Atlantic Alliance

This paper will assess the alleged relevance of the realist thinking in International Relations by answering the question whether Realism still dominates the theory and practice of International Relations. Examination of some core theoretical assumptions of Realism and assessment of the continuing significance of the realist thinking during the Cold War period and after will be undertaken with regard to both theory and practice. To answer the key research question whether Realism is still dominant, arguments against and in favour of the claim will be presented. Based on evidence, the line of argument establishes that although the realist depiction of International Relations, with its stress upon the distribution of power, provides an important departure and continuous insight, not to mention the ‘timeless wisdom’ into the understanding of the behaviour of states, it is not in itself definitive as Realism has some noticeable weaknesses. This paper begins from the premise that although Realism alone is insufficient for understanding of contemporary international relations, its insights remain necessary to that enterprise. The method adopted is Toulmin model of argument, which serves as a basis for structure and organization. The big idea is an elucidation on ‘an enlightened Realism’, which confirms the continuing validity of Realist principles throughout history. It is explained through a juxtaposition between statecraft by Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Despite arguments questioning the relevance of the classical paradigm Realism is nowhere near becoming irrelevant in the practice of some states. Whereas the discipline has witnessed an astounding flourishing of numerous post-classical theories of International Relations. Despite emergence of such new theories, it is reasonable to suggest that Realism has not become obsolete. Undeniably, Realism produces numerous prolific critics, perhaps deservedly, because in its power political mode, it provides instrumental interpretation of the international system. Some would argue even, immoral examination of international politics, as opposed to a normative one, unlocked by the study of alternative International Relations theories, such as the English School, Constructivism, Feminism, Green theories or Global Environmentalism. It will be argued, however, that scholars of international politics cannot totally discard the Realist paradigm since security, rather than economic development, still remains the most important concern for many states in the developing world (although emancipation concerns are coming to the fore as well). Realism’s applicability and ability to explain the current international politics remains unparalleled. Although the world is changing (45% of the world is democratic), in certain fundamentals, it has not changed as much as many contemporary International Relations theorists believe. To a large extent, it remains characterised by anarchy, and its attendant logic of self-help and struggle for survival. The world is still decentralised, the key political actors are states which are competitive. This confirms Realist analyses of power politics with states compelled by their anarchic environment to act in a ‘functionally undifferentiated’ manner while using capability advantages to gain more influence over outcomes based on power accumulation, as timeless. In other words, Realism as one of not many theoretical paradigms remains relevant despite the passing of history, in other words, it aspires to explain events even beyond history as it is the longest tradition of thinking about international political reality. Thus, Realism remains essential to understanding states’ choices and actions. Consequently, despite the emergence of postpositivist approaches, it would be incorrect, some would argue even naïve, to state that Realism is not dominant. However pessimistically it may sound, based on data and evidence of states' practice Realism persists. Realism is far from being an exhaustive theory though, neither has it existed without evident limitations, nor has it remained universally applicable to all times and epochs (despite claims for it being beyond history, i.e. being relevant in all epochs), but its savage, simplistic variant is still evident in the world. Whether in brutal acts of war, acts of avenge, revanchism, competition and breaking of human rights, Realism is still unrivalled when it comes to the conduct of states in the non-democratic world. However, Realism's influence is not monolithic when it comes to theory. Realism persists in acts of states only when weak leaders sacrificing integrity and objectivity decide to allow so, for example, by not disarming an aggressor in time, or by turning a blind eye to unlawful military interventions, or by not being guided by ethics. Hard military power counts for more in the context of international politics than it does in democratic domestic politics. In international relations, conquest, or pure coercion, is not leadership, but mere dictation. In other words, 'offensive' Realism exists, as long as, weak leaders who are on top of states follow the realist precepts and its attendant logic of competition, rivalry, carnal revenge and retort to war. In so doing though dictators put whole societies as well as liberal order in danger. In contrast, strong leaders help groups create and achieve shared goals. Successful transformational leadership is about change. When strong leaders allow for the possibility of transformation of the structure towards security community, then the realist logic no longer holds true and is not accurate. Realism and neo-realism are unable to explain structural change in world order. In line with the evidence, although Realism is not definitive (i.e. even weak leaders have alternatives and societies have democracy to choose strong leaders), it is alive and well, and it looks like it is not likely to disappear anytime soon from both theory and practice of International Relations. Primitive, savage and brutal elements are unfortunately still visible in 21st century civilized world. What can IR scholars do to make Realism less dominant in both IR theory and practice of states? The relationship between theory and practice is that of mutual, dual causality. If Realism persists on top echelons of power, it persists also in the practice of states. To change this, scholars have to initiate a theoretical innovation among the top most powerful statesmen. Realism persists unless IR scholars are actively engaged in innovative refinement and eclectic creation of new theories which could then be, in turn, readily applied by strong, transformational leaders, i.e. leaders who believe in change and bring about real, multiple social change. In principle, good theories lead to good policies since policy problems inspire theoretical innovation. Theories inform policy although policy makers pay relatively little attention to the vast theoretical literature in International Relations. If this trend could be reversed, if more scholars would become more interested in doing policy-relevant work and if more policy makers started to listen to IR scholars, then this would enable more effective bridging of the gap between theory and policy. If it is accepted that the point of IR theory is to enable a convergence in which political theory meets practice. Then, such an analytic activity could be, thereby leading to a smoother and swifter transfer of new, well crafted, fine-tuned, and more innovative theories strengthening 'transmission belt' from theory to policy. This would be followed by implementation of effective, successful policies to enable peaceful change though within the system, in actual reality, leading to the innovative and technological transformation of the whole system. Perhaps, even civilizing the International Society in the way that some of the English School scholars have long time ago envisaged. Creative, original ideas exist, but they are rarely applied by policy makers and statesmen who often discard eco-movements, feminist, postmodernist, pospositivist theories. Thus, if scholars and academics produce useful knowledge, as for example with the theory of 'an enlightened Realism', such constructive ideas could be implemented into the practice of statecraft. When successful, research for policy’s sake could perform an enlightenment function of social sciences (this metaphor illustrates the role of a theory in understanding the world of IR - we can only shed light on what is known, and even then, we cannot be 100% certain about the activity of theorising, for what is unknown remains in the darkness) making the discipline more diverse and the world a better place. Reminding at the same time that each of the theories whether classical or post-classical, reveal only part of truth about contemporary international political reality, and thus, from this standpoint, none is sufficiently satisfactory.

