Creatio Ex Nihilo

Warum kann Augustinus die These, dass die Welt schon immer mit Gott existiert hat, nicht verteidigen? Im ersten Abschnitt werde ich Augustinus Theorie der Zeit und Schöpfung kurz rekonstruieren und einige Probleme vorstellen. Im zweiten Abschnitt werde ich die folgenden Fragen versuchen zu beantworten: warum kann Augustinus die These, dass die Welt schon immer mit Gott existiert hat, nicht verteidigen? Ich werde argumentieren, dass wir die Augustinus Zeittheorie im Hinblick auf ihr Schuld-Doktrin betrachten sollen und, dass Augustinus, obwohl kein philosophisches Argument und auch keine biblischen Beweise für die ex-nihilo Schöpfung hat, steht seine Verteidigung seiner Zeittheorie in Einklang mit seiner Schuld-Doktrin.

Urmăresc în materialul de față, câteva chestiuni-limită din câmpul cercetării științifice, care în ultimele decenii au generat dezbateri aprinse, menționând poziții care sugerează că ele ar ascunde discontinuități de fond, ce fragmentează tabloul științific al lumii, descrierea micro- și macro-cosmosului, abordarea lumi vii și a omul. În legătură cu acestea, propun câteva înțelesuri provenite din reflecția teologiei ortodoxe, care aduc în discuție legătura dintre cunoașterea științifică și viața omului.

In this essay I compare Hegel’s theory of time and becoming with the contemporary debate, aiming on the one hand (A) at presenting Hegel’s thought in contemporary terms, and on the other, (B) at offering new inputs to the present metaphysical debate from a Hegelian point of view. From a close reading of selected Hegelian texts I argue (1) that Hegel advocates a form of presentism and shares McTaggart’s thesis that the B-series (chronological time) presupposes the A-series (dynamical time); (2) that his position is pe-culiar because, although he admits that change is inconsistent, he puts in jeopardy the law of non contradiction (at least in its universality), instead of denying the reality of time and change, like McTaggart did. These considerations will then lead to Hegel’s speculative logic. According to the so called coherentistic reading of Hegel’s thought, he never seriously questioned the principle of non contradiction: he would be just a very sophisticated Aristo-telian, after all. I oppose this view, arguing (3) that Hegel was a proponent of an articulated form of dialetheism.

Martin Luther's early sermons on Genesis include a robust defense of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. His exegesis of the creation as an act of the omnipotent God sets the Catholic doctrine of God into dynamic relationship with the Evangelical doctrine of salvation by faith.

Un viaggio alle radici del monoteismo. L'individuazione della creatio ex-nihilo come momento fondante del monoteismo, dove fu detto che il Nulla è all'origine di tutto ciò che è, impone di rivalutare l'opinione comune sul presunto monoteismo biblico.
Dalla Bibbia alla gnosi cristiana, dalla filosofia giudeo-ellenistica alla Qabbalah medievale, da Meister Eckhart al Chassidismo, un sintetico percorso storico che si propone di evidenziare le differenze antropologiche che, attorno al concetto di "nulla", hanno segnato profondamente l'evoluzione e i drammi della civiltà occidentale.

Abstract: The paper focuses on the doctrine of creation as formulated in the confession of faith at the Fourth Lateran Council, in the decree “Firmiter”. The first part outlines the main ideas of the Cathar dualist doctrine of creation. The second part articulates and interprets the Council’s doctrine of creation with regard to dualist heterodoxy as the immediate cause, as well as its theological and patristic sources. The third part analyses the characteristics of the Council’s doctrine of creation that make it relevant for today’s understanding of faith in God the Creator.

Sažetak: U članku se proučava nauk o stvaranju kako je formuliran u ispovijesti vjere na Četvrtom lateranskom koncilu, u dekretu "Firmiter". U prvom dijelu se obrađuju glavne ideje katarskoga dualističkoga nauka o stvaranju. U drugim dijelu se artikulira i interpretira koncilski nauk o stvaranju, imajući u vidu kako dualističku heterodoksiju kao neposredni razlog tako i teološke i patrističke izvore. U trećem dijelu se analiziraju značajke koncilskoga nauka o stvaranju koje ga čine važnim i za današnje razumijevanje vjere u Boga Stvoritelja.

In this essay, I contend that Karl Barth supported a theology from “above”, which originates not by way of human experience (for example: piety, ethnicity or viewpoint) but exclusively because of divine revelation in Jesus Christ, and Scripture. Firstly, the antithesis of Barth’s view was any configuration of anthropocentric natural theology or any effort made at natural knowledge of God. Secondly, he refused to acknowledge all attestations of God’s reality as merely showing the way to a fetish, or an idol, or a simulacrum, and not to the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Thirdly, Barth’s theological methodology was branded “dialectical” – or as Heinrich Emil Brunner (one of Barth’s many antagonists) called it “the theology of crisis” – because he held that all understanding of God encompasses divine-human remonstration and not connection or continuity (as Natural Theology proposes) between God and humanity through Jesus Christ.

