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securitas imperii
Juraj Marušiak
1989 in Slovakia – Between Reform and Radical Change1
Until the end of the 1980s, communism in Czechoslovakia retained the character‑
istics of a frozen post‑totalitarian regime, one whose leaders refused to reflect on
possible reforms, and though ideology was part of the practices it employed to legiti‑
mize itself, its interpretations of this ideology were, rather, carried out in a markedly
pragmatic manner.2 The extent of repression was also lesser in comparison with the
1950s, with its targets being individuals, there were not mass repressions. The fall of
the communist regime was not preceded by a longer period of open conflict between
the regime and society, which ultimately resulted in a period of the limited tolerance
of independent structures such as was found in Poland in 1980s3, or the so‑called
“Kádárization”, which was seen as the gradual liberalization of the economy and an
effort to avoid wider political repression, typical of Hungary from the second half
of the 1960s.4 In terms of the form of the political system and the organization of
the relations between its institutions, as well as in terms of its internal relations, the
normalization regime remained the exact same totalitarian dictatorship it had been
in the 1950s, though this was no longer the case concerning the expectations that
formulated by the communist powers in relation to the citizenry.5
It differed from classic authoritarian dictatorships in that it required formal man‑
ifestations of support from the population, but, at the same time, realized that it was
not capable of effectively mobilizing this population in the face of a real threat. When
discussing the normalization version of communism, however, we cannot speak of
the presence of totalitarian ideology, if we consider it to be a program for the rebuild‑
ing and re‑direction of society. In its adoption of Poučenie z krízového vývoja v strane
a spoločnosti6 (Lessons from the Crisis Development in the Party and Society) at the
1
2
3
4
5
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6
This study was undertaken in connection with the grant project VEGA č. 2/0046/19 “The Image of
the ‘Other’ in Post‑1989 Slovak Politics”.
See KOPEČEK, Lubomír: Demokracie, diktatury a politické stranictví na Slovensku. CDK, Brno 2006;
LINZ, Juan J. – STEPAN, Alfred: Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe,
South America and Post‑Communist Europe. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore – London 1996.
See PACZKOWSKI, Andrzej: Půl století dějin Polska 1939–1989. Academia, Prague 2000, pp. 288–360.
For more details see IRMANOVÁ, Eva: Kádárismus. Vznik a pád jedné iluze. Karolinum, Prague 1998.
LIPTÁK, Ľubomír: Miesto novembra 1989 v moderných slovenských dejinách. In: PEŠEK, Jan – SZO‑
MOLÁNYI, Soňa (eds.): November 1989 na Slovensku. Súvislosti, predpoklady a dôsledky. Milan Šimečka
Foundation, Bratislava, 2000, p. 28; BRZEZINSKI, Zbigniew: The Grand Failure. The Birth and Death of
Communism in the Twentieth Century. Scribners, London 1989.
Poučenie z krízového vývoja v strane a spoločnosti po XIII. zjazde KSČ. Pravda, Bratislava 1971. This ide‑
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7
8
9
ological document was passed at the 14th Congress of the KSČ, serving as the official, exclusive in‑
terpretation of the so‑called Prague Spring, an attempt at the democratization of the communist
regime in Czechoslovakia in 1968 which was repressed and dismantled by the Warsaw Pact armies
under the leadership of the USSR on August 21, 1968. The occupiers overturned and destroyed the
recent democratic changes and led the state into so‑called normalization, the ruling of public life by
the pro‑Moscow wing of the KSČ and extensive purges in the KSČ as well as in administrative, media,
cultural, and academic institutions.
BRZEZINSKI, Zbigniew: The Grand Failure. The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century.
Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York 1989, p. 255.
Even though the federalization of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (Československá socialistická
republika, ČSSR) (on January 1, 1969) was the result of the democratic processes in 1968, the realiza‑
tion of this program was embarked upon in the atmosphere of the renewed repressive course of the
KSČ.
MUSIL, Jiří: Czech and Slovak Society. In: MUSIL, Jiří (ed.): The End of Czechoslovakia. Budapest, CEU
Press 1996, pp. 77–94.
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turn of 1969–1970, the regime renounced not only any discussion of the form of
socialism, but also any projections of the future. The regime identified itself with the
concept of “real socialism” as conceived in the USSR during the Brezhnev era, wherein
the social establishment that had been achieved was considered the highest possible
stage of the development of society. Hardly an attempt to define the existing system
ideologically and programmatically, it was merely trying to prevent any sort of repeat
of the attempts at reform from 1968. The absence of any positive self‑identification
with the ruling regime took on an absurd form when the ruling Communist Party
of Czechoslovakia (Komunistická strana Československa, KSČ) managed to function
for nearly 20 years without issuing any sort of programming document whatsoever.
From this point of view, it is not possible to speak of a totalitarian regime in the form
as we knew it in the case of Czechoslovakia in the years 1948–1953.
It was not until 1987–1988 that one could speak of the advent of communist
authoritarianism in Czechoslovakia, or of independent initiatives having actually en‑
tered political life. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, the transition to the phase of the
communism retreat takes place when the succession struggles are dividing the Communist Party
and the societal pressure for socioeconomic concessions is increasing.7 This was also reflected
in the perception of independent initiatives by the communist regime. It was only
from this period on that the Communist Party leadership began to devote more space
to the activities of alternative groups than in its annual reports on the country’s secu‑
rity situation. The problems Slovak and Czech societies were faced with at the end of
the 1980s were very similar in view of the largely centralized nature of the state, which
had taken on a nominally federal character after 1968.8 However, despite the cen‑
tralized practices of the ruling elites before the turning point in power in November
1989, the dynamics of political and social processes in the Czech and Slovak societies
differed in many aspects. Since, as follows from the work of the sociologist Jiří Musil
among others, there were two different societies, there were also two different courses
of events as well perceptions of the political, social, and economic processes that took
place in the 1990s.9 For these reasons, it is justified to analyze the situation in both
parts of Czechoslovakia separately.
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Juraj Marušiak
The aim of this paper is to identify the issues and dynamics of public discourse
in Slovakia in the period in question. At the same time, I try to outline the ways in
which the situation in both parts of the former common state were similar and in
which ways the circumstances that led to the fall of communism in Slovakia and in
the Czech lands differed. I will focus predominantly on the content of the political
conflicts that took place in Slovak society in 1988–1989, setting them into the broad‑
er context of the developments of Slovakia or Czechoslovakia, respectively. Several
different characteristics resulted from objective conditions such as the position of
Slovakia within the common state. Formally, it was an equal part of a dualist federa‑
tion which had a distinctly centralized character, while this centralist and asymmet‑
rical character possessed a real center of power, the Communist Party of Czechoslo‑
vakia. The Communist Party of Slovakia (Komunistická strana Slovenska, KSS) as
a republic‑level organization of the united party did not have a counterweight on the
Czech side, and attempts in this direction were rejected and condemned after 1969.10
The relationship between the events in the Czech lands, which took place primarily
in Prague as the capital of the common state, and Slovakia thus bears on one hand
the characteristics of a relationship between the center and the periphery, while on
the other there was a characteristic and separate dynamic at play in both parts of the
former Czechoslovakia, one which stemmed from their varying reactions to different
historical events and their varied effects on both societies. In the following sections,
I will attempt to identify the extent to which developments in Slovakia at the end of
the 1980s influenced political processes immediately after the fall of the communist
regime, focusing primarily on the formation of the party system. Any analysis of the
events of 1989 placed in a broader time frame requires a combination of historical
and political science approaches, and thus I make more use of secondary literature
devoted to the subject at hand than I do primary sources.
The Readiness of the Slovak Elites for Political Change
Some of the facts that follow could possibly illustrate the extent to which Slovak
society was prepared for changes in power and how different the character of the
situation in Slovakia was from that of the Czech lands. A report of the Ministry of
the Interior (Ministerstvo vnútra, MV) of the Slovak Socialist Republic (Slovenská so‑
cialistická republika, SSR) from October 23, 1989 characterized the situation of the
state security apparatus in Slovakia as relatively stabilized, although it allowed for the
possibility of larger anti‑state action.11 However, reports from foreign diplomats re‑
siding in Prague were also carried out in a similar vein.12 It may be stated that even the
opposition, which had been considering utterly different timelines on the horizon
10
11
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12
Poučenie z krízového vývoja v strane a spoločnosti po XIII. zjazde KSČ.
PEŠEK, Jan: Pohľad štátnej moci na disent na Slovensku v „ére prestavby”. In: PEŠEK, Jan – SZO‑
MOLÁNYI, Soňa (eds.): November 1989 na Slovensku, p. 53.
PREČAN, Vilém: Středoevropský kontext demokratického převratu v Československu v roce 1989.
In: PEŠEK, Jan – SZOMOLÁNYI, Soňa (eds.): November 1989 na Slovensku, p. 19.
right before the outbreak of the revolution, did not count on the prospect of a change
in power. The organization of public discussion forums involving representatives of
official and unofficial structures were discussed at a seminar held in an apartment at‑
tended by sociologists, natural scientists, intellectuals, and ecologists from both par‑
allel and official structures, which took place on November 18, 1989 in the apartment
of the sociologist Soňa Szomolányi. When the participants heard the news that on
Prague’s Národní třída (Národní Street) the security forces had suppressed the stu‑
dent march from Albertov to the city center on November 17, 1989 to commemorate
the imprisonment of students from several Czech universities in Prague in 1939, they
agreed to organize an “individual‑group protest” in the streets of Bratislava. They did
not consider the possibility of a mass manifestation. Likewise, writers publishing in
official journals and writers publishing in the samizdat magazine Obsah (Content)
met for the first time that day in the house of the dissident writer Ivan Kadlečík in
Pukanec (in Central Slovakia).13 At this meeting they agreed to organize a joint event
to mark Human Rights Day on December 10, 1989. Neither of these meetings, at
least according to surviving memories, was devoted to or interested in mass demon‑
stration or any formation of an organized opposition against the regime, let alone
in overthrowing it.14 This is how the Hungarian Independent Initiative became the
first independent opposition group to have a clear political profile in Slovakia. It was
created by 25 people. It was a pure coincidence that it was established on November
18, 1989, i.e. one day after the suppression of the student demonstration in Prague,
in the apartment of Károly Tóth in Šaľa.15
However, it is also true that November 1989 did not come like a bolt out from the
blue. Although the reports of the communist secret police, the State Security (Štátna
bezpečnosť, ŠtB), characterized the situation in Slovakia as stabilized or relatively
stabilized in comparison with the Czech lands, from 1987 they had been repeating
13
14
15
This was one of the regular meetings that the authors from the Obsah magazine (the so‑called kvartál
/quarterly/) organized in their homes. The meeting in Pukanec was the first one that was also at‑
tended by officially publishing authors. A number of them met in Bratislava June 16, 1989 and took
steps to set up the Slovak PEN club center. The founding meeting of the Slovak PEN club center
took place on October 31, 1989 in Bratislava. 31 writers signed the Slovak translation of the PEN
Charter (e.g. Ladislav Ballek, Martin Bútora, Ján Buzássy, Anton Hykisch, Andrej Ferko, László Do‑
bos, Dušan Dušek, Ľubomír Feldek, Lajos Grendel, Daniel Hevier, Rudolf Chmel, Klára Jarunková,
Vincent Šikula, Ján Štrasser, Martin M. Šimečka, Pavel Vilikovský, Peter Zajac, Štefan Žáry and Miloš
Žiak, among others). In October 1989 some of them took part in the symposium “Československo
1989. Dialóg alebo konfrontácia” (“Czechoslovakia 1989: Dialogue or Confrontation”) in Franken
(Germany), where the organizers of the Czech exile Catholic association Opus Bonum also invited
a delegation from the official Czechoslovak Union of Writers. Representatives of exile and official
writers discussed a number of controversial issues, such as the events of 1948 (the establishment of
the power monopoly of the KSČ) and Charter 77. Z histórie SC PEN. Slovak PEN Centre – see http://
scpen.international/o‑nas/historia/ (quoted version dated 28. 3. 2020); BEHRING, Eva et al.: Grund‑
begriffe und Autoren ostmitteleuropäischer Exilliteraturen 1945–1989. Ein Beitrag zum Systematisierung und
Typologisierung. Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2004, p. 192.
SZOMOLÁNYI, Soňa: Kľukatá cesta Slovenska k demokracii. Stilus, Bratislava 1999, p. 33–34; ŽIAK,
Miloš: Spomínanie 3. In: OS, 1999, No. 8 (August), pp. 43–48.
MARUŠIAK, Juraj: The Nationalizing Processes in Slovakia 1969–1989. The Case Study of the Hun‑
garian Minority. Central European Papers, 2015, Vol. III, No. 1, p. 96.
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claims about the opposition’s activities being intensified or about attempts to create
a common platform for the whole of Slovakia and the federal republic. The turning
point was the entry of independent initiatives into the political discourse in 1987,
which came about in such a way that the leadership of the Communist Party had to
take their existence into account. Nonetheless, the development in Slovakia was slow‑
er and can be characterized as gradual. The milestones defining the particular stages
of development are much less pronounced in Slovakia than in the Czech lands. When
analyzing the course of political changes in Slovakia it is therefore necessary to speak
of the entire period following 1987. In the second half of 1987 and in the first half of
1988, Slovak society was significantly activated in the political sense via public activ‑
ities, which were also an impulse for actors from the scene of the independent initia‑
tives in the Czech lands. They were mainly concerned with the document Bratislava/
nahlas (Bratislava/Aloud) from autumn 1987, prepared by two main Bratislava organ‑
izations of the Slovak Union of Nature and Landscape Protection (Slovenský zväz
ochrancov prírody a krajiny, SZOPK), No. 6 and 13, but also the petition by Augustin
Navrátil Podněty katolíků k řešení situace věřících občanů v ČSSR (Catholic Suggestions
to Address the Situation of Religious Citizens in Czechoslovak Socialist Republic/
ČSSR) from November 29,16 and finally the Candlelight demonstration (sometimes
called also Candle demonstration) of Catholic believers in Bratislava on March 25,
1988, attended by those demanding respect for religious freedom and the abolition of
the state supervision of churches. On the other hand, after the so‑called Candlelight
demonstration in Bratislava, no similar protests took place that would provoke an
irritated reaction from the Communist Party leadership as they did in Prague. Such
activities of independent initiatives were also less present in the public discourse here
than in Czech society.
One important question is the state the actors of political change were in during
and directly before the events of November 1989. In the KSS leadership, similarly to
the KSČ leadership, the decomposition of the existing unity could be observed. The
first contradictions began to emerge on the surface, which concerned not only staff‑
ing issues, but also opinions about the tempo of further changes. At the central level
in Czechoslovakia the disagreement between the General Secretary of the Central
Committee (Ústredný výbor, ÚV) of the Communist Party Milos Jakeš and the Prime
Minister of the ČSSR Ladislav Adamec concerning the need to introduce political
changes began to escalate in the years 1988–1989. This dispute, at least superficially,
did not relate to the views on action against political opponents, although during
the course of 1989 Adamec’s advisors (namely Oskár Krejčí) were in contact with the
representatives of the Most (“Bridge”) initiative.17 In Slovakia the decomposition of
unity had become visible already in 1987, when the KSS leadership was not able to
16
17
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ŠIMULČÍK, Ján: Čas odvahy. Najväčšia podpisová akcia za náboženskú slobodu – 500 000 občanov ČSSR.
ÚPN (The Nation’s Memory Institute), Bratislava 2017.
