Beyond Reasonable Doubt

This chapter defines the fundamentals of criminal law with regard to business contexts. It describes the characteristics of criminal law (role of strict legality, role of criminal intent) in contrast to other fields of law, and proposes (internationally acceptable) definitions of classical business crimes (embezzlement, fraud, extortion, etc.), and refers to some more recently criminalized behaviors (e.g. money laundering, insider information, international corruption). It also lays down widespread standards in criminal procedure (fair trial, right to remain silent, client-attorney privilege, role of reasonable doubt).

En el derecho argentino, lamentablemente, los estándares de prueba objetivos –que no tiene porqué ser uno solo; y ni siquiera el mismo para todos los delitos– no se encuentran regulados. Ello dificulta saber cómo se distribuyen en nuestro ámbito los errores que son propios del proceso penal, y con los que necesariamente hemos de lidiar (intentando reducirlos al mínimo). Y al mismo tiempo, esa inexistencia dificulta el control intersubjetivo. Los únicos “avances” que se han dado en la materia, tiene que ver con la recepción de un estándar subjetivo (como lo es el más allá de toda duda razonable) y con todas las problemas que trae aparejada dicha subjetividad, y con tímidos pasos en pos de una mayor racionalidad en materia probatoria dada por la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación. El artículo pretende presentar estas dificultades en el marco de un camino hacia una aplicación más racional e igualitaria de las penas.

The law is axiomatic. In order to convict a person of a crime, every element of the crime with which he is charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This Article argues that this fundamental proposition of American criminal law is wrong. Two types of elements are typically found in crime definitions: factual elements and moral elements. Proving factual elements involves answering questions about historical facts—that is, questions about what happened. By contrast, proving moral elements—such as “reckless,” “unjustifiable,” “without consent,” or “cruel”—involves answering questions not only about what happened but also about the evaluative significance of what happened. This Article argues that the beyond a reasonable doubt requirement should not apply to such moral elements for three reasons. First, the beyond a reasonable doubt requirement applied to normative elements compels overly underinclusive interpretations of crime definitions because the standard requires factfinders to acquit where there are reasonable moral disagreements. Second, by, in effect, thus limiting the scope of crime definitions, the requirement undermines the value of using normative terms in crime definitions as a method of guiding citizens to behave as responsible law-abiding citizens. Third, the requirement produces a situation where important normative decisions are delegated to ultimate factfinders, especially the jury, with excessively restrictive instructions as to when they are allowed to act on their moral beliefs. The Article concludes by discussing some implications of these arguments and exploring general features of criminal law that conspire to produce these problems with the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.

Là một phần trong nghiên cứu về chứng minh trong tố tụng dân sự của tác giả, bài viết làm rõ khái niệm chứng minh từ chủ thể, cấp độ đến giới hạn chứng minh từ góc độ tổng quát nhất. Trên cơ sở đó, tác giả bình luật và đề xuất những nội dung liên quan đến nghĩa vụ chứng minh trong cả 3 loại tố tụng hiện hành ở Việt Nam.

Este artigo pretende analisar o standard probatório para condenação no processo penal brasileiro e as possíveis contribuições da categoria "além da dúvida razoá-vel" em caso de incorporação ao sistema nacional. Trata-se de temática pertinen-te, tendo em vista a ausência de regulamentação expressa no ordenamento pátrio e a recente abordagem doutrinária sobre a temática. Assim, almeja-se responder aos seguintes problemas: 1) É necessário adotar um standard probatório para con-denação no processo penal brasileiro? 2) O standard de "prova além da dúvida razoável" é uma opção viável e pertinente? 3) Quais critérios podem ser utilizados para a definição de seu conteúdo? Sustenta-se que a adoção de um standard pro-batório com critérios lógicos e objetivos é passo fundamental para a consagração de uma teoria racional da prova, de modo que, ainda que existam críticas relevan-tes, a categoria "além da dúvida razoável" pode aportar importantes contribuições ao processo penal brasileiro. Nesse sentido, este artigo propõe critérios para sua definição e apresenta sugestão de alteração legislativa. Palavras-chave Standard probatório; dúvida razoável; presunção de inocência; processo penal; valo-ração racional da prova.

