Facticity

ABSTRACT: Minimalists about truth contend that traditional inflationary theories systematically fail to explain certain facts about truth, and that this failure licenses a 'reversal of explanatory direction'. Once reversed, they purport that their own minimal theory adequately explains all of the facts involving truth. But minimalists' main objection to inflationism seems to misfire, and the subsequent reversal of explanatory direction, if it can be made sense of, leaves minimalism in no better explanatory position; and even if the objection were serviceable and the reversal legitimate, minimalists' adequacy thesis is still implausible.

Through the vehicle of Nicolas Sarkozy’s so-called “Dakar Address,” we will analyze the West’s persisting lack of insight into the need for Western decolonization. We will attempt to identify the dangers that come from this refusal, such as the continued adherence to colonial patterns, the enduring self-understanding as being superior compared to Africa, and the persisting unwillingness to accept colonial guilt. Decolonization must be understood as a two-fold business. Decolonization means overcoming endured and perpetrated violence. It is not only important that the colonially oppressed regain strength, it is equally important that the perpetrators of colonial violence understand their excess of violence and work on rendering its return impossible. We explain how Western thinking remains dangerous and untrustworthy if it rejects its own decolonization. Finally, we will draw attention to a fundamental pattern of Western thought that clashes with the fundamental values of the West: contempt. In a final step, we suggest how this contempt can be overcome through desuperiorization and the establishment of elative ethics.

Heidegger’s Being and Time has been criticized for ignoring the social and ethical dimensions of human existence. After discussing the possibility of an “ethics of individuation,” it is argued that Heidegger is not concerned with developing a social or moral philosophy as such but with the question of how individuation (Vereinzelung), within the horizon of the question of being (Sein), is possible given the predominance of the social and the fallenness of the public sphere. The priority of the question concerning the individuation of Dasein – and its explication through the alterity of uncanniness, facticity, and death in relation to the identity of tradition and the “they” – provides a basis for rethinking the significance of the ethical in Being and Time, particularly in light of Heidegger’s project of a hermeneutics of facticity. Insofar as Heidegger unfolds the finitude and facticity of the ethical, as a question to which ethical thinking must respond, Heidegger intimates an ethics of facticity.

Raffoul and Nelson, Introduction to Rethinking Facticity
"Examines the historical context and contemporary relevance of facticity.

The concept of facticity has undergone crucial transformations over the last century in hermeneutics and phenomenology, but it has not yet received the attention that it warrants. Following a suggestion by Merleau-Ponty that philosophy is not about essences but rather the facticity of existence, prominent philosophers examine the significance of facticity in its historical context and reflect on its contemporary relevance. Focusing on the works of Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Lacan, and Fanon, among others, they trace its significance from life-philosophy to contemporary European thought and explore its philosophical implications. The following questions are addressed: What thoughts of experience, of subjectivity, of finitude, of nature, of the body, of racial and sexual difference does facticity provoke? What thinking of language, of history, of birth and death, of our ethical being-in-the-world does it mobilize? Exploring these questions, the contributors offer new interpretations of facticity.

"This excellent book makes a notable addition to recent scholarship in hermeneutics, phenomenology, and contemporary continental thought. In  particular, it enriches existing perspectives  on Heidegger  but also broaches new and unexplored lines of research by showing how facticity, a term coined by the young Heidegger, plays an important role in his early and late philosophy.  More than a dozen original essays, some by foremost scholars in the area, trace the significance of facticity..."
Emilia Angelova, Trent University
Symposium

“Rarely have I read a collection so rich in implicit intersection and contestation, and thus so able to stimulate fresh thought.” — John T. Lysaker, author of You Must Change Your Life: Poetry, Philosophy, and the Birth of Sense

“This fine collection shows that Heidegger’s work does open many rich paths for engaging experience. Each essay contributes to a dialogue between today’s driving concerns in continental philosophy and Heidegger’s thought. Furthermore, the volume shows how facticity can be given new and constructive impulses for today’s philosophical work.” — Alejandro A. Vallega, author of Heidegger and the Issue of Space: Thinking on Exilic Grounds

Contributors include Giorgio Agamben, Robert Bernasconi, Ed Casey, Bernard Flynn, Namita Goswami, Patricia Huntington, Theodore Kisiel, Jean-Luc Nancy, Eric Sean Nelson, David Pettigrew, François Raffoul, Jacob Rogozinski, Gregory Schufreider, Anthony J. Steinbock, and Rudi Visker."