Some are of the opinion that cosmological predictions regarding the future of the physical universe contradict or challenge the Christian eschatological hope for a "new heavens and new earth" (2 Pet. 3:13). The present essay argues that cosmological science is irrelevant to classical theistic Christian eschatology on two grounds. First, cosmology does not substantially inform Christian eschatology, which already affirmed the demise of the cosmos on theological grounds. Second, cosmology does not challenge eschatology if a classical theistic conception of God and its corollary doctrines of creatio ex nihilo and divine conservation and concurrence are admitted.

In about the year 180 a Christian bishop, about whom we know very little, wrote to a pagan about whom we know even less: “God brought everything into being out of what does not exist, so that his greatness might be known as understood through his works.” These words of Theophilus of Antioch may seem to contemporary eyes and ears thoroughly unexceptional as a piece of Christian teaching, but at the time they not only represented something controversial for the entire tradition of Greek philosophy – which provided a terminological background for the foundations of Christian theology – but also introduced something new and original to the very foundations of Christianity. The lecture will address some crucial facts from the history of the development of the conviction that the universe must have come into existence from nothing (ex nihilo).

Mariusz Tabaczek, O.P., is a Polish Dominican and theologian. He holds Ph.D. in philosophical theology from the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley, CA and Church Licentiate from the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan, Poland. After his studies at the GTU and a fellowship at the Notre Dame Institute for Advanced Studies he returned to Poland. For three years he worked as a researcher at the Thomistic Institute in Warsaw (Poland), a lecturer at the Pontifical Faculty of Theology in Warsaw and the Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology in Krakow, and a director of Studium Dominicanum in Warsaw. He then moved to Rome where he became a professor of theology at the Pontifical University of Saint Thomas Aquinas. He is also a researcher at the Thomistic Institute at the same University.

Lo scopo di questo lavoro è quello di elaborare un significato pratico del termine «possibile», che possa poi diventare una chiave di lettura utile per tentare di decifrare la natura e il funzionamento del cosiddetto Essere, ossia dell’essere in sé, della realtà sottointesa, di ciò che c’è dietro a ciò che è. Grazie a questo strumento ermeneutico insieme con la singolare esperienza esistenziale di Mister Tanatò, il protagonista immaginario di questa trattazione, interpreteremo l’Essere come tutto ciò che è pre-destinato – cioè come l’insieme delle condizioni fondamentali per(ché ci sia) il tale essente o il nulla – e la realtà sensibile come tutto ciò che è destinato – cioè come l’avvicendamento delle evoluzioni guidate dell’Essere –. Infine, allo scopo di confermare e approfondire i risultati che avremo raggiunto, forniremo una soluzione sia all’ipotetico paradosso della predizione, in cui l’apparente antinomia sta nell’ammettere che si possano fare predizioni successivamente falsificabili, sia ad un interessante problema probabilistico.

The article focuses on Luther’s lectures on the biblical creation account as found in Gen 1:1-2:4, categorizing the Reformer’s explanations into subjects that reoccur repeatedly in order to extract the themes that seemed to be of special importance to him. These themes are preceded by a section on Luther's basic presuppositions (authority of the sources, worldview and concept of time, the nature of God). The two re-occurring themes are creation as a past act divine benevolence and as a continuous divine activity. While Luther addressed every verse of the Mosaic creation account, he focused specifically on divine activities. The creative, preserving, governing, and recreating activities of the Word stand out distinctly. Luther did not only deal with the biblical text but was also able to apply it to the daily life of the believer. He emphasized that God was not only active in the past but is still active today and wants to play a role in the life of every individual person.

The purpose of this paper is to ascertain whether or not love rooted in the Trinity is a sufficient ground for maintaining a threefold affirmation of the ontological distinction between creator/creature and the immanence of God to creation, the goodness of creation as its own distinct being, and the freedom of God in creating it. To do so, I recover the theologies of Colin Gunton and Sergius Bulgakov who both ground the work of creation in God's free Trinitarian act of love. I offer a comparative analysis of the two approaches. Currently working on a postscript to rework this draft for publication.

I była zgroza nagłych cisz!
I była próżnia w całym niebie!
A ty z tej próżni czemu drwisz,
Kiedy ta próżnia nie drwi z ciebie?[1]

Bolesław Leśmian, Dziewczyna



„Byt jest, niebytu nie ma”. Te – sparafrazowane – słowa greckiego myśliciela żyjącego ponad 2500 lat temu wyznaczyły paradygmat filozoficznych i naukowych zmagań z rzeczywistością. Wędrówka myśli rozpoczęta dawno temu i dyskusja prowadzona ze światem w języku racjonalności, zdaje się nie mieć końca. Niejednokrotnie człowiek, zachwycony tajemnicami bytu, jakie odkrywał, albo zapominał o niebycie, albo zbytnio się nim nie przejmował i umieszczał go pod szyldem „absurd”. Być może wydawało się, że wzięcie pod uwagę (nie)czegoś, co po brzegi przepełnione jest sprzecznościami, prowadzi donikąd. Wobec osiąganych sukcesów poznawczych okazywało się zbyteczne. Jednakże, mimo że często pomijany, niebyt jako cichy towarzysz lub też bezgłośny rywal bytu spełnia znaczącą rolę w rozumieniu otaczającej nas rzeczywistości.