HORÁČEK, Michael: Jak pukaly ledy. Ex libris, Prague 1990. The objective of the Most initiative,
founded by the journalist Michael Horáček and the musician Michael Kocáb in summer 1989, was to
intermediate dialogue between the leadership of the KSČ and the opposition.
take a unified position, for example, in its attitude to the aforementioned document
of the Bratislava environmental activists associated in the Bratislava organization of
the Slovak Union of Nature and Landscape Protection Bratislava/nahlas. Several mem‑
bers of the KSS participated in the preparation of this document. One of its reviewers
was, among others, the chairman of the cultural and scientific organization Matica
slovenská, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slova‑
kia, and a member of the Slovak National Council (Slovenská národná rada, SNR),
Vladimír Mináč. He defended its authorial team with interpellations in the Slovak
legislature, regardless of their bullying and propaganda campaign in the central daily
paper of the KSS, Pravda.18
In Slovakia, as in the Czech lands, however, the Communist Party was ideolog‑
ically and programmatically rigid, and within the KSS there was no discussion of
program issues and the nature of the ongoing changes. However, unlike in Poland,
Hungary, some republics of the former Yugoslavia, and the former Baltic republics
of the Soviet Union, there was no relevant reform wing to speak of.19 The frequent
changes in the leadership of the KSČ and KSS did not signal changes in the political
course, but were rather a sign of improvisation and powerlessness. Reform initiatives
within the Communist Party were limited to individuals, with the result that the
Communist Party was not able to initiate changes or respond to them in time.
On the other hand, however, the political elites in Slovakia were relatively young‑
er than those in the Czech lands. While the average age of the leaders of the KSČ
Central Committee was 65, the leaders of the KSS were 60.5 years old on average.20
The KSS had weaker bonds in Slovak society before 1948 than in the Czech lands, as
reflected in the results of the last partially competitive parliamentary elections before
the Communist Party took power in 1946. Therefore, the KSS had to supplement its
members and functionaries much more actively in the 1950s and 1960s, while during
that period new members were motivated to enter the Communist Party no longer by
their approval of the values it represented, but rather an attempt to gain better social
standing through political activity. Hence, much more than in the Czech part of the
country, new KSS members also had to be recruited from families with indifferent
or non‑communist pasts. Ideology played a lesser role in the everyday functioning
of the KSS than in the Czech part of the KSČ. As a result of the different course
taken by normalization in Slovakia and in the Czech lands the communist elites in
Slovakia were less affected by purges. This being the case, the communist leaders in
Slovakia made greater efforts to remain in political life and maintain their positions
of power, especially after the leadership of the Central Committee of the KSS repre‑
sented by Ignác Janák resigned on December 6, 1989. The motivation for joining the
KSS was far more the desire to gain a better social standing than identification with
18
19
20
Bratislava/nahlas a Nič nového pod slnkom. In: HUBA, Mikuláš (ed.): Ponovembrové Slovensko I–II.
EuroUniPress, Bratislava 1994, pp. 90–91.
BARNOVSKÝ, Michal: Vedenie KSČ a KSS – od nástupu Gorbačova po november 1989. In: PEŠEK,
Jan –SZOMOLÁNYI, Soňa (eds.): November 1989 na Slovensku, p. 42.
Ibidem, p. 32.
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communist ideology. The communist elites and the membership base in Slovakia
were thus able to think much more pragmatically, as exemplified, for instance, in the
formation of the KSS Action Committee (Akčný výbor) on December 6, 1989 as an
ad hoc structure composed of mostly reform‑oriented individuals, but also during
the extraordinary KSS congress on December 17, 1989 when the reform course of the
new KSS leadership, a relatively radical one compared to the period before November
1989, was accepted. The pragmatism of their behavior was also reflected in 1968 and
later during the normalization period.
Thus, in the KSS, there were certain groups who were younger and sympathized
with the reform process, at least to the extent of the Soviet perestroika. Additionally,
the gerontocratic nature of the regime caused them to suffer from a kind of genera‑
tional stopper. These groups were preparing to take over power and had the potential
to reach a consensus with the reformist forces. However, these were isolated groups,
or rather initiatives of individuals who did not have a broader political background
among the members and officials of the KSS. The political atmosphere, which pre‑
vented any free horizontal exchange of information, did not allow for the creation of
such a background. At the same time, these groups did not attempt to operate out‑
side of the official structures. They wanted to initiate the reform process from above
and from inside the existing political system.
The most important of these groups was made up of young researchers from
the Institute of Marxism‑Leninism (Ústav marxizmu‑leninizmu) of the KSS Central
Committee and other “ideological departments” of the KSS, in particular Peter Weiss
and Pavol Kanis, who operated under the protection of Viliam Plevza, the head of this
KSS ideological department and close collaborator of the General Secretary of the
KSČ Central Committee, Gustav Husák (1969–1987).21 They published in the weekly
magazine Nové slovo (The New Word), issued by the Central Committee of the KSS.
They invited non‑conformist intellectuals to seminars organized at the Institute of
Marxism‑Leninism and published translations of top foreign literature for the inter‑
nal circle of readers, for example Third Wave by Alvin Toffler.22 Besides them, there were
also other circuits that brought together former or current members of the KSS who
sought political changes. One of these was the initiative of the Leninist Spark Club
(Klub leninskej iskry), headed by the former journalist and ŠtB member Igor Cibu‑
la, who had to quit his job in the media and in the security forces as a result of the
purges after the suppression of the Prague Spring. The club, which was established
on the grounds of the Czechoslovak‑Soviet Friendship League (Zväz československo‑
‑sovietskeho priateľstva, ZČSSP), sought to gain support for its activities from the
USSR. Its aim was to disseminate information about the reconstruction being un‑
dertaken in the USSR through lectures and discussions. However, the Czechoslovak‑
‑Soviet Friendship League and the KSS leadership rejected the attempts to legalize
21
88
22
In 1975–1989, Gustáv Husák (1913–1991) was also the president of Czechoslovakia. Due to the nature
of the political system, this function was of secondary importance. After 1987 his influence on polit‑
ical decisions was radically reduced.
ŽIAK, Miloš: Slovensko. Od komunizmu kam? Archa, Bratislava 1996, p. 29.
the club, and the club was thus closed down in 1987. In 1988, the Social Science
Forum Dialogue (Spoločenskovedné fórum Dialóg), whose objectives were similar to
those of the Leninist Spark Club, began to operate within the Municipal Council of
the Czechoslovak Science and Technology Society (Mestská rada Československej ve‑
deckotechnickej spoločnosti). Cibula was again involved here, and the chairmanship
was held by Jozef Moravčík, a pedagogue at Comenius University’s Faculty of Law.23
When compared with the Czech lands, it is a unique Slovak phenomenon that the
former members of the Communist Party who had been expelled after 1968 worked
together in these structures with the then Communist Party members.
The writer and essayist Vladimír Mináč had great political authority. Although
he was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, he increasingly
criticized the policies of the then leadership. Be that as it may, these groups and the
individuals failed to create a common platform within the KSS, i.e. a reform wing
that might have become an alternative to the then KSS leadership before November
1989. The nascent intra‑party opposition in the KSS was subjected to stress tests
during the groundbreaking events of the summer and autumn of 1989, including its
connection with the so‑called Bratislava Five (Bratislavská päťka) trial.24 Some of the
protagonists of this non‑institutionalized and unarticulated internal party opposi‑
tion openly opposed the actions of the Communist Party leadership. It took part in
a petition demanding the release of political prisoners and in November 1989 joined
up with critically‑minded intellectuals and protagonists of independent initiatives
and participated in the establishment and further activities of the Public Against Vi‑
olence (Verejnosť proti násiliu, VPN). The majority of the reform‑oriented members
of the KSS, especially from the circle of those working at the Institute of Marxism‑
‑Leninism of the KSS Central Committee, did not, however, intend on entering into
any open confrontation with the powers that be, as a result of which they lost their
political initiative and found themselves on the sidelines of the political events in
the spring of 1989. This part of the potential reform wing in the KSS stepped up
only after decisive changes were made and thanks to the definitive dissolution of
23
24
Idem.: Slovensko medzi napredovaním a úpadkom. Self‑published by the author, Bratislava 1998,
pp. 21–26.
The trial against a group of Bratislava‑based members of the Movement for Civic Freedom (Hnutí
za občanskou svobodu, HOS) after notifying the Office of the Government of the USSR and the
Editorial Office of Literárny týždenník (Literary Weekly) in August 1989 of their intention to lay flow‑
ers in front of the building of Komenský University in Bratislava, where, during the Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968, Danka Košanová had been shot dead. The authorized letter
was written on August 4, 1989. In connection with the planned action, a criminal trial was initiated
against the representatives of the Christian dissent Čarnogurský, Anton Selecký, and members of the
so‑called civic dissent Miroslav Kusý, Vladimír Maňák, and Hana Ponická. The letter addressed to
the Office of the Government of the USSR was signed by Andrej Strýček in lieu of Ján Čarnogurský.
Moreover, on August 4, 1989 Hana Ponická, Katarína Lazarová, Ján Čarnogurský, Vladimír Maňák,
and Anton Selecký sent a letter to the Municipal National Committee (Mestský národný výbor, MNV)
in Zvolen, in which they announced their plan to commemorate the military commanders of the anti‑
‑fascist Slovak National Uprising (Slovenské národné povstanie, SNP) (1944), Rudolf Viest and Ján
Golian, at the site where their monument stood. This was met with disapproval by the representatives
of the city of Zvolen.
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the pre‑November KSS leadership. The dissolution of the KSS leadership, headed
by Ignác Janák, was not finalised until the KSS Action Committee was instated on
December 6, 1989 i.e. 12 days after the fall of Miloš Jakeš.25 The pragmatism of the
younger ranks of the communist establishment and intellectuals allowed for a high‑
er degree of the regime’s personal continuity after 1990 with the pre‑November re‑
gime when compared to the developments in Czech politics, but they too had their
limits. They were concerned about the radical course of changes in which they were
not involved, as they were often people who had gained prominent positions in the
spheres of academic research, culture, and journalism as fresh university graduates
in the early 1970s. They jumped at the chance to fill positions left empty by the
victims of normalization. One reason they adopted a restrained stance on the polit‑
ical earthquake in November 1989 might be that such a sudden reversal could have
worked against them.
After some partial changes in the leadership positions of the KSS, more exten‑
sive at the central level, less at the regional and local ones, younger functionaries
connected with the sole youth organization, the Socialist Youth Union (Socialistický
zväz mládeže, SZM), began to gain leverage. At the end of the 1980s, critical voices
were being raised in the organization about former political practices, but the vast
majority avoided any sort of systemic critique. Nevertheless, the reconstructed KSS
elites were aware of the need to adopt a more pragmatic attitude toward the ongoing
changes, which was reflected both in the factual organizational independence of the
KSS at the extraordinary congress in December 1989 and in the attempt to trans‑
form the KSS into a social‑democratic type of political party in the newly founded
Democratic Left Party (Strana demokratickej ľavice, SDĽ) in 1990. Whereas such an
attempt had ended unsuccessfully in the Czech lands and its initiators were forced
to leave the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (Komunistická strana Čech
a Moravy, KSČM), in Slovakia, on the contrary, supporters of orthodox communist
orientation found themselves in the minority.26 Unlike in the Czech lands, non‑
‑communist parties under the auspices of the National Front played a minimal role
in political debates before November 1989, and thus had only a minimal impact on
the political changes themselves. Slovak political émigrés found themselves not only
outside the mainstream of the political debates before 1989, but outside the course
of the ongoing changes in Slovakia as well. Its only representative to acquire a more
significant position in Slovak politics after 1989 was the head of the Democratic Par‑
ty (Demokratická strana, DS), Martin Kvetko.27 His relevance in Slovak political life
after 1989 was, nevertheless, substantially less than that of Pavel Tigrid28 in the Czech
Republic, for example.
25
26
90
27
28
ŽIAK, Miloš: Slovensko. Od komunizmu kam?, pp. 45–48.
In 1991 they created two smaller successor entities – the KSS 91 and the Union of Slovak Communists
(Zväz komunistov Slovenska), which merged into the Communist Party of Slovakia in 1992, regis‑
tered as a new political entity.
KUBÍN, Ľuboš: Rola politických elít pri zmene režimu na Slovensku. Veda, Bratislava 2002, p. 67.
Pavel Tigrid (1917–2003) was a writer in exile and publicist. He published the periodical Svědectví
(Testimony) in Paris during 1956–1989, which met with a significant response in exile as well as in
Independent Initiatives in 1989
In terms of focus and form of activity we can divide the dissent operating in Slovakia
into “Christian” and “civic.”29 Moreover, a significant segment of the independent
initiatives was represented by environmental activists, Hungarian minority activists,
and the alternative culture scene. Civil dissent, grouped around the Charter 77 (Char‑
ta 77) signatories30 and individuals who were not signatories but cooperated with
them (e.g. the historian Jozef Jablonický and philosophers Milan Šimečka and Július
Strinka), did not represent the strongest current of independent initiatives in Slo‑
vakia, either in terms of pure numbers or from the institutional points of view and
publishing possibilities. Nevertheless, it had its foundation in the form of a dissident
scene and a network for publishing samizdat works in Prague and Brno. Its intellec‑
tual potential and determination to take the communist regime head on represented
the greatest political danger in the eyes of the ŠtB. The moral credit of Charter 77 had
the effect of making the politically oriented part of the Christian dissent cooperate
closely with activists of civic dissent in Slovakia, which favored this arrangement over
the creation of a Christian democratic party as an independent political formation,
which Ján Čarnogurský had been considering since the mid‑1980s.31 This coopera‑
tion involved almost all major policy initiatives on the dissident scene, at least in the
form of moral support.
Despite the presence of certain internal conflicts and tensions, the representa‑
tives of civic dissent were also respected on the so‑called alternative culture scene, i.e.
among the young members of the artistic underground, despite the fact that part of
the younger generation of alternative culture viewed Charter 77 in a negative light for
moral reasons. They blamed the expelled communists for having helped co‑create the
communist regime and now it was too late to see that the project (socialist society – au‑
thor’s note) had serious mistakes.32 At the same time, however, this “second generation”
pointed out that Charter 77 was insufficient because it lacked any positive agenda:
Rather, we see the importance of there being at least a trace of some sort of future here.33 Despite
29
30
31
32
33
Czechoslovakia. He was also an external collaborator with Radio Free Europe. After 1989 he acted as
an influential publicist and in 1994–1996 he took on a post at the Ministry of Culture of the Czech
Republic.
JABLONICKÝ, Jozef: O disente na Slovensku. Dilema, 1999, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 20–26; KUSÝ, Miroslav:
Ľudské práva a slobody v období rokov 1968–1989. In: KOGANOVÁ, Viera (ed.): Demokracia a ochrana
ľudských práv. Teória, prax, medzinárodná úprava. University of Economics – Slovak Association for the
Political Sciences, Bratislava 1996, pp. 202–220.
Charter 77 (declared on January 1, 1977) was a Czechoslovak civic initiative during the years 1977–
1992 which demanded that the communist authorities of Czechoslovakia uphold international laws
on human rights. It was the most significant platform of democratic opposition in Czechoslovakia in
the 1970s and 1980s.
ČARNOGURSKÝ, Ján: Cestami KDH. Vydavateľstvo Michala Vaška, Prešov 2007, p. 5.
KUSÝ, Miroslav – ŠIMEČKA, Milan: Prvý rozhovor s druhou generáciou. In: KUSÝ, Miroslav – ŠIMEČ‑
KA, Milan: Veľký brat a veľká sestra. O strate skutočnosti v ideológii reálneho socializmu. Milan Šimečka Foun‑
dation, Bratislava 2000, p. 11.
Ibidem, p. 195. “The second generation” would have meant the son of Milan Šimečka, Martin Milan
Šimečka, but he was linked to the younger generation of members of the independent initiatives and
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these generational disputes, the Charter 77 signatories and supporters used space on
the pages of alternative culture samizdat magazines, such as Kontakt (1980–1983),
Altamira (1985–1987), Fragment (1987), and K, or Fragment K (1988–1989), as they had
no access to independent publication space in Slovakia. Articles by Milan Šimečka,
Hana Ponická, and Jozef Jablonický were also published by the Christian‑oriented
Bratislavské listy (Bratislava Letters) (1988–1989). Therefore, the division of dissent
into “civic” and “Christian”,34 or its separation from the scene of the so‑called alter‑
native culture, effectively illustrates the focus and form of activity of the individual
components of independent initiatives, but it does not testify to the real relations in
the world of dissent, as these were not strictly separate segments.
