Legal Standards of Proof

Susan Haack, “Justice, Truth, and Proof: Not So Simple, After All”

Background: This paper was written for a conference in Girona, Spain, on the work of Italian legal scholar Michele Taruffo—who is celebrated by the evidence group at the University of Girona for his defense of the so-called “rationalist conception of proof.” My paper is in part an attempt to disentangle the many elements that seem to be run together in that conception, and figure out which are defensible, and which not; and at the same time to suggest that his broad comparisons of common-law vs. civil-law evidentiary procedures require much closer attention to the details of how these work in practice. So it is a kind of conversation with Taruffo (and with other legal theorists in Spain, Colombia, Brazil, etc. who share these ideas).

Abstract: Preamble: Substantive justice requires factual truth. So if legal proof-procedures are to be more than judicial theater, they must be capable of arriving, often enough, at factually correct verdicts. 

§1. The very possibility of substantive justice requires:
• that there be such a thing as factual truth;
• which is objective (not a matter of what anyone, or everyone, believes;
• that it is often enough possible for us to figure out, at least fallibly, what the truth of a disputed factual matter in is;
• which in turn requires that there be objective standards of stronger and weaker evidence;
• and that the fact that evidence is, by these standards, good, be at least a fallible indication that it is likely true.

The truth of these presuppositions is defended by reference to the laconicist understanding of truth, and the foundherentist account of the structure and quality of evidence.

§2: It remains an open question, however, whether these or those evidentiary procedures are capable arriving, often enough, at true verdicts. 

POWERPOINTS TO ACCOMPANY THIS PAPER ARE AVAILABLE IN THE SECTION LABELED “SELECTED PRESENTATIONS” BELOW (UNDER “MORE”). A LINK TO A YOUTUBE VIDEO OF HAACK GIVING THIS PRESENTATION CAN BE FOUND UNDER “LINKS” IN THAT SECTION

This essay introduces the 'she said, he said' paradox for Title IX investigations. 'She said, he said' cases are accusations of rape, followed by denials, with no further significant case-specific evidence available to the evaluator. In such cases, usually the accusation is true. Title IX investigations adjudicate sexual misconduct accusations in US educational institutions; I address whether they should be governed by the 'preponderance of the evidence' standard of proof or the higher 'clear and convincing evidence' standard. Orthodoxy holds that the 'preponderance' standard is satisfied if the evidence adduced renders the litigated claim more likely than not. On this view, I argue, 'she said, he said' cases satisfy the 'preponderance' standard. But this consequence conflicts with plausible liberal and feminist claims. In this essay I contrast the 'she said, he said' paradox with legal epistemology's proof paradox. I explain how both paradoxes arise from the distinction between individualised and non-individualised evidence, and I critically evaluate responses to the 'she said, he said' paradox. Keywords Rape accusations, Title IX investigations, proof paradox, individualised evidence, legal standards of proof, preponderance of the evidence.

El artículo apunta contra la concepción objetivista de
los estándares de prueba defendida en la obra conjunta
de Jordi Ferrer Beltrán. Se toma en consideración, como
blanco principal de la crítica, su último trabajo: Prueba
sin convicción. En primer lugar, se pone de manifiesto
por qué el autor está comprometido con una visión objetivizada
de los estándares de prueba y en qué sentido
ha de entenderse ese objetivismo. Luego, se desarrollan
varios argumentos para mostrar que esa visión está desencaminada.
Algunos de esos argumentos apuntan contra
réplicas que Ferrer Beltrán articula en Prueba sin convicción
frente a objeciones más antiguas. Por último, luego
de mostrar por qué la pretensión objetivista tiene que ser
abandonada, se propone una relectura de las fórmulas que
establecen supuestos estándares de prueba.

