightly modified. In the parallel passage in EE . the Hector quotation is
preceded by: ‘And aidōs took hold of Hector’ ( Ἕκτορα δ᾿ αἰδὼς εἷλε, a). This
does not appear in any other source for the Iliad.
The parallel passage in the Magna moralia replaces aidōs with aischunē (. ,
a, a).
Reeve avoids the puzzle by rendering ὅτι δι᾿ ἀρετὴν γίνεται ‘because it seems to
come about because of virtue’ (NE, ad loc., my emphasis), but I see no basis for that
qualification in the Greek.
Compare EE . , b–, where Aristotle refers to enkrateia as an aretē.
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heroes into battle is a fundamentally different kind of motive from
the fear of corporal punishment. From the context, we can suppose
that Aristotle would be unlikely to call Hector and Diomedes ‘base’
(φαῦλοι), even though he will go on to say in NE . that shame is
characteristic of a base rather than a ‘decent’ (ἐπιεικής) person. We
have also seen that in NE . he says that the fear of disgrace is
‘fine’ (καλόν) and the person who has aidōs ‘decent’ (a–).
His account of civic courage now suggests a way to resolve this tension. On a charitable reading of the second argument of NE . ,
as we saw, the reason why prospective shame is uncharacteristic of
a decent person is that it prevents one from acting on motives that
one should not be inclined to act on in the first place. It is only base
people or children who need aidōs, because unlike the virtuous, they
have no other motivation that will keep them from going astray.
Does it follow that Hector and Diomedes are base or like children?
Perhaps Aristotle would say that the aidōs of the Homeric heroes
presents a special case, because the motive their shame inhibits is
one that is universally shared: the fear of death. Death, according
to Aristotle, is the most frightening of all things (. , a),
and even the truly courageous person will fear it to some extent
(. , b–). So, unlike someone who wants to steal or commit adultery, but is held back by shame, the warrior who overcomes
his fear of death because of aidōs is not necessarily counteracting a
base desire. Thus, Aristotle can hold both that shame is generally
characteristic of a base person and that the fear of disgrace is a fine
thing (καλόν, . , a), when shame overcomes the fear of dying in battle. In the context of war, aidōs is a more noble motive
than the fear of corporal punishment, and it does not imply a desire
to do something base.
At the same time, Aristotle believes that the motivations of
Diomedes and Hector, however admirable, do not express genuine
courage. What, then, separates the truly courageous from those
who act because of aidōs?
The difference between the two types becomes clear when we
compare their respective ends or goals. Both desire the fine and want
to avoid the shameful, but the telos of each is distinct. As we have
seen, Aristotle says that people with civic courage endure dangers
‘because of a desire for what is fine (since it is for honour), and to
avoid reproach, as something shameful’ (διὰ καλοῦ ὄρεξιν (τιμῆς γάρ)
καὶ φυγὴν ὀνείδους, αἰσχροῦ ὄντος, . , a–). His point seems
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to be that the Homeric heroes aim to win honour and avoid reproach
because that is what they take the fine and the shameful to be.
But people with true courage have a different standard: they endure dangers simply ‘for the sake of the fine’ (τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, . ,
b–), or ‘because it is fine to do so or shameful not to’ (ὅτι
καλὸν . . . ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή, a–). In Aristotle’s view,
honour is indeed generally speaking a fine thing, and worth pursuing for its own sake. And yet, as with all external or bodily goods,
Aristotle does not think that one should always pursue it. Likewise,
although health is generally a good thing, it does not follow that we
should always strive to be healthy. A virtuous person will choose
to exercise or eat well only if it is beneficial to do so. This does not
just mean that she will avoid over-exercising and thereby harming
her health. She will also choose not to exercise when more important activities demand her attention. This ability to correctly prioritize among competing goods is central to Aristotle’s conception of
phronēsis or practical wisdom. The virtuous person understands
the relationship between individual goods, such as health or honour, and the goal of human life as a whole—eudaimonia––and she
does not mistake one for the other. Just as pursuing health is not
Alternatively, Aristotle’s point is that people with civic courage face dangers
because of a desire for something fine, namely honour, as opposed to the fine (virtuous action for its own sake). The absence of the definite article in διὰ καλοῦ ὄρεξιν at
a might suggest this contrast, though Aristotle has already used καλοῦ without
the definite article to refer to the fine in the previous chapter (καλοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει, . , b). I thank an anonymous reader for OSAP for help on
this point.
See also T. H. Irwin, ‘Ethics in the Rhetoric and in the Ethics’, in A. O. Rorty
(ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric (Berkeley, ), – at : ‘The brave person is not moved primarily by considerations of honor and shame, but by the fact
that brave action is itself fine, whether or not it wins him honor. While those who
have the bravery of citizens are concerned for something that is fine, they do not
choose brave action for its own sake and because it is fine.’
See NE . , b–; . , b–; . (EE . ), a–.
See NE . (EE . ), a–: ‘It seems, then, to be characteristic of a practically wise person to be able to deliberate well about what is good and advantageous
for himself, not partially (for example, about what sorts of things further health or
further strength), but about what sorts of things further living well as a whole’ (δοκεῖ
δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα,
οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν, πρὸς ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως).
Cf. . , a–, where Aristotle suggests that a temperate person will desire
things that further health ‘moderately and in the way he should’, which implies that
someone can pursue health in a way that is not kalon. For a helpful discussion of the
subordination of health to other goods see S. A. White, Sovereign Virtue: Aristotle
on the Relation between Happiness and Prosperity (Stanford, ), –.
See NE . , b–, where Aristotle denies that honour could be the ulti-
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always beneficial, the course of action that is most likely to bring
honour (or stave off reproach) may not be the fine thing to do overall. In such cases a virtuous person will disregard the consequences
for her reputation and aim for what is truly kalon.
