Venture Capital and Private Equity

ABSTRACT: Prospective private equity managers
have not historically targeted Non-professional
retail investors. On the contrary, the former
have focused their fundraising or private placement
efforts on institutional investors. This article
analyzes the rationale behind the preceding
exclusion, pointing out the legal and practical
barriers that have kept the private equity asset
class away from the retail investor market, while
assessing the motivations for private equity
managers to increasingly approach retail investors.
The article also highlights the alternatives
that investors have at their disposal to access
such a singular asset class, whose relevance in
the current international financial environment is
undisputed.

This is a republish of the NASSCOM Emerge blog: A Macro economy view point by Shrikrishna Prakash, Saravu prior to September 2008 market collapse & USD 700B bailout. It has played out.

Scenario
Around 80% of foreign exchange/trade transactions is denominated in US dollars(USD) and a majority of these in crude oil import export. Crude being a lever to control USD flow (back to US), its rise impacts balance of payment for net crude oil importers, inflation and increase in cost of capital for business. Hence stocks discovering its prices to the re-adjusted EPS. In December 2007 realized time was not far off for business to chase funds and Private Equity (PE) and not the other way round.

Wall Street Outcomes
The heady day’s perceived profits in instruments, are now ill-liquid assets. To improve liquidity, earlier banks sought petro USD’s, some consolidated within Wall Street and others are filing for bankruptcy. About USD 450 billion of illiquid assets from various banks crept into Freddie Mac & Fannie Mae. Freddie & Fannie had to be bailed out by the US Federal Reserve(Fed). Fed released more than USD 250 billion in emergency funding. Fed has to clean up its balance sheet. New laws are being enacted giving treasury powers to create market for ill-liquid assets, buy and sell assets to tune of USD 700 billion.

OTC USD derivatives as an enabler ?
Most of USD’s are derivative positions and are traded on secretive OTC. As one of the steps to arrest the USD decline, central banks led by Fed in a synchronized manner went long on USD to the point of triggering short covering and shoring up USD. Central banks long positions were/are in the money. Globally, institutional investors who went long USD post the short squeeze upsurge, will feel the long squeeze when the intervention impact reduces and USD starts depreciating. This will make them square off and take on losses. (Read from central banks, as the coordinated entities would have booked profits at USD highs and positioned to buy at lower levels).

USA’s borrowings are denominated in home currency and the above process will assist in shoring up current assets in Fed’s balance sheet helping even out the ill-liquid assets. The reduction in OTC leveraged USD and a better Fed balance sheet enables printing USD in large quantity, controlling inflationary pressures- strategic in the world order. The consumption story will continue.

Possibilities
As the effect of coordinated intervention reduces, the USD is expected to weaken. If countries consume more USD’s, it will help ease the equation, else crude will continue to remain as a lever.

If Fed’s balance sheet gets cleaned up with no great inflationary effect, USD could get stronger. However to reach that state, the implementation of new monetary framework will have the affect of a “Manthan”, a sanskrit word for churning of the ocean to obtain nectar, when consumed attains immortality.

India over the next 18–24 months is expected to reduce crude import to an extent of 40%, a result of increasing production from KG-D6 block. On this materializing, equivalent USD’s will find its way back, assuming India’s orders for importing nuclear reactors & ancillaries will not off-set the reduction. Industrialist Mr. Godrej believes India has the potential to be a net exporter aswell. All these means the RBI may build USD reserves helping maintain USD 80–20 balance. The rupee’s (INR) movement depends on above equation, ECB, FII money flows and the existing flow dynamics.

Closing Comments
USA on its part will manoeuvre back to maintain world order and invent new “alpha seeking opportunities”. “Manthan’s” impact on India, its domestic story in healthcare, materials, industrial’s, infrastructure, financial services and software product space will be keenly watched.

Disclaimer: Views expressed here are personal.