The aim of this text is to question the use made by Heidegger, from the start to the end of his work, of the lexical field of weight to express the relationship of Dasein to being, a relationship thought under the modality of taking on a load. Having recalled the context and the passages in which Heidegger mobilises this lexical field, and having proposed an interpretation in the sphere of the conceptuality of the existential analytic, we shall attempt to bring to light the reasons that may have led him, somehow unwittingly, to place the relationship of Dasein to being under the heading of the phenomenon of weight. We shall seek in this regard to show from a phenomenological description of the experience of physical weight (weight of the body proper as well as the weight of objects) that this convocation of the phenomenon of weight to express the ontological experience constitutive of Dasein, far from being anodyne, is motivated by the very structure of this phenomenon – a phenomenon in which Dasein is led to experience in a privileged way the “that he is and has to be” in which his understanding of being is originally realised. (translated by J. Dudley)

Life and Time: Hans Blumenberg's Critique of Husserl's Phenomenology of Time-Consciousness In this article, I try to demonstrate the outline of Hans Blumenberg's critical interpretation of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. My argument is that according to Blumenberg there is an incompatible disruption between the phenomenological description as a method and its transcendental claim. While Husserl's point of departure in descriptive phenomenology is the given experience in its factual limitations, he forgets these limitations in his transcendental turn and assumes the apodicticity of absolute consciousness. Blumenberg does not follow Husserl in his transcendental turn. Instead, he rather tries to lead the philosophical reflection back to its factual situation. By so doing, he faces Husserl's slogan " back to things themselves! " with two questions: " from where? " and " back to where? ". With these questions, Blumenberg tries to understand where the phenomenologist stands himself as a human being in his work and to what extent his philosophy is influenced by his engagement with the world.

Aristotle's philosophy and Husserl's phenomenology both give immediate access to effective reality. A full ontology presupposes the facticity or givenness of the world. They both state the necessity of factual existence inasmuch as the presence of a being (Aristotle) or of the self-givenness of the Ego and of the world (Husserl) establishes itself in experience as apodictically evident. Both share the view that worldly beings are characterized by their contingency, though they differ as to its necessity. This chapter will argue that facticity paired with the accidental allows for the irruption of an event as Ereignis. It will thus examine the relationship between the absolute and the conditional necessity of a fact, as well as the contingent features involved therein at both authors, insofar as facticity is concerned.

A lo largo de este trabajo intentaré mostrar cómo la fenomenología sartreana es una ontología de la negatividad, en tanto se apoya sobre su experiencia fundamental de la nada entendida como nihilización-negación que introduce la diferencia en el mundo homogéneo y bruto del ser-en-sí, lo que sostiene una metafísica existencial de la contradicción y la ambigüedad sobre la que se funda todo el resto de sus ideas literarias, políticas y humanistas. Como un estudio atento puede comprobar, es posible comprender genealógicamente estos rastros de negatividad ya implícitamente latentes en la fenomenología husserliana y heideggeriana, elementos que Sartre toma y radicaliza. Lo negativo, expresado en los conceptos interconectados de nada, contingencia, facticidad y libertad es, en última instancia, aquel rasgo esencial que posibilita una existencia comprometida y orientada a la constante deconstrucción de su mundo circundante.