For Aristotle, then, the warrior who acts from aidōs differs from
a person of genuine courage because the former acts for the sake of
the wrong end. The issue here is not that shame inhibits his base
desires, but that his generally noble desire to win honour and avoid
reproach may blind him to what is truly fine. Both the person who
has aidōs and the virtuous person want to do what they consider
kalon, but the former conflates the truly fine with good repute. The
result is that aidōs can cause a person to act contrary to phronēsis or
practical wisdom. This point is brought out by the parallel discussion in the Eudemian Ethics:
οὔτε γὰρ ὅτι ἀδοξήσει, δεῖ μένειν φοβουμένους, οὔτε δι᾿ ὀργήν, οὔτε διὰ τὸ μὴ
νομίζειν ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ἢ διὰ τὸ δυνάμεις ἔχειν φυλακτικάς· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἰήσεται
οὕτω γε φοβερὸν εἶναι οὐθέν. ἀλλ᾿ ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα 〈γ᾿ 〉 ἀρετὴ προαιρετική (τοῦτο δὲ
πῶς λέγομεν, εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι ἕνεκά τινος πάντα αἱρεῖσθαι ποιεῖ, καὶ τοῦτό
ἐστι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τὸ καλόν), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀρετή τις οὖσα ἕνεκά τινος
ποιήσει τὰ φοβερὰ ὑπομένειν, ὥστ᾿ οὔτε δι᾿ ἄγνοιαν (ὀρθῶς γὰρ μᾶλλον ποιεῖ
κρίνειν) οὔτε δι᾿ ἡδονήν, ἀλλ᾿ ὅτι καλόν, ἐπεί, ἄν γε μὴ καλὸν ᾖ ἀλλὰ μανικόν,
οὐχ ὑπομένει· αἰσχρὸν γάρ. (EE . , a–)
It is not because of prospective disrepute [ἀδοξήσει] that we ought to stand
our ground when afraid, nor because of anger, or because we do not think
we will be killed or because we have the means to protect ourselves—in
these latter cases one will not think that there is anything frightening. Now
every virtue issues in decision. We have said previously what we mean by
this––virtue makes everyone choose for the sake of something, and this
‘something for the sake of which’ is what is fine. That being so, it is clear
that courage too, being a virtue, will make us endure what is fearful for the
sake of something, and that will be due neither to ignorance (since virtue
makes our judgements more correct) nor to pleasure, but because doing so
is fine [ὅτι καλόν]. If it is not fine but crazy, one does not endure danger,
since that would be shameful.
mate human good: ‘Further, people seem to pursue honour in order to be convinced
that they are good—at any rate, they seek to be honoured by practically wise people,
among people who know them, and for virtue. It is clear, then, that according to
them, at least, virtue is better’ (ἔτι δ᾿ ἐοίκασι τὴν τιμὴν διώκειν ἵνα πιστεύσωσιν ἑαυτοὺς
ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι· ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ παρ ᾿ οἷς γινώσκονται, καὶ
ἐπ᾿ ἀρετῇ· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κατά γε τούτους ἡ ἀρετὴ κρείττων). Cf. Rhet. . , a–;
Pol. . , b–.
Here I follow Inwood and Woolf in retaining the manuscripts’ φοβουμένους.
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Here Aristotle distinguishes clearly between the end of aidōs
(avoiding disrepute) and the end of virtue proper (the fine). He also
suggests that aidōs, as well as the other motivations that resemble
genuine courage, can conflict with correct reason: if someone faces
dangers out of shame when it is ‘crazy’ (μανικόν, a) not to
retreat, his endurance is not fine but shameful.
It is probably not an accident, then, that in both passages Aristotle quotes from the Iliad in NE . , a–, we find aidōs
motivating a warrior to act unwisely. The second quotation comes
from book , after Diomedes saves Nestor from Hector and hands
him the reins of his chariot. The two men are bearing down on Hector when Zeus hurls a thunderbolt in their path; their horses shrink
back in fear and Nestor warns Diomedes to give up the chase (–
). Diomedes replies:
ναὶ δὴ ταῦτά γε πάντα, γέρον, κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες·
ἀλλὰ τόδ᾿ αἰνὸν ἄχος κραδίην καὶ θυμὸν ἱκάνει·
Ἕκτωρ γάρ ποτε φήσει ἐνὶ Τρώεσσ ᾿ ἀγορεύων·
“Τυδεΐδης ὑπ᾿ ἐμεῖο φοβεύμενος ἵκετο νῆας.”
ὥς ποτ᾿ ἀπειλήσει· τότε μοι χάνοι εὐρεῖα χθών.
(– Munro and Allen)
Yes, old sir, all this you have said is fair and orderly.
But this thought comes as a bitter sorrow to my heart and my spirit;
for some day Hector will say openly before the Trojans:
‘The son of Tydeus, running before me, fled to his vessels.’
So he will vaunt; and then let the wide earth open beneath me.
Nestor assures him that the men and women of Troy will never believe Hector’s boasts, given that Diomedes has made them suffer
so much already. Nestor’s words are persuasive, but as they flee towards the Greek ships, Hector shouts that the Danaans who once
revered Diomedes will now ‘dishonour’ (ἀτιμήσουσι) him, since he is
‘no better than a woman’ (–). Diomedes must resist the urge to
turn and face him: ‘Three times in his heart and spirit he pondered
turning, | and three times from the hills of Ida Zeus of the counsels thundered’ (τρὶς μὲν μερμήριξε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν, | τρὶς
δ᾿ ἄρ᾿ ἀπ᾿ ᾿ Ιδαίων ὀρέων κτύπε μητίετα Ζεὺς, –). In the end,
Diomedes wisely decides to flee, not because of but in spite of his
sense of shame. The scene beautifully illustrates the potential con
See also a–: ‘But reason does not order [a courageous person] to endure
what is greatly painful and destructive unless it is fine to do so’ (ὁ δὲ λόγος τὰ μεγάλα
λυπηρὰ καὶ φθαρτικὰ οὐ κελεύει ὑπομένειν, ἂν μὴ καλὸν ᾖ).