C-suite executives are regularly dismissed in case of Private Equity1 (PE) investors taking over
companies. Especially Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and, even more, Chief Financial
Officers (CFOs): up to 4 out of 5 will have to leave shortly after the buy-out (Deloitte 2014 &
2019; Leopard, Jain & Bhatia, 2018). Such often abrupt changes can lead to Enterprise Value
(EV)2 destruction, as much as 0.5 to 1 times EBITDA3 according to market specialists
interviewed.
Little research is available on the role of the CFOs, their personal experience and why they are
dismissed so often in this PE-setting.
The present thesis suggests that there is a lot more going on than “just” technical inability to
the PE context - which however is still the most spontaneously cited reason for dismissals after
ownership change, especially by PE sponsors.
Such dismissals are not an independent phenomenon, but seem to be the consequence of a
deeper-rooted, systemic issue about the balance in the relationship between the CFO, the CEO
and the PE fund (the “System”) - the CFO being the pivotal balancing agent.
Using Organizational Role Analysis (ORA, Borwick, 2006), work-groups and valencies (Bion,
1961), three categories of CFOs in the PE-setting are identified and assumptions are being made
that a high awareness about their personal valencies and a clear distinction between the person,
the role and the System will help the CFOs to become true Leading Balancing Officers.

This article presents a review and discussion of Tim Ancev’s article titled ‘Equity crowdfunding in Australia: a regulatory balancing act’ (2015) 33 Company and Securities Law Journal 352. The article discusses the emerging issues surrounding equity crowdfunding and the manner in which technology is presenting new challenges for regulators. Ancev’s article provides a good overview of the topic and recommends an experimental path forward through this uncertain future.

"The present article discusses the new regulation on the regime of delegation of the functions of management companies of closed-end type collective investment entities (SGEICs) under LAW 22/2014. The article analyzes the obligations that SGEICs and the delegated, or sub-delegated, entities must comply with, and reflects on the impact of this new regulation on players in this sector.

Key words: Venture capital, private equity, growth capital, seed capital, SGEICs."

The following report was compiled for two reasons. The first, to define and explore the mechanics of hyperlocal start-up investing. The second, to analyze the start-up community of Greater Lafayette while attempting to make an investment case, under the hyperlocal model, for this community.

In the following sections of the introduction, the report discusses in greater detail, the theory behind hyperlocal start-up investing, how it can work in practice, and the appeal of Greater Lafayette as a local market for hyperlocal investment. Following the introduction, the second section of the report breaks down the local market, provides demographic and economic data, resource analysis, and insight on the start-ups currently in the market. The third section of this report will make an investment case for the local market of Greater Lafayette. The investment model focuses specifically on Purdue University related start-ups and intellectual property (“IP”) as this appears to be the most robust source of start-up activity in the local market.

The research conducted by Gold Sail in the production of this report takes an in-depth look at the start-up community in Greater Lafayette, and the companies that make it up. It became clear early on that there are several factors, both intrinsic and manufactured, about the community that make it a strong candidate for the hyperlocal method. Once this model is laid over the framework created by the existing qualities of the community, Gold Sail found it relatively straightforward to make a strong case for why this start-up community in particular would make for a good place to attempt this methodology.

This study aims to analyze what criteria are used by Venture Capital (VC) firms to value Indonesian tech startups as high-flyer investments. We define high-flyer investment here as start-ups projected to generate return five times or more than its initial investment. We evaluated what criteria are considered more important than the others by VC's. Research carried out on variables that considered as main aspects evaluated by VC firms are: company, product, and market factors. We used mixed qualitative and quantitative primary data collected through questionnaires for quantitative data and interviews for qualitative data. Logistic regression results revealed that companies with product performance passed the minimum viable product (MVP) phase have a significant chance to value as high-flyer investment compared to those who offer products or services that are not market-proven yet. Sequential qualitative interview findings indicate VC preferences for companies that are fast followers over the pioneers and also suggest that the founder, or human-related aspect, is a critical factor in investment decisions made by VCs.

Accelerators are becoming an increasingly popular option for entrepreneurs looking to finance their startup and benefit from the accelerator network. Research suggests that accelerators allow entrepreneurs the opportunity to resolve uncertainty surrounding their companies earlier to make better financing decisions. What has yet to be researched in depth is the effect that accelerators have on the success of startups in comparison to other financing channels. Building on a previous paper, I will try to discover if firms that just missed being accepted into an accelerator perform better than firms that were accepted. I will gather data on startups that were rejected from Y Combinator to see if accelerator participation affects metrics like funding choices and probability of closure.

