NATO and EU Aspirations. Political Systems

The international analysis carried out in the first two decades after the fall of communism brings us new information regarding the evolution of the influence of NATO on European security and politics. This article aims to analyze the role of NATO in ensuring European security seen through the research of the most significant German think tanks. It is important to underline the fact that the concept of "security" is not unanimously understood by the international environment. After the collapse of the bipolar system of international relations, various structures engaged in the study of international relations set themselves the goal of identifying the signs of a newly emerging system and offering their assessments to the actions of the main actors trying to participate in its formation. The USA set the course for the construction of a unipolar international system, which would be guided by the USA. This approach is most often observed in the studies of American experts on global security problems. (Michta, 2014:36-54

The question of a defence White Book at European level has been under discussion for some time. Many voices, particularly in the European Parliament, are pushing for such an initiative, while others consider that it is not only unnecessary, but could even dangerously divide Europeans.
Concretely, the question cannot be tackled separately from that of defence planning and processes which underpin the development of military capabilities, as White Books are often the starting point for these.
Within the European Union, however, there is not just one, but three types defence planning: the national planning of each of the Member States; planning within the framework of NATO (the NATO Defence Planning Process) and, finally, the European Union’s planning, which has developed in stages since the Helsinki summit of 1999 and comprises many elements. Its best-known component - but by no means not the only one - is the capability development plan established by the European Defence Agency.
How do all these different planning systems coexist? What are their strengths and weaknesses? Answering these preliminary questions is essential in mapping the path to a White Book. This is what this study sets out to do.

While the new security environment has driven the EU to take a bigger role in security and defence, it has also forced the EU-NATO relations to evolve from a desirable strategic partnership to a more ‘essential’ one, since both their security is interconnected and neither organisation has the full range of tools available to address the new security challenges on its own. Thanks to the new framework initiated by the Joint Declaration in 2016, cooperation between the EU and NATO has been gradually improving in several designated areas. But it is obvious that, within the defined framework, there are many obstacles to overcome before opportunities could be more fully exploited. While the new challenges emanated from the East and South of Europe can be seen as an opportunity for a wider cooperation, the rise of illiberalism and authoritarianism in the world, even including the member nations, poses a big challenge against the cooperation. Further concrete steps are to be taken for a wider and substantial cooperation between two Brussels-based organisations. We argue that a joint response must be formulated in the form of a common strategy, implemented in an integrated way by using a more comprehensive toolbox.

Les temps où l’évocation de la défense européenne suscitait au mieux les sourires des eurosceptiques et au pire les critiques virulentes des atlantistes les plus militants sont révolus. Toutefois, pour l’observateur en dehors du cercle des initiés, cette défense européenne, bien que plus présente sur la scène sécuritaire internationale depuis l’activation de la coopération structurée permanente (mieux connue sous son acronyme anglais PESCO), reste source de confusion et d’incompréhension.
Deux éléments sont à l’origine de ce défaut de compréhension et des conclusions souvent erronées qui en découlent. Le premier résulte d’une comparaison simpliste entre le fonctionnement de l’OTAN et ’la mise en œuvre de la politique de sécurité et de défense commune de l’Union européenne. Le second est lié à la méconnaissance de l’évolution de notre environnement sécuritaire, du profil de la menace et des doctrines de guerre « hybride » de nos ennemis. Je reviendrai plus tard sur l’inadéquation du qualificatif « hybride », qui ne décrit qu’imparfaitement le type de menace à laquelle nous sommes exposés.
La première partie de mon argumentaire démontrera le caractère indispensable de l’intégration de la défense européenne pour apporter une contribution européenne plus substantielle à l’effort de défense, principalement dans le cadre de l’OTAN mais aussi au sein d’autres formats collaboratifs.
La seconde partie étudiera les mécanismes d’intégration qui sont à l’œuvre afin de doter l’Union européenne des structures nécessaires à la réalisation de son ambition sécuritaire qui découle de la Stratégie globale de 2016.
La troisième partie tentera de définir un nouveau paradigme de défense et d’anticiper les évolutions nécessaires dans l’architecture sécuritaire internationale afin d’évoluer d’une logique de défense collective vers celle d’une résilience intégrée.