The institutional framework of Charter 77 and the close personal ties to the
Czech dissident scene (specifically in Prague and Brno) places the so‑called civic dis‑
sent in Slovakia into the unified context of Czechoslovak dissent. At the same time,
however, in terms of its thematic scope, as well as the conditions and forms of its ac‑
tions, it is possible to think of the civic dissent, which was most closely linked to the
dissent taking place in the Czech lands, as a specifically Slovak phenomenon. Despite
its low numbers, the Slovak “civic dissent” took up an independent position on issues
sensitive to Slovakia, such as the stance of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia i.e. the
construction of the Gabčíkovo‑Nagymaros waterworks on the Danube.
For the opposition, the most important moment was its very entry into the polit‑
ical debate and breaking out of its marginal position in political life. In Slovakia, this
was represented by the aforementioned Candlelight demonstration in March 1988.
During and immediately after it, several facts were introduced that later influenced
the course of events in 1989. It showed the presence of a strong worldview opposi‑
tion to the normalization regime, while its supporters made clear their readiness to
express their opinion publicly. It also demonstrated the organizational background
that the Christian dissidents, thanks to the network of communities of the so‑called
secret church and religious samizdat, had at their disposal. Although the primary re‑
quirements of the organizers and participants were not of a political nature in terms
of changing the political regime or the leaders of the state, their content discussed
crucial elements of the prevailing political system.
In the eyes of the other segments of parallel structures, the Candlelight demon‑
stration greatly increased the prestige of the Catholic dissent as an ideological al‑
ternative to the powers that be, and one capable of mobilizing a significant number
of people. The response to this demonstration also played a part in bolstering the
self‑confidence of the protagonists of Catholic dissent and accelerated the process
of its politicization. The ensuing dialogue between the protagonists of the “Chris‑
34
alternative culture. At the same time, this “second generation” assumed an imaginary subject, the
likes of which M. Kusý and M. Šimečka have addressed in their critical reflections of their own pasts.
KUSÝ, Miroslav – ŠIMEČKA, Milan: Prvý rozhovor s druhou generáciou (excerpt). Kritika & Kontext,
2003, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 26–27.
JABLONICKÝ, Jozef: O disente na Slovensku, pp. 20–26; KUSÝ, Miroslav: Ľudské práva a slobody,
pp. 213–218.
tian” and “civic” dissent made it possible for the first openly political samizdat,
officially unregistered magazine in Slovakia, with the address of the editorial office
and publisher of Bratislavské listy to be open not only to members of the Christian
dissent, but also to the civic opposition and artistic underground.35 It was the first
clearly politically oriented samizdat magazine in Slovakia. Nevertheless, arriving in
1988, it came much later compared to the Czech lands, or neighboring Poland or
Hungary for that matter. It rejected communist ideology from the outset. Civil dis‑
sent support for the Candlelight demonstration helped to strengthen the dialogue
of different channels in independent initiatives, and co‑created the preconditions
for their cooperation on the basis of the Movement for Civic Freedom, and later
in the anti‑totalitarian movements of the Civic Forum (Občanské forum, OF) and
Public Against Violence.
After the shock caused by the declaration of so‑called martial law in Poland in De‑
cember 1981, the artistic underground and environmental initiatives began to pull to‑
gether and revive themselves. Gradually, non‑religious samizdat journals came to the
fore (Fragment and K were created in 1987, which eventually merged into Fragment K
magazine in 1989). The door to public life was opened up to the opposition by peo‑
ple who until recently had only operated in official structures, published in official
periodicals, and who represented a certain moral and spiritual authority in Slovakia.
This was done in two different ways. One way was that those interested began to
get involved in actions initiated by the protagonists of independent initiatives (e.g.
the Vyhlásenie k deportácii Židov zo Slovenska /Statement on the Deportation of Jews
from Slovakia/) in October 1987,36 or the signing of the petition Několik vět37 (A Few
Sentences), or petitions against repressions, especially in the case of the so‑called Bra‑
tislava Five); or, the other way was the “co‑option” of opponents of the regime to
official or semi‑official periodicals (the publication of texts by Dominik Tatarka in
Slovenské pohľady (Slovak Views), the birthday wishes for Tatarka’s 76th birthday in
Literárny týždenník (Literary Weekly), and the announcement of his death in the same
periodical; the publication of Martin Milan Šimečka’s short story Indiánske leto (In‑
dian Summer) in the magazine for young authors Dotyky (Touches); the occasional
publication of texts by Ivan Hoffman, Marcel Strýko, as well as in the artistic press,
and elsewhere); or at events, for example, the participation of the dissident writer
35
36
37
ŠIMULČÍK, Ján: Čas svitania. Sviečková manifestácia – 25. marec 1988. Vydavateľstvo Michala Vaška,
Prešov 1998, p. 15.
Vyhlásenie k deportácii Židov zo Slovenska. Document No. 17. 10. 1987. In: ŽATKULIAK, Jozef – HLAVO‑
VÁ, Viera – SEDLIAKOVÁ, Alžbeta – ŠTEFANSKÝ, Michal (eds.): November 1989 a Slovensko. Chronoló‑
gia a dokumenty (1985–1990). Milan Šimečka Foundation – Historical Institute, Slovak Academy of
Sciences, Bratislava 1999, pp. 171–172. See also Vyhlásenie k deportáciám Židov zo Slovenska, Octo‑
ber 1987. Kritika & Kontext, 1999, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 21–22.
The proclamation Několik vět was created in the context of Charter 77, calling for the end of political
persecutions, freedom of speech and religion, as well the start of a dialogue between the ruling elites
and the citizenry. It was published on June 29, 1989. The first 1,800 signatures also included promi‑
nent figures in official cultural and intellectual life. By November 17, 1989, nearly 40,000 people had
signed it. SUK, Jiří: Petice, kterou dějiny předběhly. Před patnácti lety bylo v Československu zveře‑
jněno a podepisováno Několik vět. Mladá fronta dnes, 26. 6. 2004, příloha Kavárna, pp. E–II–III.
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Martin Milan Šimečka at a gathering of writers convened as part of a conference
on the situation in contemporary Slovak literature by the official Union of Slovak
Writers in Budmerice in May 1989. The result of both methods was the blurring of
the differences between the “official” and “unofficial” spheres. Incidentally, the afore‑
mentioned ecological document Bratislava/nahlas was the result of the intersection of
the activities of independent initiatives and those functioning on the basis of official
structures.
One specific case was that of the internal newsletter of the Bratislava municipal
organization SZOPK, Ochranca prírody (Protector of Nature), particularly with regard
to a part of the critically attuned public in Bratislava. Amongst other things, this
magazine published an interview with the actor, Milan Kňažko,38 in which he ex‑
plained the reasons for signing the petition Několik vět, although its dissemination
was subject to repression by the criminal justice authorities. After all, even the fact
that the document Bratislava/nahlas was created in the guise of internal material of the
officially operating Slovak Union of Nature and Landscape Protection in 1987 shows
that the boundaries between the two spheres were no longer hermetically sealed by
that time. As reported in Charter 77 in early February 1988, within a few months
after its publication the number of people interested in joining the organization had
grown by 400 and one hundred people were attending its public meetings.39 However,
the protagonists of the environmentalist movement, e.g. Juraj Podoba, recall from
their memories the increasing politicization of the Bratislava environmentalists, as
for many new members it was the political ability of the movement that attracted them to it
more than its original environmental activities.40
Although Bratislava/nahlas meant a great upheaval for the regime, it had not yet
become a mass protest against the communist regime. The petition Podněty katolíků
k řešení situace věřících občanů v ČSSR,41 which demanded the restoration of proper reli‑
gious life in the country and respect for religious freedoms, elicited a great response
in Slovakia. Although it was initiated by the Moravian Catholic activist Augustin
Navrátil, a large proportion (approximately half) of its 600,000 signatories were from
Slovakia.42 Unlike in the Czech lands, however, in Slovakia it was not until autumn
1989 that street demonstrations became a hallmark of the expression of disagree‑
ment. Notwithstanding, the activity of believers and participation in church ceremo‑
38
39
40
41
42
94
TATÁR, Peter: Interview with Milan Kňažko. Ochranca prírody. Spravodaj MV SZOPK Bratislava, 1989,
No. 3–4, p. 43.
Bratislavský SZOPK. Infoch, 1988, Vol. 11, No. 3 (7. 2. 1988), pp. 15–16.
PODOBA, Juraj: Polozabudnutá legenda. Bratislava/nahlas s dvadsaťročným odstupom. In: HUBA,
Mikuláš – IRA, Vladimír – ŠUŠKA, Pavol (eds.): Bratislava/nahlas ako výzva. Po dvadsiatich rokoch. Geo‑
graphical Institute, Slovak Academy of Sciences – Society for Lasting Sustainable Life of the Slovak
Republic (STUŽ SR), Bratislava 2007, p. 23.
Podnety katolíkov na riešenie situácie veriacich občanov v ČSSR. Rodinné spoločenstvo, 1988, Vol. 4,
No. 2 (17), pp. 13–15 – see http://samizdat.sk/system/files/rodinne‑spolocenstvo/1988/rodinne‑
‑spolocenstvo‑1988‑2.pdf (quoted version dated 28. 3. 2020).
OTÁHAL, Milan: Opozice, moc, společnost 1969/1989. ÚSD AV ČR (Institute of Contemporary History,
Czech Academy of Sciences) – Maxdorf, Prague 1994, p. 60; ŠIMULČÍK, Ján: Katolícka cirkev a nežná
revolúcia 1989. Vydavateľstvo Michala Vaška – Milan Šimečka Foundation, Prešov – Bratislava 1999, p. 14.
nies and pilgrimages increased significantly, which, from the point of view of their
participants, was also a way expressing their disagreement with the regime.
The weakness of the anti‑regime opposition in Slovakia was its organizational
underdevelopment. In contrast to the Czech dissent, which lacked numbers but was
richly structured, the first organizational unit of civic dissent and the first known
politically oriented group outside the official structures was established in Novem‑
ber 1988. That was the Slovak group of the Movement for Civic Freedom.43 The
Committee for the Protection of the Rights of the Hungarian Minority in Czecho‑
slovakia (Výbor na ochranu práv maďarskej menšiny v Československu) , established
in March 1978, had limited influential potential due to its conspiratorial nature
and its focus on the particular problems of the Hungarian minority. The presumed
attempts by some of the former reform communists of 1968 to create their own
political initiative (the Slovak Democratic Association /Slovenské demokratické
združenie/, and Príboj /Breaking Wave/ magazine) from the early 1980s was also
short‑lived and of minimal impact. The opposition in Slovakia was thus much less
prepared for political changes than its Czech counterparts, not to mention the polit‑
ical opposition in Poland, for example, which was a qualitatively different phenome‑
non compared to the whole of Czechoslovakia. This unpreparedness was caused not
only by organizational weakness, but at least to the same extent by programmatic
weakness. A characteristic feature of the anti‑regime opposition in Slovakia was its
“non‑political” character. According to political scientist Soňa Szomolányi, it was
the least visible among the countries of the Visegrad group. November 1989 caught
the Slovak opposition in a state where it was only beginning to overcome its frag‑
mentation.44
For example, in the autumn of 1989, it was cultural and academic figures that
had no ambitions of becoming politically active at the time, or representatives of
a number of independent initiatives who also lacked any primary political character,
who played a dominant role in shaping the political opposition to the regime, as well
as the creation of the VPN. It was members of the so‑called secret church, the artistic
underground, non‑conformist professional artists, theatre artists, parts of art associ‑
ations, environmental activists, and others that took on the task of anti‑government
opposition because of the repressive and totalitarian nature of the communist re‑
gime. The opposition in Slovakia, far more so than the Czech one, was not prepared
to take political responsibility for the fate of the country. The scarcity in the numbers
of the so‑called civic dissent multiplied with the persecutions of the Bratislava Five
43
44
Ján Čarnogurský’s information on the first meeting of the HOS members in Bratislava on Novem‑
ber 11, 1988. Document No. 35. In: ŽATKULIAK, Jozef – HLAVOVÁ, Viera – SEDLIAKOVÁ, Alžbeta –
ŠTEFANSKÝ, Michal (eds.): November 1989 a Slovensko, p. 257. HOS was an independent initiative,
formed mainly in the context of Charter 77. In October 1989, on the 70th anniversary of the creation
of the Czechoslovak Republic (ČSR), it presented the manifesto Demokracie pro všechny (Democracy
for All), the signatories of which demanded the establishment of a parliamentary democracy. Its main
initiators were, amongst others, Rudolf Battěk and Václav Havel; from the Slovak side, it was Milan
Šimečka who took part in preparing the manifesto.
VPN 1989–1991. Svedectvá a dokumenty. Milan Šimečka Foundation, Bratislava 1998, p. 15.
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in autumn 1989, and their lack of structure meant that the so‑called old opposition,
that is dissidents who were primarily focused on the protection of human rights,
did not play a dominant role in the task of forming a counter‑elite during the fall
of communism and the emergence of the VPN. People from spheres that did not
define their goals as primarily political became its core. These circles even offered the
political opposition a publishing platform and an organizational foundation. Thus,
for example, the VPN was able to carry out its activities thanks to the support of the
Bratislava organization of the Slovak Union of Nature and Landscape Protection, or
the Bratislava organization of the Slovak Union of Creative Artists (Zväz slovenských
výtvarných umelcov); and leading up to November 1989, publishing platforms were
to be found among opposition circles, for example the magazines Ochranca prírody,
Fragment K, and, to a certain extent, the legal art journals.
1989 in Slovakia and Slovak-Hungarian Relations
The “Hungarian question” was one of the specific aspects of the entire political dis‑
course in Slovakia. The common experience of dissidents remained an unexploit‑
ed opportunity on both sides to reflect on Slovak‑Hungarian relations both at the
international (Slovak‑ or Czechoslovak‑Hungarian) and at the national level, with
regard to the relationship between the Hungarian minority and the majority. While
the activities of the Committee for the Protection of the Rights of the Hungarian
Minority in Czechoslovakia were dominated by the minority rights agenda, Slovak
dissidents took account of the activities of Miklós Duray only in connection with
his re‑arrest in 1984, when Miroslav Kusý, Milan Šimečka, Jozef Jablonický, and Ján
Čarnogurský put together letters of protest demanding the prosecution be stopped.
These protests were held primarily in the spirit of human rights, and despite the fact
that M. Kusý and J. Jablonický did point out the need to discuss issues of mutual
Slovak‑Hungarian relations45 more openly during them, there was no deeper reflec‑
tion on mutual relations on either the Slovak or Hungarian sides. Representatives
of the Slovak exile Imrich Kružliak and Martin Kvetko also sharply criticized Du‑
ray’s statements.46
Under the influence of representatives of the Slovak dissent, Charter 77 took
a cautious stance on the issue of the Hungarian minority in southern Slovakia and
on issues related to the construction of the Gabčíkovo‑Nagymaros waterworks on
the Danube. This was also due to the opposition of the majority of the population to
the engagement of Charter 77 in the activities of the Committee for the Protection of
the Rights of the Hungarian Minority in Czechoslovakia and in the issues of Slovak‑
‑Hungarian relations more generally.47 The Charter 77 therefore only referred to cer‑
tain cases of human rights violations. Controversial reactions in Slovak society to the
96
45
46
47
Solidarita s uvězněným Miklósem Durayem. Infoch, 1984, Vol. 7, July–August, pp. 23– 25.
HÜBL, Milan: Češi, Slováci a jejich sousedé. Naše vojsko, Prague 1990, pp. 126–129.
RYCHLÍK, Jan: Maďarský faktor v česko‑slovenských vztazích 1948–1992. In: Česko‑slovenská historická
ročenka 2002. Masaryk University, Brno 2002, pp. 79–80.
opinions of M. Duray generated a failed attempt to produce a joint Slovak‑Hungarian
study on the current issues of Slovak‑Hungarian relations and the position of the
Hungarian minority in Slovakia. It was to be authored by M. Duray, M. Šimečka, M.
