Pegida

This study analyses the contestation of the concept of Europe by contemporary anti-
liberal groups. The aim of this analysis is to answer the question for the motives of
these groups to choose Europe as a point of reference instead of national or regional
frames of reference. The analysis is based on conceptual history which traces changing
meanings of concepts through history, in this case the concept of Europe. The theoretical
approach builds on Koselleck's Zeitschichten and Schulz-Forberg's Raumschichten. The
temporal, spatial and normative dimensions of the concept of Europe are therefore the
main guiding categories of the analysis. In addition, Sirinelli's model of generations
serves as a hypothesis for the emergence of social movements and their durability.
As a first step, an overview over the concept of Europe and the main aspects with
regard to its temporal, spatial and normative meaning which have been attached to it is
provided. The claim of the EU as an “owner” of the concept and the role of the public
sphere in defining are furthermore discussed. As a next step, a short historical overview
outlines earlier anti-liberal movements and their conceptualisations of Europe. The analysis
focuses on two anti-liberal groups: Pegida (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation
of Europe) and the Identitarian Movement. The analysis shows that both movements
challenge the liberal concept of Europe in several ways. They point back to Christianity
as a normative basis, state that Islam is not compatible with or at least problematic within
Europe and are highly critical of immigration. Whereas Pegida has a very vague conceptualisation
of Europe and refers more to the national context, the Identitarians establish an
ideologically consistent framework of Europe which is highly essentialist and strongly
refers to earlier anti-liberal movements. The reason for referring to Europe lies in their
interest to gain and maintain credibility, defend themselves against allegations of xenophobia
and create an antagonist. The hypothesis of a political generation holds in case of
the Identitarians, but is hard to uphold in case of Pegida due to the diverse backgrounds of
their members.
The analysis shows how the EU definition of the concept of Europe is challenged
as the gap between political elites and civil society widens. Anti-liberal groups avoid
overtly xenophobic discourses and adapt ideological and aesthetic elements from the left
which makes it difficult to discern them. At the same time, rejection of the EU becomes
politically and socially established, putting the EU project at danger. New media play an
increasingly important role in spreading their messages and ideology and have become a
counter-public sphere which deserves further monitoring and analysis.

Vortrag am 10.05.2016 im Rahmen der Veranstaltungsreihe Kritische Leere/Lehre 3 der Basisdemokratischen Fachschaft Sozialwissenschaften der Universität Hannover

Wird Pegida hauptsächlich als eine nationalistische und rassistische Bewegung wahrgenommen, die  vorwiegend „den“ Islam, Geflüchtete und einen versteckten Antisemitismus als Feindbilder bedient, so wird doch kaum rezipiert, dass der überwiegende Teil von Pegida-Aktivist*innen männlich ist und welche Rolle dies für den Anschluss an Pegida spielt. So werde ich in meinem Vortrag darauf eingehen, warum Pegida gerade im Kontext hegemonialer Männlichkeit besonders attraktiv ist und Antifeminismus und Anti-Gendermainstreaming als ideologische Bindeglieder nicht unterschätzt werden sollten. Aus einer psychoanalytisch-sozialpsychologischen Perspektive werde ich zeigen, dass dem eine Abwehr des Weiblichen durch männlich-hegemoniale Sozialisationserfahrungen zugrunde liegt.

Bu çalışmada İmparatorluk döneminden Cumhuriyet dönemine, Türk toplumunun ve devletinin Avrupa'ya olan akademik, ekonomik ve siyasi alakası; Avrupa'ya çeşitli nedenlerle göç eden Türkler üzerinden ele alınmıştır. İkinci Dünya Savaşı ardından kalkınmak isteyen Avrupa, kapılarını vasıfsız yabancı işçilere uzun bir süre boyunca açık tutmuş ve bu durum günümüz Avrupa'sının sosyodemografik ve ekonomik yapısını, Avrupalıların Türk imgelemini, Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği ilişkilerini etkilemektedir. Avrupa'daki göçmen Türklerin durumu ele alınırken olumlu ve olumsuz boyutlar birlikte değerlendirilmiştir. Bu çalışma, Avrupa Türklerinin günümüzdeki durumunu, Avrupa ve Türkiye siyasetinde ve Türkiye halkı üzerinde ne denli etkili olabileceğini ortaya koymayı hedeflemektedir.