Absztrakt
Ennek a tanulmánynak a célja az, hogy egy nem túl könnyen azonosítható filozófiai aspektus megjelenésére mutasson be példákat a fenomenológia három különböző időszakából, különös tekintettel olyan szerzőkre, mint Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty és Michel Henry. Ez a közvetlenség aspektusa, amely alatt egy olyan filozófiai ambíciót és metodológiát értünk, amelynek alapvető igénye az élet minél eredetibb, spontán önadódásában való tettenérése. Ez az első hallásra nehezen meghatározható mozzanat körülbelül azt jelenti a filozófiában, mint az impresszionizmus és posztimpresszionizmus a festészetben. Illékony impresszióknak, a test köztes világának, az affekciókkal átitatott tapasztalatnak vagy a Másikkal való kapcsolatom fakticitásának a legális filozófiai térbe való beemelése. Az elemzés először G. W. F. Hegel értelmezését tekinti át röviden, akinél a közvetlenség még egy absztrakt formában, de már a közvetettel párhuzamba állítva és részben egy ontológiai szerkezetbe illesztve ábrázolódik. Majd előre ugorva a fenomenológia megszületéséhez, Edmund Husserl munkásságában keressük meg a közvetlenséget előtérbe állító és olykor eltávolító mozzanatokat, akinél már helyenként konkrét formában jelenik meg a közvetlen. Egyik központi témánk Maurice Merleau-Ponty, aki a Husserl-i alapokból kiindulva, de teljesen autonóm módon újítja meg a fenomenológiát és fejleszti végül ontológiává. Egyedülálló módon egy új heterogén egységet teremt a tudat, a test, és a világ között, az egyes vetületeket a lényegükbe hatolóan összekapcsolva, számos fogalmat teljesen újraértékelve. Zárásként pedig Michel Henry-t mutatom be röviden, aki magát az Életet emeli fenomenológiájának központi fogalmává. Munkáiban az Élet megnyilatkozása egy Ön-kinyilatkozás, melyben az Élet magát hozza a világra, és mely immanens módon tárul fel önmagának. A közvetlenség aspektusának térnyerése során tanúi lehetünk a fogalom két különböző mozgásának: először az absztrakttól a konkrét felé, majd a teoretikustól a fakticitás, majd az immanencia felé. A történeti áttekintésben nem állt szándékomban a közvetlenséget kizárólagos filozófiai módszerként beállítani. Pusztán a közvetett és a közvetlen hatékony és egymást kiegészítő egyensúlyára szeretném felhívni a figyelmet, mint amely előremutató lehet például a kortárs fenomenológiában is.


Abstract
This paper aims to indentify examples of manifestation of a difficult to access philosophical aspect in three ages of phenomenological movement, focusing on Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Michel Henry. This is the aspect of immediacy, a philosophical ambition and metodology which has a principal need to spontaneously embracing life as pristine originality. At first glance this challenging moment of philosophy can be translated as impressionism and post-impressionism in the history of painting. It moves the volatile impressions, the „in-between” world of human body, the affection-sodden experiences or one’s factual relationship with Others into legal philosophical space. First, this study reviews shortly G. W. F. Hegel’s interpretation, who presents the immediacy in an abstract form, however in parallel with the indirect, and partially integrated it into an ontological system. Then, so fast-forward to the birth of phenomenology, we try to find illuminating moments of immediacy in Edmund Husserl’s works, where the immediacy already emerges in concrete shape. One of our main topics is Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who is starting from the husserlian basics, but wholly autonomously renews the phenomenology and develops into ontology. He uniquely creates a heterogeneous unity between consciousness, body and world, he interconnects essentialy the different areas, and reappraises several terms completely. Lastly I show you Michel Henry briefly, who makes the „Life” as the central element of his phenomenology. In his works the Life’s expression is a Self-expression, in which the Life gives birth to Itself, and that reveals to Itself immanently. We can see two different movements of the concept during the rise of immediacy aspect: first, from abstract to concrete; second, from theoretical to factual and later to immanent. In the historical overview I have no intention of showing the immediacy as only philosophical method. I would like to draw attention to the direct and indirect aspects together are efficient and complementarity balance, and which balance would be the way forward for example in the contemporary phenomenology too.

This article recalls Edward Schillebeeckx’s basic categories of a hermeneutics of faith that is engaged with all realms of life. Recourse to facticity and self-realization can expand our thinking and scope of creativity, which furthermore can help to make an up-to-date consideration of the concept of the wider realm of human experience

Die vorliegende Arbeit ist der Ausdruck eines Ringens. Das, womit und worum dabei gerungen wird, ist nichts anderes als die Klärung und Darstellung dessen, was unter dem Titel der Faktizität in die Husserl-Forschung eingegangen ist. Man könnte freilich zeigen, dass dieser Eingang zugleich den Charakter eines Einbruchs hat, da sich dieses Thema den anderen Themen und Fragerichtungen der Phänomenologie nicht einfach in der Absicht der Bewahrung ihrer Problemordnung zugesellt, sondern durch seinen Einbruch-Charakter eine Umwälzung jener Sach- und Frageordnung bewerkstelligt hat. Dadurch wird zunächst deutlich, dass das, was hier unter dem Begriff des Faktischen auftritt und sich in der Doxographie einen Namen gemacht hat, mit den sonstigen Forschungsgegenständen der Phänomenologie nicht in einer Reihe liegt, sondern sich auf sie – um es bildlich auszudrücken – wie eine Funktion auf ihre Variablen bezieht. Es findet also eine Neuorientierung, Neubewertung und Umstrukturierung aller Probleme im Hinblick auf den Begriff des Faktischen statt.

