The Philosophy of Spinoza (Volume 1)

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA

VOLUME
I
LONDON HUMPHREY MILFORD

*.
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
THE PHILOSOPHY
OF SPINOZA
UNFOLDING THE LATENT PROCESSES OF HIS REASONING
BY
HARRY AUSTRYN WOLFSON

NATHAN LITTAUER PROFESSOR OF JEWISH LITERATURE AND PHILOSOPHY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY
VOLUME
CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

1934
COPYRIGHT, 1934
BY THE PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
PRINTED AT THE HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
CAMBRIDGE, MASS., U.S.A.
PREFACE
To THE
trained observer the simplest thing in nature has a structure and a history; to the naive mind the most com-
plicated product of human device appears simple and spontaneous. Imagine a primitive man, brought up in natural
surroundings and without ever having witnessed human art in its making. Placed sudde/ily.in one of the canyon-like
a primitive man would think of the flanking sky-soaring structures of undoubtedly
streets of a
modern metropolis, such
and workmanship as something which grew like trees and grass. Similarly, imagine a student of philosophy, trained in some miraculous manner
intricate design
out of the
soil
concepts and vocabulary of the without any inkling of their past history. Conpresent day, fronted suddenly with the Ethics of Spinoza, such a trained
in the usages of philosophic
student would undoubtedly think of
it
as
something which
sprang forth full-grown and completely armored, like Minerva, from the brain of its author, and he would quite
naturally try to interpret
tions
it
it in
evoked
in his
mind.
the light of whatever associaOf course, there is no such pre-
posterously trained student of philosophy, any more than there is such a naive-minded primitive man as he to whom
a student of Spinoza comes very near treating his Ethics in the fantastic fashion which we have described. Like the Bible, the Ethics of
still,
we have compared him. But,
many
Spinoza has often been the subject of homiletical interpretations. It has been treated like an amorphous mass of floating clouds in which one's fancy may cut whatever figures it
pleases.
vi
PREFACE
Now,
I will
not deny that we must allow for philosophic license as we allow for poetic license, and that the cutting of
When Goethe
imaginary figures in Spinoza's Ethics is not without its uses. confesses that he cannot tell what he got out of the Ethics and what he may himself have put into it, we
can only say that we are grateful to Spinoza for having served as a stimulus to the thought of Goethe. In the same way, and permany a worthy thought of men less distinguished
haps also
less
frank
than Goethe has had
its
birth in a mis-
interpretation of Spinoza or else has received due attention by its having been mounted, gratuitously, on Spinoza's writings.
But
is
it
would be carrying the analogy of the
license too
far if
we should say
to be as little
tion
that the philosopher in his interpretabound by the truth of scholarship as the
poet in his imagery
is
by the truth of science.
It is certainly
is
no compliment
to a philosopher of the past
who
prominent
study him to say that only by being misenough understood does he become philosophically important. Indeed, the entire field of the history of philosophy would be placed outside the bounds of exact disciplined study if we
for us to
should maintain that

tance only
its
study
is
of philosophical impor-
meaning
effort to
superciliously disregard its objective as established by research, or indolently make no

it,
when we
acquaint ourselves with

it.
selves in ignorance of
The
fact
is,
or blissfully keep ourwhat is often called
subjective interpretation in philosophy is nothing but the explanation of a text in terms of the haphazard knowledge
that one happens to possess, just as what is called popularization means nothing but the explanation of a text in terms
of the ignorance supposed to be possessed by the readers for whom it is intended. In either of these cases, whatever merit
the particular form of presentation possesses is derived from the fact that it helps to give currency to the results of historical
PREFACE
vii
scholarship, which in its proper sense means the interpretation of a text in terms of everything that can be known about
which a systematic search must be made. The first the basic step, in the understanding of any philosopher, step, one upon which any subjective form of interpretation or
it,
for
any
literary
form of presentation must
rest,
is
the deter-
mination by the method of historical criticism of what the philosopher meant by what he said, how he came to say what he said, and why he said it in the manner in which he
happened
to say
it.
It is this threefold task that
we have
set ourselves in the
really
it
present study of Spinoza. Now, the historico-critical method means the presupposition that in any text treated by
there
who
a sort of dual authorship an explicit author, himself in certain conventional symbols and expresses
is
patterns, and an implicit author, whose unuttered thoughts furnish us with the material for grasping the full significance of those symbols and patterns. In the case of the Ethics of
Spinoza, there
is,
on the one hand, an

It
is
explicit Spinoza,
who speaks in definiand propositions; it is he, too, who reasons tions, axioms, according to the rigid method of the geometer. Then there is, on the other hand, the implicit Spinoza, who lurks behind
shall call Benedictus.
whom we
he
and propositions, only occasionhimself in the scholia; his mind is crammed ally revealing with traditional philosophic lore and his thought turns along
these definitions, axioms,
shall call Baruch.
the beaten logical paths of mediaeval reasoning. Him we Benedictus is the first of the moderns; Baruch is the last of the mediaevals. It is our contention
that
unless
we cannot get the full meaning of what Benedictus says we know what has passed through the mind of Baruch.
Starting with the assumption that the Ethics is primarily a criticism of fundamental problems of philosophy as they
viii
PREFACE
we proceed
to analyze these
presented themselves to Spinoza,
problems, to set forth their salient features, to construct

hypothetically the arguments which constitute the criticism, and to show how these arguments and criticism underlie the
statements which we have before us in the Ethics.

result of this procedure, the Ethics
As a
emerges as a logically conis
structed
work throughout which there

propositions,
order and sequence

disconnected,
and
continuity:
apparently
group themselves into unified and coherent chapters; words, phrases, and passages, apparently meaningless or commonplace,
assume meaning and

in a
significance;
and the philosophy

all its
of Spinoza, as a systematic whole and in

detail,
fulness of
light setting and perappears Into the fabric of this work, which in form follows spective. the order of the Ethics we have also woven relevant passages
in a
',
new
and
new
from the other writings of Spinoza, so that the study of his philosophy herein presented is based upon his Ethics as well
as
upon
all
his other writings in so far as
they are related to
the Ethics.
This work can be read as a self-explanatory systematic presentation of the philosophy of Spinoza. It can be read
with greater profit as a companion volume to the Ethics and a running commentary on it. It can be read with still
greater profit together with some standard works or special studies on Spinoza, for, with the exception of general references to the literature on Spinoza whenever they were neces-
sary either for the bibliographical guidance of the reader or as an acknowledgment of indebtedness on certain points,
and with the further exception of an occasional expression of disagreement, we have refrained from entering upon an examination and comparison or criticism of the various extant
a subject which, if dealt with interpretations of Spinoza at all, is deserving of a study by itself. Independently of
PREFACE
ix
Spinoza, this work can be read as a study of the development of certain fundamental problems in the history of philosophy,
or of the understanding of certain points in the teachings of the authors brought into the discussion and of certain signifi-
cant texts in their writings. Students who are interested in the relation of Spinoza to other philosophers will find in
this
work an abundance of undreamed-of new material,
culled
from the writings of various philosophers ranging from Aristotle to Descartes, though we do not say that every author
whom we
useful or necessary to quote is to be considered a forerunner of Spinoza or as having had a domiit
have found
nant jnfluence upon

it
his philosophy. The principles on which the êlection of this material was made, the manner in which
was used in the interpretation of Spinoza, and the method by which its direct literary relationship to Spinoza and its influence upon him can be determined, are discussed in the
opening chapter. The analytical table of contents at the beginning of each volume and the several Indexes at the end of
various uses to which the book
the second volume will serve as guides to the reader in these may be put.
Chapters
III, IV,
V, and VIII were published
in
Chronicon
Spinozanum, Vols. I (1921), pp. 101-112, II (1922), pp. 92117, III (1923), pp. 142-178, and IV (1924-1926), pp. 79103, respectively. Chapter VI appeared in Italian translation in Ricerche Religiose^ Vol. IX (1933), pp. 193-236. All these chapters are reprinted here with some revisions. The original title and description of this work were announced
in the Chronicon
Spinozanum
as
"Spinoza the Last of the
Mediaevals: a Study of the Ethlca Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata in the light of a hypothetically constructed Ethica
More
to be
title
Scholastico Rabbinicoque Demonstrata." This title had abandoned, as it did not seem advisable to have the
begin with the word "Spinoza."
PREFACE
The
protracted delay in the completion of the work was for by the promptness with which its publi-
amply made up
cation
was undertaken when the manuscript was finished. This was made possible by the Fund for the Support of the Humanities at Harvard University provided by the General
Education Board.
For
this I
also deeply indebted to
am profoundly grateful. I am Miss Christabel Garner, of the Har-
vard University Press, for her searching reading of the proofs
and
for valuable suggestions.
HARRY AUSTRYN WOLFSON

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
May,
1933
CONTENTS
VOLUME
CHAPTER
BEHIND THE GEOMETRICAL METHOD
Method of procedure
in the study of Spinoza's Ethics in this work,
i. ^Grouping of propositions into logically ordered topics, 5. The problem of Coherence of propositions within each group, 6.
documentation,
8.
Hebrew and Latin
literatures the sources of
The common tradition Spinoza's knowledge of philosophy, 8. The literary languages of Spinoza, underlying these literatures, 10.
n.
Hebrew
literature as the basic source of Spinoza's

12.
knowledge
of philosophy, be studied, 14.
How the literary background of Spinoza is to How immediate sources of Spinoza are to be de-
The method used in this work in the collection termined, 15. of literary sources, and the form in which this work is written,
The importance of the literary background as an aid to the 17. The ellipticalness and alproper understanding of Spinoza, 20. lusiveness of the Ethics, and the reason therefor: personality of The application of the scientific Spinoza, 22. to the study of the Ethics, 25.
method of research
CHAFFER
THE GEOMETRICAL METHOD
II
32
Central idea of
all his
Classification of Spinoza's writings, 32.
writings, 33.
35.
Titles of his works, 35.
Why
the
title
Ethics?
Historical background for the variety of literary forms
em-
ployed by Spinoza, 39.

its
Analysis of the geometrical method and
Was the geometrical method demanded by the history, 40. nature of Spinoza's philosophy? 44. Analysis of Descartes' state-
ments about the geometrical method: distinction between geometrical method and geometrical form and the identity of the geometrical and syllogistic methods, 45. Analysis of Meyer's statements about the geometrical method, 51. Extent of Spinoza's mathematical
No metaphysical conception of the way of looking at things, 52. Hebrew language in Spinoza, 54. Aesthetic reasons for the demands of the use of the geometrical form in philosophy in the seventeenth century, 55. The Ethica more scholastico rabbinicoquc
demonstrata behind the "Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrate" 59.
xii
CONTENTS
(ETHICS,
T)
CHAPTER
DEFINITION OF SUBSTANCE AND
III
MODE
61
Division of Being into cateTraditional division of Being, 61. Difficulties in Spinoza's gories and into substance and accident, 62.
definitions of substance
difficulties,
Method of solving these and mode, 63. Traditional classifications of substance, 67. Hypothetical construction of Spinoza's criticism of these classifications, 68. Spinoza's reduction of substances to one, and his defini66.
tions of substance
and mode,
71.
Substance as "whole": meaning
of "whole," 73.
Substance a sum mum genus and unknowable, 76. Substance "prior in nature" (Prop. I): meaning of "prior in
nature," 77.
CHAPTER
UNITY OF SUBSTANCE
.
IV
.
...
79
Pur-
I. The philosophic dualism of traditional philosophy, 79. pose and method of Spinoza's criticism of this dualism, So. Hypothetical construction of mediaeval arguments against a duality of
gods as they formulated themselves in the mind of Spinoza, 81. Reduction of Propositions II-VI to a syllogistic argument, 85.Detailed explanation of these propositions: restatement of mediaeval dualism (Prop. II), 86. Refutation of mediaeval dualism, by showing untenability of the theory of creation, especially that of
emanation, to which
(Props.
it
must
resort (Prop. Ill), 88.-
Tentative
defence of emanation, 91.
Rebuttal of that tentative defence
IV-VI),
91.
Explanation of Corollary to Proposition
VI, 94II.
tenability of creation, as treated in Short Treatise, 96. B. Nor could it world could not have created itself, 98.
Criticism of mediaeval philosophic dualism, by showing the unA. The
have been
created by God, for (a) creation is incompatible with God's immutability, omnipotence, and benevolence: history of this argument, 99;
(b] creation is incompatible with God's simplicity: history of this argument, 105. Impossibility of the Platonic theory that the world was created out of eternal formless matter: influence of Ger-
sonides, 108.
Argument against an immaterial prime mover, no.
CONTENTS
xiii
CHAPTER V
SIMPLICITY OF SUBSTANCE
I.
. .
112
. .
Simplicity and Attributes
112
How the topic of the discussion in Propositions VII-X and XII-XIII

Twofold meaning of the traditional exhas been determined, 112. Threefold implication of the tradipression "unity of God," 113.
tional insistence
upon the simplicity of God:
(a)
Exclusion of acci-
dents,
(c)
Exclusion of distinction of genus and species, 114. Exclusion of distinction of essence and existence, 115. This
1
13.
(b)
threefold implication of simplicity as reflected in Spinoza, 115. Background of Spinoza's definition of God: influence of Albo, 116.
-
119.
Simplicity and personality of God and the problem of attributes, Logical structure of Propositions VII-X, XII-XIII, 120.
. .
II.
Essence and Existence

121.
121
The two main sources of Spinoza's discussion of essence and existence,
-How
the problem of essence and existence originated: the
views of Aristotle, Avicenna, and Averroes, 122. Spinoza on essence and existence (Prop. VII), 125. Meanings of causa sui:
(b) positive, (a) negative, 127; as treated in Short Treatise ^ 130.
129.
Essence and Existence
IIF.
Definition of the
Term
"
Infinite"
...
'
133
Historical background of Spinoza's definition of the terms "infinite" and "finite," 133. Meaning of the various kinds of finite" and "infinite" in Spinoza, 135. Meaning of "infinite" when applied to God, 137. Spinoza's analogy between his own "substance"
and the traditional God (Props. VIII-X),
139.
IV.
Relation of Attribute to Substance
....
names of God
142
God unknown
His essence but known through His attributes, 142. Certain points of agreement among mediaevals on the nature of
in
attributes, 143.
The
interpretation of the
in the
Bible as attributes, 144.

tive
Spinoza's definition of attribute: subjec-
and objective interpretations, 146. These two interpretations are analogous to mediaeval controversies, 147. Analysis of mediaeval problem of essential attributes, 147. The case of those who
reject essential attributes: objective theory of attributes, 149.
The
case of those
who admit
essential attributes: subjective theory
of attributes, 150.
attributes to one, 154.
Evidence for the subjective interpretation of
The reducibleness of all Spinoza's conception of attributes, 151. Explanation of Propositions XII-XIII, 156.
xiv
CONTENTS
CHAPTER
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
I.
VI
158
The
Ontological Proof
160.
158
Transition from "substance" to
of necessano
existit,
"God" What the
(Prop. XI), 158. Meaning proofs of the existence of

',
God
are
meant
to prove, 161.
reason, 161.
Classification of the traditional
Being: real\ fictitious verbal, and of methods of proving the
If God is known immediately, what need is Meaning of the ontological proof, and the stock objection against it, 167. Meaning of St. Anselm's answer to Gaunilon, 170. -- Meaning of the syllogism employed in ontoThe logical form of the syllogism underlying logical proofs, 174.
existence of God, 163.

there for proof? 165.
the ontological proofs, 176.
II.
Spinoza's Four Proofs

Evaluation of the ontological proof, 176. Analysis of the proofs of Descartes and Spinoza and their relation to each other, 178. Spinoza's first proof: its three types, and how the type used in the
Ethics
is
176
a modification of one of the two forms of the proof as given
Spinoza's second proof: its composite origin, 179. Distinction between internal, external, and impedimental Mediaeval proof for eternity of God, 186. Distinccauses, 186.
by Descartes,
184.
tion between necessary, impossible, possible, and contingent, 187. Analysis of the cosmological proof of the existence of God: its three Transformation of the third stage of the cosmological stages, 192. proof into an ontological proof in Spinoza's second proof 197.
',
Spinoza's third and fourth proofs:
how
related to Descartes' second

-
Analysis of Descartes' cosmological proof in Meditation III, 200. second cosmological proof: a modified form of the traditional proof from creation or conservation, 201. Why Spinoza calls it a proof Exfrom power, 204. Explanation of Spinoza's third proof 205.
',
planation of Spinoza's/0wrM/>r00/,207.- Explanation of Scholium to
Proposition XI, 208.
Concluding remarks on Spinoza's proofs, 212.
CHAPTER
EXTENSION AND THOUGHT
I.
VII
214
The Framework
of Spinoza's Universe
214
Recapitulation of Spinoza's arguments leading up to his conclusion that extension and thought are attributes of God (Prop. XIV), 214. The framework of Spinoza's universe and how he came by it, 216.
CONTENTS
The mediaeval framework of
fied
xv
the universe, 218.
How
a modi-
form of the mediaeval framework presented itself to the mind of Unfolding Spinoza's criticism of that framework Spinoza, 219. and his conclusion that God is material, 221. History of the conception of the materiality of God and how little it has to do with
Spinoza's similar conclusion, 222.
II.
Properties, Attributes,
and Modes
224
Origin of the doctrine of the infinite number of attributes, 225. Enumeration of attributes in mediaeval philosophy and Descartes,
226.
Mediaeval attributes called propria by Spinoza: the meaning

Spinoza's various
lists
of propria, 227.
of propria, 230.
Attri-
by which Spinoza has arrived at the two known attributes, and why he calls them extension and thought, 232. Modes: Forma corporeatatis as the origin of extension, 234. (a) Immediate infinite modes; how Spinoza came by them, 236. The names for the immediate infinite mode of thought, 238.
butes: the logical steps
The Meaning of idea Dei, 239. Meaning of intellect us, 238. names for the immediate infinite mode of extension, 242. Why the immediate infinite modes are called "Sons of God," 243. (b} Mediate infinite mode: only one; how Spinoza came by it, 243.
modes, 249.
(c) Finite or Meaning of fades totius universi, 244. Meaning of the resfxae aeternaeque, 249.
particular
Varieties
of possibility and necessity, 252. Natura naturans and natura naturata: influence of Thomas Aquinas, 253. How the attributes of extension and thought may be conceived as really distinct, one without the assistance of the other, and still not imply a plurality in
the nature of substance, 255. Attribute of extension not to be confused with the popular conception of the corporeality of God, 258.
CHAPTER
INFINITY OF EXTENSION
VIII
262
who
Spinoza's statement and refutation of the case of his opponents
deny
Spinoza seems to misrepresent his opponents and to commit the fallacy of equivocation, 265. Descartes not the one meant by his opponents, 268. Method to be
infinite extension, 262.
How
employed
Aristotle
in arriving at
an explanation of Spinoza's position, 270.
How Crescas estaband his followers on infinity, 271. lishes the existence of an infinite extension, 275. Explanation of Spinoza 'sfrst "example" and its corresponding first "distinction," 281. Explanation of Spinoza's second "example" and its corresponding second "distinction: the infinite and the indefinite," 286. Explanation of Spinoza's third "example" and its corresponding
third "distinction," 291.
xvi
CONTENTS
CHAPTER IX
THE CAUSALITY OF GOD
I.
296
Materiality and Causality of
God
-296
Traditional conception of omnipresence of God brought to its logical conclusion by Spinoza (Prop. XV), 296. -- Variety of characterizations of Spinoza's conception of God: Deism, Atheism, Acosmism,
Immateriality and causality two fundamental Pantheism, 298. characteristics of the traditional God, 301. Threefold causality of
the traditional God reduced by Spinoza to efficient causality, 302. Conventional classification of God's efficient causality adopted by
XVI), 304.
cause, 307.
God a universal cause (Prop. Spinoza and applied to his God, 303. God an efficient cause not in the restricted sense of
-
cmanatire cause, 306.
God an
essential cause, 307.
God
a first
II.
God
God
as Free
Cause
308
a principal and free cause (Prop. XVII), 308. Spinoza's definition of freedom, 309. - Mediaeval conception of will and intelli-
gence in divine causality and Spinoza's refutation thereof, 312. Spinoza's refutation of the view that God omitted to create things
He could create, 314. Spinoza's contention that the mediaeval conception of the homonymy of divine intelligence and will Denial of amounts to an assertion of necessary causality, 316.
which
-
chance and causelessness, 318.
III.
The Meaning
of
Immanent Cause
319
Two kinds Distinction between external and internal causes, 319. of internal or immanent causes, 321. Meaning of "transcendent,"
Meaning of Spinoza's conception of God as immanent cause The Immanent as whole or universal, 324. (Prop. XVIII), 323. Two differences mentioned by Spinoza two kinds of "whole," 325. between the "whole" and the conceptual universal; how they are
322.
traceable to Aristotle, 326.
Conjectural addition of a third differ-
ence: the concrete
and the abstract universal, 327.
IV.
God
God
as Conscious
Cause
}2tf
as a conscious but non-volitional cause, 328.
CONTENTS
xvii
CHAPTER X
DURATION, TIME, AND ETERNITY
I.
331
331
The Story
of Duration
Analysis of Plotinus' discussion of time: definite and indefinite time, How the term duration was given to indefinite time, 335. 332. Three forms of the Plotinian conception of duration in Arabic and
Hebrew
First form: in opposition to Aristotle's definitexts, 336. tion of time, 337. --Second form: supplementary to Aristotle's defiThird form: similar to Aristotle's definition nition of time, 338.
of time, 339.
tion, 340.
Etymology of Arabic and Hebrew terms
for dura-
Duration in Augustine: meaning o{distentio,34i.

in Descartes
Com-
mon
characteristics of duration in scholastic philosophy, 343.
Duration
and Locke, 345.
General characteristics
of duration, 346.
II.
Duration and Time
in
Spinoza
in Cogitata Metaphysica,
347
and Reason
its
Formal definition of duration
three
verbal differences from that of Descartes, 347. verbal difference: substitution of "attribute" for
for first
"mode," 348.
Reason
349.
for
Reason
second verbal difference: addition of term "actuality," for third verbal difference: addition of term "cre-
Relation of duration to existence, 351. Definiated," 350. tion of time in Cogttata Metaphyslca^ 353. Problem of the subjecDuration and time in letter to Meyer, 356. tivity of time, 355.
Duration and time in Ethics, 357.

III.
Eternity
358
Difference between Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of eternity, and the reasons for that difference, 358. Platonic conception of
Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of eternity in Plotinus, 361. Platonic eternity in Arabic and Hebrew philosophic texts, 361.
364.
and Aristotelian conceptions of eternity in Latin philosophic texts, Three common elements in mediaeval conceptions of eternity
when applied to God: (a) not infinite time, (b} immutability, (c) identity of essence and existence, 366. Only two of these three elements adopted by Spinoza as properties to be applied exclusively to God: (a) not infinite time or duration; examples of defective uses of the term "eternity," 366; (b) identity of essence and existence,
Meaning of Spinoza's comparison of the eternal existence of with "eternal truths," 368. Problem of the applicability of duration to God, 369.
367.
-
God
xviii
CONTENTS
CHAPTER XI
MODES
Structure of Propositions
370
X1X-XXXVI,
370.
Infinite
Spinoza's philos-
ophy
in its relation to
of "eternal
when applied to God (Props. XIX-XX), 375. Meaning of "eternal" and "infinite" when applied to immediate modes The mediate infinite and eternal mode (Prop. (Prop. XXI), 376.
"
emanation, 371.
modes: meaning
Introduction of the use of the term "mode" (Prop. The threefold sense in which God is said to be the 379. cause of the infinite and eternal modes: (a) as their efficient cause
XXII), 378.
XXI 1 1),
(Prop.
XXIV),
(c)
380;
(b) as their
383;
as their free cause (Prop.
dom and
Spinoza's denial of it or res singulares, 387. Where do they
immanent cause (Prop. XXV), XXVI), 385. Meaning of freeFinite modes (Prop. XXVII), 385.
come from?
388.
Spinoza's
An explanation which apparent explanation (Prop. XXVIII), 389. Certain historical explanations: (a) Finitude does not explain, 392.
an
(c]
illusion, 393.
(b}
Matter
as -Aprineipium individuationis, 393.

(d]
Cabalistic zimzum, 394.

in
"Emergent emanation,"
all
395.
Spinoza's real explanation, 397.
Conclusion of the discussion of

of them traceable to
modes: no contingency
their cause (Prop.
modes;
398.
God
as
XXIX),
CHAPTER
NECESSITY AND PURPOSELESSNESS
I.
XII
400 400
Intellect, Will,
and Power
Mediaeval belief in design in the causality of God and freedom in the action of man, 400. Design in God expressed in terms of attributes of life, intellect willy and power 401. How Spinoza denies design
, ,
by attacking these
attributes, 401.
(b}
(a)
Attribute of life
intellect
is
to be
will;
included under power, 402.

(1) first method of attack:
Attributes of
and
For God to act by intelligence and will as conceived by the mediaevals is the same as to act by necessity, 402; (2) second method of attack: Intellect and will do not pertain to the
essence of
402.
God and
Hence
there
belong to natura naturata (Props. XXX-XXX1), is no freedom of will in God (Prop. XXXII):
definition of will
and its freedom, 405. Hence, the world could not have been produced by God in another manner and in another order than that in which it has been produced (Prop. XXXIII): history of Continuation of the same problem in Scholia I the problem, 408. and
II
of Proposition XXIII: analysis of Scholium

will: (i) arbitrary
II, 410.
Two
sake of
mediaeval theories of divine
and
(2) for the
CONTENTS
some good, 416. Unfolding of Spinoza's criticism of the second (c) Attribute of view; explanation of his reference to "fate," 418. power: the identity of power with the essence of God makes for
necessity in God's causality (Props.
xix
XXXIV-XXXV),
421.
II.
Final Causes
422
final
How
problem of
causes
is
introduced by Spinoza, 422.
Spinoza's denial of final causes by his reducing them to efficient causes (Prop. XXXVI): historical background, 423. Appendix to Part I as a Scholium to Proposition XXXVI, continuing the discussion of final causes, 425.
Analysis of the Appendix: (a) Statement
of the case for
and its literary background, 425. Spinoza's explanation of the origin of the belief in final causes, 426. Problem of evil, 430. (b) Four arguments against final causes, 431. (c) Some erroneous views arising from the belief in final causes:
final causes,
relativity of
good and
evil, 436.
Problem of moral
evil or sin, 438.

VOLUME
I
CHAPTER

IN DISCUSSING once with a group of friends the importance of philology and of bookish learning in general for the study of
the history of philosophy, I happened to remark that philosophers, after all, see the universe which they try to explain as already interpreted to them in books, with the only possible exception, perhaps, of the first recorded philosopher,
all
and
he could see was water.
"How
"Was
about Spinoza?" chal-
lenged one of the listeners.
he also a bookish philosopher?" Without stopping to think, I took up the challenge. "As for Spinoza," I said, "if we could cut up all the philo-
sophic literature available to him into slips of paper, toss them up into the air, and let them fall back to the ground,
then out of these scattered slips of paper

struct his Ethics."
we could
recon-
long after that I found myself reconstructing the out of scattered slips of paper figuratively cut out of Ethics
the philosophic literature available to Spinoza. The problem before us, as I discovered, was like that of a jig-saw puzzle.
Not
Suppose we have a box of pieces out of which we are to construct a certain picture. But the pieces contained in the box
are
more than can be used, and from among them we have

which are needed
for
to
select those
our purpose. Furthermore, do not fit together, and they have to be reshaped. the pieces Finally, many necessary pieces are missing, and we have to
supply them ourselves. But to offset all these difficulties, we have an outline of the picture which we are to construct.
picture which we have to construct in our own jig-saw puzzle is the Ethics as it was originally formed in the mind of
The

its
is
Spinoza, of which the present Ethics in only a bare outline. Since, however,
1
geometrical form
we do not know nor
read,
can we ascertain exactly what books Spinoza had actually what quotations he had come across in the course of
his readings, or
what casual information he had gathered from conversations with friends, we must take as our box of pieces the entire philosophic literature available at the time
make our necessary selections. Furthermore, since philosophic texts and ideas are the most
of Spinoza and out of this
plastic of material, capable of
assuming a variety of meanings
with different philosophers, pieces in the form which we have reason to believe they assumed in the mind of Spinoza. Finally, since the Ethics before us is not
the result of a syncretism of traditional philosophy but rather the result of criticism, and since this criticism, though implied,
is
we must reshape our
not explicitly expressed, we shall have to supply
it
ourselves.
In our study of the Ethics we must try to follow the same method that Spinoza followed in writing it. Spinoza did not
start out with classified lists of bibliographies, outlines, abstracts, quotations, and all the elaborate equipment with which methodical scholarship of today prepares itself for the writing of an informative work of reference. He started out
with a certain fund of knowledge acquired through miscellaneous reading which in his mind formed itself into a composite picture of the salient features of traditional philosophy. In this composite mental picture, we may assume, the prob-
lems of philosophy presented themselves in a certain order, each problem modelled after a certain pattern and expressed
Tagged on to this picture, underand deep down into the recesses of Spinoza's consciousness, we may further assume, there was an
in a certain terminology.
neath
its
surface,
Cf. below, p. 59.
aggregation of notes swarming with references to sources of texts, to parentages of ideas, to conflicts of opinions, and to
diversities of interpretations, all of
them ready
to
come up
to
the surface, whenever the occasion arose, and take their place in the picture. In our endeavor to retrace the steps of Spi-
noza's reasoning, we must, therefore, first of all, equip ourselves with a similar fund of knowledge, or philosophical
mass of apperception,
as
it
may
be called.
With such an apperceptive mass as our equipment we begin to read the Ethics. Without forcing ourselves to understand the book, we let its propositions penetrate into our amassed fund of knowledge and by the natural process of association and attraction become encrusted with terms, phrases, and ideas out of the storehouse of our memory. At
first
these encrustations are indistinguishable
and shapeless
clumps, clinging to the propositions as bits of scrap-iron cling to a magnet. But then we let our mind play upon them
them and to study them. By the catalytic mind these indistinguishable and shapeless clumps begin to dissolve; they begin to group themselves, to solidify themselves into larger units, to become differento scrutinize
action of the
tiated
from each other, to assume form, and ultimately to
crystallize themselves into distinct topics of recognizable historical problems of philosophy. Thus at the very outset of the Ethics^ Proposition I, together with Definitions III and V and Axioms I and II upon which it is based, emerges as a dis-
tinct topic
by
itself,
which we label the definition of substance
The next five propositions, II- VI, crystallize themselves into a discussion of the unity of substance, made up of two historical problems, the unity of God and creation.
and mode. and XII-XIII shape themselves into a Propositions VIIof three closely related topics under the general discussion heading of the Simplicity of Substance, and wedged in be-

is
tween them
gives way discussion of the traditional proofs of the existence of God. Next follow two propositions, XIV and XV, which deal with
to the term
Proposition XI, where the term "substance" "God"; this is easily recognized as a
which deals with the
the attributes of extension and thought, and a Scholium, infinity of extension. The remaining
propositions of the First Part of the Ethics readily group themselves into discussions of the various meanings of the
causality of God, among which Spinoza dwells especially upon the immanence, freedom, necessity, and purposelessness of God's causality. In the Second Part of the Ethics the propositions fall into the traditional outline of the discussion of
the soul, dealing in the conventional order and manner with the definition of the soul, its relation to the body, and the
classification of its faculties.
The
last three parts of the
Ethics deal with
what
is
traditionally
known
as practical
philosophy as contrasted with the theoretical philosophy of

first two parts, dealing successively with the problems of the emotions, virtues, and the final happiness of man. As our
the
mind scrutinizes still further these groups of propositions it discovers that they follow one upon the other according to a certain order of sequence, which is at once intrinsically
logical
terns.
and
to
extrinsically in conformity with historical patthis,
With
the
first
stage in our study of the Ethics

to find a certain
comes
an end.
is
Then
the next stage in our investigation
coherence within each group of propositions.
The data upon
which we have to work are twofold.
On
the one hand, there
are the problems of philosophy as they unfold themselves before us in all their variety of forms in the vast literature that was available to Spinoza. On the other hand, there are the
utterances of Spinoza in the Ethics,

disjointed,
elliptical,
fragmentary,
and oftentimes,
if
we
are to admit the truth to

ourselves, enigmatic and
unintelligible. Between these two extremes we expect to find the problems as they must have formulated themselves in the mind of Spinoza, the doubts which he must have raised against accepted views, and his own solutions of these doubts which he must have meant to
express in his uttered statements in the Ethics. The task before us, then, is to reconstruct the process of Spinoza's reasoning in all its dialectical niceties and in all its fulness of detail
it will lead us to a thorough understanding of the statements which confront us in the Ethics. By the method
so that
and error we experiment with one conjecture after another, until we finally arrive at a result which seems to us satisfactory. Thus, for instance, at the very outset of the Ethics, in Proposition I and its underlying Definitions III
of
trial
which we have already set apart with definition of substance and by itself, dealing mode, we reconstruct out of the material scattered in the literature of philosophy the problem as we assume it pre-
and
and Axioms
and
II,
as a topic
sented
itself to the mind of Spinoza the division of being, the definition of substance and accident, the classification of
substances, and so on.
Again, out of direct internal discus-
sions of these problems which occur in the philosophic literature of the past, or indirectly out of certain suggestions and hints, and sometimes even without these direct or indirect
aids,
as
we reconstruct a criticism of these traditional definitions we assume it formulated itself in the mind of Spinoza. As result we are enabled to integrate these Axioms, Defini1
and Proposition I into a coherent chapter, containing a logically formed argument. We follow the same method in
tions,
our study of the next group of propositions, Propositions IIVI, which we have found to reflect two historical problems, the unity of God and creation, and which we have subsumed
1
Cf. below, pp. 6 1
ff.
under the heading of the Unity of Substance. Here our task is somewhat more difficult, for we have to deal here not with
one single proposition, as

with
five propositions,
is
each of which
the case in Proposition I, but is followed by a demon-
stration,
transition.
and between which there seems to be no unity and Again, by the method of trial and error we ultiin reconstructing the
mately succeed
that in the light of it these five 1 And so we go through the entire Ethics, logical syllogism. and by the use of different devices we succeed in bringing
unity, coherence,
sitions.
thought of Spinoza so propositions form a connected
and harmony within each group of propothe second stage of our investigation
With
this,
comes
to an end.
the third and last stage of our investigathat of documenting our findings so that we may contion, vince others of the truth of our statements and reasoning.
Then we take up
Here, too,
we must follow the same method that Spinoza would have followed, had he documented his Ethics. We feel that it would not be enough to quote from books which we happen to know, or which happen to be generally known. We must ask ourselves what works Spinoza himself would have
used
if
this question
he had chosen to document his writings. To answer we must determine, even though only in a gen-
eral
way, the extent and variety of the philosophic literature

philosophic literatures were open to Spinoza, the and the Latin. His knowledge of Hebrew he had
available to Spinoza.
Two
Hebrew
acquired in a school where he had studied it systematically under the guidance of competent teachers probably from the
age of seven to the age of eighteen

'
(i
639-1 650)
2
.
Latin he
'
Cf. below, pp. 85
fT.
As
for the years of Spinoza's entering
Hayyim y
thal,
see Dunin-Borkowski,
and leaving the Hebrew School Ez Derjunge De Spinoza (1910), p. 103, and FreudenGebhardt, 1927),
I,
Spinoza Lebcn und Lehre
(ed.
p. 31.

to
began His systematic study of that language under the tutorage of Francis van den Enden did not begin until 1652, when he was
already twenty years old. Though he had also a knowledge of several modern languages, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch,
1 French, and possibly also Italian, German, and Flemish, the philosophic material in these languages was negligible. He-
study later, at first not in a school but privately.
to him not only the works of Jewish but also the works of Arabic philosophers, the philosophers works of Aristotle, mostly as incorporated in the commentaries of
brew made accessible
A verroes,
tators
on Aristotle, and
scholastic
some of the Greek commenworks of some of the Latin Latin similarly opened to him not philosophers.
the works of
also the
only the original Latin writings of the philosophers of the Roman period, of mediaeval scholasticism, and of the Renaissance, but also translations from the Greek, Arabic, and
Hebrew.
the most important works of Jewish whether those translated from the Arabic or philosophers, those written originally in Hebrew, were already accessible
In
Hebrew
to
him in printed form, some of them in several editions; but the translations from non-Jewish authors, with but a few
were accessible to him only in manuscript Manuscripts, however, at that time were not yet
slight exceptions,
form.
gathered up and stored away in a few closely guarded central libraries; they were still widely scattered among individual
owners and
Amsterdam, where and Hebrew printing presses flourished scholarship and where privately owned collections of Hebrew manuFurthermore, the student of scripts must have existed.
freely circulated, especially in
Hebrew
Hebrew
philosophic texts could gain a thorough knowledge
11.
1 As for Spinoza's knowledge of languages, see Epistola 19 (Opera, IV, p. 95, 12-15); Epistola 26 (p. 159, 1. 1 6); Lucas' La Vie de feu Monsieur de Spinoza in
A. Wolf, The Oldest Biography of Spinoza y pp. 51-52 and 104.
io
of the contents of the unpublished Hebrew translations of Arabic and Greek authors through the numerous and extensive quotations
from
their
works as well as through the
ela-
borate discussions of their views which were to be found in
Hebrew works
already published. In Latin the proportion of printed works in philosophy was greater than in Hebrew, even of works which were translated into Latin from the
Hebrew. Thus, for instance, the bulk of Averroes' commentaries on Aristotle, which were translated into Latin from the
Hebrew, existed
printed editions in Latin, whereas in Hebrew they existed only in manuscript form. To Spinoza these three literatures, Hebrew, Latin, and
in
many
Arabic, represented a common tradition. Whatever differences he noticed between them, they concerned only problems of a purely theological and dogmatic nature; the
philosophic basis of all such problems, and especially the discussion of problems of a purely philosophic nature, he could not fail to see, were all of a common origin. They were all
based upon Greek philosophy, at the centre of which stood Aristotle. The same Greek terminology lay behind the Arabic,
Hebrew, and Latin terminology, and the same scientific and philosophic conceptions formed the intellectual background
of
all
those
who
philosophized in Arabic, Hebrew, or Latin.
three philosophic literatures were in fact one philosophy expressed in different languages, translatable almost literally
into one another.
The
And
within each of these philosophic
liter-
atures
numerous works existed which were encyclopaedic
in
nature, covering as they did the entire range of philosophy, containing the same roster of problems, the same analyses of those problems, the same definitions of terms, the same metaclash of contrasting views, the same arguments in support or in refutation of each view, and, barring certain individual differences of emphasis or of inter-
physical brocards, the
same
reader pretation, arriving also at the same conclusions. of these books in one of these three who had mastered any
languages found himself treading upon familiar ground when he came to read any book in the other languages. We do not know exactly in what language Spinoza would
books had the choice of language been determined by him on the basis of the ease with which he could express himself in it rather than on the basis of the linguistic
have written
his
equipment of the readers
whom
he wished to reach.
Had
Spinoza lived in the land of his forefathers, Spain or Portugal,

before the expulsion, or in any other European country where Jewish philosophy was cultivated, such as Southern France or Italy, he would have undoubtedly written in Hebrew, for Hebrew had been the exclusive medium of expression of Jewish philosophers
and
scientists
throughout Europe ever since
the disappearance of Jewish life in Southern Spain under Moslem rule with the coming of the Almohades in the twelfth
The particular attitude of an author toward the of religion was no deterrent to his use of Hebrew, problems for every shade of opinion, from extreme adherence to tradicentury.
tion to the
most daring adventures into freedom of thought,
found expression in Hebrew literature. In the intellectual autonomy which the Jews enjoyed during the Middle Ages, with the systematic pursuit of the study of philosophy and
the sciences in Jewish schools out of Hebrew books, Jewish thinkers were always assured of appreciative as well as criti-
people of whatever views they chose to express in Hebrew. But toward the end of the fifteenth century there appeared Jewish philosophers who,
cal readers
among
their
own
though brought up on Hebrew philosophic literature and themselves writing in Hebrew, wrote books in non-Jewish
languages for non-Jewish readers. Elijah Delmedigo, better known as Helias Hebraeus Cretensis (1460-1497), wrote his
12
Quaestiones Tres and his Adnotationes in Dictis Averrois super Libros Physicorum l in Latin, and Judah Abrabanel, better
known
as
Leo Hebraeus
(d. 1535),
wrote
his Dialoghi
d'Amore
in Italian. 2
In Spinoza's
which he was born, own teachers and schoolmates
own time and in Hebrew was still used
community in extensively by his
the
in their literary
was
in
also
made by some of them

Israel
works, but use of Spanish and Latin. His
teacher
Manasseh ben
wrote on theological problems
Hebrew, Latin, Spanish, and Portuguese. Under these circumstances, what language Spinoza would have used if he had chosen that in which self-expression was the easiest for him can be only conjectured. That it would not have been Latin or Dutch, in which his books happen to be written, is
quite evident by his own confession. At the time of the publication of his Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae and Cogltata Metaphysica (1663) he still felt the deficiency of his Latin, and before allowing his friends to publish these works he
stipulated that one of
them should,
3
in his presence,
"
clothe
In 1665, in one of his letters to he intimates that he could express his thoughts Blyenbergh/
in
them
more elegant
style."
was brought up/' better Whether Hebrew was with him, as it was with many Jewish authors of his time and place, a more
in
Spanish, "the language in which

in
than
Dutch.
natural vehicle of literary expression is uncertain. But it is quite certain that Hebrew literature was the
primary source of stock upon which

