Defence Budgets

While the new security environment has driven the EU to take a bigger role in security and defence, it has also forced the EU-NATO relations to evolve from a desirable strategic partnership to a more ‘essential’ one, since both their security is interconnected and neither organisation has the full range of tools available to address the new security challenges on its own. Thanks to the new framework initiated by the Joint Declaration in 2016, cooperation between the EU and NATO has been gradually improving in several designated areas. But it is obvious that, within the defined framework, there are many obstacles to overcome before opportunities could be more fully exploited. While the new challenges emanated from the East and South of Europe can be seen as an opportunity for a wider cooperation, the rise of illiberalism and authoritarianism in the world, even including the member nations, poses a big challenge against the cooperation. Further concrete steps are to be taken for a wider and substantial cooperation between two Brussels-based organisations. We argue that a joint response must be formulated in the form of a common strategy, implemented in an integrated way by using a more comprehensive toolbox.

We take into account that interpretations of security complexes, traditions of long peace, and violent peace do not fully explain how South American countries are organized regarding Defense. Given those, we ran a cluster analysis with data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and Military Balance report with economic defense expenditure and capabilities investment from South American countries to identify how they are organized, determining those that are most similar to each other (which would form complexes) and how they differ from the others (dissimilarities). The results showed four different clusters: the first formed by Chile, Peru, Argentina, and Bolivia; the second by Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Paraguay; the third only by the Guyana; and the fourth, formed only by Uruguay. We interpreted these clusters considering the history of conflicts, current countries threats and treaties.

TURKEY’S SECURITY PERCEPTION AND DEFENSE EXPENDITURES IN THE
BUDGET IN THE FIRST YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC (1924-1929)
Considering the occupations of the Allied States after the Armistice of Mudros, the strategically
determined places were vital for the heart of the Ottoman Empire, that is, places of economic
importance. Undoubtedly, the historical reasons behind the occupied Turkish homeland, as well
as the economic importance of these regions, have a great role. The notables of the young
Turkish Republic were also aware of the importance of economic issues as well as defense for
the survival of the state, and in this context, they tried to direct defense expenditures and other
expenditure items with scarce resources. But how to optimize this balance was important.
The first priority for the young Turkish Republic, which took over the Ottoman industry under
the control of minorities and foreigners, was to realize the development move under the
umbrella of survival. For a newly established state, the war industry and regional production
places of the war industry were very important, which would guide other industries. The
production of weapons, ammunition, tools, equipment, materials and spare parts, which are all
kinds of war industry products that will be needed for the survival of the state in case of
mobilization and war, and their contribution to the country’s economic structure were
important. However, the stock of capital available was very limited. For this, it was necessary
to wait until 1929 and give priority to agriculture, trade and banking.
It is very important to deal with the events after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in
terms of economic history in terms of revealing the characteristic features of the period, namely
the structural appearance of the society and the route of the state’s upper mind. In order to make
sense of the economic history of this period, it is necessary to take into account what has been
done for the security of the country in the national economy. Thus, the analyzes reveal more
concrete issues. In the paper, the defense expenditures in the context of the national budgets
and the perception of security in the period before the Great Depression of 1929 (1924-1929),
when the Republic of Turkey applied the liberal economic model, will be revealed.

The article seeks to analyse three different issues. The first is the general tendencies within the defence budgets of the biggest defence spenders in the European Union: France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom between 2005 and 2010. The second is the risks that result from potential influence of the economic crisis on armaments policies within the EU. The third is the opportunities that may emerge as a result of the defence procurement and defence R&D being impacted on by the negative global economic situation.

La llegada de Donald Trump a la Casa Blanca y sus declaraciones respecto a las “obligaciones” de sus socios europeos en el seno de la OTAN, habida cuenta de sus gastos respectivos en Defensa, ha recuperado el debate sobre cuánto hay que dedicar a esta partida  presupuestaria.

España registra para 2017 un aumento del 30% del gasto en Defensa, el mayor desde la dictadura. ¿Responde este abrupto aumento a las exigencias de la OTAN y/o la Administración Trump?

Además de responder a este interrogante, a continuación se pretende
profundizar en las tendencias de gasto en Defensa, tomando cierta
perspectiva y analizando los montos dedicados a este campo a escala
internacional, para posteriormente ir complejizando la problemática
conforme se aterriza en el escenario europeo, y en concreto, al propio
caso español.