Henology

ABSTRACT: Plotinus’ famous treatise against the Gnostics (33), together with contemporary and thematically related treatises on Intelligible Beauty (31), on Number (34), and on Free Will and the Will of the One (39), can be seen as providing the essential components of a Plotinian defense of polytheism against conceptual moves that, while associated for him primarily with Gnostic sectarians overlapping with Platonic philosophical circles, will become typical of monotheism in its era of hegemony. When Plotinus’ Gnostics ‘contract’ divinity into a single God, they not only devalue the cosmos for its multiplicity and diversity, but also multiply intelligible principles unreasonably. This is because they have foreclosed the distinction, which is to become increasingly explicit in the later antique Platonists, between the intelligible and that which is given existentially, the domain belonging to Plotinus’ indeterminate multiplicity of ‘intelligible Gods’, as opposed to the dialectically determinate number of intelligible principles. Plotinus is prescient in recognizing that incipient monotheism threatens to erase the distinction between philosophy and theology, and between both of these and psychology, the final outcome of which can only be solipsism or nihilism. The defense of polytheism is seen in this fashion to be essential to the preservation of the space for philosophical discourse.

In this book, I examine three major topics: Being, the One and God. On the one hand, they might be considered independently, as they are of interest for the respective fields of philosophy; on the other, each chapter is a part of the whole, a step in realizing the book’s plan.
In the first chapter, I consider the concept of Being and the ontological vocabulary of Greek philosophy. The main aim of this chapter is to clarify the difference between Being (τὸ εἶναι) and beings (τὸ ὄν) so called ontological difference, to grasp elusive and unbearable lightness of Being. Historical and philosophical material, which was traditionally used in navigating in the area, though often lead to wrong results, is of a great help. Here I would like to note that the Being is anarithmical, or anarithmological (ἀν-άριθμος), i.e. beyond and without number. Although this does not yet bring us to the solution of the ontological problem, it allows us to see from a new point of view the Neoplatonic henology, which I discuss in the second chapter.
In fact, the doctrine of the One was developed in ancient philosophy in the context of a certain ontological model, which constituted a framework for analyzing Being in terms of ‘one-many’ (ἓν-πολλά), i.e. arithmologically. In the light of the first chapter, it becomes clear that this is an incorrect approach, since Being is neither one nor many. Therefore, I argue that the deconstruction of classical henology is needed. For this purpose, I analyze the relevant texts from Parmenides to Proclus. As a result, I conclude that the One of Neoplatonism is a conceptual idol, whereas a more correct understanding is to consider Being and the One not as two hierarchically different levels, but – as Aristotle did – as the same nature. This statement needs a refinement: Being is transcendent, but the One is immanent (i.e. the first appears as a condition of existence, and the second – as a condition of knowledge).
In the third chapter, I reconstruct the idea of God, which is interpreted in light of Neoplatonic henology and criticism of metaphysics as onto-theology. I believe that the idea of God was reduced to the realm of beings. For this reason, we make such ontological demands, which do not correspond to it. In other words, the idea of God was understood as a conditioned being (οὐσία), which depends on Being. However, as the texts of Christian authors show, the status of God is by no means reduced to the level of ‘one-many’, i. e. beings, but already in the
pre-secular epoch is interpreted as a superior to any statements and negations. This allows us to take seriously the thesis of God’s incomprehensibility and mystery, and helps to prepare the conditions for the experience of the presence of the Divine. Although the last point is the least you can be sure.                               
........................................................................................
Keywords: Being, beings, essence, the One, God, ontological difference, energy, ἐπέκεινα
.....................................................................................................................................................................................................
Table of contents. 0.1. Acknowledgements... p. 5; 0.2. Foreword... p. 6; 1. Being: Lexicon of ontology: 1.1. Introduction... p. 10; 1.2. Lexicon of Greek ontology... p.13; 1.3. Ontological difference... p. 37; 1.4. The univocity of Being and the many senses of beings... p. 44; 2. One: Deconstruction of henology: 2.1. Introduction... p. 51; 2.2. Pre-Platonism: Being and the One... p. 56; 2.3. Plato: the One and Being ... p. 63; 2.4. Neoplatonism: henology and ontology... p. 81; 3. God: Reconstruction of theology: 3.1. Introduction... p. 118; 3.2. The ontological status of God... p. 121; 3.3. Transformation of the idea of God... p. 142; 3.4. Onto-theology and metaphysics... p. 154; Conclusion... p. 166; Bibliography... p. 173.