The present article seeks to show that, for the Dadaists, film was an unsatisfying medium because as a technically reproduced artifact it counteracted Dada’s sense of immediacy. The focus of my text revolves around the notion of “facticity” inspired by Wieland Herzfelde, for whom Dada represented a reaction to all attempts at disavowing the “factual.” Manifestations of Dada, such as the readymade, live performance, collage, photomontage and not least the photogram, attest to a radically new understanding of realism in art, adhering to an “anti-mimetic concept of realism” (Elsaesser). As I will argue, Dada did not capitulate to film, but made a ‘compromise,’ by exploring different strategies to reinsert the “factual“ into this medium of reproduction. This could be done by (1) turning a screening into a live performance, (2) eliciting a bodily reaction in the spectator, (3) experimenting with hand-made, camera-less devices of film making, and (4) calling to mind the material existence of the cinematic apparatus. What these strategies have in common is to minimalize (although not necessarily to abolish) the distance between “reality” and its representation in order to maintain film’s initial tactility, as described by Walter Benjamin in “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.”
Man Ray’s Le Retour à la raison (1923) and Marcel Duchamp’s Anémic cinéma (1924–26) are prototypes of the Dadaist ‘compromise.’ A similar impetus can be found in a more recent example, Dream Work (2001), the third part of Peter Tscherkassky’s CinemaScope-Trilogy, which explicitly refers to the early days of French experimental film. What these three films, despite their differences, have in common, is to privilege a certain immediacy (be it during the moment of production or during the moment of reception) and to include an element of tactility, usually absent from cinematic works.
In: Aniki : Portuguese Journal of the Moving Image, North America, 1, jun. 2014. Available at: <http://aim.org.pt/ojs/index.php/revista/article/view/93>.

Tentative correspondences within a 10-bull framework
Cognitive entanglement of corresponding "stories" of insight emergence
Phases in the "re-cognition" of "bull" according to Zen?
Implication in interwoven "bull" and "ox" themes
Facticity, alternative facts and Zen?
What really exists -- truthfully?
Non-linear patterns of distinctions constrained by number
Circular configuration of cognitive phases framing toroidal experience?
Engaging with the missing -- however encircled or encycled
Eliciting the "pattern that connects" via "bull"?
Reframing "winning" through neural network learning -- as "bullying"?

"""Die Begriffsbildungen Endlichkeit, Faktizität, Geschichtlichkeit und Hermeneutik, die sich alle auf das Verstehen des menschlichen Daseins beziehen, werden verständlicherweise in der gegenwärtigen Philosophie häufig in Verbindung mit Martin Heideggers frühem philosophischem Projekt gebracht und von hier aus auch gedeutet. Weniger wird jedoch darauf geachtet, wie stark Heidegger diese leitenden Grundbegriffe mit Bezug auf Wilhelm Diltheys Denken über die menschliche Existenz interpretiert und auf seine eigene Art und Weise umgewandelt hat.
Im Zusammenhang der wichtigen Auseinandersetzung des frühen Heideggers mit Dilthey in den 1920er Jahren hat Heidegger Edmund Husserls transzendentale Phänomenologie erst lebensphilosophisch und dann hermeneutisch umgedeutet. Heidegger hat in diesem Kontext die „kategoriale Anschauung” (die nach Husserl das Universale im Singularen wahrnimmt) als eine interpretative Hermeneutik und als „formal anzeigend“ gedeutet; eine Formalisierung, die auf das „auslegende Vorlaufen” der konkreten Faktizität des menschlichen Daseins in seiner Mannigfaltigkeit hinweist.
Nach Diltheys Begriff einer „modernen Lebensphilosophie” kann das Leben nur „aus ihm selbst gedeutet werden.”  Die eindrucksvollen, sehr frei ausgedrückten und gefühlsmäßigen Deutungen des Lebensbegriffs, die von den Lebensphilosophen stammen, sollen von einer in der Luft schwebenden Spekulation befreit werden und zu wahrer Erkenntnis führen. Das gelingt laut Dilthey, wenn diese Deutungen in der Selbstbesinnung und in der wissenschaftlichen Reflexion methodisch und begrifflich geklärt werden. Heidegger hat teilweise – und zwar in seinen früheren Vorlesungen nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg - in ähnlicher Weise die Philosophie als einen Versuch dargestellt, das faktische Leben aus sich selbst zu verstehen.  Aber das „Aus-sich-selbst Verstehen” ist beim früheren Heidegger gegen die erkenntnistheoretischen und psychologischen Tendenzen der neuzeitlichen Philosophie gewendet, die er immer noch im Neukantianismus sowie bei Husserl und Dilthey spürt und beklagt und die er besonders in der Mitte der 1920er Jahre im Rückgriff auf Aristotelus gedeutet hat."""