A review of Dan Barker's tome, godless, how an evangelical pastor abandoned fundamentalist faith and embraced so-called New Atheism. Mr. Barker is now codirector of Freedom From Religion Foundation. Barker's justifiable excoriation of his evangelical easy believism seems trite on the surface, but for him it was critical, life changing. How religious experience is not reliable and there is even in the most sincere theist experience a vacuum for something bigger than a movement, a belief, a faith even in the resurrected Christ. I read and reviewed this during my own period of agnostic experience, weary from the divisions in Christianity. From whence I rose, returned, and re-embraced "the Church of the firstborn... the pillar and foundation of the truth." I found my doubts embraced by love. In my own experience, as many Evangelicals who have not experienced Christian orthodoxy in its historic expression, we have only our experience from which to judge something entirely mysterious as the Church revealed from God who gives the Bible its authority. Bible fundamentalism was not enough to keep Barker and it almost lost me to skeptical agnosticism. Individual liberty from religion may be the epitome of Barker's New Atheism, while for me Orthodox Christianity is the epitome of life in Christ.

Comentario al fallo "MPF s/investigación" de la CSJN (año 2017) donde la minoría decide que en el caso hubo una aplicación incorrecta de la duda en favor del imputado. Se recorre el camino transitado por los fallos de la Corte en busca del alcance del "in dubio por reo" y de las posibilidades que tiene la parte acusadora en el sistema argentino de lograr que en última instancia se examine la corrección de los veredictos absolutorios en base a la duda

Introductory overview of New Zealand artists who began working in film and video between 1970 and 1985, following their work up to 2010 and beyond.  This piece was originally titled A Place Near Here and  published in Illusions #35.  It has been significantly updated since then. Back issues of Illusions are available from PO Box 6476, Marion Square, Wellington, New Zealand.

In criminal trials the state must establish, to a particular standard of proof, the defendant's guilt. The most widely-used and important standard of proof for criminal conviction is the " beyond a reasonable doubt " standard. But what legitimates this standard, rather than an alternative? One view holds the standard of proof should be determined or justified—at least in large part—by its consequences. In this spirit, Laudan uses crime statistics to estimate risks the average citizen runs of being violently victimised and falsely convicted. He argues that since the former risk is higher, and the aggregate harms are worse, the standard of proof should be substantially lowered. He presents a formula for calculating the preferred standard. In this paper I outline various ways Laudan's uses of crime statistics are flawed, and explain how he substantially overestimates risks of victimhood and underestimates costs of false convictions. I also explain why his formula is mistaken, and illuminate consequences Laudan neglects. I conclude that, even if consequences determine the appropriate standard of proof, Laudan's arguments fail to show the standard is too high. I conclude by suggesting that the inadequacies of Laudan's reasoning might be good news for consequence-based justifications of the standard of proof. ________ 1. The Standard of Proof The state sometimes performs actions against the wishes or interests of individual citizens. They might stop and search an individual, charge him with a crime, incarcerate him, impose a restraining order or curfew, remove child custody rights, or order him to pay costs or fees, such as child support. Standards of proof are levels of confidence required to perform these actions legitimately. Before the state may perform these actions they must determine, to that confidence level, certain facts to be the case. 1 Employing public, clearly understood standards of proof serves a range of functions, including bolstering citizens' trust in the system and protecting individuals from undue loss of liberty. There are several standards of proof in use across the world. They vary in demandingness according to the seriousness of the state's action—weaker standards are employed for less severe actions—and the consequences risked by not acting. Formal standards include the " reasonable suspicion " standard in the US, which is required for a brief stop and search. 2 To satisfy this standard the police officer must have a specific, articulable, and individualised suspicion that crime is afoot before they conduct a brief search of an individual. The " preponderance of evidence " standard—usually understood as requiring that the claim is more likely than not—is operative in many Western democracies for most civil and family court cases. 3 The " clear and convincing evidence " standard is even more demanding. It is

Lo scritto esamina i cinque problemi principali posti da Giovanni Tuzet nella recensione del mio libro su
libero convincimento e ragionevole dubbio nel processo penale. Replicando alle obiezioni della
recensione, esso mira a chiarire il significato e le implicazioni della tesi teorica secondo cui le idee di
libero convincimento e di ragionevole dubbio compongono i due principi costituzionali del giudizio
probatorio penale.
The paper addresses five main problems raised by Giovanni Tuzet in a review of my book on free
assessment of evidence and reasonable doubt in the criminal trial. Replying to some objections in the
review, the paper aims to clarify the meaning and implications of the theoretical thesis that the ideas of
free assessment of evidence and reasonable doubt compose the constitutional principles of criminal
evidential judgement.