Kusý, and J. Čarnogurský and to be published as part of the anthology collection of
the Congress of the Society for Science and Art (Společnost pro vědy a umění, SVU),
which was held in Boston (USA) in September 1986. The authors drew on a proposal
stemming from the Hungarian political opposition in Budapest. Its author is un‑
known (though assumed to be the Hungarian writer Győrgy Konrád). Negotiations
on the final version of the document were unsuccessful, and in the end separate,
individual studies were published instead.48 The opinions of Slovak and Hungarian
dissidents found common ground only after M. Duray had left for the USA in 1988.
Despite this gradual convergence, however, the ethnic line of conflict in Slovak
public discourse took on a new relevance, as the democratization processes in Hun‑
gary also raised the issue of Hungary’s relations with Hungarian minorities abroad.
Tensions arose in the bilateral relations between Czechoslovakia and Hungary in con‑
nection with Hungary’s decision to stop work on the aforementioned joint project
of a waterworks on the Danube, and, above all, regarding the progress of the democ‑
ratization processes taking place in Hungary. The Czechoslovaks sympathized with
the reforms as a successful example of the gradual easing of economic and political
conditions. Hungary was a frequent leisure and shopping destination for tourists
from Czechoslovakia, thanks to which the latter’s population was quite familiar with
the living conditions there.
In contrast to the environmentalists of Bratislava, some of the nationally orient‑
ed Slovak intellectuals connected with Literárny týždenník began to write about the
waterworks on the Danube in a way reminiscent of the social realist novels of the
1950s,49 and this project gradually started to become a symbol of Slovak national
pride. In contrast to the official propaganda, the discourse on Slovak‑Hungarian rela‑
tions to be found in Literárny týždenník focused on minority issues rather than on the
growth of opposition tendencies in Hungary. The weekly was the platform for a fiery
debate about the status of the Slovak minority in Hungary.50 However, in addition to
the militant51 and less militant52 anti‑Hungarian reactions, it also gave space (albeit
with editorial commentary)53 to the views of representatives of the Hungarian minor‑
ity, such as Károly Tóth and Eleonóra Sándor.54 However, in its first response to the
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
SCHÖPFLIN, George – WOOD, Nancy (eds.): In Search of Central Europe. Polity Press, Cambridge U.K.
1989.
MORAVČÍK, Štefan: Dunasaurus alebo rozprávanie o vodnom diele na Dunaji. Literárny týždenník,
1988, Vol. 1, No. 4 (14. 10. 1988), pp. 12–13; ŤAŽKÝ, Ladislav: Pred potopou. Slovenský spisovateľ, Bra‑
tislava 1988.
BOBÁK, Ján: Rozoznelo sa slovo. Literárny týždenník, 31. 3. 1989, No. 13; Zamlčaný protipól. Ohlas na
reláciu MTV Panoráma. Literárny týždenník, 7. 7. 1989, No. 27, pp. 8–9; MARUŠIAK, Juraj: The Nation‑
alizing Processes in Slovakia 1969–1989, pp. 100–102.
HÔRNY, Samuel: Len dereš? Literárny týždenník, 11. 8. 1989, No. 32, p. 16.
PLEVKA, Milan: O koexistencii. Literárny týždenník, 4. 8. 1989, No. 31, p. 16.
Od pólu k pólu. Literárny týždenník, 1. 9. 1989, No. 35, pp. 12–13.
TÓTH, Károly – SÁNDOR, Eleonóra: List zo Šale. Literárny týždenník, 1. 9. 1989, No. 35, pp. 12–13.
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arguments of K. Tóth and E. Sándor the magazine’s editorial staff refused outright to
discuss any issues concerning the oppression of members of the Hungarian minority
after the Second World War,55 though later on published an article by the historian
Štefan Šutaj condemning these events.56
Some representatives of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, who took part in
the reform process in 1968, also criticized the nationality policies in Hungary regard‑
ing the rapid assimilation of the local Slovak minority.57 With the exception of the
extraordinary voices that allowed criticism of the Czechoslovak nationality policy
not only towards the Hungarian minority, but also, for example, towards the Ger‑
man and Croatian minorities,58 the Slovak‑Hungarian discussion gradually took on
a confrontational tone, which was sharpened by one of the main contributors to this
issue, Ján Bobák.59 In November 1989 he also called for the principle of “consistent
reciprocity” to be applied in the minority policy. While the Slovaks from Hungary
saw this as a step that would enable the extension of minority rights to the Slovak
community, Bobák demanded that the principle of reciprocity be enshrined in our po‑
litical practice by law.60 Part of the break with communism in all the states of the Soviet
Bloc was to open up discussions on problematic chapters of national history. So, too,
in Slovak samizdat and later also in official magazines previously taboo topics were
being opened up, among others the First Czechoslovak Republic (1918–1939) and
the national revival in the 19th century, but also questions of the wartime Slovak
state, national symbolism, and, gradually, the issue of the repressions after 1948. One
example of a painful subject for members of the Hungarian minority was the issue
of the widely applied repressions in the years 1945–1948 and the policy of so‑called
re‑Slovakization.61
Especially at the end of the 1980s, in the context of the liberalization of political
conditions, the question of the position of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia be‑
came part of the confrontation between two resurgent Slovak and Hungarian nation‑
alisms. The legacy of totalitarian thinking was not evident only in the lack of dialogue
or knowledge of the culture and arguments of others, but also in the unwillingness
to become acquainted with these arguments. This was reflected in the discourse on
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
98
Compare TÓTH, Károly – SÁNDOR, Eleonóra: List zo Šale; Od pólu k pólu.
ŠUTAJ, Štefan: O reslovakizácii (a nielen o nej). Literárny týždenník, 13. 10. 1989, No. 41, pp. 12–13.
DOBOS, László: Otvorený list Imre Pozsgaymu. Literárny týždenník, 8. 9. 1989, No. 36, p. 2; SZABÓ,
Rezső: Vlasť je len tam, kde je aj právo. Literárny týždenník, 8. 9. 1989, No. 36, pp. 12–13; see: POZS‑
GAY, Imre: Odpoveď Imre Pozsgayho na otvorený list László Dobosa. Literárny týždenník, 24. 11. 1989,
No. 47, p. 13.
ŤAŽKÝ, P.: Slováci, Maďari, Nemci, Chorváti. Literárny týždenník, 15. 9. 1989, No. 37, p. 16.
SOBOTKOVÁ, M.: List z Bratislavy do Šale. Literárny týždenník, 27. 10. 1989, No. 43, p. 13; BOBÁK, Ján:
Pól bez protipólu. Literárny týždenník, 13. 10. 1989, No. 41, pp. 12–13. Ján Bobák is a Slovak historian;
after 1989 he became one of the prominent activists of Matica slovenská.
BOBÁK, Ján: K odpovedi I. Pozsgaya na otvorený list L. Dobosa. Literárny týždenník, 24. 11. 1989, p. 13.
See the Hungarian interpretation of the respective events: JANICS, Kálmán: Roky bez domoviny. Maďar‑
ská menšina na Slovensku po druhej svetovej vojne 1945–1948. Püski, Budapest 1994; FÁBRY, Zoltán: Obža‑
lovaný prehovorí. Dokumenty z dejín Maďarov v Československu. Kalligram, Bratislava 1994; VADKERTY,
Katalin: Maďarská otázka v Československu 1945–1948. Kalligram, Bratislava 2002.
the current status of minorities, as well as in the discussion of the painful problems
of the common Slovak‑Hungarian past. This is also the reason why, as Lajos Grendel,
a Hungarian writer living in Slovakia, noted in 1989, we are now standing with our backs
to one another not out of anger but out of a deep disinterest in ourselves.62 The exchange of
opinions took place mainly on the pages of the Literárny týždenník, which at that time
was characterized by a high degree of pluralism compared to the other official me‑
dia, and showed that the issue of Slovak‑Hungarian relations was a political matter,
both internationally and at the level of relations between minorities and the majority
population. This debate became increasingly more political and had the potential to
influence future developments after the change of regime.
The Unfinished Politicization of Independent Initiatives
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It was only isolated opposition circles who fully considered the political dimensions.
One of these was a group of supporters of the former First Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party in 1968–1969, Alexander Dubček, who, under
the leadership of the economist Hvezdoň Kočtúch, prepared a project for a new ver‑
sion of the KSS Action Program. Its members expected the changes to be executed
within the existing institutional framework. Dubček was a symbol of the attempt to
establish socialism with a human face in Czechoslovakia in 1968.
Unlike in the Czech lands, Slovakia did not create a more stable organizational
structure that would unite supporters of the 1968 “revival process”63 who largely iden‑
tified with the Charter 77 program in the Czech lands. At the end of the 1970s, a group
of economists from this circle led by Kočtúch tried to create a so‑called economic circle
from the ranks of former pedagogues of the College of Economics in Bratislava.64 Its
aim was to initiate a discussion on the economic policy of the KSČ leadership. Accord‑
ing to ŠtB reports, however, the attempt to organize similar discussions, which were
to take place in Kočtúch’s summer house, was frustrated from the very start: Due to
its danger, this organized activity was prevented by appropriate disintegration measures before
the first meeting and the interest in this activity remains under our agency’s control.65 Besides
Kočtúch, those taking part in the discussions were Viktor Pavlenda, Ladislav Klinko,
Jaroslav Husár,66 and the former diplomat Juraj Králik. In the end, the advisory group
62
63
64
65
66
GRENDEL, Lajos: Triezva múdrosť. Hovoríme s prozaikom Lajosom Grendelom. Literárny týždenník,
3. 3. 1989, No. 9, pp. 1, 11.
See AUTRATA, Oto: Poznámky k vzniku Klubu Obroda Slovenska. In: LALUHA, Ivan – UHER, Ján
(eds.): Cesty k novembru 1989. Spoločnosť Alexandra Dubčeka – Nová Práca, Bratislava 2000, pp. 87–
92; KOKOŠKOVÁ, Zdeňka – KOKOŠKA, Stanislav: Obroda. Klub za socialistickou přestavbu. Dokumenty.
ÚSD AV ČR – Maxdorf, Prague 1996.
In 1992, the College of Economics in Bratislava was renamed as the University of Economics in Brati‑
slava.
8. 1. 1979, Bratislava. Zhodnotenie výsledkov agentúrno‑operatívnej činnosti XII. správy ZNB za rok
1978 po línii vnútorného nepriateľa. Document No. 19. In: SIVOŠ, Jerguš (ed.): XII. Správa ZNB. Doku‑
menty k činnosti Správy kontrarozviedky v Bratislave v rokoch 1974–1989. ÚPN, Bratislava 2008, pp. 288, 296.
Jaroslav Husár (born May 31, 1936, registration number 20938) was entered into the registration
protocols of the Administration of the Bratislava branch of the ŠtB on June 9, 1978 as an agent under
99
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considered by Dubček was not established. A different group of reform communists
involved in the years 1968–1969 initiated the establishment of the Slovak Forum for
Perestroika (Slovenské fórum prestavby e.g. Milan Strhan).67
Although A. Dubček remained the most prominent symbol of disagreement with
the regime and the most famous figure in 1989 to symbolize an alternative to the
ruling elites, which was also exemplified in the motto Dubček na Hrad (Dubček to the
Castle), which resounded in the streets of both Prague and Bratislava alike, and indi‑
cated the demonstrators’ demand for his election as the president of Czechoslovakia.
Paradoxically, Dubček’s supporters had a weaker political base in his “motherland”
Slovakia than in the Czech lands. Only a few reform communists who had been vic‑
tims of the purges of 1969–1970 actively opposed the leadership of the Communist
Party during the 1970s and 1980s, possibly also due to the fact that the oppression
was less intense compared to the Czech lands. With the exception of sporadic appear‑
ances by A. Dubček, no former communist politicians who had been excluded from
the KSS for participating in the so‑called revitalization process in 1968 were actively
involved in opposition activities against the normalization regime. In contrast to the
Czech lands, no so‑called Eurocommunist or socialist current was introduced in the
first half of the 1970s. At the same time, such a current played an important role
in the Czech lands in formulating political demands and the concepts of dissent.68
This was evidently because the respective communist and socialist traditions were
not deeply rooted in Slovak political culture. Even the spread of the left‑wing and
socialist samizdat was more down to individuals (e.g. Viliam Ciklamíni69), and no
significant political‑samizdat activities were recorded in the reformist communist
environment until 1988. A. Dubček was mainly involved at the individual level, did
not participate in the preparation or signing of Charter 77, and had only sporadic
contacts with dissidents.70
A wealth of myths and speculations have been linked to the activities of the group
of communist officials who were expelled from the Communist Party after 1969.
I think that, on the one hand, it is necessary to refrain from questioning their oppo‑
sitional positions, since, in their magazine Myšlienka a čin (Thought and Action), de‑
spite its limited scope, they also called for free elections71 to be held during the debate
on the future constitution of the ČSSR; while on the other hand, their role in politi‑
cal life after November 1989 tends to be exaggerated or even demonized. In contrast
67
68
69
70
71
100
the codename “Magister.” His documentation was lodged in the archive until December 3, 1989. He
was utilized in efforts to counter “the right.” Registration protocols of State Security agency and
operation unions, Bratislava – see http://www.upn.gov.sk (quoted version dated 28. 3. 2020).
LALUHA, Ivan: Alexander Dubček a november 1989. In: LALUHA, Ivan – UHER, Ján (eds.): Cesty
k novembru 1989, pp. 28–29.
OTÁHAL, Milan: Opozice, moc, společnost 1969/1989, pp. 20–30.
AUTRATA, Oto: Poznámky k vzniku Klubu Obroda Slovenska, p. 87.
See: KUSÝ, Miroslav: Stretnutia s Alexandrom Dubčekom. OS, 1998, Vol. 8, p. 71; LALUHA, Ivan –
UHER, Ján (eds.): Cesty k novembru 1989.
Pravdou práva k právu pravdy. K pripravovanej Ústave ČSSR: In: Myšlienka a čin, 1989, No. 21, samiz‑
dat. (Materials from the private archive of Ivan Laluha, to whom the author extends his gratitude for
providing access).
to the Czech lands, in Slovakia the Club for the Revival of Slovakia (Klub Obroda
Slovenska) was formed after the fall of the communist regime. Unlike the Czech Club
for the Socialist Reconstruction Obroda (Klub za socialistickou přestavbu Obroda),
the members of the Obroda club in Slovakia did not define their goals as political.
With the exception of its chairman Ivan Laluha, who was the only member of the
Club for the Revival of Slovakia in the Federal Assembly after the 1990 elections, and
of course the chairman of the Federal Assembly, Alexander Dubček (1990–1992), the
former prominent reform communists of the 1960s did not join this organization
or identify themselves as its affiliates. This was also true of A. Dubček’s closest as‑
sociates, for example, Hvezdoň Kočtúch, who joined the VPN as an individual. The
seemingly milder course of normalization in Slovakia meant that people persecuted
for their beliefs by the normalization purges of the 1960s did not make up a compact
generational group with a common feeling or similar fates, i.e. one able to formulate
a common platform of opinion. It was as if this had somehow been confirmed by
the fact that the translation of the Czech term “the 68ers” (osmašedesátníci) into
Slovak as šesťdesiatosmičkári sounds rather violent and is not even used in the lan‑
guage. Nevertheless, it is possible that such a platform might not have had much of
a chance even in different circumstances, as the KSS membership and functionary
base had been recruited since the 1950s. This generation in Slovakia was not able
to create a common opinion platform even after 1989. They were primarily linked
together by group solidarity and efforts to rehabilitate themselves, which of course
waned very rapidly. All of the members of the KSS expelled after 1968 ended up in all
the relevant political factions, often ones completely opposed to each other. On the
other hand, a large number of the Czech protagonists of the events of 1968 and rep‑
resentatives of the revival club in the early 1990s defined their political orientation as
social democratic and strengthened the councils of the more formidable Czech Social
Democratic Party (Česká strana sociálně demokratická, ČSSD). Although the former
reform communists of 1968 were part of the opposition to the normalization regime,
their mobilization came relatively late and they did not succeed in creating a political
platform with any significant public impact until the regime fell in November 1989.
