Early Edmund Husserl

FROM THE BACK COVER: What is the essential nature of meaning? . . . . . This book answers by examining interpretive theories from the past and present. It finds that an historical struggle with meaning has been underway since the Reformation, a struggle that reaches crisis proportions in the 20th century. On the one hand, this crisis is mollified by Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenology, which argues that we are always already in a meaningful relationship to the objects of the world. On the other hand, this crisis is exacerbated when phenomenology, structuralism, and aesthetic theory directly make meaning into an object of study. . . . . . . . . These historical developments culminate with the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, whose non-hermeneutical phenomenology delimits a cause of meaning said to be closely linked to the core of subjectivity. Intriguingly, Lacan's work reveals meaning to be sexual in nature. By integrating his notion of sexual difference with his work in discourse theory and topology, this book demonstrates how the subject's struggle with meaning can be suspended.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GENERAL DESCRIPTION: Broadly speaking, the majority of books on Jacques Lacan focus on the earlier periods of his career. They also tend to target the psychoanalytic clinical community, or else discuss his work in various political, social, and cultural contexts. But in almost all cases these books refrain from a detailed exegesis of his actual texts. They instead prefer to comment on his theoretical apparatus as a whole before turning to its practical implications. . . . . . This book positions itself against this grain. Firstly, it closely analyzes some half-dozen key Lacanian texts. This analysis is organized under a single thematic – the question of meaning – in order to advance the reader's understanding of the trajectory of Lacan's thought across his entire career, as well as to promote the book's thesis that the field of meaning can be suspended. Accordingly, an initial chapter takes up the hermeneutical tradition from Flacius onward. This is then supplemented by a chapter which surveys phenomenological, structuralist and aesthetic theories of meaning and their differing methods of textual analysis. Together these two chapters provide a unique context for the sustained analysis of Lacan's texts which begins in the third chapter, an analysis that forms the bulk of the book's content. This contextualization potentially widens the book's appeal to any scholar wishing to explore his relationship to those textual objects he interacts with on a daily basis. And because this book assumes the reader has little to no familiarity with Lacan, the reader will find patient explanations of the basics of his theories before slowly being led up to the more difficult theories of his late years. Again the argument is that Lacan has something to offer all scholars. His work is not just reserved for psychoanalysts. . . . . . It is with his late theories that the serious student of Lacan will find the book's most original contribution. For in the fourth chapter a detailed account is provided of how Lacan derived his infamous formulae of sexuation from Aristotelian logic. These formulae are then extensively discussed against the backdrop of interpretive theory and textual analysis, showing how these formulae capture much more than just the difference between the sexes. Strikingly, this difference is also found to run through meaning itself, something the final chapter aims to demonstrate. It does this by amalgamating three key components of late-Lacan: sexuation, discourse theory and his use of topological spaces. This amalgamation is a first in the literature. But this amalgamation is not just useful in demonstrating the book's thesis. It further suggests how seemingly divergent aspects of late-Lacanian theory can be made to work together.

Biografisk overblik og materiale til filosoffen Hans Lipps for årene 1918-1941. Omfattende stort set alle kendte personer, som har en relation til Lipps i disse år. Lipps' universitetskarriere, hans forhold til kolleger og som underviser for sine studerende.
Det er således også muligt ud fra indholdsfortegnelsen at finde relevant information om personer, der har særlig interesse, f.eks. K. E. Løgstrups studieophold hos Lipps.
Et overblik over det intellektuelle miljø i mellemkrigsårene, specielt den "livsideologi", der af krigsveteranerne på grundlag af fronterfaringerne udformes til eksistensfilosofi og "revolutionær konservatisme".
Alle data til Lipps i NS-tiden, hans tilknytning som soldat, feltlæge, til den regulære hær, Reichswehr, og til de paramilitære organisationer Stahlhelm, SA og SS. Og en vurdering af Lipps' ideologiske forhold til NS og antisemitisme.
Dette biografiske overblik er tillige ment som et grundlag for læsning af Lipps' to "soldaterskrifter", "Der Soldat des letzten Krieges", 1934 og "Wandlung des Soldaten", 1939.