Der  Aufsatz  führt  in  ausgewählte  Problemstellungen  der  gegenwärtigen  Forschung  zu Sozialen  Bewegungen  und  Protest,  insbesondere  den  Zusammenhang  von  sozialen Bewegungen und Demokratie, ein. Zunächst wird der Begriff der sozialen Bewegung und der Bewegungsgesellschaft im Hinblick auf den Gesellschaftsbezug und die Selbstverhältnisse kollektiver Protestakteure erläutert. Im zweiten Abschnitt wird die Bedeutung sozialer Bewegungen in der Diskussion um die 'Krise der Repräsentation' und die 'Demokratisierung der Demokratie' herausgearbeitet. Drittens wird anhand aktueller Bewegungen (Occupy, Mahnwachen  für  den  Frieden/Montagsmahnwachen,  Pegida)  gefragt,  ob  sich  in postdemokratischen Verhältnissen ein bestimmter neuer Bewegungstyp herausbildet, der insbesondere  von immenser politischer  Entfremdung  und  spezifisch  Web-2.0-geprägten Subjektivitäten  gekennzeichnet  ist.  Diese  Bewegungen  werden  als  dreifacher  Ausdruck postdemokratischer Verhältnisse begriffen: als Reaktion auf die Postdemokratie, als Kritik an der Postdemokratie und als Verkörperung postdemokratischer Strukturen. Viertens werden
einige  Herausforderungen  für  soziale  Bewegungen  analysiert,  die  sich  aus  autoritären Krisenbewältigungsstrategien und dem gegenwärtigen polizeilichen Umgang mit Protest ergeben.  Im  Fazit  wird  kurz  auf  weitere  Forschungslücken  und  theoretische
Herausforderungen für die Protestforschung eingegangen.

ÖZET
11 Eylül ve bunu takip eden “Terör-Karşıtı” savaşlar sırasında ve sonrasında, İslam, Batı medyasında sıklıkla yer almaya başladı ve güncel söylemde Müslümanlar bir “tehlike” olarak görülmeye/gösterilmeye başlandı. İslam’ın uluslararası terörizm ile aynı anlama geldiği Batı medyasında çok sık rastlanan bir olgu oldu. Özellikle Alman medyasında, Müslümanlar köktendinci, tutucu, barbar olarak gösterildi. Batı medyasında görülen bir başka eğilim de demokrasinin, düşünce özgürlüğünün ve dinsel hoşgörünün sadece Batı toplumlarına ait özellikler olarak gösterilmesidir. Olayların sebeplerinin ve sonuçlarının tarihsel gelişimlerinden koparılmaları ve küresel kapitalist sistemin işleyişinden yalıtılarak sunulmaları, İslam dünyasının içinde bulunduğu durumu ve aşırı İslamcı saldırıları, Müslümanların Müslüman olmalarından kaynaklanan doğal eylemler olarak gösterme sonucunu doğurmuştur. İslam ve şiddet arasında doğrudan bir bağ kurularak, bütün Müslümanların şiddet eğilimli oldukları iddia edilmiştir. Batı siyaset ve medyasında terör, şiddet ve aşırı dincilik Müslümanlarla bağdaştırılmıştır. Müslümanlık karşıtı bu söylemler 11 Eylül’den sonra artış gösterdi. Son dönemde IŞİD saldırıları ile bu yabancı düşmanlığı ve İslam korkusu yaşatılmaya devam edilmektedir. Müslümanlara ve ibadet yerlerine yapılan saldırılarda artış yaşanmıştır. Almanya’da ırkçı hareket PEGİDA ( Batı’nın İslamlaşmasına Karşı Vatansever Avrupalılar) ise Batı hegemonyasının ötekileştirici dili olmuş ve Huntington’un Batı ile İslam arasında çatışma olacağı tezi, ve Müslüman mültecilerin tehdit olarak görülmesi bu hegemonyanın araçlarından olmuştur. Avrupa kültürü, siyasi partileri ve medyası El Kaide, İŞİD gibi örgütleri İslam ve yabancı karşıtlığını kışkırtmak için araçsallaştırmaktadır. Avrupa’da İslamafobi, yabancı karşıtlığı ile eşdeğer bir algıya dönüşmüş durumdadır. Çalışmada Almanya’da 2014 yılında kurulan, İslam’a karşı Batı kültürünü savunan ve anti-İslam ırkçılığını temsil eden PEGİDA ele alınacaktır. Bu bağlamda Müslümanlara karşı islamafobik ve ırkçı söylemlerin siyaset ve medya dilinde bir hegemonya aracı olarak kullanılmasının toplum tabanındaki yansımasının yükselen İslam karşıtlığı ve yabancı düşmanlığı olduğu tezi savunulacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa, İslamafobi, Irkçılık, PEGİDA