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flict between aidōs and practical wisdom. Nestor’s advice to retreat
in the face of Zeus’ thunderbolts is not a sign of cowardice, because Nestor sees there is nothing to be gained—and everything to
be lost—by fighting Hector when the god is on his side. Likewise,
Diomedes’ reluctance to flee is not a mark of true courage, as Aristotle would say, since it is based on the desire to save his reputation
at the cost of a greater end. Had Diomedes given in to his aidōs, it
would have meant certain death for himself and Nestor, and disaster
for the Greeks.
The Diomedes episode provides a poignant contrast to the first
passage cited, from book , in which Hector makes his fateful decision to confront Achilles. Hector is standing alone beneath the
walls of Troy, while from above his parents plead with him to retreat inside the citadel and gather reinforcements. They appeal to
his sense of pity and filial duty, evoking images of the city’s destruction and the degradation they will be made to suffer if Troy’s
greatest warrior is slain. Having heard their pleas, Hector takes
counsel with himself:
“ὤ μοι ἐγών, εἰ μέν κε πύλας καὶ τείχεα δύω,
Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει,
ὅς μ᾿ ἐκέλευε Τρωσὶ ποτὶ πτόλιν ἡγήσασθαι
νύχθ᾿ ὕπο τήνδ᾿ ὀλοήν, ὅτε τ᾿ ὤρετο δῖος Α
᾿ χιλλεύς.
ἀλλ᾿ ἐγὼ οὐ πιθόμην· ἦ τ᾿ ἂν πολὺ κέρδιον ἦεν.
νῦν δ᾿ ἐπεὶ ὤλεσα λαὸν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ἐμῇσιν,
αἰδέομαι Τρῶας καὶ Τρῳάδας ἑλκεσιπέπλους,
μή ποτέ τις εἴπῃσι κακώτερος ἄλλος ἐμεῖο·
‘ Ἕκτωρ ἧφι βίηφι πιθήσας ὤλεσε λαόν.’
ὣς ἐρέουσιν· ἐμοὶ δὲ τότ᾿ ἂν πολὺ κέρδιον εἴη
ἄντην ἢ Α
᾿ χιλῆα κατακτείναντα νέεσθαι,
ἠέ κεν αὐτῷ ὀλέσθαι ἐϋκλειῶς πρὸ πόληος.”
(–)
‘Ah me! If I go now inside the wall and the gateway,
Polydamas will be first to heap disgrace upon me,
since he tried to make me lead the Trojans inside the city
on that accursed night when brilliant Achilles rose up,
and I would not obey him, but that would have been far better.
Now, since by my own recklessness I have ruined my people,
I feel aidōs before the Trojans and the Trojan women with trailing
robes, that someone who is less of a man than I will say of me:
“Hector believed in his own strength and ruined his people.”
Thus they will speak; and as for me, it would be much better
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at that time to go against Achilles, and slay him, and come back,
or else be killed by him in glory in front of the city.’
Hector knows that he stands a better chance of defeating Achilles
with the help of his fellow Trojans, who have amassed inside the
walls. But he is too ashamed to face them, as a result of his previous decision (in book ) to reject his brother’s sound advice and
expose the army to slaughter. Now he would rather die than hear
his name dragged through the dust, and so he uses his earlier folly
as a reason to commit an even greater one. His death at the hands
of Achilles seals his city’s and his parents’ fate.
In both examples cited by Aristotle in NE . , aidōs threatens
to bring a hero to ruin, and in the case of Hector it actually does.
The lack of wisdom displayed in the Homeric warriors’ brand of
courage is not simply a matter of miscalculation, of failing to take
an adequate measure of the dangers of standing firm. Rather, to the
extent that they are motivated by aidōs, by the fear of disrepute,
they make a mistake about what the goal of standing firm ought to
be. A truly courageous person, once again, acts ‘for the sake of the
fine’, and if the finest and therefore wisest course of action is to retreat, then the prospect of honour and the threat of disgrace will no
longer carry any weight. In contrast to the Homeric heroes, then,
On Hector’s aidōs see J. M. Redfield, Nature and Culture in the Iliad: The
Tragedy of Hector (Durham, NC, ), –.
Compare Aristotle’s comment about the ‘natural virtues’ (which include aidōs;
cf. EE . , a) at NE . (EE . ), b–: ‘but without understanding
they are evidently harmful. At any rate, this much we can surely see: that just as a
heavy body moving around without sight suffers a heavy fall because it has no sight,
so it happens in this case too’ (ἀλλ ᾿ ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβεραὶ φαίνονται οὖσαι. πλὴν τοσοῦτον
ἔοικεν ὁρᾶσθαι, ὅτι ὥσπερ σώματι ἰσχυρῷ ἄνευ ὄψεως κινουμένῳ συμβαίνει σφάλλεσθαι
ἰσχυρῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὄψιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα). The natural virtues are harmful because they are ‘without practical wisdom’ (ἄνευ φρονήσεως, b).
John McDowell has argued that the virtuous person’s desire to do the fine thing
silences any competing considerations (‘The Role of Eudaimonia in Aristotle’s Ethics’, in id., Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge, Mass., ), – at –). So it
is not as though the reasons for acting wisely outweigh the reasons for acting otherwise
(e.g. the prospect of honour or the threat of disgrace). Rather, ‘in the circumstances
[the latter considerations] are not reasons at all’ (). One might contend, however,
that because the virtuous person is attentive to value in all its forms, she sees that the
prospect of a good such as honour is still a reason to do the unwise thing. This is not
to say that she is at all tempted to act unwisely, or that she will regret her decision
after the fact. The competing considerations could simply ‘have a voice’: they could
enter into her deliberations even if at no stage do they have any pull. In this vein, Jeff
Seidman draws a distinction between ‘motivational’ and ‘rational’ silencing, and argues that eudaimonistic considerations (such as the prospect of pleasure or honour)
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aidōs plays no significant role in explaining the courageous person’s
actions.
At this point, one might object that Aristotle’s analysis of civic
courage depends on an implausible view of the psychology of honour and shame, since it seems to interpret the Homeric warriors’
aidōs as a mere concern for how one appears in others’ eyes. But
as Bernard Williams and Douglas Cairns have argued, the ‘shame
culture’ portrayed in ancient Greek literature is based on an internalized system of values and shared expectations. Diomedes and
Hector may feel shame at failing to live up to the standards of their
communities, but these are also ideals they have for themselves.