The article is devoted to the research of standards of proof, especially beyond reasonable doubt. Based on the analysis of the scientific literature and legislation United Kingdom, the United States and the European Court of Human Rights had found the basic standards of evidence that are used by the courts in the administration of justice. The author, also, highlighted some problems determining the standard of proof " beyond a reasonable doubt ". The main areas of application of the standard were outlined in the cases studied as well as in the criminal process of Ukraine. The author revealed particular issues of defining standard of proof " beyond reasonable doubt " and emphasized guidelines of its application in concerned cases and in criminal procedure of Ukraine as well.
Keywords: proving, burden of proof, standards of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt.

A good account of the agnostic attitude of Suspending Judgement should explain how it can be rendered more or less rational/justified according to the state of one's evidence-and one's relation to that evidence. I argue that the attitude of suspending judgement whether p constitutively involves having a belief; roughly, a belief that one cannot yet tell whether or not p. I show that a theory of suspending that treats it as a sui generis attitude, wholly distinct from belief, struggles to account for how suspension of judgement can be rendered more or less rational (or irrational) by one's evidence. I also criticise the related idea that suspension essentially requires an 'Inquiring Attitude'. I show how a belief-based theory, in contrast, neatly accounts for the rational and epistemic features of suspending and so neatly accounts for why an agnostic has a genuine neutral opinion concerning the question whether p, as opposed to simply having no opinion.

Authors dealing with the problem of lack of stabile material evidence in the practice of criminal procedure in Republic of Serbia. Assumption is that the lack of stabile material evidence in the criminal procedural practice in the Republic of Serbia is a result of the lack of standards in job of finding and providing of evidence, with one side, and abolition of the principle of material truth, and the reduction of investigative powers of the court, introduction of an adversarial model of criminal procedure and standard of proving beyond reasonable doubt, with the other side. Regarding this, the authors consider that applying the principle beyond reasonable doubt in making of judgement, requires respect for the principle of the continuity of evidence. On the base of this conclusion authors think that there is need for recognition of principle of continuity of evidence in criminal procedural legislation of Republic of Serbia.

Keywords: continuity of evidence, beyond reasonable doubt, truth, evidence standards, judgement.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt (BARD) is one of the most fundamental requirements of American criminal law and other legal systems. Professor Larry Laudan has criticized this requirement for several reasons. His main contention is that the BARD formula converts evidential support into subjective confidence, and is therefore not a genuine standard of proof. At the same time, Laudan holds that BARD produces a large number of guilty defendant's acquittals due to its excessive demand for evidence. The aims of this article are twofold: firstly, to show the inconsistency between these theses; and secondly, independent of this inconsistency, Laudan's argument is unacceptable regarding the number of guilty defendant's acquittals. Perhaps the real ratio of false negatives to false positives were what Laudan holds them to be, yet he fails to provide any suitable argument to support his claim, or to attribute the alleged frequency of errors to a particular standard of proof-BARD or otherwise. https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/jeap The International Journal of Evidence and Proof F o r P e e r R e v i e w Abstract: Proof beyond a reasonable doubt (BARD) is one of the most fundamental requirements of American criminal law and other legal systems. Professor Larry Laudan has criticized this requirement for several reasons. His main contention is that the BARD formula converts evidential support into subjective confidence, and is therefore not a genuine standard of proof. At the same time, Laudan holds that BARD produces a large number of guilty defendant's acquittals due to its excessive demand for evidence. The aims of this article are twofold: firstly, to show the inconsistency between these theses; and secondly, independent of this inconsistency, Laudan's argument is unacceptable regarding the number of guilty defendant's acquittals. Perhaps the real ratio of false negatives to false positives were what Laudan holds them to be, yet he fails to provide any suitable argument to support his claim, or to attribute the alleged frequency of errors to a particular standard of proof-BARD or otherwise.