Among the alternative groups, Ján Čarnogurský was the second important fig‑
ure to reflect on the political dimensions and to consider the creation of a Christian
democratic formation.72 In 1988, he also announced his intentions of doing so in
the samizdat publication Bratislavské listy. He began with a radical negation of com‑
munism when he declared that communism historically arose from anti‑Christian positions
and still holds fast to them. Its practical application in Central and Eastern Europe has been
disastrous. Not only has it left behind millions of dead, but also the relative decline of the coun‑
tries of Central and Eastern Europe when compared to other parts of the world, including the
so‑called Third World […] one day communism will die out, and with it the current division of
Europe.73 Finally, the third important potential actor in the liberalization of the re‑
gime, which no longer considered civic but rather political dimensions, was the afore‑
72
73
ČARNOGURSKÝ, Ján: Cestami KDH, p. 5.
ČARNOGURSKÝ, Ján: Videné od Dunaja. Kalligram, Bratislava 1997, p. 66.
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mentioned group of young workers of the Institute for Marxism‑Leninism and other
reform‑oriented members of the KSS. Opposition‑oriented circles of the Hungarian
minority were partially prepared for the political changes. This is evidenced by their
political documents from 1988–1989, in particular the Memorandum Maďarov žijúcich
v Československu74 (Memorandum of Hungarians Living in Czechoslovakia) published
to mark the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic,
which, in the Slovak context, was the first to openly mention the need to change the
political system rather than reform it and to include Czechoslovakia in the processes
of European integration.
There were attempts, however, to develop a common program of the emerging
anti‑regime opposition. These were made by people from unofficial structures and
from the KSS establishment. The attempt to develop this program, which was to be
based on the concept of the “Czechoslovak path to socialism based on the democrat‑
ic and social traditions of our country,” was initiated by Boris Zala.75 His political
program entitled Základy politickej reformy a humanizácie slovenskej spoločnosti (Minimál‑
ny program) (Foundations of the Political Reform and Humanization of Slovak So‑
ciety /A Minimal Program/) envisaged the National Front (Národný front, NF) as
a possible platform for the pluralization of public life.76 It presupposed that some
opposition‑oriented figures in the KSS would also cooperate with the individual
components of the opposition. Work on this program lasted from August to early
November 1989 and was actually shared by different representatives of the opposi‑
tion or people in “official structures” who were gravitating toward the opposition
(e.g. Jozef Kučerák, Vladimír Ondruš, František Mikloško, László Nagy). Zala con‑
sulted, amongst others, Fedor Gál, Ján Budaj, Ján Uher, Peter Zajac, Milan Šimečka
Sr., Ján Langoš, as well as some members of the communist establishment, like Peter
Weiss, Pavol Kanis, Milan Čič, Vladimír Mináč, and others. This attempt at prospec‑
tive joint action with disgruntled representatives of the communist elites failed in
mid‑November 1989, i.e. on the eve of the political break.77 Other attempts concerned
the elaboration of a common position on the draft principles of the new constitution
of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, which involved, among others, Ján Langoš.78
Similar activities in Slovakia did not necessarily seem unrealistic, with regard to the
74
75
76
102
77
78
Memorandum Maďarov v Československu 1988, 20. 10. 1988. Document No. 34. In: ŽATKULIAK,
Jozef – HLAVOVÁ, Viera – SEDLIAKOVÁ, Alžbeta – ŠTEFANSKÝ, Michal (eds.): November 1989 a Slo‑
vensko, pp. 254–256.
ZALA, Boris: Čo sme to vlastne žili a ako z toho von. In: ZALA, Boris: Cesty k demokracii. Print‑Servis,
Bratislava 1993, p. 12.
The National Front was established in 1945 as an association of all the legally functioning polit‑
ical parties in Czechoslovakia (the KSČ, KSS, the People’s Party, the Social Democratic Party, the
National‑Socialist Party, the Democratic Party, and from 1946 also the Freedom Party and the Work
Party). After the communist coup in 1948, the main role in the National Front was gained by the KSČ
and more social organizations became its members. After the fall of communism in February 1990, it
ceased to exist.
See also ŽIAK, Miloš: Slovensko: od komunizmu kam?, pp. 20–28.
KUSÝ, Miroslav: Ľudské práva a slobody v období rokov 1968–1989, p. 218; ZALA, Boris: Čo sme to vlastne
žili a ako z toho von, pp. 9–13.
SNR deputies’ reservations concerning the draft of the common constitution for the
federal Czechoslovakia and the national republics (the so‑called trojústava79) (tri‑
‑constitution). These attempts were neutralized, though, by the developments that
followed the arrest of the so‑called Bratislava Five in August 1989 and the inability
of the critically oriented groups or individuals in the KSS to resist the leadership of
the Party. Nevertheless, the sheer existence of this attempt and the communication
between the progressive minds in the Party leadership and the representatives of the
unofficial structures is remarkable. Zala apparently rightly believes that similar con‑
tacts between the opposition and the communist elites would not have been possible
in the Czech lands.80 This suggests that in 1989 Slovak society had the potential to
achieve a broader political consensus on the need for political change. However, if
this scenario had been successfully implemented, systemic changes would have been
slower. Before November 1989, however, there had been no discussion either in the
opposition or within the establishment about what steps needed to be taken in the
context of the ongoing political changes, not to how to proceed the “day after” the
political change. All the important players were counting on more or less gradual
changes. Until August 1989, the circle of Dubček sympathizers relied on impulses
from the processes in the official power structures.
The lack of program debates before November 1989 and the weakness of the
clearly politically oriented forces in the Slovak opposition meant that the VPN was
not perceived as a political party until the first months of spring 1990. It tried to
proceed in acting as a citizens’ initiative or conglomerate of such initiatives, without
a solid membership base or a clear definition of responsibilities. This was also reflect‑
ed in its contradictory steps in the process of taking power from the communists.
On one hand, on December 12, 1989, when the Slovak Government for National
Understanding (Slovenská vláda národného porozumenia) was established under the
leadership of the then Minister of Justice Milan Čič81 (a member of the KSS), the VPN
declared its support for the eleven new ministers, but it stated that the only person
representing its Coordination Center (Koordinačné centrum) in the government was
Vladimír Ondruš.82 At the same time, it gradually co‑opted its deputies for the Slo‑
vak Parliament, although it was more welcoming to existing parties that had been
active within the National Front and to newly formed parties in co‑options than the
79
80
81
82
ŽATKULIAK, Jozef: Spory o novú ústavu česko‑slovenskej federácie v druhej polovici 80. rokov
XX. storočia. Historický časopis, 2008, Vol. 56, No. 1, pp. 161–190.
ZALA, Boris: Čo sme to vlastne žili a ako z toho von, p. 12.
Milan Čič (1932–2012) was a Slovak lawyer and politician. In 1988–1989 he served as Minister of
Justice in the Government of the Slovak Socialist Republic, in 1989–1990 he was appointed Prime
Minister of the Government of National Understanding of Slovakia. In 1990 he left the Commu‑
nist Party of Slovakia; in 1990–1992 he was a deputy of the Federal Assembly of Czechoslovakia
from Public Against Violence, in 1991 he joined the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Hnutie za
demokratické Slovensko, HZDS) established by Vladimír Mečiar. In 1992, he coordinated the work of
an expert team preparing the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. In 1993–2000, he served as Chair‑
man of the Constitutional Court (Ústavní soud) of the Slovak Republic; in 2000 he participated in
the foundation of the short‑lived Party of the Democratic Centre (later only “Centre”).
KUBÍN, Ľuboš: Rola politických elít pri zmene režimu, p. 62.
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Civic Forum in the Czech lands was. It was only after Ján Budaj’s attempt to become
chairman of the SNR in March 1990 that the VPN openly assumed the responsibil‑
ity of the government and parliament. The “apolitical” character of the VPN, which
was caused by the specific formation of the new Slovak elites in November 1989, had
a clear impact on its future form. Some of its protagonists (e.g. Peter Zajac) admitted
that until its end in November 1992 it remained halfway between being an NGO and
a political party.83 However, its unpreparedness to take political responsibility was
not just a problem for the VPN. The non‑communist parties of the National Front
(the Freedom Party /Strana slobody/; the Party of Slovak Revival /Strana slovenskej
obrody/, renamed the Democratic Party /Demokratická strana/) were unable to dele‑
gate their members to the Slovak government of “national understanding” for several
weeks, even though they had ministerial posts reserved in it.
The programming deficit in the political opposition in Slovakia continued after
November 1989. Until the pre‑election campaign in June 1990, when the VPN adopt‑
ed the Šanca pre Slovensko (Chance for Slovakia) program, the only counterpart to the
rather large Civic Forum program Co chceme (What We Want)84 was the resolution en‑
titled 12 bodov spoločného programu VPN a štrajkujúcich vysokoškolákov (Twelve Points of
the Common Program of the VPN and the Striking Students).85 Although, according
to Czech historian Vilém Prečan, this document does not fall short of the Civic Forum
documents in terms of the nature of its defined political objectives,86 the difference in
the degree of sophistication of the two documents, which were published around the
same time, is visible to the naked eye. A comparison of the two confirms the opinion
of Slovak political scientist Soňa Szomolányi on the lack of a systemic concept of change.87
According to Slovak historian Ľubomír Lipták, the content of the democratic revolution
was realized in an improvised way, not as the result of a dispute of concepts, but
only as the result of a dispute of opinions.88 This also explains the views of some of
the key players of November 1989, who in their first statements declared themselves
to be supporters of left‑wing values, ordinary communists or social democrats, but
who later became anchored in conservative or liberal oriented formations (e.g. Soňa
83
84
85
86
104
87
88
VPN 1989–1991. Svedectvá a dokumenty, p. 88. From the summer of 1991 the VPN had acted under the
name of the Civic Democratic Union – Public Against Violence (Občianska demokratická únia – Verej‑
nosť proti násiliu), and following 1992 simply as the Civic Democratic Union.
Co chceme. Programové zásady Občanského fóra, 26. listopad 1989, 18.00 hod., Praha; Programo‑
vé prohlášení Občanského fóra Co chceme. In: Demokratická revoluce 1989. Dokumenty OF z listopadu
a prosince 1989, Document No. 18; see http://www.89.usd.cas.cz/cs/dokumenty/26.html (quoted ver‑
sion dated 28. 3. 2020).
Programové vyhlásenie občianskej iniciatívy VPN a Koordinačného výboru slovenských vysokých škôl,
25. 11. 1989. Document No. 87. In: ŽATKULIAK, Jozef – HLAVOVÁ, Viera – SEDLIAKOVÁ, Alžbeta –
ŠTEFANSKÝ, Michal (eds.): November 1989 a Slovensko, p. 358.
Like the Civic Forum, the VPN defined its primary goals in November 1989 as the balancing out of all
forms of ownership, instating free elections, protecting the freedoms of press, public demonstration,
assembly, movement, and conducting business, as well as eliminating the leading roles of the KSČ,
ensuring a free and independent justice system, and ridding the school system and world of culture of
ideology. Ibidem.
VPN 1989–1991. Svedectvá a dokumenty, p. 17.
LIPTÁK, Ľubomír: Miesto novembra 1989 v moderných slovenských dejinách, p. 27.
Szomolányi, Peter Zajac, Vladimír Ondruš).89 However, Slovak politics of the 1990s
or the first years of the 21st century also remained at this level, which is particularly
reflected in the character of the political party system in Slovakia. It is typified by the
fact that political parties do not form on the basis of the associated voters and their
values or support for particular agendas, but rather based on personnel, specificity,
or a devotion to certain symbols.
Socialism, and then What?
In the years 1988–1989 the word “socialism” was consistently phased out of the vo‑
cabularies of independent initiatives, or rather it was treated with skepticism. Neither
Ján Čarnogurský with his non‑socialist program nor Miroslav Kusý, who at the end
of the 1980s still advocated Marxism as a tool for thought90 and a model of self‑
‑governing socialism,91 any longer assumed the communist system to be reforma‑
ble: The currents of opposition no longer function here within the establishment, but outside
of it (1988).92 Socialism was perceived as an empty phenomenon. In the minds of
dissidents, real socialism was synonymous with absurdity, a dead end in which the
original socialist postulates were impossible to develop.93 The system of real socialism
was seen as a system that must be rejected at its very foundations. Thus, according to
Kusý, for example, when one is resigned to error and deformation, what […] remains
for us more or less intact is only the original socialist dream, albeit a devalued one. Neither
Stalinist nor real socialism was the way to achieve this; the question is only whether the
original noble socialist dream is worth anything to anyone at all.94 Milan Šimečka argued in
a similar vein that any deeper reform ultimately always raises the question of the basis of the
entire political system, which means the question of what the leading role of the [communist]
party is to be in this form, in which it is anchored in Soviet practice.95
Milan Šimečka also mulled over the term “socialism” in a polemic with Peter Uhl
when founding the Movement for Civic Freedom. He refused to use this term because,
in his words, it was written into the history of our century first and foremost by means of the
Russian Revolution. Its entire role in our century derives from its realization, from the one we
have had here, for so far there has been no other. Šimečka argued for doing away with terms
like right or left, but also the impossibility of returning to the concept of a hybrid of
two different European experiences. On the contrary, he posited the collapse of com‑
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
ZALA, Boris: Ľavý disent. Mocenské pomery v kontexte novembra 1989. In: LALUHA, Ivan – UHER,
Ján (eds.): Cesty k novembru 1989, p. 131.
KUSÝ, Miroslav: Byť marxistom v Československu. In: KUSÝ, Miroslav (ed): Eseje. Archa, Bratislava
1991, pp. 136–143.
KUSÝ, Miroslav: Etatistický či samosprávny socializmus? In: KUSÝ, Miroslav (ed): Eseje, pp. 210–219.
KUSÝ, Miroslav: Inštitucionálna revolúcia po dvadsiatich rokoch. In: KUSÝ, Miroslav (ed): Eseje,
p. 227.
KUSÝ, Miroslav: Veľký brat a veľká sestra. In: KUSÝ, Miroslav (ed): Eseje, p. 86.
KUSÝ, Miroslav: Kozoturiáda. In: KUSÝ, Miroslav – ŠIMEČKA, Milan: Veľký brat a veľká sestra,
pp. 107–198.
ŠIMEČKA, Milan: Ztráta skutečnosti. In: KUSÝ, Miroslav – ŠIMEČKA, Milan: Veľký brat a veľká sestra,
p. 178.
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munism and defined European integration as a central challenge that Czechoslovakia
could not face without the support of the West.96 These already older reflections by
M. Kusý and M. Šimečka in the context of the so‑called civic dissent in Slovakia did
not, however, lead to the formulation of any political program of its own.
At the same time, neither the openly anti‑communist program of Ján Čarnogur‑
ský, nor the relevant anti‑communist opposition documents prior to November
1989, not to mention the first program documents of the Civic Forum and Public
Against Violence, contained a program for the privatization or liquidation of the
welfare state. The opinion of the Canadian historian James Krapfl that most of the
popular statements on devotion to socialism were sincere, supported by several citations
from statements by students and VPN actors,97 is also confirmed by the opinion polls
conducted in November (23–24) and December (9–12) 1989 by the Prague Institute
for Public Opinion Research (Ústav pro výzkum veřejného mínění, ÚVVM). In both
polls, only three percent of the respondents voted for the capitalist path of develop‑
ment, while the socialist path was favored by 45 or 41 percent of respondents, respec‑
tively. The dominant segment of society supported the alternative of a “third way”
(i.e. a model combining the characteristics of socialism and capitalism) – 47 and 52
percent.98 Thus, democratic demands were not automatically linked to the establish‑
ment of a market economy.