1
his
all
knowledge of philosophy and the main the other philosophic knowledge which
in Libros Physicorum^ 1501,

a
These two works are printed together with Joannes de Janduno's Quaestiones and other editions.
It is quite possible,
however, that the Dialoghi cC Amore was written originally Sonne, Lisheelat ha-Tîshon ha-Mefcorit shel Wikkuhe ha-Ahahab li-Yehudah Abarbanel^ in Ziyyunim (Berlin, 1929), pp. 142-148. For new evidence
in
Hebrew.
it
Cf.
I.
that
J
was
originally written in
Hebrew, see below,

11.
vol. II, p. 14.
Epistola 13 (Opera, IV, p. 63,
20-22).
Epistola 19 (p. 95,
11.
12-15).

he later acquired was grafted.
13
He had become
familiar with
Hebrew
philosophic literature before he began to read philosophy in Latin. His nascent philosophic doubt arose as a reaction against the philosophy which he read in Hebrew.
With the exception of the new sciences, his readings in Latin supplied him merely with a new vocabulary for old ideas.
Throughout
his discussions of philosophical problems, especially those bordering
as the matrix in
upon theology, Hebrew sources appear which the general outline of ideas was formed.
Other sources appear as insets. It is Hebrew sources, too, upon which he draws for his casual illustrations. An outstanding example of this is to be found in his discussion in of the T*ractatus 'Theologico-Politicus of the two Chapter
XV
contrasting attitudes shown by philosophers towards the problem of the relation of faith to philosophy or of the-
ology to reason. been discussed in
The problem was an
old one, and
it
had
ism
alike.
Christianity, and JudaIn each of these three religions, the two contrast-
Mohammedanism,
had their exponents. In Mohammedanism, such exponents, to mention but two, were Algazali and Averroes. In Christianity, two typical exponents of these attitudes
ing attitudes
Spinoza, however, mentions none of these. He takes Alpakhar and Maimonides as his examples of typical representatives of these two contrasting views, and he does so simply because
could be found in Bernard of Clairvaux and Abelard.
men through whose works he first became with the nature of the problem. He did not even acquainted feel the need, writing as he did in Latin for non-Jewish readthese were the two
ers,
to substitute
two corresponding Christian authors
for
these two Jewish authors, for in Spinoza's time Jewish phi-
losophy had not yet been eliminated from European philosophy and relegated to the esoteric field of oriental wisdom.
From
the thirteenth century
down through
the seventeenth
4
it

was quite fashionable
for theologians
century
losophers to
authorities,
quote Hebrew authorities by and those who followed the

in
and phithe side of Greek

habit of quoting
the original Greek also quoted Hebrew sources in the original Hebrew. The only concession that
Greek sources
Spinoza seems to have made to his non-Jewish readers is that he referred to his Hebrew authorities with the aloofness of an
outsider.
literature for our
Following this principle, we go first to Hebrew philosophic documents. It is not any particular author
that
we go
to,
but the
field
of literature as a whole.
If one
particular author, Maimonides for instance, happens to be resorted to more often than others, it is not because he has
been especially selected for our purpose, but because Spinoza himself would have selected him, for his work is the most excellent depository of mediaeval philosophic lore, where one
can find the most incisive analyses of philosophic problems, the most complete summaries of philosophic opinions, the
clearest definitions of terms,
and all these couched in happy and
lels
quotable phrases. But we always try to give sufficient paralfrom other Hebrew authors so as not to create the errone-
ous impression that we are trying to draw parallels between
one single Hebrew author and Spinoza. In like manner, in order not to create the erroneous impression that the material
drawn upon
is unique in Hebrew philosophic literature, we or refer to, similar passages in the works of Arabic or quote, scholastic authors. When the occasion demands, scholastic
sources are resorted to in preference to the Hebrew. Furthermore, in order not to create the erroneous impression that
there
is
we quote from
a
list
something peculiarly "mediaeval" about the views the various mediaeval sources, we trace their
origin to Aristotle's works.
Frequently we string together of names from the various linguistic groups of philos-

ophy
a
in order to indicate that the
15
views under discussion are
common
philosophic heritage.
from a certain book we
Before quoting a passage do not stop to ask ourselves whether
that book was known to Spinoza. In several instances we rather suspect that the book in question was unknown to him. But that makes no difference to us. Provided the
idea expressed in the passage under consideration is not uncommon, we assume that it was known to Spinoza, even
though for the time being we do not know exactly the immediate literary source of his knowledge. In such instances,
only one who would arrogate to himself divine omniscience could assert with certainty that the idea could not be found
to Spinoza. The burden of proof is the negative. always upon But very often certain passages are identified as being the direct and immediate sources of Spinoza. As a rule Spinoza
in
any source available
does not quote sources literally, even when he mentions them. In a letter to Meyer, for instance, he introduces his reproduction of Crescas' proof of the existence of God by the " "it reads as follows (sic sonat)* and yet the passage
words which
follows is not an exact quotation. But in many instances the evidence points to certain passages as directly underlying the utterances of Spinoza. In determining these direct sources it is not the similarity of single terms or even of single phrases
that guides us, for in the history of philosophy terms and phrases, no less than the ideas which they express, have a
certain
persistency about
their
them and they survive

It
is
intact
winding transmigrations. always a throughout a certain context, and that term or a phrase as imbedded in
context by
its
internal structure
and by a combination of
enveloping circumstances, that help us to determine direct literary relationships. When we feel that we are in a position,
1
1.
18).
THK PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA

it is
for instance, to affirm with reasonable certainty that
Thomas Aquinas from whom Spinoza has taken over
in the
Scholium to Proposition XXIX of Ethics, I, the distinction of natura naturans and natura naturata it is not because these
phrases happen to occur in his works, for as phrases they happen to occur also in the works of other authors; it is only because Spinoza's description of these two phrases seems
to be a modification of the description given
by Thomas
Aquinas, and
also because the reason for the modification of
the description by Spinoza can be adequately accounted for. 1 When, again, we are in a position to affirm with reasonable
over
certainty that it is Crescas from whom Spinoza has taken in the Scholium to Proposition of Ethics^ I, the " which his "opponents" prove the imthree "exam pies by
XV
possibility of an infinite extension
and
in refutation
of them
the three
to
"
distinctions
"
which he mentions
in Epistola
XII
not because these "examples" and "distincMeyer, tions" are to be found in Crescas, for as individual "examit is
ples" and "distinctions" they are to be found also in other authors; it is only because these three "distinctions" are
used by Crescas as refutations of three arguments which 2 correspond respectively to the three "examples" of Spinoza.
Finally, to take but one more example, when we are in a position to affirm with reasonable certainty that Spinoza's
discussion of the highest good, of human society, and of the virtues in Propositions XIX-LXXIII of Ethics^ IV, is based
upon
Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics
it is
not because we dis-
cover in them certain similarities in individual terms or

phrases;
it is
only because we discover
in
them
definite liter3
arguments. It is such methods that direct literary relationship has been by

ary
1
similarities in the construction of the
Cf. below, pp. 254 f. Cf. below, Vol. II, pp. 233
Cf. below, pp. 264

ff.
ff.

established between Spinoza and
in this
17
many
of the authors quoted
work.
A list of passages quoted or referred to in this work from various authors will be found in the Index of References, and
an analysis of topics of each of these authors will be found in the Index of Subjects and Names. The works quoted or reit will be noticed, are drawn indiscriminately from the various linguistic groups of philosophic literature Greek, Latin, Hebrew, and Arabic. Conspicuously absent
ferred to,
the exception of a few references, mostly of ancillary importance, to Meir ibn Gabbai, Moses Cordovero, and Abraham Herrera, 1 is the Cabalistic literature, which
among them, with
from
earliest
time has been considered a source of Spinoza's
philosophy. This exclusion was unintentional; it merely happened that in our search for documentation we had no occasion to resort to the Cabalistic literature for source material.
Not
that the Cabalistic literature could not have furnished
us with apt illustrative material, but there is nothing in the Cabalistic literature which could be used for our purpose the
like
of which we did not find in philosophic literature, for, as has been said by one of the leading Cabalists, Moses Cordovero: "Know that in matters metaphysical oftentimes the
true masters of Cabala will be found to agree with the phil* "To follow" would perhaps have been a more osophers." accurate term than "to agree." The list of passages is by no means exhaustive. Had we
thought
it
necessary,
we could have added innumerable

but our purpose was not
parallels to every passage quoted;
to compile a complete catena of parallel passages.
com-
plete Index of mediaeval philosophy, Latin, Hebrew, and

1 Two of the references to Herrera, however, seem to point to a direct literary connection and are of special significance. Cf. below, pp. 245 and 314.
Elimah Rabbati,
I, 16.
Arabic, is indeed one of the desiderata of scholarship, but that will have to be done independently of any study of Spiare the passages quoted or referred to by us irreplaceable by similar passages from other works, though we have always tried to select passages which are most suitable
noza.
Nor
would be quite possible to rewrite conof this work by substituting other quotasiderable portions tions for those used by us, without necessarily changing our
for
our purpose.
It
present analysis and interpretation of the Ethics, for the passages quoted are only representative of common views
philosophic literature of the past. Had we thought it desirable, then instead of writing one single book on the Ethics, we could have written a series
in the
which were current
of papers bearing such
titles
as "Aristotle
and Spinoza,"
"Seneca and Spinoza," "Averroes and Spinoza," "Maimontdes and Spinoza," "Thomas Aquinas and Spinoza," "Leo
Hebraeus and Spinoza," "Descartes and Spinoza," and many other correlations of Spinoza with names of authors who are quoted in this work or who could have been quoted. But our
purpose was only to draw upon these authors for material in building up our interpretation of Spinoza and not to establish
analogies, and we were especially careful to avoid the extension of analogies beyond the limits of what the actual facts warranted, and also to avoid the suggestion of influences when
no direct literary relationship could be established. Had we thought it advisable we could have eliminated all the quota-
by omitting them altogether or by giving them in paraphrase form. But the interpretation of texts is an essential part of our work, and since texts had
tions
texts, either
from our
no paraphrase, however felicitous, could take the of an exact quotation. Probably the most logical literplace ary form for this work would have been that of a commento be used,
tary upon the Ethics preceded by a few general chapters of

introduction.
19
But we chose our present method because our purpose was not to comment upon single and isolated passages of the Ethics, but to show the unity, continuity, and logical order that runs throughout the work, and withal
to present the philosophy of
Spinoza as a systematic whole.

it is
Of
all
the authors quoted or referred to in this work,
only Maimonides and Descartes, and indirectly through them, and quite as often directly through his own works,
also Aristotle,
1
that can be said to have
had a dominant
in-
upon the philosophic training of Spinoza and to have him in the formation of his own philosophy. It would guided indeed have been possible, within certain limits, to depict
fluence
the philosophy of Spinoza against the simple background of any one of these three philosophers, except for the fact that that would not have been a true presentation of the genesis of his thought, for it had a more complex origin. All
the other authors quoted in this work, however helpful they may have been in our reconstruction of the Ethics, can be
said to have
had a
direct influence only
upon
single passages
most upon certain groups of propositions. To go beyond that and to attempt to build up an extended analogy between the philosophic systems of any of these authors and Spinoza, on the mere basis of such isolated parallels of expressions or passages, even when a direct literary relationship between them could be established, would only mean the inflation of footnotes
in the Ethics, or
upon
single propositions, or at
into essays or
1
monographs.
whom Spinoza has been studied, see UeberwegFrischeisen-Kohler-Moog, Die Philosophic dcr Neuzeit bis zum Ende des XVIII. Jahrhunderts (i2th ed., 1924), pp. 668 ff.; R. McKeon, The Philosophy of Spinoza (1928), pp. 322 ff. Among all the studies listed, no less than five on Spinoza and
For
lists
of authors in relation to
Maimonides and no less than sixteen on Spinoza and Descartes, there is only the following one which deals with Spinoza's relation to Aristotle: Julius Guttmann,
"Spinozas Zusammenhang mit dem Aristotelismus," in Judaica, Festschrift zu Hermann Cohens siebzigstem Geburtstage (Berlin, 1912), pp. 515-534.
20
But whether direct or indirect, the sources of Spinoza are more important for us as a means of establishing the meaning of his text and philosophy than as a means of establishing an
analogy or priority of doctrine. The text of his Ethics is not a mosaic of quoted or paraphrased passages. Nor has his
philosophy developed as a rash out of the infection of certain heretical or mystical phrases. It has grown out of the very
philosophy which he discards, and this by his relentless driving of its own internal criticism of itself to its ultimate logical conclusion. In our endeavor to reconstruct the processes of
Spinoza's reasoning, therefore, it is not phrases that we are to deal with but the thought and the history that lie behind them and the use that he makes of them. When he says, for
instance, that
God
is
the
immanent cause of
all
things,
it is
not enough for us to find some one
who had
called
God an
immanent cause. We have to study the meaning of the term "immanent" in its complicated historical development and the particular use made of it by Spinoza throughout his writings. We shall then discover that he means by it something quite different from what we should ordinarily take it to mean. Not that we are to assume that Spinoza had actually gone through all the steps of the investigation which we are to
1
for that
trudge through in discovering the meaning of such terms was not necessary for him. He lived in an age when
the traditions of philosophy were still alive, and what we nowadays have to discover by the painstaking methods of
research
tradition.
came
to
him naturally
as the heritage of a living
most
Studied against the rich background of tradition, even the colorless of terms and expressions may become invested
with technical significance of the utmost importance. A case in point is the special significance which may be discovered in
1
Cf. below, pp. 323
ff.
21
Spinoza's choice of the terms "attribute," "created things/' and "actuality" in his definition of duration, 1 and of the
terms "first thing," "actual," "human mind," "idea," "individual thing," and "actually existing" in his definition of
mind. 2
Even when Spinoza

is
is
well-known sources our task
obviously merely restating not completed by merely sup-
plying the perfunctory references. We must again study the meaning of the sources quoted and their implications and
all the shall possible uses he could have made of them. often find that what at first sight appears merely as a repetition of what others have said is in reality a criticism of what
We
they have said.
toward openly
cause of
it,
For despite Spinoza's expressed aversion 3 criticizing his opponents, and perhaps beis
primarily an implied criticism of his opponents. Thus, for instance, when he enumerates the various meanings of cause and asserts that God is a universal,
his Ethics
efficient, essential,
and
first
cause,
it is
not enough merely to
must identify the immediate source of his statement. study the implications of these terms, and we shall then find
that instead of merely repeating
said,
is
We
what
his predecessors
have
Spinoza they have said and of applying to their
really challenging their right of saying
what
"
God
the term "cause
And so throughout the Ethics, from his opening definition of substance to his concluding description of the religion of reason, we shall find that behind every posiin all these senses. 4
is lurking a negative criticism. With of his positive assertions we seem to hear Spinoza's every one challenge to his opponents: I accept your own definitions of
tive statement there
terms, but
am
1
not unwilling to use your

Cf. below, pp. 347
Cf. below, p. 58.
Cf. below, pp. 304
ff.
use them with greater consistency than you. I own descriptions of God, but
ff.
*
Cf. below, Vol. II, pp. 42
ff.
22
they are logically more applicable to my God than to yours. I see no reason why I should not use your own formulae, but
must give them an interpretation of my own. It is quite possible for me to adopt with some reservation one of your views, but I must reject all the others which you consider of
I
equal probability. That the Ethics in

is
its
literary
form
sist in
writing the obvious fact that
quite apparent. But

it is
its
a peculiar piece of peculiarity does not conis
divided into propositions and
demonstrations instead of chapters and sections. It consists in the fact, which becomes obvious only after a careful study
of the work, that the manner in which
is it
makes use of language
rather peculiar. It uses language not as a means of expression but as a system of mnemonic symbols. Words do not stand
complicated trains of thought. Arguments are not fully unfolded but are merely hinted at by suggestion. Statements are not significant for what they actufor simple ideas
for
but
ally affirm but for the denials which they imply. Now, the mere use of the geometrical method cannot explain that, for even within the geometrical method Spinoza could have been clearer and more expatiative. To some extent it may be ex-
plained, perhaps, by the cloistered atmosphere in which the Ethics was conceived and written. No challenging questions of inquiring students or friends guided Spinoza in the manner
of
its exposition or goaded him into a fuller expansion of its statements. Despite the fact that he allowed himself to enter into the discussion of problems which troubled the minds of
his correspondents, he
never communicated to them the
ful-
or discussed with them the philowhich troubled his own mind. The consophic problems genial group of merchants, booksellers, medical students, and
ness of his
own thought
holders of public office which formed the immediate circle of Spinoza's friends had a layman's interest in the general prob-
23
lems of philosophy, but they could hardly serve as effective sounding-boards for his views during the experimental stages of his thinking. They seem to have had a more vigorous
grasp of the problems of theology, in which they were the liberals of their day, but with all the adventuresomeness of
their spirit they were just beginning to approach the liberalism of the mediaeval writings of Jewish rationalists read by
Spinoza
in
his early youth,
Spinoza was welcomed by them
which he had long outgrown. as an exotic genius to whose
occasional expression of shocking views they could listen indulgently because they could dismiss them from their minds
as a sort of outlandish heresy. In this strange environment, to which externally he seems to have fully adjusted himself,
Spinoza never felt himself quite free to speak his mind; and he who among his own people never hesitated to speak out with boldness became cautious, hesitant, and reserved. It
was a caution which sprang not from
fear but
from an inner
sense of decorum which inevitably enforces itself on one in the presence of strangers, especially strangers who are kind.
Quite early in his new career among his newly found friends he showed evidence of this cautious and guarded attitude,
and when on one occasion he became conscious of

was due
to the faults of the latter arising
1
it,
in the
it
case of Casearius, he deluded himself into the belief that
from
to
his
youth and
immaturity.
Little did he
little
understand the
real cause of his
own
behavior, and
did he
know
all
stamped
his general attitude
towards
the others
not the faults of youth and immaturity. thoughts of this book been simmering in his
nicative
essence,
what extent it who had So long had the
uncommuwe
is
mind that and it is
it
was boiled down
to a concentrated
this
concentrated essence that
are
served
1
in
the form of propositions.

11.
The
Ethics
not a
19-26).
24

to the world;
it is
communication
with himself.
In
its
Spinoza's communication
allusiveness
concentrated form of exposition and in the baffling and ellipticalness of its style, the Ethics may be
compared to the Talmudic and rabbinic writings upon which Spinoza was brought up, and it is in that spirit in which the
old rabbinic scholars approach the study of their standard texts that we must approach the study of the Ethics.
We
must assume that the Ethics is a carefully written book, in which there is order and sequence and continuity, and in which every term and expression is chosen with care and used with precision. We must try to find out not only what is within it, but also what is behind it. We must try to understand not only what the author says, but also what he omits to say, and why he omits it. We must constantly ask ourselves, with regard to every statement he makes, what is the
reason?
What
does he intend to
let
us hear?
What
is
his
authority? Does he reproduce

If not,
his authority correctly or

it?
not?
why
does he depart from
What
are the differences
between certain statements, and can such differences be reduced to other differences, so as to discover in them a com-
mon
in full
underlying principle? In order to understand Spinoza and to understand him well, we must familiarize our-
must place selves with his entire literary background. ourselves in the position of students, who, having done the
reading assigned in advance, come to
to his
sit
We
at his feet
and
listen
comments thereon. Every nod and wink and allusion of his will then become intelligible. Words previously quite unimportant will become charged with meaning. Abrupt
transitions will receive an adequate explanation; repetitions
will
be accounted
for.
shall
thought than what is know what he wished to say and what he would have
of Spinoza's merely expressed in his utterances. We

shall
We
know more

said
25
had we been able
to question
him and
elicit
further in-
formation.
But a question may now naturally come up.
How
do we
that our interpretation is correct? After all, what we have done is to construct an imaginary setting to fit the
Ethics.
know
do we know, then, that the setting is not a mere figment of the imagination? Even if it is admitted that the setting is constructed out of historical material and that the Ethics seems to fit snugly in it, still it may be argued that
How
the plot of a historical novel may be similarly constructed out of historical material, the individual incidents may be all
historically authenticated,
may
work
all
act in their true historical character,
and the personages of the novel and yet the
as a whole be nothing but an artificial
and
fictitious
production. In answer to this question we may say, in the first place, that the validity of our interpretation of the Ethics rests upon
its
workability and universal applicability. If there is anything arbitrary in our interpretation it is the initial assumption that Spinoza
thought out his philosophy
in a logical,
orderly, and coherent manner, and that he wrote it down in a work which is logical, orderly, and coherent, and in a language which is self-explanatory. But having started out with this assumption and finding that the Ethics is far from being a
book which
language
tory,
in
is
logical, orderly,
it is
which
written
is
and coherent, and that the far from being self-explana-
we have
a right to believe that
any interpretation,
his-
torically substantiated, that will help to explain the entire Ethics as a logically, orderly, coherently, and intelligibly
written book
It
is
is
more
like the plot of a
not fictitious like the plot of a historical novel. work of true historical research in
historical
is
which a meagre and sketchy account of certain
events preserved in a single fragmentary document
pre-
26
sented in a
new reconstructed form by the rilling in of gaps, the supplying of details, and by the explaining of causes by and motives, all on the basis of other authentic records. Historical research in philosophy,
is
no
less
than
in literature or
claiming the same test of certainty as politics, the hypotheses of the natural scientists, namely, the test of workability and of universal applicability as a description of
justified in
the phenomena that come under observation. The analogy of our study of the Ethics to the scientific in method of research holds true in still another respect the employment of a method which may be considered as a
all
modified form of what

Invariably
is
in the writings
called in science control-experiment. of Spinoza several texts are to be
found
in
which the same problems are dealt with.
In our
study of Spinoza we have always treated these parallel texts as the scientific experimenter would treat his guinea-pigs, performing our experimental interpretation on some of them
and using the others
as a control.
Thus
in
working on any
problem, instead of collecting at once all the parallel texts and ancillary material in the writings of Spinoza and working
on
all
of them at the same time,
we confined our
investiga-
tions to
some
particular texts,
texts.
and then tested our conclufor instance, in the
sions
by the other
Thus,
1
problem
of the unity of substance, for which Propositions II -VI of Ethics , I, Chapter II of Short Treatise, I, and Appendix I of
the Short "Treatise are parallel texts, or in the problem of the
relation of
II,
which Proposition X of Ethics^ Preface to Short Treatise II, and Appendix II of the
mind and body, 2
for
',
texts, the problem was worked out first in connection with one of these sets of and then tested and checked up by the others.
Short Treatise
are parallel
fully
texts
Cf. below, pp. 79
ff.
ff.

Then
also, again in
27
in
analogy to the
method of research
the sciences, our investigation was not merely a matter of classifying data; it consisted mainly in discovering problems, stating them, and solving them; and the solution, as a rule,
was afterwards verified by a method which in scholarship may be said to correspond to the method of experiment and prediction in science. One probstarted with a conjecture which
lem with which

itself to us,
to start
our investigation always presented
and that was the problem of linking together ap-
parently disconnected propositions into a coherent argument. To solve this problem it was required to find the missing links
which
in the
in the original
form
in
mind of Spinoza and before
which the Ethics was conceived it was broken up into geo-
metric propositions supplied a logical transition between the disconnected statements which we now have before us. Now
sometimes these missing links could be forged out of material which we happened already to have at our disposal, but most often they had to be invented imaginatively out of material which we only assumed to exist and the corroborative evidence was to be discovered afterwards. And, as a rule, it was discovered.
But problems of still greater difficulty presented themselves to us on frequent occasions, such, for instance, as apparent misuse of terms on the part of Spinoza, or apparent
contradictions in his
own
set
statements, or apparent misrepreInvariably in the solution
sentations of the views of others.
up some distinction in the use of the term which Spinoza seemed to misuse, or we discerned some new aspect in the statement of the idea in which Spinoza seemed to contradict himself, or we assumed the possibility of some new interpretation of the view in which Spinoza seemed to misrepresent others. Here, again, most often these new distinctions, aspects, and interpretations were invented ad hoc, merely for the purpose of solving a certain
of such problems
we
28
difficulty,

and the evidence corroborating them was discovis the method which we have followed
ered afterwards. This
throughout our investigation, though it is not the method which we have adopted in the presentation of the results. In
the final form which this
clearness
work has assumed,
for the sake of
and brevity, the order of exposition has had to be the reverse of the order of discovery, and sources, which in
the actual process of investigation were evidence by which
a priori conjectures were corroborated, have had to be presented as data from which conclusions were drawn. The material dealt
with
in this
work did not seem
to us to possess
sufficient
elements of
human
interest to justify our attemptin the
ing to intrigue the reader form of a mystery story.
by presenting each problem
A typical illustration of this kind of proof by experiment or prediction may be found in Spinoza's discussion of the problem of infinite extension. This is one of the discussions
in
their views
which Spinoza makes reference and criticizing them.
to his
He
finds that
opponents, restating one of the

infinite
reasons
why
his
opponents denied the existence of an
extension was their belief in the divisibility of extension, and therefore concludes that inasmuch as matter is not divisible
an infinite extension does

cussion
it
exist.
From
the context of his dis-
appears that by divisibility he means divisibility into indivisible parts or atoms and that by indivisibility he
means
indivisibility in the
same sense
as a point
is
said to be
indivisible.
Having
them
is
identified his opponents,
we found
that
that kind of divisibility of extension which he seems to

ascribe to
explicitly denied
by them.
Furthermore,
we found
that Spinoza, in maintaining the existence of an infinite extension which is indivisible, uses the term "infinite"
in a sense
which
is
explicitly rejected
by
his opponents.
Spi-
29
noza thus seems to misrepresent his opponents and to commit the fallacy of equivocation. This was the difficulty which
confronted
us.
Now,
of course,
we could have
dismissed this
difficulty by assuming either that Spinoza purposely misrepresented his opponents in order to be able to refute them,
or that out of sheer ignorance he attributed to them views of which they did not approve. But we preferred to believe that
Spinoza was both intellectually honest and accurately informed. We therefore tried to find whether it would not
be possible for us to interpret his utterances in such a way would remove our difficulty. We made several vain at-
as
tempts, until we finally hit upon a possible distinction in the use of the term "indivisible" and correspondingly in that of
the term "divisible."
By assuming
these terms according to this new vented ad hoC) we were able to explain his statements about his opponents in a fully satisfactory manner. We therefore
that Spinoza had used distinction which we in-
adopted this as a tentative hypothesis, for the truth of which we had no evidence except the internal criterion of its workability.
But
then, after
we had
satisfied ourselves as to the
workability of our hypothesis, we began to ask ourselves whether it would not be possible to find some external cor-
roboration of
it in
the form of a statement by
some author,
mediaeval or ancient, where that distinction in the use of the terms "indivisible" and "divisible" was made. After some
search,
"indivisible"
we found that this distinction in the use of the term is made by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas.
1
Or, to take another illustration. In Spinoza's classification of the stages of knowledge, we traced the history of the classification itself as well as of the
terms used
in it to Aristotle.
Then when Spinoza evaluates

1
these orders of knowledge
and
Cf. below, pp. 270, 282
ff.
30
says that "knowledge of the first kind alone is the cause of is necesfalsity; knowledge of the second and third orders
sarily true" (Ethics, II, Prop.
evaluation to Aristotle.
culty.
XLI), we likewise traced this But here we were faced with a diffi-
Aristotle makes use of four terms, naturally in Greek. of these terms correspond exactly to the two terms which Spinoza describes elsewhere as the second and third
Two
kinds of knowledge, but the other two terms used by Aristotle usually mean in Greek just the opposite of the two Latin terms which are used by Spinoza in his first kind of
the evidence pointed to this Aristotelian origin of Spinoza's evaluation of knowledge, we assumed that somewhere in the history of the transmission of
all
knowledge. But inasmuch as
Aristotle's writings
in question
from the Greek into Latin the two terms
were somehow translated or interpreted in a sense corresponding to the two terms used by Spinoza. Then, after
we had completed
the chapter on the Stages of Knowledge, we began to ask ourselves whether it would not be possible for us to find some work accessible to Spinoza where that unusual
translation or interpretation of the
two Aristotelian terms
in
question actually occurred. After some search, we found that in two Latin translations made from the Hebrew of Averroes'
Arabic Long
these
Commentary on
1
Aristotle's Analytica Posteriora
two Aristotelian terms are translated exactly
as they
are found in Spinoza.
And
so in innumerable instances external corroborative
evidence was found for previously conceived conjectures. This gave us a sense of assurance that it was not merely an
structure that we were setting up for the Ethics, but some extent we had succeeded in penetrating into the mind of Spinoza and were able to see its workings, to sense its
artificial
that to
Cf. below, Vol. II, pp. 146, 151.

direction, to anticipate its
its goal.
31
movements, and
to be guided to
In order to understand another
we must completely
identify ourselves with that other, living through imagi-
natively his experience and thinking through rationally his thoughts. There must be a union of minds, like the union of
our mind with the Active Intellect which the mediaevals

discuss as a possibility
certainty.
and of which Spinoza speaks as a
CHAPTER
II

OF THE
eleven works which bear the
name
(
of Spinoza as
author, two, the Ethics and the 'Tractatus Theologico~Politicus y present his entire philosophy in its definitive form. The of God as the Ethics treats of the philosophy of nature whole of nature, and of man as a part of nature. The of Tractatus Theologico-Politicus treats of human society
in Scripture,
organized religion with its beliefs and traditions as embodied and of organized government with its powers
as
and authority
embodied
in established institutions.
All
his other works, to the student of Spinoza's philosophy as
distinguished from
the student of Spinoza's writings, are only ancillary material, not to be studied by themselves but in connection with his two major works. The Short 'Treatise
Man, and His Well-Being (Korte Verhandeling van de Mensch en des zelfs Welstand) is nothing but a tentaGod, tive draft of that phase of Spinoza's philosophy which was
on Gody
later
completed and perfected

is
in the Ethics.
The
Cogitata
of certain philosophic views of scholastic origin, just as his Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae is, as described by Lodewijk Meyer and by Spinoza
Metaphysica
summary
himself, a
summary of "the
T
first
and second parts of Desfragment of
cartes' Principia Philosophiae , together with a
the third,"
and
disregarded by sidered only as introductory to

1
these two works are not to be altogether the student of the Ethics they may be conif
',
it.
The
Tractatus de Intellec-
13 (Opera, IV,
Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae, Praef. (Opera, I, p. 131, 1. 24). Cf. Epistola 11. 13-17). In his letter Spinoza does not mention the fragment of the
third part.

fus
33
Emendatione
in its present unfinished
form
may
be con-
sidered as supplementary to the discussion of the problems of knowledge and truth which occurs in Part II of the Ethics y
though from the outline of its plan which appears at the beginning of this treatise it may be assumed that it was originally intended to deal also with the problem of the highest of the good which is discussed at length in Parts IV and
The Compendium Grammatices Linguae Hebraeae was probably intended for the use of those who would undertake the study of the Hebrew Bible along the lines suggested
Ethics.
by Spinoza
in
his
Tractatus Politicus
is
fractatus Theologico-Politicus, and the nothing but an extension of the latter
part of the Tractatus 'Theologico-Politicus. His Epistolac^ of course, do not constitute an independent work; and as for his
on the Rainbow (Stelkonstige Reeckening van den Regenboog) and the calculation of chances (Reeckening van
treatises
Kanssen), they have as
much
or as
little to
philosophy as the woolens, linen, furniture,
do with his main and silver which
were
left
by him
at his death. 1
first
All these works of Spinoza, the writing of which, from the dated letter to the end of his life, cover a period of over
to bring to sixteen years/ are in pursuit of one purpose its logical conclusion the reasoning of philosophers through-
out history in their effort to reduce the universe to a unified and uniform whole governed by universal and unchangeable
That philosophers before him had fallen short of the attainment of this purpose-- that they had broken up the universe into discontinuous parts by positing a spiritual
laws. 3
For a list of these, sec "Invcntairc des bicns et des meublcs dclaisse"s par feu Seigneur Benedict de Spinoza," in A. J. Servaas van Rooijen, Inventaire des Livres format) t la Bibhotheque de Benedict Spinozti (La Haye, 1889), pp. in -i 16. 3 \f August, i 661-2 i February, 1677. His Short Treatise, however, may have
1
le
been written before that.

3
Cf. below, Vol. II,
Chapter XXI.
34

distinct
God as in man
from a material world, and correspondingly a spiritual soul as distinct from a material body,
beliefs of design in
with the resulting
nature and free will in
man
was
in his
opinion due
in his
to a logical inconsistency in
youth, when he first came out in opposition to traditional belief, he had revealed the main trends of his philosophic thinking. The heresies of which
their thinking.
Already
he was accused are said to have been three
that
God
is
corporeal, that angels do not exist, that the soul is identical with life. 1 Interpreted, these heresies meant a denial of the
existence of an immaterial
God
as distinct
from the material
world, of purely spiritual beings as distinct from material beings, and of a soul as distinct from body, which in maturer
years gave expression to the principles that extension and which thought are attributes of God, that infinite modes
in his
philosophy were the successors of the Intelligences or 2 are both of extension angels in mediaeval philosophy
soul
is
and of thought, and that the
inseparable from the
body. As corollaries to these views he denied also design in nature and freedom of will in man. These are the central
ideas which run through all his works and to establish which he fights against his opponents with their own weapons,
using their own arguments and their own terminology and confronting them with conclusions drawn from their own premises. Whatever differences may be found between his
various works, they are only in the use of terminology, or in the restatement of the views of others, or in the arguments
employed against those views. In his essential doctrines no change or even development is to be noticed in all these
works.
1 Cf. A. Wolf, I'hf Oldest Biography of Spinoza (Lucas* La Vie dejeu Monsieur df Spinoza), pp. 45-46 and 97-98.
Cf. below, pp. 2i8ff.

The
titles
35
of their
which Spinoza gives his works are all descriptive contents, and some of them are borrowed from, or
after, the titles of
modelled
well-known books.
Such terms
call
by which Spinoza refers to what we Short Treatise,* and ^ractatus, by which he refers
as Opusculum,
Politicus,
the
to
two
of his other books, and such a combination as fheologicowere in common use. Thus, for instance, the short
treatises of
Thomas Aquinas are each described as Opuscuand the younger Buxtorf calls two of his works Tractates lum, de Punctorum and Dissertationes PhiloOrigine
. .
logico-Theologicae.
His Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae 2 retains, of course, the title of Descartes' work upon which it is based. The Cogitata Metaphysica is modelled after such
titles
as
the
Dispi4tationes
Metaphysicae of Suarez
and
the Institutiones Metaphysicae of Burgersdijck.
The word
"compendium"
Hebraeae
in
the
in his Compendium Grammatices Linguae have been suggested by the word "epitome" may elder BuxtorFs Epitome Grammaticae Hebraeae^
though
in the latter case there
was an obvious
justification
term "epitome," for the book was an of his larger work entitled Thesaurus Grammaabridgement
for the use of the
Linguae Sanctae Hebraeae. The title of the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione is evidently a paraphrase of Ibn
ticus
Gabirol's ethical
read Tractatus de
work which translated into Latin would Animae Virtutum Emendatione* The title
Ethics naturally goes back to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Still, its use by Spinoza as the title of his chief work needs
some explanation.
According to
its
contents the Ethics
may
be divided into
three parts, corresponding to the three parts into which the

1
Epistola 6 (Opera, IV, p. 36, 1. 13). Or, more accurately, Renati DCS Cartes Principiorum Philosophiae Pars /, etll.
Sefer fikfan
Middot ha-Nefesh.
36

is
divided and which, according to a statement by Meyer, must have been described by Spinoza himself as De Deoy Anima rationali, summa hominis felicitate. 1 In
Short Treatise
which the present Parts
fact the original division of the Ethics into three parts, in are combined into III, IV, and
one, corresponded to this threefold division of the Short Treatise. Now, in this original division of the Ethics, the
term "ethics"
in its historical
usage describes only the Third
Part, or rather the present last three parts, dealing as they do with the emotions of the soul (Part III), virtue and vice
(Part IV), and human happiness (Part V). These are exactly the topics which are dealt with in the Aristotelian work called the Nicomachean Ethics. The Second Part of Spinoza's Ethics,
dealing with mind or the rational soul, is historically to be described as psychology, and the First Part, dealing with God, is historically to be described as theology, metaphysics, or first philosophy. Furthermore, these three disciplines
-
metaphysics, psychology, and
ethics
which form the sub-
ject-matter of Spinoza's Ethics fall, in the traditional classification of the sciences, under different headings. Kthics is
cal science
contrasted with both psychology and metaphysics as practiwith theoretical science. Again, psychology and
metaphysics, though belonging to the same type of science called theoretical, are contrasted with each other in that
psychology
is
a subdivision of physics which differs from

in
its
metaphysics
therefore,
would seem not
subject-matter/ The term "ethics," to be used quite accurately by
Spinoza as a description of the contents of his work called by that name.

Spinoza, however, had ample justification for the use of
Cf. quotation from the Epilogus to his Philosophta S. Scripturaf hiterprcs; c Exercitatio Paradoxa t in Spinoza Opera y I, Textgestaltungy p. 408. 3 Cf. Metaphysics, VI, i, 10263, 6-16. See below, Vol. II, p. 3.
1

the term "ethics" as the
title
37
of a book of which the greater
part consisted of metaphysics and psychology. The inclusion of psychology under ethics was recommended by Aristotle
himself in his statement that the student of politics and for that matter, we may say, also the student of ethics
must be
a psychologist. Furthermore, in mediaeval philosophy, psychology, or at least the treatment of the higher
functions of the soul, was removed from physics and placed under metaphysics. Thus the Ihwan al-Safa, 2 Bahya Ibn
5 Pakuda, 3 Judah ha-Levi, 4 Abraham Ibn Ezra, and Shem6 Tob Falaquera, in their enumeration of the topics of meta-
physics, include under

tellect.
it
the science of the soul and the inoriginally
Thus psychology, which
was a branch of
physics, could very well be treated either under ethics or
under metaphysics.
But then metaphysics,

changed
the
first
too, during the
Middle Ages, had
its
position in the classification of the sciences.
As
and the highest of the three branches of theoretical

it
stood, in the original Aristotelian classification, contrasted with ethics, which was the first of the three practiscience,
cal sciences, and, in
accordance with the Aristotelian con-
ception of the superiority of the contemplative life to the active life, it was superior to ethics. In the Middle Ages,
however, when the ethical writings of the pagan authors were supplemented, and sometimes supplanted, by the revealed
Cf.
Ntcomnchean Ethics^
I, 13, 1102:1,
i8-iy.
See below, Vol.

tier
II,
pp. 181-182.
Di
Cf. Kr. Dietcrici, Die Logik nnd Psychologic Abhandlmigen der Ichiean Es-Saf y p. 251. Cf. Ilobot ha-Lebabvt, Introduction.
Cf. CusariiV, 12.
Cf. Yesod
drabcr, p. 15;
Arabic text:
Mora,
I.
Cf.
M.
Steinschneider, Die hebraeischen

Classification of Sciences in
Uebersetzungen des Mittelalters,
2,
quoting from De'ot ha-Pilusofim.

Cf.
my "The
Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy,"

ff.
in
Hebrew Union
College Jubilee
Volume (1925), pp. 290
38
writings of religion, ethics sometimes becomes a part of theology or metaphysics. Ethics is thus treated as a part of
1 2 theology by the Ihwan al-afa, al-Mukammas, and Bahya 3 Ibn Pakuda. Furthermore, the relative importance of ethics
and metaphysics
is
sometimes also changed.
Instead of
ethics being a prelude to metaphysics, metaphysics becomes a prelude to ethics. Bahya Ibn Pakuda is especially explicit " All the divisions of philosophy as determined on this point: the difference of their subject-matter are gates which by
God
has opened to rational beings through which they

. .
.
may
The attain a knowledge of the Law and the world. science which is more particularly necessary for the Law is that which is regarded as the highest science, namely,
theology."
4
In his
own
ethical work,
"The
Duties of the
Heart" (Robot ha-Lebabof)^ Bahya gives a concrete example of this view by placing his treatment of theological problems
at the beginning of his book as a sort of preamble to his subsequent treatment of ethical problems.
not without precedent that Spinoza gives the book in which he treats of metaphysics, psychology, and
It is thus
ethics the general title of Ethics.

justified
By
precedent he was quite
subsuming under metaphysics, and
in
psychology either under ethics or to treat of metaphysics as merely a
prelude to ethics. That that was his purpose is quite evident from the structure of the Ethics^ the last part of which, he
says, "concerns the
leads to liberty" 5 "liberty" being one of the terms which Spinoza uses as
method
or
way which
6
synonymous with "blessedness."

1
* 3 < &
Cf. Fr. Dieterici, op. <:/'/., pp. 16-17; Arabic text, op. cit., pp. 252 253. Perush Sejcr Yezirah le-Rabbi Judah ben Barzilai (Berlin, 1885), p. 65. Hobotha-Lebaboty Introduction.
Ibid.
Ethics, V, Praef. (Opera, II, p. 277, Cf. below, Vol. II, p. 311.
11.
7-8).