Niejednokrotnie jest też tak, że nawet nie zdajemy sobie sprawy z tego, w które zakamarki naszego życia wdziera się niebyt, bądź to jako koncepcja teoretyczna, bądź to jako brak czy negatywność. Niebyt wiele ma imion, niejedną twarz, jeszcze więcej masek. Przepełnione niebytem jest nawet najprostsze przeczenie: „nie”.

Czy perspektywa śmierci, a więc naszego indywidualnego nie-bycia, unicestwienia, nie napełnia nas lękiem? Nicość nas przeraża, a mimo to wciąż – na różne sposoby – próbujemy ją okiełznać, udobruchać, choć po części oswoić.

Współczesna fizyka – ogólnie rzecz biorąc – próbując zrozumieć podstawy wszechświata, stwierdza, że widzialna materia stanowi zaledwie niewielką jego część. Przepełnia nas niebyt (utożsamiany m.in. z ciemną materią oraz ciemną energią lub próżnią). Podobnie w codziennym życiu: coraz częściej sami określamy się przez to, kim nie jesteśmy i czego nie mamy. Ciągle odczuwamy jakiś brak. W szkole uczymy się, że nie wolno dzielić przez zero.. Nie możemy i nie potrafimy się bez niebytu obejść.

Niniejsza praca stanowi próbę wstępnej teoretycznej konceptualizacji wybranych zagadnień z pogranicza filozofii i nauki, dotyczących niebytu. Przyjęte ujęcie, należy to raz jeszcze podkreślić, jest filozoficzne i naukowe – jedno bez drugiego, bez popadania w próżne spekulacje – nie może funkcjonować.

Ponieważ, jak twierdził Platon w Obronie Sokratesa, „bezmyślnym życiem żyć człowiekowi nie warto” (38a)[2], praca ta – przynajmniej w założeniu – ma stanowić próbę racjonalnego ujęcia trudnej i kłopotliwej kwestii niebytu w szerokim kontekście współczesności. Nie jest to tym samym obrona wybranej koncepcji filozoficznej czy wizji świata. Dla mnie praca ta jest filozoficznym zmaganiem się z tematem, który w pewien sposób wymyka się racjonalności i porządkowi, jaki nasz umysł chce nadawać otaczającej nas rzeczywistości. Identyfikuję się jednak z Richardem Feynmanem, amerykańskim fizykiem, który pewnego razu powiedział: „Mogę nie wiedzieć. Nie obawiam się tego”[3]. Mogę nie ogarniać niebytu, nie obawiam się tego, tym bardziej, że niebyt z pewnością ogarnia mnie. Myśl ta niesie z sobą pewne na wskroś egzystencjalne pocieszenie… pocieszenie, które zawsze płynie z filozofii i rozmyślania nad wszechświatem.

Kończąc, wyraźnie zaznaczam, że odpowiedzialnością za wszelkie błędy, nieścisłości, przeinaczenia oraz nieporozumienia znajdujące się w tej pracy lub wynikające z jej treści należy obarczyć jej autora. Ostatecznie przecież i tak „nikt nie wie, jak sobie z Nic poradzić”[4].

Czytelnikowi jestem jeszcze winny wyjaśnienia dotyczące powstania Książeczki o Niczym. Stanowi ona poprawioną i nieco zmodyfikowaną wersję mojej pracy licencjackiej, którą obroniłem w 2017 r. na Uniwersytecie Rzeszowskim. Ma to znaczący wpływ na jej ograniczenia strukturalne, teoretyczne i metodologiczne. Ważąc jednak pojawiające się „za” i „przeciw”, postanowiłem nadać mojej pracy niejako oficjalną, a przede wszystkim publiczną formę, wierząc, że przynajmniej – przy ciągłym wzroście naszej wiedzy – w minimalnym stopniu przyczyni się ona do rozwoju filozofii i nauki lub przynajmniej pozwoli zachwycić się choć jednemu umysłowi wspaniałością Wszechświata.

Na końcu chcę wyrazić swoją wdzięczność tym wszystkim, bez których Książeczka o Niczym nie mogłaby powstać.

[1] B. Leśmian, Poezje zebrane, oprac. J. Trznadel, PIW, Warszawa 2010, s. 330.

[2] Platon, Obrona Sokratesa, przeł. W. Witwicki, Wydawnictwo Marek Derewiecki, Kęty 2005.

[3] Przytaczam za: L.M. Krauss, Wszechświat z niczego. Dlaczego istnieje raczej coś niż nic, przeł. T. Krzysztoń, Prószyński i S-ka, Warszawa 2014, s. 154.

[4] J.D. Barrow, Książka o Niczym, przeł. Ł. Lamża, CCPress, Kraków 2015, s. 15.

This essay sets forth the claim that the absolute freedom of God's act of creation informs the nature and meaning of evil. Because God created the universe without prior constraint or necessity, His moral nature and the destiny of creation are inextricably related – creation will be completed in the eschaton, free from the grip of corruption at the last. The absolute freedom of divine creation denotes that evil is in the ultimate without justification. Theodicy and the problem of evil appear by all accounts to be important subjects in that they explore key concepts regarding the moral character of God.