My contribution to the nuclear debate presents 3 possible concepts for complexity evolution, which make understood that what is at a stake right now is the evolution of complexity. The use of missiles in any war scenario has very little, and if any very bad effects on reality, which I strongly recommend to not to look for.

The official results of the conference were published under the following document, which you can find at the ETH Zürich file archive: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/154318/MD_Draft%20Report_16102012.pdf

The official report does not resolve the dilemma that was discussed in Brussels. It reveals a one-sided and partial perspective and does not uncover the risks at which Europe was. The debate was stronger than the report tells and the report fails to describe the Russian position adequately as well as the reality of the debate. The US-American assurance, that the missile defense shield set up by NATO is not offensive and does not mean a threat to Russia  is a discussable statement. Quoting Vershbow as main speaker is nice, but the way this report puts facts and presents opinions is debatable.

A report about the real terms of discussion cannot be published.

The Obama administration’s missile defense system in Europe, of which Romania is a part, is one of the most comprehensive of change of strategic military relations in Europe - and worldwide - after Cold War. How does this afect the national security of small and medium-size like Romania? What are the main gains, vulnerabilities and risks faced by Romania in deciding to host elements of the American missile defense system? This article try to look upon and answer pragmatically - emphasizing the strategic aspects of it - to these fundamental questions relations regarding Romania’s national security.

In the last two decades, the expression “asymmetric warfare” has been generally adopted with an innovative dimension by the popular imagery to point out the disparity between military means (and tactics) used by conventional and unconventional forces in a low-intensity conflict. Hence, public opinion often links the “new” wars to two warfare phases – the insurgency and the counterinsurgency – not so truly “new” . It is no coincidence that principles to win these wars were identified since the end of the XIXth century , and they did not specifically concern military technology and its innovations. The aim of this paper is to highlight briefly the continuity lines among the most important counterinsurgency military doctrines , which pave the road for today’s doctrines. The focus will be on the cultural dimension, which is here supposed to be one of the main keys to achieve victory.