At the moment, there are good reasons to give consideration not only to the Alliance’s open-door policy but the proposed roadmap for Ukraine’s future membership (sort of Ukraine’s Compatibility plan with NATO) as NATO develops its Strategic Concept for 2030. Such a roadmap would confirm the destination point set within the Bucharest Summit as to Ukraine and Georgia’s future membership in the Alliance and allow the sides to determine Ukraine’s best route towards this point through the implementation of a certain array of reforms.

W rozdziale przedstawiono sposób definiowania systemu politycznego UE, zaprezentowano główne koncepcje ustrojowe systemu politycznego UE (rozróżniając koncepcję federalistyczną od ponadnarodowej i przypisując właściwe im cechy, a także międzyrządową i wielopoziomową). Następnie scharakteryzowano podstawowe zasady systemu zarówno w ujęciu teoretycznym, jak i z odpowiednimi przykładami rozwiązań praktycznych, jak: 1) zasada demokratyzmu z obywatelstwem i partiami politycznymi na poziomie europejskim włącznie,  2) zasada legitymacji i odpowiedzialności, 3) zasada państwa prawnego, 4) zasady systemu instytucjonalnego (równowagi instytucjonalnej, lojalnej współpracy, autonomii, podziału funkcji, 5) zasadę elastyczności.

A Unipolar World Is ‘Ruinous’ for All

Today we can see the virtually unrestrained, overblown use of force in international affairs—of military force, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of conflicts, following one after another. As a result, there is not sufficient strength to achieve a comprehensive settlement of any one of these conflicts. And it is becoming impossible to settle them politically. We see greater and greater disdain for the fundamental principles of international law. More than that: certain practices, or, essentially, virtually the entire system of law of one country, above all, of course, of the United States, has overstepped its national borders in all areas: the economy, politics, and cultural and educational affairs, and it is being imposed on other countries. Well, who is happy about that?

NATO Expansion and Russia’s Security

With respect to democracy and NATO expansion, NATO is not a universal organization, unlike the UN. It is, first and foremost, a military and political alliance, military and political! Well, ensuring one’s own security is the right of any sovereign state. We are not arguing against this. Of course we are not objecting to this. But why is it necessary to put military infrastructure on our borders during this expansion? Can someone answer this question? Unless the expansion of military infrastructure is connected with fighting against today’s global threats? Let’s put it this way, what is the most important of these threats for us today—the most important for Russia, for the U.S.A. and for Europe—it is terrorism and the fight against it. Does one need Russia to fight against terrorism? Of course! Does one need India to fight against terrorism! Of course! But we are not members of NATO, and other countries aren’t, either. But we can only work on this issue effectively by joining our forces. As such, expanding infrastructure, especially military infrastructure, to our borders is not connected in any way with the democratic choices of individual states. And I would ask that we not mix these two concepts.

In 2014, at the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine and Russia‘s aggression against this neighboring country, Lithuania became concerned about the strengthening of its military capabilities, augmenting the National Defense System (NDS) budget by almost 50% in two years. This may be considered unprecedented, if seen against the background of the presidential elections and those to the European Parliament, the fiscal discipline, the introduction of euro, as well as Russia‘s economic sanctions, the political decision in the course of 2014 on increasing the defense assignation by 130 million litas and in 2015 the increase by planned additional 356 million litas. This article analyzes two closely related problems of the Lithuanian NDS capabilities. First of all, changes in the NDS financing are explored in the context of permanent agreements of Lithuanian political parties concerning the allocation of 2% of the GDP for defense. This is followed by the discussion of the issues of military personnel staffing and training of the reserve as well as future challenges. This research contributes to the assessment
of the critical NDS financing and staffing not only within academic circles but particularly among politicians and society in general. Additionally, it contributes to the awareness of the problems the
army encountered in seeking to implement the objective set for it: to ensure the military security of the state. In the presence of the emerging threats in the region, this is of particularly great significance
to the demilitarized and pacifist society of Lithuania. The article aims at identifying financing and personnel planning problems throughout a quarter of the century, ranging from the restoration of the Army of the Republic of Lithuania to 2014 inclusively. At the same time, the study encourages a discussion by the academic community on issues of the military security of the Lithuanian State and provides analyses as well as possible development scenarios.