Was the sexual act consensual? Did the defendant have a reasonable belief that he was in imminent danger of death by an attacker? Did the police use excessive force? Did the defendant act in a heinous or cruel manner? Did the defendant act with depraved indifference to human life? These are some of the questions that criminal juries encounter. Determinations of such questions involve a combination of factual and moral questions, both questions about what happened and questions about the evaluative significance of what happened. This feature of the criminal jury—that the jury routinely decides normative questions—is frequently noted but is rarely examined. What does it exactly mean when we say that juries make normative determinations, and what is the nature of the inquiry that the jurors are engaging in when they consider moral questions in this particular setting? More specifically, this Article asks whether a juror, when making moral judgments, should follow his or her individual moral beliefs or identify and implement the community’s perspective. Many things said about the criminal jury appear to support the view that the jurors should attempt to replicate the community’s perspective. It is often said, for instance, the criminal jury serves as the community’s conscience, representative, or fiduciary, and such formulations suggest an obligation on the part of the jurors to reproduce the community’s perspective. This Article argues that despite the popularity of such accounts, they are either too indeterminate to imply an obligation on the part of the jurors to reproduce the community’s perspective, or in conflict with the fundamental obligation of jurors to adjudicate fairly and accurately. This Article, therefore, concludes that we are better off jettisoning the talk of the criminal jury as the community’s conscience, representative, or fiduciary, at least in this context, and should instead embrace the notion that jurors fulfill their roles in the criminal justice system most effectively when they vote as individuals, not as representatives, by applying legal standards to particular situations and bringing a diversity of viewpoints to the task.

Стаття присвячена дослідженню теорії та практиці застосування стандарту доказування «поза розумним сумнівом» судами в кримінальному провадженні Канади. У статті здійснено аналіз судових рішень Верховного Суду Канади й апеляційних судів окремих провінцій і виокремлено основні підходи до визначення стандарту доказування «поза розумним сумнівом».
Ключові слова: стандарт доказування, поза розумним сумнівом, розумний сумнів, тягар доказування, суд присяжних, Канада.

Статья посвящена исследованию теории и практике применения стандарта доказывания «вне разумного сомнения» судами в уголовном производстве Канады. В статье осуществлен анализ судебных решений Верховного Суда Канады и апелляционных судов отдельных провинций и выделены основные подходы к определению стандарта доказывания «вне разумного сомнения».
Ключевые слова: стандарт доказывания, вне разумного сомнения, разумное сомнение, бремя доказывания, суд присяжных, Канада.

The article is devoted to the study of the theory and practice of applying the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt" by the courts within criminal proceedings in Canada. The article analyzes the judicial decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada and the appellate courts of some provinces and identifies the main approaches to the definition of a standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt”. The author also examines briefly relevant decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court and the UK House of Lords that discus the reasonable doubt standard.
It is stated that in defying the concept of the “proof beyond a reasonable doubt" the Supreme Court of Canada addressed two issues: what consists of aforesaid concept and what ideas or interpretations should be omitted, and whether the judge should instruct juries of this concept. The Supreme Court of Canada in its analysis makes a conclusion that firstly such clarifications shall be made by the judge in every criminal case involving juries, which is also backed by the practice of the Appellate courts of certain provinces.
In resolving the interpretation of the reasonable doubt the Canadian judicial authorities has developed key features of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard such as: relation between reasonable doubt and the burden of proof that lies on the prosecution: a reasonable doubt is not a doubt based upon sympathy or prejudice and should be based on reason and common sense; reasonable doubt could logically arise from the examination of evidence or lack of it; it does not involve proof to an absolute certainty; it is not proof beyond any doubt nor is it an imaginary or frivolous doubt.
Key words: standard of proof, beyond reasonable doubt, reasonable doubt, burden of proof, jury trial, Canada.