Sartre’s early works on phenomenology reveal the complexity of his relationship to Husserl. Deeply indebted to phenomenology’s method as well as its substance, Sartre nonetheless confronted Husserl’s transcendental turn from Ideas onward. Although numerous studies have focused on Sartre’s points of contention with Husserl, drawing attention to his departure from Husserlian phenomenology, scholars have rarely examined the way in which Sartre engaged and responded to the early Husserl, particularly to his discussions of intentionality, consciousness, and self in Logical Investigations. This essay focuses on Sartre’s critical response to Logical Investigations, arguing that Husserl’s understanding of these three notions shapes and informs Sartre’s own approach to them in The Transcendence of the Ego (1936-37), “Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl’s Phenomenology” (1939), and Being and Nothingness (1943). By carefully reading Sartre side by side with Husserl, this essay articulates the ways in which Sartre allowed himself to think along with, and not against, Husserl.

Biografisk skildring af relationen mellem Edith Stein og Hans Lipps og de tidlige fænomenologer omkring dem i tiden 1913 til 1921. Udførlig skildring af Lipps' tjeneste som feltlæge gennem VK 1. Lipps' ægteskabssag 1919 ny 
forståelse.
Det er Edith Stein, der ikke vil gifte sig med HL!

"ABSTRACT:
    This study assumes the subject's pursuit of meaning is generally incapacitating and should be suspended. It aims to demonstrate how such a suspension is theoretically accomplished by utilizing Lacan's formulae of sexuation integrated with his work in discourse theory and topology.
    Part I places this study into context by examining scholarship from the established fields of hermeneutics, phenomenology, (post)structuralism, aesthetic theory and psychoanalysis in order to extract out their respective theory of meaning. These theories reveal that an historical struggle with meaning has been underway since the Reformation and reaches near crisis proportions in the 20th century. On the one hand this crisis is mollified by the rise of Heideggerian-Gadamerian hermeneutical phenomenology which questions traditional epistemological approaches to the text using a new ontological conceptualization of meaning and a conscious rejection of methodology. On the other hand this crisis is exacerbated when the ubiquitous nature of meaning is itself challenged by (post)structuralism's discovery of the signifier which inscribes a limit to meaning, and by the domains of sense and nonsense newly opened up by aesthetic theory. These historical developments culminate in the field of psychoanalysis which most consequentially delimits a cause of meaning said to be closely linked to the core of subjectivity.
    Part II extends these findings by rigorously constructing out of the Lacanian sexuated formulae a decidedly non-hermeneutical phenomenological approach useful in demonstrating the sexual nature of meaning. Explicated in their static state by way of an account of their original derivation from the Aristotelian logical square, it is argued that these four formulae are relevant to basic concerns of textual theory inclusive of the hermeneutical circle of meaning. These formulae are then set into motion by integrating them with Lacan's four discourses to demonstrate the breakdown of meaning. Finally, the cuts and sutures of two-dimensional space that is topology as set down in L'étourdit are performed to confirm how the very field of meaning is ultimately suspended from a nonsensical singular point known in Lacanian psychoanalysis as objet a. The contention is that by occupying this point the subject frees himself from the debilitating grip of meaning."

Recent philosophy of mind has seen an increase of interest in theories of intentionality in offering a functional account of mental states. The standard intentionalist view holds that mental states can be exhaustively accounted for in terms of their representational contents. An alternative view proposed by Tim Crane, called impure intentionalism, specifies mental states in terms of intentional content, mode, and object. This view is also suggested to hold for states of sensory awareness. This paper primarily develops an alternative to the impure intentionalist account of states of sensory awareness. On the basis of Husserl's phenomenological work, I argue that a focus on intentionality at the level of sensory awareness is phenomenologically implausible. The final part offers an alternative functional account of sensory awareness based on what Husserl called 'immanent association'.

There is a palpable need for a new theory that embraces organisations and management – the hegemony of scientific theories is at an end. This paper argues that the phenomenological method which Husserl inaugurates has the potential to provide new insights. Those who adopt a phenomenological attitude to their situation within a business can explore unusual, and as yet unseen, depths within phenomena. The paper introduces Husserl’s method which requires the development of skills and a thoroughgoing rejection of scientific methods of enquiry. However, this method is unlikely assist practitioners to achieve already determined business goals.

Husserl often describes phenomenological discoveries as the resolution of an enigma after enormous efforts, emphasising the initial situation of obscurity and the ways that allow us to overcome obstacles and reach proper knowledge. Sometimes, some of these findings turn previous studies upside down, as in the case of the transcendental shift, and keep producing surprising outcomes concerning quite different aspects within the approach. In this framework, I will focus on the so-called discovery of the transcendental self and its features. Then, I will consider the link between these developments and the constitutive function of the body, its manifestation as Körper and Leib and its relation to the self. On this basis, I will explore the unveiling of the others' bodies as a condition of intersubjectivity and the world. Finally, I will examine Husserl's explorations of the self and the body concerning exceedance, which reveals the central role of these aspects in grasping and describing the whole range of phenomena according to the principle "to the things themselves".