Abstract
My research will focus on Russia’s relations versus the Western world from the past to the present day. Russia's vision and perception of the West since the end of the Cold War have changed the world substantially, and as a result, the idealism for the West and Russia to be strong allies have rather distanced themselves both diplomatically and politically on the international stage. For viewers to understand the implication of this research analysis,  I will examine Russia’s brutal past, the Russian Revolution of 1917, the post-WWII Soviet era, the unending Cold War’s with renewing tensions today and the fall of Communism which precipitated the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. These historical events are thematically linked as early as the Battle of Kulikovo in 1380 in which Russians defeated the Mongols by creating a surprising attack hidden from view. This ideological mechanism of Maskirovka in Russian (Маскировка), meaning ‘masking’ is a deceptive psychological apparatus used in Russian’s technical warfare during previous wars to deceive its enemies from within in a mastery art of wars. This psychological framework of deception is still present today in a series of recent international events about the attempt at reacquiring the former Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia as a sovereign state within the former Soviet Union Republics now known today as Russia. The invasion of Crimea, followed by the annexation of Ukraine in 2014 and the military intervention in Syria in 2015 not only reinserted Russia as a superpower, but also demonstrated these geopolitical moves were carried out to counter-attack NATO aggressive policy of containment toward the Baltic States and along the Russian national borders. Russia also views the West with the propagation of pro-liberalism, the promotion of democracy, human rights, international law, and the global war on Islamic terrorism carrying some significant caveats. The West places Russia on a pedestal of being an antagonist player, nonconformist and rebellious in contradiction with the West’s foreign policy which dictates liberal values and liberties. All of these historical events corroborate with consistency and conformity with the current cold war tensions and frustrations between Russia and the West in a battle of disinformation, cyber warfare attacks and impartial truths. This Russian doctrine also magnifies why Russia does not correlate to the West in a same diplomatic and political manner as the West does. As a result, it creates more geopolitical differences and political divisions. In this Master’s research paper, I will analyze the underlying causes of diplomatic tensions such as the historical, ideological, geopolitical, and political nuances that Russia’s past battles, wars, attacks, and foreign invaders from the West hemisphere have led Russia to be both fearful and defensive toward the Western world. Russia’s tumultuous and dramatic past has cast an overshadowing net over unconstructive ties with the West and deteriorating relations that continue to exacerbate any diplomatic relations from leading to successful outcomes. That has prevented both hemispheres from reaching encouraging and promising mutual footings in world affairs. Is there a way to mollify the renewed tensions between the West and Russia? Yes, and I will demonstrate that both the West and Russia can mend their differences and reset their partnerships. However, the latter is also true that increasing strains during the investigation will bring forth to the readers tangible evidence that Russia and the West will continue for years to come to be suspicious and skeptical of one and another. East-West’s problematic political discourses compounded by distrustful and complicated bilateral relations within the crossfire NATO and the European Union could potentially destabilize peace and security and as a result, reshape the world itself between the East and the West.

Per sostenere e "difendere" il regime fascista di Kiev, l'amministrazione Obama e il complesso militare-finanziario-industriale degli Stati Uniti d'America sono pronti a utilizzare i più micidiali strumenti di guerra. A metà febbraio, Washington ha ribadito le proprie intenzioni belliche di fronte ai partner europei e alla Russia di Putin, rischierando a Spangdahlem (Germania) dodici aerei da attacco al suolo A-10 Thunderbolt II e 300 aviatori del 355th Fighter Wing dell'US Air Force, provenienti dalla base aerea di Davis-Monthan (Arizona).