ABSTRACT
Islam has frequently started to appear on Western media during September 11th and after those following “anti-terrorist” wars and Muslims have been started being seen or shown as a danger. Islam, having the same meaning with International terrorism, has become a phenomenon that appears frequently on western media. Especially in the German media, Muslims have been shown as fundamentalist, conservative, and barbarian. Another tendency seen in the Western media is that democracy, freedom of thought, and religious tolerance are shown as belonging to only Western societies. The cause and effects of incidents having been separated from their historical developments and submitted by isolating from functional global capitalist system, the situation of Islamic world and extreme Islamist attacks have resulted in showing Muslims doing as natural actions due to being a Muslim. By establishing a direct link between Islam and violence, it has been claimed that all Muslims are prone to violence. Terror, violence and fundamentalism have been associated with Muslims in the Western media and politics. These rhetorics against Islam have increased after September 11th.  Recently, with the ISID attacks xenophobia and Islamophobia have been continued to be kept alive. There has been an increase in attacks on Muslims and their places of worship. In Germany, racist movement, PEGİDA, (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West) has been an alienating language of Western hegemony. Huntington’s thesis that a conflict will occur between the West and Islam, Muslim refugees being seen as a threat have been one of the tools of this hegemony. European culture, political parties, and the media have instrumentalized the Islamic organizations such as ISID and AL-QAEDA to provoke Islamophobia and xenophobia.  Islamophobia in Europe has become a perception that is equivalent to xenophobia. In this study, PEGIDA founded in Germany, 2014, defending European culture against the Islam and representing the racism of Anti-Islam will be discussed. In this context, Islamophobia and xenophobia as a thesis, the reflection on social base of being used as a hegemonic tool in political and media language of the Islamophobic and racist discourses against Muslims will be argued.
Keywords: Europe, Islamophobia, Racism, PEGIDA

Multiple Movements can be observed hitting the streets since 2014, which represent something new. Although these Movements are prima facie thematically very different, all share some common motives, which can be described as an actualization of folkish-nationalism. The Article focusses on the so called “Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident” (Pegida) and tries first to put out the major motives, which are extracted from the speeches held at Pegida-manifestations. Secondly one motive will be traced back to the 1990s to show the development of conservativism and its rearrangement. It will be argued that the old conservative structure became disintegrated and it is renewal is based on folkish-nationalist believes. The new folkish-nationalist movements are a real threat of an open and plural society, not only because a new wave of violence against migrants and leftists takes place, but also because of a normalization of paranoid views of society and the enhancement of the possibilities of authoritarian-violent solutions to phenomena of crisis.

Since its founding in 2014, Pegida has positioned itself as a populist movement striving to limit immigration and to preserve Germany's cultural heritage. It has also aligned itself with other right-wing European political groups whose exclusionary views are rooted in theories of a civilizational clash between the West and the Islamic world. Pegida's pushback against immigration also includes appeals to resist globalization and the growth of multiculturalism by embracing what Verena Stolcke has termed " cultural fundamentalism. " This ideology assumes cultural hierarchies and segregates religious and ethnic groups spatially and geographical as a means to maintain cultural uniformity. In doing so, Pegida posits that it is not racist or xenophobic, rather that it seeks solidarity in maintaining Western cultural values. The danger in Pegida's ideology is that it rejects not only constitutional principles and notions of cultural pluralism, but that it furthers a cultural divide that need not exist and, in fact, embraces an exclusionary nationalism that is not unlike the values that they purport to reject.