The Linking of “Islands of Positive Deviation”99
Before November 1989, the individual opponents of the regime communicated with
each other only minimally. The first major meeting of people from unofficial struc‑
tures and critically oriented intellectuals who had not previously been involved in dis‑
sent took place on November 10, 1989 at the initiative of the Bratislava environmen‑
tal activists. In 1988 and 1989 unsuccessful attempts were made to create a common
platform between the Slovak dissent and the oppositional Hungarian minority. The
first “official” Slovak‑Hungarian meeting on the common approach of the opposi‑
tion circles in Slovakia and ideas for further political development in Czechoslovakia
did not take place until October 1989, after the release of Miroslav Kusý from prison.
This was due to the emergence of the younger, liberally oriented generation grouped
around Károly Tóth and László Öllős in the Hungarian minority environment, when
some of the Hungarian minority activists joined protests against the imprisonment
of the so‑called Bratislava Five.100
96
97
98
106
99
Document No. 40. The polemical essay by Milan Šimečka titled “Matoucí socialismus (Odpověď Petrovi
Uhlovi)” (Confusing Socialism /An Answer to Petr Uhl/), in which he responds to criticism of the mani‑
festo of the Movement for Civic Freedom. Prague, April 1989. In: HLUŠIČKOVÁ, Růžena – CÍSAŘOVSKÁ,
Blanka (eds.): Hnutí za občanskou Svobodu. Dokumenty. ÚSD AV ČR – Maxdorf, Prague 1994, p. 120.
KRAPFL, James: Revolúcia s ľudskou tvárou. Politika, kultúra a spoločenstvo v Československu po 17. novembri
1989. Kalligram, Bratislava 2009, pp. 130–131.
VANĚK, Miroslav: Veřejné mínění o socialismu před 17. listopadem 1989. ÚSD AV ČR – Maxdorf, Prague
1994, p. 56
BÚTORA, Martin: Vyvzdorúvanie alebo každodennosť pozitívnych deviantov. In: BÚTORA,
Martin (ed.): Odklínanie. Kalligram, Bratislava 2004, pp. 181–193.
In Slovakia, as in the Czech lands, the opposition was united and transformed
into a counter‑elite by linking different currents and groups, so‑called “islands of
positive deviation” in an unexpected way: “at one go”,101 so to speak, by exploiting
the “emotionally charged moment”.102 What was different from the situation in the
Czech lands, however, was that similar first attempts had already taken place there
and communication within the opposition was much stronger. One of the first such
attempts was the foundation of the Movement for Civic Freedom in October 1988,
which was not only an attempt to unify the democratic opposition organizationally,
but also set out the basic principles of a pluralistic democratic society in its Demokra‑
cie pro všechny (Democracy for All) manifesto.
Unlike in the Czech lands, we cannot talk about the acceleration of political de‑
velopment in Slovakia in connection with the establishment of the Movement for
Civic Freedom and its Democracy for All manifesto. A mere 15 people attended the
first meeting of the supporters of the Movement for Civic Freedom in Bratislava on
November 11, 1988,103 which certainly did not signify the overcoming of the politi‑
cal stagnation in Slovakia that followed the suppression of the so‑called Candlelight
demonstration in March 1988. Even in spring (April–May) 1989 the petition among
academics for the release of Václav Havel from prison did not meet with any signifi‑
cant success in Slovakia. Only 24 signatures were collected. None of the employees of
the historical institutes of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (Slovenská akadémia vied,
SAV) or at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the SAV joined the petition.104
The impetus to speed up the unification processes in the fragmented Slovak op‑
position was the arrest and trial of members of the so‑called Bratislava Five. This
triggered the activation of intellectuals, but also other people from the so‑called grey
zone, i.e. people who were critical of the ruling regime but who were not yet prepared
to actively oppose it. In September 1989, a group of 14 sociologists, including SAV
employees, sent a letter to the President of Czechoslovakia, Gustav Husák, asking him
to release the five Slovak dissidents arrested in August.105 The trial of the Bratislava
Five led to the emancipation of the emerging civil society from the official structures
100
101
102
103
104
105
The Trial of the So‑called Bratislava Five. Documents and recordings from Radio Free Europe. Per‑
sonal archive of Vladimír Maňák Jr. See also JAŠEK, Peter: Posledný politický proces komunistického
režimu na Slovensku. Perzekúcie členov bratislavskej päťky na jeseň 1989. Pamäť národa, 2014, Vol. 10.,
No. 3, pp. 33–59; MARUŠIAK, Juraj: Bratislavská päťka. Prejav agónie komunistického režimu.
In: BYSTRICKÝ, Valerián – ROGUĽOVÁ, Jaroslava et al: Storočie procesov. Súdy, politika a spoločnosť
v moderných dejinách Slovenska. Veda, Bratislava 2013, pp. 241–258.
SZOMOLÁNYI, Soňa: November 1989 – otvorenie kľukatej cesty k demokracii. In: PEŠEK, Jan – SZO‑
MOLÁNYI, Soňa (eds.): November 1989 na Slovensku, p. 102
VPN 1989–1991. Svedectvá a dokumenty, p. 36, presentation of S. Szomolányi.
Ján Čarnogurský’s information on the first meeting of the Movement for Civic Freedom’s members
in Bratislava. Document No. 35, following November 11, 1988. In: ŽATKULIAK, Jozef – HLAVOVÁ,
Viera – SEDLIAKOVÁ, Alžbeta – ŠTEFANSKÝ, Michal (eds.): November 1989 a Slovensko, p. 257.
OTÁHAL, Milan: Podíl tvůrčí inteligence na pádu komunismu. Kruh nezávislé inteligence. Doplněk, Brno
1999, p. 75.
Letter to the President of Czechoslovak Socialist Republic from Slovak sociologists. Document
No. 53, 7. 9. 1989. In: ŽATKULIAK, Jozef – HLAVOVÁ, Viera – SEDLIAKOVÁ, Alžbeta – ŠTEFANSKÝ,
Michal (eds.): November 1989 a Slovensko, pp. 302–303.
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of the communist regime and its integration regardless of political convictions. With
a certain degree of hyperbole, this process can be compared to the importance of the
trial against The Plastic People of the Universe106 for the independent initiatives in
the Czech lands, as it integrated various, often contradictory currents of the oppo‑
sition, which was the origin of the Declaration of Charter 77 (Prohlášení Charty 77).
Although in this respect the petition was somewhat analogous to the publication
of the original Declaration of Charter 77, unlike in the Czech lands, this process had
still not been completed in the autumn of 1989. At that time, M. Šimečka said now
we have to go up against the communists, not along with them107; however, the very day after
the declaration of the VPN was first announced, the Vyhlásenie radových komunistov108
(Statement of Ordinary Communists) was made public, with the aim of attracting or
at least neutralizing KSS members. However, unlike in Slovakia, there was no need to
issue a similar special declaration in the Czech lands. In fact, by then the KSČ mem‑
bers participating in the Civic Forum no longer felt connected to their party.
Historical and Social Expectations of Change in 1989
In addition to the power elites and opposition forces, the third actor – the public
itself – cannot be overlooked. The rise of communism caught Slovakia at a time when
civil society and its institutions were not consolidated. Society’s ability to organize
itself was far weaker than in the Czech lands, which enabled the communist party to
take control relatively quickly, although there was much less spontaneous support
for communism in Slovakia in the 1940s than in its Czech counterpart. This was
also confirmed by the results of the last free parliamentary elections before the rise
of communism in 1946. More than fifty years of undemocratic development (from
1938), even after brief pauses of political thaw, only exacerbated the atomization of
society. As in 1968, in the 1980s and 1990s public pressure to respect human rights
and carry out democratic reforms was much weaker than in the Czech lands. On
the other hand, Slovak society benefited from the positive consequences of the so‑
cial measures of the normalization regime in a much more extensive and beneficial
way, due to its different economic development (the predominant rural character of
the country, the industrialization processes after 1948) and demographic situation
(higher birth rate, lower average age of the population). Due to the way the com‑
106
108
107
108
The Plastic People of the Universe is a Czech underground band. Formed in 1968, starting in 1970
its performances began to be increasingly restricted. In 1976 all of its members were arrested and
faced charges of disorderly conduct. In September 1976 the artistic heads of the band, Ivan Martin
Jirous and saxophonist Vrastislav Brabenec, had criminal charges brought against them. The trial
against the band’s members contributed to the integration of the hitherto fragmented circles of
Czech independent intellectuals and led to the preparation of the introduction to the declaration of
Charter 77. For more details see BOLTON, Jonathan: Worlds of Dissent. Charter 77, The Plastic People of
the Universe, and Czech Culture Under Communism. Cambridge – London, Harvard University Press 2012,
pp. 115–151.
SZOMOLÁNYI, Soňa: Kľukatá cesta Slovenska k demokracii, p. 30.
Vyhlásenie radových komunistov. Document No. 74, 21. 11. 1989. In: ŽATKULIAK, Jozef – HLAVOVÁ,
Viera – SEDLIAKOVÁ, Alžbeta – ŠTEFANSKÝ, Michal (eds.): November 1989 a Slovensko, p. 336.
munist elites after 1948 were constituted, the communist regime was able to rely
far more on strong social ties created on the basis of familial, regional, professional,
interpersonal, and religious affiliation than in the Czech lands. It was these ties that
made it possible to attenuate the adverse impact of the communist regime’s repres‑
sive policies while alleviating the population’s dissatisfaction with the regime. There‑
fore, they ultimately acted as a stabilizing factor and their presence was tolerated by
the normalization regime.
The younger character of the Slovak communist elites, a significant part of which,
especially at the middle and lower levels, was instated after the installation of the mo‑
nopoly of power, only added to the growth of cynicism in Slovak society, though they
exhibited a more pragmatic and less ideological attitude, for example, during the nor‑
malization purges. The existence of these social networks109 was not only an impor‑
tant element of the pre‑1989 Slovak political system, but also played an important
role in shaping the elites after November. Their existence was often a more important
factor in the formation of important political parties than the values and orientation
of their founders. This was the case, for example, with the VPN, during the creation
of which the personal friendships of its founders from the past undoubtedly played
a sizable role and vice versa; many intellectuals later became opposed to the move‑
ment due to past personal and other grudges that they held against its members.
The beginning of normalization, which coincided with the establishment of the
Czechoslovak Federation, offered the Slovak elites the prospect of power and social
advancement, as well as the creation of new opportunities to work in state adminis‑
tration, education, culture, academia, etc.110 A unique phenomenon of the normal‑
ization regime in the ideological sphere was a specific defensive and conservative,
strongly anti‑West oriented nationalism. Its aim was to reconcile modernization
processes with communist ideology and national traditions and thus legitimize the
communist regime.
The ideology of this practically ahistorical nationalism was formulated by
Vladimír Mináč foremost in his essays Tu žije národ (Here Lives the Nation) and Dúcha‑
nie do pahrieb (Fanning the Embers). The communist regime placed great emphasis on
rural and anti‑Western moments in Slovak history, culture, and art, as well as on Slav‑
ic and Russophile traditions, which led to the paradoxical symbiosis of communist
ideology and the tradition of conservative currents in Slovak thought. This peculiar
symbiosis also influenced the form of Slovak nationalism after 1989. Mináč’s work
deserves attention for his thesis on the Slovak nation as a plebeian nation,111 one with
no history of its own, and on the basis of which phenomena found not to be in line
with the communist interpretation of history could be classified as not Slovak or
109
110
111
KUSÁ, Zuzana: Buržoázny pôvod – neprekonateľná stigma? OS, 1998, No. 10, pp. 32–36.
For closer analysis see MARUŠIAK, Juraj: Slovenská spoločnosť a normalizácia. OS, January–February
2002, No. 1–2, pp. 11–24; KALINOVÁ, Lenka: K sociálním dějinám Československa v letech 1968–1989.
VŠE, Prague 1999; KAPLAN, Karel: Sociální souvislosti krizí komunistického režimu 1953–1957 a 1968–
1975. ÚSD AV ČR, Prague 1993.
MINÁČ, Vladimír: Dúchanie do pahrieb. Smena, Bratislava 1970.
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Juraj Marušiak
even outright anti‑Slovak. This made it possible to identify and bring together the
terms “Slovak” and “communist”.
Especially in its normalization phase, the communist regime strove to take advan‑
tage of conservative positions, e.g. skepticism towards change, but also the emphasis
on the family, which is common for a large part of Slovak society. Slovak society
of the “normalization” and post‑communist years was characterised by a decidedly
ambivalent attitude towards the normalization regime and the weak anchoring of
democratic traditions in the political consciousness of the population on the one
hand, and a strong rooting of the tradition of political collectivism, statism, and
paternalism, on the other.112 This tradition in Slovak society dates back as far as the
19th century, but communism was able to effectively exploit this for its own benefit
and become part of the Slovak political tradition.
Concerns about the changes were reinforced by Slovakia’s unsatisfactory eco‑
nomic structure, which was based on a preference for heavy industry and arma‑
ments, but also guaranteed the significant material growth of Slovak society in the
1970s and 1980s. Awareness of the vulnerability of this economic structure was al‑
ready evident in connection with the implementation of the agreements adopted
during the Third Follow‑up Meeting of representatives of the states participating
at the Conference on Security and Co‑operation in Europe (1986–1989) in Vienna,
which counted on a reduction in arms production, following which the Federal Gov‑
ernment of Czechoslovakia issued Resolution 84/88 dated June 26, 1988 to phase
down the production of arms and transform the facilities to civil production. Last
but not least, the specific course of normalization with milder repression in Slovakia
led to far broader segments of society being integrated into the communist regime
in Slovakia than in the Czech lands. As a result, the opposition in Slovakia did not
have such a social background or such a broad spectrum of potential supporters as
in the Czech lands, which is why opposition activities were, in reality, limited to an
individual basis until 1988.
Another challenge of 1989 was the unfinished process of Slovak national eman‑
cipation and national integration.113 This was hindered by a lack of the free exchange
of information. In fact, in many respects, Slovak society had just entered the phase
of modern society and was characterized by considerable fragmentation and regional
differentiation. There was no communication between the individual regions of Slo‑
vakia. In this way, the Košice and the Bratislava artistic underground came to know
of each other’s activities by staying in contact with the centers of alternative culture
in the Czech lands, especially Prague. This lack of communication was responsible
for the fact that in the first days of the Velvet Revolution (Sametová revoluce) the
Civic Forum was established in Košice and in several cities in eastern Slovakia instead
of the VPN. The regional principle continued to play an important role in political
differentiation also after 1989, as evidenced by the results of the parliamentary elec‑
tions, which show that several political parties had a stable background in particular
112
113
SZOMOLÁNYI, Soňa: Kľukatá cesta Slovenska k demokracii, p. 46.
Ibid., p. 13.
regions. Although the issues of human rights and democracy were some of the im‑
portant topics in the internal political discourse of Slovak society in 1989, they were
neither the only, or, at the beginning, the key issue.
An important question that partially united the official elite and the opposition,
in addition to the aforementioned Slovak‑Hungarian relations, was the question of
Slovakia’s position in the federation. This issue came to life especially after the offi‑
cial celebration of the anniversary of the establishment of the first Czechoslovakia
in autumn 1988, but also in connection with the publication of the draft of the new
constitution of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. At the meeting of the Slovak
Parliament on October 31, 1989, SNR deputies expressed their opposition to a con‑
stitutional law on the process of adopting a new constitution of the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic, which was devised to regulate all the basic relations between the
federation and the national republics in a single constitutional document. The MPs
adopted the law under threat of party sanctions.114 The adoption of the constitutions
of the national republics was one of the unfulfilled ambitions of the Slovak repre‑
sentatives from the period of the federalization of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Although
the Constitutional Act of the Czechoslovak Federation No. 143/1968 Coll. assumed
this step would be taken, it was not fulfilled until 1989. For the Czech public, the
issue of the republics’ constitutions was not pressing because it considered the estab‑
lishment of the Czechoslovak state in 1918 to be the fulfillment of its constitutional
ambitions, whereas it was an important issue for the Slovak public. Therefore, the
adoption of a so‑called tri‑constitution (trojjediná ústava), which would also regulate
the situation of the national republics, was considered to be a repeated withdrawal
from the original principles of the Czechoslovak Federation in 1968 by the Slovak
communists as well.