Resumen Este trabajo pone de manifiesto un bucle de inconsisten-cias entre tres aristas argumentales que Larry Laudan de-fiende a lo largo de sus reflexiones sobre la prueba en el contexto del proceso judicial. Por una parte, se reconstru-yen los argumentos que Laudan aduce para mostrar que la fórmula más allá de toda duda razonable no constituye si-quiera mínimamente un estándar genuino de prueba. Por la otra parte, se reconstruyen algunos de sus argumentos dirigidos a mostrar que esa fórmula produce una excesiva cantidad de falsos negativos. En tercer lugar, se pone de manifiesto su propuesta a efectos de sortear estos proble-mas. Se explicitará una inconsistencia entre las primeras dos aristas argumentales que Laudan desarrolla y se mos-trará, además, que su propuesta se torna ilusoria, en gran medida, en virtud de sus propios argumentos en contra del más allá de toda duda razonable. Se sugerirá que la so-lución de estos problemas debe buscarse por otro camino.

By far the only neutral method to assess the discriminatory potential of speech is based on the belief in experts. The imagined expert is expected to classify various expressions via historical, political, socio-linguistic, forensic and other analysis. In this respect, the standard of review developed by the ECtHR in hate speech cases (with either leaving the issue to the margin of appreciation of the state or finding violation of Article 10 ECHR) has been largely focused on such expert conclusions. This chapter offers a scrutiny of the role of expertise in the recent (2008-2012) hate speech cases from Strasbourg. It appears that the Court has been mixing largely incompatible methodologies to achieve that low standard of review. The Court is unwilling to clarify the criteria for expert evidence despite the fact the whole epistemological rationale for the margin of appreciation choice is based on the harm identified by specialists (historians, sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, psychologists, forensic experts etc.). The chapter collects the fragments of this methodological puzzle for Strasbourg, linking the standard of review (margin of appreciation) to the outlook into the standard of proof (treatment of expertise) in hate speech cases.

The essay introduces Professor Ferrer’s proposal to endow the widely employed criminal standard of proof of guilt beyond all reasonable
doubt, with epistemic-intersubjective (as opposed to psychological-subjective) content. In analyzing the positive implications of adhering
to this interpretation, the author argues it is a promising way to start eroding Mexico’s authoritarian model of criminal investigation,
and to put in place an innocence-disproving culture instead.

Em mais um artigo publicado no portal Consultor Penal (https://consultorpenal.com.br/standards-probatorios-um-novo-paradigma-acerca-das-provas-no-processo-penal/), apresentam-se os standards probatórios e demonstra-se a mudança paradigmática representada pelos modelos de constatação em relação às provas no processo penal.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt (BARD) is one of the most fundamental requirements of American criminal law and other legal systems. Professor Larry Laudan has criticized this requirement for several reasons. His main contention is that the BARD formula converts evidential support into subjective confidence, and is therefore not a genuine standard of proof. At the same time, Laudan holds that BARD produces a large number of guilty defendant's acquittals due to its excessive demand for evidence. The aims of this article are twofold: firstly, to show the inconsistency between these theses; and secondly, independent of this inconsistency, Laudan's argument is unacceptable regarding the number of guilty defendant's acquittals. Perhaps the real ratio of false negatives to false positives were what Laudan holds them to be, yet he fails to provide any suitable argument to support his claim, or to attribute the alleged frequency of errors to a particular standard of proof-BARD or otherwise. https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/jeap The International Journal of Evidence and Proof F o r P e e r R e v i e w Abstract: Proof beyond a reasonable doubt (BARD) is one of the most fundamental requirements of American criminal law and other legal systems. Professor Larry Laudan has criticized this requirement for several reasons. His main contention is that the BARD formula converts evidential support into subjective confidence, and is therefore not a genuine standard of proof. At the same time, Laudan holds that BARD produces a large number of guilty defendant's acquittals due to its excessive demand for evidence. The aims of this article are twofold: firstly, to show the inconsistency between these theses; and secondly, independent of this inconsistency, Laudan's argument is unacceptable regarding the number of guilty defendant's acquittals. Perhaps the real ratio of false negatives to false positives were what Laudan holds them to be, yet he fails to provide any suitable argument to support his claim, or to attribute the alleged frequency of errors to a particular standard of proof-BARD or otherwise.

This paper defends the heretical view that, at least in some cases, we ought to assign legal liability based on purely statistical evidence. The argument draws on prominent civil law litigation concerning pharmaceutical negligence and asbestos-poisoning. The overall aim is to illustrate moral pitfalls that result from supposing that it is never appropriate to rely on bare statistics when settling a legal dispute.