Aristippus

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Índice



Introducción............................................................................... 9

Capítulo 1. La relevancia del caso griego .............................. 17

Capítulo 2. Instrumentos de análisis: estrategias
argumentativas y zonas de tensión dialógica  ….................... 25
2.1. "Ocultamiento del adversario" como figura
argumentativa: el reverso del argumento de autoridad
2.2. La noción de "zona de tensión dialógica" y sus elementos 
2.3. Un elemento omitido: el fenómeno de los sokratikoì lógoi

Capítulo 3. Algunos ejemplos de aplicación del enfoque por ZTD …..................................................................................... 49
3.1 La defensa de Sócrates, los ecos de Gorgias
                      y los orígenes del diálogo socrático
3.2. Los socráticos en el relato platónico de la muerte de Sócrates
3.3. Las críticas de Antístenes y la reformulación de la Teoría de las Ideas
3.4. Aristipo y el número del tirano
3.5. La paradoja del Menón y los megáricos
3.6. Aristóteles y los megáricos en torno de lo posible

Capítulo 4. A modo de conclusiones sobre la producción y la enseñanza .............................................................................. 115

Bibliografía …....................................................................... 121

In this chapter I explore the portrait of Aristippus in the ancient letters pseudonymously attributed to him. My goal is not to specify the (singular) philosophical or literary content of the letters, but rather to illuminate their artistry by showing how they respond to three different readings: first, from the perspective of ethical theory; second, from the perspective of theories of humour; and third, breaking the illusion that Aristippus is the author, from the historical perspective of Second Sophistic.

ΠΑΝΑΓΙΩΤΑ ΜΠΟΥΜΠΟΥΛΗ, του Εθνικού και Καποδιστριακού Πανεπιστημίου Αθηνών ***_ Ο Αρίστιππος ο Κυρηναίος υπήρξε ο ιδρυτής της σχολής των Κυρηναϊκών, η οποία ταυτίστηκε με τον ακραίο ηδονισμό. Οι Κυρηναϊκοί θεωρούσαν την ηδονή ως το κριτήριο της ηθικής συμπεριφοράς του ανθρώπου. Η ηδονή αποτελούσε το τέλος, τον σκοπό στον οποίο έπρεπε να στοχεύει η ψυχή, ενώ ήταν περιορισμένη στις σωματικές απολαύσεις και στις απολαύσεις της στιγμής. Ο άνθρωπος αναζητούσε την ηδονή και την αποφυγή του πόνου. Πίστευε ότι επειδή το παρελθόν έχει τελειώσει και το μέλλον υπάρχει μόνο στη φαντασία μας, μόνο το παρόν είναι πραγματικό. Οι Κυρηναϊκοί αντίθετοι με το μισογυνισμό της εποχής τους, οδηγήθηκαν στην ανυπακοή των νόμων και στην αθεΐα, επιδοκιμάζοντας την ισότητα της γυναίκας έναντι των ηδονών και τη μοιχεία. Ο Αρίστιππος διαφοροποιήθηκε από τον μέντορά του, τον Σωκράτη, ακολουθώντας έναν έκλυτο τρόπο ζωής, ο οποίος του έδινε μεγαλύτερη ελευθερία να αντιταχθεί σε ό,τι τον περιόριζε. Τα κριτήρια επιλογής των ηδονών ήταν η ένταση και η χρονική εγγύτητά τους, ενώ μεταξύ των ηδονών προείχε αυτή που υπερέχει κατά την ποσότητά της. Ο Αρίστιππος αντιμετώπιζε την ηδονή ως την ουσία της έννοιας του αγαθού, διότι θεωρούσε πως η ηδονή ήταν το αγαθό που οδηγούσε προς την ευδαιμονία. Το κυνήγι των τωρινών ηδονών που υποστηρίζει ο Αρίστιππος, τον διαφοροποιεί από τον Σωκράτη, παρόλο που και οι δύο φιλόσοφοι ήταν υπέρμαχοι της αυτονομίας του ατόμου. Σύμφωνα με τους Κυρηναϊκούς, τίποτα δεν είναι από τη φύση του δίκαιο ή άδικο. Κάθε πράξη του ανθρώπου καθορίζεται από τους νόμους και τα έθιμα των ιδιαίτερων κοινωνιών. Απαραίτητη προϋπόθεση να λυθεί κάποιος από τα δεσμά της κοινωνίας του ήταν η εκπαίδευση. Ο Αρίστιππος δεν ασχολήθηκε με την αποχή, αλλά με την κυριαρχία του ανθρώπου πάνω στην εκάστοτε ηδονή . Ο ηδονισμός αναγνωρίζει ότι οι άνθρωποι μπορεί να αυταπατώνται με τις επιλογές τους, αλλά το βασικό κίνητρό τους είναι να προσπαθούν να έχουν μια ζωή γεμάτη από ηδονές. Η ηδονή καταλήγει να είναι το φως που καθοδηγεί τους ανθρώπους, σύμφωνα με την Κυρηναϊκή φιλοσοφία. Οι Κυρηναϊκοί εκθειάζουν την ηδονή, παρόλο που αντιτάσσονται στα θρησκευτικά πιστεύω της εποχής τους. Ο Αρίστιππος θεωρώντας τον εαυτό του ως πολίτη του κόσμου, αρνήθηκε τα κοινωνικά δεσμά της εποχής του και δε συμβιβάστηκε με την καταπάτηση των παθών.  Πίστεψε στην ηδονή ως το υπέρτατο αγαθό, υπηρετώντας την ευγένεια των σαρκών και την αισθησιακή ηδονή των υλικών ψυχών, απελευθερωμένων από την πίστη και τις συμβάσεις. Ο μύθος του σπηλαίου του Πλάτωνα θα μπορούσε να χρησιμοποιηθεί για να παραλληλίσει τον Αρίστιππο με τον φιλόσοφο της σπηλιάς, καθώς και οι δύο σπάνε τα δεσμά. Ο Αρίστιππος έσπασε τα δεσμά της εποχής του, τα όποια θρησκευτικά και ηθικά πλαίσια στα οποία είχε εγκλειστεί, και βρήκε μόνος τον ήλιο, μέσα από τη βίωση των ηδονών. Στην παρούσα έρευνα επιδιώκεται να παρουσιαστούν τα κεντρικά σημεία του ακραίου ηδονισμού, η υιοθέτηση του οποίου έστρεψε τους φιλοσόφους και όσους τον ασπάστηκαν, σε ένα πιο έκλυτο και απαλλαγμένο από ενοχές ή περιορισμούς τρόπο ζωής.