The paper reflects on recent developments towards authoritarianism and right-wing populism that have become apparent in a number of Western societies and aims at pinpointing possible cultural foundations for this trend. Using the example of the German PEGIDA movement and the wider milieu in which it is embedded, it identifies and describes a rapidly spreading culture of mistrust and discusses some of its political and epistemological implications. In a second step, the paper draws on Luc Boltanski's theory of justification in order to attain a better understanding of this political movement's specificities. It is argued that it is a quasi-violent refusal of justification which is constitutive for the movement in question, thereby transcending the reach of Boltanski's framework to some extent. In a third step, a closer look is taken at the epistemological paradox that results from the fact that a number of the PEGIDA movement's crucial points of criticism are effectively shared by a larger part of the overall population, raising severe problems for the question of sociological critique. The paper utilizes ideas by Bruno Latour in order to illuminate this paradox further and examine its consequences. It closes with remarks on the possibility to "reassemble" trust and critique as crucial but contested – and, hence, precarious – foundations of modern society.

İkinci Dünya Savaşı’ndan sonra Soğuk Savaş’ın Batı kanadının lideri ABD’nin desteği ile Batı Avrupa’da yeni bir düzen kurulmuştu. Bu düzende 1949 yılı itibarıyla Avrupa Kömür ve Çelik Topluluğu (AKÇT) ile somutlaşmaya başlayan Avrupa entegrasyonu fikri hızlı bir şekilde güç kazandı. Almanya, Fransa, İtalya, Belçika, Hollanda ve Lüksemburg’un katılımı ile kurulan AKÇT, bugün Avrupa Birliği’ne (AB) dönüşen yapının temelini teşkil etti. İdealist fikirlerle bölgedeki en büyük sorunlardan birisi olan Fransa ve Almanya arasındaki kömür-çelik mücadelesini iş birliği temelinde sona erdirmeyi amaçlayan bu girişim, Batı Avrupa’da özellikle savaş sonrasında doğan nesillerin gelecek için ümit var olmalarını sağlamıştı. Ancak örgütün Avrupa’daki diğer ülkeleri de bünyesine yavaş yavaş katmasına ve görece bir Avrupalılık değerleri sistemi oluşturmasına rağmen Avrupa’da zaman zaman kendisini hissettiren fakat ana aktör olmaktan daima uzak olan aşırı sağ hareketler, 11 Eylül’deki terörist saldırılar, 2008 Dünya Ekonomik Krizi ve Arap Baharı sürecinde meydana gelen özellikle 2015 Mülteci Krizi olarak bilinen Avrupa’ya yönelik büyük göç hareketleri gibi önemli olaylardan sonra kendisinden sıkça bahsettirmeye başladı.

Avrupa özelinde aşırı sağın ana akımlaşma yolunda hızla ilerlediği, söylemini kabul ettirme ve yayma mücadelesi verdiği söylenebilir. Bu mücadele aşırı sağ düşüncelere sahip kimselerce siyasi arena, internet ortamı ve sokaklar gibi farklı mecralarda sürdürülmektedir. Siyaset dışı mecralarda kendisini gösteren ve ulusaşırı bir özelliğe kavuşan Batı’nın İslamlaşmasına Karşı Vatansever Avrupalılar (PEGIDA) hareketi, Avrupa’da toplumsal anlamda en çok dikkat çeken oluşum olarak araştırmalara konu olmaktadır. Özellikle ulusaşırı özelliği ile diğer hareketlerden önemli bir ayrışma gösteren PEGIDA’yı anlamak, Avrupa’daki aşırı sağ hareketlerin toplumsal boyutlarını açığa kavuşturmak adına oldukça önemlidir.

Bu çalışma, aşırı sağın Avrupa’daki gelişimine değindikten sonra Almanya özelinde gelişen PEGIDA hareketine odaklanacak, Almanya’da aşırı sağın gelişimini, Almanya için Alternatif Partisi’nin (AfD) verilerini, PEGIDA’nın kuruluşunu ve düzenli protestolar sürecini aktardıktan sonra hareketin ulusaşırı gelişimini ortaya koyacaktır.