This publication offers a wide panorama of issues, problems and challenges confronting NATO and the Euro-Atlantic community in the regional and global contexts.  Russia’s aggressive stance at the international stage, the Ukraine crisis, the turmoil in the Middle East are the most notable examples of risks emerging outside the North Atlantic area yet strongly influencing NATO’s policy. The economic crisis, defense budget cuts,  domestic issues and national problems in member states constitute additional factors weakening unity and identity of the Euro-Atlantic security community. As a result, NATO has to work out an appropriate response to the problems and challenges piling up within and outside the Euro-Atlantic area. Several authors in their contributions to this volume highlight the importance of readiness, reassurance and revitalisation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. They also point at the need for a reinforcement of NATO’s military capabilities and deterrence potential. All agree that NATO must show political unity and determination to cope effectively with the complex set of security issues and dilemmas.
NATO’s policy should follow the path of credible and realistic collective efforts in order to be seen as a token of responsibility for protection and defense of the territory and population of the Euro-Atlantic community.

Historically, the Russian political elite held a conviction that the Balkans were a strategic pivotal field for the state economic and political interests (Jelavić, 2004). In light of this, the assertiveness of Russian hegemony in the Balkans was a recipe for success in the geopolitical rivalry with traditional contenders in Europe. In this respect, Serbia, occupying roughly the mid-part of the region, was a key pillar of Russian dominance in South-eastern Europe. Sharing ethnic and spiritual origins and faith with Russians, Serbia left a pernicious trail in Russia’s history. Ironically, Serbia caused Russia’s engagement to the Great War that turned into the collapse of the Russian Empire, followed by a murderous civil war (Kissinger, 2012).

Neue Mittel und Methoden der Kriegführung werden, vollkommen unerwartet von Russland und den Terroristen, von der ukrainischen Armee in die Praxis umgesetzt.

Die ukrainischen Streitkräfte haben angefangen, den Kampf um den Südosten gemäß allen Gesetzen moderner Militärwissenschaft zu führen.

Quasi simile a un trapezio scaleno con un'area immensa: il vertice superiore sinistro quasi a sfiorare l'arcipelago tunisino di Kerkenna; quello destro, la grande isola di Creta. Si tratta della neonata Regione Marittima Lybia SAR, l'area di competenza delle assai poco riconosciute e credibili autorità politiche e militari libiche per gli interventi di ricerca, soccorso e salvataggio dei naufraghi e di tutte le persone in situazioni di pericolo in mare. Un immenso buco nero del Mediterraneo dove oggi possono affogare in tantissimi perché mancano gli strumenti e i mezzi per intervenire efficacemente e in tempi rapidi o perché con infame cinismo l'Europa ha scelto di non vedere, non sentire e non parlare, affidando all'inaffidabile partner africano la sporca guerra ai migranti e alle migrazioni.

My contribution to the nuclear debate presents 3 possible concepts for complexity evolution, which make understood that what is at a stake right now is the evolution of complexity. The use of missiles in any war scenario has very little, and if any very bad effects on reality, which I strongly recommend to not to look for.

The official results of the conference were published under the following document, which you can find at the ETH Zürich file archive: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/154318/MD_Draft%20Report_16102012.pdf

The official report does not resolve the dilemma that was discussed in Brussels. It reveals a one-sided and partial perspective and does not uncover the risks at which Europe was. The debate was stronger than the report tells and the report fails to describe the Russian position adequately as well as the reality of the debate. The US-American assurance, that the missile defense shield set up by NATO is not offensive and does not mean a threat to Russia  is a discussable statement. Quoting Vershbow as main speaker is nice, but the way this report puts facts and presents opinions is debatable.

A report about the real terms of discussion cannot be published.

This paper presents an analysis of the future of European Union (EU) security in terms of EU- Turkey relations. It argues that, first, Turkey’s military capability and experience in military operations, secular understanding of Islam, geostrategic position and connections with the unstable periphery of Europe could enhance the credibility and capability of the Common Security and Defence policy (CSDP) of the EU. Thus, second, development of the cooperative relations between Turkey and EU is crucial for future of the EU security. To investigate these phenomena, this study seeks to assess main motivations and interests behind the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and Turkey’s roles and contributions to CSDP. It focuses on Turkey’s position and role in the European security and defence structure and EU’s new arrangements in the European security and defence architecture. Turkey’s policy towards rising new developments in the European security system in post-Cold War era will be analysed. it examines security factors behind the EU-Turkey relations and questions the role of Turkey in the future of EU security and defence architecture.
The paper will, first, examine the security motivations and interests behind European integration throughout the EU/CSDP and the enlargement policy of the EU. Second, it will assess cooperation between Turkey and EU on Security and Turkey’s position, role and meaning in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Then it will evaluate the process of European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and the attempts to build the EU’s autonomous security and defence architecture in post St Mola summit. By doing so, it will assess Turkey’s policy toward this new constructing European security architecture by arguing Turkey’s demands, and EU’s promises and offers to Turkey on ESDI/CSDP and Turkey’s veto on CSDP- North Atlatic Treaty Organization (NATO) co-operation. Finally, it will assess the prospect role of Turkey in European security architecture by analysing whether, if so, how and to what extent Turkey could contribute to the credibility and capability of CSDP.