A common reading of the Cyrenaics is that they are a school of extreme hedonist presentists, recognising only the pleasure of the present moment, and advising against turning our attention to past or future pleasure or pain. Yet they have some strange advice which tells followers to anticipate future harms in order to lessen the unexpectedness of them when they occur. It’s a puzzle, then, how they can consistently hold the attitude they do to our concern with our present selves, and yet endorse the practise of dwelling on possible future painful scenarios. To establish that this is a puzzle, though, we must first be convinced that the report is true. Cicero is our only clear source for the Cyrenaic advice, and scholars have noted reasons to be suspicious of the reliability of his report. I discuss these doubts, and why they ultimately fail to undermine Cicero’s testimony as a source. Defending Cicero as a source for Cyrenaic thought removes a barrier to taking seriously an aspect of Cyrenaic psychology which could radically alter our understanding of their views.

With this paper I tried to look at the earlier Socratic literature as a whole.
Therefore I first tried to establish how many Socratic dialogues were published by a dozen of authors who were disciples/friends of Socrates.
To look at this whole fron the outside is helpful, i.a., to consider its uniqueness as a collective saga, and identify the new literary genre which established itself in the very first decades of the fourth century BCE.
Given the quantity of text units, there is room to presume that the offer of so many dialogues, concentrated as it was in few decades, is evidence of a considerable success of the whole group. This, in turn, suggests that a considerable quantity of papyrus rolls as well as the employment of a number of copyists were involved in the process.

Plato was a Socrates’ friend and disciple, but he wasn’t the only one. No doubt,
Socrates had many followers, however, the majority of their work is lost. Was there any
antagonism among his followers? Who succeeded in interpreting Socrates? Who could be
considered as his successor? Of course, we don’t know if these questions emerged after the
death of Socrates, but the Greek doxography suggests that there was a literary rivalry. As we
underlined earlier, most unfortunately, we can’t examine all of them thoroughly due to the lack
of their work, but we can scrutinize Xenophon’s and Aristippus’ work. All of them, Plato,
Xenophon and Aristippus, presented to a certain extent their ideas concerning education.
Furthermore, they have not neglected the matter of gymnastikè, but what is exactly the role of
physical education in their work? Are there any similarities or any differences between them?
Since, Xenophon and Aristippus (as well as Plato) seem to be in favor of gymnastikè, it is
necessary to understand its role.