Nicholas of Cusa’s philosophical theology is marked as radical by his positive reception of the thought of John Scottus Eriugena (c. 810-880). Of him the great 20th century Neoplatonist scholar, philosopher, and theologian Jean Trouillard (1907-1984) judged: “In the first part of the ninth century he undertook to construct a Christian theological synthesis employing the Neoplatonic problematic. His will for orthodoxy was only equalled by the penetration with which he reinvented the greater part of the theses of Neoplatonism largely forgotten.”  Fr Trouillard estimated that after Eriugena such a profoundly authentic retrieval of the doctrines developed in the pagan Platonic schools of late Antiquity from Plotinus (205-270) to Damascius (480-c550) would not be created again in the Middle Ages until Maître Eckhart (1260-1328) and Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) —both, directly or indirectly, under Eriugena’s influence.
Eriugena’s own radical thinking comes out in his willingness to draw the conclusion of monotheism that God is self-creating, that God Himself is the nothingness from which God creates. For understanding Cusa the following features of Eriugena’s great system, the Periphyseon, Concerning Nature, are useful.
1. Drawing upon Gregory of Nyssa, Eriugena came to understand human nature in such a way, that, more than being “that in which all things could be found (inerat),” it became “that in which all things are created (condita est)” Peri. IV 807A).  The human is the workshop of creation (Peri. II 531AB, III 733B, V 893BC); it is the medium in which God creates himself and the universe of beings out of his own nothingness precisely because, uniquely among beings, the human possesses all the forms of knowing and ignorance, including sensation. Because everything is through human perception, there are no absolute objects. As in earlier Platonic systems, the forms have become not only thoughts, but forms of apprehension in various kinds of subject; as Plotinus puts it, “all things come from contemplations and are contemplations” (Enneads III 8 [30] 7, 1-2).
2. Placing, defining, knowing, creating
Eriugena’s treatment of place is revealing. Place exists only in the mind, “for if every definition is in art, and all art is in the mind, every place, since place is definition, will necessarily be nowhere else except in the mind” (Peri. I 475B). To define is to place, to know, and to create. Cusa follows Eriugena closely in this. For Eriugena, being (OUCIA ) is not as such knowable. Rather, the defined, the limited, is the knowable. Beings are known as defined, circumscribed by the accidental categories. Without place, God cannot define himself in human reason, but, by this defining, everything comes to be. Defining is placing, circumscription, within God, as the “place of places” (Peri. III 643C). “Only God is infinite; everything else is limited by “where” and “when”, that is, place and time.” Time and place are creatures, but “are prior, not temporally, but in respect to creation, to all things that are in the universe”. “What contains is prior to that which is contained, in the way that the cause precedes the effect” (Peri. I 482C).
3. The Nothingness from which God creates is himself
From two fundamental notions: God creates himself, and God is nothing, Eriugena draws the conclusion that the nothing from which God creates is himself. Unsurprisingly, Alumnus is troubled both by the premises and by the conclusion. The result is a long treatise on nothing, half of Book III and the midpoint of Periphyseon (Peri. III 634-688). Because there is no other from which the universe can be made, Nutritor concludes that “God is the nothing of the things which are and which are not” (Peri. III 687B), not as privative, like matter, but, as infinitely full.
Infinite nothingness is not left behind when God creates. Because the human soul is immediately one with its divine starting point, it shares its infinite nothingness, and its sublime ignorance of what it is.
4. Jean Trouillard on the Divine and Human Nothingness. From two fundamental notions: God creates himself, and God is nothing, Eriugena draws the conclusion that the nothing from which God creates is himself. Unsurprisingly, Alumnus is troubled both by the premises and by the conclusion. The result is a long treatise on nothing, half of Book III and the midpoint of Periphyseon (Peri. III 634-688). Because there is no other from which the universe can be made, Nutritor concludes that “God is the nothing of the things which are and which are not” (Peri. III 687B), not as privative, like matter, but, as infinitely full.
Infinite nothingness is not left behind when God creates. Because the human soul is immediately one with its divine starting point, it shares its infinite nothingness, and its sublime ignorance of what it is.

This is a presentation I gave at the International Sociological Association RC16 “Research Committee on Sociological Theory” mid-term conference, University of Trento, Trento, Italy, June 2012.
Abstract: The technological shrinking of the globe in the last few centuries has torn and erased what previously were cultural and geographical boundaries.  In the midst of others, both our implacement in the environing world of familiar contexts and its contingency and transience become apparent.  What is made explicit is that the world is a unity of many: the many worlds are now forced to contend with one another.  Nishida Kitarō, the founder of the Japanese Kyoto school of philosophy from the first half of the twentieth century, once stated that to be is to be implaced.  We exist by actively partaking in a socil-historical context, what he came to call “the socio-historical world.”  More recently, contemporary philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis has conceived of the world in terms of the social imaginary, a social-imaginative construction of a web of significations.  What is striking in both cases is that the meaningful world emerges out of a nothing, created ex nihilo — the phrase stripped of its traditional Judeo-Christian theistic connotations.  While for Nishida the world is ultimately implaced in what he calls the “place of absolute nothing” (zettai mu no basho), Castoriadis speaks of the nothing that is the source of the world’s creation.  In this presentation I will explore this possible convergence between these two disparate thinkers and the light it may shed upon our contemporary situation of globalization and its implications for human praxis.  I look to a sense of the nothing as a chōratic spatiality, a formless opening that provides the space for co-being and serves as the source of creativity.  In the face of globalization, the project for autonomy (in Castoriadis’ sense) and for a multi-cultural world (in Nishida’s sense) would mean the appropriation of such an originary anontological spatiality.