Thus Williams writes of the Iliad passage: ‘Hector was indeed
afraid that someone inferior to him would be able to criticise him,
but that was because he thought the criticism would be true, and
the fact that such a person could make it would only make things
worse.’ So perhaps what Hector is really afraid of is not disrepute, or the negative opinion of others, but acting in a way that would
warrant the loss of his reputation for aretē. In that case, the distinction between aidōs and the virtuous person’s desire to choose the
fine and avoid the shameful looks harder to sustain.
Let me offer two brief replies to this objection. First, it is clear
from the analysis of aischunē in Rhetoric . that Aristotle does not
conceive of shame as being crudely heteronomous. There he says
that a person feels shame ‘at the sorts of bad things that seem shameful either to him or to those whom he respects’. These especially
that conflict with virtuous agency will be motivationally but not rationally silenced
by virtue (‘Two Sides of “Silencing”’, Philosophical Quarterly, (), – at
). (I am grateful to Jonathan Dancy for calling this issue to my attention.)
Compare MM . , a–, where the author suggests that if a person with
merely civic courage is stripped of aischunē—‘because of which he was courageous’
(δι ᾿ ἣν ἦν ἀνδρεῖος)—he will be courageous no more.
See Cairns, Aidōs, : ‘In these passages on bravery there is a strong suggestion that aidōs is concerned with external honour and reputation alone.’
See B. Williams, Shame and Necessity [Shame] (Berkeley, ), ch. ; Cairns,
Aidōs, passim.
On shame as the perceived failure to live up to one’s own ideals see N. Sherman, ‘Moral Injury, Damage, and Repair’, in V. Caston and S.-M. Weineck (eds.),
Our Ancient Wars: Rethinking War through the Classics (Ann Arbor, ), –
at –. Sherman analyses modern soldiers’ experience of shame in connection
with Sophocles’ Ajax.
Williams, Shame, .
b–: ἀνάγκη αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις τῶν κακῶν ὅσα αἰσχρὰ δοκεῖ
εἶναι ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ ὧν φροντίζει. For this use of φροντίζειν see also a–, –; EE
. , b–; Plato, Crito –.
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include actions that ‘stem from vice’ (b) and that reveal ‘bad
things about one’s character’ (a)—that is, the very things that
one would find discreditable in others. Later in the chapter, Aristotle explains that a person does not feel shame before just any audience, but before those whom he ‘holds in regard’ (ὧν λόγον ἔχει,
a). The latter include the ‘practically wise’, whom we respect
because we suppose they speak the truth (ὡς ἀληθευόντων τῶν φρονίμων, a)—presumably in their opinions about what is fine
and shameful. Here we may recall the EE characterization of the
aidēmōn as one who respects the opinions of ‘those who appear decent’ (τῶν φαινομένων ἐπιεικῶν, . , b). Built into Aristotle’s
understanding of proper aidōs, then, is a concern for whether the
opinions of others are justified. All the same, it is important to
stress that Aristotle conceives of shame as an essentially social emotion. While the disposition to feel shame reflects one’s own ideals
and expectations, aidōs is more than just a fear of failing to live up
to our personal standards: it is the fear of falling in the eyes of a
community whose opinion matters to us.
Second, Aristotle’s view seems to me to capture the psychological
complexity of aidōs as it is actually portrayed in Homer. Consider,
for example, how Nestor responds to Diomedes’ fear that Hector
will mock him before the Trojans:
“εἴ περ γάρ σ ᾿ Ἕκτωρ γε κακὸν καὶ ἀνάλκιδα φήσει,
ἀλλ᾿ οὐ πείσονται Τρῶες καὶ Δαρδανίωνες
καὶ Τρώων ἄλοχοι μεγαθύμων ἀσπιστάων,
τάων ἐν κονίῃσι βάλες θαλεροὺς παρακοίτας.”
(. –)
‘If Hector calls you a coward and a man of no strength, then
the Trojans and Dardanians will never believe him,
See also Inglis, ‘Grand End’, –. In my view, Inglis gives inadequate
weight to the fear of disrepute in Aristotle’s analysis of civic courage and aidōs more
generally.
See also A. Fussi, ‘Aristotle on Shame’, Ancient Philosophy, (), –.
In recent decades the question whether shame has an essentially social dimension has
been the subject of much debate. Important contributions include J. Deigh, ‘Shame
and Self-Esteem: A Critique’, Ethics, (), –; G. Taylor, Pride, Shame,
and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment (Oxford, ); J. D. Velleman, ‘The Genesis of Shame’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, . (), –. For an extended
critique of the ‘social’ view see J. A. Deonna, R. Rodogno, and F. Teroni, In Defense
of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion (Oxford, ). For a defence of the Aristotelian
view from an evolutionary perspective see H. Maibom, ‘The Descent of Shame’,
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, (), –.
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nor will the wives of the high-hearted Trojan warriors,
they whose husbands you hurled in the dust in the pride
of their manhood.’
The passage does not suggest that Diomedes is merely afraid of
what the Trojans will think of him; the deeper concern, as Williams argues, is that Hector’s slights would be deserved—that fleeing
from Hector would expose him as a ‘coward’ (κακός). Nestor therefore reminds Diomedes that he is not a coward, since his previous
actions have proven his aretē. This shows that Diomedes’ sense
of shame is responsive to standards of justification, since Nestor
gives him no reason to think that Hector will not slight his character. But also notice what Nestor does not say: he does not try to
tell Diomedes that his reputation among the Trojans is of no significance, and that all that matters is whether he is really virtuous,
regardless of what they might think. Rather, it is crucial to Nestor’s
persuasive strategy that Diomedes believe the Trojans will disregard Hector’s boasts—that there be an audience who acknowledges
that he is no coward.