Resumen: El siguiente trabajo busca desplegar la problemática sobre el posible dualismo atribuido a la ontología fenomenológica de Sartre y ver cómo el fenómeno de la corporalidad está planteado en El ser y la nada. A su vez, en tanto ha sido quizás el último de los grandes filósofos-artistas, veremos cómo la corporalidad está expuesta poéticamente en su famosa novela La náusea, tendiendo puentes con su posterior ensayo sistemático para alcanzar así una mayor profundidad en torno a las cuestiones de la facticidad y la contingencia, elementos esenciales para el despliegue de la libertad.

Palabras clave: Sartre – Corporalidad – Contingencia – Facticidad – Náusea

Hermeneutics is widely celebrated as a call for “conversation”—that is, a manner of inquiry characterized by humility and openness to the other that eschews the pretenses of calculative rationality and resists all finality of conclusions. In this, conversation takes shape in efforts to understand and interpret that always unfold in the transmission of meaning historically in language. Yet, the celebration of hermeneutics for humility and openness appears, at least, to risk embarrassment in light of claims found in Heidegger and Gadamer that conversation is always contingent on “prior accord.” Critics of hermeneutics have, for some decades, interpreted this claim of prior accord to refer to a common tradition, so that the understanding achieved in conversation is restricted to those who belong to the same heritage. In this essay, the author argues that although Heidegger and Gadamer often suggest this prior accord is a matter of common tradition, crucial threads of Gadamer’s thought, in particular, recommend a different view. Gadamer, in these threads, offers that “prior accord” concerns not a common tradition, but, on the contrary, the call to participate in hermeneutic transmission as such, even—and no doubt especially—when those in conversation are not familiar with the tradition or language of the other. With this, we are called to converse not first by what the other says, but by the fact that we do not yet understand, that we have already misunderstood, and that we perhaps cannot understand.

Study on the interaction between an existential problematics and narrative technique of Sven Delblanc’s novel Prästkappan (1963) The analysis is supported by theoretical perspecives from J-P Sartre’s phenomenology, Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, and M.M. Bakhtin’s dialogic poetics.

Husserl's late claim of that transcendental logic is self-founded stands in a puzzling relation with the facticity of nature. This relation concerns issues such as the traceableness of a " living present " in the immanence of living consciousness. The article considers this matter through a specific perspective, gained by reference to the project of a transcendental foundation of the science of nature. This project requires the problematic possibility of a formal determination of facticity. One could characterize the phenomenological finding of a " living present " as Husserl's attempt to resolve the discrepancy between fact and form in a " living being " which consists of both actual materiality and transcendental ideality. This conciliatory solution remains questionable, given the impossibility to provide an a priori foundation of this synthetic moment through the self-reflexive movement of transcendental logic. However, the systematic project of transcendental phenomenology as such entails the question concerning the a priori foundation of our ordinary knowledge of facts. It seems, then, to require a solution of this sort. The problem of grounding the scientific knowledge of natural facts dates back at least to Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. So does the need for the definition of an empirical moment of this grounding. A discussion of Kant's Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft presents an aporetic facet of the way in which transcendental philosophy responds to this need. An analogous impasse occurs in Husserl's mature work. The concept of " living present " holds a central role in defining Husserl's stance towards this stalemate. The analysis of this role aims to clarify both Husserl's specific position in the broader context of transcendental philosophy, and an aspect of the transcendental foundation of the science of nature. I conclude that this foundation must encompass a factual, non-formalizable element: a material residue, required in order to complete its reflexive movement.