The hedonistic theories of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill are both widely known. Hedonism before Bentham, however, is much less known and, hitherto, no systematic presentation of hedonism’s early history has been written. In this paper I seek to fill this gap in the literature by providing an overview of hedonism in early Indian and ancient Greek thought (Sections 1-4), in Roman and Medieval thought (Section 5), and from the Renaissance until the Enlightenment (Section 6)

En estas páginas me propongo hablar sobre el conflicto (si es que sepuede usar ese término) que se ha delineado entre la humanitas presocrática  y la humanitas de Sócrates. Lo haré tomando ejemplos de otro conflicto queha sido tratado a profundidad en nuestro pasado común: aquel entre el catolicismo y la Modernidad. Parece, además, que este conflicto moderno tiene unprecedente importante (y, en gran medida, insospechado): el que se delineó dosmil quinientos años atrás en Grecia, grosso modo,  entre Homero y Sócrates.De esta manera, quiero intentar argumentar que este conflicto moderno tieneun precedente en Grecia antigua y, por ello, se encuentran similitudes que, cuando menos, son dignas de notar.
Originally read at the Univ. Lateranense, Roma, then revised , translated and published in ARETE REVISTA DE FILOSOFIA (a journal published in Lima, Peru), vol. XXVII 2015, 281-296; available through http://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/arete/article/view/14618/pdf

The Socratic heritage is a difficult topic. However, starting from ideas going back to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, it seems possible to grasp some qualifying lines of influence exerted by Socrates upon Greek ideas of life, values, and models of behavior.
In this paper I’ll address the theme of self-control by pointing out that, while a widely shared attitude encouraged to acknowledge various limits to human freedom, and thus to admit human akrasia,, Socrates not only was personally enkratēs, but at the same time devised a global strategy in order to inculcate the enkrateia as something viable, thus far from impossible, and treating akrasia as a source of true shame.
As a consequence, there is room for reconsidering the traditional objections against the possibility of reaching some sound conclusions about what Socrates may have been, considered, and taught. <> In this context a special attention is paid to Dover's Greek Popular Morality (1974) and Sarri’s Socrate e la genesi storica dell’idea occidentale di  anima (1975).

Was Socrates a philosopher? Did he presume to be a philosopher? This may seem not unikely, at least until one does not consider the momentous evidence suggesting  that he wasn't, since the only notion of philosophy available to him (and his contemporaries) was a notion having very little in common with the one made universally known by Plato.
This is the main demonstrandum of the present paper which, though based on the third chapter of a previous book of mine, "La filosofia non nasce con Talete, e nemmeno con Socrate", gives a fresh account of the topic with special reference to the cultural identity of Socrates.  ------  Caution: what I can offer here are mere proofs of a paper which is now available in A. Stavru, C. Moore (eds.), Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue, Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2018, p. 268-298. Its full title is as follows: "Philosopher Socrates? Philosophy at the Time of Socrates and the Reformed Philosophia of Plato'.

L’apparition de la figure du sage-mendiant au IVe av. J.-C. sous l’impulsion de Diogène de Sinope provoque la résistance d’autres philosophes. C’est à la fois parce qu’il est dépossédé et qu’il sollicite des dons pour assurer sa subsistance que les adversaires des cyniques, notamment les épicuriens, refusent d’adopter la vie du mendiant. Ses défenseurs doivent lutter sur plusieurs fronts afin de légitimer son mode de vie et établir sa supériorité morale.