Williams also thinks that aidōs ultimately responds to ‘real social expectations’, however much those expectations may mirror the
ideals one has for oneself. Thus the shame of the Homeric heroes, on his reading, is neither hostage to the opinions of others nor
purely autonomous. Unlike Aristotle, however, Williams doubts
that human beings have a better guide than aidōs for meeting the
demands of moral life. That is because he rejects the aspiration to
a kind of practical wisdom that transcends the mechanisms of honour and shame—a kind of wisdom, as we have seen, that is central
to Aristotle’s conception of virtue. For Aristotle, the proper aim
of virtuous action is the truly kalon, not what appears kalon to a
community whose judgements I respect. Williams suggests that the
early Greek poets offer a more realistic picture of our ethical situation than what we find in the philosophers. But if the passages
cited in NE . reveal the destructive side of aidōs, then one could
argue that the Iliad depends for its tragic effect on the possibility of
Williams, Shame, .
Note that even if shame were purely autonomous, it still would not play an important role in the motivations of Aristotle’s virtuous person. The virtuous person
avoids shameful actions because they are shameful (or because of the features that
make them shameful), not because of how she would appear in her own eyes.
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something like Aristotle’s notion of phronēsis. In that case, Aristotle
may have learnt more from Homer than Williams’ account allows.
The core objection to Aristotle’s second argument for why aidōs is
not a virtue was that it focuses only on retrospective shame, neglecting the potential role of inhibitory shame in the virtuous person’s
motivations. In this section I have shown two ways in which even
prospective shame, understood as the fear of disrepute, would be
uncharacteristic of a virtuous person on Aristotle’s account. First,
as the second part of NE . suggests, aidōs can inhibit someone
with base desires from acting shamefully. A fully virtuous person,
by contrast, wants to do the fine thing because it is fine, and so the
fear of disrepute plays no significant role in the explanation of his
actions. Aidōs and self-control (ἐγκράτεια) are similar to the extent
that both can cause a person to do the right thing while lacking virtue of character. Second, as we saw from the discussion of civic
courage in NE . , aidōs can bring a person with a generally wellformed character to ruin, since it can cause him to act for the sake
of the wrong end—that is, to avoid disrepute instead of the truly
aischron. A virtuous person will recognize when the action that is
liable to bring disrepute is in fact the noble thing to do, and will
choose accordingly. That is a key feature of the virtuous person’s
phronēsis. So again, it seems that shame plays no significant role in
explaining what a virtuous person does—even if his actions and actions done from aidōs will often look the same from the outside.
The chief task of this paper has been to examine the flaws in Aristotle’s treatment of aidōs in NE . and show that there are better
arguments available to him. In Section I reconstructed his view
that aidōs is not a virtue because it is an ‘affective’ mean, whereas
virtue—according to the formal definition in NE . (b–
a)—is a hexis prohairetikē, or a state that issues in decisions.
The success of that argument, however, depends on the dubious
claim that aidōs is essentially a disposition to have certain feelings,
rather than to decide and act for the sake of ends. We have now
seen that Aristotle has independent reasons for excluding it from
his list of virtues. For even if aidōs does issue in decisions (as it appears to, for instance, in the example of Hector from Iliad ), its
decisions aim at the wrong goal and so fail to express phronēsis. But
virtue—again, according to NE . —causes a person to decide on
On the difficulty of judging the quality of actions from the outside see Lorenz,
‘Character’, .
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the mean as determined by the reasoning of a phronimos. Whichever
way we conceive of aidōs, then, it runs afoul of Aristotle’s definition
of virtue.
It is one thing, however, to show that aidōs is not a virtue, and another thing to show that it has no part to play in a virtuous life at all.
Aristotle’s view seems to be that while aidōs has an important role in
moral development, it is eclipsed in a fully virtuous person by the
disposition to do the right thing for the right reasons. In other
words, a mature adult should no longer need the fear of disrepute
as a motivation to act well. In the final main section below I argue
that even someone who possesses virtue of character and phronēsis
may still have need of aidōs. My starting-point will be the discussion of NE . in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Ethical Problems. For
reasons we have yet to consider, Alexander argues that Aristotle’s
own theory commits him to the view that a virtuous person will be
disposed to feel shame, even if he neither does nor is inclined to do
anything shameful.
. The virtuous person’s aidōs:
Alexander of Aphrodisias on NE .
Alexander begins Problem (‘On aidōs’) by summarizing the opening argument of NE . and noting that, while in book Aristotle
had said that aidōs is a praiseworthy feeling, he now claims it is desirable only in the young. To older people, in Alexander’s paraphrase, the feeling is altogether ‘alien’ (ἀλλότριον):
τῷ εἶναι μὲν δὴ τὴν αἰδὼ φόβον ἀδοξίας, τὸν δὲ φόβον τῆς ἀδοξίας ἢ ἐπὶ γεγονόσιν αἰσχροῖς ἢ ἐπὶ μέλλουσιν γίνεσθαι ἢ ἐπὶ δοκοῦσιν, ὧν οὐκέτι οἱ προβεβηκότες
κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχοντες πρακτικοί. ῥᾴδιον γὰρ αὐτοῖς φυλάττεσθαι καὶ ὅσα οὐκ ἔστι μὲν αἰσχρά, δοκεῖ δὲ γίνεσθαι καὶ αὐτὰ ἀδοξίας αἴτια.
(. – Bruns)
Because aidōs is fear of disrepute, and fear of disrepute arises in respect
either of shameful things that have already happened or of ones that are
going to happen or of reputed ones; and those that have advanced further
in years and [now] possess the virtues no longer do [such things]. For it is
On the role of aidōs in moral development see again Burnyeat, ‘Learning’;
Curzer, Virtues, ch. .
I. Bruns, (ed.), Alexandri Aphrodisiensis praeter commentaria scripta minora:
Quaestiones, De fato, De mixtione, Supplementum Aristotelicum, . (Berlin, ),
–.
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easy for them to avoid even those things that are not [in fact] shameful but
are thought to be causes of disrepute [nonetheless].