The purpose of this article is to examine Hans-Georg Gadamer’s considerations of the hermeneutical significance of the body. This theme may come as a surprise, given that
Gadamer has criticized himself for not having done enough to elucidate the hermeneutics of the body. In this essay, I argue, however, that Gadamer makes important contributions to the hermeneutics of the body in later essays concerned with health, medical science, and the art of healing. Specifically, I argue that Gadamer’s treatment of these themes recommends the body as an ineluctable aspect of what Heidegger referred to as the hermeneutics of facticity. In this, Gadamer suggests that the hermeneutics of facticity is characterized not only by the experience of language as this is transmitted historically, but, at the same time, by the embodied experience of pain. Through an analysis of references made by Gadamer in these later essays to the newborn child’s experience of the cry at birth, in particular, I argue that the hermeneutical significance of language, or logos, is always bound up with a rhythm, or rhythmos, of the body that is punctuated by pain.

Der Aufsatz untersucht Hans-Georg Gadamers Überlegungen zur hermeneutischen Bedeutung des Leibes. Diese Themenstellung mag überraschen, da Gadamer sich selbst vorwarf, die Hermeneutik des menschlichen Körpers vernachlässigt zu haben. Jedoch versuche ich zu zeigen, dass Gadamer in späten Aufsätzen, die sich mit Themen wie der Gesundheit, der Medizin und der Heilkunst beschäftigen, durchaus wichtige Beiträge zu einer hermeneutischen Theorie des Leibes liefert. Insbesondere argumentiere ich dafür, dass Gadamer den Leib als wesentlichen Aspekt dessen begreift, was Heidegger eine Hermeneutik der Faktizität genannt hat. Gadamer schlägt damit vor, nicht allein die Sprache in ihrer geschichtlichen Überlieferung, sondern auch die Leiberfahrung des Schmerzes als wesentlichen Bestandteil einer Hermeneutik der Faktizität zu begreifen. Die hermeneutische Beschreibung von Sprache oder logos ist immer mit einem Rhythmus, einem rhythmos verbunden, der jedoch im Schmerz unterbrochen wird.

Importance and the influence of the Habermas’ theory presented in Between facts and norms will not be put under question however this article will try to profoundly analyze it and present some of the critics as a way of giving more objective perspective of Habermas’ approach. In first part this article will specially deal with authors view on Moral through reflection on his previous works on this subject, especially development of Discourse ethics. Further through the work tensions between morality and law will be presented and their relation in modern societies so we can define the main subject of this paper, modern legal system better. In the second part we will deal with issues of relation of democracy and law. It will be presented through focus on legitimacy it’s relation with democracy as well as model of Deliberative democracy. This paper contains also, view of Derrida as alternative to Habermas’ notion on co-originality. Also, we will deliberate about interesting relation within norms and values and their application in praxis and critic on Habermas’ view which came from Alexy. In conclusion we will try to give summery review of the most important points of the part of Habermas’ theory this article presented.

In this article, an attempt will be made to analyse the Jesuit drama of Georg Bernardt, in terms of its existential philosophy content. It will become apparent that the Jesuits, in accordance here with reformatory theology, assume the existence of a normative facticity. In this normative facticity, the Jesuits then, in most profound conflict with reformatory thought, believe in the possibility to work towards one's state of grace.

The Destruction of "Possible" and "Real" in the Early Heidegger
The paper explores the connection between facticity and destruction by taking into account Heidegger's theory of modalities and his understanding of "possible" and "real". It follows the dismantling of Augustine, Aristotle and Leibniz carried out by Heidegger between 1919 and 1928.

This paper offers a general outline and characterization of the idea of 'phenomenology of transcendental mediality' in the works of Yoshihiro NITTA (1929-2020), whose contribution to phenomenological philosophy consists in the radical reflection and analysis of the very issue of phenomenology: the analysis of appearance-Erscheinen-in its facticity and mediality. For this purpose, we will especially focus on Nitta's philosophical relation-determined by 'proximity and distance'-to two phenomenologists, i.e., Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink. First, we are going to show that Nitta accepts Fink's conception of appearance as 'absolute medium', which, according to Fink, renders possible all entities about which we meaningfully speak. Secondly, we will discuss the phenomenological conception of facticity in the late Husserl, a theme central in Nitta, carefully employed in order to refine Fink's idea and to develop his 'phenomenology of transcendental mediality'.