Provoked by global political events, in autumn 2014 a small group of friends around Dresden, in eastern Germany, connected via Facebook to spark off an initiative that, at its peak, brought around 25,000 people onto the streets each week. Under the banner of PEGIDA, (the acronym of Patriotische Europäer Gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes), the movement has continuously mobilised popular disaffection with current political affairs in Germany.

The following paper will discuss whether Pegida participants can be accused of having extreme right-wing attitudes or, on the contrary, the movement should be acknowledged as a legitimate form of protest by ‘concerned citizens’. To answer this question, the paper will refer to data collected at demonstrations and to general population polls. It transpires, despite other claims (also formulated by experts on Pegida), that Pegida demonstrators indeed lean sharply to the extreme right of the political spectrum. This is indicated both by the party’s electoral preferences (after all, a vast majority of the protesters would vote for the AfD) and the worldview of Pegida’s supporters that indicates their proximity to the extreme right.

"Moving beyond the focus on political parties, the next chapters provide analyses that delve into street-based practices and argumentation strategies of far-right actors that have recently emerged and received much attention from the media. At the beginning, Holger Marcks examines strategies of far-right rhetoric and their reciprocity with mainstream discourse in Germany." (Maik Fielitz & Laura Lotte Laloire, Introductory Remarks)

Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde Avrupa Birliği ülkelerinde ırkçı yaklaşımlar yoğun bir şekilde uluslararası arenada yer almaya başlamıştır. Genel olarak yabancı düşmanlığı ve ırkçılık denilince Avrupa'da akla gelen ilk ülke Almanya olmaktadır. Ancak 2014 yılında yapılan Avrupa Parlamentosu seçimleri göstermiştir ki bu yaklaşımlar sadece Almanya ile sınırlı değildir. Avrupa Birliği ülkelerinin tamamına yakınında yabancı düşmanlığı ve ırkçılık günden güne artmaktadır. Bugüne kadar ırkçılık İslam karşıtlığı şeklinde Avrupa'daki aşırı sağ siyasi partilerin söylemlerinde gündeme gelmiştir. Bugün söz konusu yaklaşımları Eylül 2014'te oluşan Pegida adlı hareket kullanmaktadır. Bu makalede son dönemde Avrupa Birliği ülkelerinde yükselen yabancı düşmanlığı, İslam karşıtlığı ve ırkçılık bağlamında Pegida hareketi incelenecektir.

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The racist approaches has began to take place on international area intensively after Cold-War period in the European Union countries. Generally, when we think about xenophobia and racism in Europe, Germany becomes the first country that comes to mind. However, the European Parliament Election in 2014 has shown that the racist approaches are not restricted to Germany. Xenophobia and racism are increasing day by day in nearly all the European Union countries. So far, the racism has been raised as a form of Islamophobia in expressions of far-right parties in Europe. Today the movement, which arised in September 2014 and called Pegida, has started to use these approaches. In this article the Pegida movement will be examined in the context of rising Islamophobia, racism and xenophobia in the European countries recently. Giriş Avrupa kıtasında özellikle Avrupa Birliği üyesi ülkelerde 21. yüzyılın başlangı-cından itibaren aşırı sağcı partilerin yükselişe geçtiği görülmektedir. Sürecin başlangıcında daha çok Avusturya ve Fransa'da etkili olan bu tehditkâr durum günümüzde neredeyse tüm Avrupa ülkelerini sarmış durumdadır. Birçok ya-zar Avrupa'da aşırı sağcı partilerin yükselişinin nedenini 2008 yılında ABD'de başlayıp dünyaya yayılan küresel ekonomik kriz olarak görmesine rağmen tek nedenin bu olmadığı aşikârdır. Örneğin; İspanya 2008 yılı küresel ekonomik krizinden en çok zarar gören ülkelerden biri olmasına rağmen sağ popülist par-tiler ön plana çıkmamıştır.