Here Alexander is referring to Aristotle’s remark that it makes no
difference if some things are shameful ‘in reality’ (κατ᾿ ἀλήθειαν)
and others only ‘according to opinion’ (κατὰ δόξαν), since a decent
person does neither type of thing. Alexander does not elaborate
on the distinction, but his thought seems to be that it is easy for
a person with experience to avoid violating norms that are merely
conventional. It is also worth noting that he takes Aristotle’s argument to apply to both retrospective and prospective shame. Even
prospective aidōs will be ‘alien’ to older people, we can infer, because they no longer suffer the temptations of youth.
Alexander then shifts from exposition to critique:
ἄξιον δὴ περὶ τούτου διαλαβεῖν καὶ μάλιστα, ἐπεὶ σύνισμεν αὑτοῖς ἤδη ταύτην
〈τὴν〉 ἡλικίαν γεγονόσιν αἰδουμένοις πολλὰ καὶ πολλάκις. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦν λεγόμενον
τὸ δεῖν καταφρονεῖν τῆς ἀδοξίας, οὐκ ἂν ἡμῖν ἔδει λόγων. ἐπεὶ δ᾿ οὐ τοῦτ᾿ ἐστὶν
τὸ λεγόμενον, ἀλλὰ κεῖται μὲν ὅτι δεῖ φυλάττεσθαι τὴν ἀδοξίαν, εἴ γε ἡ δόξα καὶ
τιμὴ μέγιστον τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν, λέγεται δὲ ὅτι μηκέτι ἐν ἀδοξίᾳ γίνονται οἱ
μήτε ποιοῦντές τι αἰσχρὸν μήτε ποιήσαντες . . . (. –)
It is worth deciding about this matter, especially since we are aware that we
ourselves, [although] we have already reached this age, feel aidōs at many
things and frequently. Well, if what was said was that one should think
little of disrepute, we would not need any discussion. But it is not this that
is being said; it is accepted that one should avoid disrepute, if reputation
and honour are the greatest of external goods, and it is being said that those
who neither do nor have done anything shameful no longer become subject
to disrepute . . .
It is this last claim in particular—that those who avoid acting
shamefully are not exposed to disrepute—that Alexander calls into
question:
οὐ γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ ἀδοξία ἐπὶ τοῖς πραττομένοις μὴ καλῶς γίνεσθαι μόνοις, ἀλλὰ
καὶ τοῖς ὑποπτευομένοις καὶ τοῖς διαβληθῆναι δυναμένοις, ἃ μάλιστα ἰσχύει παρὰ
τοῖς ἀγνοοῦσιν. εἰ δὲ γίνεταί τις καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀδοξία, οὐκ ἀποκέκλεισται
Translations are from R. W. Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias: Ethical Problems [Problems] (London, ), slightly modified. Sharples ( n. ) provides ‘are
no longer able to do [such things]’ as an alternative rendering of οὐκέτι . . . πρακτικοί
at lines –.
NE . , b–. For discussion see n. above.
See again the Anonymous commentator’s example of ‘eating in the agora’ (.
–).
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ὁ μηδὲν αἰσχρὸν ποιήσας τοῦ ἐν ἀδοξίᾳ δύνασθαι γενέσθαι. ἣν ἀδοξίαν εἰ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι, ἣ οὐδὲν ἔλαττον ἐκ διαβολῶν ἢ ἐκ πράξεων γίνεται, οὐκ ἀλλότριον τοῦτο
〈τὸ〉 πάθος οὐδενὶ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν εἴη ἂν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν προβεβηκότων,
οὐδὲ κατ᾿ αὐτόν, εἴ γε δεῖ μὲν φυλάττεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τὴν ἀδοξίαν, τοῦτο δ᾿
ἐστὶν αἰδώς. (. –. )
For it seems that disrepute is occasioned not only by ignoble actions, but
also by those [actions] that are held in suspicion and are capable of being misrepresented, which have the greatest influence among the ignorant.
But if disrepute is some[times] occasioned by such things too, then the
person who has done nothing shameful is not excluded from being capable of falling into disrepute. If one ought to fear the disrepute that comes
from slander no less than that which comes from actions, then this feeling [sc. aidōs] will not be alien to any of those who are decent and further
advanced in age—not even according to [Aristotle], if indeed one ought to
guard against and fear disrepute, and this [fear] is aidōs.
Alexander goes on to argue that aidōs is in fact more characteristic of
a virtuous person than of anyone else. Someone who has lived his
life in a noble way, free from shameful actions, will be especially
sensitive to any imputation of disgrace:
διὸ καὶ συμβέβηκεν τούτοις αἰδεῖσθαι μάλιστα, οἷς σφόδρα ἐστὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ μισητά. ἡ γὰρ αἰδὼς οὐκ ἔοικεν ἁπλῶς εἶναι φόβος ἀδοξίας, ἀλλὰ πολὺ πρότερον
ἀλλοτριότης πρὸς τὰ αἰσχρά, δι᾿ ἣν οἱ οὕτως ἔχοντες φοβοῦνται τὴν ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῖς
ἀδοξίαν. (. –)
And so it comes about that those people for whom shameful things are very
hateful feel aidōs most of all. For aidōs does not seem to be fear of disrepute
without qualification, but much rather alienation from shameful things, on
account of which those who are in this condition fear disrepute in respect
of them.
Here Alexander suggests that aidōs, understood as the fear of
disrepute, is derivative from a more basic aversion to acting
shamefully. If this is meant as a claim about aidōs in general,
then it is clearly not Aristotle’s view, because it implies that a
young person cannot be inhibited by aidōs prior to developing a
distaste for the aischron in its own right. And as I argued above
in Section , Aristotle sees an important difference between the
Following Sharples’ acceptance of Bruns’ conjecture (Problems, n. ).
Alexander goes on to say that aidōs, conceived in this way, would no longer be
a pathos without qualification, but rather a kind of hexis and diathesis (‘disposition’)
on which the pathos follows. He does not claim outright that aidōs is a virtue, though
he clearly thinks it central to the virtuous person’s psychology.