Porteur d’innovation et de croissance et véritable outil de transmission ou d’acquisition d’entreprises, le LBO permet de renforcer la compétitivité de celles-ci et d’accélérer le développement des PME. Parallèlement à cet optimisme, un certain pessimisme vient tempérer cette approche idéaliste car, pour certains, il constitue une technique de financement risquée, une forme d’enrichissement indu. Dans cette optique, le législateur s’est évertué à dresser des garde-fous contre le LBO notamment en adoptant des dispositions juridico-fiscales contraignantes visant à pénaliser ces opérations et décourager les investisseurs à se lancer dans cette aventure périlleuse. Dès lors, ce travail traite de l’intérêt qu’il existe de réaliser cette opération et des avantages qui peuvent en être tirés mais se fixe également comme objectif de jeter une lumière crue sur les déficiences et les limites de ce montage.

A special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) is a company with no commercial operations that is formed strictly to raise capital through an initial public offering (IPO) for the purpose of acquiring an existing company. Also known as "blank check companies," SPACs have been around for decades. In recent years, they've become more popular, attracting big-name underwriters and investors and raising a record amount of IPO money in 2019. In 2020, as of the beginning of August, more than 50 SPACs have been formed in the U.S. which have raised some $21.5 billion (Investopedia).

The book systematizes the thereotical aspects of the process of venture capital financing, indetifying the operational conditions for venture investments and main push - pull factors in micro and macroeconomic terms. The analysis indentifies main dettering factors facing venture capital financing in the EU and has approbated empirically a framework of factors for the development of the venture capital ecosystem in Bulgaria and its influence on financing of innovative startups in Bulgaria and the potential for boosting the lagging capital market in the country

Praca prezentuje kompleksowo pozycję inwestycji typu venture capital i private equity w polskim porządku prawnym opisując ich najistotniejsze prawne aspekty, tj. formy prawne funduszy, podstawę prawną działania, kwestie podatkowe, miejsce rejestracji funduszy, dokumenty transakcyjne oraz specyficzne klauzule umowne, bazując na gruncie prawnym przede wszystkim na ustawie z dnia 27 maja 2004 r. o funduszach inwestycyjnych i zarządzaniu alternatywnymi funduszami inwestycyjnymi, ustawie z dnia 15 września 2000 r. Kodeks spółek handlowych oraz Dyrektywie Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady 2011/61/UE z dnia 8 czerwca 2011 r. w sprawie zarządzających alternatywnymi funduszami inwestycyjnymi i zmiany dyrektyw 2003/41/WE i 2009/65/WE oraz rozporządzeń (WE) nr 1060/2009 i (UE) nr 1095/2010 (Dyrektywa ZAFI). Została przedstawiona także historia oraz rynek venture capital i private equity w Polsce, alternatywne sposoby finansowania rozwoju przedsiębiorstwa oraz pojęcie, charakterystyka i przebieg tego typu inwestycji od strony biznesowej. Pracę podsumowuje opis barier i uwarunkowań prawnych niesprzyjających venture capital i private equity w Polsce oraz wnioski de lege ferenda.

Praca nagrodzona nagrodą specjalną w XXIV edycji konkursu Wolters Kluwer Polska i Przeglądu Prawa Handlowego na najlepsze prace magisterskie z prawa handlowego – udziałem w Columbia Summer Program in American Law ufundowanym przez kancelarię Rymarz Zdort.

www.wolterskluwer.com/pl-pl/news/rozstrzygniecie-xxiv-edycji-konkursu-pph
www.prawo.pl/student/nagrodzone-prace-magisterskie-o-prawie-handlowym,515807.html
www.wpia.uw.edu.pl/pl/aktualnosci/4-absolwentow-wpia-uw-wsrod-zwyciezcow-xxiv-edycji-konkursu-miesiecznika-przeglad-prawa-handlowego

This chapter considers the relationship between the U.S. federal income tax system and innovation, using the sharing economy as a focal point for analysis. It makes two main points. First, the tax system is currently a questionable tool for encouraging innovation. Regulators are understandably concerned that taxpayers will use tax incentive provisions in unanticipated ways, and thus are inclined to tightly limit such provisions’ scope. This reduces incentive provisions’ net benefit to taxpayers, and can even cause such provisions to miss their marks entirely. Moreover, small and new companies are key drivers of innovation, and evidence suggests that they are relatively unresponsive to tax incentives.