This article explores the significance of creatio ex nihilo (“creation from nothing”) in dialogue with Stanislas Breton’s méontology. With specific interest in how the classic theological affirmation of divine “omnipotence” must be critically reinterpreted in light of the cross, the article develops Breton’s view that conventional conceptions of power, both human or divine, are not to be rejected outright but radically reformulated in terms of unconditional love (agape). Such an approach highlights the practical and theo-political significance of the doctrine, rather than viewing it in primarily speculative terms.

n the previous chapters of this book, I have focused on types
of outsiders, both human and divine. Each was shaped by Maimonides to transcend its own particularity, pointing to some universal philosophical offense or virtue, as the case may be. In this
chapter, I turn to a different outsider, the Sabbath, which interrupts the natural rhythm of time and normatively addresses only
one people to the juridical exclusion of all others.1 However, its
message is a universal one—namely, belief in the creation of the
world in time.2 The Jewish obligation to refrain from work on the
seventh day publicizes a common worldwide truth: “For this reason we are ordered by the law to exalt this day, in order that the
principle of the creation of the world in time be established and
universally known in the world through the fact that all people
refrain from working on one and the same day” (GP II:31, 359).3

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plescia g (2017). katapoyemax: poiemax (xory)by gp . vol. 5, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1976479335

plescia g (2017). katarseontox: katarsix (erixontox)by gp giax . vol. 3, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1975836863

plescia g (2017). katarserix: katarsy (ontologosofia)by gp . vol. 12, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1507694411

plescia g (2017). katastringlux. vol. 2, Seattle:Amazon-Create Space, ISBN: 978-1500717193

plescia g (2017). katastringx. vol. 2, Seattle:Amazon-Create Space, ISBN: 978-1503289185

plescia g (2017). katastrofeggia. vol. 3, Seattle:Amazon-Create Space, ISBN: 978-1494488055

plescia g (2017). katastrophaostringx. vol. 2, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1505259896

plescia g (2017). katastrophenoumena. vol. 2, Seattle:Amazon-Create Space, ISBN: 978-1495238017

plescia g (2017). katastropheontox. vol. 2, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1494377762

plescia g (2017). katastropherix: erix (eventy) by gp giax . vol. 12, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1975649395

plescia g (2017). katastrophontology. vol. 2, Seattle:Amazon-Create Space, ISBN: 978-1500180386

plescia g (2017). katastrophysistringx. vol. 2, Seattle:Amazon-Create Space, ISBN: 978-1505773651

plescia g (2017). katastrophysix. vol. 2, Seattle:Amazon-Create Space, ISBN: 978-1494236083

plescia g (2017). katastrophysophyx. vol. 2, Seattle:Amazon-Create Space, ISBN: 978-1494939441

plescia g (2017). katastrophyx. vol. 2, Seattle:Amazon-Create Space, ISBN: 978-1494488055

plescia g (2017). katatopontology. vol. 2, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1507681923

plescia g (2017). kreody: kreodox (xory)by gp . vol. 13, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1977983480

plescia g (2017). kuspideventy: stringheventy (pletony) (8) by gp . vol. 8, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1978438569

plescia g (2017). kyasmondosa. vol. 2, Seattle:Amazon-Create Space, ISBN: 978-1505521849

plescia g (2017). kyasmosophysix. vol. 2, Seattle:Amazon-Create Space, ISBN: 978-1503289895

plescia g (2017). lymphysix. vol. 2, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1497320321

plescia g (2017). matematikontox: matematikontos (eventy)by gp . vol. 6, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1974610020

plescia g (2017). mathesistringx . vol. 2, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1505901870

plescia g (2017). meontox. vol. 9, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1974397358

plescia g (2017). meonty: meon (xory)by gp . vol. 8, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1977529510

plescia g (2017). mesontox: mesontosophysistringheventy (erixontox)by gp. vol. 11, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1976142857

plescia g (2017). methysophystringx. vol. 2, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1499297478

plescia g (2017). methyxereignix. vol. 2, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1494449926

plescia g (2017). methyxeventux. vol. 2, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1494435547

plescia g (2017). methyxontology. vol. 2, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1500209872

plescia g (2017). methyxontosophy. vol. 2, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1500717193

plescia g (2017). mikrosophysix. vol. 3, Seattle:Amazon-Create Space, ISBN: 978-1500360900

plescia g (2017). mitopoiesisophysix. vol. 3, Seattle:Amazon-Create Space, ISBN: 978-1507548226

plescia g (2017). mondosa. vol. 2, Seattle:Amazon-Create Space, ISBN: 978-1507681558

plescia g (2017). morphysix. vol. 2, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1500925970

plescia g (2017). nihily: nihilyx (phlex) . vol. 4, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1979298735

plescia g (2017). noumenontox: noumenontosophysistringx (eventy) . vol. 13, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1975709655