In the aftermath of the Norwegian terror attacks of 22 July 2011, the question of agency with regard to the convicted perpetrator, Anders Behring Breivik, has frequently been discussed. Did he really act on his own? Were his actions self-directed? Was he, as a typical ‘lone wolf’, inspired by the prevalent far- right concept of ‘leaderless resistance’ or, simply, a blind tool, a string puppet pushed and pulled by dark forces, as some commentators have claimed? His cut- and-paste manifesto points to inspiration from ideas circulating in the European Counter Jihad Movement (ECJM), in itself a contradictory mix of ideological positions. A number of these ideas were given new life when the so-called ‘populist right-wing movement of indignation’, the Patriotische Europäer Gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes (PEGIDA) took to the streets of Dresden in the autumn of 2014. The driving force behind PEGIDA, Lutz Bachmann, with a past as petty criminal and doorman, is an unlikely front man for one of the most successful political initiatives in post-unification Germany. Comparing Breivik and PEGIDA, Önnerfors argues that the ECJM is part of the ‘third generation’ of right-wing discourse that is without a consistent world view, dominant leaders and prolific ideologues. Instead, in a new atmosphere of ‘politics of passion’ and ‘post-politics’, fuzzy ECJM ideology turns into a screen upon which diffuse uneasiness with current political affairs can be projected and channelled. Outside the scope of Önnerfors’s article but worth noting is the considerable impact these developments have had on electoral support for right-wing populist parties such as the Front National in France, the Alternative für Deutschland in Germany and the Sverigedemokraterna in Sweden.

Der Rechtspopulismus und sein Umschlagen in rechtsterroristisches Gewalthandeln – organisiert wie bei der NSU oder individuell wie bei den »Einsamen Wölfen« Anders Behring Breivik und Frank S. – lassen sich nur dann wirksam bekämpfen, wenn man an seiner Wurzel ansetzt: der subjektiven Ohnmacht. Wer Rechtsextremismus nachhaltig bekämpfen will, muss für reale Gegenmachterfahrungen bei den »kleinen Männern (und seltener Frauen)« sorgen – für die Erfahrung, dass man nicht immer nur das Opfer der Geschichte sein muss, nicht immer nur Amboss ist, sondern auch Hammer sein kann. In diesem Sinne ist jeder Streik, der zu Lohnerhöhungen oder besseren Arbeitsbedingungen führt, jeder Massenprotest, der die Erhöhung von Hartz-IV-Sätzen oder die Abschaffung von Studiengebühren erzwingt (denn Geld ist, wie die Bankenrettungen gezeigt haben, immer genug da), antifaschistisch. Ja, eigentlich ist nur das auch ein wirklich nachhaltiger, nicht-hilfloser Antifaschismus, der dem ohnmächtigen Antifaschismus der Eliteneinen gegenmächtigen Antifaschismus der Massen entgegenstellt. Es wäre fatal, keinen klaren Unterschied zu sehen zwischen dem eigenen linken und sozial(istisch)en Antifaschismus der Gegenmacht einerseits und andererseits dem ohnmächtigen Antifaschismus der Eliten, die erst die Rente oder Stütze kürzen und für prekäre Beschäftigungsverhältnisse sorgen (welche dann die Ohnmacht und die Angst vor sozialem Abstieg als wichtigste Triebkräfte der extremen Rechten in der Mitte der Gesellschaft verankern) und die dann den Zeigefinger moralisch erheben, wenn die subjektiv Ohnmächtigen in ihrer Wut über diese Ungerechtigkeit zu rechtem Gedankengut neigen – und zum Schluss aus ihrer subjektiven Ohnmacht heraus rechtsterroristisch handeln.