Cada día nos afrontamos al reto de ser los que hemos sido—de sernos auténticamente, es decir, sin mentir a nosotros mismos y sin pretender a existir de una manera incompatible con la condición humana, una condición tanto libre como endeudada y cargada de responsibilidad. ¿Cómo figura el haber sido en la autenticidad? ¿Qué significaría haber sido de la manera adecuada?

Kant’s concept of the “thing in itself” constitutes a formidable challenge to the project of “(anthropological-)historical ontology” with which the name of Li Zehou has become synonymous. Li’s radical reinterpretation of Kantian critical philosophy, which locates the conditions of the possibility of knowledge and experience within historical and social evolution and thus allows for a form of human self-determination, brings us face to face with the close relation between the epistemological/ontological and normative dimensions of the notion of the thing in itself. My paper attempts to tease out some of the conceptual repercussions and presuppositions of Li’s approach to the thing in itself in his "Critique of Critical Philosophy" (Pipan zhexue zhi pipan) while locating his reading in the broader context of Kant’s transcendentalism.

Heidegger's fundamental ontology of human existence in "Being and Time" (1927) has evident affinities with Kierkegaard's analysis of the present age in "A Literary Review" (1846), as we demonstrate here.  We investigate what we believe is an unfortunate tendency to interpret the two thinkers along categorically discrete lines.  Bringing Kierkegaard and Heidegger into dialogue can be mutually illuminating, as we show, and can inform the development of a compelling ontology of social existence.

This thesis explores how some recent French films engage with the problem of correlation in their post-cinematic context. Drawing on the philosophy of Quentin Meillassoux, I argue that film reflects and reflects on the way it correlates both with the world, and with the Other of correlation, i.e. the humans involved at the various levels of the cinematographic experience. In order to theorize and analyse the affects emerging from the possible assemblages of these two distinct correlating correlates at work in the making of the post-cinematic real, I focus on a selection of contemporary French digital cinema (2009-2014). I analyse how these films reflect on their relation to consciousness, time, space and causality, and on their ability to produce novelty.
I first discuss Enter the Void (Gaspard Noé, France/Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan, 2009) and Vous n’Avez Encore Rien Vu/You Ain’t Seen Nothin’Yet (Alain Resnais, France/Germany, 2012) as two films that assume that consciousness is necessary and explore the impossibility for cinematic thought to think what is out of thought. I analyse how these films suggest that the world is unthinkable if not experienced by a consciousness with which it correlates, and that novelty is necessarily relative and develops in a closed system as the eternal return of affects. Chapter 2 focuses on films that suggest that this correlation is, however, not an absolute and that the way human consciousness processes the real could be radically other. The chapter focuses on Les Garçons et Guillaume, à Table/Me, Myself and Mum, (Guillaume Galienne, France/Belgium, 2013) and Ne Te Retourne Pas/Don’t Look Back (Marina de Van, France/Luxemburg/Italy/Belgium, 2009), two films that play with the facticity of correlates, i.e. the fact that the laws according to which the real (time, space, bodies, affects) emerge can vary, and novelty can be produced.
Chapters 3 and 4 radicalize facticity further by exploring the possibility of the facticity of becoming, i.e. a time without becoming, and engaging with filmic times that resonate with Meillassoux’s concept of Hyperchaos. Chapter 3 discusses Rubber (Quentin Dupieux, France/Angola/USA, 2010) and Bird People (Pascale Ferrand, France, 2014) and develops the principle of unreason – i.e. Meillassoux’s concept according to which only contingency is necessary – and its ethics. Finally, Chapter 4 explores Hyperchaos further, as a time without becoming that develops as a non-whole, by drawing on scenes from Holy Motors (Léos Carax, France/Germany, 2012) and Réalité/Reality (Quentin Dupieux, France/Belgium/USA, 2014).

The broad concern of this article is to contribute to discussions within hermeneutical philosophy that address the question of life as a form of correlation. More specifically, its purpose is to shed light on the character of life as correlation with reference to a basic aspect of this correlation: our living relation to things. To this end, the author focuses, first, on the later Heidegger’s suggestion that our proper relation to things takes shape as an enactment guided by the releasement or letting-be (Gelassenheit) of things in their independence; and, second, on Günter Figal’s recent claim that this enactment, in turn, depends on our referential relation to the exteriority or objectivity of things. The author concludes that our living relation with things may be understood best in terms of the movement or mutual interplay of these two conditions.