L`Harmattan - Paris ; 2013.

"commander le livre : info@europavarietas.org
sur le site de l`Harmattan : http://www.editions-harmattan.fr/index.asp?navig=catalogue&obj=livre&no=41212&razSqlClone=1

Ce deuxième ouvrage de l'auteur concernant la politique étrangère et de défense de l’Union européenne étudie l’évolution des missions et opérations de la PESD/PSDC en Afrique, dans le concert de la diplomatie européenne et l'activité des organisations internationales et des différents acteurs. L'approche régionale nous aide à comprendre la complexité des enjeux et des défis, la structure des conflits, et à analyser les interactions transfrontalières.
Les premières missions et opérations sont l’expression concrète de la volonté de l’Union d’agir. Agir pour promouvoir la paix et la stabilité, agir pour contribuer à la prévention et à la résolution de conflits. Mais, est-ce que les missions européennes strictement limitées dans l'espace et dans le temps sont capables de contribuer à la stabilisation en Afrique?
Le contient africain au cœur des intérêts des grandes puissances surtout à cause des matières premières stratégiques, le terrorisme international, la piraterie et de plus en plus pour la migration et la fuite des cerveaux. L’intérêt de l’Union européenne est garantir sa propre sécurité et ses besoins et qu’elle soit un partenaire fiable des pays et organisations africains. L’Afrique a besoin des aides et des subventions, plusieurs États sont incapables de garantir leur propre sécurité. La géopolitique en Afrique a une priorité absolue.
La question principale à laquelle l‘auteur cherche la réponse, c’est dans quelle mesure l’Union peut-elle devenir un acteur international. Comment l’Union peut-elle transformer sa puissance économique en une puissance politique dans le système international du XXIème siècle. Comment concevons nous la coopération entre les institutions de l’Union européenne et celles de l’Union africaine et de l'OTAN ?

Ancien visiting fellow de l’EUISS et de la Commission de Défense de l’Assemblée de l’UEO, András István Türke est docteur de Paris III-Sorbonne Nouvelle. Il a effectué sa thèse sur l’évolution de la défense européenne et travaille aujourd’hui comme consultant pour les questions internationales et de défense. Il est chercheur associé de plusieurs instituts de recherche en France en Hongrie et en Suisse.

256 p.

TABLES DES MATIERES

CHAPITRE I. Les enjeux et les défis européens en Afrique
/Néocolonisation ou nouvelles stratégies pour une présence en Afrique ?/

CHAPITRE II. Les missions de l’Union européenne en République Démocratique du Congo

CHAPITRE III. L’Union européenne et la crise du Darfour
/Les missions de l’Union européenne au Soudan, au Tchad et dans la République centrafricaine/

CHAPITRE IV. La réforme du secteur de sécurité en Guinée-Bissau

CHAPITRE V. L'Union européenne, la PSDC et la crise en Libye
/EUFOR Libye : « L'opération fantomisée de la légion invisible? »/

CHAPITRE VI. Somalia, East Africa and the EU: Geopolitics, drivers and “comprehensive” engagement
(András Hettyey)

Conclusion générale
Bibliographie

Europa Varietas Institute - http://www.europavarietas.org
András István Türke - http://andrasistvanturke.blogspot.ch"

Since 2016, efforts to increase cooperation in the EU’s security and defence policy have accelerated. New initiatives have been undertaken in the military, industrial and civilian dimensions under the label of a European Defence Union. So far, nothing indicates that the enhanced cooperation of the EU member states will lead to an integration of their defence policies or to building an alternative to NATO. The new EU instruments, even if they are actively used by the member states, will to only a small extent increase European military capabilities, lead to innovation in the European defence industry or improve the capacity of the military and civilian crisis management missions. This report presents and analyses the EU’s instruments, as well as the opportunities and challenges they present to those EU member states that form NATO’s eastern flank at the same time.

