Amisom

The 'They are the Enemy, so Beware of Them' film series began with the release of the first video instalment in January 2012 during a period when Al-Shabaab was facing severe political, financial, and military pressures due to a renewed series of offensives by AMISOM, SFG, and allied Somali militia forces. However, the first video instalment included footage of the confession of an accused spy, Ahmed Kisi, which was originally broadcast in early February 2011 in a trial run of Al-Shabaab's terrestrial television station, the Al-Kataib News Channel, which stopped broadcasting after the group's withdrawal from Mogadishu in August 2011. In the footage, Kisi confessed to working for the CIA. He was later publicly executed by Al-Shabaab in the Huriwa district in northeastern Mogadishu. In a 2 February 2011 statement from Al-Shabaab, Kisi, a former member of the Somali Salafist Al-I'tisaam group that eventually became critical of Al-Shabaab, was accused of working for the CIA since 2004. Later video instalments included lengthy narrative confessions from other Somalis arrested by the Amniyyat and accused of spying for the group's enemies, including the CIA and the French intelligence services, the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE). In the third instalment, for example, a young Somali man, Muhammad Gele Abdullah, "confessed" to guiding French commando forces to the town of Buulo-Mareer in a failed attempt in January 2013 to rescue Denis Allex, who the DGSE had sent in 2009 to train Somali government forces and who was captured by Al-Shabaab in July of that year.

The purpose of the film series and other videotaped 'confessions' and written and photographic
reports from Al-Shabaab's media apparatus about alleged spies is to both warn current or potential spies working against the group and to broadcast an image to the group's enemies of an organisation that, although having suffered significant urban territorial losses, remains a both formidable and capable force, especially in terms of internal security and intelligence. Although reports and the production of written, audio, and audio-visual media focusing on spies has
increased since Spring 2011 as Al-Shabaab began to suffer major battlefield setbacks, the militant group has long been concerned about the dangers posed by domestic spies, particularly during periods of territorial upheaval.

http://www.janes.com/

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) alone cannot defeat al-Shabaab. This can only happen if AMISOM can partner with a capable, legitimate and inclusive set of Somali security forces. Unfortunately, over the last decade, Somalia’s political leaders have failed to forge a political settlement that charts an agreed pathway towards creating an effective set of professional national security forces. The African Union (AU) and AMISOM’s international partners have exacerbated the problem by failing to provide the mission with vital capabilities, including the 12 military helicopters authorized in 2012. Moreover, the growing influence of Somalia’s neighboring states within AMISOM has damaged the mission’s reputation among Somalis. These failings have not only further endangered AMISOM personnel, they have also undermined the mission’s effectiveness and the prospects of stabilizing Somalia.

This “Evaluation of the implementation of the African Peace Facility (APF) as an instrument supporting African efforts to manage conflicts on the continent” covers the period 2014-2016 and two of the three areas by the APF, i.e. support to African-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and to capacity building of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The third area, the Early Response Mechanism, was already evaluated in 2015. Previous APF evaluations were conducted in 2006, 2011 and 2013. The current study builds on this record and looks in particular at the outcome of the 2013 evaluation.

The African Peace Support Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has been operating since 19 January 2007, when through the Resolution of the 69th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the African Union (AU) urged the deployment of troops with the purpose of providing an African response to the multifaceted
security challenges and imminent state collapse of Somalia. Despite years of bloody fighting, with limited resources that led to a significant number of casualties among soldiers, a general
assessment of AMISOM reflects the importance of this AU-led Peace Support Operation (PSO) in the quest for the stability of the country.

Somalia is currently experiencing a political and historical turning point. After almost 8 years of the transitional period and 21 years of state collapse, the end of the transition and the launching of a new government have engendered the hope that this could be the inception of a broader political process embracing all Somalis. It also opens the door for a possible and much needed transformation from a war-based economy to a post-war civilian economy. However, the stabilisation of the country is a long way off.