The law is axiomatic. In order to convict a person of a crime, every element of the crime with which he is charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This Article argues that this fundamental proposition of American criminal law is wrong. Two types of elements are typically found in crime definitions: factual elements and moral elements. Proving factual elements involves answering questions about historical facts—that is, questions about what happened. By contrast, proving moral elements—such as “reckless,” “unjustifiable,” “without consent,” or “cruel”—involves answering questions not only about what happened but also about the evaluative significance of what happened. This Article argues that the beyond a reasonable doubt requirement should not apply to such moral elements for three reasons. First, the beyond a reasonable doubt requirement applied to normative elements compels overly underinclusive interpretations of crime definitions because the standard requires factfinde...

آنچه به عنوان عقايد اماميه شناخته ميشود عمدتاً برآمده از آثار كلامي متكلمان قرن چهارم و پنجم- مثل شيخ مفيد و سيدمرتضي - است گواينكه در سده هاي بعدي امثال خواجه نصيرالدين طوسي بيانهاي متفاوتي از بعضي امور ارائه كردند. عمده چالشها در اين آثار بر محور امامت و متعلقات آن- مثل عصمت، علم خاص و فضل امام- متمركز است. غيبت در آن ميان جايگاهي ويژه دارد.
پژوهشي كه مقاله حاضر آن را گزارش ميكند :
- با تدقيق در مدل انديشه غيبت در آثار سيد مرتضي، آشكار ميكند كه وي درصدد نبوده است با اعراض از نقل، از راه احتجاجات عقلي براي اماميان باورسازي كند. بلكه عقايد را در ميان ايشان شايع و متواتر و متكي به نقل و بي نياز از اثبات مي يافته، غايات و روشهاي وي غالباً بلكه محضاً متكلمانه و اسكاتي بوده است. مدلي كه وي ارائه كرده عناصر اصلي تفكر اماميه را در بلندايي از استدلالهاي نظري قرار داده كه دست مخالفان به دامن آن نرسد و در عين حال از حوزه نقل شيعه هم كوتاه باشد. او با طرح كلامي مسائل ميخواسته باروي مستحكمي حول عقايد اماميه ايجاد كند كه از طعن مخالف در
امان و براي مؤالف اطمينان آفرين باشد. پس او به اين معنا عقلگرا نيست كه چون در اثبات عقايد و باورزايي، نقل و معرفت حاصل از آن را قابل اعتماد نمي يابد، با تكيه بر عنصر يقين سراغ استدلالهاي عقلي رفته باشد؛ بلكه وي از يك سو طرح عقايد با رويكرد نقلي را براي شيعيان تكلف آفرين و شبهه خيز و دردسرساز مي يافته و از سوي ديگر مخالفان را از اشكال در استدلالهاي عقلي عاجز و لذا رويكرد جدلي فارغ از نقل را كارآمد ميديده است.
- همچنين با تعمق در "مدل غيبت" سيد مرتضي، تطور مبادي، اركان، موانع و اقتضائات انديشه غيبت را در عصر حاضر نسبت به زمان او آشكار كرده، ميزان كارآمدي امروزي آن مدل را بررسي و بايسته هاي مدل مناسب روزگار حاضر را پيش- نهاده است.

كليدواژه: سيد مرتضي، اماميه، غيبت، متكلمان، شبهه، مدل.

Guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (BARD) has generated much criticism, especially that BARD does not lend itself easily to mathematical precision; it is notoriously difficult to specify the probability
threshold, if any, that constitutes BARD-proof. We reconstruct BARD-proof such that it admits of the desired mathematical precision, but we do not explicate BARD-proof as mere shorthand for some sufficient threshold probability (or credence). Two major insights are offered to cash this out. The first tells us when a belief state (whether a credence or full belief) is reasonable. The second describes the reasonable dynamic evolution of belief states during a trial. For convenience, we speak as Bayesians (while remaining agnostic between its subjective and objective varieties.)

On the first, ruling out relevant alternatives as unreasonable requires attention to higher-order evidence about the belief-formation process that the trier-of-fact used to arrive at a guilty verdict. The probability of guilt is sufficient only if (i) the trier-of-facts have higher-order evidence with respect to first-order evidence adduced at trial such that their beliefs caused by that first-order evidence are not themselves believed to be caused by flawed or otherwise unreasonable cognitive processes; and (ii) that belief-formation process is safe, in the sense that the agent could not have easily been wrong in similar situations (Williamson 2000: 147).