Second, innovation can help improve the tax system. To fix a problem, one must first identify it; innovation provides opportunities to see where tax law is achieving its goals and where it is falling short. The sharing economy experience suggests some strengths, such as the tax system’s definition of income, as well as weaknesses, such as the dividing line between independent contractors and employees.

Диссертация является комплексным исследованием правового регулирования венчурного инвестирования. В работе анализируется место венчурного инвестирования в системе правового регулирования инновационной и инвестиционной деятельности; статус участников венчурного инвестирования и формы осуществления соответствующей деятельности, а также правовые средства венчурных сделок. Изучены особенности, формы и средства правового регулирования венчурного инвестирования в России. Актуальность темы связана как с недостатками действующего законодательства, так и с фрагментарностью и недостаточностью теоретических разработок в правовой доктрине. По результатам проведенного исследования автором обоснован ряд предложений по совершенствованию законодательства в рамках частноправового регулирования венчурного инвестирования.

Despite the scientific evidence on the positive effect of venture capital (VC) on portfolio firm performance, such evidence badly pulls up alongside the non-negligible number of entrepreneurial firms that receive an offer by a VC fund and choose to refuse it. We investigate the microeconomic determinants behind the missed realizations of VC investor-investee dyads by focusing on the Italian VC market, that represents an ideal test bed for our identification strategy. We investigate firm characteristics that lead entrepreneurs to refuse VC, which motivations are behind this choice and which is the impact on firm growth.

A wide range of definitions exists of what constitutes value creation and -generation in private equity buyouts. At the core of the problem is that our understanding of the diverse set of levers, drivers and mechanisms by which financial value is generated has been inconsistent and incomplete. This paper attempts to address extant deficiencies in the literature by proposing a novel and cohesive conceptual model of value generation that connects various strands of research in the field.

Tyler Tysdal is an expert when it comes to matters of investment and he has spent his entire career working in a number of roles within this industry. From fund manager to investor, Tyler knows his way around his world very well and that is why we are very lucky that he has made the time to speak with us to answer the investment queries which you have been sending us. Today we are going to focus on venture capital and private equity, two very similar investment vehicles but two strategies which also differ greatly from one another, and here is how.

Key Differences
Whilst both of these investment strategies involve a pooled fund which invests in a business, the details around each of them do differ a lot. The key difference between the two methods is that venture capital will look to invest in a young business such as a start up, and private equity is about investing in a business which is well established.

Investment Stage
As you can imagine the stage of investment between these two strategies is the key difference and in the case of venture capital this investment will be made very early on in the life of a business. The idea behind venture capital is that an investment group will look to significantly invest in this company and use their experience of business to impact opportunities for the young company. In the case of private equity this investment will usually come when a business is seeking additional funds or if it is struggling. In such a situation a private equity group will invest heavily and seek to place a member on the board, selling back the investment once the company is on a better footing.

Industries
Another key difference between these two investment vehicles is the type of industry which they will look to invest in. For venture capital funds they will seek out young businesses which are operating in rapidly growing industries such as tech, pharma or energy. For private equity funds they will invest in any industry as long as the investment makes sense financially.

Level of Ownership
When venture capital funds put their money into young businesses they will aim to try and get a large stake in return, often up to 49% which allows the owners to stay on as majority shareholders. In the case of private equity they will look for a far more sizable stake as well as expect a board position. This will usually have clauses within the contract which indicate a temporary arrangement.

The risk levels of these two strategies also differs greatly, in the case of venture capital there is of course a much higher risk to the investment given that the young business has not yet managed to prove itself.