In response to the claim that our sense of will is illusory, some philosophers have called for a better understanding of the phenomenology of agency. Although I am broadly sympathetic with the tenor of this response, I question whether the positive-theoretic blueprint it promotes truly heralds a tenable undertaking. Marshaling a Schopenhauerian insight, I examine the possibility that agency might not be amenable to phenomenological description. Framing this thesis in terms of Charles S. Peirce’s semiotic framework, I suggest a way to integrate the idea of streaming experiences with that of bodily strivings, which, owing to their primitive structure, can never be represented.

This chapter aims to draw a cartography of the phenomenological movement that presents the dynamic specific to each of its main currents as well as their systematic and historical relation to each other. It presents the philosophical framework within which the ‘breakthrough of a newly grounded philosophy’, namely phenomenology, was made possible, and analyses the fundamental features that characterize this philosophical breakthrough. The chapter examines the different shifts that contributed to renewing the meaning and scope of phenomenology and constituted it as the tradition of thought that became the cornerstone of continental philosophy throughout the 20th century. The impact of Martin Heidegger’s hermeneutic shift on the phenomenological movement was strong enough to deeply modify the meaning, the scope and the goals of phenomenology. In order to describe the paradigmatic reversal of the intentional analysis operated by Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Marion coined the term ‘counter-intentionality’, which he later appropriated as a keystone of his own phenomenology of givenness.

This paper shows that Husserl is not guilty of Sellars' myth of the sensory given. I firstly show that Husserl's account of 'sensations' or 'sense data' seems to possess some of the attributes Sellars' myth critiques. In response I show that, just as Sellars thinks that our 'conceptual capacities' afford us an awareness of a logical perceptual space that has a propositional structure, Husserl thinks that 'acts of apprehen-sion' (Akt der Auffassung) structure sensations to afford us perception that is similarly propositionally structured. Not only this, but there is much affinity and shared motivation between Husserl and Sellars accounts of the sensory stratum. Reflection on phenomenological considerations prevents Sellars from denying phenomenal non-conceptual content, whilst Husserlian 'sense data' are technical designations; dependant parts of perceptual experience grasped in abstraction, necessary for providing a reflective/philosophical account of empirical knowledge. I show that both Husserl and Sellars assert that the proper description of phenomenal content affords it the function of presenting properties of spatial objects during perception, and reiterate the well-known fact that Husserl thinks that perception is of 'conceptually' apprehended spatiotemporal objects (not sense data).

Penultimate draft. Please, quote from printed version

In the following paper we will attempt to analyze and reconstruct Edith Stein's interpretation of Husserl's "transcendental idealism," notably, the reason why, in her opinion, the latter ended up embracing that specific philosophical position. As will soon become apparent, according to Stein, Husserl misunderstands the peculiar ontological structure of individual essences and, in particular, the specific connection with reality that they carry within themselves. Without raising the question of whether Stein's own understanding of transcendental idealism perfectly corresponds with Husserl's, we will confine ourselves to discussing, first, the wider context within which she tackles it and, second, the relation between Husserl's idealism and the formal-ontological issue of how to characterize the internal content of individual essences. No matter what we think of Stein's critical assessment, her approach has the great and undeniable merit of forcing the "interpreter" to face the problem of the tight connection between the transcendental dimension and the eidetic dimension of Husserl's thought.

En 1936, en su última obra, Crisis, Husserl afirma que la filosofía ejerce una función orientadora con respecto a la cultura. El propósito de esta investigación es mostrar que la caracterización del filósofo como "funcionario de la humanidad" está en estrecha conexión con la fenomenología de la experiencia: ciencia de la ‘doxa’, ciencia del mundo de la vida. En la década del treinta, Husserl desarrolla una fenomenología de la facticidad, fenomenología de la subjetividad trascendental, cuyo carácter es monádico, pero cuyo ser tan solo adviene real mediante relaciones intersubjetivas. La ciencia del mundo de la vida permite establecer que en la raíz de la crisis de la cultura occidental se encuentran el 'dualismo psico-físico', el 'objetivismo' y el 'naturalismo'. Para superarlos se requiere revalorizar la doxa, y mostrar cómo en ella tiene lugar la constitución, el a priori, del mundo de la vida.