The Balkans and Iraq have become emblematic features of the
post-cold war geography of international relations. However, by
concentrating on the current ruptures in the Euro-Atlantic community, most commentators: (i) neglect the macro-historical tendency of the US towards unilateralism in response to ‘existential threats’ and to multilateral approaches whenever and wherever the sense of urgency is not pressing; and (ii) overlook the fact that the Iraq crisis is an aberration in an otherwise persisting transatlantic relationship of co-operation. It can be argued that an exploration of the externally-driven processes of order-promotion in the region indicates that the Iraq crisis did not impact dramatically on the role of either the EU or NATO.This is because the Balkans remains an area of co-operation between the transatlantic partners as a result of their reaction to the Kosovo crisis. Secondly, the current regional perspective suggests that the transatlantic rows offered Balkan states the opportunity to pursue particular agendas. Finally, it can be suggested that, unlike Iraq, the Balkans region is not in fact prone to a relapse into so-called ‘Balkanisation’.

La mise en œuvre différée, en 2017, de la Coopération structurée permanente (PESCO) donne une nouvelle dimension à l'intégration de la défense de l'Union européenne. 25 États membres se sont engagés à accroître leurs dépenses de défense et à intensifier leur collaboration par des projets communs dans les domaines opérationnel et capacitaire. Six des quarante-six projets de la CSP ont pour ambition de développer des capacités maritimes. Vingt-deux des vingt-cinq participants sont, par ailleurs, Alliés au sein de l'OTAN, qui dispose aussi de son propre processus de planification de défense (NDPP), par lequel elle définit les capacités nécessaires à la réalisation de ses missions.
Dans un contexte sécuritaire en rapide évolution, caractérisé par une diversification des menaces, les États européens sont sollicités de toutes parts pour mettre à disposition leurs capacités militaires. Que ce soit pour leurs missions au sein de l’OTAN, dans le cadre de la Politique de Sécurité et de Défense commune (PSDC) de l’UE, dans le cadre des Nations unies ou pour la participation à des coalitions, les États ne disposent que d’un seul ensemble de forces pour honorer tous leurs engagements. Comme ce sont les États — et non les organisations dont ils sont membres — qui décident souverainement de leurs plans de développement capacitaires, l’objet du présent travail est de répondre à la question :  Les projets capacitaires maritimes de la coopération structurée permanente répondent-ils aux besoins capacitaires de l’UE et de l’OTAN ?

The principle that armed forces and security services should be subordinate and accountable to democratically elected political leadership has long been seen as a basic condition for the effective functioning and well-being of Western societies. Yet for many years in NATO member countries the principle was taken for granted; assumed but largely unspoken and seldom explored. NATO enlargement changed this situation. One of the conditions aspirants were asked to meet was to ensure that their armed forces and defence establishments conformed to the standards prevailing in alliance countries.
However, having set the condition NATO members then had to
reach agreement on what these standards were and what reforms would
be needed to reach them. In the flurry of activity that followed officials and academics hastened to define the basic parameters of acceptable civil-military relations against which the aspirants could be assessed. Three basic problems inherited from the former regimes stood out: the dominant, privileged and insular position of the military, the lack of civilian defence expertise and the absence of the habit and the mechanisms for democratic accountability. The need to address these problems saw the emergence of two initiatives relevant to this volume. The weakness of parliamentary institutions and expertise and the consequent democratic deficit provided the impetus for an initiative by the NATO PA designed to assist the new parliaments in developing the structures, processes and expertise needed for parliamentarians to play an effective role in the development and implementation of security policy.
The Editors would  like to thank respondents from national parliaments
who responded to requests for information about the ‘Powers, Procedures and practices of Parliamentary Oversight of Defence in NATO Member States’ tabulated in Annex 1.