In this paper I critically examine Heidegger’s interpretation of Trakl, focusing in particular on a possibility it opens up but just as soon forecloses: namely, the idea that spirit is inherently and insuperably riven. Rather than allowing for the inevitability of discord, distress, and dissemination—as his own logic seems to demand—Heidegger tranquilizes the pain of being, turning it into a force of gathering and an actor in a rather conventional three-part drama about ontological history.

Mysticism, theurgy, non-philosophy: this text will experiment with the three in an attempt to perform a non-philosophical hijacking of so-called theurgy (theurgia). I will experiment with a comparison between Iamblichus' theurgy, Laruelle's non-philosophy, and the notion of the Vision-in-One. I claim their point of convergence is their allegiances to the theory of the One, derived from Plato's Unwritten Doctrines. The ancient notion of the One is subject to a similar procedural gesture in both Iamblichus and Laruelle, namely, the procession of the One from the noematic to the aesthetic realm. What connects them is their rejection of the theory that the soul's descension from the One to the visible realm represents a degeneration of the Nous. In a concept akin to the very idea of theurgy, Laruelle proposes his Vision-in-One, which is to think from the One rather than the One. The Vision-in-One is an attempt to materialize the disembodied fate of the noema against realistic skepticism.

The paradigm according to which the cosmos is ordered by the demiurge is characterized in the Timaeus as ‘Animal Itself’, while παράδειγμα in the vision of Er from the Republic denotes the patterns of lives chosen by individual humans and other animals. The essay seeks to grasp the animality of the paradigm, as well as the paradigmatic nature of animality, by means of the homology discernible between these usages. This inquiry affirms the value within a Platonic doctrine of principles of persons over reified forms, of modes of unity over substantial natures, and of agency over structure.

Le présent ouvrage, issu d’une thèse de doctorat soutenue en Sorbonne, propose une analyse philosophique détaillée de l’œuvre de celui qui fut surnommé « le prince des obscurs ». David König étudie les thèmes fondamentaux de la pensée de Jacob Böhme en se servant du processus de manifestation du Sans-fond comme d’un fil directeur guidant le lecteur jusqu’au cœur de la doctrine. Son but est triple : éclairer les difficultés de la théosophie böhmienne, mettre en lumière sa structure métaphysique inédite, et évaluer son influence sur le postkantisme, et plus spécifiquement sur les philosophies de Hegel et de Schelling.

L’appartenenza alla corrente onomatodossa dell’ortodossia determina i tratti essenzia- li della filosofia di A. F. Losev. Essa è intesa a mostrare il rivelarsi dell’Uno nelle cose tramite il nome. L’henologia di questo autore è un’ontologia del Nome, ovvero una di- mostrazione del movimento dell’autodeterminazione dell’Uno, di Dio, dell’Assoluto, nell’essere che ha come proprio «arresto», il proprio fine, nel Nome e nei nomi. Il nome è ciò che noi sappiamo della cosa ed è ciò che la cosa conosce di se stessa. Nel nome è racchiusa tutta la cosa, ma la cosa non è il proprio nome. Non si può conoscere una cosa senza saperne il nome. La dialettica delle cose è una dialettica dei nomi. La dialettica del mondo e dell’essere è una dialettica del Nome con cui si danno il mondo e l’essere.

In this article I analyze some key fragments of Plotinus, in which he argues that the One has a special kind of intellection and consciousness. I also try to establish possible sources of this doctrine and
its meaning, and, for the better understanding, give two examples of a similar doctrine from the history of Neoplatonism of III–IV centuries. I demonstrate, that despite the radical transcendence of the One due to its absolute perfection and simplicity, it rises above the realm of being and thinking, and does not need to think or be aware of itself, since this would suggest a duality
and a distinction between the thinker and the thinkable, Plotinus, nevertheless, ascribes to the One a certain kind of intellection and consciousness that is superior to the intellection of the Intellect. Such intellection, or rather, “superintellection” (ὑπερνόησις) of the One is absolutely simple and primary, and at the same time infinite in its potency; it is like pure contemplation which is not
directed at any object; it is undifferentiated, does not contain any subject-object relations and is completely identical with the One itself, being its pure energy
constituting its essence. These statements could be confirmed indirectly by Plotinus’s teaching about the nature of the mystical union of human soul with
the One, when the soul surpasses everything exterior, turns inward and contemplates the One as a pure light, completely merging with it in an undifferentiated
knowledge. To confirm this and to point to the development of Plotinus’s thought, I consider similar doctrines of the two Neoplatonists of the late III – mid IV centuries – Porphyry and Marius Victorinus, according to
whom the One (in the Christian context – God the Father) possesses an absolutely simple, primary and indifferentiated knowledge directed itself and coinciding
with its own being.