When the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
Miloš Jakeš presented a draft of the principles of the new Czechoslovak constitution,
he did not forgo a change in state symbolism; several articles were published in the
Slovak press, especially in Literárny týždenník and Nové slovo, requiring the restoration
of Slovak national symbols. Dissatisfaction with Slovakia’s position in the federation
was also manifested to some extent in the official press. In January 1989, in a discus‑
sion held in the Literárny týždenník devoted to the 70th anniversary of the establish‑
ment of Czechoslovakia, Pavol Kanis did not rule out the future establishment of
an independent Slovakia and he claimed the right to a state as “a nation’s natural
right”. The other participants in the discussion did not oppose this argument. The
link between the reform of the Czechoslovak federation and democratization was
also stressed by Vladimír Mináč (There will be no democratic Czechoslovakia without the ex‑
act functioning of the federation) and Ľubomír Feldek (There is no democracy without federa‑
tion or federation without democracy115). Nevertheless, the increasing political diversity of
Slovak intellectuals was reflected in this debate. When Ľ. Feldek, who was a member
114
115
ŽATKULIAK, Jozef: Spory o novú ústavu.
Slováci vo federácii. Beseda Literárneho týždenníka k 20. výročiu vzniku federácie. Literárny týždenník,
1989, Vol. 2, No. 3 (20. 1. 1989), pp. 12–14.
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of the Communist Party until 1989, but who had gradually fallen into conflict with
its leadership and published several statements criticizing it, openly linked the defor‑
mation of the federation with the events of August 1968, the supporter of the uncom‑
promising national line Mináč rejected his thesis. On the other hand, the historian
Plevza raised the issue of the national constitutions; another writer, Peter Jaroš, also
a member of the Communist Party, not only criticized the lack of constitutions of
the national republics, but also spoke about the need to legalize informal groups: We,
too, should overcome in ourselves not only the fear of Stalin but also the fear of Novotny’s time
and perhaps of later eras.116
On the other hand, the oppositional circles, but also the democratically oriented
intellectuals operating within the “official” structures, were discussing the link be‑
tween the struggle for national rights and democratic demands. Ján Čarnogurský and
Hana Ponická contributed to this discourse during the commemoration of the 70th
anniversary of the death of General Milan Rastislav Štefánik117 on May 7, 1989.118
Likewise, however, the signatories of the Vyhlásenie k deportáciám Židov zo Slovenska
during the Second World War had previously stated that anti‑Jewish measures and espe‑
cially the displacement of the Jews from Slovakia were against the principles that we would like to
think necessary for the creation of the Slovak future: equality of all regardless of race, tolerance,
religious freedom, democracy, legitimacy, love between people.119 The declaration did not,
however, mention the existence of Czechoslovakia.
Ecology was also a subject of public debate, which resulted from the role played
by the environmental movement in uniting the political opposition. Questions about
the democratic changes themselves began to emerge later than in the Czech lands.
After members of the so‑called Bratislava Five were arrested in August 1989, they
came to the fore. A comparison of the student demonstration in Bratislava on No‑
vember 16, and the demonstration that took place the day after in Prague might
serve to illustrate the different forms of public discourse in Slovakia and the Czech
lands. While the students from Prague clearly called for the “end of the one‑party
government” on their banners, their counterparts in Bratislava were found hesitant
to formulate clear political demands. Incidentally, the fact that the unauthorized
116
117
118
119
112
Slováci vo federácii. Beseda Literárneho týždenníka k 20. výročiu vzniku federácie – pokračovanie.
Literárny týždenník, 1989, Vol. 2, No. 4 (27. 1. 1989), pp. 12–13. Antonín Novotný (1904–1975) was the
first secretary of the Central Committee of the KSČ (1953–1968) and the President of Czechoslovakia
(1957–1968). Before 1963 he had rejected the politics of de‑Stalinization and enforced repressive pol‑
itics. Public life was later liberalized, but meanwhile Novotný tried to strengthen his personal power,
which was the reason for his departure from the highest position in the KSČ in January 1968.
Milan Rastislav Štefánik (1880–1919) was a Slovak astronomer and politician. During the First World
War, together with Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk (1850–1937), he participated in the creation of the Czech‑
oslovak foreign resistance and Czechoslovak Legions. He was deputy chairman of the exiled Czecho‑
slovak National Council and Minister of War in the first Czechoslovak government (1918–1919).
„Vodné delá pod Bradlom. Document No. 44, 7. 5. 1989. In: ŽATKULIAK, Jozef – HLAVOVÁ, Viera –
SEDLIAKOVÁ, Alžbeta – ŠTEFANSKÝ, Michal (eds.): November 1989 a Slovensko, pp. 285–286.
Vyhlásenie podpísaných občanov Slovenska k deportáciám Židov. Document No. 17, October 1987.
In: ŽATKULIAK, Jozef – HLAVOVÁ, Viera – SEDLIAKOVÁ, Alžbeta – ŠTEFANSKÝ, Michal (eds.):
November 1989 a Slovensko, pp. 142–143.
demonstration by Bratislava students was not suppressed by the forces of law and
order, while the police were seen repeating their ritual from previous gatherings in
the case of the authorized one in Prague, may serve as an argument to support the
claim that there was greater potential for consensual political change in Slovakia.
The fact that communism as an undemocratic system in Slovakia was rejected far less
than in the Czech lands is evidenced by the structure of topics in the internal political
debate in the late 1980s. The issue of human rights was not foremost in Slovakia in
the first half of 1968, or even in 1998, before the elections that marked the departure
of Vladimír Mečiar as Prime Minister.120
In this way, there is a relatively high continuity of topics in the political discourse
before and after 1989. The new subject of discussions about the past before 1989 be‑
came questions related to the existence of Slovak and Czech statehood; lesser heard
were questions about the communist past, although this was partly also due to the
general lack of political freedom. This topic, however, after peaking briefly at the
beginning of the 1990s, again faded into the background; in public discourse, atten‑
tion was devoted far more often to the issues of Czech‑Slovak, or Slovak‑Hungarian
relationships and national statehoods.
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1989 in Slovakia – Between Reform and Radical Change
Between Internal and External Impulses
One important task is to assess the character of the change that occurred in Novem‑
ber 1989, and to identify similarities and differences in both parts of the former com‑
mon state. As I have already mentioned, the events in Slovakia unfolded more grad‑
ually than in the Czech lands and it is here where less radical ruptures and reversals
are evident, with the opposition steadily rising up from the underground. There are
even discussions to be found as to whether there was a separate revolution in Slovakia
or whether it was part of the common Czechoslovakian revolution.121 However, the
truth of the matter is that in the weeks immediately after the suppression of the stu‑
dent demonstration on November 17, 1989 no one was asking this question; it reared
its head a few years after the fall of communism. It is true that different subjects res‑
onated in Slovakia than in the Czech lands; Slovak society had to deal with specific
problems and had a different structure. Slovak political representation was also dif‑
ferent, both for the communist elite and for the emerging (or potential) opposition.
Moreover, it must be taken into account that Slovakia was part of a federalized, but
at the same time strictly centralized, state. In the conditions of this type of so‑called
democratic centralism, leading Slovak politicians had only limited impact not only
120
121
BÚTOROVÁ, Zora – GYÁRFÁŠOVÁ, Oľga – VELŠIC, Marián: Verejná mienka. In: MESEŽNIKOV,
Grigorij – IVANTYŠYN, Michal (eds.): Slovensko 1998–1999. Súhrnná správa o stave spoločnosti. IVO, Bra‑
tislava 1999, pp. 233–272. Vladimír Mečiar (born 1942) served as Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak
Republic (1990) and the Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic in the years 1990–1991, 1992–1994,
and 1994–1998. Although he started out as being nominated for a function in the VPN movement, as
Prime Minister he exhibited authoritarian tendencies.
For more details, see ŠÚTOVEC, Milan: Semióza ako politikum alebo „pomlčková vojna”. Kalligram, Bra‑
tislava 1999.
113
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Juraj Marušiak
on events in Czechoslovakia, but also those in Slovakia. The public was aware of this
in Slovakia and the Czech lands, as they were too the need for cooperation, and this
cooperation as a rule usually worked in November and December 1989. Questions
about the organization of Czech‑Slovak relations and the completion of the constitu‑
tional system were present in the public debate more or less from its very beginning,
though they did not play a dominant role. On the other hand, due to the centralist
nature of the common state, the changes in Slovakia were to a large extent a response
to the course of events in Prague, i.e. the Czech lands. As for the unfinished process
of national integration, the question arose as to whether the inhabitants of Slovakia
would identify themselves more as citizens of the Czechoslovak Federation, i.e. the
common state, or as citizens of Slovakia. However, in the first months after Novem‑
ber 17, 1989 the attention of the majority of the Slovak population was undoubtedly
focused on the place where the key decisions concerning the future of all of Czech‑
oslovakia (and thus Slovakia), were being made, i.e. Prague and the federal organs.
Ultimately, this was not a new phenomenon in Slovak history. Perhaps in all the
modernization processes in the 19th and 20th centuries, or if we go as far back as the
Industrial Revolution and up to the construction of the pre‑war democratic Czecho‑
slovakia or “socialism with a human face”, but also in the case of the communists’
selective modernization and the advent of two totalitarian regimes in 1938 and 1948,
a certain external factor played a significant role. As a rule this was the result of
the direct influence of Budapest in the Hungarian state, or the influence of events
in Prague, i.e. in the center of Czechoslovakia. In connection with this historian
Ľubomír Lipták stated that although Slovakia had never been at the center of the creation of
any new social system, and was not the initiator of any major movements that shaped history,
it was as a rule very quickly “drawn into” them; however, here, these movements never ripened
to the full potential of their classical form (feudalism, the Reformation, free‑market capitalism,
the dictatorship of the proletariat).122 Hence, in November 1989, instead of a negotiated
transformation operating on a consensus between the moderate forces of the camp of
power and the moderate components of the opposition (others were not even visible
in Slovakia at the time), for which there were realistic expectations in Slovakia, the
path of change was laid by a rupture, which was most likely unavoidable in the case of
the Czech lands.123 On the other hand, the democratic forces in Slovakia were overall
logically oriented mainly towards appropriating the Czech experience. Soon, howev‑
er, in as early as 1990, it had started to become clear that the transfer of the Czech political
systems, ideals, and goals to Slovak society sped up the development of Slovakia in some
respects, but at the same time it introduced elements of discontinuity and defined
it. As in 1968, it could be said that contact with world affairs through the federal
center of Slovakia did make many things easier and quicker, but this too meant the
122
114
123
LIPTÁK, Ľubomír: Niektoré historické aspekty slovenskej otázky (tézy). Historický časopis, 1993, Vol. 41,
No. 4, pp. 452–461. Cited according to CHMEL, Rudolf: (ed.): Slovenská otázka v 20. storočí. Kalligram,
Bratislava 1997, p. 448.
SZOMOLÁNYI, Soňa: November 1989 – otvorenie kľukatej cesty k demokracii, p.106.
impoverishment of the Prague filter plus an option that might not suit Slovakia’s basic needs.124
However, this external factor continued to play an important role as a catalyst for
the internal political processes taking place in Slovakia. The refusal to attempt a re‑
surgence of authoritarianism in the 1998 parliamentary elections was also largely
influenced by concerns about the possibility of Slovakia finally ceasing to be part of
the integration processes in Europe and its international isolation.
Given the situation the Slovak democratic opposition found itself in during the
period of normalization, it was only natural that, as in 1968 and during the First
Czechoslovak Republic, the reform forces declared in November 1989 were much
more supportive of the idea of maintaining a common state and cooperation with
the Czech, i.e. federal elites that opposed them. However, it is also true that in the end
this orientation hampered their maneuverability and caused their failure after 1992.
As in the 1960s, there was dissatisfaction with the “constitutional stopper”, which
meant that the Slovak national elites’ ability to satisfy their ambitions was limited. In
1968 the federalization of Czechoslovakia initially alleviated this pressure, but para‑
doxically this led to the issue of Slovakia’s political emancipation being revived with
much greater intensity after the loosening up of the political conditions. During the
two decades of “Normalization” (1969–1989) of society relatively viable, national po‑
litical elites were formed in Slovakia, ones awaiting their chance for self‑fulfillment.
Unlike in the 1950s and 1960s, they had much better institutional facilities through
which to start seeking such opportunities. Unlike in the 1960s, nationalism and the
demands for an independent Slovakia were supported by the technological and eco‑
nomic intelligence, not human intelligence. This is not only related to the humanist
intellectuals’ conviction of the need for the cooperation of democratic forces, their
resistance to nationalism, the manifestations of which were abused at the end of
the 1960s to facilitate the beginning of normalization, or the positive perception of
Czech culture in Slovakia, and vice versa, but also to the fact that the federalization
of the state created such favorable conditions for the development of Slovak national
culture that humanist intelligentsia did not perceive the relationship between the
Czech and Slovak nations as a relationship between a dominant and a submissive
nation. On the other hand, some elites operating in the economic sphere and state
administration had completely different practical experience of the functioning of
the common state, which did not meet its needs or ambitions. This may explain why
nationalist forces showed such intense support for this part of the Slovak intellectu‑
al elite. In the period before 1989 a nationalist orientation had been present in the
Slovak opposition to the regime and it deliberated in political terms. This applies
not only to Ján Čarnogurský, but also to Alexander Dubček’s associates (Hvezdoň
Kočtúch, Ivan Laluha) and the emerging opposition within the KSS (e.g. the afore‑
mentioned speech by Pavol Kanis in the discussion in Literárny týždenník125).
124
125
LIPTÁK, Ľubomír: Niektoré historické aspekty slovenskej otázky, p. 452.
Slováci vo federácii, pp. 12–14.
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In the 1990s Slovak nationalism followed the traditions of Hlinka’s Slovak Peo‑
ple’s Party (Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana, HSĽS) to a limited extent.126 Concerns
about their resurgence, in which the communist authorities, as well as an influential
part of the post‑November Slovak and Czechoslovak elites, justified their opposition
to the opening of the national issue, did not prove to be fully justified. The political
forces that had openly declared their intention to continue the tradition of the Slo‑
vak People’s Party and even the war‑time Slovak regime did not become engaged in
November 1989 and remained in a marginal position thereafter.
Conclusion: The Nature of the Political Change in Slovakia
The political breakthrough that took place in November 1989 can be described as
a revolution, a coup d’état, an implosion of the old regime, but also as an evolutionary
change, which in its time resembled the so‑called negotiated transition in Hungary.
Testimony to this assertion about the revolution can be seen not only in the demon‑
strations in the streets of large cities, but also the size and depth of the changes
introduced in November 1989. The consequences of November 1989 were compre‑
hensive changes in ownership relations, the division of power, the individual’s status
in society, and the international status of the country; from both the point of view
of the political system, and ultimately the existence of the state, it was one of the
greatest twists in Slovak and Czech history.127 However, there are journalists and pub‑
licists who claim that November 1989 was the result of an attempt by some of the
communist structures (parts of the KSČ and the ŠtB) to remove the then Communist
Party leadership. The existence of such attempts could not be credibly proven, but
could not be credibly disproven either. Even if we accept the coup d’état hypothesis,
regardless of the certain staffing continuity of the political elite, which was greater
in Slovakia than in the Czech lands, or despite the ability of parts of the old elite
operating mainly in the national economy to transform political capital into economic
capital,128 it must be admitted that this attempt got out of hand. Equally acceptable
is the paradigm of the implosion of a normalization regime, since there was no real
force that could defend a power that was no longer capable of its own reproduction.