As
in the titles of his
39
works, so also in the form in which
they are written Spinoza follows traditional patterns. With the notable exception of the poetical form, in which such
philosophers as Parmenides, Cleanthes, Lucretius, Solomon
Ibn Gabirol, Dante, and Bruno expounded their philosophy, Spinoza experimented with every literary form in which
philosophy throughout its history had been written. The gnomic saying with which the philosophy of the Greeks and the wisdom of Israel had made their beginning is represented in many of Spinoza's propositions, especially those which deal with human conduct, some of which read like verses from the Book of Proverbs or like sayings from the Seven Wise Men. The dialogue form used by Plato and the author of the Book of Job and favored by such authors as Erigena, Abelard, Solomon Ibn Gabirol, Judah ha-Levi, Leo Hebraeus, Galileo, and Bruno is represented in the two Dialogues which are inserted between the second and third chapters of Part I of the Short "Treatise. Philosophy in the form of exegeses of Scriptural passages which appears alike in the Agadic Midrashim of the rabbis and in the writings of Philo, from whom it passed on to the Christian Church Fathers,
and was used by Jews as well as by Christians throughout the Middle Ages, and even up to the very time of Spinoza, is the characteristic literary form of the theological part
of the Tractates Theologico-Pohticus. method of philosophic writing such as
The autobiographical we find in Descartes'
Discours de la Methode and in some of the works of other

philosophers before him is attempted by Spinoza at the beginning of his Tractates de Intellectus Emendatione. The dis-
such as we
cussion of problems of philosophy in letters to correspondents find, for instance, in the writings of Cicero, Seneca,
Maimonides, and Descartes

In addition to
all
is
these forms, Spinoza
represented in his Epistolae* makes use of the geo-
4o
metrical
in the

method
in the Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae,
',
Appendix to the Short Treatise and in the Ethics. This method, too, had its precedents. What the external form of this literary method is may be ascertained by a study of the form of Euclid's Elements^
all
which served as a model to method of demonstration
those
in
who used the geometrical philosophy. The geometrical
said to consist of the following parts: First, the primary truths which form the premises in the demonstrations are grouped together and placed apart from the
method may be
demonstrations as the first principles upon which the demonstrations rest, and are divided into definitions, postulates, and axioms or common notions. Second, that which is
sought to be demonstrated, that is, the conclusion which is to be established by the demonstration, is summarized apart from the demonstration in the form of a proposition. Third,
the the demonstration itself reasons from the known, that is, first principles, to the unknown, that is, the conclusion.
Fourth, supplementary deductions, explanations, and propositions are given in
theform of corollaries, scholia, and lemmas.

it is
is called geoEuclid in his work on employed by geometry, was also used in part or in whole in philosophy. An example of one kind of partial application of the geo-
Now
this
method of demonstration, which
metrical, because
method to philosophy is the reduction of philosophic views to the form of propositions, which may be either followed or not followed by demonstrations. This is to be
metrical
found
in
Porphyry's Sententiae ad
wpos
ret vorjra)
Intelligibjlia
Ducentes
('A</>opjuat
and
in Proclus' Imtitntio 'Theologica
(Sroixôms #0X071/07). It is also to be found in almost every mediaeval compendium of philosophy. Duns Scotus in his fheoremata and Burgersdijck in his Institutiones Logicae even
designate these propositions by the Euclidian term "the-

orem."
41
An
is
method
imitation of this partial form of the geometrical also to be discerned in Bruno, when he summarizes
the conclusions of his doctrine of the unity and simplicity of God's being in a series of propositions. 1 In Jewish philosophy,
the twenty-six propositions at the beginning of Part II of
Maimonides' Moreh Nebukim y which summarize some of Aristotle's physical and metaphysical principles and to
later added demonstrations, belong to same type of literary composition. Outside of the field of philosophy and quite independently of Euclid's Elements^
which commentators
the
propositions which may be described as geometrical are to be found in various literatures. In Hebrew literature, this
form of proposition is characteristic of the Mishnah, which contains a digest of the teachings of the Tannaim, legal as
well as ethical. So impressed was an anonymous early Hebrew author with the similarity between the Mishnaic form and the form of geometrical propositions, with which he must
have become acquainted through Euclid, that his geometric work written not later than the tenth century and perhaps as
early as the second century, consisting of a series of definitions, constructions, tions,
is
called
and propositions without demonstrahim the Mishnah of Geometry (Mishnat by
ha-Middoi).
An example
geometrical method
of another kind of partial application of the to philosophy may be found in the
identification of the syllogistic
form of demonstration with
into the other.
the Euclidian geometrical form or the transformation of one Thus Aristotle's first argument against the
existence of a
2 vacuum, which is syllogistic in nature and is restated by Crescas in the form of a hypothetico-disjunctive
DC Immenso, I, Ch. i r (Of era Latina, Vol. Cf. J. L. Mclntyre, Giordano Bruno, pp. 192 f.
1
I,
Pars
I,
Neapoli, 1879, pp. 242
ff.).
Physics, IV, 8, 2i4b, 28-2 15a, 24.
42

2
1 syllogism, is concluded by both Averroes and Crescas with the equivalent of the phrase quod erat demonstrandum with
which Euclid concludes
The same
his geometrical demonstrations. Euclidian phrase is also used by Avicenna at the conclusion of some of his own syllogistic arguments. 3 Con-
versely, too, Aristotle's arguments against the existence of a circularly moving infinite body in De Caelo, I, 5-7, which
strations
are obviously written in the form of geometrical demonand are restated by Averroes in the form of geometrical demonstrations, are reduced by Crescas to the
4 syllogistic form.
The
identification of the syllogistic
method
of reasoning with the geometrical method is clearly indicated by Saadia, who in his plea for the validity of logical inference as a source of knowledge and for its application to matters
religious describes the conclusion arrived at
by demonstrative
reasoning as that
Finally, in
in philosophic
5 "geometrically demonstrated/' evident imitation of Euclid, we sometimes find
which
is
demonstrations that the
first
principles
upon
which the demonstration hinges are grouped together and put apart from the demonstration itself in the form of a
series of propositions
sometimes even called by the Euclidian terms, definitions, postulates, and axioms or common notions.
Thus Maimonides introduces
his
restatement of the
Aristotelian proofs of the existence of
God by
a series of
twenty-six propositions upon which the proofs

1
rest.
Though
Cf.
my
Crescas' Critique of Aristotle
',
pp. 141-143.
* 3
Cf. tf /V/., p. 339, n. 24.
Cf. Avicenna's treatise
on the soul published by

in Zeitschrift der
f
S.
Landauer under the
title
of
"Die Psychologic des Ibn Sina"

Gescllschajt,
4
Deutschen Morgenlandischen
9.
29 (1875), at tne enc^
Chs.
i, 2,
3,
and
ff.
Cf.
my
Crescas' Critique of Aristotle , pp. 175

y
Emunot we-Deot Introduction: ^v-UîT

rON^D!}.
Cf. D.
U Û
(p. 20),
1TT3JVP HD 'DJ
"TiytPTl
Philosophy, p. 183,
far as they are
Neumark, "Saadya's Philosophy," in Essays in Jewish where the phrase used by Saadia is aptly translated by "in so
deduced more geometrico"
43
these twenty-six propositions, unlike Euclid's "first principles," are themselves subject to demonstration, still they
are used in these proofs of the existence of God as the "first Prior to Maimonides, principles'" are used by Euclid.
Bahya Ibn Pakuda,

istence
in his un-Aristotelian
proof for the ex-
of God, similarly lays down three propositions, which are again subject to proof but are used by him as first principles, and then says: "And when these three propositions
have been established, the conclusion will follow, to him who knows how to use them and to join them together, To "join them together" 2 that the world has a creator/'
l
be taken here as a technical term meaning "to syllogize" (crv\\oyl$<yQai). A contemporary of Maimonides,
may
Alanus de Insulis or Nicolaus of Amiens, follows the same

still clearer indication that he is consciously the geometrical method. In his De Arte seu Artifollowing culis Catholicae Fidei, before starting upon his main work,
method and gives
which consists of a
demonstration
logue a
series of propositions,
each followed by a
in syllogistic form,
he lays
down
in the pro-
number of
definitions
(descriptiones}*
postulates
and axioms (communes animi conceptiones)^ so that the whole book assumes the geometrical form in its
(petitioned) y
completeness. A complete geometrical form is also used in Liber de TrinitatCy which is falsely ascribed to Alanus. 5
Boethius
nitely
in the preface to his
Liber de Hebdomadibus defi-
recommends
the mathematical
method
as the
method
to be followed also in other branches of learning. 6

*
'
Hobot ha-Lebabot,
I, 5.
U^" J
(p- 43),
Cf. below, p. 1 60, n. i. * Cf. Migne, Patrologia Latina, Vol. 210, Col. 597. s Cf. Cl. Bacumker, "Handschriften zu den Werken des Alanus," in Philosophise hes Jahrbuch, VI (1893), pp. 428-429.
6
Cf.
M. Baumgartner, Die
Philosophic des dlanus de Insulis (Miinster, 1896),
pp. 27-32;
Ueberweg-Baumgartner, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophic der
44
It

1
was not without precedent, therefore, that one of Descartes objectors suggested to him to present his Meditationes in the geometrical form, that Descartes himself made an attempt at it, and that Spinoza attempted it in the Ap-
pendix to the Short Treatise, carried
it
out
in
full
in his
Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae and Ethics, and wanted 1 to use it in his Hebrew Grammar.
the geometrical method which with all his predeceswas only a casual attempt, and which Descartes himself, who attempted it, explicitly characterized as a method which "cannot so conveniently be applied to these meta2 is adopted by Spinoza and used conphysical matters/'
Still,
sors
sistently in his discussions of metaphysical matters throughout his chief philosophic work. Mere imitation of his predecessors cannot therefore explain his use of the geometrical method. Some other explanation will have to be found for it.
Many students of Spinoza regard his use of the geometrical

method
as a logical consequence of his mathematical
way
of
looking at things. One of his early biographers declares that " Spinoza had a geometrical mind" (I* esprit geometre)* Erd" mann says: For no other reason than because it is a necessary consequence of the mathematical way of looking at things, the geometrical form of proof is of great significance,
even where the proofs themselves are insipid and marred by inaccuracies.'' 4 Freudenthal maintains that "it was not
patristischen
und scholastischen Zeit (loth cd., 1915), pp. 326-327. For other examples of attempts at the application of the geometrical method to philosophy, mostly of the type described by us here as partial geometrical method, see S. Hahn, Thomas Bradwardinus (Miinster, 1905), pp. 13-14.
1
Cf. Preface to Opera
Posthuma quoted
in
Spinoza Opera,
I,
Textgestaltung^
p. 623.
Secundac Responsiones (Oeuvres, VII, p. 156, 11. 25-26). Pierre Bayle, Dictionaire Historique et Critique (ist ed., 1695-1697), under "Spinoza (Benoit de)"; A. Wolf, The Oldest Biography of Spinoza, p. 160.
*
Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophic^
II,
272.2 (English translation, II,
p. 58).
45
therefore a capricious notion, which might as well have been dispensed with, that made Spinoza style his system Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demons frafa ^ on the contrary, the method
called for in the title follows
1
thought/*
in a
from the inner necessity of his And Joachim concludes that "the form of
is
Spinoza's exposition
essential to its matter.
He
casts his
geometrical mould, because the subject-matter, system as he conceives it, demands such treatment." 2
But
let
us consider
is
all
the facts in the case

for the
and
see
whether
assumption that the nature of Spinoza's philosophy demanded that it should be written in the geometrical form. The points which we shall try to
there really
any ground
Both Descartes and Lodewijk Meyer make a distinction between the geometrical method of demonstration, which may be either synthetic or analytic, and the geometrical form of literary exposition, which,
establish are as follows:
(i)
whether synthetic or analytic, is to be modelled after the (2) The geometrical literary form of Euclid's Elements.
method of demonstration of the synthetic type

tory of philosophy.
(3)
is
nothing but
valid syllogistic reasoning as practised throughout the his-
The geometrical method of demon-
stration, whether synthetic or analytic, need not necessarily

in the geometrical literary form, and, conversely, the use of the geometrical literary form is not determined by the subject-matter of which it treats. (4) Spinoza's mathematical way of looking at things means only the denial of
be written
design in nature and freedom in man, and this need not necessarily be written in the geometrical literary form. The fullest discussion of the geometrical method is to be
found
in
the phrase "geometrical

1
Descartes Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii. method" in either two of

II, pp.
Though
its
forms
Spinoza Leben und Lthre (ed. Gebhardt, 1927),
iio-ui.
A Study
of'the Ethics of Spinoza, p. 13.
46

ordine geometrico and more geometrico
does not occur
there, Descartes openly advocates that "in our search for
the direct road towards truth we should busy ourselves with no object about which we cannot attain a certitude equal to that of the demonstrations of arithmetic and geometry." This method, which by implication may be called the geo1
contrasted by him with that method of philosophizing which others have already discovered and those weapons of the schoolmen, probable syllogisms, which
metrical method,
is
"
are so well suited for dialectical combats."
The
contrast
between the old
syllogistic
method of
the schoolmen
and the
as
*
new geometrical method which he proposes is described follows: The former deals with "probable knowledge"
"probable opinion"; attainment of truth;
4
or
its
it
object
is
"dialectics"
and not the
had no
utility
save the solution of
The geometrical method, on the other he says, deals with "true and evident cognition," ^ its hand, object is the discovery of truth, and it is to be employed to
empty problems.
6
This new geometrical method, he then continues, is based on intuition and deduction. It starts with premises which must be self-evidently true, and
solve useful problems.
by the method of inference, profrom the known to the unknown. 8 ceeding logically In analyzing these statements of Descartes about the geoit
arrives at conclusions
metrical method,
would
call
we find that it is nothing but what Aristotle a scientific demonstration. Descartes' insistence
that truth can be attained only by premises which are selfevidently true and by deduction is nothing but a repetition
of Aristotle's theory that demonstrative reasoning as ex1
Regulae ad Dircctionem Ingenii,

Ibid., II (p. 363, Ibid., II (p. 363,
11.
11.
11.
II (Oeuvres,
3 s
i
21-24).
14-15).
X, p. 366, Md., II (p.

IKd., II
(
.
11.
6-9).
11.
1.
362,
14-15).
23).
5).
P 363,
Ibid.,
8
IV
(p.
373,
26
ff.).
Ibid., II (p. 362,
1.
Ibid.,
IX and XI.

pressed in
"
true,
47
any syllogism must start with premises which are primary, immediate, more known than, prior to, and
"
l
the cause of, the conclusion.
Furthermore,
if
we study
carefully Descartes' language we shall notice that he does not really contrast his own method with syllogisms in general but with what he calls "probable syllogisms" or what
Aristotle
would call a "dialectical (5taXe/crtAc6s) syllogism" and a "contentious (epumfcAs) syllogism," 2 for Descartes' "probable syllogisms" are syllogisms which consist of what
Aristotle calls probabilities (ret côa), and "probabilities," according to Aristotle, yield a "dialectical syllogism" and a "contentious syllogism." 3 This is exactly what Descartes
means when, speaking of "probable
syllogisms," he says that 4 they are so well suited for "contentions" (bellis) or, as the French version translates it, "dialectical combats" (combats
de la dialectique). 3 His geometrical method, as described by him so far, is thus not contrasted by him with the syllogistic
method
method.
as such, but rather with the abuse of the syllogistic
on he adds a new point to his conof the geometrical method. Ancient geometricians ception were acquainted with two methods of proof, one by analysis
But
as Descartes goes
and the other by synthesis, though the proofs
in Euclid's
Elements are of the synthetic type. Descartes refers to the antiquity of the analytic method when he says: "Indeed I
seem
in
to recognize certain traces of this true

. .
mathematics
is
Pappus and Diophantus.

1
But
my
opinion
that
these writers then with a sort of low cunning, deplorable inAnalytic a Posteriora,
Topics,
* * 5
I, 2,
71 b, 21-22.
I, i,
looa, 29-30,
and loob, 23-24.

II (Oeuvres,
Ibid., looa, 29-1 oob, 24.
Regtilae
ad Directionem Ingenii,
la Direction de
I*
X,
p. 363,
1.
23).
Regies
pour
Esprit, II (Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Cousin, XI,
p. 206).
48
l deed, suppressed this knowledge." These ancients, however, performed their analyses of geometrical problems by means
of construction; Descartes performs them by means of algebraic calculations, the process of which is known as analytical
change he extends the method of analysis to everything within the realm of mathematics, or, as he expresses himself, to any object in which "the question
geometry.
By
this
of measurement arises."
matics."
3
This he
calls
"universal mathe-
further, he applies the method of other sciences, thus making the knowledge of analysis to the 4 all things mathematical.
still
But going
From
this analysis of Descartes*
own conception
of the
geometrical or mathematical method, it is quite clear that he means by it only the method of demonstration itself and
not at
all
the literary form in which Euclid happens to couch

used, the synthetic or analytic, there anything Descartes says that it has to be
is
the demonstration. Whichever kind of demonstration of the
geometrical method
is
no indication
in
written in the form which Euclid employs in his Elements. That the application of the geometrical method of demonstration to philosophic problems does not necessarily require
the use of the external literary form of the Euclidian geometric propositions is still more evident from Descartes*
Secundae Responsiones. In a reply to one of his objectors who counselled him to propound the arguments of meditations in the geometrical
distinguishes in the "geometrical mode of writing" (modo scribendi geometrico) two things, namely, the order of proof and the method of proof
1
method (more geometrico}* he
Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii, IV (Oeuvres, X, p. 376,

Ibid.,
11.
21-26).
3 4 s
Ibid.,
/*/</.,
IV IV IV
(p. 378,
(p. 378, (p.
II. 11. 11.
3-4).
8-9).
5 ff.).
379,
Secundae Objections (Oeuvres, VII,
p. 128,
11.
13-17).

(ordinem
scilicet,
49
r
.
6? rationem demonstrandi)
it,
As
for
the
" merely in putting forward those Regulae, as consisting first that should be known without the aid of what things
"order of proof/' Descartes explains
as he does in his
comes subsequently, and arranging all other matters so that 2 their proof depends solely on what precedes them." This, as we have shown, is nothing but a repetition of what is
generally considered to be true of any good syllogistic argument. The "method of proof" is described by Descartes,
again as in his Regulae, as being twofold. One is analytic; the other is synthetic. The former reasons as it were a -priori, from cause to effect; the latter reasons as it were a posteriori,
from
effect
to
cause,
the latter
being, however,
in
the only
writings.
far as
method employed by ancient geometers
their
Now,
in his Meditationes,
says Descartes, in
so
he tried to put forward those things first that should be known without the aid of what comes subsequently, he
did certainly follow the geometrical order of proof. But he admits that, unlike the ancient geometers who had employed
only the synthetic method of proof, he employed in his Meditationes the analytic method, and he did so for the very good
reason that he did not believe that the synthetic method is applicable to the discussion of metaphysical matters. For
the synthetic
method of
"
proof, he says,
must
start with cer-
tain presuppositions or
primary notions" (primae notiones)
which are granted by all. Now, in geometry there are certain primary notions which "harmonize with the use of our
senses, and are readily granted by all"; in metaphysics, however, "nothing causes more trouble than the making
1
Sccundae Responsiones (Otuvres, VII,

Ibid. (p. 155,11. 11-14).
Ibid. (p. 155,
11.
p. 155,
11.
8-10).
J 3
23-24; p. 156,
11.
6-7).
Cf.
French version (Oeuvres, ed.
Adam
and Tannery, IX, pp. 121-122).
50

its
the perception of
primary notions clear and distinct
though in their own nature they are as intelligible as, or even more intelligible than, those the geometricians study." l
"This is the reason," concludes Descartes, "why I used the form of Meditations rather than that of Disputations [and Questions], as do philosophers, or that of Theorems and 2 Still, despite his explanation Problems, as do geometers."
of his preference for the analytic method over the synthetic method, he appends at the end of his reply to the second ob3 as he dejections "something in the synthetic style/'
scribes
sists
This "something in the synthetic style" conit. of his "arguments demonstrating the existence of God and the distinction between soul and body drawn up in geometrical fashion/' 4 in which he begins like Euclid with a
series of Definitions, Postulates,
and Axioms or
Common
Notions, and then follows with Propositions each of which 5 is proved by a demonstration.
Here, then, as in his Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii y Descartes makes it quite clear that by the geometrical method in its primary and general sense he means nothing
but what Aristotle would
call
a scientific demonstration con-
sisting of premises which are self-evidently true and of a conclusion deduced from those premises by logical inference. Again as in his Regulae the geometrical method is divided
>
by him into two types, the analytic and the synthetic. Now, the analytic type of the geometrical method, we know, is as1
Ibid. (p. 156, Ibid. (p. 157,

p. 123).
1.
2-p. 157,
I.
10).
11.
17-19).
Cf. French version (Oeuvres^ ed.
Adam and
Tannery,
IX,
3 <
Ibid. (p. 159,11. 13-14). Ibid. (p. 160, 11. i ff.).
It
is
the
first
principles
to be noted that, unlike Descartes, Spinoza includes no Postulates among which precede his propositions. Postulates are used by him,
however, between Props. 13 and 14 of Ethics, II (repeated in Ethics, III) and at the beginning of Part III ofPrincipia Philosophiae Cartesianae.
51
sociated historically with a certain external literary form, though Descartes makes no reference to it here. It is the
form
in
which the few
relics
of the analytic demonstrations
of the ancient geometricians and Descartes' own analytical geometry are written. But this external literary form was
not essential, according to Descartes' own admission, to the geometrical method of the analytic type. In Descartes' ap-
method to philosophical problems it took the form, as he himself says, of meditations. The external literary form of the synthetic type of the geometrical method
plication of this
is
likewise associated historically with certain external liter-
ary forms which are alluded to by Descartes himself. In the past, he seems to say, it had taken two literary forms:
that of "Disputations [and Questions]," by which he means the method used in the scholastic writings, and, secfirst,
ond, that of "Theorems and Problems," by which he means the method used in Euclid's Elements. The inference to be
drawn from
erary form
this statement, again,

is
is
that the Euclidian
lit-
not essential to the synthetic geometrical
to philosophical problems, inasmuch as the scholastic "Disputations and Questions" is another type of literary form mentioned by Descartes as one which can
method when applied
geometrical method of demonstrahe himself, as a concession to his correspondent, tion, though attempts to reduce a few of his philosophical arguments to the Euclidian literary form.
be used
in the synthetic
The same distinction within geometrical method between a method of demonstration and a method of literary exposiMeyer's Preface to Spinoza's Principia Philosophiae Carfesianae. He speaks there of the "wretched plight of philosophy" (niiserimam Philosophiae fortem) which finds itself without a proper method. The method in
tion
is
to be
found
in
Opera,
I,
p. 128,
11.
17-18.
52

in the scholastic literature,
vogue
which Descartes
refers to
as "Disputations and Questions," is described by him as "a method where the end is attained through definitions and
logical divisions
which are indirectly connected with each
other and interspersed with numerous questions and exI As against this he describes the new method planations.**
which was developed by those who were desirous to "leave to posterity some studies besides mathematics established
with absolute certainty.** He refers to this method as the "mathematical method** (methodo mathematicd)? At first
.
it
would seem that Meyer
refers here to the Euclidian
liter-
ary form. But as he proceeds and restates Descartes* words in the Secundae Responsiones it becomes clear that he deals
here not with the geometrical literary form but rather with the geometrical method of demonstration, which, following
Descartes, he divides into analytic and synthetic. Later, speaking of the Euclidian literary form of demonstration, he refers to it as "more Geometris" 3 But in the entire discus-
nothing to indicate that the application of the geometrical literary form by Spinoza to Descartes* Principia Philosophiae was the outgrowth of the mathematical method
sion there
is
of demonstration employed by Descartes. On the contrary, the indications are that it was considered to be something
imposed upon
it
externally.
In Spinoza, beyond the mention of the fact that he has reduced parts of Descartes' Principia Philosophiae to the 4 geometrical literary form and references to its use in the
work which
later
its
11.
1. 1.
came
to be
discussion of
Ibid.) p. 127, Ibid., p. 128,
nature as
ff.
known as the Ethics * there is no a method of demonstration. He
24
21.
27.
Ibid.^ p, 129,
Epistola 13 (Oeuvrts, IV, p. 63, Epistola 2 (p.

8,
1.
1.
13).
1.
15); cf. Epistola 3 (p. 10,
7).

makes
53
use, however, of certain mathematical analogies, such indeed as are also to be found in the works of Descartes.
these mathematical analogies Spinoza goes much In Descartes the mathematical further than Descartes.
But
in
analogies are used only as illustrations in his discussions of the method of demonstration. In no way do these analogies
imply that Descartes conceived the universe as a whole to be governed by laws of necessity like those which prevail in
mathematics.
In his universe, according to his own statements, there was still room for final causes, for a divine will, and for human freedom. In Spinoza, on the other hand, the
exist-
mathematical analogies are used as illustrations of the
ence of inexorable laws of necessity throughout nature.
Spinoza gives expression to this view when on several occasions he declares that all things follow from the infinite nature of God according to that same necessity by which it
follows from the essence of a triangle that its three angles are 1 equal to two right angles, and when he declares that the
human race would have been kept in darkness to all eternity with regard to final ends "if mathematics, which does not deal with ends, but with the essence and properties of forms,
had not placed before us another
2 rule of truth," or, finally,
when
sider
in
denying
human freedom he
3
declares, "I shall con-
human
actions
and appetites just
as
if I
were consider-
ing lines, planes, or bodies." It is these two principles the
the denial of final causes in

in
universe
and of freedom
human
actions
that
Spinoza wishes to illustrate by his use of mathematical analogies. It is only this, and nothing more, that his mathematical
1
way
I,
of looking at things means.

II,
Beyond
this, there
Ethics,
Prop. 17, Schol.;

II, 9.
Prop. 49, Schol.; IV, Prop. 57, Schol.; Cogitata

11.
Mttaphysica,
2
Ethics,
*
I,
Appendix (Opera,
II, p. 79,
32-34).
Ibid., Ill, Praef. (end).
54
is
nowhere any indication that he in any way connected his use of the geometrical literary form with this his mathe-
matical way of looking at things, nor can there be any such connection logically established on independent grounds. On the contrary, the fact that his Short ^Treatise^ where his
mathematical way of looking at things

oped,
is
is
already fully devel-
not
written in the geometrical literary
form would
seem
to indicate that the geometrical literary
form was not
a logical consequence of his mathematical way of looking at things. Furthermore, the fact that he had applied the
geometrical literary form to the philosophy of Descartes, which does not look at things mathematically in Spinoza's
sense,
would
also
seem
to indicate that there
is
no
logical
connection between the contents of a philosophy and the

particular literary form in which it is written. Finally, the fact that Spinoza had intended to apply it to the grammar of the Hebrew language would similarly seem to indicate that
there
is
no logical connection bteween the geometrical
liter-
ary form and the subject-matter to which it is applied. The thought that may occur to one that the planned application of the geometrical form to the Hebrew grammar may somehow be connected with a metaphysical conception of language which students of Spinoza maintain to have detected in his
theory of the priority of nouns to adjectives and verbs in the Hebrew language may be dismissed as a passing fancy.
'
Spinoza himself does not explicitly link his grammatical view as to the relation of adjectives and verbs to nouns with
metaphysical view as to the relation of modes to substance, and if he did ever link them at all in his mind,
his
in
J.
"Anhang"
Compendium Grammatices Linguae Hebraeae^ Chs. V and VIII; J. Bernays to C. Schaarschmidt, Des Cartes und Spinoza (Bonn, 1850), p. 197; Freudenthal, Spinoza Leben und Lehrc (ed. Gebhardt, 1927), I, p. 291; N.
1
Cf.
Forges,
"Spinozas Compendium der hebriiischen

p. 146.
Grammatik,"
in
Chronicon
Spinozanum y IV (1924-1926),

it
55
must have been
those
who
nature of a literary analogy. All have attached a metaphysical significance to this

in the
view of Spinoza have failed to notice the fact that an explicit analogy between the relation of adjectives and verbs to nouns
and the
relation of accidents to substance occurs also in the
1 philosophical grammar of Profiat Duran, and yet no implication of any metaphysical conception of language is to
be discerned there.
If, as we have been trying to show, there is no logical connection between the substance of Spinoza's philosophy and the form in which it is written, his choice of the Euclidian
geometrical form
is
to be explained
on other grounds. Pri-
marily, we may say, the reason for its choice was pedagogical, the clearness and distinctness with which the geometrical form was believed to delineate the main features of an argu-
ment and to bring them same reason that one
into high relief. It was used for the uses outlines and diagrams. This
pedagogical reason for the application of the geometrical form to philosophy is clearly stated by Descartes' objector,
when he suggested
"This
is
to
Descartes the use of this form.

if,
He says:
why
it
would be well worth the doing
hard upon
your solution of the difficulties, you advanced as premises certain definitions, postulates, and axioms, and thence drew
conclusions, conducting the whole proof by the geometrical method, in the use of which you are so highly expert. Thus
would you cause each reader

as
it
to
have everything
in his
mind,
were, at a single glance, and to be penetrated throughout with a sense of the Divine being." 2 Equally pedagogical is the reason given by Meyer for the reduction of Descartes'
philosophy to the Euclidian geometrical form by Spinoza. Conceiving the two types of geometrical method, the Euclid1
Maaseh
EJod, Ch. 9. Secundac Object! ones (Oeuvres y VII,
p. 128,
11.
13-19).
56
ian synthetic and the Cartesian analytic, as mutually complementary, the former as the method by which mathemati" cal truths are written down" (conscriptae) 1 and the latter
method by which they are disco vered" (inventae)? Meyer recommends the rewriting of Descartes* philosophy, which was discovered by the analytic method, in the Euclidas the
"
ian synthetic method, for the benefit of those who, having read Descartes' philosophy in the non-geometrical form in which it is written, "are not able to follow it for themselves,
nor can they teach

the
it
to others,"
and
also for the benefit of
many who have made Descartes' opinions and dogmas only a matter of memory and are unable to demonstrate
them and defend them against attacks. 4 It is thus always for the benefit of the reader, and because of the clearness with which it is supposed to state an argument, and not because the philosophic system itself demands it, that the geometrical form
is
made
use
of.
But there may have been another reason which had prompted philosophers at the time of Descartes and Spinoza
to turn to the use of the geometrical form. It may have been as a reaction against the new literary forms which since the
Renaissance, under the influence of the works of ancient writers, had been imported into philosophic writings, where
had taken the place of the syllogistic style. The Renaissance philosophers had an aversion toward the syllogistic method of the mediaevals, not so much on intellectual
it
grounds as on purely aesthetic grounds; not so much because the method itself could not be properly used in the
method could be abused and be made
discovery of truth or because of the ease with which the to lend itself to give a
semblance of proof to things which were not true as because

1
Opera,
I, p.
129,
1.
1.
16.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 129,
11.
1
Ibid., p. 129,
8.
ff.

it
57
dissatis-
was bare and bleak and
skeleton-like.
They were
fied
satisfied
with syllogisms for the same reason that people are diswith food that is merely nourishment, with clothes that are merely warm, or with a house that is merely a shelter.
syllogistic
The
method may have been
practical
and
useful,
but it lacked form and was not pleasing to the eye and the ear. They therefore began to experiment with new literary forms, more polished, more refined, and more resonant
dialogues after the manner of Plato, poetry after the manner of Lucretius, and rhetorical prose after the manner of
Cicero.
ment.
But all these new literary forms proved a disappointInstead of merely garbing the logical nakedness of that logical syllogism which must inevitably the syllogism be implied in every sound argument they sometimes
and reasoning. Philosophy became metaphorical and efWhat was thus gained in grace was lost in accuracy and precision. A new method in presenting philosophical arguments was needed. To return to the old syllogistic
served as a cloak to cover up the lack of any kind of logic

fusive.
method openly and directly would have meant a return to scholasticism, for which the world was not yet ready. They
therefore returned to
cal form.
it indirectly by adopting the geometrithe philosophers of the seventeenth century the blessed word "mathematics" served as a veneer of
To
respectability for the discredited syllogism. In the case of Spinoza there may have been reason for his use of the geometrical form. It
still
another
in order
was
as
to avoid the need of arguing against opponents. The Ethics y we shall show, primarily consists of conclusions of an elabo-
rate criticism of traditional philosophy. Had Spinoza followed the old traditional method, the method used by rabbis and schoolmen alike, the comparatively small volume of the
Ethics would have run into
many bulky
tomes. That method
58
required that the various views held by opponents on each problem should be stated, that the pros and cons for each view should be reproduced, that refutations and rebuttals
should be marshalled, and that only then the author's own view should be given and its superiority to those of others
Spinoza, for reasons which can only be explained psychologically, did not want to go through all this elaborate formality. In a letter to Oldenburg he says, "It
pointed out.
custom to expose the errors of others," and in another place he expresses a reluctance "to seem to be deis
not
my
sirous of exposing the errors of others." place he declares himself not to be bound
In
still
another
"to discuss what
every one
may dream."
By
geometrical form he could avoid
resorting to the use of the all this, at least openly.
to imply that by his use of the form his philosophy, like the geometry of Euclid, geometrical is the unfoldment of certain a priori self-evident truths. For
his axioms, properly understood, are not necessarily selfevident truths, any more than his propositions are necessarily new truths discovered by demonstration. Most often
But Spinoza never meant
they are merely restatements of generally accepted mediaeval brocards. It will be noticed that the "Axioms" mentioned
in a letter
from Oldenburg
and
also in the geometric ap-
pendix to the Short treatise are called "Propositions" in

the Ethics for the terms "definitions," "axioms," "propositions," and their like are used by Spinoza more or less in',
discriminately as conventional labels to be pasted on here and there in order to give to his work the external appearance of a work of geometry. What the motives were that
prompted Spinoza
1
to depart
from the old form of exposition

11.
3
*
Epistola 2 (Oeuvres, IV, p. 8, 11. 18-19). Tractates de Intellects Emendatione, 95 (Opera, II, p. 34, Ethics, II, Prop. 49, Schol. (Opera, II, p. 133, 1. 20).
31-32).
Epistola 3.
59
can be only conjectured, but among them there may have been the desire to produce a book which externally would be different from
all
other books on philosophy.
He had
something new to say, and he wished to say it in a new way. And >erhaps, also, he chose the geometrical form in order to
;
avoid the temptation of citing Scripture.
But
still,
the form in which the Ethics
is
written,
we have
reason to believe, is not the form in which it formulated itself in the mind of Spinoza. He must at first have thought
out
all its
problems
in their full detail after the
manner of
the rabbis and scholastics, and only afterwards, when he came to write them down, did he break them up into geometric
propositions.
onstrated
in
thus behind our present Ethics, demgeometrical order, an Ethics demonstrated in
There
is
own fragmentary attempt

istence of
in
rabbinical and scholastic order, just as behind Descartes' to draw up his proofs of the ex-
God and
of the distinction between soul and body
geometrical fashion are the corresponding parts of the Meditationes, just as behind Spinoza's Principia Philosoph'tae Cartesianae
is
Descartes* Principia Philosophiae, and
just as behind the geometric Appendix to Spinoza's own Short Treatise is Chapter II of Part I of that book. Now,
Descartes himself admits that his geometric fragment does not give the full content of the arguments as they are unfolded in the Meditationes. "I should, however, like them kindly to notice," he says, "that I have not cared to include here so much as comes into my Meditations nor shall
.
explain in
such accurate detail that which
do include."
Spinoza similarly admits that the geometrical method might not convey easily to all the readers what he had in his mind, for in a Scholium, where he gives an outline of the topics
dealt with in a subsequent group of propositions, he says:
1
Sccundac Rf sponsions (Oeuvres, VII,
p. 159,
11.
15-19).
60
"Before, however, I begin to demonstrate these things by our full geometrical method, I should like briefly to set forth here these dictates of reason, in order that what I have
in
jny mind about them

l
may
be easily comprehended by
II of Spinoza's Short Treatise,
all."
Imagine now
that Descartes* Meditationes and Prin-
cipia Philosophiae
I,
and Chapter
were lost, and only Descartes*
own geometric
fragrient,
and Spinoza's Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae, and the geometric Appendix to the Short Treatise were left. In that
case, to understand fully these extant geometrically wr.tten
works we should have

Ethics
lies
to reconstruct the lost
works upon
which they are based. Similarly, to understand our prejent we must construct that hypothetical Ethics which
behind
it.
But how
Ethics?
in the
we to go about constructing that hypothetical The answer to this question has already been grên preceding chapter where we have discussed the method
are
in the reconstruction
employed by us
lies
behind the Ethics.
We may now
of the reasoning that proceed to the actual
task of reconstruction.
1
Ethics, IV, Prop. 18, Schol.
CHAPTER
III

THERE
MODE
are certain types of literature which are inseparably associated in our minds with some sort of formal, conventional beginning. We thus all expect a fairy tale to begin with "Once upon a time," and a Christmas ballad with
"'Twas the night before Christmas/ A Biblical narrative always suggests to our mind the phrase "And it came to pass/' and epic poems, from the Iliad to the latest parody, begin with an invocation to the Muse. I suppose we should all be sorely disappointed if we woke up some fine morning
1
to find that Caesar's
Commentaries on (he Gallic Wars did not
begin with the familiar "Gallia est omnis divisa in partes

tres."
Now,
like
fairy tales,
and Christmas ballads, and
Caesar's Commentaries^ metaphysical treatises in the Middle Ages as a rule set out on their philosophical investigation by
a statement which might be reduced to the following formula:
All
Being
is
divided, etc.
the
All
o*>,
2
The term "Being" which I have used here represents Arabic maujud* the Hebrew nimza, and the Latin ens. these three terms are meant to reproduce the Greek TO
which
is
used by Aristotle as the main subject of his tenfold division of categories. But at this point the mediaevals depart from Aristotle's method of procedure. say outright at the very beginning that Being
ten categories,
They do not
is
divided into
very good reason that they do not seem to take the Aristotelian tenfold classification of catefor the
and
62
gories

as does
[ETHICS,
John Stuart Mill and others who have to be a primary, logical, and accriticized or ridiculed it curate classification of Being. In their opinion, it would
seem, when Aristotle wanted to be logical and accurate he simply divided Being into substance and accident; its subsequent subdivision into ten categories was meant to be merely tentative and was by no means fixed. It is with the
logical division of
fore, that the
Being into substance and accident, theremediaevals mean to begin their metaphysical
here, again, they do not exactly say that of beginning directly with the statement outright. Instead that all Being is divided into substance and accident, they
investigation.
But
begin with a rather broader and more general statement, and
by gradual paring,
whittling,
and edging
finally
narrow
it
down ment
to the Aristotelian phraseology.
usually reads that all Being is dwells within a dwelling and that which does not dwell
1
Their opening statedivided into that which
within a dwelling.
gated, and a
The term "dwelling" is then investi2 special kind of dwelling, named "subject," is
At
last the wished-for state-
differentiated from the others.
ment
which
is
is
arrived at, namely, that all Being is divided into that in itself and that which is in a subject, and the
former
is
given the
given the name of substance whereas the latter is name of accident. Thus the formula that everything
which exists is either in itself or in another thing occurs in the 4 3 writings of such philosophers as Joseph Ibn Zaddik, Albo
*.
2
Cf.
my
Crescas* Critique of Aristotle, p. 577.

Cf. ibid.
K2713,
3
fr
JJPJA.
viroKtlntvov.
'Qlam lâ\an^ I, ii (p. 8): "Every existing thing of the things which exist inevitably falls under one of the following four classes: [a] It exists in itself, \f\ it
exists in another thing, exists both in itself
*
[c] it
exists neither in itself nor in another thing, or [d]
it
and
in
another thing."
which
'Ibbarim, II, ii: "Things which exist are divided first into two classes, those exist in themselves and those which exist in other things."
PROP, i]
MODE
63
is
and the formula that everything either a substance or an accident occurs still more widely
and Burgersdijck/
in
the writings of such philosophers as Alfarabi, 2 Algazali, 3 Abra-
ham Ibn Daud, Jacob

4
6 5 Anatolio, and Burgersdijck. A combination of these two formulae occurs in Eustachius a Sancto
divides ens into ens per se and ens per accident, 1 though he does not use the expressions ens per se and ens per accidens in the ordinary sense of substance and accident. 8
Paulo,
who
All these formulae
may
be traced to Aristotle's statement

it
that
is
things can exist apart and some cannot, and the former that are substances/' 9
is
"some
This
and
this is
chosen to
how mediaeval thinkers begin their philosophy; how Spinoza would have begun his Ethics had he write it more scholastico rabbinicoque. But as a
matter of
fact, even in its present artificial, geometrical form the Ethics begins with this statement, logically though not
spatially.
It
is
contained in Axiom
I,
which reads: "Every-
thing which
is, is
either in itself or in another/'
When we
come, however, to Spinoza's formal definition

is
of that thing which

1
in itself, labelled
by the good old name
Institutioncs Metaphysicae, Lib.
I,
Cap.
II,
dimus Entia quaedam per

per se subsistunt."
2
se subsistere, alia
non per
Thesis VIII: "Praetereadeprehense, sed in iis subsistere, quae
Mehut
exists
ha-Nefesh, in Kdelmann's
which
*
must inevitably be Ma%a$id al-Falasifah, II,

I,
i
Hemdah Genuzah, I (p. 46): either a substance or an accident."