The young Edmund Husserl stressed that the success of his philosophy hinged upon his ability to determine the subject and the predicate of impersonal propositions and their expressions, such as 'It is raining'. This essay accordingly investigates the tenability of Husserl's early thought, by executing a first study of his analysis of impersonal propositions from the late 1890s. This examination reshapes our understanding of the inception of phenomenology in two ways. First, Husserl pinpoints the subject by outlining why impersonal expressions are employed during communication. This contravenes interpretations of the early Husserl as uninterested in intersubjectivity. Second, by studying how Husserl determines the predicate by investigating existential propositions, I show that Husserl had, in the late 1890s, come to his final view on the concept of being.

Husserl’s controversial distinction between meaning and indication in the Logical Investigations has been attacked by Derrida and others. In this paper I investigate the nature of this distinction, its meaning, and its implications for the philosophy of language and phenomenology. Husserl takes signs, in the sense of a Kantian transcendental clue, as evidence for the structure of the subjective acts that constitute them. Thus, Husserl’s investigation into the ambiguity in the ‘sign’ leads us to the mind, for only the mind can distinguish between the indicative and meaning-functions of signs. Thus I use the resources in Husserl’s account to articulate the structure of indication, sketching how we have access to the structure of subjectivity by examining indication in interpersonal communication.

The paper offers an overview of Husserl's conception of consciousness and conscious experience in light of recent debates in philosophy of mind. Forthcoming in Sebastian Luft and Maren Wehrle (Ed.): Husserl-Handbuch, Metzler Verlag, Stuttgart 2017.

This paper accomplishes two tasks. First, I unpack Husserl's analysis of interest from his 1893 manuscript, "Notes Towards a Theory of Attention and Interest" to demonstrate that it comprises his first rigorous genetic analysis of attention. Specifically, I explore Husserl's observations about how attentive interest is passively guided by affections, moods, habits, and cognitive tensions. In doing so, I reveal that the early Husserl described attention as always pulled forward to new discoveries via the rhythmic recurrence of tension and pleasure. Second, I demonstrate that "Notes" is the germ of Husserl's mature genetic phenomenology of attention. The 1893 analysis provides Husserl with all of the philosophical reasons and tools for the construction of his genetic account of attention in his late works. I then discuss how the disclosure of this novel subterranean link can prompt a rethinking of the development of phenomenology.

Existe un ámbito teórico que en buena medida define el porvenir de la filosofía husserliana, me refiero a los análisis matemáticos emprendidos por los “Maestros” de E. Husserl, Karl Weierstrass y Leopold Kronecker, a quienes puede considerarse como dos pilares fundamentales en los desarrollos de la fenomenología de las matemáticas. Todo lo anterior es visible si se revisan las lecciones y obras de estos matemáticos, a quienes Husserl sigue, desde, por ejemplo, su noción de número natural como base de la aritmética, la teoría de la axiomatización de las ciencias, hasta la necesidad de dar cuenta de un tipo de condición que permita comprender la constitución de las entidades ideales. Según lo anterior, el objetivo de este ensayo es “revivir” y en la medida de lo posible ampliar el panorama teórico de los filósofos arriba mencionados. El ensayo comenzará con la figura de Weierstrass, para después revisar a Kronecker y finalizar con algunos apuntes sobre las “matemáticas” brentanianas en una especie de excurso filosófico.

The preservation of correspondence and notes by Husserl offers a relevant case for evaluating the relationship between the development of philosophical ideas and their relation to personal assessment, in a situation where the author is especially sensitive to signs of incomprehension. In his letter to Albrecht in December 1930, Husserl states that "bringing to maturity his transcendental phenomenology" he finds himself "philosophically alone" and his disciples are "a new generation [...] that misinterprets my fragments and incomplete published beginnings in the most profound sense, and propagates a supposedly improved Phenomenology revering me as an outdated old man" (HuDo III / IX, 75). Now, a more in-depth look will allow us to connect this sensation with the views about the development of Phenomenology to assess if this "philosophical solitude" points to a model of abandonment as a phase of progress within the same line, or implies a model of parricide understood as a denial of the fundamental grounds. With this purpose, (1) we will review the presentations of the transcendental Phenomenology developed by Husserl from 1905 to 1925 and their links with autobiographical hints. Then, (2) we will analyse the mentions about incomprehension regarding the episode of the drafting of the article for the Encyclopaedia Britannica as a sign of the conflict with Heidegger. Finally, (3) we will examine the impact of this view in the last period of Husserl's production, to assess the tension between the models of abandonment and parricide regarding the development of Phenomenology and its distortive relationship with Hermeneutics.