plescia g (2017). ondosa. vol. 2, Seattle:Amazon-Create Space, ISBN: 978-1497472365

plescia g (2017). ondosophysix. vol. 4, Seattle:Amazon-Create Space, ISBN: 978-1974129638

plescia g (2017). ontologia del progetto. vol. 2, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1974128914

plescia g (2017). ontondosa. vol. 2, Seattle:Amazon-Create Space, ISBN: 978-1500933210

plescia g (2017). ontophaostringx. vol. 2, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1501079436

plescia g (2017). ontosa. vol. 2, Seattle:Amazon-Create Space, ISBN: 978-1497463769

plescia g (2017). ontosofeggiax. vol. 2, Seattle:Amazon-Create Space, ISBN: 978-1500717193

plescia g (2017). ontosofia del progetto. vol. 3, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1974129300

plescia g (2017). ontox. vol. 1, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1974120994

plescia g (2017). paradigmaticontox: paradigmabontox (eventy)by gp . vol. 1, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1974524679

plescia g (2017). physeontox: physeontos by gp . vol. 13, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1974496143

plescia g (2017). plektikontox: abplektika (eventy) by gp . vol. 7, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1974634057

plescia g (2017). pletoneventy: pletonty (pletony) by gp . vol. 6, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1978338920

plescia g (2017). pletontox. vol. 5, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1974175239

plescia g (2017). pletonty: pletony (xory) . vol. 4, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1977597441

plescia g (2017). pletony: pletontosophysistringheventy (xory)by gp . vol. 4, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1976478864

plescia g (2017). ploty: plotinx (xory)by gp . vol. 11, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1977982704

plescia g (2017). poietikontox: poietikontos (eventy) by gp . vol. 5, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1974606535

plescia g (2017). postmodernontology: ontologia postmoderna by gp . vol. 11, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1974471522

plescia g (2017). postmodernontosophy: ontosofia postmoderna by gp . vol. 12, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1974472093

plescia g (2017). progettontology. vol. 2, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1497472365

plescia g (2017). remotasophysix. vol. 2, Seattle:Amazon-Create Space, ISBN: 978-1495369254

plescia g (2017). remotontosophysix. vol. 2, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1499219067

plescia g (2017). remotontox. vol. 4, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1974129638

plescia g (2017). situsophysix. vol. 2, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1503257689

plescia g (2017). skemerix: skema eris (eventuax)by gp Giacinto. vol. 2, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1500906955

plescia g (2017). sophony: sophonty (pletony) by gp . vol. 3, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1978214880

plescia g (2017). stringheventy: stringheventi (pletony)by gp . vol. 8, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1978377233

plescia g (2017). stringhy: stringy (phlex) . vol. 1, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1979140454

plescia g (2017). stringravitony: stringx gravitony (pletony) by gp . vol. 4, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1978282957

plescia g (2017). stringravityx: stringx gravityx (katapan)by gp Giacinto p P. di m. vol. 6, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1505689464

plescia g (2017). sublimy: sublimy eventy (pletony) . vol. 11, SEATTLE:Amazon, ISBN: 978-1979011372

plescia g (2017). takystringx: takyon

The notion of creatio ex nihilo has become a doctrine firmly established in the three Abrahamic religions (i.e., Christianity, Judaism and Islam). Almost all groups of Islamic thinkers accept the truth of the createdness (creatio) of the universe, and that it is preceded by its “non-existence” (ex nihilo). However, there is a diversity of opinions as to whether the concept of creatio ex nihilo is compatible with alternative accounts of the origin of the physical world, and this diversity is particularly marked between Islamic philosophers and kalam theologians (Mutakallimun). Three major factors, independently or together, play a fundamental role on how Islamic scholars deal with this very issue: (a) their views of the physical world; (b) their approaches to the divine attributes; and (c) their understandings of the teachings of their religion. The aim of this chapter is to investigate whether four different notions of creatio ex nihilo espoused by different Islamic thinkers are compatible with seven alternative accounts of the origins of the universe (five philosophical/theological doctrines – first level of compatibility; and two possible interpretations of a modern scientific theory – second level of compatibility).

Augustine of Hippo prescribed authoritative hermeneutic rules and techniques designed to accomplish the twin tasks of understanding the Bible oneself and then teaching others orthodox Christian doctrine. In doing so, Augustine also re-invented the Bible story, giving it a meta-narrative construction that differed markedly from the Hebrew hermeneutic adopted by Paul and the apostles. Augustine's meta-narrative enabled the early church to understand itself as the foundation for Christians as the "third race" of the ancient world. There is good reason to believe that Augustine's cosmology has outlived its usefulness.
The apostles Paul and Peter looked forward eagerly to the imminent end of the Mosaic Age, in their own generation, not at the end of human history.  The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo and a futurist millenarian eschatology framed Augustine’s contribution to Christian cosmology. 
Augustine’s Hellenic biblical hermeneutic drew upon the universalistic and cosmopolitan spirit of Greco-Roman culture which was far removed from the particularistic ethnoreligion of Old Covenant Israel.  The thesis of this article is that a Hebraic biblical hermeneutic could help to develop a biblical metanarrative that is both true and more useful to contemporary WASPs than Augustine’s rendition of the bible story. 
As I argued in the discussion on “Anglo-Republicanism and the Rebirth of British History,” WASPs desperately need a neo-Angelcynn ethnotheology which can help us, like Alfred the Great, to find a biblical warrant for the reconstruction of our own holy Christian nation.
Any such ethnotheology will run contrary to both Church Tradition and the more recent work of Radical Orthodox theologians such as John Milbank.  I would very much like to hear what orthodox Christians and others make of the thesis outlined in this paper.  If posting this piece here sparks any interest, I will put its companion piece, “Global Jesus versus National Jesus: The Political Hermeneutics” once the time for the present discussion expires.