(p. 79):
"Everything
"Existence
is
divided into substance and
accident."
4
Ernunah Rama/j,
(p. 4):
"Things which
exist are divided first into substance
and accident."
s
Ruah Hen, Ch.
10:
"All things which exist must inevitably be either subThesis III: "Itaque partiemur Ens
stance or accident."
6
primo
7
Institutiones Metaphysicae, Lib. II, Cap. in substantiam et accidens."
I,
Summa
Philosophiae, IV: Metaphysica, Pars
I:
"Prima
8
igitur divisio entis latissime
I, Posterior Disputatio, Quaestio sumti est in ens Rei, et ens Rationis: Secunda,
entis rei, in ens Per se et ens Per accidens."

Cf. ibid., Quaestio IV.
9
Metaphysics, XII,
5,
loyob, 36-10713,
i.
with the mediaeval definition, we find that while in part they read alike, Spinoza's definition contains a new additional element. The mediaeval
it
64 " substance/'

1
[ETH!CS,
and compare
definition simply reads, as has been said, that substance
is
that which
to "that
is
in itself,
is
which
2 But Spinoza adds i.e., not in a subject. not in itself" the statement "and is con-
ceived through itself" (Def. III). Again, the mediaeval definition of accident is that which is in another thing. 3 Here,
again, using the term "mode" (modus) which he identifies with the affections (ajjectiones) 4 of substance, Spinoza first
defines
it like
the traditional accident as "that which
is
in
another thing," but then adds the clause "through which " also it is conceived (Def. V) Furthermore, why did Spinoza
.
reject the term
"accident" (accidens)
in his definitions at the
beginning of the First Part of the Ethics , and replace it by the term "mode"? And why, too, did he not mention the
term "subject"
Shall
in his definitions
all
of substance and
mode?
we say
that
these are matters of mere accident or
This might pass as an explanathe Ethics to be an accidentally, carelessly, and indifferently written book. But we are now working on the assumption that the Ethics is as careful a piece of
carelessness or indifference?
tion if
we considered
In one of his letters he speaks, however, of "substantia sive ens."

1.
Epistola 9
(Opera, IV, p. 44,

2
17
and
1.
35).
i
Maka$id
al-Falasifah y II,
(p. 82):
"Substance
is
isting thing not in a subject";
Emunah Ramah,
I, i
a term applied to every ex(p. 4): "Substance is that
existing thing
which
is
not in need of a subject"; Burgersdijck, Institutiones Meta-
physicae. Lib. II, Cap. I, Thesis IV: "Substantia est Ens per se subsistens. Per se subsistens non excludit in hac defmitione dependentiam ab omnibus causis (nam
dici potest per se subsistere quam solus Deus) sed solummodo dependentiam a subjecto." * Emunah Ramah> I, (p. 4): "An accident is that which exists in [another] thing"; Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Quodlibetales Quodlibetum IX, Quaest. 3, Art. 5, Ad Secundum: "Substantia est quod per se est; vel, accidens est quod est
i
t
hoc sensu nullum Ens
in alio."
Cf. below, Vol. II, pp. 193-194.
PROP, i]
MODE
65
writing even as the Elements of Euclid, where every term and phrase and statement has been carefully thought out and
chosen, where every variation from what we may with right consider his literary sources must be accounted for; and it
is
to prove the accuracy of this
assumption that
is
the main
burden of our present study. The solution that would naturally suggest itself to the reader, and one which is generally assumed by students of
the Ethics, is that Spinoza is following here not the mediaeval authorities but rather Descartes. It is sometimes argued that
the elements of Spinoza's conception of substance are to be found in Descartes, for Descartes, too, considered substance not only as something existing by itself but also as
all
something conceived by itself. However, the formal definition of substance given by Descartes in Principia Philosophiae^ I, 51, to which Spinoza makes reference in his Cogltata
Metaphysica,
isting
I,
by
itself, itself,
ceived by
i, describes substance only in terms of exwithout any mention of its being also conthough Erdmann, in his exposition of Des-
mode and substance, introduces from other sources the distinction between "per aliud concipiun2 tur" and "per se concipiuntur." " " Then also with regard to his use of the term mode instead of "accident," it may again be traced to Descartes. In fact
cartes' definition of
Spinoza himself ascribes his division of Being into _u_hs-taandjnade to Descartes. 3 Still, while it is true that the term
does occur in the passage of Descartes 4 referred to by Spinoza, Descartes himself uses the term "accident" as <l " s synonymous with mode" and the opposite of substance."
1
"mode"
Cf. A. Leon, Les ftttments Cartesiens de la Doctrine Spinoziste, p. 85.
2
3
Cf. Grundriss der Geschichtc der Philosophic, II, Cogitata Metaphysica, II, 5. Cf. also I, i.
267.4.
Principia Philosophiac,
s
I,
48 and 49. Cf. also

1.
I,
56.
Mcditationes, III (Ocuvres, VII, p. 40,
15):
"modos,
sive accidentia."
66
[ETHICS,
Why
then did Spinoza restrict himself in the Ethics to the use of the term "mode" after having used the term "accil
dent" as the equivalent of "mode" in some of his other writThat his subsequent rejection of the term "accident" ings?
is
not unpremeditated may be gathered from the following statement in the Cogitata Metaphysica, I, i: "In regard to this, however, and I say it deliberately,(l wish it to be noted
that Being is divided into substance and modes and not into substance and accident. 'V
The
solution of these difficulties, therefore, seems to
lie in
an entirely different direction. Spinoza, I think, was forced to introduce this additional element in his definition of substance not so
much because he
differed
from the mediaevals

substance
in the definition of that
term as because he differed from
them
in the
definition_of
mode. As
far as
itself is
concerned, Spinoza's definition, as we shall presently see, does not essentially differ from the mediaeval; he only re-
upon its rigid logical meaning. It is only in his conception of modes that Spinoza strikes out a line of his own;! his modes are entirely different from Aristotelian jacoSents^ and it is mainly for this reason
by firmly
insisting
stricts its application
that he discards the use of that term, and completely alters The thesis its definition by omitting the term "subject."
which
tional
am
going to sustain, therefore,

it
is
that Spinoza's
to the
definition of substance contains nothing new, that the addi-
element
contains was not
unknown
mediae-
vals, and that Spinoza introduced this additional element in order to round up his definition of substance so as to make
Fpistola 4. In Short Treatise, Appendix I, Axiom i, the reading is either "toevallen" (accidentia) or "wijzen" (modification es). See Opera, I, p. 114 and p. 603. Cf. G. T. Richter, Spinozas philosophi sche Terminologie (Leipzig, 1913), p. 85, n. 507.
1
Locke, too, substituted the term
"mode"
13,
19).
for
"accident"
(cf.
Essay concern-
ing
Human
Understanding,
II, 12,
3;
Leibniz, in his criticism of Locke,

(cf.
however,
tries to reinstate the
term "accident"
Nouvtaux Essais,
II, 13,
19).
PROP, i]
it
MODE
new
67
defini-
read as the diametrical opposite of his entirely tion of mode.
In mediaeval philosophy the definition of substance mediately followed by the classification of substances.
the
is
imto
As
method by which
the different classes of substances are
deduced, something
fice it for
will
be said in another connection. Suf-
the present that the mediaevals speak invariably of four or five substances, including matter, form, concrete
object, soul,
and the separate Intelligences

will recognize as a
a classification
which the reader
composite view
made
up of several statements
sible of existence,'*
made by
Aristotle. 2
stances belong to a class of being which is 3 with which is contrasted a single, unique " " known as the Necessary of Existence 4 or God. The Being
relation
All these sub" termed the pos-
between these two kinds of Being
is
that of cause
the mediaeval
and
effect.
Now,
generally speaking,
it
is
view that thd Necessary of Existence or God cannot be called substancel even though He is in himself, for God cannot be
subsumed with other things under

acteristic
zali,
is
s
a general term.
Char-
statements on this point are to be found in AlgaAsher Crescas, 6 and Moses ha-Lavi. 7 But while this view
it is
generally admitted,
1
still
maintained by Augustine, 8
cf.
Cf.
Makavd al-Falasijah
II,
(p. 82);
Shahrastani, ed. Cureton, p. 365;

4123, 19.
my
Crescas' Critique of Aristotle^ p. 575.

3
Cf. Metaphysics, VII, 10, io35a,
i,
and De Anima,
II, i,
3"inD,
*
->^^1 V^J- C(
ii
Cogitata Metaphysica,
I, i.
t\talfa$id al-Falasifah, II,

it
of existence, just as
"Eleventh, that of Him who is necessary cannot be said that He is an accident so it cannot be said that
(p. 144):
He
6
is
a substance."
I,
Commentary on Moreh Nebukim^
57 (2):
"But He
is
neither a substance nor
an accident."
'
Maamar
Elohi:
sary of existence does not of the other categories."

8
"It has already been demonstrated that He who is necescome under the category of substance nor under any
De
Trinitate t VI, 5 (Migne, Patrologia Latina> Vol. 42, Col. 928).
68
1

2
[ETHICS,
that God can be called subGersonides, and Descartes stance provided only that He is understood to be a substance unlike any other substance. Burgersdijck says explicitly that substance is divided into God and created being. 3
In view of this application of the term "substance

crete objects, which
"
to con-
must necessarily exist in some place, and which must necessarily exist in matter, and to soul, to form, which must reside in a body, a certain question naturally
arises in
our mind.
If at least three of the so-called sub-
stances in the Aristotelian classification always exist in something else, what, then, did the mediaevals mean when they
itself
distinguished substance from accident as that which is in should the and that which is in something else?
Why
snub-nosedness of Socrates, for instance, be called accident, on account of the existance of the snubness in Socrates' nose,
any more than Socrates'

Or,
soul,
why
should the
"
which equally exists
in his
body ?
redness" of a "red table" be called an

its
accident, on account of
existence in a table, any

in
more than
the table
is
itself,
which must exist
some
this
definite place, that
to say, in
some other body? For
is
the implication of
1
space according to Aristotle's definition of the term.
The mediaevals were not unaware

difficulty,
of the first-mentioned
and they answered
it
as follows:
An
accident
is
said to exist in something else as in a "subject,"

in
and
to exist
in
a subject
1
means
to exist in
something without
any
Milhamot Adonai, III, 3 (p. 132]: "You must know that there are certain atwhich must inevitably be attributed to God, as, for instance, the predication that God is substance, not that the term 'substance' is predicated of God and other beings as a common genus but it is predicated of them stcundum prius tt
tributes
posterius." Ibid., V, iii, 12 (p. 280): "It can also be shown that fully to be called substance than is any other being."
* *
God
is
more
truth-
Principia Philosophiac y
I,
51.
Institutiones Metaphysicae, Lib. II,
Cap.
I,
Thesis II:
"
Et substantiam deindc
subdividas in
<
Deum
4.
et
creaturam," Cf. quotation above
p. 64, n. 2.
Physics, IV,
PROP, i]
MODE
69
sense being the cause of the existence of that something. Incarnate soul, therefore, unlike snub-nosedness, is called
substance because, while existing in the body, it is the cause of the body's life, and for this very same reason is form called substance, since it confers upon matter, in which it is, actual
existence.
I
1
do not know whether the mediaevals have ever discussed

for
directly the second difficulty
answer
their
in
it
them from
their
we have raised, but we can easily own point of view and out of
own
statements.
To
say that a concrete object exists
something else, they would argue in the manner of Aristotle, may mean two things, either as a body exists in place or
Neither of these two kinds of
2 as a part exists in the whole.
existence in something else, however, makes a thing an accident, for in both these cases the thing might also exist without that something else. To exist in place, according to
Aristotle's definition of place,
means
is
to exist in
from which the occupant might be removed,

essential characteristics of place
3
for
another body, one of the
that
it
must be external
to the occupant. Then, again, in the case of existing in the whole as a part, the part can be removed from the whole, if it is a discrete quantity; and the part will have to be a sub-
stance like the whole,
only when
that
is,
a continuous quantity. It is a thing exists in something else as in a subject,

if it is
it
when
that
it is
called accident.
cannot exist by itself without its subject, The mediaevals could have found
support for this distinction in the following passage of Aristotle: "I mean by a thing being in a subject (vTroKel^pov) that which is in anything, not as a part, but so that it cannot exist separately from that
1
in
which
it
is."
The
red
Cf. my Crf seas' Critique of Aristotle, p. 573, n. 9. Physics, IV, 3, 2ioa, 16 and 24; Metaphysics, V, 23, 10233, 14-17.
Physics, IV, 4, 21
a,
ff.
<
Categories, 2, la, 24-25.
yo

is
[ETHICS,
table, therefore,
a substance, because
it
can exist without

to exist;
that particular place in

ness, however,
is
which
it
happens
the red-
redness,
it
an accident, because, as that particular cannot exist without that particular table.
it
This
is
how,
justified to their
appears to me, the mediaevals would have own satisfaction their formal distinction
between substance and accident and their application of the
term "substance" to concrete things. But I can see how Spinoza would have balked at such an explanation, and whoever has tried to approach the problems of philosophy by the same road as Spinoza, and to traverse the ground trod by
that ex-pupil of the Teshibat Ez llayyim of Amsterdam, cannot help feeling that these were the problems that passed
l
through his mind before he broke ground for the foundation of his new system. He would have argued against them somewhat as follows: It is true that concrete objects may be removed from the particular place in which they happen to be; still they cannot be removed from space in general.
Everything in the universe must exist in space, which, as has been said before, means in another body. This is an
Aristotelian
follow.
principle
which the mediaevals professed

all
to
Aristotle says something to the effect that
things
1 are in heaven (oupa^w),
logical
heaven to
by which he does not mean the theowhich martyrs and saints and others with
proper introductions are admitted to enjoy a life of eternal bliss and beatitude. What he means is that the universe,
which
is finite, is
all-surrounded by a sphere, which

if
is
the
all
outermost of a
the universe
series of concentric spheres, within
which
Consequently, everything within thus within something else, namely, within the outermost sphere, and if a substance must be in itself,
is
things exist as in space.
then nothing within the universe can be a substance.

1
Or,
Cf. Physics, IV, 2, 2cx)a, 33; IV, 4, 21 la, 24.
PROP, i]
MODE
71
in
other words, the red table can no more be a substance than the redness.
It is reasoning like this, if
not exactly this very same

artificial
reasoning, that
must have
led Spinoza to reject the mediaeval
distinction between substance
and accident, and the
distinction of existing in something else and existing in a subject. Everything that is in something else in any sense or
manner, he seems to say, cannot be a substance. "That there is no such thing as a finite substance" is the starting point of his philosophy, and indeed it is the statement with which he
tise J
begins his investigation of "What God Is," in his Short Treawhich is a kind of Urethik. It is a challenge hurled at all
the mediaeval philosophers, ulemas, rabbis, and schoolmen alike, for they were all nursed by the same mother and fed
from the same source.
It denies the application of the
term
"substance" to
finite
things within the universe.
Thus in one
of his Dialogues, Reason, addressing Desire, says: "What you say, O Desire, that there are different substances, that, I
tell
you,
if
is false;
for I see clearly that there
is
exists
through
itself,
and
is
a support to
all
but One, which other attributes.

as sub-
And
you
will refer to the material
and the mental
stances, in relation to the
modes which are dependent upon must also call them modes in relation to them, why then, you the substance on which they depend." 2 Note that he does
not reject the generally accepted definition of substance; on the contrary, he insists upon its rigid application. Only that
which
is
really
stance, and
so only that
and absolutely in itself can be called subwhich is called the Necessary of
Existence or
be truly called substance. All the other things which belong to the so-called possible of existence are not substances; they are what the mediaevals would have
called accidents, but which Spinoza prefers to call
1
God can
by a new
9.
I, 2.
Short Treatise,
I,
First Dialogue,
72
[ETHICS,
name, modes, seeing that they are not exactly what is generally meant by accident. He confines the term "accident"
to
one of
its
more
specific usages,
and distinguishes
is
it
from
mode
as follows:
"For accident
real being].
thought and exists only in For example, when

is
nothing but a mode of to this [whereas mode is a regard
the motion
mode
I say that a triangle is moved, not of the triangle but of the body
moved. Therefore,
an accident, but
for
in respect to the triangle,
motion
is
only
in respect to the
body,
it is real
being or
motion cannot be conceived without a body, but mode; it may without a triangle."
'
is
If our account of the processes of Spinoza's mind thus far right, we can readily see how at this point, with his re-
jection of finite substances
and with
his restricting the
term
"substance"
to
God
alone,
Spinoza was confronted with a
perplexing problem. How should he define those discarded substances which he has renamed modes? As for his real
substance, he could very well retain the old definition, being But could he just in itself, for God indeed is in himself.
something else? Spinoza could have used that definition if he had retained Aristotle's conception of a finite universe, bounded from
it is
as well say of
mode
that
that which
is in
without by an all-surrounding sphere, for then indeed all modes would have been within something else. But believing as Spinoza did in an infinite universe he could not natu-
speak of modes as existing in something else, by this meaning Aristotle's space. Nor, again, could he say that they existed in a "subject," for the term "subject" to him
rally
has no meaning at all. And yet, if substance is to be defined as that which exists in itself, mode will, of course, have to
be defined as that which exists in something else. But what might that something else be if it is not space nor subject?
1
Cogitata Metaphysica t
I, i.
PROP, i]
MODE
73
If
we were
justified in penetrating thus far
behind the
uttered statements of Spinoza in unfolding the hidden arguments that lie beneath them, we may be allowed to proceed
a little further with the same method and to go through the slow paces of this imaginary tentative reasoning of his until we arrive at a happy conclusion. We can clearly see how
Spinoza, in his groping for a new differentiation between substance and mode, would at first strike upon the other
sense in which, according to Aristotle, a thing is said to be in 1 something else, namely, as a part in the whole. Substance is thus the whole which exists in itself, whereas mode is the
part which exists in something arrived at a term with which
else.
Here
at last
we have
in
we
so often
meet
in
works
on Spinoza.
mind, steeped undoubtedly was and trained as it also was in its rigorous logical discipline, the term "whole'* would need further explanation. For there are several kinds
philosophic lore as
it
But
to Spinoza's
mediaeval
of wholes, 2 and which of these, he would ask himself, should he say is substance? The kind of whole that would probably
first
in
suggest itself to him as the most applicable in the case question would be that of a physical quantitative whole,
is simply the whole of the modes it is nothing but the universe, and the universe to Spinoza as to the mediaevals is something physical and quantitative. But such a
for if substance
conception of substance as merely the aggregate sum of the modes is contrary to all the uttered statements of Spinoza. To Spinoza's mediaeval mode of thinking the difficulty of
manner.
such a conception of substance would appear in the following A quantitative whole must be either discrete, conSubstance, however, could be neither
See also Short Treatise,
I,
sisting of heterogeneous parts, or continuous, consisting of
homogeneous
1
parts.
Cf. Physics, IV, 3, 2ioa, 16.
First Dialogue.
Metaphysics, V, 25.
74

It could
[ETHICS,
of these.
not be a discrete quantitative whole, because the modes, if their nature is to be judged by the two known modes, are each continuous. Even extension is continuous, for Spinoza
was an
Aristotelian, believing in the
continuity of matter. He was no atomist, and for this we have ample evidence in his discussion of infinity. 1 As for
the second alternative, there
self in
is
saying that substance
is
nothing contradictory in ita continuous quantitative
it is not impossible that Spinoza conceived a conbetween extension and thought. Still Spinoza would tinuity reject this conception. For if substance were only the aggregate sum of modes, how could one insist upon the unity
whole, for
and simplicity of substance without thereby declaring the between modes a mere illusion ? To such a view could by no means subscribe, for he was no mystic, Spinoza no idealist of the kind to whom everything that kicks and
differences
He was, many views to the a hard-headed, clear-minded emcontrary notwithstanding, piricist, like most of the mediaevals and like Aristotle.
knocks and
resists is unreal.
Spinoza will thus take a final step and declare that substance is a whole which exists over and above and beyond
the modes, and saying this he will rest his case. sound alarming and tantalizing, and it may also may appear as wholly inconsistent with what we have been accustomed to understand by Spinoza's repeated assertion that God is an immanent cause and not a transeunt cause.
the
sum of
This
But we shall see in a subsequent chapter that the term "immanence" as used by Spinoza in its application to substance
not contradictory to the term transcendence" in its original meaning of being more general. Quite the contrary, the
is
"
immanence of Spinoza's substance

manence. 2 Spinoza's substance
1
is
a transcendent im-
is
thus a whole transcending

2
See Epistola
12.
Cf. below,
Chapter VIII.
Cf. below, pp. 323
ff.
PROP, i]
MODE
75
the universe, the latter being the sum of the modes, and the relation of substance to the universe is conceived by him
after the
manner of
whole
in this particular case
the relation of the whole to the part, the being a universal of a special
kind, a real universal, as distinguished from the attributes which are only nominal universals. 1 By the same token,
when Spinoza speaks of thing (in alio) he means
the modes as existing in another that the modes, individually or in their aggregate totality, exist in substance in the same sense " as when Aristotle says that the ringer is in the hand and
2
generally the part in the whole/*
and that "man
is
in
animal and generally species in genus/* 3 The term "universal," however, carries associations which
would be only confusing in its use in connection with Spinoza. Aristotle himself would have simply spoken of genus and species. In Arabic and Hebrew literature philosophers also
speak of genus and species rather than of universals, though the latter term is not altogether unknown. 4 It is also significant that the famous passage
versals, just as
in
s
Porphyry's Isagoge
to
which
legendary history assigns the origin of the problem of uni-
grammar-school readers assign to the falling the origin of Newton's laws of motion even that apple of genera and species rather than of univerpassage speaks sals. Spinoza himself, though he makes use of the term "universal** quite frequently, says in
one place:
"Hence
the
fixed
be like universals to us, or, so to speak, the genera of the definitions of individual mutable 6 We shall therefore use here the term "genus,** things.'*
.
and eternal things
will
and describe Spinoza's conception of the

1
relation
between
a 3
Cf. below, pp. 327-328. Physics, IV, 3, 21 oa, 15-16.

Ibid., 2ioa,
1
8.
I,
Moreh Nebukim,
6
51.
Ch.
I.
fractatus de Intellectus Emendatione,
101 (Opera,
I, p.
37,
11.
5-8).
76

its
[ETHICS,
mode and substance

and
genus.
as that between the individual essence
We
now come
to the last step in
totelian logic, universal terms like
perform certain functions
in
genus and "species" the formation of concepts. They
"
our argument. In Aris"
are the elements, or rather the causes, in the terms of which the individual essence of a thing, the "what" of it, can be
conceived.
his
They form
its definition.
Man
is
thus conceived
genus "animal" and his species "rational," and through he is thus also defined by the combination of these two terms.
And
so everything that
is
in
something
else, as
an individual
in its genus,
thing
else.
mode
it is
as
"
may be thus said to be conceived by that someThis is what Spinoza means by his definition of
is
that which
in
it, namely, as the individual Substance, on the contrary, "is in itself" absolutely, and "is conceived through itself," inasmuch as it is a summum genus. But to be conceived through itself is really
sense that
conceived"; that is it is conceived through
another thing through which also to say, it is in another thing in the
in its genus.
means
This
a negation. It does not mean anything positively. All it is that it cannot be conceived through anything else.
"That is the significance of Axiom II, which reads: which cannot be conceived through another must be conthrough
itself
itself." The emphasis is that to be conceived merely means not to be conceived through
ceived through
something
substance
else.
is
implication therefore is that Spinoza's inconceivable, and its essence undefinable and
1
The
hence unknowable.
Thus
cation
the mediaeval definition of the term "substance"

its
has not undergone any change in Spinoza, though
appli-
was
is
restricted only to
God.
It is still defined as that

its
which
1
in itself.
Even
the additional fact of
being a
Cf. below, p. 142.
PROP, i]
MODE
is
77
it
summum genus,
undefinable and unknowable,
not new;
is a mediaeval commonplace. That unique substance, God, was thus conceived throughout the Middle Ages among
rational theologians.
stands alone in the views he

like
Says Maimonides, and he by no means is about to utter, for passages can be gathered at random from many a book: these
is
"There
sence of God.'*
no possibility of obtaining a knowledge of the esAgain he says: "The object is described

r
by
its definition, as, for
example,
.
.
man
is
described as a being
that lives and has reason.
All agree that this kind of
description cannot be given of God; for there are no previous causes to His existence, by which He could be defined: and
on that account
philosophers,
it is
a well-known principle, accepted
by
all
who
are precise in their statements, that no
definition can be given of
God."
That the something

stance and that
essence to
tion
I.
else in
which the modes are

in
is
sub-
mode
is
is
related to substance as the individual
Proposiproposition affirms the priority of substance to its 3 affections, i.e. modes, which is a truly Aristotelian principle, for the genus, according to him, is prior to, and better known
its
genus
clearly set forth
by Spinoza
The
4 than, the individual.
But of
particular interest
is
the ex-
pression "prior in nature" (prior est natura) used by Spinoza. In Aristotle, the expression "prior in nature" (irpbrepov rf;
<t>v(Ti) is
used
in
more
excellent,
two senses: and second,
first, in
the sense of better
and
in the sense of being the
cause
of something. 5 In the latter sense it is very often used in Arabic and Hebrew as well as in Latin philosophic literature. But we find that the expression has acquired in the Middle
Ages an additional meaning, namely, as the more universal

1
Moreh Nebukim,
I, 59.
4
Ibid., I, 52.
Cf. below, Vol. II, pp. 193-194.

Categories, 12, 14!), 4
ff.
Topics, VI, 4, i4ia, 26
ff.
78

is
1
[ETHICS,
to the less universal, as, for example, animality
prior in
legiti-
nature to humanity.
This seems to be nothing but a
mate extension of
genus
is
2 vidual essence.
use in the sense of "cause/* for the considered by Aristotle as the cause of the indiits
Or
it
may
also reflect Aristotle's statement
that the whole
is
3 prior in nature to the parts.
rightly says that "substance fections" (Prop. I).

1
is
prior in its
Spinoza thus nature to its af-
Maba$id al-Falasifah,
II,
(p. 119):
is
"With
regard to [prior] in nature, as

in nature, as, for instance,
when
we
is
say, for instance, animality
prior to humanity."
Millot ha-Higgayon, Ch. 12:

prior to
"Second, prior
animal
man."
prior in nature to
the
Ruah Jfen, Ch. 8: "In the same way you say that animals are human species." Duns Scotus, Qiiaestiones in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum^
2,
Lib. II, Dist.
1,
Quaest.
No.
.
3:
. .
"Hie
dicit
Primo
a
3
positive
sicut est
Doctor quod prius natura potest dupliciter accipi. de animali et rationali in homine, quia prius natura
positive animal praecedit rationale."
Analytica Posteriori, II, 2, 903, 31.

Politics, I, 2, 12533, 19-20.
CHAPTER
IV
UNITY OF SUBSTANCE
I
IN HIS definition of substance we have seen how Spinoza, reasoning from the mediaeval definition of the term, has arrived at the conclusion that conditional being can in no sense
whatever be called substance. The term is to be applied only to Necessary Being, or God. With this as a starting point, Spinoza now proceeds, in the First Part of the Ethics to de',
scribe the properties of substance, beginning in Propositions II-VI with a discussion of its unity, which in manner of
treatment, as we shall endeavor to show, runs along the line of the mediaeval discussions of the unity of God. It is philosophic dualism of which Spinoza's discussion of
the unity of substance is aimed to be a refutation, just as theological dualism was the target of mediaeval discussions of the unity of God. The philosophy against which Spinoza
took the field, starting with the Aristotelian distinction of matter and form, passed through a hierarchy of beings until
it
ultimately arrived, again like Aristotle, at a being, unique and absolute, who is pure form. In this philosophy, it may
is
be said, there
did
it
to be discerned a twofold dualism.
posit in the
world
itself a
or, as it
was better known
Not only of matter and form, duality in the fashionable philosophy of

and thought, but
it
Spinoza's
own
time, of extension
also
maintained the duality of a material, multifarious, changeable world and an immaterial, simple, immutable God, who is
pure form, whose essence
is
thinking. Matter and form,
thought, and whose activity is in the traditional terminology,
8o

all
[ETHICS,
concrete beings, which are also called substances; and by the extension of the 1 term "substance/' for which he had several precedents,
are two substances, which combined form
Spinoza speaks of the mediaeval contrast between God and the world again as a contrast between two substances. It
is
upon
this latter
phase of dualism, the existence of an imis
material
God
over against a material world, that Spinoza
warring whenever we find him contending against the existence of two substances, in the Ethics as well as in the Short
'Treatise.
The
is
object of Spinoza's criticism of this kind of dualism
not to abolish the materiality of the world, but rather to abolish the immateriality of God. He will endeavor to show
that
the assumption of an absolutely immaterial God is incompatible with the relation which the mediaevals as-
sumed
to obtain
between
God and
of cause and
effect.
He
it
will thus
the world, namely that introduce into his discus-
sion of the unity of substance the

first
problem of creation
the
might be said, which the mediaeval religious thinkers encountered when they attempted to
serious problem,
identify the Aristotelian pure form, a
mere
logical concept,
with the personal
God of tradition, and
to use it as a
working
hypothesis to explain the origin of a created world as well as its governance. The difficulties of the theory of creation, of which the mediaevals were not unaware, were many and varied, all arising out of the conception of God as an immaterial,
simple,
and immutable being, combined with the Neo-
platonic principle that "a simple element can produce only a simple thing." 2 Spinoza will hardly bring out new difficulties which have not already been thought of and fully discussed and answered by the mediaevals themselves, but he will insist that their answers are a kind of special pleading
1
See above, pp. 67-68.
Moreh Nebukim,
II, 22.
PROPS. 2-6]
UNITY OF SUBSTANCE
81
which really does not solve the problem. Had the Ethics been written more scholastico rabbinicoque^ Spinoza would have prefaced his argument in Propositions II-VI with
to the following effect: We shall now proceed to demonstrate that there is no God distinguished from the world
words
after the
manner of two substances, one

For
to posit such a
spiritual
and the
other material.
God would
involve us
which you have yourselves noticed in the problem of creation, and from which, despite all your efforts, you have not been able to extricate yourselves comshall see that, even in their present form, these pletely.
in all the difficulties
We
five
propositions contain
a clear-cut,
single,
consecutive
argument which in its external, logical outline is modelled after the mediaeval reasoning against the hypothesis of two deities and which substantially embodies the principal
mediaeval arguments against creation.
To
the
mind of Spinoza,
it
would seem, the widely scattered

l
mediaeval discussions of the problem of the unity of God presented themselves in the form of a hypothetico-disjunctive syllogism. If there were two gods, either they would have to be absolutely unrelated to each other or there would have to be some kind of relation between them. He could
clearly see why the mediaevals these alternatives as untenable.
would have rejected both Two unrelated gods would
imply the existence of two independent worlds, for in one world there could be no adequate division of labor between
and two unrelated gods would contradict the very conception of God as something absolutely unrelated. To
them;
Spinoza discusses the problem of the unity of God directly in Cogitata Metaphysica, II, 2. He reproduces there two arguments which he characterizes as futile. Both these arguments are taken directly from Burgerdijck's Institutiones Metaphysicae. Lib. I, Cap. VI, but are also found in Emunot we-De'ot y II, i and 2, and in
1
(lo&ot ha-Lebabot,
I, 7,
First and Third Arguments.
Cf. Freudenthal,
Zeller
. .
"Spinoza und
die Scholastik," in Philosophische Aujs&tze>
Eduard
gewidmet^ p. in.
82
[ETHICS,
assume such a formulation of the problem in the mind of Spinoza is nothing but to rearrange the mediaeval discussions and weld them into one composite argument. God to the mediaevals meant the God of a world. Their conception of God, which was the hybrid product of the
joining together of the Aristotelian logical principle of prime mover, or first cause, with the Biblical ethical teaching of sources
a creator and supreme ruler, has derived from both these its main characteristic feature as that of cause and
creator.
cause and creator, however these terms may have become attenuated, must of necessity be the cause and cre-
ator of something.
sole activity,
tify itself in
God's thinking, which constitutes His

either
by necessity or by design objeca world at a certain stage in the process of
must
An idle, quiescent, passive God, a God who no world to operate upon, would be an impotent God has and an object of commiseration and pity, as the hero of Chamisso's story who was without a shadow. It therefore
emanation.
follows that, granting two absolutely independent deities, there would have to be two absolutely independent worlds. But the existence of more than one world was generally
agreed to be impossible. For this there was the overwhelming authority of Aristotle, who with an impressive array of arguments had shown in the latter part of the First Book of De
Caelo (Chs. VIII-IX) that the existence of many worlds was impossible. It would thus be necessary first to establish the possibility of many worlds before it could be assumed that
there
was more than one God; and,

to
in fact,
Crescas, in his
expose the flimsiness of the philosophic proofs for the unity of God, attacks the problem from that very
attempt
angle, showing that the existence of
more than one world
is
not impossible.
1
Or Adonai,
ff.,
I, ii,
15
and
19.
Cf.
my
Crescas' Critique of Aristotle, p. 217
and
pp. 472
n. 127.
PROPS. 2-6]
UNITY OF SUBSTANCE
83
Since there must be only one world, within that only

world, the argument would proceed, two absolutely independent and absolutely unrelated deities could not be con-
ceived to exist and at the same time be active.
"A duality could only be imagined in this way, either that at one time the one deity is active, the other at another time, or that
both act simultaneously, nothing being done except by both But either of these arrangements would be together."
'
inconsistent with the absolute independence and omnipotence and self-sufficiency of the deities. To say that the two
deities act each independently in their
own
spheres
is
likewise
impossible, for "the whole existing world is one organic Hence body, all parts of which are connected together. it is to assume that one deity is engaged in formimpossible
. . .
ing one part, and another deity in forming another part, of that organic body of which all parts are closely connected 2 Here, again, Crescas tries to disprove the philotogether."
sophic proof for unity by suggesting a possibility, with what success does not concern us here, of an adequate division of
labor between two gods within this organic world. 3 If two absolutely mutually independent deities are impossible, the mediaevals would then consider the case of two deities
having something
in
common. Such
in
deities,
however,
could not properly be called two unless

possessing something in
addition to their
thing in
be
to
in
common they also possessed somewhich they differed. But what would that something which they differed? Usually in things which are said
in
have something
is
differ the identity implied is that of a
common and something in which they common genus and the
diversity that of a
common
that of a specific difference, or the identity is species and the diversity is that of an inIt is for
dividual difference, such as accidental qualities.

'
March Nfbukim, Or Adonai^ I, ii,
II, i.
Ibid.
19.
84
[ETHICS,
between which there no generic or specific or individual difference, cannot be is " Whatsoever is not a body does not admit of the counted.
this reason that bodiless spiritual beings,
idea of
number except
individual forces
may
it be a force in a body, for then the be numbered together with the mat-
ters or subjects in
which they
exist."
If
two
deities therein
>
fore existed,
having something in
differed, they
common and something

to possess the
still
which they
would have
metaworse,
physical distinction of genus and species, or, they would have to possess physical qualities.
are contrary to the very nature of
lutely simple follows:
Both these
and
indivisible.
God, who must be absoThe argument is stated as

believes that there
is
"We
God
say to him
who
more
that the essence of the two gods must inevibe one or more than one. If he says the essence is one, tably then the thing is one, and there is not more than one Crea-
than one
tor; and if he says that the essence of the one deity is unlike that of the other, then it would be necessary to posit a cer-
tain difference
between them/'
There is only one way, the mediaevals would conclude, in which purely immaterial beings can be counted, and that is when they are related to each other as cause and effect. Such
the case of the Intelligences which preside over the spheres. Though immaterial, still they are numbered, their number
is
3 corresponding to that of the spheres. The basis for their to the view held by Avicenna, is that in number, according the process of emanation they proceed in succession from one
another, thus being the cause of one another. "It follows, therefore, that separate beings, which are neither bodies nor
forces in bodies,
1
do not admit of any idea of number except

II,
I,
Moreh Nebukim y
and
I,
Introduction, Prop. 16.

7 (4).
Cf.
Hobot ha-Lebabot y
75
(2).
Emunot
we-De'ot, II, 2,
and Moreh Ncbukim,
II, i,
3
See Moreh Nebukim, II,
4.
PROPS. 2-6]
UNITY OF SUBSTANCE
85
x
when they
are related to each other as cause and effect."
Number
deities.
however, could not be applied to two If two deities were postulated to exist, they could
in this sense,
effect,
not bear to each other the relation of cause and

being produced by
one
the other, for that would run counter to
the very conception of God as an uncaused being. "The hypothesis that there exist two gods is inadmissible, be-
cause absolutely incorporeal beings cannot be counted, ex2 cept as cause and effect."
This then
is
the mediaeval argument against a duality of
gods as we assume it was formulated in Spinoza's mind. It begins with the alternative that two deities either would
have
to
to be absolutely different
in
from each other or would have
the impossibility of the first alternative, proceeds to reason against the second alternative by pointing out that if two gods were not absoit
have something
common. Showing
lutely different from each other they would have to be absolutely the same, inasmuch as their natures could not be
divided by being partly different and partly the same. Nor, having the same nature, could they be differentiated by their relation to each other as cause and effect. Within this
framework Spinoza's
in logical order,
five propositions
arrange themselves
forming the following consecutive argument: There are no two substances, that is to say, an immaterial
a material world, for
if
God and
A.
there were, the following
two alternatives would be inevitable:

be absolutely different from the world, and " hence have nothing in common with it, for two substances
God would
having different attributes have nothing one another" (Prop. II). But then,
(i)
1
in
common
with
There could be no causal relation between God and
Ibid., II, Introduction, Prop. 16.

Ibid., II, i, First Proof.
86

the world, for
[ETHICS,
If two things have nothing in common one another, one cannot be the cause of the with other" (Prop. III).
"
B. Or,
ferent, but then,
God and the world would not be absolutely God and the world would have to be
dif-
ab-
solutely the same, for the following reasons: (1) Things are said to be two only when they differ in essential or accidental qualities, for "two or more
distinct things are distinguished
either
by
the
difference
from one another, of the attributes of the
substances, or by the difference of their affections"

(Prop. IV).
(2)
Consequently,
if
God and
the world were of the
same nature and
differed neither in accidental nor in
essential qualities, they could not be called two, for
"in nature there cannot be two or more substances of

the
(3)
same nature or attribute (Prop. V). To say that God and the world would
one
is
"
differ in so
far as
"one
impossible, for substance cannot be produced by another subis
the cause of the other
stance" (Prop. VI).
The
form
logical order of these propositions
and
their syllogistic
thus quite apparent. But we must clothe this bare, skeleton-like outline with a body, in order to give to the propositions meaning and weight. Spinoza does not manipis
ulate his terms according to certain rules of the
game, as
if
they were pawns on the chess-board, for the mere pleasure of the play. There is always some concrete application in
his reasoning.
His propositions and their proofs, whenever are not an interpretation of facts of nature, are to be they taken as a criticism of the philosophy upon which he was
Proposition II contains Spinoza's restatement of the me-
nurtured.
PROPS. 2-6]
UNITY OF SUBSTANCE
87
diaeval view concerning the distinction between God and the world. The essence of God, according to this view, is so
different from the essence of the world that
no attribute can
be predicated of them in the same, or in any related, sense.

All terms used in describing the divine nature are to be taken as homonymous terms, none of them having the meaning
associated in our mind, and none of them conveying to our mind any direct knowledge of the divine nature,
with which
it is
which must always remain unknowable and ineffable. When the mediaevals speak of a knowing God or a living God they
do not mean to attribute to God a kind of knowledge or life which he shares in common with other beings, for knowledge and life in their application to God must have an absolutely different and unique meaning. "When they ascribe
to
God
essential attributes, these so-called essential attri-
butes should not have any similarity to the attributes of other things, and should according to their own opinion not
be included in one and the same definition, just as there is no similarity between the essence of God and that of other
beings/'
no way
a decisive proof that there is, in or sense, anything common to the attributes predi-
Again, "this
is
cated of God, and those used in reference to ourselves; they
have only the same names, and nothing else is common to them." 2 Referring to this view, Spinoza says: "Two substances having different attributes have nothing in common with one another" (Prop. II) that is to say, when the
same
attributes, predicated of
two substances, are homony-
mous
terms, used in absolutely different and unrelated senses, the predication of these attributes does not imply any real
relationship in the essence of the
two substances. The term
attributa in this proposition should be taken
sense of predicates, which, as will be

1
shown
simply in the in another
March Nebukim,
I,
56.
Ibid.
88

is
1
[ETHICS,
is
chapter,
one of the senses
in
which the term

is
used by
Spinoza.
The
refutation of this view
given in Proposition III.
Spinoza seems to be challenging the mediaevals in the following words: If you say that the divine nature is absolutely different from the nature of the world, how then can you interpret your traditional creation, as most of you do, in terms of emanation and call your creative God an emanative cause?
The theory of emanation maintains

verse with
all its
that the entire uni-
manifold
finite
infinite divine nature, the
the unfolding of the beings of its thinking. There is product

is
nothing in the universe which is not involved in the nature of God, and nothing happens in the universe which does not
emanate from Him. "Inasmuch as it has been demonstrated that God is incorporeal and has also been established that the universe is His work and that He is its efficient cause.
.
emanation and that God
say that the universe has been created by divine is the emanative cause of everythat comes into being within it/' 2 It is for this reason thing that God is said to know particulars by virtue of His knowl. .
We
3 edge of himself; it is also for this reason that it is said that by our contemplation upon the nature of the universe we may
arrive at the
relation
4 knowledge of the nature of God. This /kind of which God is said to bear to the world is a causal
relation of a particular kind, unlike the causal relation of corporeal agents to the objects upon which they operate. It
is
called
emanative causation. "Inasmuch as the actions of
the purely incorporeal Intelligence are clearly manifest in the world, and they are especially manifest in every case of
1
Cf. below, p. 228.
2 3
Morch Ncbukim, II, 12. See Milhamot Adona /, III, 4

See Robot ha-Lebabot,
II,
(p. 138),
and Or Adonai^
II,
i,
(p.
32b).
Cf. be-
low, Vol. II, p. 14.