In meinen Arbeit werde ich über die Immigration sprechen, nähmlich die Fluchtmigration, und seine Auswirkungen auf die europäische Politikbühne. Die Flüchtlingskrise die im 2015 ausgebrochen ist, hat eine Perspektivänderung zu einige europäischen Politiker und Regierungschefs gebracht. Es hat zu eine Aufteilung der Meinungen gebracht und eine, meiner Meinung nach, Krise auch innerhalb des Europäischen Unions hergestellt. Folgend zu diese Meinungenaufteilung ist eine neue Ideoligieart entstanden: Der Populismus

This article provides an analysis of a public protest by the far-right group Pegida-Netherlands, where the participants attempted to demonstratively eat pork near a mosque in Eindhoven on 26 May 2019. This led to fierce responses: hundreds of young Muslim counter-protesters prevented the Pegida supporters from reaching the mosque, shouting insults at them and throwing stones at the police. Based on field notes from the event and a variety of other research material, this article shows how pork becomes a means of provocation in a larger entanglement between people and their perceived intentions, other objects, times and places. Furthermore, the author argues that the clash between protesters and counter-protesters can be seen as a theatrical performance set up by Pegida to share its worldview with a wide audience, and critically analyzes the role of pork in Pegida's attempt to 'reclaim Dutch territory' that has been 'lost to Islamization'. Last but not least, this article discusses how provocations bring about counter-provocations. As such, this article shows the value of a material approach to the study of conflicts, and critically evaluates Pegida-Netherlands' official stance of non-violence vis-à-vis the implications of its protest language.

En Allemagne, l’espace politique entre la droite parlementaire et l’extrême droite est peu structuré. Les limites entre chaque camp manquent de clarté et laissent la place au développement d’une zone intermédiaire où s’exprime un populisme rassemblant des personnalités venues de divers horizons (membres de partis politiques, d’associations, intellectuels). En effet, ces personnes font office de passeurs entre les deux pôles, et elles s’illustrent dans les médias en prenant position dans des débats politiques particuliers qu’elles animent par leur engagement volontiers polémique (souveraineté nationale, rejet de l’Europe, lutte contre l’immigration…).
Cet article analyse comment les médias utilisent le fonctionnement en réseau de la droite populiste pour surmonter les difficultés à définir les idées et les polémiques qui animent cet espace politique qui cherche à diffuser ses idées dans la société allemande et à les mettre à l’agenda politique des partis de gouvernement.

With a launch event in December, the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2020 was presented to a wide audience by the Institute of Economy and Peace. The Index has been one of the most important empirical studies that, for years, has contributed to the efforts, studies and analysis focusing on re-evaluating new developments in the field and reviewing existing anti-terrorism strategies. This review article will highlight the most crucial findings in the Global Terrorism Index, prepared by using the data provided by the University of Maryland Global Terrorism Data Set initiative (START), and it will discuss these findings and make some predictions about them.

The following paper will discuss whether Pegida participants can be accused of having extreme right-wing attitudes or, on the contrary, the movement should be acknowledged as a legitimate form of protest by ‘concerned citizens’. To answer this question, the paper will refer to data collected at demonstrations and to general population polls. It transpires, despite other claims (also formulated by experts on Pegida), that Pegida demonstrators indeed lean sharply to the extreme right of the political spectrum. This is indicated both by the party’s electoral preferences (after all, a vast majority of the protesters would vote for the AfD) and the worldview of Pegida’s supporters that indicates their proximity to the extreme right.

Vortrag im Rahmen des Forschungskolloqiums der Gesellschaft für psychoanalytische Sozialpsychologie am 08.10.2016 am Sigmund-Freud-Institut in Frankfurt am Main