This bibliography contains books, edited volumes, journal articles, book chapters, theses, grey literature, bibliographies,and other resources on the Harakat ash-Shabāb al Mujāhidīn, also referred to in short as al-Shabaab. The publications compiled in this bibliography primarily focus on al-Shabaab’s organizational evolution, attacks, military successes and drawbacks, national and international recruitment efforts, ideology, and territorial expansion, predominantly in Somalia and Kenya. Moreover, many of the publications examine PVE and CVE strategies to contain al-Shabaab’s influence or assess the achievements and shortcomings of the African Union’s stabilization mission in Somalia AMISOM.

In January 2016, Kenya suffered its largest ever military defeat at the battle of El Adde in the Gedo region of Somalia. Yet many of the questions surrounding this attack remain unanswered. On the six-month anniversary of the battle at El Adde, this report provides a preliminary analysis of the battle and some of the wider issues with respect to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This issue brief lays out a number of lessons the attack on El Adde can offer to the Kenya Defence Forces, AMISOM, and all peace operations engaged in various forms of stabilization and counterinsurgency.

Deployed to Mogadishu in March 2007, AMISOM was authorised by the AU PSC and later endorsed by the UN Security Council. AMISOM was tasked with providing protection for VIPs associated with the political reconciliation process in Somalia, but it was also required to protect civilians as part of its obligations under IHL. It was not until late May 2013, however, that AMISOM officially adopted a mission-wide PoC strategy. This long
delay was the result of several factors. First, the AU and AMISOM disseminated mixed messages about the status of PoC issues. Second, the AU only began developing guidelines on this topic during 2009. And third, there were prudential concerns about adopting a PoC mandate, because AMISOM had to balance efforts to protect its own personnel and civilians. Adopting a PoC mandate was
thus thought likely to raise local expectations without necessarily providing the tools needed to meet them. Over time, however, AMISOM recognised and improved its PoC strategy in achieving its strategic objectives, and adopted
various policies to reduce civilian harm while carrying out its operations.

The political and security context in Somalia has improved substantially over the last year. The security situation remains fragile, however, and the African Peace Support Mission
in Somalia (AMISOM) is in need of a new mandate. In light of these developments, a Special Committee of Experts from the African Union assessed the mandate of AMISOM, after six years of deployment. This policy paper, which is targeted at both researchers and practitioners working in the field of peace and security, analyses AMISOM’s successes and failures so far, in order to define the crucial elements that have to be
taken into account when renewing the mandate. Examining the trends that AMISOM might develop in the coming months, it provides several strategic recommendations for identifying how AMISOM can best contribute to the stabilization of Somalia and allign its activities to the priorities of the Federal Government of Somalia.

Authorized in January 2009, the UN Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA) was an unprecedented operation. Through UNSOA, the Department of Field Support used the UN’s assessed contributions to directly support a non-UN regional peace operation (AMISOM). Although this significantly enhanced AMISOM’s capabilities and increased its overall effectiveness, UNSOA faced numerous challenges that severely inhibited its ability to deliver on all its mandated tasks. This report analyzes five sets of challenges that UNSOA faced from 2009 through to 2015. These challenges revolved around the expanding scope of UNSOA’s tasks, the clash between the UN and the AU’s organizational cultures, the highly insecure operating environment, the size of the theater of operations, and some of AMISOM’s idiosyncrasies.

"Despite renewed hope in the future of Somalia, post-transition efforts towards peace and stability in this country face numerous challenges. This situation report notes that progress will be defined by the dynamics surrounding the strengths or weaknesses
of the new Somali Federal Government (SFG), the rapidly adapting al-Qaeda-linked Islamist al-Shabaab and the success or failure of international support  in the pursuit of peace. The emerging perception among sections of the Somali population as well as
the international community of a weak and weakening Somali central government constitutes one of the most challenging developments, with far-reaching implications for the collective push for peace in the country. This situation report proposes that efforts should be aimed at strengthening the government,
since its performance is central to any realistic progress in the country."