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virtuous person’s desire to pursue the fine and avoid the shameful
and the motivations of the aidēmōn. At the same time, however,
Alexander’s criticism reveals a major limitation in Aristotle’s account of aidōs. In NE . , as we saw, Aristotle suggests that once a
person learns to avoid doing anything shameful, he will no longer
be subject to disrepute and so will not feel shame (prospective or
retrospective). This assumes that acting virtuously is sufficient for
avoiding disrepute. But as Alexander shows, that is simply not the
case, since even a virtuous person is liable to have his actions misrepresented by others and to become an object of slander. Given that
honour is the greatest of external goods, as Aristotle himself says, a
virtuous person should be concerned to avoid the mere appearance
of disgrace, in addition to not doing anything shameful. If that is
right, it seems aidōs will play a role in the virtuous life after all.
Let us turn to an example. Near the beginning of Plato’s Charmides, Socrates arranges to engage the young Charmides in a conversation in order to find out whether his soul matches his beautiful
face and body. He asks the older Critias to call him over: ‘Surely
if he were even younger, there’d be no shame in his having a discussion with us—at least not in your presence, since you’re both
his guardian and his cousin.’ Socrates knows that his attempt to
‘undress’ Charmides’ soul ( –) through dialectical examination is liable to be viewed by others as a sexual overture. Given the
norms of Athenian paiderastia, it would be shameful for Charmides
to be seen alone with a potential suitor. There is less shame in it
for the older Socrates, but we can imagine that he would not want
to raise suspicions against himself either. By reminding Critias that
the conversation would be taking place in his presence, Socrates
shows he is sensitive to the prospect of disrepute. This is not to
say that shame is what prevents him from actually trying to seduce
the young Charmides. Instead, we might suppose, it is Socrates’
sōphrosunē or temperance that explains why he does not pursue him
sexually. But Socrates realizes that even if his motives are pure, he
is not immune from the appearance of impropriety. The example
Compare the Anonymous commentator’s claim that aidōs pertains to the ‘suspicion’ (ὑπόνοια) of shameful deeds (. –), discussed in n. above.
– (Moore–Raymond trans., in progress): οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄν που εἰ ἔτι ἐτύγχανε
νεώτερος ὤν, αἰσχρὸν ἂν ἦν αὐτῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἡμῖν ἐναντίον γε σοῦ, ἐπιτρόπου τε ἅμα καὶ
ἀνεψιοῦ ὄντος.
See K. Ormand, Controlling Desires: Sexuality in Ancient Greece and Rome
(Westport, Conn., ), –.
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therefore suggests that he is disposed to avoid disrepute in addition
to being disposed to act temperately for its own sake. The former
disposition, Alexander would say, is the virtuous person’s aidōs.
Alexander’s response points to a more general problem in Aristotle’s account of the relationship between shame and virtue. According to that account, a virtuous person will not be disposed to
feel shame for the simple reason that ‘aidōs is occasioned by voluntary actions [ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις], and a decent person will never
voluntarily do base things’ (NE . , b–). By tethering aidōs
to voluntary action, however, Aristotle fails to acknowledge the role
of luck in determining one’s reputation. Whether a person has cause
to fear disrepute is not wholly up to him. We have already seen this
in the case of actions that are liable to be misrepresented. Even if
Socrates would never do anything base voluntarily, he may become
the object of slander nonetheless. Yet his sense of shame helps him
avoid the mere appearance of impropriety, making it harder for
others to distort what he does. If his actions are misrepresented,
moreover, Aristotle might think that shame is the appropriate reaction. A virtuous person would at least not be indifferent to the matter, especially if he should fall into disrepute among those whom he
respects.
In addition to cases of misrepresentation, Aristotle’s works suggest two further scenarios in which a virtuous person might have
reason to feel shame through no fault of his own. First, there is the
category of ‘mixed’ actions discussed in NE . :
ὅσα δὲ διὰ φόβον μειζόνων κακῶν πράττεται ἢ διὰ καλόν τι, οἷον εἰ τύραννος
προστάττοι αἰσχρόν τι πρᾶξαι κύριος ὢν γονέων καὶ τέκνων, καὶ πράξαντος μὲν
σῴζοιντο μὴ πράξαντος δ᾿ ἀποθνήσκοιεν, ἀμφισβήτησιν ἔχει πότερον ἀκούσιά
ἐστιν ἢ ἑκούσια. (a–)
Actions done because of fear of greater evils or because of something fine—
for example, if a tyrant with control over your parents and children orders
you to do something shameful and if you do it, they will survive, but if you
In NE . Aristotle suggests that the ‘great-souled person’ (μεγαλόψυχος) will
be ‘moderately pleased by great honours conferred by excellent people [ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων]’ (a–), but contemptuous of honour and dishonour that comes from the
many (a–). The implication, I take it, is that the great-souled person will also
be moderately annoyed if he is not honoured by those he deems excellent. Aristotle
also says that the great-souled person ‘is ashamed [αἰσχύνεται] to be a beneficiary’
(b–), since it is characteristic of an inferior person to receive benefits. Assuming
the great-souled person cannot always control whether someone benefits him, this
suggests that aidōs will be part of his character.
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do not do it, they will be put to death––give rise to disputes about whether
the actions are involuntary or voluntary.
Aristotle argues that such actions are strictly speaking voluntary,
because they are choiceworthy given the circumstances and the
starting-point is internal to the agent. But considered in the abstract, they are involuntary, since nobody would choose to do
such things unless they were under extreme duress. Later on he
adds: ‘People are sometimes even praised for actions of this sort,
when they endure something shameful or painful for great and
fine things.’ Despite what he says in NE . , then, Aristotle
does think that a virtuous person may voluntarily choose to do
(or endure) something base, if that is the only way to achieve
a noble end. But even though such a person might be praised,
nowhere does Aristotle suggest that there is no shame attached to
performing mixed actions. Indeed, part of what is praiseworthy
may be the fact that the person chose to act in spite of his feelings
of shame at what he would be putting himself through. Of course,
a virtuous person would feel shame only in the appropriate degree;
but the absence of any shame (either before or after the deed) might
show that he fails to properly appreciate the value of honour and
reputation. So again, it seems that aidōs may have a role to play
even in a life of virtue.