<
I ff.
PROPS. 2-6]
UNITY OF SUBSTANCE
89
change that does not originate in the mere combination of elements, we cannot escape the conclusion that this agent,
definite distance.
is
not being corporeal, does not act by impact nor at a certain The action of the incorporeal Intelligence
always termed emanation, on account of its similarity to a

*
water-spring."
duced
even
This principle of emanation, which was primarily introto obviate the difficulty of how an incorporeal agent could act upon a corporeal object, was found to be insufficient
in the eyes of the
mediaevals, whose strictures upon this point will be quoted later. Even after interposing a series of immaterial intermediaries between God and the
world, they were
still
harassed by the question
how
could
matter ultimately arise if it were not to be found originally in the nature of God. One of the solutions offered is that God as
the emanative cause of the universe does not act by necessity but
by
volition,
and consequently
all
variety in nature,
due
to the existence of matter, as well as
matter
itself, is
2
to
be attributed to the design and determination of God. The principal points in this mediaeval view, so far as
are here concerned, are three.
we
God
is
the emanative cause
of the world, with all that it implies. But God is immaterial, and how could a material world emanate from Him ? The
answer
is
that
God
acts
this,
In opposition to
and design. denies the immateriality of Spinoza

by
volition
in
God
as well as will
and design
His action.
He
does not
hesitate to speak of
God
as the cause of the world, but he
insists that the causality
must be mechanical and not intenthink that
tional.
As against
those
"who
God is a free cause,"
and that He creates "by a certain absolute will," he argues that "I think that I have shown with sufficient clearness
1
Moreh Nebukim y
Ibid., II, 22.
II, 12.
90
(Prop.

XVI)
infinite nature, infinite things in infinite
all
[ETHICS,
His
say
that from the supreme power of God, or from ways, that is to
things,
by
the
same
necessity, in the
have necessarily flowed, or continually follow same way as it follows from the
*
nature of a triangle, from eternity and to eternity, that its three angles are equal to two right angles." This conception of God as a necessary cause is laid down by Spinoza
in
Axioms III, IV, and V, at the beginning of Ethics, I. The term "cause'* which occurs in these axioms is to be taken as
God, or substance,
he affirms that
in its relation to
referring specifically to
the world. In
sity:
Axiom
III,
God
acts
by neces-
a given determinate cause an effect necessarily " Since God acts by necessity and not by volition, follows. there is nothing in the nature of the world that is not in
the nature of
"From
God; the two must be mutually implicative. "The knowledge of an effect depends upon and involves
(Axiom IV), for "those things which have nothing mutually in common with one another cannot through one another be mutually understood, that is to say, the conception of the one does not involve the conthe knowledge of the cause
"
ception of the other his own premise that

the mediaevals that
"
(Axiom V). Starting,
therefore, with
God
if
by necessity, he argues against God's nature be essentially different

acts
from the nature of the world, He could not be the cause of the world, for "if two things have nothing in common with
one another, one cannot be the cause of the other" (Prop. III). In an earlier version of the same Proposition, the argument is stated more directly: "That which has not in itself
something of another thing, can also not be a cause of the

existence of such another thing" a that is to say, if God is immaterial, He cannot be the cause of a material world.
-
Ethics, I, Prop. 17, Schol.
Short Trfatisf, Appendix
I,
Axiom
5.
PROPS. 2-6]
UNITY OF SUBSTANCE
that
91
Spinoza, however, knew
by
this
he had not yet fully
succeeded in reducing his opponents to silence. To tell them that God could not be the cause of the material world, if He
were assumed to be immaterial, would only evoke the reply that it was just to meet this difficulty that emanation was
introduced to take the place of direct creation. God as the direct cause of matter would indeed be impossible. But emanation claims only that
God
is
the cause of a single Intelli-
gence, a purely spiritual being, as devoid of matter as God himself. It is this pure spirit of which God is the cause;
and matter proceeds not directly from God but from the Intelligences. "In accordance with this axiom, Aristotle holds that the direct emanation from God must be one simple Again, "from the NecesIntelligence, and nothing else/'
1
sary Existent only one thing can proceed without an intermediary, but many things can proceed from Him by order of succession and through intermediaries." 2 Reduced to Spinoza's terminology, it may be said that there are two substances, namely, God and the first Intelligence, who are reshould that be lated to each other as cause and effect.
Why
impossible?
The answer
and VI,
in
to this
is
to be found in Propositions IV, V,

will
which Spinoza
endeavor to show that the
in-
terposition of incorporeal intermediaries was merely a makeshift and did not really solve the problem how a purely
spiritual
God
could produce a material world.
begin with, Spinoza repeats the question raised with respect to the hypothesis of two deities, namely, by virtue
To
of what could
God and
the
first
Intelligence be called two? In
order to be susceptive of number, things must be distinguished either as separate substances or as separate modes;
1
Moreh Nfbukim^ II, 22. Makajid al-Falasifah II,

y
ii,
10 (p. 143).
92
or, to
[ETHICS,
put it in the words used by Spinoza elsewhere, the distinction between them must be either realis or modalis y for
l
extramental being, that is, real being (ens reale), as distinguished from fictitious being (ens ficturri) and being of reason (ens rationis)? must be either substance or mode.
Hence Proposition IV: "Two or more distinct things are distinguished from one another, either by the difference of the attributes of the substances, or by the difference of their
affections.
"
he endeavors to prove that the first Intelligence, in the mediaeval theory, could not be distinguished from God and still have something in com-
Continuing
this line of reasoning,
mon
with Him, but that the two would have to be either
absolutely different or absolutely identical. God and the first Intelligence, he argues, could not be said
to be distinguished
from each other
in part of their nature, that is to say,
common and something in since God is the highest genus, He could not share anything in common with any other being, as that would constitute His genus. If God is therefore to be distinguished from the first Intelligence realiter^ He will have to differ from the latter in His entire nature, having no attribute in common
thing in
by differing only by their having somewhich they differed. For
realiter
with
by
it. Spinoza thus says: "If they are distinguished only difference of attributes, it will be granted that there is
but one substance of the same attribute (Prop. V, Demonst.). God and the first Intelligence would therefore have to be
absolutely different from each other. Still less could it be said that God and the
differed in accidental qualities.
first
Intelligence
Spinoza does not attempt to refute this on the ground that the mediaeval immaterial God
1
Short Treatise , Appendix

Cf. Cogitata Mttaphysica y
I,
Prop.
I,
Demonst.
I, I.
Cf. below, p. 161.
PROPS. 2-6]
UNITY OF SUBSTANCE
93
qualities which are He knew quite well that for the mediaeaccidental to matter. vals that would form no obstacle. They could interpret
and pure Intelligences could not possess
these qualities atrributed to God and the Intelligences in the same way as they interpreted the divine attributes, namely, either as external relations/ or as actions and nega-
He attacks it, however, from another angle. He seems to say to his imaginary opponents: However you would take these qualities, as relations, actions, or negations, you would
tions.
2
have to admit that they are something external; that they are distinctions existing only in relation to our own mind, and
in
their
no way affecting the nature of God and the Intelligence. In own nature and essence, therefore, God and the Intel-
ligence
would be identical and hence one.
To quote him:
"But
if
since substance
they are distinguished by difference of affections, is prior by nature to its affections (Prop. I),
the affections therefore being placed on one side, and the substance being considered in itself, or, in other words (Def. 3 and Ax. 6), truly considered, it cannot be conceived as dis-
tinguished from another substance'' (Prop. V, Demonst.). The upshot of this is that God and the first Intelligence
would have to be either absolutely different or absolutely identical, inasmuch as "in nature there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute" (Prop. V).
Spinoza would have been quite
in
satisfied,
on mere
logical
grounds, assuming that God and the first Intelligence are of absolutely the same nature and are to be distinguished
only
in so far as the
former
is
related to the latter as cause
But he would insist that this identity would mean that both God and the Intelligence must be material; that is to say, they must have extension as one of their attributes.
to effect.
1
Cf. Cuzariy II, I, and Emunah Ramah t II, iii. Cf. Moreh Nebukim, I, 52 and 58. Cf. below, pp. 143-144.
94

shall see, is
1
[ETHICS,
His own view, as we

a doctrine.
only a modified form of such

far
But the mediaeval thinkers were

all
from ac-
knowledging such an identity. They were
agreed on the
absolute immateriality of God, though there was some difference of opinion as to the immateriality of the Intelligences.
Matter makes
its first
appearance
in
the Intelligences them-
selves, according to those
who
like
it
Ibn Gabirol held the In-
telligences to be material, or
arises
from the particular
nature of the Intelligences, according to those who believed that while the Intelligences are immaterial they possess in
their nature a certain possibility
which ultimately gives
rise
consider God to matter. In either case, they ent from the Intelligences; and still they all agree that God is the cause of the Intelligences. The difficulty raised by
all
to be differ-
in Proposition III thus occurs again, and is restated him in Proposition VI: "One substance cannot be proby duced by another." Proposition VI, as will have been noticed, is a repetition
Spinoza
of Proposition III, and in fact its demonstration is based upon the latter proposition. Likewise the second demonstration of the Corollary of Proposition VI is a reproduction of the demonstration of Proposition III. Furthermore, in
dix
a letter from Oldenburg (Epistola III), as well as in AppenI to the Short 'Treatise^ the equivalents of Proposition III are given as axioms upon which the equivalents of Proposition
VI are based
in
occur
some
as propositions. That both these should the Ethics as propositions would seem to need explanation. However, in the light of the logical out-
line in
which we have shown these propositions to be conis
nected, there
repetition.
ample justification
for this
seemingly useless
Our
1
discussion of these five propositions
may
be brought
Cf. below, pp. 2i8ff.
PROPS. 2-6]
UNITY OF SUBSTANCE
95
by the following remark on the Corollary in VI. The Corollary begins with the statement, Proposition "Hence it follows that there is nothing by which substance
to a conclusion
("Hinc sequitur substantiam ab alio non posse "), and ends with a similar statement, produci "Therefore absolutely there is nothing by which substance can be produced" ("Ergo substantia absolute ab alio produci
can be produced"
non potest"). In Short Treatise^ I, 2, the proof of the third " that one substance cannot produce another/' proposition,
same as Proposition VI in Ethics I, is given as follows: "Should any one again maintain the opposite, we ask whether the cause, which is supposed to produce this substance, has or has not the same attributes as the produced [substance]. The latter is impossible, because something cannot come from nothing/' Similarly in the proof of the first proposition given in the foot-note in the same chapwhich
is
the
',
ter of the Short 'Treatise it is said that, if there
were a
finite
would necessarily have something which it would have from nothing." Likewise in Epistola IV to
substance, "it
Oldenburg Spinoza produces Proposition

as follows:
III,
which he proves
"Nam quum
nihil sit in effectu
commune cum
In the light causa, totum, quod of all these passages, the conclusion of the Corollary here may be interpreted to mean as follows: Therefore, if substance
haberet, haberet a nihilo."
could be absolutely produced, it would have to be produced from nothing (Ergo, si substantia absolute produci posset, a
nihilo deberet produci).
The main point

if
of the Corollary
would thus be
to
show that
the material world were pro-
duced by an immaterial God, something would be produced from nothing. The force of this argument as well as its historical background will be dealt with in the second part
of this chapter, in the discussion of the Short Treatise, to
which we now turn.
96

II
[ETHICS,
The second chapter of

which bears the
tions
the First Part of the Short Treatise,

Is," is again, like Proposia criticism of mediaeval dualism.
will therefore occasionally
"
title
What God
I,
II-VI of the Ethics,

this
Our comments upon

have
to dwell
chapter
upon matters which have already been dealt
with in our discussion of the Ethics. Whenever such a repetition occurs, it is to be excused on the ground that it could not be avoided, unless we preferred to be economical at the ex-
pense of clearness and completeness. Mediaeval dualism considers God as something essentially different from the world. God is pure form; the world is material.
all
As a corollary of this, the world is conceived to have the imperfections of which God as pure spirit is free. The
is
world
furthermore the creation of God; the world
is
thus
called conditional being whereas God is absolute being. Since creation is assumed to be in time, the world is still further
contrasted with
God
l
as the created substance with the un-
created substance
or as the temporal with the eternal. The creation of the world was not by a single act but rather by a of emanation. Matter did not come directly from process
God;
it
has
made
its
appearance at a certain stage
in
the
devolution of the issue of divine thought. thought, and His only activity is thinking.
thinking
is
God
But
is
pure
as His
thought, known
a creative power, it becomes objectified in a as Intelligence, which, while immaterial like

is
himself, according to one of the prevailing views, 2 of a less perfect order, inasmuch as by its nature it is
God
only
possible being,
this
thought of
1
having a cause Intelligence, which

Deo"
for
is
its
existence.
The
said to possess a dual

Mctaphysica,
I, 2.
"de substantia increata, sive de Cf. above, p. 91, and below, p. 223.
Cf.
in Cogitata
PROPS. 2-6]
UNITY OF SUBSTANCE
97
another Intelligence and a sphere. nature, So the process goes on until at a certain stage crass matter appears which is the basis of the sublunar world. The world thus possesses imperfections which are not found in
objectifies itself in
the original thinking essence of God. In the language of Spinoza these mediaeval contrasts befinite
God and the world are expressed in the phrases "insubstance*' and "finite substance." It is Spinoza's purpose in his discussion of "What God Is" to abolish this
tween
dualism between the thinking essence of
God and
the
ma-
terial, or extended, essence of the world, to identify God " with the wholeness of nature, and to conclude that we posit He begins in the first extension as an attribute of God."
I
proposition by denying the old conception of a hierarchy of substances falling into a general division of spiritual and material substances, or infinite and finite, asserting "that there
substance; but that every substance must be in2 If the mediaevals therefore finitely perfect in its kind." to speak of the world as an emanation of the are pleased
is
no
finite
divine thinking essence, that divine thinking essence must contain the material element of which the world is made,
"that
is
to say, that in the infinite
understanding no sub-
stance can be more perfect than that which already exists in nature." 3
this proposition by the method employed him elsewhere, 4 ex absurdo contradictor 10^ for "should any by one want to maintain the opposite, we would ask the follow-
Spinoza proves
ing question." Suppose, he says, God is a purely immaterial being and beside Him there is a material created substance.
The
1
question would then be raised:

I, 2,
11. 1
how
did this material
Short Treatise y
Ibid.,
8 (Opera, I, p. 24,
1.
n).
Ibid. (p. 20,
11.
>
2 (p. 19,
ff.).
6-7).
<
Cf. below, pp. 183,378.
98

You would have
[ETHICS,
world come into being?
to resort to the
various theories of creation offered by the mediaevals.
But
none of these
is
free
from insurmountable
difficulties.
And
hereupon Spinoza proceeds to discuss some of the difficulties of creation and their attempted solutions by the mediaevals.
In the classic writings of Jewish philosophers the discussion of the problem of creation opens with a consideration of
the Epicurean theory of a world having a beginning in time but without necessarily having come into existence through " a God. Says Saadia: After it had become perfectly clear
that all things are created, I began to inquire whether could have been produced by themselves or whether they they could not have been produced except by some agent not themselves/' x Says also Bahya: "The propositions by which
to
me
may
be proved that the world has a creator by whom it has been created from nothing are three: First, a thing cannot
it
produce
after
For anything coming into existence itself. has been without existence must inevitably satisfy
.
either one of these conditions
either
it
has come into ex-
istence through itself or
a cause not itself/' 2
has come into existence through Similar allusions to a theory of creait
tion through itself, or what is better known as creation by 3 4 chance, abound also in the writings of Maimonides, Ger-
sonides,
and Crescas. 6 Descartes,

in the
too, formulates the prob-
lem of creation
it
form of a disjunctive proposition: "But

itself
seems to
me
to be self-evident that everything that exists
springs from a cause or from
considered as a cause/'
Following his masters, Spinoza similarly begins his

1
in-
Em tin of we-De' of
y
I, 2.
Ifobot ha-Lebabot^
I, 5.
Cf. below, p. 318.
4 *
6
7
Moreh Nebukim II, 13 and 20. Milhamot Adonai y VI, i, 6. Or Adonai, III, i, 3 (p. 635). Primae Rcsponsiones (Oeuvres, VII,
p. 112,
11.
3-5).
PROPS. 2-6]
UNITY OF SUBSTANCE
1 *
99
quiry by asking "whether this substance is finite through or whether it is thus finite through its cause. itself.
1
.
.
Spinoza's refutation of this
first
alternative
is
found
in
two
versions, one given in the text and the other in the footnote. The latter is not much unlike the refutation given by
Saadia.
self,
It
reads as follows: "It could not have done so
it-
its
because having been infinite it would have had to change whole essence/' 2 The following is Saadia's answer: "If
we take any of the existent things and assume it to have made itself, we know that after its coming into existence it must possess a still greater power and ability to create something like itself. If it could therefore produce itself when it was weak and in a state of non-existence, it should be able
to
produce something
like itself after it
has become powerful
and attained a state of existence. Seeing, however, that it cannot produce something like itself when it is powerful, certainly it could not have produced itself when it was
weak/'
tions
is
3
The underlying assumption in both these refutathat the substance, having made itself, could not so
change its nature as to become less powerful or less infinite than before it has made itself. It is somewhat like the following argument quoted from Suarez by those who objected " If anything is self-derived and does not against Descartes:
issue
from a cause,
it is
necessarily unlimited
and
infinite."
Thus disposing of creation through itself, Spinoza takes up the second alternative suggested by the mediaevals, namely, that "it is made finite by its cause, which is necessarily
God."
Against
this alternative
is
Spinoza raises three
objections, one of which

1
found both
11.
in the text
and
in the
Ibid.,
3
< s
Short Treatise, I, 2, 3 (Opera, I, p. 20, 2, note 2 (p. 19, 11. 20-21). Emu not we-De'ot, I, 2.
p. 95,
11-13).
Primae Objectiones (Oeuvres, VII,

Short Treatise,
I, 2,
11. 11.
16-18). 17-18).
4 (Opera,
I, p.
20,
loo
foot-notes;
It
is
[ETHICS,
my
the other two are given only in the foot-notes. purpose to show that these arguments are directed
against mediaeval attempts to remove two great difficulties with regard to the theory of creation, and furthermore to show that Spinoza's arguments themselves are taken from
the mediaeval discussions.
One of
the difficulties about creation in time which the

is its
mediaevals grappled with

the omnipotence
obvious inconsistency with

or,
Maiwants, changes, and it, An omnipoobstacles are absent from the essence of God." tent and immutable God could not be conceived as being active at one time and inactive at another. And then, too,
as
and immutability of God,

"
monides puts
with the belief
that
all
why
tion?
is
did
God
choose one time rather than another for creathe argument from Maimonides: "An agent and inactive at another, according
.
To quote
active at one time
As, not subject to accidents which could bring about a change in His will, and is not affected by obstacles and hindrances that might appear or disappear, it is im. .
as favorable or unfavorable circumstances arise.

is
however, God
possible, they argue, to imagine that
God
is
active at one
time and inactive at another/'
In answer to this difficulty, Maimonides draws a distinction between the actions of God and the actions of created
beings.
Human
is
action
is
an exercise of power, or free
will,
which
dependent upon external conditions; God's action an exercise of pure or absolute will and is entirely selfis sufficient. "Every being that is endowed with free will and
performs certain acts in reference to another being, necessarily interrupts those acts at one time or another, in con1
Morth Ncbukim,
III,
i,
II, 18.
Ibid.y II, 14, Sixth

i.
Method.
Cf.
Milhamot Adonai, VI,
i,
3 (p. 299), and
Or
Adonai)
PROPS. 2-6]
UNITY OF SUBSTANCE
.
101
.
.
sequence of some obstacles or changes. circumstances change his will, and the
with obstacles,
is
will,
Thus changed when it meets

is
not carried into
effect.
This, however,
only the case when the causes of the actions are external; but when the action has no other purpose whatever but to fulfil
the will, then the will does not depend on the existence of
favorable circumstances.
The being endowed with
this will
need not act continually even in the absence of all obstacles, because there does not exist anything for the sake of which
it
acts,
and which, the absence of
all
obstacles,
would neces-
sitate the action:
is given somewhat Gersonides. Creation, he says, is an exercise not only of by the divine absolute will but of the divine disinterested good-
the act simply follows the will/* x different turn to this same argument
will.
"If
God
created the world for His
own
benefit, there
would be some ground

been
tion
for this difficulty.
But
since
it
has
made
clear that
God
derives no benefit from His crea-
and that creation is only an act of goodness and kindness, the time and manner of creation must be attributed to His
2
will."
The argument that any sort of finitude in the world, whether that of creation in time or that of magnitude, implies either a lack of power or a lack of good-will on the part
God is repeated by many other philosophers. Thus Leo Hebraeus asks: "Furthermore, the purpose of the Creator in creating the world was nothing but His will to do good.
of
should not the good have been made from eternity, seeing that no obstacle could have hindered the 3 Bruno similarly powerful God who is most perfect ?" that if the world were finite God would have to be argues
Since
it is so,
why
Morth Nebukim, II, 18, Second Method. Milhamot Adonai, VI, i, 18, Ninth Doubt.
Dialoghi d'Amore^ III, pp. 238-239 (Bari, 1929).
102
[ETHICS,
considered either as unable or as unwilling to make it infinite; in either case God would be evil, for "not to be
able is privatively evil, to be able and to be unwilling would be positively and affirmatively evil." Suarez, too, those who objected against Descartes as saying is quoted by that "all limitations proceed from a cause, and the reason
l
why anything
fection/'
2
is finite it
could not, or that
and limited is, either that its cause would not, give it more being and perHerrera, in his tentative argu-
Finally,
Abraham
ment against the finite number of emanations, says that if their number were finite, it would have to be "either because God was unwilling to make them infinite and thus His is not or because He was unable, and thus goodness perfect,
.
3 lacking in power/' Drawing upon these passages, without necessarily following them, Spinoza similarly argues that the creation of a
He
is
finite
world by an
infinite
God would
be incompatible with
divine power and with divine will or good-will. "Further, if it is finite through its cause, this must be so either because
cause could not give more, or because it would not give more. That He should not have been able to give more would
its
contradict His omnipotence; that He should not have been willing to give more, when He could well do so, savors of
ill-will,
which
4
is
nowise
in
God, who
is
all
goodness and
felt
perfection."
Both Maimonides and Gersonides, however,

ness of their solution.
will,
the
weak-
To
attribute creation in time to divine
or good-will,
immutability, but
1
would indeed save divine omnipotence and it would still allow for change in divine
I,
De Immensoct Innumerabilibus^
10 (Opera latina,
I, I,
Neapoli, 1879,
P- 2 3^)
Cf. J. L. Mclntyre, Giordano Bruno, p. 191.

2
Primae Objectiones (Oeuvres, VII,
p. 95,
11.
14-16).
Shaar ha-Shamayim,
Short Treatise,
I, 2,
II, 4.
5
(Opera,
I, p.
20,
11.
18
ff.).
PROPS. 2-6]
will.
UNITY OF SUBSTANCE
ask, even
if
103
"But, some might

all this, is
we admit
the correct-
not change imputed in the fact that the x will of the being exists at one time and not at another ?" While in one place Maimonides attempts to answer it by
ness of
drawing a rather arbitrary line of distinction between human will and divine will, the latter of which he declares to be a 1 homonymous term, in another place he answers it in the
following words:
"The
question remains,
Why
has this
thing been produced now and not long before, since the cause has always been in existence? The answer is that a certain
relation
cause be corporeal;
In a like
between cause and product has been absent, if the or, that the substance has not been
3
sufficiently prepared, if the cause be incorporeal/'
same answer to his own theory of creation. Unlike Maimonides he does not believe in absolute ex nihilo. The world according to him was created from a primordial, formless matter which co-
manner Gersonides
applies the
existed with
God from
eternity, the act of creation being
The
nothing but the investiture of the formless matter with form. choice of a particular time for creation was determined
not by a change in the will of God but by the nature of the matter out of which the world was created. This, according
would militate neither against the immutability of the divine will nor against divine omnipotence: "One might say that inasmuch as God exists always in the same manner,
to him,
His
will
must
it
also remain always the same;
therefore that
God
wills to
by assuming do a thing at one time and does
not will to do
at another, there
must inevitably be a change

that the nature of
it
in the divine nature.
To him we answer
is
the material, primordial element

1
such that
requires that
t
Moreh Nebukim
II, 18,
Second Method, and

a
Ninth Doubt.
i
cf. Milhamot Adonai VI, Moreh Nebnkim, he. cit.
i,
18,
Moreh Ncbukim,
II, 12.
104
[ETHICS,
the existence of the good in it should have a beginning ii time, inasmuch as that good must come to it from somethinj without itself, as has been shown before, whence it has als(
case,
been proved that the world must be created. This being th< it is clear that the existence of the good in this material
primordial element is due to God, whereas the fact that tha good did not exist in it from eternity is due to the imperfec nature of that primordial element, which imperfection ha:
were
served us as a proof that the good in it must be created, fo] it not for this, we have shown, the good in it woulc
have come into being without an efficient cause, which woulc be absurd, as has already been pointed out. This being the case, the coming of the world into existence necessarily hac
to be at a certain time.
There
is
no reason therefore
created
for tru
question,
the
why God
did not create the world at an earliei
time, because whatever time
God
it
before this time
same question could
still
be asked.
And
just as
Goc
cannot be described as possessing the power to create in a thing two opposites at the same time, inasmuch as He h
prevented from doing so by the nature of the object receiving the action, so also cannot God be described as having the
power of making the good exist from eternity in the material element out of which the world was created, for the imperfection in the nature of that element requires that the good
in it
should be created
in
time."
Against both these passages Crescas argues that absolute nothingness and formless matter cannot be said to possess
any nature which would require that
its
creation should take
place at a certain particular time. His argument against Maimonides reads as follows: "The question still remains,
What
1
has
made God
it
create at one time rather than at anit
other? For
would seem that

i,
could not be explained by
Milhamot Adonai, VI,
18,
Ninth Doubt.
PROPS. 2-6]
UNITY OF SUBSTANCE
105
any other reason except that it was the will of God. For if it were for some other reason, that reason would inevitably Agent who performed the action, or in the object upon which the action was performed, or in something outside both the Agent and the object, as, e.g., the organs through which the action was performed.
have
to be
found either
in
the
It could
not be
in the
it
Agent, for His relation to
all
times
is
the same; nor could
non-existence; nor a fortiori could nal, for there is nothing external."
be in the object, for it is nothing but it be in something exterl Against Gersonides he
argues in this wise: "That the change would have taken place without a cause can be easily shown by what has al-
ready been
said.
For
if
the change of God's will
had a cause,
or in the
that cause would have to be found either in

eternal, formless matter, inasmuch as there
God
is
nothing else
besides these two.

times,
But the
relation of
God
is
the
same
to all
and so also is the relation of that eternal, formless matter, and of all that arises from it, the same to all times. Thus there could be no cause for the change of will implied
choosing a particular time for creation." This tilt of Crescas against Maimonides and Gersonides is unquestionably the source of Spinoza's argument given in
in
2
say to this that the nature of the thing required such [limitation] and that it could not therefore be otherwise, that is no reply: for the nature of a thing can rethe foot-note:
"To
quire nothing while
it
does not exist/'
great difficulty of creation which the mediaevals grappled with is the explanation as to how this material, multifarious world could have arisen from the simple, im-
The second
material divine thinking essence.

1
"Ex
nihilo nihil fit/'
This
Or Adonai,
III,
i,
(p.
66b).
Ibid. (p. 68b).
Short frtatise,
I, 2,
5,
note 3 (Opera,
I,
p. 20,
11.
23-25).
io6
[ETHICS,
Aristotelian principle is repeated in Jewish philosophic literature from the earliest time. 1 Matter could not have
origi-
nated
did
it
in
God,
for it
is
excluded from His nature.
Whence
is stated by Jewish philoso" formula that a simple element can phers Neoplatonic 2 Crescas expresses the imonly produce a simple thing/' of matter arising directly from God in the followpossibility
come then? The problem
in the
ing words:
is
"Inasmuch
is
as this matter [in Gersonides' theory]

it
extremely imperfect,
could not have

3
come by
necessity
from God who
infinitely perfect."
The theory of emanation which purported to be a solution of this difficulty was found to be unsatisfactory by both Maimonides and Gersonides. If everything must emanate
from God and if in God there is nothing material, how could matter appear at all at any stage of emanation unless you say it sprang up out of nothing and is in no way traceable to God? It was this reasoning that forced Maimonides to make emanation a volitional process and Gersonides to accept the
Platonic theory of the pre-existence of an eternal, formless matter. Their solutions, however, do not interest us now.
We
are interested only in their statement of the problem. Says Maimonides: "I ask the following question: Aristotle
first Intelligence is the cause of the second, the second of the third, and so on, till the thousandth, if we assume a series of that number. Now the first Intelligence
is
holds that the
undoubtedly simple.
How
then can the
compound form
of existing things come from such an Intelligence by fixed laws of nature, as Aristotle assumes? ... By what law of
nature did the spheres emanate from the Intelligences? What 4 relation is there between material and immaterial beings ?"
Says Gersonides:
1
"This analogy, when

2,
closely examined,
5
Emunot ve-De'ot, 1, Morth Nebukim, II, 22. Morch Ntbukim> II, 22.
Cf.
and Ifobot ha-Lebabot> I, J Or Adonai,
III,
i,
(p. 68a).
PROPS. 2-6]
UNITY OF SUBSTANCE
fall
107
will
be found to
short of proving that matter can be
created from absolute nothing. Only forms can arise in this manner, but not matter. In general, form can produce something of its own kind; hence it produces forms, for all forms are things of reason; but how could it produce materiality?"
'
These discussions as
to the rise of
matter are reflected
in
the following argument of Spinoza, also given in a foot-note. "That there can be no finite substance is clear from this,
namely, that, if so, it would necessarily have something which it would have from nothing, which is impossible. For
whence can
it
derive that wherein
it
differs
from God?
Certainly not from God, for He has nothing imperfect or 2 We have finite, etc. So, whence then but from nothing?**
already called attention to other passages where the same
argument
This
is
first
advanced by Spinoza. proposition of Short Treatise^
I, 2,
as will have
been noticed, corresponds to Propositions II and III of Ethics I. The second proposition, "that there are not two
',
like substances,"
corresponds to Propositions
IV and
of
that "if there were two alike they would necessarily limit one another" 4 is reminiscent of the argument after which it is modelled, namely, that if there
the Ethics.
The argument
were two deities they would limit each other by having a
common genus and
a specific difference. 5
I, 2,
6
The
third proposi-
tion of the Short Treatise,
namely, "that one substance

7
cannot produce another,"

the Ethics > and
is
corresponds to Proposition VI of
proved by three arguments. The first is the argument based upon the impossibility of something arising from nothing which we have already discussed. The
1
Schol.,
a
Milhamot Adonai, VI, i, 17 (p. 364). A parallel statement in is cited by Joel in Lewi ben Gerson als Religionsphilosoph,
I, p. 19,
11.
Ethics, I, Prop. 15,

p. 78, n. I.
3
s
Short Treatise, I, 2, 2, note 2 (Opera, 2 (p. 20, 1. 4). Ibid.,

Cf. above, p. 83.
26-30).
I, 2,
Short Treatise,
'
6.
Short Treatise,
I, 2,
and
7.
Ibid.,
8.
io8
1
[ETHICS,
second, however, is new and somewhat puzzling. It is my purpose to show that it can be rendered clear and intelligible
by interpreting it as a criticism of Gersonides' theory that the world was created from an eternal formless element.
In Cogltata Metaphysica, II, 10, in a passage which is an undoubted allusion to Gersonides* theory of creation, 2 Spinoza says as follows: "We will not pause to refute the
opinion of those who think that the world as chaos, or as matter devoid of form, is co-eternal with God, and so far
independent of Him."
to refute Gersonides,
Here, however, Spinoza does pause
and with an argument raised by Ger-
sonides himself.
Gersonides begins to argue against his
own
theory by saying that "it is inevitable that either some part of this formless element remained after the world had been
created from
to
it or no part of it remained." He then proceeds that neither of these alternatives is possible, adding prove that "it is also past comprehension that the size of this pri-
mordial element should exactly agree with the size of which the world must be, for it is evident that the size of the world
less than what it is." 3 This is exactly what Spinoza means by the following argument: "Further, that which is created is by no means produced from nothing, but must necessarily have been produced from that which is existent (die wezentlyk /V). 4 But that something should come forth from that which is existent and that this latter should not have that something less even after it had been produced from it that we cannot grasp with our understanding." 5 If we take the last part of the passage to mean that the thing "which is created," i.e., the world, after it was produced "from
can be neither more nor
that which
1
is
existent,"
a
i.e.,
the eternal formless matter,
Ibid.,
*
4
9.
Cf. Joel,
Z#r
Genesis der Lehre Spinoza's, p. 48.

141, n. 4,
Milhamot Adonai, VI, i, 18, First Doubt. On the meaning of wezentlyk, cf. below, p.
Short Treatise,
I, 2,
and
p. 382, n. 7.
9 (Opera,
I, p.
21,
11.
21-26).
PROPS. 2-6]
UNITY OF SUBSTANCE
less
109
could not be
than the latter had been before the world was

the
produced from
it,
meaning of the
entire passage
may
be
restated, in the light of Gersonides' argument, in the following manner: Further, since creation ex nihilo has been shown
to be impossible, let us
now
consider creation from an eternal
pre-existent formless element.
This
is,
however, likewise
inconceivable, for
how
by
the created
we cannot grasp with our understanding world, the size of which must be determined
its
own
size of the eternal pre-existent element,

size, so
nature, should happen to agree exactly with the and not be of a lesser
that no part of that element would remain unused after the world had been created from it. This unaccounted
for
agreement in size is characterized by Spinoza as something which "we cannot grasp with our understanding/'
1
Gersonides similarly characterizes
"past comprehension" " comprehend or "conceive

If
is
it as something which is and as something which "I cannot
"
of.
last passage quoted from then the argument contained therein as correct, Spinoza well as the argument contained in the parallel passage
our interpretation of the
quoted from Gersonides is based upon an assumption which is found in Plato and repeated by Philo, namely, the assumption that the matter out of which the world was created was
completely used up
ing
in the creation
of the world so that nothin the following passage:
was
left
of
it.
Plato states
it
"Now
the creation took
up the whole of each of the four
elements; for the Creator compounded the world out of all the fire and all the water and all the air and all the earth,
leaving no part of any of them nor any power of them outside. He intended, in the first place, that the whole animal should
was formed should be
be perfect, as far as possible, and that the parts of which he perfect; and that he should be one,
no
[ETHICS,
leaving no remnants out of which another such world might be created/' 1 Philo restates this view in the following passage:
"It
is
unlikely that
any material body has been
left
over and was moving about at random outside, seeing that
God had wrought up and

matter wherever found."
2
placed in orderly position all Eusebius quotes another passage
from Philo's
lost
De
Providentia as follows:
"With
a view to
estimated an exactly sufficient of matter, so that there might be neither deficiency quantity nor excess. ... I shall therefore confidently assert that the
the creation of the world
God
world needed neither

its
3
less
nor more material substance for

is
in
This passage from Eusebius furnishing." Hebrew by Azariah dei Rossi. 4

third
reproduced
The
argument reads as
follows: "Lastly, if
is
we would
seek the cause of the substance which
things which issue from its seek also the cause of that cause, and then again the cause of that cause, et sic in hifinitum; so that if we must necessarily stop
the origin of the attributes, then it behoves us to
and halt somewhere,
as indeed
5
we must,
it
is
In this passage would seem to admit the impossibility of an infinite Spinoza causal regression, and he would therefore contradict himself, 6
necessary to stop at this only substance/'
for elsewhere
he denies
this impossibility. 7
It
seems
to
me,
however, that the argument contained in this passage has

an entirely different meaning. It must be borne in mind that Spinoza advances it as a proof "that one substance cannot produce another," by
1
* 3
De
Timaeus, 32C-33A. Translation by Jowett. Palantationc Noe, II, 5. Translation by G. H. Whitaker.
Praeparatio Evangelica, VII, 21. Translation by E. H. Gifford.
Mf'or 'Enayim, Imre Binah, Ch. 6
s 6
7
(ed. Cassel, p. 125). Short Treatise, I, 2, 10 (Opera, I, p. 21, 11. 26-32). Cf. A. Wolf, Spinoza's Short Treatise p. 174.
',
Epistola 12.
Cf. below, pp. 195
ff.
PROPS. 2-6]
UNITY OF SUBSTANCE
to refute the theory that a material
in so far as
1 1 1
which he means
world
is
was created
material
is
by an immaterial God who

a
He
im-
transeunt cause.
Like most of his other
arguments
premises.
it
The passage
reasons against his opponents from their own therefore is to be divided into two
parts, in the first of which he reproduces the premise of his opponents and in the latter of which he draws his own con-
clusions from the self-same premise. Spinoza seems to say to them as follows: do you assume the existence of
Why
two substances, God and the world, considering God as the prime cause and rejecting the existence of any other cause
prior to
Him?
It is
things in
change must have
because you believe with Aristotle that a cause and that the series of
causes cannot be infinite, and so you argue that "if we would seek the cause of the substance [i.e., God] which is the origin
of the things which issue from its attribute, then it behoves us to seek also the cause of that cause, and then again the cause of that cause, and so on in infinitum" Your postulating of a prime cause outside the world is therefore dictated by nothing but the alleged need of arbitrarily terminating the series of cause and effect. This being the case, why
not stop the series with the world as a whole and postulate the prime cause as something immanent in the world, "so
that
if
we must
necessarily stop
and halt somewhere, as
in-
deed we must,
it is
necessary to stop at this only substance
[i.e., the world]." The full force of this reasoning will be discussed in our comments on Proposition XVIII of Ethics^ I.
The
fourth and last proposition in this chapter of the Short
its proof many elements taken from the proofs of the preceding propositions, does not properly belong in our present discussion of the unity of substance. It will be treated subsequently in our discussion
Treatise ^ though containing in
of the simplicity of substance.
CHAPTER V
I.
SIMPLICITY AND ATTRIBUTES
IN THE Appendix at the end of the First Part of the Ethics, Spinoza furnishes us with the unused titles for the unmarked
chapters into which the book would have undoubtedly been divided had he chosen to write it after the manner of the
scholastics "
and the
rabbis.
in
Using the terms

their
"
nature'* and
technical sense, he says: properties" advisedly "In these chapters I have explained the nature of God and
His properties/'
erties:
He
then proceeds to enumerate these prop-
(i) necessarily exists; (2) that He is one; that from the necessity alone of His own nature He is (3) and acts; (4) that He is, and in what way He is, the free
"That He
cause of
all
things;
(5) that all things are in
Him, and
so
depend upon Him
that without
Him
nor be conceived; and,
finally, (6)
they can neither be that all things have been
predetermined by Him, not indeed from freedom of will or from absolute good pleasure, but from His absolute nature
or infinite power." The "nature of God," as we have already seen, is treated in Proposition I, which supplements the definition of substance. Of the six "properties" enumerated by
1
Spinoza the
last four will
be found to cover Propositions
may serve as a heading for There remains therefore only the second " property, that He is one," which is to describe the contents of Propositions II-X and Propositions XII and XIII. We
while the
first
XIV-XXXVI,
Proposition XI.
have already shown

1
in the
preceding chapter
3
that Proposiff.
Cf. above, pp. 61
ff.
Cf. above, pp. 79
PROPS. 7-io, 12-ij]
113
tions II-VI deal with the traditional
of God.
We
shall
now
problem of the unity endeavor to show that in Proposi-
tions VII-X and XII-XIII Spinoza similarly deals with another traditional aspect of the same problem. " The expression unity of God*' was used by mediaeval phi-
losophers in two senses. In the first place, it was used in the sense of numerical unity, as an assertion of monotheism and
a denial of the existence of more than one
it
God. In the second

1
of essential unity, or simplicity, place, as a denial of any kind of inner plurality in the divine nature. This distinction in the use of the term "unity" may be traced
in the sense
was used
to Aristotle's discussion of the various meanings of the term "one,"^ which is repeatedly reproduced with the usual modifications and elaborations in mediaeval literature. 3
Unity in the first sense is the subject of the mediaeval proofs of the unity of God; unity in the second sense is the principle underlying the mediaeval discussions of the nature of the
divine essence, or what
divine attributes.
4
generally known as the problem of Spinoza follows the traditional method

is
of treatment. Having discussed the numerical unity of God in Propositions II VI, he now enters upon the discussion of
the essential unity, or simplicity, of God in Propositions VII-X and XII-XIII. The simplicity of God upon which the mediaevals so
strongly insisted was meant to emphasize the impropriety of the assertion, or even of the implication, of any kind of inner plurality in the divine essence. They especially mention
three of such inner pluralities which the idea of absolute simplicity was meant to deny. First of all, it denies the ex1
Or Adonaiy
I, iii, 4.
3 3
Metaphysics, V,
6.
i
Maka$id al-Falasijah, II, (p. Emunah Ramah, II, ii, i; 'Ikkarim,

<
114);
II, 10.
Hobot ha-Lebabot^
I,
8;
Citzari, II, 2;
Cf. 'Ibfrrim, II, 7.
14

God
of accidental qualities.
[ETHICS,
istence in
These had
to be re-
jected on account of the belief in the absolute incorporeality of God which tradition, if not the actual asseverations of
the Bible,
intensified
which belief was further had taken for granted when the traditional God was identified with the
Aristotelian pure form.
"He
is
not a magnitude that any
quality resulting from quantity as such could be possessed by Him; He is not affected by external influences, and there-
any quality resulting from emotion; not subject to physical conditions, and therefore does not possess strength or similar qualities; He is not an animate
fore does not possess
He
is
being, that He should have a certain disposition of the soul, or acquire certain properties, as meekness, modesty, etc., or be in a state to which animate beings as such are subject, as, e.g., in that of health or of illness. Hence it follows that
no attribute coming under the category of quality can be predicated of God." But the simplicity of God denies more than that. It also
l
denies the metaphysical or logical distinction of genus and species in the divine nature, or what are known as essential
attributes as distinguished from accidental attributes.
Arabic as well as Jewish philosophers are explicit in their denial of the distinction of genus and species in God. 2 It is
this principle that underlies the following
passage of Mai-
monides: "The object
is
described by
its definition, as, e.g.,

.
described as a being that lives and has reason. All agree that this kind of description cannot be given of God;
is
. .
man
for there
is
no previous cause
. .
to
His essence, by which
He
could be defined.
definition, as
when,
e.g.,
. .
An object is described by part of its man is described as a living being or

.
as a rational being.
1
All agree that this kind of descrip-
Moreh Ncbukim
Ma%a$id
I,
52.
ii,
al-Falasifah, II,
(p. 145);
'Ibfyarim, II, 6
and
7.
PROPS. 7-10,12-13]
in reference to
115
inappropriate speak of a portion of His essence, essence to be a compound." *
tion
is
to God; we should consider His
for if
we were
There
is
nature which
a third possible kind of distinction in the divine is specifically rejected by the mediaevals in
their discussion of the simplicity of
tinction of essence
torical reasons, to
God, namely, the disThere are certain hisbe dealt with subsequently, which induced
and
existence.
the mediaevals to single out the predicate of existence for special discussion. Suffice it to say for the present that both Arabic and Jewish philosophers deal with this problem
specifically in their general discussion of the nature of the
We may quote here the following typical from Maimonides, which occurs in the course of his passage discussion of attributes: "It is known that existence is an
divine essence.
and therefore an element superadded to their essence. This must evidently be the case as regards everything the existence of which is due to some cause; its existence is an element superadded to its essence. But as regards a being whose existence is not due to any cause God alone is that being, for His existence, as
accident appertaining to
all
things,
we have
said,
is
absolute
existence
and essence are peris

2
fectly identical.
He
is
not a substance to which existence
joined as an accident, as an additional element."

plurality, physical as well as metaphysical
Simplicity in this sense, as a denial of any kind of internal
and
logical, is
maintained by Spinoza with regard to substance.
Of
the
three kinds of internal plurality especially rejected by the the plurality of subject and accidental qualmediaevals,
genus and species, and of essence and existence, Spinoza mentions the last one specifically in Proposition
ity*
f
VII. As for the second kind of internal plurality, he quotes

1
Moreh Nebukim,
I,
52.
March Nctukim,
I, 57.
n6
x

"God
is
[ETHICS,
the mediaevals to the effect that
not a species of any
genus,"
is
which means the same as to say that in God there no distinction of genus and species. This, as we have alis
ready seen/
the implication of his definition of substance
and of Proposition I, which is based upon it. It is this, too, which is meant when he says in one of his letters to Jellis that "of His [i.e., God's] essence we can form no general
idea (universalem
3 ideam)." Finally, as for the first of internal plurality, in Scholium 2 to Proposition VIII, kind which really belongs to Proposition VII, he dismisses, in un.
mistakable terms, the inherence in substance of accidental qualities, and almost in the words of Maimonides he says
that those
so because
who
"
attribute accidental qualities to substance do they do not distinguish between the modifica-
tions of substances
and substances themselves," and
also
because they "confound
"readily attribute to thus to Spinoza, like simple, free from accidental as well as from essential attributes,
human nature with divine" and God human affects." Substance is God to the mediaevals, absolutely
to the distinction of essence
and likewise impervious
and
existence.
The mediaeval insistence upon the absolute simplicity of God did not, however, mean to divest Him of all traits of personality. A God who has been conceived as creator and
governor of the world, as lawgiver to man, and judge of human actions, could not possibly be conceived as impassive
as a mathematical point
and
as indifferent as a metaphysical
absolute. This belief in the personality of God is summed up by the mediaevals in the statement that "God, blessed be
He, must be
1
free
of imperfections,"
a
by which
is
meant that
Short Treatise,
I, 7,
3.
II.
Cf. above, p. 77.