Cette thèse vise à reconstituer la théorie de l'espace développée par Husserl dans les manuscrits des premières années quatre-vingt-dix qui composent le Livre de l'espace. On en exposera les thématiques principales et identifiera les influences exercées sur la pensée de Husserl durant sa formation philosophique, avec une attention particulière en ce qui concerne les aspects mathématiques et scientifiques du problème de l'espace.
Le Livre de l'espace représente encore un défi interprétatif, bien que Ingeborg Strohmeyer ait composé une édition critique de l'œuvre en suivant le sommaire esquissé par Husserl. Le corps textuel se fragmente dans une série des sections qui, à première vue, suggèrent que Husserl était "attiré" par un objet d'étude qui l'éloignait du cours principal de ses réflexions. Plusieurs chercheurs ont suivi cette lecture et ont interprété le Livre de l'espace comme une première exploration de la question des idéalités géométriques, en y repérant les concepts et les coordonnés théoriques des œuvres de la maturité. Selon une deuxième hypothèse complémentaire, bien que le Livre de l'espace ne réussisse pas à formuler une véritable théorie de l'espace, ses idées représentent néanmoins une ébauche de celles présentées dans le cours phénoménologique sur la chose de 1907. Ces interprétations abordent le problème en considérant seulement les textes publiés et, secondairement, elles tendent à lire les théories du jeune Husserl à travers les catégories de la phénoménologie tardive.
Même si certains aspects du Livre de l'espace anticipent les analyses des idéalités géométriques de la Crise des sciences européennes et de La chose et l'espace, on trouve des donnés textuels qui montrent l'impossibilité de réduire la théorie de l'espace préphénoménologique au contexte et au style des analyses phénoménologiques. Ces raisons émergent en concentrant l'analyse sur le chemin des recherches qui partent de la Philosophie de l'Arithmétique et s'ouvrent à des questions latérales, mais pas marginales. On aura ainsi l'occasion d'aborder des questions relatives à l'optique, la physiologie, les mathématiques et à la psychologie, qui sont largement traitées dans les inédits.
En abordant ces thématiques dans le cadre de la psychologie brentanienne, Husserl formule une théorie de l'espace qui, bien qu'irréductible aux catégories de la prochaine phénoménologie, n'est pas une théorie complète et cohérente. Le projet du Livre de l'espace est ainsi abandonné en faveur de certaines recherches plus urgentes qui conduiront Husserl vers le "tournant antipsychologiste" des Recherches Logiques. Cette thèse vise aussi à mettre en lumière les raisons qui ont poussé Husserl à abandonner sa première théorie de l'espace, en intégrant les réflexions de l'époque dans l'ensemble de la production husserlienne. À travers des références ponctuelles à la théorie phénoménologique de l'espace on montrera ses analogies et différences avec le Livre de l'espace et son contexte, en comprenant ainsi dans quel sens elle constitue l'héritage conceptuel des réflexions des années quatre-vingt-dix. Il s'agira donc de souligner le passage graduel de la théorie géométrique de l'espace à la théorie phénoménologique afin de tracer une histoire des différentes réponses que Husserl a données à la question de l'espace, entre psychologie et phénoménologie.