The article shows that the concept of god in Greek philosophy, however interpreted, cannot become the concept of Creator ex nihilo. God can be a Demiurge of the world, its Providence, or its guard. God can be the telos of the world or simply a justification of its existence, he cannot however create the world in the absolute sense of the word because the world in the
Greek thought does not emerge from nothingness. There is no concept of nihil in the ontological sense. The world has no beginning, has always existed in various forms, or at its roots, there is an eternal substratum, which may evolve into cosmos. Olof Gigon’s opinion seems very accurate here that the ancient gods are never understood as creators of the cosmos, but always as only those who arrange it. After the 6th century, the philosophical understanding of cosmogony made the intervention of gods unnecessary. One is the beginning from which emerged that which is bright and dark, light and heavy, etc. Elements arrange themselves
according to their nature. Deity regains its meaning only where for interpretation of the world teleological principles are referred to. Those who speak about beauty or the purpose of the world introduced the necessity of the existence of some kind of planning/arranging spirit, who had wanted this beauty and created it. This is the beginning of the creation of the philosophical understanding of god: god as a spirit assembling the world and being its providence, but, significantly is important, this understanding has always remained underdeveloped. Greek gods, the gods of myth or philosophy, have never become creators of the world.

The narrative of the martyrdom of a mother and seven brothers has had an enormous impact on the history of both Church and Synagogue. The cult of the Macca-bean martyrs began to develop very early, so that in the fourth century at the latest, they were celebrated among the Christians. The story about them is to be found in the seventh chapter of the Second Book of Maccabees. Its canonical status has become the subject of debate in the last few centuries, both among the Orthodox and other Christians. The Synagogue rejected this book in its entirety, although it contains the oldest recorded testimony about the celebration of Hanukkah, one of the most important Jewish holidays today. However, the story of the mother and brothers remained preserved in Talmud in a certain form. Apart from the story of martyrdom, the seventh chapter hides one of the oldest, and certainly one of the most vivid descriptions of the early faith in the resurrection from the dead. In addition, the seventh chapter reveals the oldest explicitly expressed faith in God, who is the absolute Creator and who creates the world out of nothing. This idea will later become one of the central motives of Christian and Jewish cosmology.

Este escrito trata acerca de dos puntos importantes de la teología cristiana de la creación: la creación de la nada, y la unidad de creación y salvación. Primero expone la idea de creación de la nada dentro del contexto apologético en que se formó, y critica el abordaje racionalista y filosófico de la misma. Luego trata de la unidad de creación y salvación, y critica las posturas que disocian al Verbo de Dios del Jesús histórico y escatológico.

This writing deals on two important points in Christian creation theology: creation out of nothing (creatio ex nihilo), and the unity of creation and salvation. First, it exposes the idea of creation out of nothing within the apologetic context in which it was formed; and critiques the rationalist and philosophical approach on this topic. Then it deals with the unity of creation and salvation, and critiques the positions that dissociate the Divine Word from the historical Jesus.

In several recent publications, Craig A. Carter argues that classical theism is the only model of God that can consistently affirm the Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo (that God creates from nothing). He claims that because competing models of God deny true transcendence of God they cannot affirm creatio ex nihilo. We argue that Carter’s claim is false and that his argument is both unclear and fallacious. We further argue that creatio ex nihilo is consistent with other models of God, and we argue this by demonstrating the coherence between the doctrine and two competing models of God: neoclassical theism and open theism.