As you can see there are clear similarities between these two investment vehicles, but the details separate them and this is where the differences lie.

https://www.linkedin.com/in/tyler-tysdal

The hypothesis addressed by the dissertation states that value creation in private equity transactions is observable. This statement is supported by adduction of four empirical cases: management buyout of Dell Computers Corporation in US, buyouts of Moncler and Serbia Broadband in Europe, and a leveraged buyout of Infastech in Singapore. By describing the factors and phenomena specific to each of its stages, it successfully defends the initial hypothesis of presence of positive value creation in appointed private equity investments. Positive alpha return generated by PE investments in all analyzed geographies sustains the hypothesis in macro level.

The principal management theoretical lenses for examining leveraged buyouts have been the agency theory and information asymmetries. Occasionally a wider number of theories and concepts have been invoked, such as the parenting advantage, the resource-based view, and the market for corporate control. This paper reviews the fundamental literature connected with the theories and examines the applicability to the leveraged buyouts carried out by private equity firms.

Tyler Tysdal details the 3 different types of private equity funds. Venture Capital

Venture capital falls under the umbrella of private equity but it is usually discussed as being a separate form of investment. VC funds look to buy low stakes in new businesses such as a start-up and then seek to use financial backing and experience to impact opportunities and help the business to reach its goals. Usually, the state of investment will be early and the business types will be those that are in rapid growth industries. This is a relatively high-risk strategy with a simple goal, invest, grow and then sell the valuable stake and share profits amongst investors.

Leveraged Buyouts

This is the most common private equity vehicle which you are likely to see and leveraged buyouts are seen as a lower risk strategy. PE funds will look to take full control of a struggling company, using the pool of funds which it has along with borrowed money. Once they have control they will look to strip assets, restructure the management team, streamline the employee structure and find ways and opportunities that it can use to increase the value of the business. Once this is completed and the value rises, the PE fund will then look to sell the business in its entirety, repay any money which has been borrowed and then share out the profits amongst its investors. There is no restriction on which types of industries these funds will invest in, as long as the due diligence suggests that the business is worthwhile and can be turned around quickly.

Growth Equity

Growth equity sits somewhere between later-stage venture capital investment and leveraged buyout, and it involves a fund offering financial support for a business, which is looking for growth, for a sizable but not controlling stake in the business. This growth may be organic or it could be done using mergers and acquisitions. The growth equity fund will look at this as a short term investment and once growth is achieved it will sell off the stake and spread the profits amongst its investors.

https://twitter.com/TysdalTyler/
https://www.linkedin.com/in/tyler-tysdal

There has been an increased public awareness for entrepreneurship and the context that encompasses it, notably venture capital investment operations. Portuguese law underwent a considerable revision in this matter in 2015 (Law n.º 16/2015 and Law n.º 18/2015), imposed by the last EU legislation (Directive 2011/61/EU and Regulation n.º 345/2013). Since future prospects for venture capital in Portugal appear to be extremely favorable, we believe it is important not only to encourage local investors, but also to reassure and attract foreign investors to this scene. The primary purpose of this article is to elucidate the country's main rules concerning venture capital investment entities and their operation. We list these investment entities, describe their characteristics, and organize the essential documentation and structural requirements that such entities must observe in order to begin their activities.