In this contribution, I aim to show how locating the Platonic dialogues in the intellectual context of their own time can illuminate their philosophical content.  I seek to show, with reference to a specific dialogue (the Theaetetus), how Plato responds to other thinkers of his time, and also to bring out how, by reconstructing Plato’s response, we can gain deeper insight into the way that Plato shapes the structure and form of his argument in the dialogue. In particular, I argue that the subtler thinkers (hoi kompsoteroi) discussed by Plato’s Socrates at Tht. 156a3 are Aristippus and the early Cyrenaics. (Recent scholars, such as Giannantoni and Tsouna, have rejected this identification, which was earlier defended by Schleiermacher, Grote, Zeller and Mondolfo.)  Further, I claim that, once we recognise that the subtler thinkers are most likely to be the early Cyrenaics, we can make better sense of the scope and content of the arguments Plato puts forward at Tht. 156a - 160e (especially 156a - 157c). Also, I suggest that this identification helps us to understand a crucial part of Tht. 184b - 186e. Here Plato, in exploring the account of perception offered at 156a - 157c, uses the metaphor of the Wooden Horse to illustrate the conception of perception that he attributes to thinkers such as Protagoras and, in my view, the early Cyrenaics, who maintain that knowledge is a form of perception.

The paper outlines several forms of ethical attitude to good life and good death in the Socratic literature of the fourth century BCE. A model for the Socratic discussions could be found in Herodotus' story about the meeting between Croesus and Solon. Within their conversation, Solon shows the king of Lydia that death is a place from which the life of each man can be seen as the completed whole. In his Phaedo, Plato depicts Socrates' last day before his death in a similar spirit, as the completion of his beautiful life. However, there is no consensus regarding opinions on death among the Socratics. The final part of the paper outlines various meanings of death in the writings of the first generation of the Socratic authors, which arise from different attitudes that the individual philosophers hold regarding the soul as well as other topics. This part puts the principal emphasis on Aristippus, who is considered as the most controversial figure of the Socratic movement. Aristippus makes an interesting opposite to Plato concerning death, since he associates the philosopher's endeavour for a good life solely with that which is here and now.

The paper outlines several forms of ethical attitude to good life and good death in the Socratic literature of the fourth century BCE. A model for the Socratic discussions could be found in Herodotus’ story about the meeting between Croesus and Solon. Within their conversation, Solon shows the king of Lydia that death is a place from which the life of each man can be seen as the completed whole. In his Phaedo, Plato depicts Socrates’ last day before his death in a similar spirit, as the completion of his beautiful life. However, there is no consensus regarding opinions on death among the Socratics. The final part of the paper outlines various meanings of death in the writings of the first generation of the Socratic authors, which arise from different attitudes that the individual philosophers hold regarding the soul as well as other topics. This part puts the principal emphasis on Aristippus, who is considered as the most controversial figure of the Socratic movement. Aristippus mak...

En el presente seminario nos proponemos examinar el diálogo entre Filosofía Antigua y el pensamiento de Foucault a propósito del tema de la filosofía como forma de vida, o más específicamente, como práctica del cuidado de sí. El problema socrático de la enkráteia o dominio de sí  tuvo distintas interpretaciones en el marco del círculo de pensadores que lo rodeaba, tanto en Platón cuanto en los llamados “socráticos menores”, interpretaciones que a su vez influenciaron a las líneas filosóficas helenísticas que se remontan a estas figuras. En este marco de influencias se para Foucault para pensar, desde nuestro días, el problema del cuidado de sí. Creemos que la Filosofía clásica constituye un hito ineludible para la comprensión del decurso posterior del pensamiento. Existen dos perspectivas historiográficas tradicionales que justifican la necesidad del estudio del pensamiento clásico: el clasicismo y el historicismo. Sin embargo, si se las considera detenidamente, ambas despojan de sentido el estudio de la Filosofía antigua (Berti, 1975). El clasicismo idealiza la antigüedad como modelo extra temporal perfecto que sólo puede ser objeto de imitación en la historia posterior; para el historicismo, el estudio de la Filosofía antigua consistiría en una búsqueda erudita que se propone reconstruir un pasado cuyas verdades han sido superadas. Sin embargo, existen otras líneas exegéticas que abordan el estudio de la Filosofía antigua, no como mero objeto de investigación histórica, sino a causa de su actualidad, confiando en que puede efectuar un aporte a la elucidación de nuestros problemas, si es interrogada de modo pertinente (Wieland, 1988; Mársico, 2010). La actualidad de la Filosofía antigua radica en la vigencia de su forma y contenido, es decir, tanto en los problemas que los filósofos clásicos tematizan, los cuales son retomados por la Filosofía de épocas posteriores, cuanto en la metodología de la que se valen para pensar (Boeri, 2000). Tal es el caso de la perspectiva que adopta Pierre Hadot en sus textos ¿Qué es la filosofía antigua? y Ejercicios espirituales y filosofía antigua. La hipótesis de Hadot es que la filosofía, en tanto búsqueda de la sabiduría es, ante todo, una forma de vida (1998: 13-14; 2006: 235-251). Esta misma hipótesis es tomada y transformada por Foucault en la última etapa de su obra, cuyo problema central es la el gobierno de sí (1987; 2002; 2009). En primer lugar, según demuestran los trabajos de Pierre Hadot (1995; 2003) y de Michel Foucault (1987; 2002; 2009), todo discurso filosófico –y especialmente el antiguo y el tardoantiguo– no cuenta exclusivamente como un encadenamiento de enunciados abstractos, regidos únicamente por la intrínseca legalidad del rigor lógico. A diferencia de lo que podría creerse, la Filosofía Antigua no es un theatrum philosophicum donde los griegos contemplaron la sucesión de sistemas conceptuales destinados principalmente a explicar el universo pero sólo eventual y secundariamente a incidir en la praxis. Por el contrario, «por lo menos desde Sócrates, la opción por un modo de vida no se localiza al final del proceso de la actividad filosófica [...] sino en su origen», de modo que «el discurso filosófico se origina en una elección de vida y en una opción existencial y no a la inversa» (Hadot 1995: 13).