Dacă doctrina creștină a creației conține un accent central pus pe întrebarea cum, răspunsul este că Dumnezeu a creat prin intermediul Cuvântului Său și, mai mult, că El a creat ex nihilo. Scriptura nu-L pune pe Dumnezeu alături de materia preexistentă sau de haosul etern; mai degrabă, ea prezintă Cuvântul sau Înțelepciunea alături sau față în față cu Tatăl. Dacă vreo trăsătură captează starea de spirit a activității lui Elohim așa cum este ea reflectată în narațiunea biblică a creației, aceasta este împăcarea magnifică a lui Dumnezeu sau, așa cum se exprimă Robert Davidson, "suveranitatea Lui absolută și fără vreun efort" în crearea universului (Genesis 1-11, "The Cambridge Bible Commentary on The New English Bible," pag. 15). Faptul că Dumnezeu creează prin Cuvântul Lui (Gen. 1; Is. 41:4, 48:13; Amos 9:6; Ps. 33:6; cf. Ioan 1:1-3) nu înseamnă numai că universul nu este nici o necesitate ultimă, nici o emanație divină inevitabilă, ci și că nu este un act al unui impuls brusc ori arbitrar al voinței. Creația este lucrarea unui Dumnezeu omnipotent care acționează conștient și rațional. Mai mult, faptul că Dumnezeu este Domnul întregii existențe nu înseamnă numai că El are aseitate; în afară de Dumnezeu, nimic nu are realitate independentă. El este creatorul și susținătorul absolut al universului. Toate celelalte își dobândesc substanța și forma din decretul și din fapta Lui. Numai voia Lui suverană cheamă toate realitățile finite din inexistență și păstrează continuu omul și lumea ca să nu se întoarcă în neant. Fără voia Lui creatoare, toate celelalte ar dispărea în neființa de unde le-a chemat și din care le păstrează. James Houston pune un accent mai mare pe creația per verbum decât pe creația ex nihilo și, desigur, accentul biblic cade pe aceasta din urmă. Dacă Bibliei i se permite să își stabilească programul pe baza acestei teme, insistă el, atunci putem și trebuie chiar să afirmăm prioritatea Cuvântului lui Dumnezeu în creația divină (I Believe in the Creator, pag. 51). Dar Houston subliniază mai mult decât pur și simplu prioritatea în creație a Cuvântului și Înțelepciunii divine. El crede că "probabil este mai înțelept să recunoaștem că afirmația biblică a creatio per verbum este singura afirmație credibilă care trebuie făcută" în măsura în care concepția creației ex nihilo a dus la concepții serios eronate; în unele expuneri, a reînviat chiar dualismul pe care afirmația sa originală intenționa să îl respingă (I Believe in the Creator, pag. 51, 274 și urm.). În afara acestor considerații, unii critici se îndoiesc ori neagă faptul că Scriptura sprijină ferm creația ex nihilo; pentru alții aceasta nu este nici măcar de conceput. Creația ex nihilo nu poate fi concepută, spun ei, din cauză că creația absolută, la fel ca și distrugerea absolută, cade în afara experienței noastre. Întrucât creația este primul moment în timp, ea se găsește la începutul succesiunii temporale, lucru care nu stă la dispoziția noastră. De fapt, adevăratul motiv pentru care nu putem localiza creația absolută în succesiunea noastră temporală este mai degrabă acela că noi nu putem măsura vârsta universului creat. Dar ceea ce poate fi

The dialogue between theology and science, nowadays more and more frequently approached from different perspectives in the Romanian space, proves relevant, among other things, in establishing a way of receiving scientific data about the world. A whole series of important discoveries that were made in the last century has revealed new data regarding the structure of space-time, several quantum constituents of matter and energy, unexpected regularities present in the living world and in the processes of the physical world. Such data have elicited long debates and led to the formulation of several questions such as those regarding the nature of the human mind, the nature of mathematical constructions and how the structures of the living and nonliving world can, to a large extent and in many respects, be rendered in mathematical terms.

As scientific exploration reveals more and more situations in which certain mathematical concepts and constructs prove adequate to describe some particular aspects of physical reality, new nuances and possible answers are added to the old questions, further increasing the consistency of discussions and formulation of nuanced perspectives. The order, the harmonies, the patterns existing in the structures and processes of the physical world are most easily located in the space of dialogue between theology, philosophy and science, as they bring into question both the problem of the mind, of the mathematical instrument, the question of the fact of science, but also the remarkable situation of the convergence of three aspects, namely matching the mind and its mathematics with the structures of the surrounding reality. Such situations naturally require a triple perspective, a correct use of the data of science and its premises, a philosophical contribution meant, among other things, to provide possible appropriate interpretations and understandings and, finally, a more comprehensive theological approach, capable of proposing meanings that link these contents with the life of man, with his spiritual uplifting.

We shall next highlight, through three recent work areas, some results that highlight three possible places of convergence between theology, philosophy and science, mentioning, where appropriate, important aspects that condition the authentic dialogue.

Wykład rozpoczyna przedstawienie syntetycznej wersji teorii ewolucji, a także jej trudności z punktu widzenia nauk szczegółowych, filozofii oraz teologii. Następnie zostają krótko omówione kluczowe stanowiska w teologicznej debacie dotyczącej ewolucjonizmu. Przedmiotem drugiej części wykładu jest analiza opisu dzieła 6 dni w Rdz 1 w ujęciu patrystycznym, u św. Augustyna i Tomasza z Akwinu (wraz z definicją stworzenia w myśli Akwinaty). Kolejnym punktem jest propozycja metafizyki transformacji gatunkowych oraz odpowiedź na pytanie o to czy Bóg stwarza przez ewolucję. Wykład zamyka propozycja modelu współdziałania przyczynowości Boga i stworzeń w procesach ewolucyjnych.

This article puts Michel Foucault's conception of power into critical engagement with that of Bonaventure. For Foucault power is manifested in wills to knowledge or meaning-making in a senseless universe in order to legitimate the drama of dominations. Bonaventure, however, roots his notion of power in the essence of God, so that any act of power from God cannot be classified as domination, but rather donation – a free-willed gift. This is especially evident in Bonaventure's theology of creation and sacrament. As such, Bonaventure provides a way to deal with Foucault's critique theologically without dispensing with it altogether.