Relief Work

Carlisle in northwest England suffered its worse floods for more than 180 years in 2005. A study, reported here, was undertaken to assess the health and social impacts of these floods via in-depth, taped individual and focus-group interviews with people whose homes had been flooded and with agency workers who helped them. Respondents spoke of physical health ailments, psychological stress, water health-and-safety issues related to the floods, and disputes with insurance and construction companies, which they felt had caused and exacerbated psychological health problems. Support workers also suffered from psychological stress. Furthermore, it was found that people had low expectations of a flood and were not prepared. The findings are presented in five sections covering flood risk awareness, water contamination issues, physical health, mental health, and impact on frontline support workers. The discussion focuses on the implications of the findings for policy and practice vis-à-vis psychological health provision, contamination issues, training and support for frontline support workers, matters relating to restoration, and preparation for flooding.

This article discusses the influence of management theory, some principles of leadership, four strategic management considerations, that are applied to emergency management, allow emergency managers to transform their followers, organizations, and communities at large. The authors argue that in the past there has been little recognition of the value, or application, of these three areas of emphasis in the disaster profession. Using more of these principles, emergency managers may transform into transformational change agents who make a difference in their followers' lives, who themselves transform other people and improve emergency management.

In the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan, the World Health Organization (WHO) Representative Office in the Philippines had no social media presence to share timely, relevant public health information. Risk communication is essential to emergency management for public health message dissemination. As social media sites, such as Facebook, are popular in the Philippines, these were adopted for risk communication during the response to Haiyan. The WHO Representative Office in the Philippines established Facebook, Twitter and Instagram accounts. Thirty days after these social medial channels were established, a gradual increase in followers was observed. Facebook saw the largest increase in followers which occurred as posted content gradually evolved from general public health information to more pro-active public health intervention and preparedness messaging. This included information on key health interventions encouraging followers to adopt protective behaviours to mitigate public health t...

It is unclear how international donors' stated commitment to ownership and partnership ‘translates’ in fragile state or ‘post-conflict’ settings. The very notion of ownership is violently contested in Afghanistan and donors have to negotiate with, and choose between, multiple state and non-state interlocutors. The developmentalist principles outlined in the 2005 Paris Declaration may carry little meaning in such contexts and their application can have paradoxical effects that impede the emergence of broad-based ownership. The limitations of, and alternatives to, developmentalist approaches in fragile states, are explored here with reference to donor policies and practices in Afghanistan, focusing on the period following the 2001 Bonn Agreement. This paper examines how aid policies and programmes have become part of a complex bargaining game involving international actors, domestic elites, and societal groups. It argues that international donors' failure to appreciate or engage sensitively and strategically with these bargaining processes, when combined with contradictory intervention objectives, has contributed to the steady unravelling of a fragile war-to-peace transition in Afghanistan.

Considerable progress has been made in volcanic disaster mitigation in the Philippines during the last four decades, since the devastating Hibok-Hibok eruption in 1951 and the establishment of the Commission on Volcanology (COMVOL), the forerunner of the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS) in 1952. The management of the Pinatubo Volcano eruption crisis of 1991-92 marks the highest point in the development of volcanic disaster mitigation in the country. State-of-the-art volcano monitoring techniques and instruments were applied; the eruption was accurately predicted; hazards zonation maps were prepared and disseminated a month before the violent explosions; an alert and warning system was designed and implemented; and the disaster response machinery was mobilized on time. The unprecedented magnitude and lingering nature of the hazards, however, and their widespread, long-term impacts have sorely tested the capability of the country's volcanic disaster mitigation systems. In particular, the lahar threat has triggered controversies and put decision makers in a dilemma of choosing between adaptive versus confrontational/control approaches. At least three strategies have been articulated and adopted in varying degrees and forms: (1) the establishment of a lahar monitoring-warning-evacuation system to deal with the lahar problem on an emergency basis; (2) relocation of settlements from the hazard zones; and (3) installation of engineering countermeasures to control/divert the lahar flows and protect settlements. A combination of the three appears to be the best, but the most effective and least costly mix remains to be determined.

NGOs appear to be well placed to play a significant role in natural disaster mitigation and preparedness (DMP), working, as they do, with poorer and marginalised groups in society. However, there is little information on the scale or nature of NGO DMP activities. This paper reports the findings of a study seeking to address that gap. It confirms that NGOs are involved in a diverse range of DMP activities but that a number of them are not labelled as such. Moreover, evidence of the demonstrable quality and benefits of DMP involvement is poor. The paper concludes that a number of problems need to be overcome before DMP can be satisfactorily mainstreamed into NGO development and post-disaster rehabilitation programmes. However, there are some early indications of momentum for change.

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, a rapid succession of plans put forward a host of recovery options for the Upper and Lower Ninth Ward in New Orleans. Much of the debate focused on catastrophic damage to residential structures and discussions of the capacity of low-income residents to repair their neighbourhoods. This article examines impediments to the current recovery process of the Upper and Lower Ninth Ward, reporting results of an October 2006 survey of 3,211 plots for structural damage, flood damage and post-storm recovery. By examining recovery one year after Hurricane Katrina, and by doing so in the light of flood and structural damage, it is possible to identify impediments to recovery that may disproportionately affect these neighbourhoods. This paper concludes with a discussion of how pre- and post-disaster inequalities have slowed recovery in the Lower Ninth Ward and of the implications this has for post-disaster recovery planning there and elsewhere.