The Socratic philosophers often received the nickname of "minors." This minority makes that anyone who looks at the few testimonies we have of them has the feeling that he enters the house of a bunch of poor relatives in the realm of Greek philosophy. Many times it was considered that they were lucky enough to go down in history because they were students or companions of those who deserve the name of philosophers, i.e. the golden line made up of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. These incomparable, and therefore almost inhuman, milestones appear to construct their theories with the material they bequeathed to each other, and only secondarily they add to the challenge of theoretical opponents that had no way of shadowing them.
Other times the stereotype sketches them as poor arguers.
We are trying to revert this perspective, not because we are particularly interested in some historical reparation of the ignored thinkers, nor we enjoy the margins nonchalantly. Neither do we pretend, for example, that encyclopaedias should devote equal effort to Eufantus of Olinthus and Plato, to Antipater of Cyrene and Aristotle. In fact, we point to the reversal of a persistent tendency in the studies of the last century that radicalised the internal readings from the consecrated authors to the detriment of the attention to the dialogical context in which the theories arise. This translation with Introduction and notes, the first integral version to a modern language, tries to open this way.

Los filósofos socráticos a los que está referida a esta obra han recibido por mucho tiempo el mote de “menores”. Esta minoridad hace que quien se asoma a los pocos testimonios que sobre ellos conservamos tenga la sensación de que entra a la casa de los parientes pobres de la filosofía griega. Muchas veces se tendió a considerar que tuvieron la suerte de pasar a la historia por haber sido alumnos o compañeros de los que de verdad merecen el nombre de filósofos, la primera línea áurea conformada por Sócrates, Platón y Aristóteles. Esos hitos incomparables, y por lo tanto casi inhumanos, se perfilan, desde esta perspectiva, construyendo sus teorías con el material que se legaban unos a otros, y, sólo secundariamente, suman a ello la impugnación de adversarios teóricos que por incapaces, corruptos o ambos motivos no tenían modo de hacerles sombra.
Otras tantas veces el estereotipo los bosqueja como meros discutidores. Un trabajo reciente se refiere a ellos del siguiente modo: “si aunque sea una fracción del chisme, el rumor y las indirectas relatadas por Diógenes Laercio es verdadera, los socráticos eran un rejunte mezquino y pendenciero que no sólo estaban monumentalmente en desacuerdo entre ellos sobre las perspectivas filosóficas de Sócrates, sino que también se detestaban intensamente unos a otros”.
El trabajo que nos planteamos intenta revertir esta perspectiva, no porque nos interese especialmente algún tipo de reparación histórica de los pensadores ignorados, ni disfrutemos morosamente en los autores de los márgenes. Tampoco pretenderemos, por ejemplo, que las enciclopedias deban dedicar igual empeño a Eufanto de Olinto y a Platón, a Antípatro de Cirene y a Aristóteles. En rigor, apuntamos a la reversión de una tendencia persistente en los estudios del siglo pasado que radicalizó las lecturas internas de los autores consagrados en desmedro de la atención al contexto dialógico en que las teorías se plasman. Esta traducción con introducción y notas, la primera versión integral en una lengua moderna, trata de abrir esta brecha.