,
2-3).
I,
15;
cf. II, 7.
PROPS. 7-10, 12-13]
117
possess power and will and the other attributes without which He could not be thought of as perfect."
*
"He must
Spinoza restates this view in a letter addressed to Hudde in the following words: "That everything, which includes necessary existence, can have in itself no imperfection, but must 2 Thus while on the one hand God express pure perfection."
must be absolutely simple and unqualifiable, on the other hand He must possess all those qualities which make for personality. How these two can be reconciled is the problem
of attributes, which does not concern us for the present. The following brief statement from Albo will suffice as an indication of the mediaeval point of view: "All the attributes of perfection that are predicated of God or are conceived to
exist in exist in
Him are Him only

3
predicated of
in the sense in
in
Him and
are conceived to
but
in
none of the senses
which they imply perfection which they would imply imper-
fection."
made by
particular importance for us here is the use the mediaevals of the term "infinite" with regard
Of
to these attributes of perfection.
In the
first
place, these
attributes of
God
are to be infinite in
number: "It must be
understood that the perfections which exist in God are infinite in number." 4 In the second place, each of these attributes must be infinite in two senses: infinite in time, that eternal, and infinite in the degree of importance, that is,
its
is,
in
essential nature.
attributes
by which
"When we ascribe to God any of the He may be described, whether negative
or positive, that attribute must be taken to be infinite in two s and infinite in perfection or imrespects, infinite in time
6
portance."
1
The term
"infinite" applied to
2
God
thus means
Ibid., I, 15.
3
s
Epistola 35.
Ibid., II, 25.
'Ikkarim,
II, 21.
The term "time" has two meanings according

passage
is
to Albo,
and
infinite
time in
this
6
the equivalent of eternity.
Cf. below, pp. 339, 363.
'Ifckarim, II, 25.
Il8
[ETHICS,
to designate that He possesses an infinite number of attributes each of which is eternal and absolutely perfect. To
with reference to this that the Cabalists designated God by the term Infinite (En Sof), to indicate that the perfections which are to be found in Him are infinite in the
quote: "It
is
three senses which

infinite in the
finite in
we have mentioned that is to say, number of attributes and each attribute in'
"
time and in perfection. Similarly to Spinoza, while God is absolutely simple and unqualifiable, He may still be described as possessing attributes, infinite in number,
the mediaevals called time
and each of them infinite in what and perfection. His definition

is
of God at the beginning of the First Part of the Ethics

ing but a restatement of the passages from Albo in the preceding paragraph.
noth-
we have reproduced
"By God,
under-
stand Being absolutely infinite, that is to say, substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses
Note the expression "eternal and infinite essence." By "eternal" 3 he means here what Albo calls "infinite in time," and by "infinite" he means again what Albo calls "infinite in perfection or importance."
eternal
and
infinite essence."
In his definition of God given in a letter to Oldenburg, 4 where incidentally the term "eternal" does not occur, Spinoza
himself explains the term "infinite," by which each of the infinite attributes of God is described, as meaning "in the
highest degree perfect of its kind." And what he has laid down of God in his definitions, he now tries to prove of sub-
stance in his propositions. First he shows that "every substance is necessarily infinite" (Prop. VIII), just as God is
"absolutely infinite." Then, just as

1
God
I,
is
"substance conand
Ibid.
Ethics,
Def. 6.
ff.
For Spinoza's various uses of the term "eternal," see below, pp. 366
ff-
375
11.
25-26).
PROPS. 7-10, 12-13]
119
sisting of infinite attributes," so substance possesses infinite " the more reality or being a thing possesses, attributes, for
the
more
attributes belong to it" (Prop. IX),
and inasmuch
as substance has infinite reality or being, it must have infinite attributes. Finally, each attribute of substance must "ex-
press eternal
for
and
infinite essence," just as the attributes
of
"each attribute of a substance must be conceived God, through itself" (Prop. X), and must therefore be identical with substance, and inasmuch as substance is infinite, each of its attributes must be infinite. In Jewish philosophy, too,
the infinite nature of each attribute
finite
is
deduced from the
inis
nature of God.
"For
just as God, blessed be He,
infinite
time and in importance, so is each of His 1 attributes infinite both in time and in importance."
both
in
of the mediaevals to preserve God's personality by endowing Him with infinite attributes while at the same time insisting upon His absolute simplicity has landed
The attempt
them, as we have already pointed out, in a self-contradiction. Attributes are either accidental or essential; they must be
and weight and suchlike, or as genera and species, as, e.g., life and rationality are related to man. In either case they must imply a distinction of essence and attribute in the subject, though
related to the subject either as color
and
size
only metaphysical or Furthermore, attributes differ among themselves logical. from each other, and therefore the assertion of an infinite
in the latter instance the distinction
is
number of number of
attributes
must imply a corresponding
infinite
differences in the nature of the subject.
If the
divine nature is to be free from any kind of plurality, how then can it have attributes? This difficulty constitutes the
problem of divine attributes in mediaeval philosophy. The solutions offered will be touched upon in the sequel. In a
1
'Ifckarim, II, 25.
120
[ETHICS,
general way, it may be said that in the attempted solutions two facts are sought to be established: first, all the attri-
butes of
God
are in reality one attribute, and, whatever
differences there
do not
appear to exist between them, they nature of God; second, whatever may be the relation between essence and attribute, the assertion of
may
affect the
divine attributes does not contravene the simplicity of God's

essence.
Similarly Spinoza, after having stated in Propositions that substance has an infinite number of VIII, IX, and
attributes, proceeds to
show that though assuming an
infinite
number of
attributes of which two
"may
be conceived as
really distinct,
that
is
to say,
one without the assistance
we cannot nevertheless thence conclude that of the other, " they constitute two beings or two different substances
(Prop. X, Schol.), and that "no attribute of substance can be truly conceived from which it follows that substance can
be divided" (Prop. XII), concluding that "substance abso" lutely infinite

is
indivisible
(Prop. XIII).
This then
is
the logical
VII
and XII-XIII.
argument underlying Propositions Had the Ethics been written more
Spinoza would have prefaced these with the following words: We shall now propropositions ceed to show that just as substance is like God in its numerischolastico rabbinicoque
cal unity (Props. II VI), so
it is
also like
God
in its
absolute
simplicity.
That
it
has no distinction of genus and species
has already been stated (Def. Ill and Prop. I); that it should have accidental qualities must be dismissed as something incomprehensible to a philosopher (Prop. VIII, Schol. What is therefore left us to show is that like the philo-
2).
sophic God of the mediaevals substance has no distinction of essence and existence (Prop. VII). Furthermore, though like
God "every
substance
is
necessarily infinite*' (Prop. VIII),
PROPS. 7-io, 12-ij]
121
that is to say, consisting of infinite attributes (Prop. IX), each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence (Prop. X), still this infinity of attributes does not imply that sub-
stance
is
in
any sense
divisible (Prop.
X,
Schol.;
Props.
XII-XIII).
With these general remarks we are now ready to discuss more fully the following three topics and the propositions in which they are treated: (i) the problem of essence and
existence (Prop. VIII; Def. I); (2) the definition of the term "infinite" (Def. II; Def. VI; Props. VIII-X); (3) the relation of attribute to substance (Def. IV;
Prop. X, Schol.;
Props. XII-XIII).
II.
ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE

existence which
is
The problem of essence and
dwelt upon
by Spinoza not only in his Ethics but also in his other writings, the terms in which the problem is couched, and the
manner
in
which
it is
treated, are
all
part of the great philo-
Two
sophic heritage which had fallen to him from his predecessors. distinct traditions served him as sources of supply.
the philosophic writings in Hebrew which have preserved the traditions of Arabic philosophy; the other was
One was
Descartes,
scholastics.
who has preserved

It
the traditions of the Latin
can be shown that the two traditions had
crossed at one time, and that the scholastic tradition of a

later period
influence.
was greatly indebted to the Arabico-Hebrew But in Descartes, in whom the scholastic tra-
dition reached
its culminating point, owing to the influence of Anselm's ontological proof of the existence of God, the assertion of the identity of essence and existence in God as-
sumed
which
it
a meaning which was entirely different from that had in Jewish philosophy. In Jewish philosophy the
122

God
else it is phrased,
is
[ETHICS,
assertion that in
however
that
essence and existence are identical, or 1 was merely another way of saying
necessary existence out of which arises the eternity, unity, simplicity, immutability, and unknowability of God, and in fact all those negations which tend to make God
God
an absolute and
infinite being. It
does not however
mean
that
thereby God becomes a "real" being (ens reale) as opposed to a being of reason and a fictitious being (ens rationis, ens
fictum).
God
Or, in other words, the fact that in the idea of essence involved existence was not used to prove the
actual existence of God, for in Jewish as well as in Arabic

2 In philosophy that mode of reasoning was not followed. Descartes the identity of essence and existence means all
it also means something else in addition. means also that this very idea of the identity of essence and existence in God proves that He is a "real" being. In Spinoza, as we shall endeavor to show, these two trends of
that, to be sure, but
It
inherited from the
thought meet, and upon the groundwork of philosophic lore Hebrew books of his youth he raised the
superstructure of Descartes* ontological proofs of the existence of God.
However complicated and important the problem of sence and existence may have become in the course of
sumed
had
in the
esits
development, and however great the significance it has asin its later history, the problem seems to me to have
it originated of propositions in which meaning the term "existent" forms the predicate, as, for instance, "A
a simple
and humble
origin.
To my mind,
question as to the
is
existent."
1
In order to appreciate the significance of this

of phrasing it is that God is existence without essence added "Crescas on the Problem of Divine Attributes," Jewish Quarterly
The
other
way
thereto.
See
n.s.,
my
Review,
3
Cf.
my
I
"Notes on
Vol. VII, p. 189, n. 85. the proofs of the Existence of

f.
God," Hebrew Union
College
Annual\
(1924), pp. 583
PROPS. 7-10,
2-13]
in
123
question,
we must bear
mind that
Aristotle,
and following
him Arabic and Jewish logicians, held that every logical judgment must be synthetic, so that in every proposition the predicate must be a universal term belonging to one of the four or five predicables enumerated by Aristotle and Porphyry. It must be the genus of the subject, its species, a
specific difference, a
property or an accident.
In mediaeval
terminology the
first
sential attributes," the last
three predicables are known as "estwo as "accidental attributes."
characteristic of all these predicables is that are all universal terms and are not identical with the they essence of the subject. Essential attributes state the ele-
The common
ments of which the essence of the subject is constituted or to which it belongs, and though not different from the essence of the subject they are either more extensive or less extensive than it, as, for instance, when the combination of
animality and rationality, or either one of these, is predicated of man. Accidental attributes are something different from,
the essence of the subject, adding some adventitious quality to it, as, for instance, when color and
and external
size
to,
and age are predicated of man. Nothing that is perfectly identical with the subject and co-extensive with it and is a mere verbal repetition of its essence can be affirmed
tle laid it
in the predicate, for identity
not a logical relation. Aristodown as a rule when he stated that "individuals,

is
and whatever is one in number, are predicated of no suband the mediaevals condemned as tautological any ject," proposition like "A is A." In view of this the question may be justly raised as to what kind of predicate is the term
l
"existent"
in the proposition
"A
is
existent."
It
cannot be
identical with the essence of the subject, for then the proposiis A. It is theretion would be tantamount to saying that
Categories, 2, ib, 6-7.
124

is
1
[ETHICS,!
fore concluded that existence
always an accident super-
added to the essence of a thing. That existence is an element adventitious to the essence of things would seem to be on the whole in accord with what
we know of Aristotle's views on the subject. According to him the existence of things is not implied in the knowledge of their essence which we may attain from their definition, and thus while we may have an idea of man and knowledge of his essence, and while we are even capable of defining him, none of these can prove the actual existence of man. For all definitions are answers to the question what a thing is but
not to the question whether a thing
is.
"But 'what man

3
is*
and 'that man
exists' are
two
different questions."
Again:
'Evidently those who define according to the present methods of definition do not demonstrate that a thing exists." 3
To form
conceptions of certain essences, to define them, to describe them in formal propositions, does not imply that
nominal
they exist, for definitions and propositions may be purely in which words rather than things are the subject of
If a thing does actually exist,
it
discourse.
it
only happens to
exist, just as
only happens
to be white or black, large or
assert therefore of such a thing that it is existent is simply to attribute to it an accidental quality, just as to say of a black or white thing that it is black or white. This
small.
To
interpretation of Aristotle, to be sure, might be doubted. It might be argued that while indeed there are nominal definitions in which existence is not implied, it may be still possible that in real definitions existence is implied, and that to attribute existence to things that do actually exist is not to
attribute an accidental quality but rather to affirm some1
This argument
I, iii, i.
is
reproduced by Crescas in the name of Avicenna in his Or

92!^ 10-11.
Adonai,
2
Analytica Posteriora,
Ibid.) 92b, 19-20.
II, 7,
PROPS. 7-10,
2-13]
is
125
thing that
involved in their essence.
This indeed would
seem
to be Averroes' interpretation of Aristotle, for he

is
mainan
tains that existence
always involved
in the essence of
1 actually existent subject. Avicenna, however, and his Jewish followers, as Maimonides, for instance, by maintaining
that existence
seem
to
is an accident superadded to the essence would have understood Aristotle as explained above.
But even according

exception. to His essence any
to
Avicenna and
his school,
God
is
an
In
Him
existence cannot be assumed to be added
more than any of the other
attributes
could be considered as accidental qualities. This is impossible by reason of the simplicity of the divine nature. It is
because of this general principle that existence is accidental to the essence of created beings that the theologians of the Avicennian school have included in their discussion of the
divine attributes the statement that
superadded to His existence, or that

istence are identical. 2
It
God in God
has no essence
essence and ex-
would seem that
it
was
this traditional
method of
in-
sion of attributes or the simplicity of
cluding the problem of essence and existence in the discusGod that led Spito lay
noza
down
his
seventh proposition.
All of Spinoza's
statements with regard to the nature of existence in relation to essence reflect the Avicennian and Maimonidean point of
view.
Repeating almost verbatim the words of Aristotle, he
says that "the true definition of any one thing neither involves nor expresses anything except the nature of the thing involved." 3 Again, corresponding to the Avicennian formula
that in created beings existence
their essence, Spinoza says:
1
is
an accident superadded to
essence of things produced
I,
"The
Cf. quotation in
Munk, Guide
cf.
des
gars, Vol.
p. 231, n. I.
3
J
Cf. above, p. 122, n. i. Ethics y I, Prop. 8, Schol. 2;
Epistola 34.
126

r
[ETHICS,
by God does not involve existence."

ferent, for
"I define
2
God
as a being to
is
God is however difwhose essence belongs

is
existence."
And what
true of
God
true also of sub-
"It pertains to the nature of substance to exist." 3 The contrast between God and created beings is clearly
stance:
brought out in the following passage: "Essence in God is not different from existence; indeed the one cannot be conceived without the other. In other things essence differs from 4 existence, for the one may be conceived without the other."
In his proof of Proposition VII, no less than in the proposition itself, Spinoza follows his predecessors. In Jewish philosophy, the negation of the distinction of essence and ex-
God, as well as that of any other distinction, is based upon the view that any form of composition requires a cause to bring about that composition and that God can have no cause. "Everything that is composed of two eleistence in
ments has necessarily
their composition as the cause of its
existence as a composite being, and consequently in respect to its own essence it is not necessary of existence, for its
upon the existence of its component parts 5 Again: "Everything which is of existence in respect to its own essence has no necessary cause for its existence in any manner whatsoever or under 6 any conditions whatsoever." With this in mind Maimonides
existence depends
and
their
combination."
argues for the identity of essence and existence in God as follows: "It is known that existence is an accident apper-
and therefore an element superadded to This must evidently be the case as regards everything the existence of which is due to some cause; its
taining to
all
things,
their essence.
Jbid.,\, Prop. 24.
2 4
Epistola 83 (Opera,
I, p.
335,
1.
5).
Ethics,
7.
I,
Prop.
7.
I, 2.
Cf. Ethics, I,
Axiom
Moreh Ncbukim,
Ibid., Prop. 20.
II,
PROPS. 7-10, 12-13]
127
an element superadded to its essence. But as a being whose existence is not due to any cause regards God alone is that being, for His existence, as we have said,
existence
is is
absolute
is
existence
and essence are perfectly

is
identical;
He
joined as an accix so as to constitute an additional element." dent, The short proof of Proposition VII given by Spinoza fol-
not a substance to which existence
line of reasoning. The essence of substance must involve existence, he argues, because substance has no cause, for " there is nothing by which substance can be produced/' Were existence superadded to its essence, substance would require a cause to produce it. This state of
lows the same
being causeless, which the mediaevals as well as Spinoza himself usually designate by the expression "necessary existence," Spinoza also designates by the expression "cause of itself" (causa sui\ a phrase which had already been in current use in philosophic literature. 2 Causa sui y like the
mediaeval "necessary existence,"
is primarily nothing but a negation, meaning causelessness, and to Spinoza it is only a shorter way of saying that the essence of substance in-
volves existence.
tion of causa sui y
He
thus says in his first part of the defini"By cause of itself, I understand that,
whosef*essence involves existence/' 3 though the latter part of'the definition, as we shall presently show, introduces a
new
idea into the phrase.
We thus have in Spinoza the following equation

existence
causa sui
necessary that whose essence involves exist:
All of these expressions, as marily nothing but causelessness.

this effect
*
ence
we have
seen,
mean
pri-
is
to be
found
in
explicit statement to the following passage of Spinoza:
An
Ibid., 1, 57.
2
Cf. J. Freudenthal,
. .
.
"Spinoza und die Scholastik"
in
Philosophised Aufsdtze.
of Spinoza , p. 118, n.
i.
Eduard Zeller
a
gcwidmet, p. 119; Martineau,

i.
A Study
Ethics,
I,
Def.
128

thing must be conceived either through
its
[ETHICS,
"A
essence alone
or through its proximate cause. Namely, if a thing be in itself, or, as it is commonly termed, its own cause (causa sui) y
then
if
it
must be understood through
its
essence alone; but

it
r
a thing be not in itself, but requires a cause to exist, then
must be understood through its proximate cause." Now, Arabic and Jewish philosophy the concept of necessary existence as applied to God is the main principle out of which arise all the negations and affirmations about the divine nature. It is from this that it is deduced that God is immain
not an accident existing in a subject or a matter, that His essence and existence are identical, that He is not conditioned by any other cause nor
terial,
that
He
is
form existing
in
being, that He is one, that He has no accidental qualities, that He is immutable, that He is the emanative cause of every thing, that He
in
any other way dependent upon another
is
indefinable,
and that
2
He
is
the source of the existence of
to By everything deduce from the concept of necessary existence, or its equivalents, a similar list of negations and affirmations about God.
else.
the
same token Spinoza undertakes
in one of his letters to Hudde: "I will briefly show what properties must be possessed by a Being that includes necessary existence. To wit: I. It must be eternal. ... II. It must be simple, not made up of parts. III.
Says he
.
It
. .
cannot be conceived as determinate, but only as infinite. IV. It must be indivisible. ... V. [It] can have in itself
.
no imperfection, but must express pure perfection. there can only be a single Being, of which existLastly
.
ence belongs to
that
1
its
nature."
Again:
"From
the fact alone,

exist-
define
God
as a Being to
whose essence belongs

92 (Opera,
II, p. 34,
11.
Tractates de Intelltetus Emendationc,
9-13).
2 3
Mafya$id al-Falasifah,
Epistola 35.
II,
ii
(pp. 137
if.).
PROPS. 7- 10, 12-13]
129
ence,
*
infer several of
necessarily exists,
etc."
His properties; namely, that He that He is one, unchangeable, infinite,
Not only from the mediaevals but also from Descartes has Spinoza derived the method of deducing the properties of God from the concept of necessary existence. "Indeed upon this truth alone, namely, that existence belongs to the nature
of God, or that the concept of God involves a necessary existence as that of a triangle that the sum of its angles is equal to two right angles, or again that His existence and His of God's attributes by which
essence are eternal truth, depends almost all our knowledge we are led to a love of God (or
to the highest blessedness)."
2
But from Descartes Spinoza has borrowed also the ontological proof. A being whose conception involves existence, according to this reasoning, must necessarily exist, and this
existence of
sort of reasoning forms the basis of Spinoza's proofs of the God in Proposition XI, to be discussed in a sub-
sequent chapter. Now, according to Descartes, the term a se, which he applies to God in the same sense as sui causa, 3
has both a negative sense and a positive sense. In its negative sense it means that God has no cause; 4 in its positive
sense
it
means that God stands
to himself in the
as an efficient cause does to its effect. 5
same way The term causa sui

meaning causeit is
similarly in Spinoza is not a mere negation, lessness; it means also something positive:
an asser-
tion of self-sufficency and hence actual existence. He thus says in the second part of his definition of causa sui: "or that, whose nature cannot be conceived unless exist1
Kpistola 83.
Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae,
I,
Prop.
5,
Schol.
16
J
*
Primae Responsiones (Ofuvres, VII, Ibid. (p. no, 1. 24). Ibid. (p. in, 11. 6-7).
p. 109,
11.
and
21).
130
*
[ETHICS,
Likewise Proposition VII of the First Part of the Ethics, while on the whole it is a reproduction of mediaeval Jewish discussions, contains also the additional Cartesian
ing."
is indicated in its phrasing. Spinoza does not there as he says in Cogitata A4etaphysica, I, 2, that say essence in substance is not different from existence, but he
element, as
says, "It pertains to the nature of substance to exist."
The identity of essence and existence is also the burden of the fourth proposition in the second chapter of the First Part of the Short 'Treatise. The wording of the proposition somewhat obscures
infinite
meaning. It reads as follows: "That in the understanding of God there is no other substance than
its
is
that which
formaliter in nature/'
proposition, however, becomes clear with its restatement at the end of the Short Treatise,
The purpose of this when it is compared

Appen-
"To such an extent does existence I, Proposition IV: nature to the essence of every substance, that it pertain by
dix
impossible to posit in an infinite understanding the idea of the essence of a substance that does not exist in nature/'
is
It
is
clear that this fourth proposition, both in the

in
main
text
Appendix of the Short Treatise, is parallel to Proposition VII in Ethics, I, namely, that existence pertains to the nature of substance. In the Short Treatise, howthe
and
and existence
ever, Spinoza utilizes the principle of the identity of essence in substance as an argument for what is the
main contention of Chapter 2 of the Short Treatise, I. The main contention of that chapter, as we have already shown, is to refute the mediaeval view that there are two substances,
God and
volved in
1
the world, the latter of which has no existence inits
essence,
i.
inasmuch as
it
must acquire existence

But
is
Ethics, I, Def.
Short Treatise,
is
I, 2,
2 (Opera,
I, p.
20,
11.
6-7).
"there
no substance or attribute" instead of "there
II (p. 21, 11. 33-34): in no oth^r substance."
PROPS. 7-10,
2-13]
131
through an act of creation or emanation. Spinoza seems to say to his mediaeval opponents, in Proposition IV of the
Short Treatise ,
[i.e.,
I, 2,
as follows:
You maintain
that the world
conditional substance] had existed prior to its creation as an "idea" in the "infinite understanding [i.e., intelonly lect] of God," and that only through an act of creation has
But any form of creation, however have already shown to you to be impossible. 1 Existence therefore must pertain to the essence of the world just as you say it pertains to the essence of God, and there is
it
acquired existence.
I
explained,
thus no such distinction between
God and
the world as that
of creator and created, or absolute substance and conditional substance. He thus concludes, in the Corollary to Proposition IV in Appendix I at the end of the Short Treatise, that:
"Nature
thing.
infinite
is
known through
itself,
It consists of infinite
and not through any other attributes, every one of them
and perfect in its kind; to its essence pertains existence, so that outside it there is no other essence or existence,
thus coincides exactly with the essence of God, who alone is glorious and blessed." By "nature" here Spinoza
and
it
means
the universe;
God
is
not outside of
it,
that
is
to say,
pure form as opposed to matter, but the two are essentially the same, for, as he sums up his conclusions at the end of the
four propositions in the same chapter of the Short Treatise, "we posit extension [i.e., matter] as an attribute of God." 2
The proofs of the fourth proposition given in Chapter 2 of the Short Treatise, I, are not altogether new. They are only restatements of the arguments already used by Spinoza in his
first three propositions. We have already out the literary origins of these arguments in our pointed discussion of the unity of substance in the preceding chapter.
discussion of the
Cf. above,
Chapter IV.
1, 2,
1
Short Treatise >
8 (Opera, I, p. 24,
1.
H ).
But see below, pp. 299, 3 19
ff.
132
[ETHICS,
The
sources quoted there will throw light upon Spinoza's reference here to an argument "from the infinite power of
God, since in Him there can be no cause by which He might have been induced to create one sooner or more than another"
x
date his
Argument). They will likewise help to elucireference to an argument that God "cannot omit to
(First
is
do what
good"
ment based upon
(Third Argument), as well as his arguthe principle "that one substance cannot
3 produce another" (Fourth Argument). There is only left for us to account for his allusion to an argument "from the 4 simplicity of His will" (Second Argument). This I believe to reflect a passage in which Crescas attempts to refute Maimonides* solution of the problem of creation. It will be
recalled that as to
Maimonides endeavors
why God
answer the question created the world at one time rather than at
to
another, as well as to explain the other difficulties of creation, by the general statement that creation was an act of divine
will.
To
this
Crescas retorts somewhat as follows:
If the
is
world was created by divine will, then inasmuch as the world composite, the will that has created it will have to be com-
posite, for the creative will
must be
diffused throughout the
parts of the object created. But this is impossible, since God's will, not being distinct from His essence, must be as simple
as the essence
itself. 5
Hence Spinoza's cryptic statement,

will."
6
"from the simplicity of His

1
3
Short treatise,
Ibid. (p. 22, Ibid. (p. 22,
11.
1.
I,
2,
1 1
(Opera,
I, p.
3
21,
1.
35~p. 22,
(p. 22,
11.
1.
3).
3-4).
3).
I^d.
5-7).
Cf.
Or Adonai)
III,
i,
(p.
66b,
11.
42-45): "Granted that the proposition leads
to the conclusion that there
must be
will
the will of an agent, this very
same proposition
would
also
have to make that

itself
composite object would

6
produce one simple object, for a will producing a have to be composite, inasmuch as the will must be
it
diffused throughout the composite object which
produces."
Cf. also Descartes' statement that "the will consists only of one single element,
is
and
so to speak indivisible" (Mcditationes^ IV, Oeuvres, VII, p. 60,
II.
22-23).
PROPS. 7-10, 12-13]
133
III.
DEFINITION OF THE
TERM "INFINITE"
"every substance endeavor to explain in
Coming now
is
to Proposition VIII, that
necessarily infinite,"
we
shall first
what sense Spinoza uses the term "infinite." Here, too, it is to his predecessors that we must turn for help and information. Spinoza speaks of two kinds of infinite. There is,
first,
With
(in
the "absolutely infinite" (absolute infinitum) (Def. VI). this is contrasted, second, the "infinite in its own kind"
suo genere infinitum) (Def. VI, Expl.).
Corresponding
its
to the "infinite in its
own kind"
there
is
the "finite in
own kind"
will
(in suo genere fin itum) (Def. II). These phrases to be sure, all defined by Spinoza, but his definitions, as are,
have been gathered, are in most cases brief restatements of generally accepted and well-known mediaeval concepts.
What then is the origin and background of these phrases as well as of the ideas behind them ?
In mediaeval discussions of infinity the term "infinite" is said to have two meanings. It may be an accident either of
magnitude or of number, or
lect.
1
it
may
be an essence, that
is
to
say, a self-existent substance, immaterial like soul
and
intel-
As an accident of magnitude
it
means an unlimited
distance or length, something that has no end or boundary. As an accident of number, it means something that is endlessly addible or divisible. "Finite" as the antithesis of this
kind of infinite means just the opposite, a distance that is bounded and a number that is limited, or, in other words, something comparable with others of its kind and exceeded
by them. But an
essentially infinite
substance means something
1 See Or Adonai, I, i, i (p. 4a-b), based upon Averroes' Middle Commentaries on Physics , III, 4, 2043, 2-5, 2043, 32, and Metaphysics XI, 10, io66a, 35~io66b, 21. Cf. my Crescas' Critique of Aristotle, p. 137 and notes on pp. 329-335.
,
134
[ETHICS,
It means a substance whose essence is entirely different. unique and so incomparable that it cannot suffer any form
of limitation and hence cannot have any form of positive

description, for every description necessarily implies a limita1 tion, or as Spinoza puts it: "determination is negation."
To
call
a substance infinite in this sense
is
like calling voice

it
colorless.
When
voice
is
described as colorless
does not
mean
the negation of a property which we should expect it to have and which it may have, but rather the absolute ex-
clusion of voice from the universe of color.
By
the
same
" trasted with "particular negation expressed in the distinction between

is
when substance means its absolute exclusion from any form of finitude, limitation, and description. The negation of finitude implied " " infinite is what the mediaeval in this sense of the term would call "absolute negation" as conJewish logicians
token,
is described as infinite in this sense,
it
a contrast which
is
"A
is
not-B" and
"A
There is a suggestion of this distinction in Arisand Spinoza himself uses for these two kinds of netotle, gation the terms "negation" (negatio) and "privation"
not B."
2
"Thus privation is nothing else than denying of (privatio). a thing something which we think belongs to its nature; negation is nothing else than denying of a thing something because 3 Of the parallel passages it does not belong to its nature."
in Jewish philosophy the following
may
be quoted:
"You
is
already know from your reading in logic two kinds. One is particular negation, 4
*
that negation
as, e.g.,
of
when we
say
Balaam does not see/ which
sense of the term.

to say, the
1
The
other
is
negation in the true absolute negation, 5 that is

is
denying of the subject that which does not natu11.
Epistola 50 (Opera,YV, p. 240,

I,
13-14): "determinatio negatio est."

Interpretations
5-7).
',
Cf.
Ethics,
*
<
Prop.
8, Schol. i.
De
11.
Ch.
10; Metaphysics,
V, 22.
Epistola 21 (Opera , IV, p. 129,
rnnvon
n^pn.
nrfrwon n
PROPS. 7-10, 12-13]
it,
135
is
rally belong to
as, e.g.,
"The wall does not see/ which

l
negation in a general sense/'

cidental infinite
totle:
is
This mediaeval distinction between an essential and an ac-
"The
infinite is either that

it is
based upon the following passage in Ariswhich is incapable of being

not
its
traversed because
nature to be traversed
'
this
,
corresponds to the sense in
which the voice
is
in visible*
or that which admits only of incomplete traverse or scarcely admits of traverse, or that which, though it naturally admits of traverse, is not traversed or limited; further, a thing may
be infinite
in respect
of addition or of subtraction or of both." 2

is this.
The
implication of the passage

limit.
The
infinite is that
which has no
The term
is
derived from magnitude and
other thing which
number, and must thus primarily apply to them or to any may be measured either quantitatively or
may therefore speak of infinite beauty as qualitatively. well as of infinite length and number. All such forms of
measurement, however, imply a common standard and a comparison of the thing measured with other things of its kind.
We
But the term "infinite" may be used
also in a derivative
sense as applied to ured on account of their uniqueness and incomprehensibility in a class in which they can be compared with others of their
kind. "Infinite" in this sense is an absolute negation, the denial of a thing of any kind of determination and description, as something not belonging to its nature.
things which are incapable of being meas-
In view of this discussion, we may now explain the meaning of the different kinds of finite and infinite in Spinoza.
and since only like things can be compared, to be finite means to be " If between two things included within a class of like things.
be
finite or limited
To
means
to be comparable,
Narboni's commentary on Moreh Nebukim, Metaphysics y XI, 10, io66a, 35-10666,

i;
cf.
I,
58.
Physics , III, 4, 2O4a, 2-7.
136
[ETHICS,
no relation can be found, there can be no similarity [and hence no comparison] between them, and there is no relation
between two things that have no similarity to each other; as, e.g., we do not say that this heat is similar to that color,
or this voice
is
similar to that sweetness.
You must
that two things of the same kind i.e., whose essential properties are the same, distinguished from each other by
are greatness and smallness, strength and weakness, etc. I similar/' that suffers description necessarily Everything
know
may
therefore be called finite in
its
own
kind, for
it
cannot be
described except in terms that properly belong to it and limit A thing finite is thus something that is similar in some it.
respect to something else of
its
own kind with which
it
may
be compared and be found greater or smaller, longer or
more important or less important. Hence Spinoza's definition: "That thing is called finite in its own kind which can be limited by another thing of the same nature. For exshorter,
ample, a body is called finite, because we always conceive another body which is greater. So a thought is limited by another thought; but a body is not limited by a thought,
nor a thought by a body" (Def.