The second key insight is predicated on an understanding that a simple model of conditionalization starting from a prior probability function is insufficient to capture reasonable doubt, since absent cases of deductive certainty, there will always be a set of priors, starting from which, and conditional upon evidence adduced at trial, doubt regarding guilt would be warranted and, therefore, prima facie reasonable. Accordingly, the BARD test should trace back to all possible priors and ask: of all the possible starting points (priors) that lead to doubt, is there at least one of them that is reasonable?

What is reasonable is captured by the first insight we offer. Unreasonable doubt is doubt that even if it is fully rational (such that it obeys Kolmogorov’s axioms and updates without error on the evidence
via conditionalization) is nonetheless unreasonable because its initial credence assignment was unreasonable.

We take it as plain beyond peradventure that a probability threshold for BARD-guilt is at most a necessary, not sufficient, condition for conviction. One could discover what it is and still not know whether to acquit or convict in a trial. By contrast, our two insights offer a sufficient condition for BARD-proof.

This essay considers the doubt and its relation to desire as explored in William Godwin’s Caleb Williams (1794). It argues that the novel’s interest in doubt, and particularly its interest in how doubt organizes legal inquiry, should be read in dialogue with a form of legal doubt adopted within eighteenth-century legal epistemology as a response to problem of legal judgment under uncertainty and now crystallized in the “beyond reasonable doubt” evidentiary standard that continues to organize legal proof in Anglophone law. The essay considers how the novel’s insistence on the ways desire conditions doubt subverts the claims to “disinterestedness” and “reasonableness” that recommend “reasonable doubt” as legitimate and adequate response to the risks posed by judgment under uncertainty. The novel’s ironic treatment of “reasonable doubt” exposes how reasonable doubt is itself conditioned by an “unreasonable” desire to preserve the possibility of legal judgment despite these risks and how this unreasonable, conservative desire ultimately compromises its ability to assess and respond to uncertainty. Through Caleb’s “unreasonable doubt” and the reader’s “doubt-as-suspense,” the novel pursues doubt as raw, affective excess -- doubt as it exists “before” it is disciplined or conditioned by skepticism -- in an attempt to expose the basis of doubt in unreasonable, inaccessible desire and, thus, to call into question its legitimacy as a ground for legal judgment. The essay’s coda considers how the doubt “before skepticism” pursued by Caleb Williams might be generalized as a form of “Romantic doubt” and, further, how this “Romantic doubt” allows us to reimagine the relation of Romanticism and skepticism.

Стаття присвячена аналізу процесів формування та розвитку стандарту доказування «поза розумним сумнівом», з'ясуванню його особливостей та природи в історичному розвитку. На основі аналізу наукової літератури було виділено два основних підхода до розуміння природи стандарту та виявлено їх основний зміст. Автором вказано на ключові особливості кожного з підходів та можливості адаптації стандарту доказування «поза розумним сумнівом» у вітчизняному кримінальному процесі.
Ключові слова: доказування, поза розумним сумнівом, стандарти доказування, суд присяжних.

Статья посвящена анализу процессов формирования и развития стандарта доказывания «вне разумного сомнения», выяснению его особенностей и природы в историческом развитии. На основе анализа научной литературы было выделено два основных подхода к пониманию природы стандарта и определено их основное содержание. Автором указано на ключевые особенности каждого из подходов и возможности адаптации стандарта доказывания «вне разумного сомнения» в отечественном уголовном процессе.
Ключевые слова: вне разумных сомнений, доказывание, стандарты доказывания, суд присяжных.

The article is devoted to analysis of formation processes and development of the standard of proof «beyond reasonable doubt», and also to determine its characteristics and the nature of its historical development. Based on the analysis of scientific literature author suggested two key approaches for understanding the nature of the standard and detailed its key characteristics. The author indicated on the key features of each approach and the possibility of adapting the standard «beyond reasonable doubt» into domestic criminal process.
Key words: beyond a reasonable doubt, standards of proof, jury trial, proving.