This is an uncorrected pre-proof version.

The manuscripts of De officiis all record something strange at 1.148: Cicero says that the philosophers Socrates and Aristippus had exceptional licence to flout social custom and convention owing to their “great and divine good qualities” (magna et divina bona). There are no worries about Socrates, but the example of Aristippus seems preposterous. This paper makes the following argument: (1) elsewhere Cicero defines divina bona in such a way to exclude hedonists; this should rule out crediting Aristippus with magna et divina bona alongside Socrates; (2) all scholarly efforts to account for the presence of Aristippus at 1.148 fail to convince; (3) the name Aristippus at 1.148 should, therefore, be remedied; (4) there are excellent philosophical reasons to think that Antisthenes, a follower of Socrates who is credited with setting in motion the Cynic philosophical tradition, is the name that Cicero wrote or should have written in the original.

"Sobre un antiguo exilio de la luz. Los contactos obliterados entre la gnosis griega y la filosofía de M. Henry", Revista Alpha, ISSN: 0716-4254, 0718-2201.

Resumen La filosofía de Michel Henry llevó adelante una propuesta de radicalización de la fenomenología que apela a una puesta en primer plano de la afectividad como expresión de la Vida. Para dar cuenta de la especificidad de este viraje adoptó las categorías opositivas de gnosis griega y gnosis cristiana, la primera asociada con el compromiso de la descripción del mundo en su exterioridad y la segunda vinculada con la experiencia de la carne. Sin embargo, entre las filosofías de la antigüedad griega se halla el caso de la posición de los cirenaicos, que preanuncia numerosos rasgos del tratamiento henryano de la afectividad. Este trabajo estudia esta relación repasando los puntos centrales de la caracterización henryana de gnosis griega para conectarla luego con los presupuestos centrales de la filosofía cirenaica y sus tesis acerca de las afecciones, el tacto interno y el diseño de un lenguaje que refleje la afectividad. Este recorrido permitirá sopesar los alcances de la tesis acerca de la homogeneidad de la gnosis griega y mostrará una deriva importante de antecedentes respecto del pensamiento de la inmanencia.

Abstract The philosophy of Michel Henry carried out a proposal of radicalization of phenomenology, which appeals to a foregrounding of affectivity as an expression of Life. In order to account for this turn, he proposed the opposing categories of Greek gnosis and Christian gnosis. The first one is associated with the commitment of describing the world in its exteriority and the second one is linked to the experience of the flesh. However, among the philosophies of Greek antiquity, the Cyrenaics raised many issues similar to those of the henryan treatment of affectivity. This work studies this relationship by reviewing the main aspects of the henryan characterization of Greek gnosis and then connects it with the key points of the Cyrenaic philosophy about affection, internal tact and the design of a language that reflects affectivity. This exploration will allow us to evaluate the scope of the thesis about the homogeneity of the Greek gnosis and will show important factors of the ancient thought about immanence.

The present article aims to reconstruct some political consequences of aristippean philosophy in the light of fragment fs, 570 (= ssr, iv.a.163 = Memorabilia, ii.1.1–17) in order to show how Aristippus' agreement with Socrates' remarks fits the Cyrus composed by Xenophon in his Cyropaedia. In pursuance of this, I will review Aris-tippus' ethics and will show how, despite the opposition with his hedonistic principles for a pleasureable life, Aristippus accepts that a good ruler needs to be a enkratic one—althouth he argues that pursuing any rule is senselessness. After showing how it is possible to recognice some hedonistic position in Adeimantus' question at the beginning of Republic, iv, I will present the enkratic character of Cyrus. Finally, I will conclude pointing out the political continuities between Aristippus' acceptance in fs, 570 and the ideal of ruler constructed by Xenophon.

Socrates is commonly viewed as a model of rational argumentation and ascetic behavior. However, there is a different way of Socratic thinkingthe Cyrenian school with its founder Aristippus of Cyrene. This philosopher was considered a radical hedonist for whom good life was fulfilled only with pleasure. Our paper has two main goals: 1) in the first part of this study we will answer the question whether Aristippus' hedonism corresponds to other forms of Socratic approach to virtue; 2) in the second part of our text we will deal with the problem of what the Aristippean education through pleasure might look like.