This contribution was prepared for the workshop of the UACES "CSDP STRATEGY" Network, which took place at the University of Surrey on February 1st, 2013.
The note presents the early findings of a collaborative research project launched in the Summer 2012 and co-ordinated by the COST (European Co-operation in Science and Technology) Action IS0805 “New Challenges of Peacekeeping and the European Union’s Role in Multilateral Crisis Management”: http://www.peacekeeping-cost-is0805.eu/.
Drawing from co-ordinated fieldwork research in Madrid and Paris (Manuel Muniz), Rome and London (Giovanni Faleg), this note analyzes the CSDP from the Spanish, French, Italian and British national interest perspectives. It accounts for the key elements of the four countries’ national interests and how they are crisscrossed with security co-operation at the CSDP level. The empirical findings provide new and important insights on the evolution of strategic interests and culture over the past 20 years, namely as far as the integration of civilian and military tools for crisis management missions and capacity building through pooling & sharing are concerned. The methodology is based on semi-structured interviews with security stakeholders as well as on the review and content analysis of relevant secondary sources and material available.

The 1982 Anglo-Argentine war over the Falkland Islands, in which the United States “superpower” ultimately sided with the British vital ally against the Argentine important ally, had repercussions at systemic, regional and local levels. In the aftermath, the victorious Great Britain led by Margaret Thatcher was diplomatically strengthened. The victory rose the country’s morale, reversed its declining international posture and allowed the British to play a relevant role in the Cold War bipolar dynamics in the second half of the 1980s, including a leading position within NATO. Such leadership was welcomed in the US administration, where the Prime Minister increased her influence on issues concerning the Euro-Atlantic area. The Soviet Union appeared to be surprised by the British assertiveness shown during the war. This perception further complicated the Soviet precarious international situation. The Falklands victory, indeed, vigorously impacted upon the overall Western strategic posture. The lesson learned was that NATO had capabilities and will to fight when necessary. In Washington, Thatcher’s influence on systemic issues relating to the Euro-Atlantic context was not extended to other theaters, such as Latin America. The 1983 US invasion of the former British colony of Grenada, still a member of the Commonwealth Realm headed by the British Crown, was emblematic. The US support given to Britain in the 1982 South Atlantic war and the unilateralism shown in the Caribbean one year later imperiled the hemispheric pillar of US foreign policy and, therefore, weakened US hegemony over the Americas. The resulting anti-Yankee wave propagated across Latin America compromised almost definitely the inter-American multilateral system. Because of the military defeat in the Falklands war, Argentina concluded the era of military dictatorships and returned to democracy. This new manifestation of the ‘third wave of democratization’ gave further legitimacy to the idea of moral superiority of democracy over other forms of repressive governments and, consequently, of the Western system over Communism. Today the sovereignty over the Falklands remains an open issue. The rivalry between Argentina and Britain has been recently rekindled by diplomatic attacks of neo-colonialism on both sides. The 1982 war and its memory crystallized the two positions. Argentina asked for new diplomatic talks, but Britain has been refusing any dialogue for more than 34 years, upgrading on the contrary her military posture at the Islands. Also for this reason, a definitive agreement equally satisfactory for the two counterparts does not appear to be on the horizon.

Il Patto Atlantico del 1949 segnò l'inizio di una nuova era per l'Occidente. Per la prima volta nella loro storia gli Stati Uniti si impegnarono militarmente in tempo di pace a difendere gli alleati europei da un'aggressione esterna. Ad oltre dieci anni dalla fine della Guerra Fredda, gli attentati terroristici dell'11 settembre 2001 capovolsero questa prospettiva con l'Europa decisa a sostenere l'alleato oltre Atlantico. La NATO applicò in breve tempo il casus foederis: l'attacco al cuore dell'America divenne così un attacco a tutti gli Stati membri dell'Alleanza. Ma quel consenso e quella rapidità rappresentarono una «pietra miliare sulla via dell'impotenza» per la stessa NATO.

The end of the Cold War dramatically changed the global security environment. Old power dynamics faded away, new actors appeared and organizations born and flourished in the bipolar age, like NATO, needed to find another raison d'être to remain effectively responsive when confronted with international crisis. Twenty-six years on since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the debate about how the Atlantic Alliance can stay relevant in the rapidly-changing scenario of the XXI century has not ended. Particularly now, direct strategic threats and/or challenges such as the Ukrainian crisis, the advance of the so-called Islamic State in the Greater Middle East and the contrasting territorial claims in the Artic region have ignited once more the discussion on the future tasks of NATO.