Aristotle’s discussion of shame in Rhetoric . suggests a third
and final reason why even a virtuous person would need to have
aidōs. Towards the end of the chapter, Aristotle describes the types
a–: ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσι δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται, ὅταν αἰσχρόν
τι ἢ λυπηρὸν ὑπομένωσιν ἀντὶ μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν.
Compare Aristotle’s view that a courageous person does the fine thing in spite
of his (appropriately measured) feelings of fear. A total absence of fear in the face of
mortal danger would show that he fails to properly appreciate the value of his own
life.
Related to the case of mixed actions is the possibility of being forced into a
shameful situation entirely against one’s will. Thus, in Rhet. . Aristotle includes
being raped (τὸ ὑβρίζεσθαι, a) among the causes of shame in people, ‘since enduring it or failing to defend oneself against it is due to unmanliness or cowardice’
(ἀπὸ ἀνανδρίας γὰρ ἢ δειλίας ἡ ὑπομονὴ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀμύνεσθαι, a–). Aristotle
might believe that a virtuous person, being neither unmanly nor cowardly, could
never be a victim of rape, and so would have no need of aidōs in that respect. Alternatively, Aristotle is only reporting the views of the many (sc. ‘it is seen as a sign
of unmanliness’) without stating his own position on the matter. In that case, he
might hold that a virtuous person would be disposed to feel (appropriate) shame at
being raped—a deeply troubling view, but one that seems consistent with his ethical
theory.
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of audience before whom people are likely to feel shame. Chief
among them are those whom we admire and esteem, and so wish to
be admired by in return—including our rivals (a–; b–
). ‘And in general’, Aristotle later adds, people feel shame before
‘those on whose behalf they themselves feel ashamed [ὑπὲρ ὧν αἰσχύνονται αὐτοί ]’ (a). Here Aristotle introduces the idea that
a person might feel shame not because of what he himself does
(or has done to him), but because of someone else’s actions. And
people are especially prone to feel shame in relation to those who
have some special connection to them, for example whose teachers
or advisers they have been (a–). The thought must be that—
fairly or not—if a student acts disgracefully, it reflects poorly on his
teacher, so that both will have reason to fear disrepute. To Aristotle’s example we could add friends, family members, and even
one’s fellow citizens. In each of these cases, a virtuous person may
be exposed to disgrace by the actions of another without doing anything shameful himself. If shame is indeed the right response to
such situations, then Aristotle should admit that a virtuous person
would be disposed to feel shame.
Beginning with Alexander’s critique of NE . , we have considered at least three reasons why aidōs might be characteristic of a
virtuous person after all. The possibility of slander and misrepresentation, the potential need to perform ‘mixed’ actions, and the
fact that one’s reputation is tied to the actions of others—all show
that even a virtuous person is not immune from falling into disrepute. In claiming that only voluntary actions give rise to aidōs,
Aristotle neglects the fact that honour and reputation are external
goods and therefore vulnerable to luck. In short, a virtuous character is not sufficient for avoiding adoxia—just as it is not sufficient for
achieving eudaimonia, of which honour and good reputation form a
part. That is not to say that a person should be indifferent to his
reputation, just because it is not fully within his control. Even
if honour is partly subject to chance and misfortune, there may be
better or worse ways to deal with that fact. As Alexander suggests, a
virtuous person will be sensitive to slander and misrepresentation,
and will guard against them in so far as he is able. If he has to do
See NE . , b–, where Aristotle suggests that eudaimonia depends on
having friends and political power, which in turn will depend on a person’s reputation and social standing.
In NE . , when discussing the virtue concerned with minor honours, Aristotle suggests that complete indifference to honour is a vice (b–).
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or endure something shameful for the sake of a noble end, he might
feel shame as an acknowledgement of the dishonour—even though
he knows the act was justified. The same is true if his student does
something disgraceful, or if a shameful secret is uncovered in his
family’s past. Shame may indeed be the correct response, even if a
person bears no responsibility for what was done. It is, of course,
a further question whether shame is the correct response in these
circumstances. But given that Aristotle considers honour and reputation to be genuine goods, he should also think that a virtuous
person would be affected by the threat of losing them, or by their actual loss. In that case, the fully virtuous person will be disposed to
feel both prospective and retrospective shame in appropriate ways.
The natural term for such a disposition is aidōs.
. Conclusion
So is aidōs an Aristotelian virtue? It is hard to see why we should resist that conclusion, if a virtuous person will show a proper concern
for his reputation, and will be disposed to feel shame when appropriate. We have seen that Aristotle has two main reasons for separating aidōs from the genuine virtues. First, he conceives of aidōs as
strictly an emotional disposition, whereas the virtues are expressed
not only in feelings but also in wise decisions and actions. But if
avoiding disrepute can be the goal of action, it seems he should allow that aidōs can be a ‘prohairetic’ mean as well. Second, Aristotle thinks that aidōs implies an imperfect character, either because
it depends on the desire to do something shameful, or because it
aims at the wrong end, mistaking honour and reproach for the truly
kalon and aischron. As such, it can lead a person with generally good
motives to act unwisely. Aristotle wants to preserve a distinction
between acting from the fear of disrepute and acting for the sake of
the fine. For the most part the distinction seems warranted: a virtuous person does the just thing because it is just, not in order to
protect his reputation.
And yet, even a completely virtuous person will not be indifferent to what people think of him, because he appreciates the value
of honour and social standing as external goods. Since reliably doing the just, or the generous, or the courageous thing is not suf
See again NE . , b–; . , b–; . (EE . ), a–.
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ficient for avoiding disrepute, a virtuous person will need aidōs in
addition to the several virtues. He will guard against having his actions misrepresented by others, and he will respond with appropriate shame should his reputation be compromised, whether by his
own ‘mixed’ actions or by the actions of people connected to him.
Knowing when, how, and to what extent to care about the opinions
of others will require practical wisdom. Given that Aristotle acknowledges specific virtues concerned with honours great and small,
there is no obvious reason why a sense of shame, properly circumscribed, should be denied the same status. It seems that Aristotle
should have recognized aidōs as a virtue after all.
Vassar College
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