Die Personen, die an Pegida Demonstrationen teilnehmen, können durch verschiedene quantitative Studien, trotz methodischer und forschungspraktischer Mängel und Schwierigkeiten, mit zwischen 75% - 81,9% der Teilnehmer*innen als männlich bestimmt werden (vgl. Keil 2015: 374). So gehe ich der Frage nach, warum Pegida gerade auf Männer so anziehend wirkt, so dass sich unter den Teilnehmer*innen ein derart deutlicher Männerüberschuss heraus bildet. Ich möchte am Beispiel eines biographisch-narrativen Interviews mit einem Pegida-Aktivisten zeigen, dass eine anti-feministische Haltung in der Diskussion um Pegida ein weitaus unterschätzter ideologischer Kitt eines völkischen Nationalismus ist. Vor dem Hintergrund einer in Sozialisationserfahrungen eingeübten »hegemonialen Männlichkeit« (vgl. Connell 2006), können bestimmte biographische Einschnitte bei Männern (Trennung, Arbeitsplatzverlust, ausgebliebene Karriere, Prekariat, etc.) mit öffentlichen Gleichstellungsdebatten und Feminismus politisiert als Angriff auf die Männlichkeit gedeutet werden und als narzisstische Kränkung empfunden werden. Aus dem daraus konstruierten Opfer-Narrativ kann sich eine „paranoid getönte Abwehr-Kampf-Haltung […] als Reaktion auf narzisstische Kränkungen und Krisen“ (vgl. Pohl 2004: 293) entwickeln, um die als „beschädigt“ empfundene Männlichkeit zu reparieren. Aus einer Einheit von Symptom und Sprachschablone (vgl. Lorenzer 1981: 119) vollzieht sich ein Politisierung, in dem die Ideologie an der Sprachschablone des persönlichen Konflikts ansetzt, so dass dieser reaktionär umgedeutet wird. Eine persönliche Stabilisierung wird in diesem Zuge nur über die Partizipation an einer Kollektivierung und Massenbildung erreicht (Schiefheilung). Ideologisch können hier, als Teil eines völkisch-nationalistischen Weltbildes, Bezüge auf das Deutsche Reich hergestellt werden, wie ich am Beispiel des Interviews zeigen möchte, die vorgeben, dass dies ein Zeit war, in der die Geschlechterordnung noch nicht aus den Fugen geraten war. Im Zuge dieser Logik wird dann der NS als eine notwendige Reaktion auf die „Wirren“ der 20er und frühen 30er Jahre erzählt, der die vorherige Ordnung wieder herstellen musste. Methodisch greifen ich dabei insbesondere auf die Tiefenhermeneutik als Methode der psychoanalytischen Sozialforschung zurück. Hier kann zentral der Frage nachgegangen werden, was wie warum erinnert und nicht erinnert wird, abgespalten, marginalisiert, verdrängt oder unbewusste gemacht wird, sowohl auf individueller als auch auf kollektiver Ebene (vgl. Klein 2008: 57). Dabei kann vor allem die unbewusst-affektive Dimension herausgearbeitet werden, so dass wie im Fall hier, die eigene Männlichkeit als „narzisstisch gekränkt“ erlebt wird und es zu einer Verschränkung mit einer antifeministischen und völkisch-nationalistischen Ideologie kommt.

Literatur- und Quellenangabe:
Connel, R. W. (2006): Der gemachte Mann. Konstruktionen und Krise von Männlichkeit, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 3. Auflage
Keil, D. (2015): Erweiterung des Resonanzraums. Pegida, die Aktualisierung des Völkischen und die Neuordnung des Konservatismus. In: Prokla, 45. Jg (3), S. 371 – 385
Klein, R. (2008): Kultur erinnernd verstehen – Versuche einer reflexiven Begegnung zwischen Cultural Studies, Biographieforschung und Psychoanalyse. In.: Dörr, M. et al. (Hg.): Erinnerung – Reflexion – Geschichte. Erinnerung aus psychoanalytischer und biographietheoretischer Perspektive, Wiesbaden, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, S. 49 - 64
Lorenzer, A. (1981): Das Konzil der Buchhalter - Die Zerstörung der Sinnlichkeit. Eine Religionskritik, Frankfurt am Main, Fischer Verlag
Pohl, R (2004): Feindbild Frau. Männliche Sexualität, Gewalt und die Abwehr des Weiblichen, Hannover, Offizin Verlag

They fear to be left-behind, to get extinct or to be played and deceived by the powerful. Within Europe and especially in German-speaking countries the formation of new movements that not only declare war on incoming refugees and migrants, but also on mainstream media and politicians in power, can be witnessed since the end of 2014. Terrorist attacks additionally fuel the perception of many that things have already gotten terribly out of hand. Even though Pegida  might be seen as a local phenomenon that is only really visible in Saxony/Germany, similar sentiments are widely held in European societies.

The following paper seeks to investigate what constitutes the identity of PEGIDA, other far right movements and its members. Which narratives are used by them? Who is the 'Other'? What are some useful mechanisms to counter these narratives?