"Infinite in its
II).
the superlative of comparison, its surpassing of all others of the same degree kind. It does not mean that the thing so described as infinite
is
own kind" means simply
unique and incomparable by possessing an

it
infinite
number
of qualities, nor does
mean
and incomparable. What it qualities upon being compared with others of their kind will be found to surpass them all. Hence Spinoza's statement:
that any of its qualities is unique means is that certain ones of its
"For of whatever
is
infinite
only in
its
own
kind,
we can
deny infinite attributes" (Def. VI, Expl.). But "absolutely infinite" means an absolute exclusion
1
Moreh Nebukim,
I,
56.
PROPS. 7-10, 12-13]
137
from the universe of finitude, determination, and description. It implies uniqueness and incomparability; there is no kind
to
which
it
may
be said to belong.
its
It
is
sui generis.
It
is
an
individual essence of
own
kind.
The number
of
its attri-
butes
is infinite,
reason
it
suffers
and so is each of its attributes, and for this no description or determination. Spinoza
to the essence of that
thus says:
"But
which
is
absolutely
infinite pertains
whatever expresses essence and involves no

this
negation" (Def. VI, Expl.). It is as an "absolutely infinite" of
kind that
God
is
described by the mediaevals, a description which denies the existence of any relation between the essence of God and that
of other beings.
"Since the existence of a relation between
God and man,
or between
denied, similarity who like Crescas contended for the existence of essential
attributes likewise denied that there
must
Him and other beings, has been likewise be denied/' r Even those
is any similarity between divine and human attributes, "for they widely differ the one being finite and the other infinite," and "there
. .
can be no relation and comparison between the infinite and the finite." 2 In almost exactly the same words Spinoza says:
is
"This I know, that between the no comparison (proportion em)
finite
;
and the
infinite there
so that the difference be-
tween the greatest and most excellent creature and God is the same as the difference between God and the least creature."
3
The
absolute infinity of God in this sense
is
described
by Maimonides as follows: "Even these negative attributes must not be formed and applied to God, except in the way
which, as you know, sometimes an attribute is negatived in reference to a thing, although that attribute can naturally
in
never be applied to
'
it in
the
same
sense, as, e.g.,
we
say,
Ibid., I, 56.
2
Or Adonai,
I, iii,
3 (pp. rjb-â).
Epistola 54.
138

x
[ETHICS,
Says also Judah ha-Levi: "As regards the negative attributes, such as Living, Only, First
'This wall does not see/"
and Last, they are given

stand them.
to
Him
in
contrasts, but not to establish
them
order to negative their in the sense we underlife
For we cannot understand
except accom-
God, however, is panied by sensibility above them. One cannot, for instance, speak of time as being endowed with life, yet it does not follow that it is
. . .
and movement.
dead, since its nature has nothing to do with either life or death. In the same way one cannot call a stone ignorant,
is
although we may say that it is not learned. Just as a stone too low to be brought into connection with learning or
ignorance, thus the essence of God is too exalted to have " 2 Exactly the same anything to do with life or death.
reasoning, though for a different purpose, Spinoza: "I say then, first, that privation
is
employed by
not the act of
.
is
depriving, but simply and merely a state of want. say, for example, that a blind man is deprived of sight, because we readily imagine him as seeing. This imagination
. .
We
we compare him with others who we compare his present condition with his But when the decree past condition when he did see. of God and His nature are considered, we cannot say of that
comes about
see, or
either because
because
man any more
than of a stone, that he
is
deprived of sight,
less inconsist-
for at that time sight pertains to that

3 ently than to a stone/' Hence the term "infinite" stands
man no
in
as
"
"
"
Spinoza for such terms

"
indeter-
unique,"
incomparable,"
"
homonymous,"
"
ineffable," minate," "incomprehensible," indefinable," "unknowable," and many other similar terms. "Unknow-
able" and "indefinable," however,

1
will
be found
2.
its
most
March Nebukim,
Epistola 21.
I,
58.
Cuzari, II,
PROPS. 7-10, 12-13]
It is in
139
convenient equivalents.
accordance with Aristotle's

is
dictum that
"
the infinite so far as infinite
unknown,"
'
which Spinoza himself repeats in connection with his argument that by an infinite number of methods "we can never
arrive
...
at
any knowledge whatever/'
In the three propositions from VIII to

to prove, as
we have already
trying indicated, that substance is

in his defini-
X Spinoza
like
is
everything that
tion.
God
has been laid down to be
absolutely infinite," substance is also "necessarily infinite." Formally the proof of this proposition is based upon
is
"
Proposition VIII begins by showing that
God, who
in Proposition
the identity of essence and existence in substance, as stated VII, and upon the impossibility of two or more
substances having the same nature or attributes, as stated in Proposition V. Materially, however, the proposition rests upon the very definition of substance. For Proposition VII,
we may recall, is based upon the principle that substance has no prior cause, and Proposition V is likewise based upon the principle that substance can have no higher genus, both of
which principles are implied in the definition of substance. So this proposition, too, is derived from the very nature and
definition of substance as
"something which
is in itself
and
is conceived through itself." In fact, Propositions VII, VIII, are all unfoldings of the implications of the definiIX, and
tion of substance.
The next
is
to
show that by
step in the analogy between substance and God infinity in both cases is meant the possesis
sion of infinite attributes. This
IX.
The
proposition as
it
stands
the purpose of Proposition is incomplete. Only the
major premise is given. Its full significance, however, can be brought out by supplying the minor premise and conclusion.
,4,
187^7.
Emcndatione^
13 (Opera, II, p. 13,
11.
'Tractatus de Intellectus
17-23).
140
[ETHICS,
"The more
tributes
reality or being a thing possesses, the more atbelong to it." But substance possesses infinite
reality or being. Hence, to substance belong infinite attri1 butes. In one of his letters to de Vries, as well as in the
Scholium to Proposition X,
tion
IX
is
both of which places Proposireproduced, Spinoza actually adds the needed

in
I
conclusion.
There
is
one incidental comment which
should like to
make here with regard to the source of Proposition IX. It seems to me that this proposition reflects Aristotle's discussion with regard to the character of a true proprium predicated of a subject. If it can be shown, says Aristotle, that A
can also be shown that what is more A is what is more B. To quote him in full: "The confirmer however [must consider], whether what is simply is the property of what is simply; for the more will be
is
a proprium of B,
it
also a proprium of
the property of the more, the less also of the less, the least of the least, and the most of the most; thus, since it is the
property of
fire
naturally to tend upwards,

fire
it
would
also be
the property of what is more naturally to tend more upwards, and in the same manner we must direct attention
from other things also, to all these." 2 That Aristotle speaks of proprium ('idiov) whereas Spinoza here speaks of "attributes" is a matter of indifference. In mediaeval Hebrew literature the term proprium in a similar passage of Aristotle is translated by the word which usually means "attribute." 3
1
11.
2-4 and 20-22).
Topics, V, 8, I3yb, 33~i38a, 3. 3 Cf. Emunah Ramah, II, iv, 3 (p. 65): "These are some of the propositions which are derived from the more (iniYI) and less (ninDHl). Aristotle mentions
them
in the
Book on
Dialectic (fTOJ
rabi as the
Book on Topics (JTIDIpDn
= J-*-), the title of which is translated by Alfa= JjJ-l ^J^; cf. Steinschneider, Al-
Farabi y p. 53, n. 74). The proposition in question is as follows: If a certain thing has a certain attribute ("JNin), and if also the more that thing is the more it has of that attribute, then the attribute belongs to the thing truly by necessity." This
PROPS. 7-10, 12-13]
141
Spinoza himself occasionally uses the term "attribute" in the sense of property. Starting therefore with the definition
1
of attribute as "that which the intellect perceives of substance, as if constituting the essence of substance" (Demonst. of Prop.
IX) and assuming
it
to be thus a true proprium
of substance, Spinoza concludes that
"
the
more
reality (reali-
tas) or being (esse) a thing possesses the
more attributes be-
long to it" (Prop. IX). Incidentally it may be remarked that 2 since here as well as in his correspondence Spinoza uses realitas as the equivalent of esse or of entitasj* the term wezentheid (or wezeendhijd),
which
4
Short
'Treatise^ I, 2,
ly, is
translated by esse
(i.e.,
corresponding passage in used in place of realitas , should be being, Sein) rather than essentia (i.e.,
realitas
is
in a
essence, Wesenheii).
Spinoza further uses
as the
equivalent of perfection for which use there Descartes. 6

Proposition
a parallel in
concludes the analogy between substance

is
and God by showing that each attribute of substance

finite in all the
in-
various senses of infinity, "Each attribute of substance must be conceived through itself." To be con-
ceived through
has already been shown, means to "indefinable" and "infinite," it has also be indefinable, and
itself, it
been shown, are interchangeable terms. 7

passage
is
based on Topics, V,
8,
ijyb, 14
ff.,
where the locus of more

the
(juaXXop)
for
and
less (JITTOV) Is discussed.
The Greek term underlying
Hebrew term
"
attri-
bute
1
"
is
proprium
(tSiw).
Cf. below, p. 230.
Epistola 9 (Optra, IV, p. 45,
11.
2-3 and 20).

1.
Ethics, IV, Praef. (Optra, II, p. 207,
27).
Optra,
n. 7.
*
6
7
I, p.
23,
II.
22-24; p. 534.
Cf. above, p. 108, n. 4,
and below,
p. 382,
Ethics, II, Def. 6, et passim.
Medttationes, III (Otuvrts, VII, p. 40,
1.
28).
See above, p. 76.
42

IV.
[ETHICS,
RELATION OF ATTRIBUTE TO SUBSTANCE

the
The God or substance of Spinoza, like

rationalists,
is
God of mediaeval
unknowable in His essence.
He may indeed, in
Spinoza's view, be immediately perceived by intuition as a

clear
and
distinct idea, but

its
He
is
not subject to knowledge
terms broader and more general. When Spinoza argues against the mediaeval conception of an unknowable God, 1 he simply argues for the view that God
that defines
object in
can be known, after a manner, even though He cannot be defined in terms of genus and species. "Of His [i.e., God's]
2 general idea." Spinoza indeed will endeavor to prove the existence of God, but in this he will be merely carrying out the mediaeval tra-
essence," says Spinoza,
"we can form no
dition that while we can have no knowledge of God's essence we can prove His existence. "There is no possibility of obthe only taining a knowledge of the essence of God
.
thing that
exists."
3
man
can apprehend of
Him
is
is
the fact that
He
Or again: "If knowledge
sought concerning a
thing whose very existence is in doubt, the first question to be asked is whether it exists or not. When the question of
its
existence has been answered positively, the thing then to

it is,
What is it? How is it? Wherefore is it? Concerning God, however, man has no right to ask except the question as to whether He exists." 4 But while the real nature of God must remain beyond comprehension, still God as a living and dynamic force in
be asked about
the world, conceived as creator, lawgiver, caretaker, guide,
and guardian, makes himself known

1
to
mankind through His
Short 'Treatise ,
I, 7,
ff.
11.
2-3).
Morch Nebukim>
Hobot ha-Lfbabot,
I, 59. I, 4.
PROPS. 7-10, 12-13]
assumes
143
and works, and acter and personality. God was determined, in tive terms drawn from
actions
in their eyes a certain char-
This character and personality of
the Middle Ages, by a set of descripthe literature of religious tradition. In the philosophic terminology of the time, these descriptive terms were known by the name of divine attributes.
There were many kinds of attributes which, when taken in their literal sense, would express the various relations that
may
exist
between attribute and subject.
Some
of these
divine attributes would constitute in their ordinary meaning accidental qualities. Others would designate actions. Still
others would only express some external relations. It was, however, generally agreed that attributes could not be taken
in a sense
which would imply plurality
in the divine essence
or a similarity between God and His creatures. 1 It was therefore commonly recognized that attributes are not to be
taken in their literal sense. The Talmudic saying that "the " Torah speaks according to the language of men 2 is quoted in this connection by the mediaeval Jewish philosophers. 3 Spinoza repeats it in his statement that "the Scripture 4 How these continually speaks after the fashion of men."
.
.
attributes could be interpreted so as not to contravene the absolute simplicity and uniqueness of God constituted the problem of divine attributes with which all the mediaeval Jewish
philosophers had to grapple. That attributes could not be taken as accidental qualities was generally admitted.
Whether they should be interpreted as external would seem to be a question upon which opinions
1
relations
differed,
5
See
my
"Crescas on the Problem of Divine Attributes," Jewish Quarterly Re-
view, n.s., Vol. VII, p. 9, n.

2
u.
3
Berakot jib, and parallels.

11.
Moreh Nebukim,
I,
26.
11.
Cuzari, II, 2;
Emunah Ramah,
12-13); Epistola 21 (p. 132, II, iii; Ilobot ha-Lcbabot y I, 10;
34
f.).
Moreh Nebukim,
I,
52 and 58.
144

I
[ETHICS,
though,
believe, it
can be shown that the difference was

It was agreed by all, however, be taken in the sense of actions. There
merely
in the use of terms.
that attributes
may
was equally a general agreement that no attribute, in its literal and obvious sense, expresses the real essence of God, inasmuch as the essence of God must forever remain unknowable.
The mediaeval
discussion about attributes
is
sometimes
drawn between the name Jehovah and the other names of God. Says Judah ha-Levi: "All names of God, save the Tetragrammaton, are predicates and
in a distinction
summed up
attributive descriptions, derived from the way His creatures * are affected by His decrees and measures." Says also Mai-
monides: "It
is
well
known
that
all
the
names of God
oc-
from His actions, except the Tetragrammaton, which consists of the one, namely, 2 letters yod^ he waw> he. This name is the nomen proprium
curring in Scripture are derived
y
of
is
God and
is
to say, the
on that account called Shew ha-Meforash that name which indicates the essence of God in a
y
the implication of its having anything in common with the essence of other beings. All the other glorious names are common appellatives, 3 inasmuch as
similar/'
manner which excludes
they are derived from actions to which some of our own are 4 In connection with these divine names Judah
ha-Levi quotes Exodus 6, 3, where God says to Moses: "And I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, by the name of God Almighty (El Shaddai\ but by my name
Jehovah was
in
not known to them."
In Spinoza we find this view of the mediaevals restated almost their own words. Quoting the same verse from
1
Cuzari, II, a.
1ITPO DP.
3
5
fpnBQ
Cuzari y
omo.
II, 2.
March Nebukim,
I,
61.
PROPS. 7-10, 12-13]
145
6, 3, he comments upon it as follows: "We must note that in Scripture no other name but Jehovah is ever found which indicates the absolute essence of God,
Exodus
without reference
that the other
in truth, the
to created things.
is
for this reason, that this
the only
The Jews maintain, nomen propriitm of God;
names are mere appellatives (cippellativa); and, other names of God, whether they be substanis
tives or adjectives, are

in so far as
or
as
is
mere attributes, which belong to God conceived of in relation to created things manifested through them." He then concludes: "Now,
He
tells Moses that He was not known to the patriarchs the name of Jehovah, it follows that they were not cogniby zant of any attribute of God which expresses His absolute
God
essence, but only of His deeds and promises 2 power, as manifested in visible things."
that
is,
of His
Now, Spinoza
has adopted the traditional term "attribute," and makes use of it as a description of the manner in which substance,
unknowable
in itself,
manifests itself to the
human mind.
But how would Spinoza characterize his attributes if he were to classify them according to the mediaeval fashion? They
are not accidents, nor relations, nor actions.
ever, what, as
They
are,
how-
we
shall presently see, the

is
mediaevals called
essential attributes, that

stitute the essence.
1
to say, attributes
which conI
He
thus says:
"By
attribute,
under-
In his
comment on
the divine
name El Shaddai which
occurs in this verse,
Spinoza remarks that "El Shaddai, in Hebrew, signifies the God who suffices, in " that He gives to every man that which suffices for him (Opera, III, p. 169, 11. 3-5).
Judah ha-Levi, in the corresponding passage quoted in the preceding paragraph, explains El Shaddai as meaning "power and dominion." Spinoza's explanation, however, is found in Rashi's commentary on the Bible (cf. Genesis 17, i; 28, 3; 35, 1 1). Maimonides, though he like Rashi derives El Shaddai from a word meaning "sufficient," explains it to mean that "His existence is self-sufficient" (Moreh Nebukim^ I, 63). These two etymologies of El Shaddai go back to still earlier
sources.
a
fracfatus fhcologico-PohticuSy Ch. 13 (Opera, III, p. 169,
11.
7-24).
146
[ETHICS,
stand that which the intellect perceives of substance, as constituting its essence" (Ethics, I, Def. IV).
if
But here we
too,
are
met with
a difficulty, a natural difficulty,
which has divided Spinoza scholars into two camps. The definition may have two meanings, depending upon
its
which of
"
elements
is
emphasized.
is
If the
expression
it
which the
intellect perceives"
laid stress
upon,
would
seem that attributes are only

thus be only a subjective
in intellectu.
Attributes would
of thinking, expressing a relation to a perceiving subject and having no real existence in the essence. On the other hand, if only the latter part of the
definition is taken notice of, namely, "constituting the essence of a substance," it would seem that the attributes are extra intellectum^ real elements out of which the essence of the
mode
substance
be sure,
there
is it
is
is
composed. According to both interpretations, to the mind which perceives the attributes, but
According to the former
to be in-
the following difference.
interpretation, to be perceived
vented
by the mind means
by
the mind, for of themselves the attributes have
no
independent existence at all but are identical with the essence of the substance. According to the latter interpretation, to
be perceived by the mind means only to be discovered by the mind, for even of themselves the attributes have independent
existence in the essence of the substance.
1
been adduced by scholars
In the discussion of the subject two kinds of evidence have in support of their respective inand material. It is not my purpose terpretations: literary
here, however, to assemble
and
assess
what has been
said
by either side in support of its own view and in objection to the other. On the whole, the abundance of both literary and
material evidence
is in is
This interpretation
1
in
favor of the subjective interpretation. harmony both with the variety of

Gcschichte der Philosophic
',
Cf.
Erdmann, Grundriss der
II,
272.6.
PROPS. 7-10, 12-13]
attributes
147
statements
made by Spinoza about
and with the
place which the attributes occupy in his system. Of the latter we shall have occasion to speak in other chapters. The
main objection
in the
to this interpretation has
been
summed up
l
statement that "no prae-Kantian reader would have We shall such a construction on Spinoza's language/' put therefore address ourselves to this particular objection and
try to show that this very controversy between the upholders of the subjective and the objective interpretations of Spinoza's attributes is the question upon which mediaeval Jewish philosophers were divided in their theories of divine
attributes, and also to point to certain facts which indicate that
Spinoza has consciously and advisedly aligned himself with

that group of Jewish philosophers theory of attributes.
who
held a subjective
The gravamen of the mediaeval discussion of divine attributes is what is known as the problem of essential attributes. By essential attributes are meant those elements which constitute the essence of a subject, or
which are related to the
essence of the subject as the genus and species are related to the essence of the object defined. It appears primarily as a problem in the exegesis of those adjectives which in the Bible
or in the other traditional literature are ascribed to God.
Admitting, as we have already pointed out, that attributes are not to be taken literally, that they cannot be interpreted
as accidental qualities but
may
be interpreted as actions, the
mediaevals raised the question as to whether any of these adjectives may be taken as being related to God in the same
sense as the elements of a definition to the object defined, that is to say, as if constituting the divine essence. The prob-
lem, it must be remarked, was not whether the divine essence could be conceived as consisting of a genus and species. The
1
Martineau,
Study of Spinoza
p. 184.
Cf.
Krdmann, he.
cit.
148
absolute
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA [ETHICS, simplicity of God is a principle established beyond

i
any question, a simplicity which is to exclude metaphysical and logical plurality no less than physical composition. It is thus generally admitted that God is not a species and can have no genus. The question was merely as to whether the
1
assumption of essential attributes contravened that simplicity of essence.
To put the question more bluntly: Assuming that the relation of God's attributes to His essence is analo-
gous to that of the parts of a definition, genus and species, to the essence of the object defined, does that mean that the
essence
is simple or not? Those who reject essential attributes answer it in the negative; those who admit them anit
swer
in the positive.
The
basis of the problem,
it
seems to me,
is
to be found in
the question as to the nature of the reality of genus and species, or, in other words, of universals. If universals have
genus and species have some kind of real existence, and a subject to which are attributed terms related to it after the analogy of genus and species cannot be
reality, then
some kind of
said to be absolutely simple. On the other hand, if universals have no reality at all, then genus and species are mere
names, and definitions are purely nominal, and the essence

is in reality simple. The problem of thus a problem of universals, the controversy between realism and nominalism. It is, however, not a conflict between Platonism and Aristotelianism. Pla-
of the subject defined

is
essential attributes
tonic realism
had no
followers
among
the classical Jewish
philosophers.
It is as Aristotelians,
and as interpreters of
which are hid away
in
Aristotle's view, that Jewish philosophers latently formulated
their respective theories of universals their discussions of divine attributes.
universals,
,
it
may
6 and
7.
problem of be said, began with the rejection of Plareal

Cf. Short 'Treatise,
I,
For the
II,
7,
3.
PROPS. 7-10, 12-13]
speculation became
those
1
149
tonic realism,
when
universals which were
As spokesman of
now who
concerning those said to exist only in the mind.

rife
reject essential attributes
we
may
While essential attributes, says take Maimonides. Maimonides, denote the essence of the object and do not
imply anything extraneous superadded to
it, still they are to be rejected, for they imply that the essence itself is composed, as it were, of genus and species, which as universal terms are
considered as previous causes to the existence of the individual essence. 2 It is here that the theory of universals comes
into play. Like all Arabic and Jewish philosophers, Maimonides rejects Platonic realism, affirming that "species have no existence except in our own mind." 3 Still this assertion
makes him neither a nominalist nor a conceptualist. Nominalism must be rejected as inconsistent with the entire trend of his argument, for if universals were mere words, definitions would be purely nominal, and Maimonides could not reject essential attributes on the ground that "there are no
previous causes to His existence, by which He could be defined/* and quote with approval those who maintain that
God." 4 Conceptualism, or the theory that universals have ideal without real existence, is explicitly rejected by Maimonides in his repudia" tion of the assertion of some thinkers, that ideas, i.e., the
definition can be given of
"no
universals, are neither existent nor non-existent."
Maimonides, as follower of Avicenna and

all his
in
What common with

s
contemporaries, conceived of universals is that they have both ideal and real existence. Universals, to be sure,
exist in the
1
mind, but the human mind does not invent them
The historical survey which follows is based upon my essay "Crescas on the Problem of Divine Attributes/' Jewish Quarterly AV:7>:r, n.s., Vol. VII (1916), pp.
1-44, 175' 221
* *
-
Morfh Nfbukim,
Ibid., Ill, 18.
I, 51 "
and
52.
Ibid., I, 52.
Ibid., I, 51.
150

What
the
[ETHICS,
out of nothing.
in
mind does
is
the multifarious individuals. For prior
only to discover them to the rise of in-
dividual beings the universals exist in the

entities,
mind of God
as
and they remain as such even when independent enter upon plurality in material form, though their they presence in the individuals is not discernible except by mental
activity.
lated to the subject as genus
Consequently essential attributes, which are reand species are related to the
object defined, must necessarily imply some kind of plurality in the essence of the subject. This plurality, to be sure, would be only mentally discernible, but still it would be inconsistent with the conception of absolute simplicity. As against this view there are those who maintain that
essential attributes are admissible.
They
insist that uni-
versals have no reality at all; their existence in the mind means that they are invented by the mind. Genus and
species are thus only generalizations, and definitions consisting of genus and species are only nominal. Averroes, whose
view
this
quoted in Hebrew literature, is clearly outspoken on point. "It is of the nature of essential attributes that
is
they do not introduce any plurality into the subject which

supports them actually. If they do import into them some kind of plurality, it is only in the same sense that the parts of a definition
may
be said to import some kind of plurality
into the object defined, and that is what is called by philosophers an intellectual plurality in contradistinction to an actual
l
plurality/'
No
less
outspoken
is
Moses ha-Lavi
in his ad-
mission of essential attributes.
"Some
attributes," he says,
as,
"are identical with the essence of the object described,

for instance,
. . .
when we
describe
man by
the attribute 'animal.'
With
reference to such attributes as are identical with

p. 300,
11.
Averroes, âhajut a/-Tahafut, V (ed. M. Bouyges, phrased also by Narboni on Moreh Nebukim> I, 58.
1
12-15); para-
PROPS. 7-10, 12-13]
151
the essence of the object described, it is evident that God can be described by them, inasmuch as they do not imply
any addition
again
is
The implication here that essential attributes, related to God after the
to the essence at all."
z
analogy of the genus animal to man, are purely subjective terms, in reality being absolutely identical with the essence of
argument against Maimonof attributes, justifies his own negative interpretation positive interpretation by pointing to their subjective charGod. Likewise Gersonides,
in his
ides'
acter.
a distinction between two kinds of propositions, one in which the relation of subject and predicate is
He draws
that of discourse, the other in which

a distinction reminiscent of that
it is
that of existence
Aristotle
made by
between
nominal and real

lated to
definitions. 3
Divine attributes are thus to
him purely subjective and nominal predications of God, reHim only in discourse, and implying no plurality in His essence, and may therefore be taken as positive terms. It can also be shown that Crescas* insistence upon the admissibility of positive essential attributes
is
based upon the
view that attributes are purely subjective terms. The eclectic Albo, vacillating between the positive and negative interpreof attributes by calling them intellectual conceptions" 4 of " divine perfection. When I awaken from my reflections upon
the plurality of attributes I begin to realize that all the attributes are nothing but intellectual conceptions of those perfections which must needs exist in Thy essence but which in
reality are nothing but
tations of attributes, endeavors to justify the positive form "
Thy
essence."
In view of this controversy over essential attributes in the

Md'amar
Elohi.
III, 3:
y
Milhamot Adonai,
DIN'SDH
pjb, 29
Analytica Postfriora
II, 10,
ff.
nvîw mrna.
'Jkkarim, II, 25.
152
[ETHICS,
philosophic literature with which Spinoza had an intimate acquaintance, and in view of this insistence upon the subjective nature of essential attributes on the part of many of his Jewish predecessors, it is not unreasonable to assume that
it is
not as a mere turn of speech that Spinoza always refers
to
it,
attribute in subjective terms, as when he describes for instance, as that which the intellect perceives (perl
cipif)
concerning the substance, or as that which expresses 2 3 (exprimii) or explains (explicat) the essence of substance,
or as that under which

is
God
is
considered (consideratur)
or
conceived (concipi)^ or as that which is the every entity same as substance but is called attribute with respect to the
intellect (respectu intellectus}? There is, furthermore, evidence that Spinoza was acquainted with the moderately realistic Avicennian and Maimonidean theory of universals
and that he disagreed with

set
it
and
. . .
up general
ideas," he says,
criticized "
it.
"They have
These
ideas, they state,
have
are in the understanding of God, as many of Plato's followers said, namely, that these general ideas (such as rational,
animal, and the like) have been created by God; and although those who follow Aristotle say, indeed, that these
things are not real things, only things of reason, they never-
The theless regard them frequently as [real] things/' reference in this passage to the objective interpretation of Aristotle's universals is clear. He finds it to differ only little
7
from Platonic realism.
It
would seem that Spinoza himself
considered universals, with the exception of only one uni1
Ethics,
2
I,
Def. 4.
Ibid.) I, Prop. 10, Schol.; Prop. 32,
Demonst.
1.
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Ch. 13 (Opera, III, p. 169,
23).
11.
Ethics, II, Prop. 6; Prop. 7, Schol.; Epistola 64 (Opera, IV, p. 277,
23-24
and 28-29).
5
6
7
Ethics,
I,
Prop. 10, Schol.;
cf.
1.

4).
1.
2).
Epistola 9 (Optra, IV, p. 46, Short Treatise, I, 6, 7.
PROPS. 7-10, 12-13]
1
153
versal, namely, substance, as purely subjective concepts; and what is true of universals is also true of attributes. It is thus
not in vain that in his formal definition of attribute Spinoza 2 says that he understands by it "that which the intellect
perceives of substance, as if constituting its esssence," instead of merely saying, as does Descartes, that attributes
constitute
Elsewhere, too, in the Ethics as well as in his other writings attributes are always spoken of in terms which suggest their subjective
character. 4
the essence of substance. 3
In one place he says explicitly that attributes are distinguished only by reason. 5 This subjective interpretation of attributes disposes of
the difficulty which
is
raised
tive interpretation.
"How
by those who follow the objecthat essence can be one and
self-identical, while its constituents are
many, heterogeneous
6
and unrelated,
1
is
a question which
is
hopeless of solution/'
Cf. below, pp. 327-328.
By
the term "intellect" in this definition Spinoza
means
the finite
human
in-
Prop. VII, Schol., that "we have already demonstrated, that everything which can be perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance pertains entirely to one substance, and consetellect.
When
he says in Ethics
II,
quently that substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute and now under that," it
is
not to be inferred that an attribute of substance
is
that which can be conceived
only by the "infinite intellect." What the passage means to say is that "everything which can be conceived of by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence of sub-
and the infinite intellect can conceive of an infinite number of things as stance" is only an attribute of substance and not a constituting the essence of substance substance itself, and consequently extension and thought, which alone can be conceived by the finite human intellect as constituting the essence of substance, are only attributes of substance and not substances themselves. J Principia Philosophiae, I, 53: "Substantiae praecipua proprietas [= attributum], quac ipsius naturam cssetiamque constituit"; Notae in Programma
((EitvreSy
VIII,
2, p.
349,
11.
naturamque
II,
4
constituit."
1-2): Attributum, quod ejus [substantiae] essentiam See Erdmann, Grundriss dcr Geschichte der Philosophic^
"
272,6.
See references above, p. 152.
Cf. Busolt, Die Gi undzuge der Erkenntnisztheorie

s
und Metaphysik Spinozns, pp. 107-111.

6
I, 3.
Martineau,
A Study
of Spinoza, p. 185.
154
[ETHICS,
The
question had already been raised by Simon de Vries in a letter to Spinoza: "If I may say that each substance has
only one attribute and if I had the idea of two attributes, then I could rightly conclude that where there are two different attributes there are also
two
different substances/'
Spinoza's answer is like that given in Jewish literature by those who admitted essential attributes, namely, that attributes are merely different sence.
"You
desire,
though there
words expressing the same esis no need, that I should
by an example, how one and the same thing can be stamped with two names. In order not to seem miserly, I 2 That essential attributes, as suggested will give you two/' in this quotation, are only names by which the essence is
illustrate
denoted
is
the view held by both those
who admit
the use of
positive attributes and those who reject it. Even Maimonides speaks of essential attributes as being merely "the 3 If he does reject their positive use, explanation of a name/'
only because he endows essential attributes with some kind of objective reality. Were they all names only and
it is
Maimonides would permit their positive use. Albo well restates Maimonides' view in the following passage: "You must know that God cannot be described by two things which would constitute His essence after the He can, analogy of animality and rationality in Man.
nothing
else,
. .
however, be described by any attribute which explanation of the name by which He is called."
is
4
only the
In the mediaeval enHâvor to reconcile the apparent contradiction between the plurality of attributes and the simplicity of essence an attempt is often made to reduce all the
different attributes to one.
1
It
is
shown that the variety of
11. 11.
10-13).
7-9). Cf. below, pp. 229-230.
a
*
Moreh Nebukim,
'Ibfcarim, II, 9.
I,
51
and
'
52.
PROPS. 7-10, 12-13]
different they
155
us, are in
attributes,
however
may
appear to
reality one, for they are all involved in our conception of God,
they are conceived by us simultaneously, and they are always

together in God. "These three attributes [life, power, wisdom] are conceived by our mind immediately and simultaneously without the aid of intermediate reasoning, for conceiving God as we do in the nature of a creator we at once think of Him as living, powerful, and wise. But though these three attributes occur to our mind at once, it is impossible
.
for our
tongue to utter them at once, for we do not find
in
human
speech a single word comprehending all the three attributes and we are compelled to resort to the use of three
1
words/'
Again:
ascribed to God,
therefore say that the attributes though different from each other when
all
"We
used with reference to us, are
erence to ourselves, inasmuch as
one in Him. For with refwe conceive them or acquire
them one after the other, we consider them as being different from each other; similarly, inasmuch as we acquire them after we have been without them, we naturally consider
superadded to the essence. With reference to God, however, we must consider them as unified and unacquired in such a manner as not to imply any plurality in His es-
them
as
sence."'
It
is
the
same reasoning that underlies the
follow-
ing passage of Spinoza: "From this it is apparent that although two attributes may be conceived as really distinct
that
is
to say,
one without the assistance of the other
we
cannot nevertheless thence conclude that they constitute two things or two different substances; for this is the nature
of substance, that each of
itself,
its
attributes
is
conceived through
since
all
the attributes which substance possesses were
always
1
in it together,
we-De'ot, II, 4.
,
nor could one be produced by another;
Emunot
II, 21.
156

Schol.).
[ETHICS,
but each expresses the reality or being of substance" (Prop.
X,
The two
The implications of this passage are these: attributes appear to the mind as being distinct
reality,
from each other. In

Proposition X,
however, they are one. For by
attributes, like substance, are
summa
genera
("conceived through itself"). The two attributes must therefore be one and identical with substance. Furthermore,
after
the two attributes have not been acquired by substance it had been without them, nor are they conceived by the mind one after the other or deduced one from the other.
They have always been in substance together, and are conceived by our mind simultaneously. Hence, the attributes
are only different words expressing the being of substance.
same
reality
and
Proposition XII is complementary to the definitions of substance and attribute. While the definition of attribute
states affirmatively the subjective nature of attributes by declaring that they are only perceived by the mind, the pro-
position denies any independent reality to attributes by which the simplicity of the substance would be endangered.
"No
which
attribute of substance can be truly conceived from it follows that substance can be divided." The conis
clusion
then reached in Proposition XIII, namely, that "substance absolutely infinite is indivisible."
Spinoza's demonstrations for both these propositions are practically the same. In both cases he begins with the same
hypothetico-disjunctive proposition and proceeds to show in an identical manner that substance, because it is absolutely infinite,
cannot be divided.
It will
be recalled that
Spinoza's "absolutely infinite" has been shown to correspond to what the mediaevals called "essentially infinite."
It is singularly worthy of notice that Spinoza's argument here against the divisibility of an absolutely infinite substance is
PROPS. 7-10, 12-13]
157
argument against the divisibility of an essentially infinite substance.

the
same
as the mediaeval
Spinoza's argument runs as follows: I. If an absolutely infinite substance were divisible, the parts would either retain the nature of the whole or not.
II.
If the parts retained the nature of the whole, there

infinite substances,
would then be many

III.
which
is
absurd.
If they did not retain the nature of the whole, then
the whole would lose the nature of substance and cease to be.
against the divisibility of an essentially infinite substance, as given by Averroes, runs in a similar vein:
I.
The mediaeval argument
If an essentially infinite substance were divisible, the
parts would either have the same nature as the whole or not. II. If the parts had the same nature as the whole, then the parts of an infinite would be infinite, which is absurd.
III. If they did not have the same nature as the whole, then the whole would consist of heterogeneous parts and would thus lose its homogeneous and simple character.
1
The
fined to those phases of the problem
discussion of attributes in this chapter has been conwhich the exigencies
of the interpretation of Propositions VII -X and XII -XIII required. Other phases of the problem will be discussed in
the chapter on Extension and Thought.
r
See Averroes' Middle Commentaries on Physics, III,

1
5,
2O4a, 20-32, and Meta-
physics, XI, 10, io66b,

(dj
1-21.
Cf.
my
Crescas* Critique of Aristotle, p. 137,
and note
on pp. 331-332.
CHAPTER
VI

I.
THE ONTOLOGICAL PROOF
THE
first ten propositions of the Ethics^ which precede Spinoza's proofs of the existence of God, are a challenge to mediaeval philosophers. The starting point is the definition
of God, placed by Spinoza near the beginning of his work, which, as we have already shown, is an exact reproduction
of a definition found in a standard work of a popular mediaeval Jewish philosopher. 1 Spinoza seems to address his imaginary opponents as follows:
you mediaevals, to whatever school of thought you may belong, have builded your philosophies on the conception of a God epitomized by you in a formal definition which
All
contains four characteristic expressions. You say that God is (i) an ens in the highest sense of the term, by which you mean that He is a being who exists necessarily. You also say
that
He
is
is (2)
He
(4)
(3)
"a substance
"absolutely infinite," by which you mean that consisting of infinite attributes,"
"each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence" (Def. VI). God so defined you call absolute substance^ you differentiate Him from the world which you call conditionaj^
substance, and then you declare that the relation between the ^ absolute and the conditional substance is like that of
to you, I deny at the very createdTjIn opposition outset the existence of a God outside the world and of His
creator to
relation to the world as creator.

1
Still,
unaccustomed as
am
'Iklfarim, II, 25.
Cf. above, p. 118.
PROP, ii]
159
1 to dispute about mere names, I shall retain your own term substance as a philosophic surrogate to the pious name God,
and
in
your own terms
of the nature of
I am going to unfold a new conception God and of His relation to the world.
To begin with, I shall abandon your distinction between absolute substance and conditional substance, but shall use
the term WEstance in that restrictive sense in which you use the expression absolute substance. Then, what you call
conditional substance, or the world,
I
shall call
mode. Fur-
thermore, unlike you, I shall not describe the relation of substance to mode as that of creator to created, but rather as
that of whole to part, or, to be
to particular (Defs. II
The reason
for
my
more exact, as that of universal and V; Axioms I and II; Prop. I). 2 disagreeing with you on the question of the
causal relation between
God and
the world
is
that
I find
your
doctrine of creation, however you
may
untenable hypothesis (Props. II-VI). 3 between us, a difference which, I must confess, is fundamental and far-reaching in its effect, I am going to describe
try to explain it, an Barring this difference
my
substance in
all
those terms which you
make
use of in
describing your God. Like your God, my substance is (i) the highest kind of ens, for existence appertains to its nature
(Prop. VII).
(3)
(2) It is also absolutely infinite (Prop. VIII).
(4) Finally,
Furthermore, it consists of infinite attributes (Prop. IX). each of its attributes expresses eternal and inX). 4 I have thus described my substance terms which you use in your formal definition of
I
finite essence (Prop. in all those
God. Consequently, as
the existence of
I
am now
to reproduce
your proofs of
God
to prove the existence of
shall bracket together the

1
terms
God and
my substance, substance and

n. 3.
* <
Cf. Cogitata Mctaphysica, Cf. above, Chapter III.
I,
3,
quoted below. Cf. below, p. 190, Cf. above, Chapter IV.
Cf. above, Chapter V.
160
[ETHICS,
say: "God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily
exists" (Prop. XI). Having made it clear by this time what I mean by the term God, I am no longer afraid of being mis-
understood.
use in
its
Hereafter
shall
stead the term God.
drop the term substance and And so he does.
expression necessario existit y which Spinoza uses in the eleventh proposition, is to be understood to have two
The
meanings.
In the
first
place,
it
means that
it
can be shown
apodictically, by necessary, logical reasoning, that God must exist. In the second place, it means that the existence which
is
proved of God belongs to that class known as necessary existence as opposed to possible existence. In a passage in the Cogitata Metaphysica^ I, i, Spinoza points out the distinction
between these two classes of existence: "From the

or, if
defi-
description, it is now easily seen that Being should be divided into Being which because of its own nature necessarily exists, or Being
nition of Being,
you
prefer,
from
its
whose essence involves existence, and Being whose essence

involves only possible existence." In the course of our subsequent discussion of the proofs, especially of the second
proof, it will become clear that the purpose of this proposition is to state not only that God exists but also that His
as necessary existence. This double purpose of the proofs of the existence of God is clearly
existence
is
of the kind
known
brought out by Spinoza in his Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae^ I, Proposition V, Demonstration: "The concept of God includes necessary existence. Therefore it is true to say
'
Definition (6pio>i6s,
-*>-,
TT3)
is
to be distinguished
from description (viroypa^y

Spinoza's hesitancy as to
j,
QCn). Cf. Maimonides, Millot ha-Higgayon, Ch.
10.
whether Being (ens) has a definition or only a description reflects the question raised by Hillel of Verona in his Commentary on Maimonides' Twenty-five Propositions (Prop. 25) as to whether substance has a definition in view of the fact that it is a
summum genus.
Cf.
my
Crescas' Critique of Aristotle , p. 575.
PROP, ii]
161
that He has a necessary existence in himself, or that He exists." Similarly Crescas in conclusion of his summary of Maimonides' proofs of the existence of
God seems
to emphasize that
the proofs demonstrate not only that God exists but that exists with an existence which is necessary per se.
1
He
what what he is trying to establish thereby. Spinoza himself would have said that he was trying to determine by these proofs or rather the what kind of being (ens) God is. For being
he
ideas
It will be well for us to state in Spinoza's own terms is driving at in his proofs of the existence of God and
according to Spinoza, of fourjdnds ^classification which seems to be derived from a Hebrew

is,
we have of being
source.
Some
ideas are reaJ,
and these are ideas which have
an extra-mental object as their source; others are unreal^
mere figments of the imagiof things perceived and experination, composite pictures enced; others are rational, mere modes of thought, such as the universals known as genera and species; and still others
fictitious,
and of these some are
nor
are merely verjxil, because they exist neither in the intellect in the imagination, such as chimeras and ideas conveyed " 2 by expressions like a square circle." None of these unreal
ideas are ideas of things, for they have

1
no
real object as their
Or Adonai)
I, i,
32.
I, I. is
The
source of this classification

5.
to be found in the
Hebrew
Rutih Hen, Ch. of being:

1.
According to the Ruah lien, there
is
philosophic manual the following classification
Real beings, D"fiDN D'TJl, which exist outside the mind and of which we
can form an idea either in the mind or in the imagination. 2. Unreal beings, D"J"1DN QrNlP D'TUT, which exist neither in the mind nor outside the mind. They are fictitious 1'DNDH ]VD"O niN'XD WHH py
beings, having existence only in the imagination,

1
GHP N^N. Previous
to this in the
same chapter
is
they are also called "verbal beings," vided into two parts:
a.
"Q^
"1131 p")
DP
]'WP. This class
subdi-
Factitious beings which have no existence in reality, 02'KIP
D'TDH
"V'2T1
^3
b.
D'NXDJ.
Factitious beings which not only have no existence in reality but whose nature
62
[ETHICS,
source, nor have they a counterpart outside the mind. Extramental existences only are real, and ideas in the mind are
real only in so far as they represent those extra-mental existences.
Spinoza, therefore, is trying to establish by his proofs of the existence of God is that God is not a fictitious being, nor a verbal being, nor a being of reason, but a real
being,
What
who has
existence outside our
mind and who

1
is
the
source and counterpart of the idea we have of Him. Substance, says Spinoza, is outside the intellect, that is to say,
not fabricated by the intellect. Only that conception of God, says he again, is a fiction which uses the name of God
it is
not
harmony with His real nature; the true conception of " God is that of a body in nature whose idea is necessary in
in
is
order to represent God immediately/' 3 In order to determine whether an idea
real or not
one
has to ascertain by means of the various approved sources of knowledge whether or not it has an extra-mental object
involves a contradiction, as the words
ynnD hbn HD-PP

Dvran
"a square circle" QHain Jlion "V2T IN IDD ,anron "j>na D'tccon. 3. Beings of reason, which exist only in the mind but have no existence outside BH the mind, as genera and species, niN'XD OH ? | ^DBQ D'NSD3P D3
1
D^DH
"iwzn
DTDH am
this
p
is
onm
The resemblance between

(1)
}yyth pin psyn ^D. classification and that of Spinoza
striking.
The
only differences to be noted are as follows:
The
classification in
Ruah Hen
it
both 2a and 2b. Spinoza applies

to 2b.
(2)
applies the expression "verbal being" to only to what in his classification corresponds
This classification considers the expression "a square circle" as something in the imagination. Spinoza says of a chimera, which to him is the equivalent of a "square circle," that it is neither in the intellect nor in the imagination
which
is
(sec Cog. Ato.,1,3).
Freudenthal is thus not quite right in saying that the distinction ofensjictum, ens chimerae, ens rationis and ens reale does not occur in Jewish philosophy. Cf.
"Spinoza und die Scholastik"

gewidmet,
1
in
Philosophische Aufsatze,
Eduard
Zeller
p. 103.
2
3
Cf. EthifSy I, Prop. 4, Demonst. Tractates de Intellect us Emendatione,
Short Treatise , Second Dialogue,
54 (Opera , III, p. 20, note 12 (Opera, I, p. 34, 11. 15-17).
t).
PROP,
u]
163
to correspond to it. Again and again Spinoza classifies the sources of knowledge. Not all of his classifications are of
the same type; they are, however, all made up of various mediaeval classifications with some slight modifications of his own, as we hope to show in another chapter. Roughly
1
speaking, Spinoza maintains, clearly so in the Short freafise, II, i, that we may know things either directly or indirectly. Direct knowledge may be either sense perception in its many
forms and derivations, or intuition, the latter of which

Spinoza as
"
clear
distinct
is
comprehendesignated by jmd 2 3 4 or a persion/^ "clear cognition/'. "intuitive science/' \wherein a thing is perceived through its essence ception 5 alone/' that is to say, "intuitively, without any process of
6 Indirect knowledge consists of the inference of working.'^ the unknown from the known, which is described by Spinoza
"art of reasoning," 8 or that mode of perception-" wherein the essence of one thing is concluded from the essence of another." 9
as "true belief/'
7
Now, according
knowledge
idea
is
to Spinoza,
any one of these sources of

any
sufficiently valid to establish the reality of
we happen
to have.
Intuition
and
logical inference are
as valid proofs for the reality of ideas as direct sense perception; to Spinoza, in fact, they are more valid, for sense per-
ception and imagination alone

'
may
lead to falsity. 10
Still, in
Cf. below, Vol. II,
Chapter XVI.
I,
3
3
klaarc en onderscheide bevatting. Short Treatise, II, klaare Kennisse. Op. cit., II, 2, i.
scientia intuitiva.
2.
< 5
Ethics, II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2.
ubi res percipitur per so/am 19 (Opera, II, p. 10,

1.
suam
essentiam.
Tractatus de Intellectus
Emen11.
datione,
6
20).
Ibid.,
sed intuitive, nullam operationemfacientes.
^(Opera,
II, p. 12,
13-
4).
1
waar gelooj. Short

ratio.
Treatise, II, I,
2.
Ethics, II, Prop. 40, Schol. 2.
ubi essentia rei ex alia re concluditur.