This report is a follow-up study building on the previous Kukula Capital baseline study which was prepared in September 2019 for the Zambian National Advisory Board for Impact Investment (NABII).
This report addresses and analyses both the Private Asset Impact Funds (PAIFs), that is non-Development Finance Institutions (non-DFIs) self-identifying as impact investors albeit not necessarily in full accordance with the official definition of impact investment, and the DFIs.
❖ Study coverage: The study compiles data on 23 asset managers of which the headquarters of 4 are located in Zambia and the rest are located in 12 other countries. In terms of assets under management (AUM), the study survey covers 5 DFIs and another 18 non-DFIs which all
together are deploying capital into (impact) enterprises across the following 7 impact sectors: Financial Services; Renewable Energy; Real Estate; Agriculture; Food and Agro-Processing; Waste Management and Tourism.
❖ Market size: The study aggregates a total of USD 85.17 Mn of assets into 28 impact enterprises, which were split between DFIs: $47.17 Mn in AUM; Private Equity: $36.17 Mn in AUM; High Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs): $1.40 Mn in AUM and Crowdfunding: $0.43 Mn in AUM.
❖ When looking exclusively at DFIs’ 13 Impact Deals Flow into projects in the period 2019-2020 the total amount $706 Mn in AUM is invested by 8 different Multilateral and Bilateral DFIs.
The study brings the most comprehensive data set to date on this investment fund universe focusing on Zambia exclusively during the period 2019-2020 by providing a clear picture state of the size of the
impact investment market in Zambia. The study does this by:
i. Mapping all known 23 impact investors including by highlighting which Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) they all focus on and investment products they use;
ii. Estimating the Market size (i.e., the total value of impact investments) including highlighting the methodology used and assumptions made;
iii. Identifying existing and potential trends in the Zambian impact investing market and showing developments from the baseline period 2015-2018 to the follow-up up period from 2019-2020;
iv. Investigating the fund management landscape in Zambia and describing the impact measurement and management tools which these impact investors are using;
v. Identifying AUM by sector, instrument and organisation type;
vi. Investigating the investment performance and the risks of various instruments;
vii. Mapping the (impact) enterprises who received impact capital from both the 18 non-DFIs and 5 DFIs, and counting the actual number of transactions from 2019-2020;
viii. Finally, by identifying some of the major challenges the impact investors are confronted with and proposing what could be done to ensure that the opportunities associated with growing of the impact investment market size in Zambia eventually materialize within the newly Elected Zambian Government’s forthcoming 8th National Development Plan (2022-2026).

The article draws on land and green grabbing debate to critically interrogate the failure of eight Italian investments in agrofuel production in Senegal. It focuses on the characteristics of the Italian investors who were drawn to agro-energy production and of the incentives structures that motivated them. Once on site, multiple management problems and conflicts with the local population arose. The article argues that this is not solely attributable to a lack of responsibility, bad governance and ethics of individual firms: green economy and its speculative arrangements must also be considered.

The aim of this paper is to deepen our understanding of the investment valuation process followed by venture capitalists (VCs) at the European level. Its contribution is twofold. First, we shed light on the manner in which VCs estimate the investee companys value and operationalize the main variables involved in the practical application of the well-known discounted cash flow method. Second, we study whether the different degree of use of valuation methods across European countries may be explained by differences in institutional characteristics related to the underlying legal regime (i.e, English vs German vs French-based legal traditions). Using both univariate and multivariate analysis for a sample of 99 responses obtained from a survey addressed to VCs from the UK, France, Germany and Italy, we find that both legal systems and characteristics of VCs (i.e., experience, preferred investment stage, and main source of funds) do influence in the valuation methods used.

La plupart des travaux qui étudient la dimension cognitive de la gouvernance des entreprises financées par Capital Investissement (CI), essentiellement de nature quantitative, se focalisent sur l’aide à la stratégie et à la gestion des investisseurs mais ignorent les limites de la collaboration productive, liées notamment à la possibilité de conflits cognitifs. Au travers d’une démarche empirique originale d’étude qualitative de onze cas, cet article s’interroge sur ces limites, analyse les sources et les manifestations des conflits cognitifs ainsi que leurs conséquences sur la collaboration productive. Il étudie également les mécanismes de résolution de ces conflits.

Most of the studies about the cognitive governance of firms financed by Venture Capital are quantitative and focussed on the influence of VCs on firms’ strategy and management. But few studies deal with the limits of productive collaboration and cognitive conflicts between Venture Capitalist and CEO. On the basis of original empirical qualitative case studies, this research underlines those limits. It analyses the reasons why conflicts occur and shows their consequences on productive collaboration. This paper studies also the mechanisms which help to regulate conflicts.

Overcoming the various “valleys of death” in the commercialisation process is one of the complex problems faced when supporting entrepreneurship and innovation. The creation of a pipeline of investable opportunities is needed by investors to diversify investing risks. Using a systems engineering approach, an alternative solution is found in the Cooperative Venture Capital Model (CVCM) that balances entrepreneurial support and mitigates risks to overcome these challenges to commercialisation. The CVCM creates an innovation pipeline that’s validated by enterprise engineering principles.

"Kings Over Aces" is the best-selling guide on how to invest in startups with venture capital.  You get inside access to how venture capital investing and angel investing works, by expert investor Ross Blankenship (http://rossblankenship.com).  Kings Over Aces includes a review of the next billion dollar companies, how to take a startup to IPO, and what makes a failure vs. successful company.  Many of the principles of investing are taken from years of extensive research from the team at http://angelkings.com.