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Il presente lavoro mira a ricostruire la teoria dello spazio sviluppata da Husserl nei manoscritti dei primi anni Novanta che vanno a formare il cosiddetto Raumbuch, esponendone le tematiche principali ed individuando le influenze recepite da Husserl durante la sua formazione giovanile, con particolare attenzione ai risvolti matematico-scientifici del Raumproblem.
Sebbene Ingeborg Strohmeyer, nel comporre l'edizione critica dell'opera, abbia seguito l'indice abbozzato dallo stesso Husserl, comprendere il Raumbuch rappresenta ancora una sfida per l'interprete. Il corpo della trattazione è infatti frammentato in molteplici sezioni, più o meno sostanziose, che a un primo sguardo potrebbero dare l'idea di un Husserl attratto/distratto da una curiosità passeggera. Numerosi studiosi hanno assecondato questa lettura, scorgendo nel Raumbuch un primo confronto di Husserl col problema delle idealità geometriche e riconoscendovi i concetti e le coordinate teoriche che torneranno nelle opere mature. A questa prima ipotesi interpretativa se n'è associata un'altra, complementare, secondo cui il Raumbuch, pur non riuscendo a formulare una teoria dello spazio che possa definirsi tale, rappresenti un abbozzo della teoria dello spazio fenomenologica presentata nelle lezioni sulla cosa del '07. Entrambe le interpretazioni sono in realtà frutto di un approccio alla questione che tiene conto dei soli testi editi da un lato, e dall'altro cade tende a leggere le teorie giovanili attraverso le categorie della fenomenologia matura.
Anche se che alcuni aspetti del Raumbuch anticipano la trattazione delle idealità geometriche della Krisis der europaischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie e la teoria della Dingvorlesung, non si possono certo ignorare quelle ragioni che fanno della teoria dello spazio pre-fenomenologica un tentativo di affrontare il Raumproblem autonomo dal contesto delle riflessioni fenomenologiche, seppur ad esse evidentemente legato. Tali ragioni testuali emergono se si volge l'attenzione al panorama di problemi che occupano Husserl in quel periodo: solo seguendo il filo dell'indagine che dalla prima opera di Husserl si apre a considerazioni laterali ma non per questo marginali, si accede ad un orizzonte di problemi (ottici, fisiologici, matematici, psicologici) ampiamente dibattuti negli inediti.
Dall'incontro tra la discussione del problema della spazio e gli strumenti ereditati dalla psicologia di matrice brentaniana, nasce una teoria dello spazio indipendente dalle categorie della fenomenologia, ma non per questo completa e consistente con il corpus delle riflessioni husserliane che si andavano codificando durante quell'ultimo decennio del XIX secolo. Il progetto del Raumbuch viene infatti accantonato nell'ottobre del '93, a favore di indagini più pressanti che avrebbero condotto Husserl alla "svolta antipsicologistica" delle Logische Untersuchungen. Il presente lavoro mira a decifrare i motivi e le tempistiche che hanno condotto Husserl all'abbandono della prima teoria dello spazio, integrandone le riflessioni finora poco frequentate dalla letteratura critica nel complesso della produzione husserliana. A tal scopo, si troveranno alcuni rimandi alla teoria dello spazio fenomenologica che, nell'illustrare differenze e analogie con la temperie del Raumbuch, aiuteranno a comprendere in che senso la prima possa essere considerata erede della seconda. Mettendo in luce il graduale passaggio dalla teoria geometrica dello spazio alla teoria fenomenologica dello spazio, verrà tracciata una storia delle differenti risposte fornite da Husserl alla questione dello spazio, tra psicologia e fenomenologia.

« Mais de quoi parlions-nous ? » ne cesse de demander à sa fille Mme Armfeldt dans Sourires d'une nuit d'été, soulignant ainsi l'impossibilité de déterminer en toutes circonstances quel est l'objet visé aussi bien par notre discours que par notre pensée. C'est à cette difficulté que répond traditionnellement la théorie des catégories, nous permettant de comprendre comment les formes conceptuelles que nous of fre le langage peuvent articuler une référence à un objet déterminé, et établir un pont entre la pensée et la perception. C'est cette question que reprend à nouveaux frais Husserl dans l'ouvrage fondateur de la phénoménologie, les Recherches Logiques, où l'analyse des catégories se voit intégrée à une théorie originale de l'intentionnalité des actes de conscience de façon à décrire l'articulation du voir et du signifier, de la pensée et de la perception. A nouveaux frais, car la description phénoménologique renouvelle la question des catégories en la détachant des présuppositions métaphysiques qui en ont compromis l'analyse, et en refusant de projeter les structures du langage ou du jugement sur celles de la perception.

Heidegger, after Husserl, stressed the significance of the doctrine of categorial intuition and insisted on its importance for the emergence of phenomenology. Both he and Husserl have emphasized the methodological function, as well as the founding role of the theory of categories with respect to the discovery of a new field for philosophical investigations based on the description of phenomenality. However, it is far from clear why the analysis of the most fundamental concepts at work within thought and knowledge should matter especially to a discipline that focuses primarily on the modes of appearing of phenomena. This article aims at clarifying the intrinsic relation that ties the phenomenological use of categories together with the descriptive method that phenomenology requires. A closer look at Husserl and Heidegger’s accounts of categorial intuition reveals that, far from making similar claims regarding the phenomenological significance of the theory of categories, Husserl and Heidegger defend two substantially different conceptions of the nature and tasks of phenomenology. While the latter holds that categorial intuition provides the necessary ground for phenomenological hermeneutics, the former makes it the keystone that warrants the solidity of phenomenological analyses, maintaining an irreducible tension between sensibility and understanding that disappears in Heidegger’s phenomenology.