Plato was a Socrates’ friend and disciple, but he wasn’t the only one. No doubt, Socrates had many followers, however, the majority of their work is lost. Was there any antagonism among his followers? Who succeeded in interpreting Socrates? Who could be considered as his successor? Of course, we don’t know if these questions emerged after the death of Socrates, but the Greek doxography suggests that there was a literary rivalry. As we underlined earlier, most unfortunately, we can’t examine all of them thoroughly due to the lack of their work, but we can scrutinize Xenophon’s and Aristippus’ work. All of them, Plato, Xenophon and Aristippus, presented to a certain extent their ideas concerning education. Furthermore, they have not neglected the matter of gymnastikè, but what is exactly the role of physical education in their work? Are there any similarities or any differences between them? Since, Xenophon and Aristippus (as well as Plato) seem to be in favor of gymnastikè, it is nec...

In 1953, just outside the southwest corner of the Athenian Agora a small building was identified with the house and workshop of Simon the shoemaker. Our sources report that despite his humble profession, this man was blessed with a smart mind and diverse customers among the citizens of Athens between the 5th and the 4th century BCE. Starting from the remains of some of his belongings, I will reflect on how the position of his shop helped him attract both Pericles and Socrates, and how his profession contributed to shaping his intellectual profile, getting him good as well as bad reputation. Cynics regarded him as the truest interpreter of Socrates’ way of life, whereas Cyrenaic Aristippus criticized him, mocking the toil of his job and the frugality of his existence. Simon perfectly knew how to address those spiteful words, as I shall show in the last part of the paper, devoted to the writings that ancient and modern scholars attributed to him. There, I shall also suggest a new reading of Diog. Laert. 2.123, arguing that, rather than as the inventor of the literary form of the Socratic dialogue, Simon is there described as Socrates’ first philosophical interlocutor.

En el presente artículo se analiza la presencia de elementos próximos al escepticismo en la filosofía griega anterior a Pirrón de Elis a través de la hermenéutica que hizo de ella el escepticismo del siglo II d. C. En concreto, la discusión sobre la proximidad o lejanía de estas posiciones con respecto a las tesis pirrónicas que Sexto Empírico desarrolla en el amplio pasaje de su obra que abarca desde HP, I, 210 hasta HP, I, 241, puesta en relación con las visiones ya planteadas desde la antigüedad respecto a la tradición de pensamiento que culmina en el escepticismo helenístico, permiten determinar qué elementos de los que conforman la postura escéptica son comunes con su herencia anterior y cuáles son patrimonio exclusivo de dicha corriente.

The phenomenon of the Socratic dialogue describes how many members of the circle attribute their own ideas to Socrates. This procedure provokes profiles distant from Plato or Xenophon's variants. In this case, we are interested in the Hedonist Socrates built by Aristippus of Cyrene and his followers. We examine the Cyrenaic obstacles to justify Socrates' strategy during the trial that was understood at the moment as a choice for death, which results incompatible with hedonistic principles. With this purpose, we will analyse the information from Papyrus Köln 205 that presents a Hedonist Socrates trying to explain his behaviour, and then we will study the elements in the Cyrenaic thought that make it compatible with Aristippus' ideas. Thus, we will be able to elucidate relevant points of the link between pleasure, happiness and death in the Cyrenaic philosophy.

En este trabajo nos ocuparemos en revisar las conexiones entre el pensamiento de Cicerón y Aristipo. Es importante tener en cuenta la influencia del cirenaico para comprender cabalmente la tarea que realizó el orador. Esta no consistió simplemente en una mera comunicación del saber helenístico al mundo romano, sino que se trata de un minucioso trabajo especulativo. Para comprender esto, analizaremos la versión que realiza Cicerón del término griego hedoné, acuñado por Aristipo, al latino voluptas con que comunica su filosofía hedonista. Leeremos los fragmentos en que Cicerón menciona a Aristipo (Acad. 4.131,139 De Fin 2,19, Tusc 2,15, Ep. 1. 9. Ep. 26), para luego contrastar los testimonios con los pasajes en griego de Giannantoni y en castellano de Mársico.