See also Azeri, Russian and Ukrainian versions

Turkey’s relationships with the West, particularly its relationship with Western security institutions, are
today more important than ever. As the United States fights two wars in the region and attempts to rebuild its
reputation in Europe and the Middle East, Turkey is once again central to America’s plans. Yet, this crucial ally is
little understood by U.S. policy makers. Turkey has a long relationship with Euro-Atlantic security institutions,
specifically NATO and the various European institutions, culminating in today’s European Security and Defense
Policy (ESDP).
The following study poses the following questions of relevance to those interested in theory and policy. Why
do the government and people of Turkey participate in these institutions? What long-term policy objectives do makers
of policy in Turkey wish to advance through its participation in these institutions? What are the different ways that
Turkey leverages its participation to advance its goals? Specifically, how does Turkey use its participation in
European security institutions to advance its positions on issues such as European Union membership, defense
modernization, and its ongoing internal and external areas of conflict? How does Turkey’s Ottoman legacy affect
these relationships and how has this historical background shaped today’s events?
This thesis also sets out to answer whether Turkey is successful in its participation; in other words, does its
participation allow Turkey to advance its goals better? How do current trends in Europe affect Turkey’s participation
in these institutions?

In this study, the evolution of the NATO-EU relationship from the Cold War years to present day is examined and this relationship is comprehensively analysed politically, economically and militarily. This analysis consists fundamentally of major problems like the Libya crisis, which enhanced tensions among the EU, NATO, the USA and Turkey. Furthermore, the question of EU’s autonomy from NATO, NATO allies military spendings, NATO’s “Smart Defence” initiative and Turkey’s role in the NATO-EU strategic partnership are examined. The study begins with a historical overview that brings attention to new opportunities and risks in transatlantic relations in the next part. In the last analysis,
emphasis is given to targets which the EU want to reach in world politics in the future including Europe’s military reform, the limits of NATO-EU relations and the search for a new balance of power in the Euro-Atlantic security chain. The article concludes that searching for a balance between “NATO’s primacy against the EU” and “EU autonomy” in the Euro-Atlantic partnership continue and the Cyprus issue is not the only obstacle which limits NATO-EU relations.
Keywords:
USA, France, NATO, Military Intervention, EU, Turkey

The  Permanent  Structured  Cooperation  (PESCO)  aims 
to  achieve  more  effective,  efficient  and  synergic  military 
capabilities through a series of
ad hoc
projects. It is legally
rooted  in  the  EU  Lisbon  Treaty,  yet  it  is  substantially 
intergovernmental  and  much  of  its  content  and  shape 
will  be  decided  by  the  member  states  over  the  next 
few  years.  As  with  all  institutional  designs  incorporating 
differentiated  integration,  the  onset  of  PESCO  begs  the 
question  of  how  this  initiative  relates  to  third  countries 
that  are  not  full  members  of  the  EU  such  as  Norway, 
Turkey  and  –  in  the  future  -  the  UK.  The  modality  of 
these  countries’  involvement  in  PESCO  directly  impacts 
on  the  future  of  EU–NATO  collaboration.  In  principle, 
this  involvement  could  be  achieved  by  granting  NATO 
member  third  countries  consultation  rights  in  deciding 
on  PESCO’s  policy  direction,  and  full  participatory  rights 
in  PESCO’s  capability  and  operational  projects  to  which  they can participate.