The legitimacy of the regime was low even in the eyes of a large part of its bearers,
the members of the KSČ nomenklatura.129 This was due both to the public’s rapidly
126
116
127
128
129
Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party was a Slovak conservative Catholic party. It started to form in 1905–
1913. Its founder and first leader was the Catholic priest Andrej Hlinka (1864–1938); after his death
the Catholic priest Jozef Tiso (1887–1947) became the new party leader. It supported the establish‑
ment of Czechoslovakia, but it promoted Slovakia’s autonomy, which it gained in 1938. In Slovakia it
gained a monopoly, which it strengthened after the creation of the Slovak state (the Slovak Republic)
on March 14, 1939. The first Prime Minister of the autonomous Slovakia was the party leader Jozef
Tiso, who, subsequently, in 1939–1945 became the President of the Slovak Republic. After 1938, au‑
thoritative and fascist tendencies reigned within the ranks of the party, and until the end of the
Second World War this party advocated an alliance between Slovakia and Nazi Germany.
LIPTÁK, Ľubomír: Miesto novembra 1989 v moderných slovenských dejinách, p. 24.
KUBÍN, Ľuboš: Rola politických elít pri zmene režimu, p. 64.
Ibidem, pp. 57–58.
waning social acceptance of the representatives of the communist nomenklatura and
the spontaneous revival of market relations in society.130 The possibilities of imple‑
mentation provided by the grey economy or the prospects of the legalization and
development of a market economy turned out to be more attractive than working in
the communist nomenklatura. This was particularly true for the younger generation
of the KSČ nomenklatura. It is worth noting that the change in Slovakia resembled
a so‑called negotiated transition.131 Although preconditions for this kind of transfor‑
mation of the communist system did exist in Slovakia with regard to the presence of
reform‑oriented individuals in the KSS establishment, it was not carried out, at least
in the early stages of the break in November 1989. Instead, a radical rupture occurred.
The Round Table in Czechoslovakia was not an impulse to initiate political changes,
but the result of the acceptance of the political reality by the more pragmatic part
of the Communist Party’s leadership. This did not mean, though, the communist
regime becoming transparent – for it was opened up from below. Certain elements of
the negotiated transaction can only be discussed in the context of Slovakia after the
resignation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the accession of
Rudolf Schuster132 (chairman of the SNR from November 30, 1989) and Milan Čič
(Prime Minister of the Slovak Socialist Republic from December 12, 1989) to leading
posts at the end of 1989. The leadership of the KSS, led by Ignác Janák, and Prime
Minister Pavol Hrivnák were unable to accept the negotiated transition. Finally, ele‑
ments of the “negotiated transition” were also present at the federal level, for example
in Marián Čalfa’s accession to the position of federal Prime Minister and the very
existence of the federal “government of national understanding”. This model was
reproduced at the level of the national republics. However, Marián Čalfa, originally
a Communist Party candidate, soon had to completely break off contacts with the
communist sphere if he wanted to stay in political life.
One factor in favor of the negotiated transformation was the pragmatic attitude
of some elites of the KSS, the presence of reform‑oriented individuals centered espe‑
cially around the publication Nové slovo, and the Institute of Marxism‑Leninism of
the Central Committee of the KSS, but also, when compared to the Czech lands, the
greater permeability of the boundaries between “official” and the “unofficial” dis‑
course, especially in the late 1980s. On the other hand, the reform‑oriented approach
only concerned people who, without external pressures, were unable to reverse power
in the leadership of the KSS, which remained in rigidly set until November 1989.
The reformed and pragmatically oriented part of the KSS was able to take a strategic
initiative inside the party in 1989 and promote the adoption of the reform agenda.
In the second half of 1990, unlike in the Czech lands, most members of the KSS were
able to be convinced to identify with the nominal break with the communist ideology
130
131
132
KALINOVÁ, Lenka: K sociálním dějinám Československa, pp. 59–60.
SZOMOLÁNYI, Soňa: November 1989 – otvorenie kľukatej cesty k demokracii, pp. 92–110.
Rudolf Schuster (born 1934) was the mayor of Košice in 1983–1986 and 1994–1999, in 1986–1989 the
Chairman of the Regional National Committee of the East Slovak Region. In 1989–1990 he was the
Chairman of the SNR; he was later elected President of the Slovak Republic (1999–2004).
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and political heritage of the KSS and to join the social democratic program of the
Party of the Democratic Left, which became the successor of the KSS. The revived
KSS remained a marginal entity, unlike in the Czech Republic, where the Communist
Party of Bohemia and Moravia has not changed its name and a significant part of its
members and some representatives today still adhere to the legacy of the political
system from 1948 to 1989.
A characteristic feature of the political reversal in Slovakia was the fact that the
“civic” opposition was less involved in implementing changes. This was mainly due
to scarcity of numbers, since in Slovakia “civic opposition” implied a history of indi‑
viduals rather than the history of an independent community. The lack of numbers
also made it organizationally weak, lacking a relevant independent organizational
structure, which only intensified after the arrest and indictment of five members of
the Bratislava Movement for Civic Freedom (the so‑called Bratislava Five) in August
1989. In the formation of the civic movement Public Against Violence, which inte‑
grated forces dissatisfied with the normalization regime in November 1989, a key
role was played by forces such as the sphere of alternative culture, the Bratislava circle
of ecologists, and intellectuals who, despite working in official institutions, began
to be active in the late 1980s. The protests against the prosecution of the members
of the aforementioned Bratislava Five in August and September 1989 were a catalyst
which accelerated the integration of the various opposing currents and individuals.
The politicization of the Bratislava environmentalist movement and the role of the
Bratislava environmentalists in the creation of the VPN in November 1989 caused the
ecological agenda to become marginalized in the public debate. Although the Green
Party (Strana zelených) had been established in Slovakia and had been elected onto
the Slovak National Council in the first free elections, the environmental movement
did not regain its previous political strength and its main protagonists before 1989
were no longer involved in the “green” agenda (e.g. Ján Budaj, Peter Tatár, and others),
or, after a short stint in politics, they returned to their academic work or work in non‑
‑governmental organizations (e.g. Mikuláš Huba), respectively.
The response to the petition Podněty katolíků k řešení situace věřících občanů v ČSSR,
the so‑called Candlelight demonstration in March 1988 and the launch of the sam‑
izdat political magazine Bratislavské listy displayed the strong organizational and
mobilizing potential of the “Christian opposition”. This potential became a crucial
factor in the first division of the VPN. By the end of 1989 the Christian Democratic
Movement (Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie, KDH) was starting to formulate itself,
though its main initiator and first chairman Ján Čarnogurský became deputy Prime
Minister of the federal government of the ČSSR on December 10, 1989, nominated
by the VPN. It was the KDH that became the main challenge for the VPN in the June
1990 parliamentary elections, unlike on the Czech side, where the main line of con‑
flict before the elections ran between the Civic Forum and the Communist Party, as
the coalition of the Christian Democratic Union, which grouped together the Chris‑
tian Democratic Union and the post‑dissident Christian Democratic Party, made for
a drastically weaker opponent.
Another characteristic element distinguishing the course of socio‑political chang‑
es in Slovakia from the conditions prevailing in the Czech Republic was the presence
of lines of ethnic division. The factor of Slovak‑Hungarian relations significantly de‑
termined the nature of political discourse in Slovakia and influenced the behavior of
the KSČ as well as the opposition. At the same time, the situation of the Hungarian
minority was a matter for discussion in several of its aspects, in relation to the status
of national minorities, and in terms of the bilateral relations between Czechoslovakia
and Hungary. These aspects also played an important role in the discussion on the
construction of the Gabčíkovo‑Nagymaros waterworks. At the same time, the involve‑
ment of Charter 77 in these issues was widely viewed in a negative light in Slovak
society. On the other hand, the process of the political convergence of the Hungarian
minority opposition activists and independent initiatives operating within the Slovak
mainstream progressed slowly, and cannot be said to have accelerated until the second
half of 1989. Be that as it may, the Hungarian minority did not present itself as a ho‑
mogeneous community between 1988 and 1989, or in the years that followed. Where‑
as many representatives of the Hungarian minority worked and held high positions
in the KSČ, on the other hand, after 1988 its opposition activists were already clearly
starting to split into the national oriented followers of Miklós Duray and the liberal
oriented ones gathered around K. Tóth and L. Öllős. The latter group was involved in
the establishment of the liberal Hungarian Independent Initiative in November 1989,
while M. Duray’s supporters established two entities in 1990: the nation‑oriented
Spolužitie/Együttélés (Coexistence) Party and the conservative Hungarian Christian
Democratic Movement (Magyar Kereszténydemokrata Mozgalom, MKDM).
Although Alexander Dubček was a moral and political authority in Slovakia,
as was reflected in the support his candidacy for president of the ČSSR received
from numerous Slovak political entities in autumn 1989, he and his supporters
were unable to generate any relevant political formation. Unlike in Slovakia, the
non‑communist left‑wing parties in the Czech lands were part of the opposition
in the early 1970s; the so‑called Eurocommunists or former reform communists
from 1968 were an important component of Charter 77; some of its signatories
signed up for the Independent Socialists’ agenda and in early 1989 an independ‑
ent political organization, the Club for the Socialist Reconstruction “Obroda”
was established. The Society for the Study of Democratic Socialism (Společnost pro
studium demokratického socialismu) was formed in Prague at the beginning of 1989,
and already by November 19, 1989, i.e. the beginning of the protests following the
suppression of a student demonstration in Prague on November 17, 1989, a renewed
Czechoslovak Social Democracy was established on their grounds, one which became
part of the Civic Forum. There was no Slovak equivalent of the Czech version of this
movement of the so‑called New Left, represented by Peter Uhl and his Program of
Social Self‑Management,133 and no reflection on similar ideas is to be found in the
133
UHL, Petr, et al.: Program společenské samosprávy. Index, Köln 1982. For more details on the ideas of Petr
Uhl see DALBERG, Dirk Mathias: From class‑society to a democracy in permanence. Petr Uhl’s “Pro‑
gram of social self‑management”. Studia Politica Slovaca, 2016, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 5–23.
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Slovak independent discourse of the 1970s and 1980s. The circle of A. Dubček’s sup‑
porters along with their ideas failed to exert any strong influence on society, as did
the samizdat magazine Myšlienka a čin (Thought and action), perhaps because of its
strong orientation towards the past; the Party of Democratic Socialism (after a few
months renamed to the Democratic Socialists’ Party /Strana demokratického social‑
izmu, later Strana demokratických socialistov/) founded by previous reform commu‑
nists in 1968 under the leadership of the journalist and former ŠtB officer, Igor Cib‑
ula, was short‑lived and did not even participate in the first parliamentary elections
in June 1990.
The issue of Slovak‑Czech coexistence in the dissident discourse was not mean‑
ingfully resolved, although it did begin to be revived in connection with the drafting
of the new constitution of the ČSSR, which included matters of state symbols and the
constitutional structure. However, Slovak‑Czech tensions had been present in a latent
form throughout the 1980s, owing to the different internal development dynamic in
Slovakia and the Czech lands. This was, furthermore, also reflected in the fact that in
November 1989, the VPN was established as an independent political force in Brati‑
slava, although in some cities, especially in eastern Slovakia, groups were formed that
professed ties to the Civic Forum. Closer contact with the dissident scene in Prague
over the one in Bratislava was also typical for Slovakia’s second largest city, Košice.
It was a matter of course, however, that during the so‑called Velvet Revolution two
organizationally separate, though closely cooperating, anti‑totalitarian movements
were formed. It can therefore be stated that at the end of the 1980s, dividing lines
were formed in Slovak society, also referred to as lines of conflict, i.e. cleavages, which
became fully apparent after the political changes. These divisions also corresponded
to the character of the party system in the Slovak Republic and the structure of the
first freely elected Slovak National Council and the Federal Assembly of the Czech
and Slovak Federative Republic (Česká a slovenská federativní republika, ČSFR). It
can be stated that the political changes in November 1989 were the result of the
Slovak public’s reaction to events at the countrywide level, but also to the specific
internal dynamics of the political and socio‑economic development of Slovakia.
In addition to the civic and nationalist considerations of the political events in
Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, social factors also played an important
role. The revolutionary discourse and placards on the squares also included slogans
demanding a more socially just society. A significant part of people’s dissatisfaction,
and not only in Poland where the independent anti‑communist trade union Solidar‑
ity had become the most important opposition force, was due, for example, to the
privileges enjoyed by representatives of the ideological and power apparatus of the
communist regime, the so‑called nomenklatura. This social aspect was also present
in Czechoslovakia, where a major role in the decomposition of the structures of the
communist regime and its ideological de‑legitimization was played not only by mass
demonstrations in large cities, but perhaps also to the same extent by the political
activation of workers and employees in state enterprises, which was responsible for
the inarguable success of the general strike of November 27, 1989. It follows that, in
addition to attributes such as “democratic”, “civic”, and “national”, we can also apply
the attribute “social” to the revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989. Along
with the demand for freedom and the attempt to redefine the principles of belonging,
the requirement of equality was an integral part of the social movements in 1989.
The 1989 revolution rejected the communist system and the government of the
KSČ. It was anti‑communist, though not anti‑socialist or pro‑capitalist. Its reinter‑
pretation, which became the dominant right‑wing interpretation of the concepts of freedom,
democracy, and human rights134 first in the Czech lands and later in Slovakia in the peri‑
od of mid‑1990 and early 1991, at the same time disqualified and delegitimized leftist
values by equating them with authoritarian nationalism or as defending the former
regime. It was extremely successful and implemented with the aim of creating a po‑
litical justification for the realization of the neoliberal socio‑economic and political
model and the widespread privatization of state‑owned enterprises. This meant the
demise of the pro‑socialist consensus which had prevailed at the end of 1989135. On
the other hand, in view of the anti‑communist nature of the revolution in November
1989, expressions of dissatisfaction with the consequences of the 1991–1992 econom‑
ic transformation did not reinstate the political forces that identified with the legacy
of the pre‑November regime.
In November 1989, as in 1968, we can discern the interaction of two factors:
the qualitatively different character of Slovak society and the peripheral, secondary
position of Slovakia within the common state. Therefore, the events in Slovakia, in
comparison with those in the center, occurred with a certain phase shift, and some
attempts to implant Czech models into Slovakia even had an inhibitory effect. Mean‑
while, however, the attitude of much of the Slovak population towards the reforms
in 1968, the perception of normalization in Slovakia, and the attitude toward the
changes in 1989 testify to the words of the Slovak sociologist Robert Roško that
while the Soviet model of socialism in the 1960s presents itself as a suit that scratches unbearably
and smothers the Czech body, it still somehow fits the Slovak one, i.e. he still extracts some real
or supposed benefit from wearing it.136 Although this statement concerned the state of
Slovak society at the end of the 1960s, it might also be applicable to the period two
decades later.
The inherited elements of Slovak political culture, its conservatism, expressed by
a skeptical approach to change, the persistence of rural stereotypes in the political
dealings of its mostly urbanized or newly urbanized population, the residue of the
authoritarian manner of thinking that the communist regime managed to use to its
benefit in Slovakia, but also the unfinished national emancipation, have thus pre‑
vented the economic and political transformation from becoming a main topic of
internal political discourse in Slovakia. And the same is true for anti‑communism,
134
135
136
ŠIMEČKA, Martin M.: Intelektuáli neprevzali zodpovednosť, tak musel niekto iný. Denník N, Novem‑
ber 16, 2014 – see https://dennikn.sk/3268/intelektuali‑neprevzali‑zodpovednost‑tak‑musel‑niekto‑
‑iny/ (quoted version dated 28. 3. 2020).
See KRAPFL, James: Revolúcia s ľudskou tvárou; PULLMANN, Michal: Konec experimentu. Přestavba a pád
komunismu v Československu. Scriptiorium, Praha 2011.
ROŠKO, Robert: Dominantné charakteristiky sociálnej štruktúry Slovenska v 60. rokoch. Archive of the Insti‑
tute of Political Science, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava, undated, p. 11.
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and coping with the communist past, although these topics were an integral part
of the agenda of the majority of national‑democratic and nationalist movements in
Central and Eastern Europe, e.g. in the former Yugoslavia and the USSR. However,
in the case of Slovakia, nation oriented forces have mostly been defined not as being
against communists but rather against the bearers of the liberal‑democratic concept
of change instead.