Recent cuts in EU member states’ defence budgets
make it impossible to maintain adequate military
capabilities at the national level. Only a greater
European integration of the national armed forces
can keep them effective and efficient. Some steps
forward in this direction are possible, although
difficult, on several levels: the implementation of the
pooling and sharing approach on the military level;
the establishment of the permanent structured
cooperation on the institutional level; the definition of
a European roadmap for dual-use technologies on
the technological level; the launch of European
procurement programmes co-financed by the EU on
the industrial level. All these steps forward are linked
to a urgent and basic political choice between two
alternatives: more Europe in defence policy, or the
complete inability of European countries to conduct
such a policy.

In 2014, the United States and Europe faced many controversial diplomatic and military dynamics. Until 2013, NATO was requested to unravel two main Gordian knots that would have determined its future: the commitment in Afghanistan and the burden sharing issue. However, today the Atlantic Alliance has revised the nature of its priorities essentially due to the Ukrainian crisis. The United States, the majority shareholder of NATO, has undertaken a similar path by rethinking the role of the Alliance in its grand strategy. Nevertheless, Washington should still address a fundamental question for the future of the Western alliance: is America still an Atlantic power or has returned to its historical vocation toward Asia? During President Obama’s first term, in fact, NATO was not at the core of the US foreign policy. Is this maybe the symptom that the Alliance has finally turned into the already predicted relic of the Cold War? Obama's second term has instead shown a different approach toward Europe. Nowadays, the American debate on NATO is focusing on what is happening not only in Eastern Europe but also in the Greater Middle East. What kind of tasks and what prospects for the NATO post-2014, then? In the US, the discussion is still open.

Transition Strategic Studies and International Order, 2003

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338340060_Europe_North_America_and_International_Security_The_need_for_a_revised_balanced_relationship-Transition_Studies_ReviewTransition_Strategic_Studies_and_International_Order_22003

The mass atrocities that precipitate a humanitarian crisis are rarely sudden. The conditions slowly build up; whether by the escalation of pre-existing tensions and sentiments, the targeted and focus actions of an autonomous coordinated movement or group, or direct paramilitary or state acting forces. The context of a humanitarian intervention is often juxtaposed with an estimation of what a human life is worth. Calculations are made regarding the potential financial expenditure by the intervening nation or nations, the size of the population that will be saved by this military action, the duration of the intervention mission, and the projected loss of life by the intervening forces.

The involvement of NATO forces in the ousting of Mu’ammar Gheddafi has been controversial since the beginning of the Libyan crisis. The fracture between those in favour of a direct involvement, and those wishing to keep out of the crisis provides for a clear example of the diver-gences existing within the Alliance. The decision of the Obama’s administration to maintain a low profile both before and after NATO took officially charge of the multinational intervention seems to confirm the lack of unity of purpose. The success of the military operation is unlikely to solve the internal contradictions. The request of the Libyan TNC to delay the end of the operation for at least a month and the possibility of an involvement of NATO forces in a “stabilization” mission have exposed the divisions within the interventionist camp itself. The potential mission creep rises further questions over the aims and goals of the Alliance.

Il saggio si basa su documentazione recentemente desecretata. Attraverso tali fonti d’archivio viene ricostruito il dibattito in seno all’Amministrazione Clinton in merito all’allargamento della NATO in Europa centro-orientale. Il lavoro prospetta come tale processo abbia avuto luogo anzitutto perchè gli Stati Uniti ne hanno fatto un’importante priorità strategica, promossa nonostante l’opposizione russa – invero talvolta contraddittoria – che avrebbe voluto dare maggior peso all’OSCE come istituzione di sicurezza paneuropea.

For more than two decades after the end of the Cold War, the core of European security has been unchallenged. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO looked for a new rationale inside a new strategic global framework. The outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in 2014 turned out to be a dramatic game-changer for NATO. Since then, the Alliance had to face controversial – but familiar – diplomatic and military dynamics, which echoed those of the Cold War. Even after Russia reawakened the Cold War nightmares, the territorial defense should be considered as one part of a more complex security environment that extends well beyond Eastern Europe. Out-of-area missions are not out of date, at least until when turmoil and international terrorism continue to upset the Mediterranean region and the Greater Middle East.

Is NATO in Need of a Renewed Security Concept? Marios Panagiotis Efthymiopoulos Department of Politics, University of Crete, Rethimnon, Greece. Marios. efthymiopoulos@ stud. soc. uoc. gr Abstract: The requirement for a renewed concept of security for NATO policy and actions ...