ΑBSTRACT

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Defense Agency (EDA) are two defense organizations having as their major “product” the collective effort in the defence sector.
Since 1949 when NATO was established, events of great significance like the fall of Berlin wall and the 9/11 terrorist attacks caused changes to the global environment and brought up identity and adaptation problems for both organizations. In addition, human poverty and climate change are new potential hazards of humanitarian crisis that will not leave European countries unaffected. As a result both NATO and EDA shifted their orientation more towards safety and security against threats than defense against an opponent.
Moreover, due to the current economic crisis fiscal constraints are imposed on the member-states of the two organizations making the sufficient funding of defence needs difficult. This converted NATO and EDA’s strategic planning concept into defence capabilities-based approach and initiated structural and functional transformation procedures.
Aiming to achieve economies of scale to defence expenditures of their member-states, NATO and EDA established cost reduction mechanisms: Smart Defence for NATO and Pooling and Sharing for EDA. These projects enhance cooperation among the participants concerning defence industry and military procurements. They also support the development of capabilities of their member-states and the exploitation of existing military capabilities and resources in a collective manner.
The dissertation, using the strategic management theoretical framework, attempts to define the identity of NATO and EDA, their history, vision and mission and their strategic planning procedures. The study concludes that strategic planning of both organizations has been profoundly affected by the economic crisis, and suggests the prerequisites that make Smart Defence and Pooling and Sharing mechanisms beneficial to the member-states. Lastly, there is a specific reference to the potentials of the Hellenic military and defence sector.

Key words: NATO, EDA, strategic planning, military capability, Smart Defence, Pooling and Sharing.

Turkey’s Eurasianist foreign policy lacks a full-fledged strategy that can realistically be expected to yield positive outcomes for the country, especially when compared to its Kemalist pro-Western counterpart. Despite its rhetorical allure, the anti-Western stance has not translated into a sustainable and prosperous economic model for Turkey. Indeed, Turkey is structurally dependent on a free market economy and deeply-rooted integration with Western institutions such as NATO, the EU, and the Council of Europe.

August 19, 2008
Open a Microsoft Word document; try to write the name of a country, the name of a recently, widely mentioned land: Ossetia. Try eventually to write the name of the indigenous nation, a very ancient people, the Ossetians. You will immediately notice that both names are red underlined, which means that you probably wrote a mistake, eventually misspelling the ethnographic terms. Do not try it with one s; this would be the real orthographic error. What happens then?

Very simply, you discovered, without even knowing it, the very complicity of the Western World. For the Microsoft Office software, the very ancient Caucasian nation, whose customs have been described by Apollonius Rhodius in his memorable Argonautica, simply does not exist. This is a shame, one should tell them. Tell to whom?

To Bill Gates and his successors at the top of the software giant? To the State Department where so numerous, so excellent experts failed to notice the ´detail´ in a Word document and immediately report the error and thus convey the message about the necessary rectification? To whom?

Most probably to all!

None of these six scenarios is reassuring. The first option,  preservation of the current grey zone, is by far the most likely. It remains unclear, however, whether mere cooperation, adaptation and association, within this scenario, can replace, or compensate for, proper institutional integration into a defense coalition. While material, technical and financial help for Ukraine is forthcoming, such piecemeal support could remain eventually insufficient to fundamentally improve the security of Ukraine. Even the concurrent and resolute application of a large and varied battery of mutually re-enforcing legal, military, economic, technical and other instruments strengthening Ukraine’s international embeddedness will not make a new treaty on East European security unnecessary.

Az elmúlt kevesebb mint egy évtized alatt jelentősen romlott Európa biztonsági környezete. Ez a multipolarizálódó világrendben az Európát érő keleti és déli kihívások felerősödésében és hatásaiban öltött testet. Keleti kihívásként a 2014-es ukrán válságban játszott orosz szerepvállalás eredményeképpen mélypontjára került a NATO–orosz kapcsolatrendszer, eközben a felemelkedő Kína is – főleg amerikai nyomásra – a NATO napirendjére került.
2015-től Európában példátlan migrációs válság kezdődött, aminek részeként a terrorizmus is felerősödött. A migrációs politika terén is megmutatkozott az EU válsága, ami politikai és cselekvési egység hiányában a kérdéskörben markáns álláspontot képviselő Magyarországgal is konfliktusokhoz vezetett. A Brexit, az európai eladósodás, a negatív demográfiai mutatók, a vártnál gyengébb gazdasági teljesítmény megmutatták, hogy hazánk növekvő mértékben kell, hogy építsen a regionális együttműködésre és nem utolsósorban nemzeti önerőnkre.
A NATO-nak alkalmazkodnia kellett az új biztonsági környezethez, a Szövetség adaptációja pedig hazánkra is hatást gyakorolt.