The Second Edition includes a new chapter (chapter 7)  that has not been previously published. 

7. The Phenomenology of the Nothing: The Hidden Dialogue with
Heidegger—A New Chapter Added to the Second Edition

This chapter, composed especially for the second edition and not previously
published, addresses HCM’s ontological perspective on the Nothing, while
consulting Heidegger’s perception of the same that is bound with his idea
of the inception (Anfang) of Being. Based on the analysis of the thinking of
the two contemporaries, the chapter proposes an outline of a phenomenology
of the Nothing in three steps: first, I present the point of departure rooted
in a fundamental ontological difference; second, I establish the precedence
of the Nothing over real existence; finally, I discuss the fundamental bond
between Nothing and Being. These steps join to form one metaphysical argument: Nothing precedes Being, which is maintained throughout, and thereby
forms the essential finitude of reality.

In the final book of Logical Investigations from 1901, Husserl develops a theory of knowledge based on the intentional structure of consciousness. While there is some textual evidence that Husserl considered this to entail a critique of Kantian philosophy , he did not elaborate substantially on this. This paper reconstructs the covert critique of Kant's theory of knowledge which LI contains. With respect to Kant, I discuss three core aspects of his theory of knowledge which, as Husserl's reflections on Kant indicate, Husserl was familiar with. These are (i) the cooperation of two faculties for the justification of beliefs; (ii) the concept of a priori structures of knowledge Kant operated with; and (iii) the delivered transcendental proof of these structures. Regarding Logical Investigations, I first briefly outline the intentional structure of consciousness as presented in the fifth book and then turn to the theory of knowledge in the sixth book. I then clarify, partially on the basis of manuscripts and lecture notes, the covert critique of the three core aspects of Kant's theory which the sixth book contains.

Husserl's original notion of grammar seems to be somewhat disconnected fromif not at odds withthe intentionalist framework of his phenomenological investigations. The discovery of «pure logical grammar», indeed, is contingent upon the identification of a basic level of constitution of meaning (Sinn), recognized as strictly independent from the intentional relationship that tie meaning-intentions together with their objects and insensitive to the (even merely formal) possibility of reference. This article examines how Husserl's account of pure grammar connects with his phenomenological analysis of intentional acts and lived-experiences. Do pure grammatical laws only determine external constraints on the production of meaning, and to which extent is grammar involved in the phenomenological description of the lived-experience of sense-making? In order to highlight the phenomenological stakes of pure grammar, the article points out its implication in Husserl's analysis of the freedom of thought. The analysis of this relationship between pure grammar and the freedom of thought can shed light on the aesthetic and literary uses of language, which investigate original ways of making sense that overstep the limits of logic. With that respect, the last works of French linguist Emile Benveniste on the status and functions of poetical speech (in Baudelaire's poetry in particular) bring an interesting complement to Husserl's idea of pure grammar that reveals its fertility for literary analyses and allows an original interpretation of the functions of meaning in poetry.

Traducción al español de las primeras lecciones impartidas por Husserl en el semestre de invierno 1898/99 en la Universidad de Halle sobre teoría del conocimiento y puntos capitales de la metafísica, publicadas como anexo en el tomo tercero de Husserliana - Materialien del año 2001. Las lecciones son importantes como antecedente de los motivos que conducirán más tarde a la reducción trascendental. Con presentación del traductor.

The article introduces and discusses an unpublished manuscript by Edmund Husserl, conserved at the Husserl-Archives Leuven with signature K I 26, pp. 73a–73b. The article is followed by the text of the manuscript in German and in an English translation. The manuscript, titled “The Transition through the Impossible” (Der Durchgang durch das Unmögliche), was part of the material Husserl used for his 1901 Doppelvortrag in Göttingen. In the manuscript, the impossible is characterized as the “sphere of objectlessness” (Sphäre der Gegenstandslosigkeit) and Husserl addresses the question whether and when it is warranted to perform a transition through the impossible to obtain valid results for the sphere of objectivity.