In this article, we assess the ongoing conflict between al-Shabaab on the one hand, and the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), on the other. Though al-Shabab has been around since the mid 2000s, the current round of the conflict began in 2010 when AMISOM was deployed to Somalia to bolster the fledgling Somali government. The main thrust of the paper, therefore, is to reexamine what effect, if any, this African force has had on the conflict. Data were collected from 2009-2021 through monitoring and analysis was done using software. Data gathered included recording specific instances of violence between the two groups, including who orchestrated the violence, the location of the violence and the fatalities in each act of violence. While TFG/AMISOM made substantial gains initially against al-Shabab, the result did not specifically conclude which of the two groups is poised to win the war. However, it demonstrates that al-Shabab is able to stay in play by resorting to a host of other strategies which neither the TFG nor AMISOM can deploy.

Since the 2011 offensive that dislodged al-Shabaab from southern Somalia, the group has slowly but surely recovered its offensive capability, carrying out a string of deadly attacks against military forces and civilians alike. With the on-going closure of the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya – home to more than 250 000 Somali refugees – and prospects for a withdrawal of the African Union peacekeeping force on the horizon, the security situation in Somalia could deteriorate significantly. Unless decisive action is taken by the Somali federal government, the African Union and their international supporters, hard-won progress in Somalia could be unraveled, affecting the entire Horn of Africa.

This publication provides lessons on the importance of civilian protection during peacekeeping and stability operations, challenges for international forces, and actions taken to enhance mission success.  Actions such as command attention, soldier training, promulgating lessons learned, and corrective actions for eliminating civilian casualties may become necessities.

My research examines the dynamics of third-party peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and development interventions and their combined effects on resiliency of different actors in civil conflict, using Somalia as a case study.  Understanding the integrated effects of these interventions over time requires knowledge of what is happening on the ground among stakeholders and primary actors at the local and regional level, how these dynamics impact the broader conflict, and the result on both local and regional interests. Kenya has long-standing strategic interests in the Somali conflict that include instability in south central Somalia and operations in the port of Kismayo, cross-border spillover of violence and extremism, one of the world’s largest refugee camps in northeast Kenya, and absorption of displaced persons living as refugees in major urban cities such as Nairobi.  These interests intertwine with domestic politics in Kenya and affect local stability, shaping Kenya's response to the conflict in Somalia.  In addition, many International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs) that provide humanitarian aid or support peace operations in Somalia have their program offices in Nairobi.  I will engage a cross-section of key stakeholders in Nairobi from all of these different organizations – NGOs, government, and military – to discuss their interventions in Somalia and the impacts.

My research examines the combined effects of third-party peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and development interventions on resiliency of different actors in civil conflict, using Somalia as a case study.  Understanding the integrated effects of these interventions over time requires knowledge of what is happening on the ground among stakeholders and primary actors at the local and regional level, how these dynamics impact the broader conflict, and the result on both local and regional interests.  Ethiopia is a key regional player with long-standing strategic interests that affect the Somali conflict.  These interests involve complex security and economic concerns that include the presence of Ethiopian Somalis in the Somali regional state of Ethiopia and their claims upon the Ethiopian government (supported by extremists in the conflict in Somalia), a large influx of Somali refugees from the conflict in South Central Somalia, and violent cross-border spillover from Somalia. Historic governance, cultural, and natural factors in the region (e.g., climate change) create stresses that exacerbate the conflict and complicate the pursuit of Ethiopia’s interests.
I wish to engage a cross-section of key stakeholders in Ethiopia who are (or have been) involved these interventions.

Since mid-2013 AMISOM has undergone a series of strategic reviews aimed at strengthening the mission, and since early 2014 it has conducted four major operations aimed at taking the fight to Al-Shabaab. Although these operations have enjoyed some successes, AMISOM continued to confront four major challenges that badly hindered its ability to achieve its mandated tasks. Paul D Williams explores these challenges – both internal and external to AMISOM – and argues that AMISOM cannot be expected to implement a successful exit strategy unless these issues are addressed.