Object Permanence

This thesis uses concepts developed by Ruth Millikan as part of her “biosemantic” theory of intentional signs to explain her theory of about what it means to identify the “substance” that is the object of one’s thoughts. It then applies these concepts and the theory to elucidate her analysis of identity statements. Finally, it develops and explores Millikan’s notion of “sameness marker” functioning, the notion being that there exist sameness markers in the mind or brain that allow people to recognize that the same substance is being encountered at different points of time. It relates this notion to Millikan’s theory of identification, on the one hand, and to her analysis of identity statements, on the other. Throughout the thesis, Millikan’s notions are contrasted with those she attributes to Frege.

The current study evaluated the relative roles of conceptual knowledge and executive control on the development of categorical flexibility, the ability to switch between simultaneously available but conflicting categorical representations of an object. Experiment 1 assessed conceptual knowledge and executive control together; Experiment 2 differentiated conceptual knowledge from costly executive processes. In Experiment 1, 3- to 5-year-olds were given a three-choice (taxonomic, thematic, and nonassociate) match-to-sample task and asked to match two associates. In Experiment 2, same-aged children were assessed on another match-to-sample task that reduced executive costs by presenting thematic and taxonomic associates on separate trials. By comparing performance across tasks, age-related changes resulting from conceptual knowledge and executive control indicated that conceptual knowledge of superordinate relations showed gains between 3 and 4 years, whereas gains in executive control were seen between 4 and 5 years, suggesting a décalage in the development of conceptual and executive processes underlying categorical flexibility.

Recent interest in the development and evolution of theory of mind has provided a wealth of information about representational skills in both children and animals. According to J. Perner (1991), children begin to entertain secondary representations in the 2nd year of life. This advance manifests in their passing hidden displacement tasks, engaging in pretense and means-ends reasoning, interpreting external representations, displaying mirror self-recognition and empathic behavior, and showing an early understanding of "mind" and imitation. New data show a cluster of mental accomplishments in great apes that is very similar to that observed in 2-year-old humans. It is suggested that it is most parsimonious to assume that this cognitive profile is of homologous origin and that great apes possess secondary representational capacity. Evidence from animals other than apes is scant. This analysis leads to a number of predictions for future research.

This study tested participants' preparedness to acknowledge that an object could change as a result of magical intervention. Six-and 9-year-old children and adults treated perceived and imagined objects as being equally permanent. Adults treated a fantastic object as ...

Three experiments investigated the effect of an adult’s social cues on 2- and 3-year-old children’s ability to use a sign or symbol to locate a hidden object. Results showed that an adult’s positive, engaging facial expression facilitated children’s ability to identify the correct referent, particularly for 3-year-olds. A neutral facial expression and the presence of the adult’s hand also facilitated performance, but to a lesser degree than did an engaging facial expression. The effect of the adult’s social cues was greater for relatively unfamiliar signs and symbols (replica or arrow) than it was for a more familiar sign (pointing finger). These findings indicate that non-directional social cues such as facial expression help to convey communicative intent and facilitate children’s comprehension of signs and symbols.

The author wishes to express gratitude to the Jim Casey Youth Opportunities Initiative for initiating and supporting this study. Special appreciation is extended to staff and administrators at Jim Casey Foundation’s national office and the Opportunity Passport ™ grantees that participated in this study. Their assistance and support made this project possible. Special thanks are due to LaShaun Brooks, who served in multiple roles including recruiter, interviewer, and data collection manager. His diligence in coordinating with the Opportunity Passport ™ grantees and participants at four sites across the country and his skill in interviewing young people were crucial to this study. The author wishes to note appreciation to Anne Clary and staff for their editing skills and to Chapin Hall for its administrative support and the provision of transcribers for the interview data. Ultimately, this project is indebted to the young adults who agreed to participate in this study and share their ...

Poor Theory of Mind (ToM) (or difficulties imputing mental states to self and others) [1], (See also [2-5]) is often blamed for certain responses and behaviour in autism. However, the Theory of Mind Task Battery requires an understanding of language, the use of cognitive skills, as well as the child's motivation and attention to complete. All of these factors are either weak or underdeveloped in individuals with autism suggesting that this is not the best means to measure one's understanding that other people have their own thoughts, plans, beliefs, or point of view. Behaviours like strong defiance, insistence on sameness, fear associated with sudden change and severe anxiety may be related to difficulties seeing beyond the 'now' [6]. This paper suggests that some of the stress and anxiety in the autism population may actually be due to delayed object permanence (OP) (knowing something may still exist even if it is out of sight), which can appear as poor ToM. This delay in establishing OP is governed by single focused attention. For more information on this concept see: Lawson, W. (2011) The passionate mind, JKP:London. Although ToM and OP are defined differently, this paper aims to show the relationship between them and how one concept can influence the other using examples in everyday life to illustrate how poor OP is associated with single focused attention, which detracts from the bigger picture.