Ross Blankenship has invested and written extensively on the topics of cybersecurity, venture capital and ways to invest in newly diversified VC and private equity funds.

A propriedade desagregada dos recursos produtivos envolve direitos fragmentários e sobrepostos, temporários ou condicionais, titularizáveis por diversos perfis de agentes econômicos, como trabalhadores, investidores privados, bancos e agências públicas de desenvolvimento. Direitos reais e intelectuais compartilhados, empresas de participações, pirâmides e teias societárias, fundos de capital de risco para startups (venture capital e private equity) e parcerias público-privado-comunitárias (PPPCs) estão entre as ferramentas aptas à modelagem de regimes alternativos de propriedade empresarial. Esses arranjos jurídicos permitem concentrar ativos e descentralizar a economia de mercado, com potencial para a estruturação de uma democracia poliproprietária – capaz de difundir capacidades empreendedoras e de sustentar novos direitos fundamentais, que funcionem como equivalentes a dividendos universais. Disaggregated property and ownership of productive resources involves fragmented and overlapping, temporary and conditional rights that can be held by various profiles of economic agents, such as workers, private investors, banks, and public development agencies. Shared real and intellectual rights, holding companies, pyramids and corporate webs, venture capital and private equity funds for startups, and public-private-community partnerships (PPPCs) are among the tools suitable for modeling alternative business property regimes. These legal arrangements make it possible to concentrate assets and to decentralize the market economy, with potential for the structuring of a poly-owner democracy - capable of spreading entrepreneurial capacities and of sustaining new fundamental rights that function as the equivalent of universal dividends.

In Turkey, most university administrators and academic staff members are not yet fully aware of intellectual property rights (IPRs). Researchers often have difficulty in licensing opportunities that can provide additional revenue streams due to the lack of either strategic policies set by the administration or a dedicated technology transfer (or licensing) office (TTO). This paper attempts to shed some light
on the relationship between intellectual property rights and licensing awareness in Turkish universities as well as how this is affected by the lack of TTOs. Semi-structured exploratory interviews were conducted with 45 researchers in two different faculties (Medicine and Engineering). Results show that most of the participants, including a higher-than-expected percentage from the Faculty of Engineering,
were not aware of the importance of the technology that they had developed in terms of licensing and royalties that they could earn. In conclusion, it can be said that universities in Turkey have to undergo a policy change regarding managerial issues, especially with regards to Technology Transfer Offices. Increasing the visibility of technology transfer options and agreements, as well as further research on this topic, is recommended.

This article examines how private equity returns in Asia are related to levels of legal protection and corruption. We utilize a unique data set comprising over 750 returns to private equity transactions across 20 developing and developed countries in Asia. The data indicate that legal protections are an important determinant of private equity returns in Asia, but also that private equity managers are able to mitigate the potential for corruption. The quality of legal system (including legal protections) is positively related to returns. Inefficient legal protections negatively impact transaction structures and economic certainty when exiting investments. We also find that private equity managers, irrespective of the quality of legal system they are operating within, can mitigate the potential impact of corruption. Private equity returns are higher in countries with higher levels of corruption, controlling for legal systems. This finding is consistent with the view that private equity managers bring about organizational change to alleviate the costs of corruption. Our findings are robust to inclusion of controls for Hofstede cultural variables, economic conditions, and transaction specific characteristics, as well as consideration of econometric sample selection methods for unexited investments.

Hasta la fecha ningún autor se había interesado en estudiar la posible incidencia del régimen jurídico de los grupos de socie- dades en las operaciones de capital-riesgo. Siendo el objeto principal de la actividad de capital-riesgo la toma temporal de participaciones en empresas es común que las entidades de capital-riesgo acaben adquiriendo el control de una o varias so- ciedades. Interesará resolver los posibles problemas que pueda plantear esa relación de dependencia sobre todo para exami- nar si se podría producir una comunicación de responsabilidad de las sociedades filiales a la sociedad matriz a través de la aplicación de la doctrina del levantamiento del velo societario.