In Being and Nothingness, Sartre explains that being-in-itself is transphenomenal and becomes a phenomenon only through the process by which consciousness qualifies itself as its negation. Thus, there can be no phenomenon except as the object that consciousness (consciously) negates. This ontology of phenomena proves contradictory because one does not understand how consciousness can negate what does not appear to it, especially if it needs to do so as an existentialist freedom, which has to choose (in terms of phenomena) the end towards which it negates being. Sartre's theory of facticity as 'body' then comes as an alternative conception of phenomena, answering these problems by ultimately tending to present being-in-itself as a non-objective, hence non-conscious, phenomenon. Intentional consciousness thus becomes a transcendental condition for objectivity only and not for phenomenality in general.

Art as a Way of Coping with Facticity

This essay suggests a functional definition of art as a social system that analogously to politics law economics science and religion solves a specific problem in society. The function of art here is conceived not as an external supplementary aspect but is rather intended as a definition in the sense of a demarcation from other systems. This system-theoretical approach which assigns both a less problematic foundation and an appropriately central position to the Kantian idea of »purposiveness without purpose« is augmented by the phenomenological concepts of facticity and the imaginary in order to be able to represent art as the solution to the problem of facticity. In this way the essay attempts to outline not only a connection between art and society but also a concept of art as a genuinely social system.

Gott? Schicksal? Der Mensch alleine? Was bestimmt Gegenwart, Zukunft und Vergangenheit? Inwiefern spielt Gott dabei eine Rolle? Leitende Annahme dieser Untersuchung ist, dass der 2009 verstorbene Theologe Edward Schillebeeckx ein philosophischtheologisches Konzept entwickelt hat, das nicht nur für das letzte Jahrhundert bedeutsam war, sondern auch für dieses von wegweisender Bedeutung ist. Es geht dabei um die Anerkenntnis autonomen, endlichen Daseins, der Anerkenntnis der Faktizität als Ausgangspunkt des Denkens und die entsprechende theologische Analyse. Dieses Theorem wird thematisch im schöpfungstheologischen Bezugsrahmen analysiert. Aufbauend auf den gewonnenen Erkenntnissen wird in dieser Studie ebenso einlassend rekonstruiert und kritisch konstatiert, dass Faktizität als theologische Interpretationskategorie für den Dialog mit der Welt in kulturtheologischer und dialogischer Absicht trägt.

Resumen: La confrontación entre Heidegger y Husserl que ha dominado hasta fecha reciente la interpretación filosófica debe ser revisada a la luz de las indagaciones de Husserl sobre la pro-tofacticidad: Ella concierne a una ontología del mundo de la vida que es afín a la mundaneidad heideggeriana: Los protohechos constituyen un horizonte de sentido ya instaurado, que el yo debe reconfigurar en su praxis. Esta protofacti-cidad inmodalizable alberga un núcleo de proto-contingencia que da cuenta no sólo de la contin-gencia fáctica de las categorías experienciales, sino también la del mundo, del ego y de los en-tes finitos: En tanto procesos o sujetos a cam-bios cualitativos en sus características esencia-les su modo de ser se caracteriza por una per-manente apertura esencial. Ambos pensadores sostienen la contingencia esencial del mundo, de la que sólo puede dar cuenta la experiencia fác-tica hic et nunc de un ego encarnado y mun-dano.
Abstract: The confrontation between Heidegger and Husserl, ever present in philosophical debates , should be reviewed in the light of Hus-serl's late inquiries into protofacticity. Concerning the ontology of the lifeworld, it addresses some of the issues of Heidegger's characterization of Dasein as being-in-the-world: Protofacts constitute an already given sense-horizon, which the ego must re-configurate in its praxis. This unmodalizable primal facts host a core of protocontingency that accounts for the factual contingency not only of the categories of experience , but of the world, the ego and of finite beings: Understood as processes or subjected to qualitative changes in their essential structures, their mode of being is characterized by an essential openness. Both thinkers sustain the contingency of the world, for which only the hic et nunc factual experience of a mundane, incar-nated ego can account.