1.
Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione,

10
19 (Opera, II, p. 10,
16).
Ethics, II, Prop. 41.
164
[ETHICS,
the proof of the existence of God in the history of philosophy, not all of these sources of knowledge were of use. Direct
sense perception had to be eliminated, for, in the words of Scripture, if a proof-text is necessary, "Man shall not see me and live" (Exodus 33, 20). In fact, Spinoza explicitly
states that this verse should be taken in its literal sense as
an answer to Moses' request that

to
God
should show himself

it
him
in
some perceptible form, which,

1
may be remarked
incidentally, is an oblique criticism of Maimonides' interpretation of the verse as meaning that God's essence cannot be
comprehended by the human intellect in denial of Moses' request that God should become known to him in His true
essence.
2
Historically, therefore, the proofs of the existence

to fall
of
is
God had
back upon the kind of knowledge which

is,
either direct like Spinoza's intuition, or indirect, that

logical reasoning.
by way of
In the history of religious philosophy both these methods of proving the existence of God, the direct and the indirect, were made use of. When theologians, for instance, appeal
to revelation as a proof of the existence of
God, either
to
an
act of historical revelation in the past or to the constantly
repeated revelations in the religious experience of chosen or gifted individuals, they make the knowledge of God something direct and immediately perceived. Similarly when Cicero 3 and, following him, others maintain that the idea of God isjnnate in mam, they also make it an object of
immediate apprehension. Likewise the argument from consensus gentium rests, in its ultimate analysis, on the assumption that God is an object of immediate knowledge. 4 But,
1
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus^ Ch. 2 (Opera, III, p. 40,
11.
12
ff.).
a
3
Moreh Nebukim,
Ibid.
I,
64,
and
I, 4.
De Natura Deorum,
I, 17,
44~45; H, 4,
11.
PROP. TI]
165
on the other hand, the cosmological argument and the argument from design proceed on the assumption that God cannot be immediately known; He can become known only
art of reasoning. ^To Spinoza, however, be an object of direct knowledge, for God, acnoted, Qod cording to him, is known to us as an in tuition, "as a clear and
indirectly
it
by the
is
distinct idea,
which
is
adequate and
true.
"That
existence
belongs
to
the essence of God," says
Spinoza,
"we can
clearly and distinctly understand" (Short Treatise, I, I, i); "The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God which each idea involves is adequate and perfect "\(Ethics,
II,
Prop.
XLVI); and "By adequate

it is
idea, I
understand an
without
refer-
idea which, in so far as
considered in
itself,
ence to the object, has all the properties or internal signs of a true idea" (Ethics , II, Def. IV). To Spinoza, therefore, the
God, that is to say, the existence of immediate fact of knowledge^ for God, we can have a knowledge of God which is " as~cTear as that
reality of the idea of
is
self-evident as an
with which we also know our body."
But here
is
a difficulty arises. To say that God's existence immediately perceived as an intuition and to declare in-
tuition as a valid source of knowledge, which establishes the reality of the intuited idea, is to start out with a major
premise which would seem to require no further demonstration, and to which no further demonstration could add anything, least of all a demonstration in the Aristotelian sense.
For a demonstration, according to Aristotle, is a syllogism which produces science" 2 and the science it produces in the conclusion must be something not known directly from
the major premise.
in the
1
"
It
has indeed been asked whether even
deductive syllogism of Aristotle the conclusion ever

14 (Opera,
I, 2,
I, p.
Short Treatise, II, 19,
93,
11.
20-22).
Analytic a Posteriora,
71 b, 17-18.
66

in
[ETHICS,!
Still,
1 really adds anything to the major premise. there may be some justification for Aristotle
while
reasoning
and in trying to prove that Socrates is mortal from the immediately syllogistically known and undemonstrable premise that all men are morfrom the universal
to the particular
tal,
for, after all,
there
seem to be where the subject proof and the predicate in both the major premise and the conclusion are practically the same. For what Spinoza is practhere does not
logism in so far as there the particular and the universal,
may may
be a real inference in the sylbe a real difference between
even
this saving grace in Spinoza's
tically trying to do is to prove syllogistically that God is existent from the immediately known and undemonstrable
premise that
attempt
to
is existent. Logically it is analogous to an the mortality of Socrates by the syllogism: prove

is
God
The husband of Xanthippe

Socrates
is
mortal,
the
husband of Xanthippe,
is
i>
Therefore, Socrates
in
mortal, **
which there
is
is
here
to
meant that
no inference unless by Socrates' mortality special kind of mortality which came
him
as a result of the fact that he
was the husband of
Xanthippe. And
yet Spinoza goes through all the motions of proving the existence of God. What need is there for proving that which at the very outset is assumed to be immediately
known? The answer
that would naturally suggest itself
is
that
we
did not reproduce Spinoza's argument quite accurately, that the major premise in his syllogism does not in itself establish the existence of God; it only states the fact that we have an
idea of
God
syllogism therefore
'
as an existent being, and the purpose of the is to prove that our idea is real.
We
J. S. Mill,
System of Logic, Bk.
II,
Chs.
and
III.
PROP, ii]
167
should probably be referred to what is known as the ontological proof, to which class of reasoning most of Spinoza's proofs
belong, and we should be reminded that in the ontological proof the major premise is always a statement of what our
idea of
God
be,
ever
it
is and an assertion that our idea of God, whatwhether of a greatest being, or of a most perfect
being, or of a self-caused being, always involves existence, and that the purpose of the proof is to establish the reality of the idea. In refutation of this answer we may say that if
the major premise is assumed not to establish the existence of God, then the conclusion does not establish it. Further-
more, we shall endeavor to show that in its classical formulation by the three authors with whom we shall chiefly concern ourselves here, Anselm, Descartes, and Spinoza, the reality of the idea of God was never sought to be proved by the syllogism, but it was already conceived to be established
in the
major premise by some other
principle.
needless for us to repeat here in detail the stock objection to the ontological argument in its conventional formulation. The objection has become historically as famous
It
is
as the proof itself. Generally speaking, it tries to point out that what the ontological proof establishes is that if God is
conceived of as the greatest being, or the most perfect being, or a self-caused being, He must also be conceived of as existing outside the
existent.
mind and cannot be conceived of

is
as non-
There
nothing
in the proof, the objection con-
tinues, to
show that the idea of God conceived of in any of those forms is not a fictitious and arbitrary idea fabricated by
our mind.
cal
Now
all
these three protagonists of the ontologithis objection,

St.
proof were aware of

it
meet
squarely and
it
directly.
and they all tried Anselm was challenged
to
to
answer
by Gaunilon, and he answered it. Descartes quotes the same objection from Thomas Aquinas and tries to rebut
168
it.
1

2
[ETHICS,
Spinoza, too, was confronted with the stock objection 3 by Oldenburg, and he answered it. Furthermore, he also
as stating that "God cannot be a priori" and refutes that statement. 4 What is the proved force of all these answers, rebuttals, and refutations?
quotes
Thomas Aquinas
If we examine closely the answers given by St. Anselm, Descartes, and Spinoza to this most obvious objection, we shall find that they all try to show that the idea we have
of
God
as an existing being does not

its reality
is
upon the syllogism, but that
is
depend for its proof immediately known,
just as the reality of anything that
immediately perceived
and experienced. God, they all seem to say, is an immediate object of knowledge, and the knowledge by which He becomes
known
to us
is
a valid source of knowledge.
This
is
is
their
proof to corroborate
for the existence of

it.
God. Nothing
of knowledge
else
The kind
we
necessary have of God
they hold to be as valid a proof for His existence as a miraculous revelation or a natural personal experience of His
presence.
There
it
is
no need to go further into
this
kind of
immediate knowledge.
shall discuss
fully in
As
far as Spinoza
is
concerned,
we
That
jection
this is
is is is
6
another chapter. 5 the meaning of the answer to the stock ob-
clearly brought out in Descartes,
and
in his case the
answer
answer
is
generally so understood.
The main
and
point of his
7
that "whatever
we
true
"
clearly
its
distinctly perceive
reality,
true in the sense of
having objective
its not being an arbitrary and fictitious idea. The force of the ontological proof in Descartes, therefore, is its clearness and distinctness, its intuitive character, its immediacy
of
Primae Responsiones (Oeuvres, VII,

Epistola 3. Short treatise,
I, i,
p. 115).
3
Epistok
4.
ff.
10.
6
7
Primae Responsiones
(Oeuvres, VII, p. 116).

11.
Mcditationes, III (Oeuvres, VII, p. 46,
8 f.).
PROP, ii]

manner of self-consciousness.
It
is
169
after the
this self-evident
God that distinguishes Descartes' ontological proof from his first proof in Meditation III, though both are alike in that they reason from the
nature of the truth of the idea of
idea of God to His existence. In the
first proof of Meditation an idea of God is not in itself III, the fact that we possess taken by Descartes to be a proof for His existence, for the
idea might be arbitrary and fictitious. It is therefore necessary to establish the truth of the idea demonstratively, by
reasoning from effect to cause, by showing that the idea we have of God could not have been produced except by a real object corresponding to it. In the ontological proof, on the
other hand, the very nature of our idea of God is evidence of His existence, just as our thinking is evidence of our own existence and as our sense perception is evidence of the existence of the things perceived. It is not at all necessary to assume, as it is done, that Descartes' ontological proof is de-
pendent upon his first and second proofs in Meditation III. It is rather an independent proof, its basis being Descartes'
idea like
reality.
theory of knowledge, according to which a clear and distinct God is self-evidently true and contains objective
Similarly Spinoza
makes
it
unmistakably clear that
his
primarily grounded upon the premise that God's existence is an immediate fact of our knowledge. In antici-
proof
is
pation of the objection of Thomas Aquinas that "God cannot be proved a priori^ because, indeed, He has no cause/' he maintains that "God, however, the first cause of all
things and even the cause of himself, manifests himself 2 The manifestation of God to us through through himself."
Kuno Fischer, Geschichte der neuern Philosophic I, i (jrd ed., Heidelberg, 1889), pp. 309 ff. Norman Smith, Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy, p. 58. 2 Short Treatise, I, i, 10.
1
-,
yo
[ETHICS,
himself as evidenced by the clearness and distinctness and adequacy of the idea we have of Him directly and without
any further reasoning proves His existence. Similar passages to the same effect are abundant in Spinoza's writings. 1 If thus in both Descartes and Spinoza the ontological argument is really psychological, resting as it does upon the view
God is a direct object of our knowledge, can the same be asserted with equal certainty of St. Anselm's proof? On
that
this point there exists a difference of opinion.
On
St.
the one
hand, attempts have been
made
to
show that
Anselm's
argument is ultimately psychological like that of Descartes/ But, on the other hand, these attempts have been refuted on the ground that there is nothing in St. Anselm to warrant
such a construction upon his argument. 3 In troversy, however, one important passage
this entire conin
St.
Anselm
seems to have been

Gaunilon.
lost sight of,
namely,
his
answer to
If we study the true meaning of Anselm's answer to Gaunilon's objection, we shall find that like Descartes and
Spinoza he stresses the point that his ontological proof is based upon the premise that the existence of God is an immediate fact of consciousness. Gaunilon, as may be recalled,
objected to the ontological proof by arguing that the idea of a being than whom a greater cannot be conceived no more
proves the existence of
God than
the idea of an island than

existis
which a more excellent cannot be conceived proves the
ence of that island. Anselm vehemently denies that there

1
See
W.
Beda Adlhoch,
Apel, Spinozas Verhdltnis zum ontologischen Beweise (Leipzig, 1911). " " Der Gottesbeweis des hi. Anselm in Philosophisches Jahrbuch,
also ist es nicht,
VIII-X (1895-1897), XV-XVI (1902-1903): "Verwegenheit
wenn
im Nachfolgenden zu beweisen versucht wird, das Argument sei ein psychologisches " und geschichtsphilosophisches, kein ontologisches (Vol. VIII, 1895, p. 56). See also G. Grunwald, Gtschichte der Gottcsbewcisc im Mitte/a/ter, pp. 31-33.
*
Cf. C.
Baeumker,
Vitelo, p. 305.
PROP, ii]
171
any analogy between the idea of a being greater than all other beings and the idea of an island more excellent than
all
other islands, and exclaims:
"But
I call
on your faith
and conscience to attest that this is most false/* x We read this answer and wonder. We say to ourselves: Simple Saint! if the authority of faith and the dictates of a religious conscience are the ultimate arbiters in the controversy, why go into all this trouble of proving the existence of God?
Why
not quote Scripture and the church doctrine and be done with it? There must therefore be some deeper meaning in
these simple words of Anselm. Is pealing to faith and to conscience
it
not possible that in apis
Anselm
really invoking
the argument from revelation as attested by tradition by which the existence of God is established as a fact of immediate personal experience?
is
Such an argument from revelation

it
common
in
2 Jewish philosophy, and
may
be considered
as partly psychological, in so far as the proof from revelation derives its validity from the fact that it is an immediate ex-
perience, and partly historical truth of the fact of revelation
and
is
social, in so far as the
attested
by an unbroken
chain of tradition universally accredited within a certain 3 group. It may thus be considered as the equivalent of the argument from consensus gentium, which is also social and is
likewise ultimately based
upon the immediacy of our knowl-
edge of God, namely, the innateness of the idea of God. Just as the general agreement of mankind is used by Cicero
as evidence that the idea of
1
God
is
innate, so
is
the generally
2
3
ApologeticuS) Ch. 1. Cf. Moreh Ncbukim, II, 23. Such a historical proof based
upon revelation
is
referred to
by Spinoza
in
fractalus Theologico-Politicus, Ch. 4 (Opera, III, p. 61, 11. 28-31): "The truth of a historical narrative, however assured, cannot give us the knowledge nor consequently the love of God, for love of God springs from knowledge of Him, and knowl-
edge of Him should be derived from themselves certain and known."
common
notions (comminubus notionibus)^ in
172
[ETHICS,
accredited religious tradition within the group taken by the Jewish philosophers to prove the veracity of the fact of reve-
Anselm thus says to Gaunilon that the idea we have God is unlike the idea we have of a most excellent island. The latter may be arbitrary and imaginary; the former is a
lation.
1
of
true and necessary idea, being based upon the immediate experience of God's existence in the act of revelation as attested by religious tradition universally accepted. That the ontological proof must ultimately rest upon a
psychological basis may also be gathered from one kind of opposition to that argument among the scholastics. There
were those who attacked the validity of the proof on the ground of their denial of the major premise, maintaining that the idea of God as a being whose essence involves existence
was not immediately perceived by everybody.
It
was
only well-trained philosophers, they argued, who perceived it as an immediate truth. But admitting that philosophers
immediate truth, these opponents of the ontological proof admitted the validity of the ontological
did perceive
it
as an
2 proof for philosophers. The particular theory of knowledge involved in this sort of reasoning is that indirect knowledge may in the course of time become direct knowledge which is
immediately accepted without the need of demonstration. Spinoza himself intimates this particular view when he says that the desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge
may
that
arise
from the second kind of knowledge. 3

to be reflected also in Descartes'
The
state-
same view seems
ment
"
those propositions indeed which are immediately

first
deduced from
now by
1
principles are known now by intuition, deduction, i.e., in a way that differs according to our
in
Cf. my "Notes on Proofs of the Existence of God in Jewish Philosophy" Hebrew Union College Annual, \ (1924), p. 577. 3 * Ethics C. Baeumker, Vilelo^ p. 301. , V, Prop. 28.
The
PROP,
u]

l
173
point of view/*
istence
And
is
so,
when
the knowledge of God's exdirect,
becomes immediate and
whatever
its origin,
said to be proved ontologically instead of demonstratively, for to prove the existence of God ontologically means to perceive it directly as a given fact. The im-
the existence of God
mediacy of the knowledge of God's existence is fully explained by Spinoza toward the end of the Second Dialogue in the Short Treatise and there, too, he seems to intimate that
p
it is
not
all
men
that do have at
I
first
such an immediate
tell you this, that so knowledge of God. "However, long as we have not such a clear idea of God ... we cannot truly
say that we are united with God." We have thus shown, I believe, that Spinoza as well as Descartes and Anselm starts his ontological argument with a
major premise that God's existence

It is
is
a fact of immediate
not necessary, as is generally done, to knowledge. set up a straw-man in the form of an untenable ontological
argument as it is conventionally stated, to riddle it through and through, and then to take up the defence of one particular favorite, either Anselm, or Descartes, or Spinoza, and claim that his particular argument is immune from such " " criticism on the ground that it is not ontological but rather " 2 The point we have been trying to make is psychological/' that all these three protagonists of the so-called ontological
argument are
alike in this respect.
They
are
all
making use of
a "psychological" argument, and their syllogism is tantamount to saying that we know directly, as we can know anything at all, that God exists. There is nothing in the conclusion of the syllogism that is not contained in the major premise. But if this is so, the question may be raised, not
Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii, III (Oeuvres, X, p. 370, 11. 10-13). Adlhoch does this with reference to Anselm; Apel with reference to Spinoza; Descartes is singled out by everybody as an exception.
1
174
[ETHICS,
only against Spinoza, but against Anselm and Descartes as well, What is the significance of the syllogism in the ontological proof?
The answer
premise. But
is
that the syllogism adds nothing to the major
still it is
not altogether redundant. It
may
be
said that the function of the ontological proof is like that of the proposition of an analytical judgment, in which the predicate adds nothing to the subject, and still its use is not alto-
gether unjustifiable. Perhaps the comparison can be put in the following manner. Just as propositions are either analytic or synthetic, so are syllogisms also either analytic or
and the relation of the analytical syllogism to the major premise is like that of the analytical proposition to the subject. To be more specific: The ontological proof for the existence of God is an analytical syllogism just as
synthetic,
the proposition "God is existent' is an analytical judgment, and the relation of the syllogism in the ontological proof to the major premise is like the relation of the proposition "God " is existent to the subject "God/* Neither of them adds
1
anything to the contents of its respective subject or major premise with which it starts, but both of them analyze the
contents of their respective subject and major premise. It was not Kant who was the first to draw the distinction
between analytical and synthetical judgments.
It has
been
shown that the
scholastics before
expressed it by the distinction aliud nota or by similar other distinctions, such as per se and per accidens or in materia necessaria and in materia
it was not unknown and Jewish philosophers, and having known that distinction, they asked themselves what kind of relation was expressed in an analytical proposition. That the relation
him had recognized it and between per se nota and per
contigenti*
It
can also be shown that
to Arabic
Cf. P. Coffey, 'The Science of Logic ,
I, p.
70.
PROP. 11]

seem to agree. They only seem
to question
175
could not be real and hence the judgment could not be real
they
real.
all
whether
there could be a justifiable logical relation which was not Thus in the proposition "God is existent/' argues
Avicenna, followed by a chorus of Jewish philosophers, since

essence and existence are identical, the proposition
logical,
is
z
tauto-
and is tantamount to saying "God is God." And Maimonides argues that in a proposition where the similarly predicate is identical with the subject there is no real logical
relation but only the explanation of a name.^
Likewise Ger-
sonides maintains that in the proposition "God is existent" the term "God" is a subject only "in discourse," not "in
existence."
All this
3
be considered as a sort of anticipation of John Stuart Mill's conclusion that an analytical judgment is only
may
verbal, or that
it is
explicative, as others call
it.
And
so
may
it is
we
also say of the analytical or ontological proof that

It is
indeed true to say of an ontological proof what John Stuart Mill says of every form of Aristotle's deductive syllogism. It contains no real infer-
only verbal and explicative.
ence.
It
adds nothing to what

still its
is is
already
known from
For
it
the
major premise. But
use
justifiable.
trans-
an argument. It elicits a truth which is only implicitly contained in the major premise. It puts an immediate fact of consciousness in the form of a syllates a conviction into
logistic reasoning.
It resolves
an idea into
its
component
parts.
Thus when Spinoza proves
the existence of
God
covered
ontologically, he does not pretend to arrive at a newly disfact, but rather to restate in formal language a fact
already known.
1
8 *
Or Adonat) I, iii, I. Cf. above, p. 123. March Nebukim, I, 51; cf. 52. Cf. above, p. Milhamot Adonai III, 3. Cf. above, p. 151.
y
154.
176
[ETHICS,
Truly speaking, if the ontological proof were to be put into a syllogistic formula in such a way as to bring out its entire force, it would have to be as follows:
Everything which
exists.
is
immediately perceived to exist

exist.
God
is
immediately perceived to
Therefore,
God
exists.
Now, none
as given
of the ontological proofs in their various forms

three
by
its
main exponents, Anselm, Decartes, and
Spinoza, prove directly that God exists. What they prove is that the existence of God is known to us by a certain kind
duced
of immediate knowledge. Their various proofs can be reto the following syllogism:
If
we have an idea of God as the greatest, or as the most perfect, or as a self-caused being, then God
as the
is immediately perceived by us to exist. But we have an idea of God as the greatest, or most perfect, or as a self-caused being.
Therefore,
exist.
God
is
immediately perceived by us to
Their direct proof of the existence of God is their respective views that our immediate knowledge of God's existence
implied in the idea we have of God as the greatest, or as the most perfect, or as a self-caused being is valid
which
is
knowledge.
II.
SPINOZA'S
FOUR PROOFS
foregoing discussion of the nature of the ontological proof may serve as a general approach to the understanding of all of Spinoza's proofs of the existence of God. Whatever
The
may
be said
in criticism
of this
ing hardly concerns those of us
mode of ontological reasonwho are now mainly inter-
PROP. 11]
177
ested in the objective understanding of Spinoza's thought, rather than in passing criticism on it. It may perhaps be
that the alleged immediacy of the idea of God is nothing but an after- thought of a departed traditional belief, just
as the catless grin which Alice saw in Wonderland was nothing but an after-image of a departed grinning cat; or it
may
be that Spinoza is claiming "an arbitrary right to accept and it may perhaps anything he pleases as self-evident ";
l
also be, as
we have been
trying to show, that the reasoning
by which
it is
sought to dissolve this idea into a syllogism,
despite the cogency of its logical form, is nothing but the breaking up of a complex term into its component parts.
But however
him
by
to
its
slight this
proof
may
appear to
us, it certainly
carried conviction to the
mind of Spinoza and of others like whom an immediately and intuitively conceived idea
very clearness and distinctness connoted as much reality as, aye even greater reality than, the undimmed perceptions of unimpaired senses. And perhaps we should be in-
more weight to this reasoning if we could only bear in mind that Spinoza's God is not the God of traditional theology, that his "God" is merely an appeasive term for the
clined to give
most comprehensive principle of the universe, which he supposed to be conceived apriorily as the ideal triangle, but unlike the ideal triangle,
verse and not
its
being the working principle of the unimere ideal pattern, its a priori conception in-
volved an extra-mental reality which the a priori conception of a triangle did not. With these considerations looming before our mind, there remains for us only to deal with the
external structure of the proofs, their origin, their individual history, their growth, and the final form in which they appear
before us.
It
1
may
be recalled that Descartes has three proofs of the
F. Pollock, Spinoza^ p. 129.
178

them
in
1
[ETHICS,
existence of God, two of
Meditation III and a third
in Meditation V, corresponding respectively to the three

2 proofs in the Discours de la Methode, IV, in the Principia Philosophiae, I, 18-19, 20-21, and 14, and in the geometrical
formulation of the arguments demonstrating the existence of God at the end of Secundae Responsiones, Propositions II, III, and I. The first two of these three proofs we shall designate respectively as the first and second proof of Meditation III, and the third as the ontological proof. All the proofs
for the existence of
God adduced by Spinoza
in his various
works
may
be traced to these three Cartesian proofs, and
may
be divided accordingly into three groups: First, Descartes' first proof of Meditation III to be found
in Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae, I, Proposition VI,

in
and
I, i,
the proof designated as a posteriori
in Short treatise
',
and referred
in a
to also in a letter to Jelles (Epistola
XL) and
76
note to the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, (Opera, II, p. 29, note a).
Second, Descartes' second proof of Meditation III to be found in Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae, I, Proposition
VII, and in the third proof of Ethics, I, Proposition Third, Descartes' ontological proof to be found in Principia Philosophiae
XL
Cartesianae,
I, I,
Proposition V;
I;
in
the
a priori proof of Short Treatise,

Ethics ,
I,
in the first
proof of
Proposition XI; and in letters to Blyenbergh (Epistola XXI) and Hudde (Epistola XXXIV).
fourth proof in the Ethics is a modification of Descartes' second proof of Meditation III, and the second proof in the Ethics, we shall try to show, has been suggested by
Descartes' ontological proof, but
it
The
contains
many
elements
borrowed from mediaeval Jewish and Arabic philosophy.

1
(i) Ocuvres,
'
VII, p. 45,
VI, p. 33,
11.
9
25
ff.,
ff.,
(2) ibid., p. 47,
11. 11.
24
24
flF.
(i) Oeuvres,
11.
(2) ibid., p. 34,
ff.,
(3) ibid., p. 36,
11.
ff.
PROP, ii]
179
with the four proofs of the Ethics, corwith them the parallel proofs found in the other relating
shall here deal
We
writings of Spinoza.
FIRST PROOF
What
in
is
in the Ethics
mainly of interest to us in Spinoza's first proof and its parallels elsewhere is the various forms
which he reproduces Descartes' ontological argument. Spinoza does not summarize Descartes, he does not epitomize
him, nor does he merely paraphrase him. He rather selects what he considers to be the salient features of Descartes' argu-
ment and moulds them
into a form of his own.
If
we com-
pare the various versions of Descartes* ontological proof as given by Spinoza, we shall find that the Demonstration of
Proposition V in Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae, I, and the first part of the a priori proof in Short 'Treatise , I, i,
XXXIV
represent one type; that the proofs in Epistolae XXI and and the second part of the a priori proof in Short
Treatise ,
I,
I,
thus," represent another type;
introduced by the remark "otherwise also and that the first proof of
Proposition XI in Ethics, I, represents a third type. How these three types of Descartes' ontological proof were chiselled
out from the unhewn and rugged block of Descartes' rather
and informal discussion of the ontological proof can be best shown by trying to outline the salient features of Descartes' argument as they must have formulated themdiscursive
selves in Spinoza's mind.
The
starting point of Descartes'
of the idea of
God
in
our mind.
argument is the presence This idea of God, he con-
tends, could not
of our senses, nor
have reached our mind through the medium is it a factitious idea, depending solely on
rather derive this idea of God, so to speak,
our thought.
We
l8o

"
the storehouse of our mind."
l
[ETHICS,
first
from
It
is
the
and
fore-
most of the clear and distinct and true ideas born within us. But how do we know that the idea of God is not factitious?
we know it by the fact that and absolutely unlike any other idea, "for unique really I discern in many ways that this idea is not something factitious, and depending solely on my thought, but that
this
To
Descartes answers that

is
the idea
it is
because the image of a true and immutable nature cannot conceive anything but God himself to whose essence
. . .
existence [necessarily] pertains/' 2 That existence pertains to the essence of
God
is
known
by
us, according to Descartes, in
V, in Principia Philosophiae, I, formulation of the arguments demonstrating the existence

of
two ways. In Meditation 14, and in the geometrical
God
at the
he says that
it is
end of Secundae Responsiones, Proposition I, implied in our immediate idea of God as
"a Being supremely perfect/* 3 for since existence is perfection it must be included in that idea as something pertaining to the essence of God. In his Primae Responsiones, however, he declares that the pertinence of existence to essence in
God
is
also implied in our idea of
God
as a self-caused being,
or, as he expresses himself, in a being who possesses necessary 4 existence, for necessary existence is the equivalent of ex-
istence per se, 5 which, according to Descartes, means selfcaused as well as causeless. 6 It is therefore natural for
Descartes sometimes to leave out this intermediary step of

1
Meditations ,
Meditationes,
Meditationes,
(Oeuvres, VII, p. 67,
11.
22
10
9).
f.).
Cf. Meditationes, III (Oeuvres,
VII, p. 51,11. i8ff.).

a
3
V V
11.
1.
ff.).
(Oeuvres y VII, p. 67,
Primae Responsiones (Oeuvres, VII, p. 117, 11. 5 ff.). See Gerhardt, Die Philosophischen Schrijten von Gottfried Wilhelm
406: chose."
p.
6
"Car
Leibnitz, IV, 1'Estre necessaire et 1'estre par son Essence ne sont qu'une meme
Primae Responsiones (Ocuores, VII, pp. 109
ff.).
PROP, ii]
181
perfection or self-causation, by which we know that God's essence involves existence, and to speak of our immediate
conception of
existence.
God
as that of a being
whose essence involves
assumption of the pertinence of existence to the essence of God Descartes builds his ontological proof. We
Upon
it
this
find
in
two forms.
first
In the
I
form, the major premise states that "all which
know
it
[i.e.,
distinctly as pertaining to this subject of the innate idea] does really belong to it," x or as he
clearly
and
puts
in
Primae Responsiones
>
"That which we
clearly
and
distinctly understand to belong to the true and immutable nature of anything, its essence, or form, can be affirmed
2
of that thing."
The minor premise
states that
we
clearly
and
distinctly understand that to exist belongs to the nature
of God, and hence the conclusion that we can affirm of God that He exists. This is also the form used in the geometrical
formulation of the arguments demonstrating the existence of God at the end of Secundae Responsiones^ Proposition I. It
is
this
form of the argument that
is
reproduced by Spinoza
in Proposition
and
I, i,
in the first
of Principia Philosophise Cartesianae^ I, part of the a priori proof of Short Treatise^
the phraseology of the
Primae Responsiones being espe-
cially noticeable in the latter.
the idea of
In the second form, Descartes draws a comparison between God and that of a triangle. Both have "a deter-
minate nature, form, or essence, which is immutable and eternal." 3 That determinate nature, form, or essence in the
case of the triangle is implied in its definition; but in the case of God it is implied in our idea of Him as all-perfection
1
Meditationes,
(Oeuvres y VII, p. 65,
11.
17
ff.).
11.
Primae Responsiones (Oeuvres, VII,

Meditationesy
p. 118,
11.
22
flf.).
15
ff.).
82
[ETHICS,
or as self-causality. Thus from the definition of a triangle diverse properties follow, viz., "that its three angles are
equal to two right angles, that the greatest side is subtended by the greatest angle, and the like/* J Similarly from our idea of God as an all-perfect or self-caused being it
follows "that an [actual]
and eternal existence pertains
to
His nature/*
The nerve
force of the
would say, the

the essence of
to
of the argument, or, as Spinoza argument (vis argument?)? is the
conclusion "that existence can no
more be separated from
two
having its three angles equal be separated from the essence of a [rectiright angles
its
4
God
than can
linear] triangle."
It
is
this
form of the argument that
is
briefly restated by Spinoza in Epistola XXI, when he says: "If the nature of God is known to us, then the assertion that
God
exists follows as necessarily
from our own nature as

s
it
follows necessarily from the nature of a triangle that
its
three angles are equal to two right angles." part of the a priori proof of Short 'Treatise
',
In the second
i, it is
I,
repro-
duced rather incompletely: "The essences of things are from all eternity, and unto all eternity shall remain immutable.
The
existence of
God
is
essence.
Therefore, etc."
The
con-
from Descartes, should read as follows: Therefore, the essence and existence of God are together from all eternity, and unto all eternity shall reclusion, in the light of our quotations
main unchanged, that
is
to say, existence can never be sep-
arated from the essence of God.

In the Ethics^ Spinoza uses the
1
first
form of Descartes'
Meditationes, V (Oeuvres, VII, p. 64, 11. 18 ff.). use of the triangle having its three angles equal to two right angles as an illustration for the idea of necessity is to be found in Aristotle, Physics, II, 9, 2ooa,
The
17
ff.
2
3
Meditationes, V (Oeuvres, VII, p. 65, Epistola 12 (Opera , IV, p. 62, 1. 5).
1.
24).
<
Meditationes,

s
11.
ff.).
Cf. French version (Opera, IX,

11.
p. 52).
4-7).
PROP, ii]

Reduced
183
to a
ontological proof with some modification.
syllogism, the major premise therein is the statement that everything whose essence involves existence exists. The minor premise is the statement that God's essence involves
existence.
But the conclusion, that God

by proving the contrary
exists, is arrived at
indirectly
to be absurd.
This
is
like
the reasoning employed in St. Anselm's proof. In a letter to Schuller, Spinoza expresses a preference for this kind of
proof, namely, the reductio ad absurdum^ when the proposiIt is also to be noted that in this proof tion is negative. 1 Spinoza finds that existence must pertain to the essence of
God
not in the idea of perfection, as does Descartes in Meditation V, but rather in the idea of self-causality, for Spinoza
refers here to Proposition VII, the

is
demonstration of which
based upon the premise that subtance, or, as he now calls it, God, cannot be produced by an external cause and must
But we have already seen that Primae Responsiones, makes selfcausality the basis of the identification of essence and existence in God. There is therefore no foundation for the ofttherefore be self-caused.
in
Descartes himself,
repeated statement that Descartes bases his ontological proof on the idea of God as a most perfect being, whereas
Spinoza bases his ontological proof on the idea of

self-caused being.
2
God
as a
The
two, as
we have
seen, are identified
by Descartes
himself.
In the light, however, of what we have said, namely, that the basis of the ontological proof is the assertion that we
1 Epistola 64 (Opera, IV, p. 278, 11. 8 ff.): "deducendo rem ad absurdum." Cf. Epistola 63 from Schuller. See above, p. 97, and below, p. 378. 2 It may be said that Leibniz advocated the substitution of "existence/)^ se"
for "perfection" as a criticism of Descartes, whereas Spinoza evidently did so as an interpretation of Descartes. Cf. A. Hannequin, "La preuve ontologique carte sienne deYendue centre Leibnitz" in Revue de Mftaphysique et de Morale IV (1896),
,
PP- 435 436.
184
[ETHICS,
have a valid immediate perception of God's existence and that the so-called ontological proofs merely show how our
our idea of
valid immediate perception of God's existence is implied in God as the greatest or the most perfect being,
or, in this particular proof, as a
existence, Spinoza's
first
being whose essence involves proof in the Ethics is really to be
reduced to the following syllogism: If we have a clear and distinct idea of
whose essence involves
existence, then us to exist. mediately perceived by
God as a being God is imas a
But we have a clear and distinct idea of God being whose essence involves existence.
Therefore,
exist.
God
is
SECOND PROOF
Against his own ontological proof based upon the inseparableness of existence from the essence of God Descartes himself raises a difficulty
which he considers of no accustomed
little
mo-
ment.
"
We are so much
to distinguish existence
from essence
in the case of other things/'
he says, "that we
do not with
sufficient readiness notice
to the essence of
other things/'
'
existence belongs than in the case of degree In order to remove this difficulty, Descartes
how
God
in a greater
draws a distinction, or rather recalls an old distinction, between possible and necessary existence, declaring that "in the concept or idea of everything that is clearly and distinctly
conceived, possible existence is contained, but necessary existence never, except in the idea of God alone/* 2 It may be
here remarked that by necessary existence, as already pointed out, is meant existence/)^ se, which, according to Descartes
1
Primac Rfsponsioncs
Ibid.
(11.
(Oeuvrfs, VII, p. 116,
11.
f.).
20
ff.).
PROP, ii]

in the sense of
185
himself, has a negative aspect
uncaused as
well as a positive aspect in the sense of self-caused. 1 With this distinction drawn, Descartes substitutes the expression " " " "necessary existence for the mere word existence in his
ontological proof, arriving at his conclusion that God exists not from the premise that existence is involved in the essence
of God, but rather from the premise that necessary existence is involved in it. It will have been noticed that in his restateof Descartes in Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae, I, Proposition V, Spinoza has already made use of this substi" tution, declaring that the concept of God includes necessary
existence/' that
existence.
first
is to say, necessary existence and not merely In the Short Treatise, I, i, however, and in the
ment
proof in Ethics, I, Proposition XI, the term "existence" without the adjective "necessary" is used.
second proof in the Ethics Spinoza takes up new phrase "necessary existence" and builds again around it a new proof. But why did Spinoza make a new proof out of it? Why did he not embody it in his first proof
in the
Now
this
as did Descartes
and
as he himself did in his restatement of
Descartes in his Principia*
The answer would seem
to be
phrase "necessary existence" had to Spinoza's mind the recollection of the mediaeval brought discussions about possible and necessary existence and of
found
in the fact that the
a mediaeval cosmological proof based
upon that
distinction,
warrant the framing of an appeared new and distinct proof. Thus Spinoza's second entirely proof is of a composite nature. It is ontological and Carall this
and
to
him
to
tesian in form, but its substance
is
enriched by borrowings
from mediaeval sources.

this
We
shall
attempt to disentangle
it
complicated and involved proof and reduce
to its
simple constituent elements.

1
See above, p. 180,
n. 6.
86
[ETHICS,
In mediaeval Jewish philosophy, under the influence of Aristotle, a distinction is made between an internal cause,
which resides
in the
nature of the thing
itself,
and an external
cause, which resides outside of the thing. If the cause resides in the thing itself, an effect must follow from that cause unless there is
external impediment
cause,
an external impediment to prevent it. That may also be considered as a sort of
and thus we have a further distinction between a cause
which produces existence and a cause which prevents or

negates existence. Similar distinctions are familiar also to In Maimonides these students of scholastic philosophy. are implied in the following statement: "Everydistinctions
1
thing that passes from potentiality to actuality has something different from itself as the cause of its transition, and
that cause is necessarily outside itself, for if the cause of the transition existed in the thing itself and there was no obstacle to prevent the transition, the thing would never
have been
been
in a state of potentiality
2
but would have always
In the commentaries upon this passage, distinct technical terms for the contrast between effective causes and impedimental causes are inin a state of actuality/'
troduced. 3
Then, again,
in
tempt
1
to prove that
mediaeval Jewish philosophy, in the atGod is everlasting and can never be
For the distinction between external and internal cause (causa extrinseca^
causa intrinseca), see Metaphysics^ XII, 4, loyob, 22-23; Summa Theologica^ Prima Secundae, Quaest. i, Art. 3, Obj. i. See also Principia Philosophiae Cartesianac, I,
Axiom
ii. Cf. below, pp. 319 ff. For the impedimental cause, see
ejffectus coelestis corporis
Summa
non ex
Obj. 3: Si
2 *
Theohgica y Pars I, Quaest. 115, Art. 6, necessitate proveniat> hoc est propter ali-
quam causam impedientem.

Moreh Nebukim, II, Introduction, Prop. 18. See commentary of Shem-fob on Moreh Ncbukim,
ad. /or.: N'21D, effective
1.
cause; VTID ,p'VD (Arabic:
^ U.
Cf. Cuzari, V, 20, p. 338,
19: p'NJ7
y31B)>
in
impedimental cause. The impedimental cause is also mentioned by Avicenna his Al-Shifa*. Cf. M. Horten, Die Metaphysik Avicennas^ p. 267.
PROP, ii]
187
deprived of His existence, it is argued that God's existence could not be negated or taken away except by some cause, but that cause would have to be either like God himself or
unlike himself; and as neither of these is possible, it is concluded that God's existence can never be negated. To quote:
"God
as the
is
everlasting,
being proved to coming of the non-existent into existence must have a
and will never cease to exist. For a have no beginning cannot pass away. Just
cause, so also the disappearance of a thing from existence requires a cause. Nothing vanishes from existence on its own
account, but on account of
its
opposite.
God, however, has
nothing opposite Him, nor, for that matter, anything like Him. For if anything were like Him in every respect, it would be identical with God himself and they could not therefore be described as two. As for assuming something
God to be the cause of His ceasing to exist, it is likewise impossible for the following reason. That opposite
opposite
thing could not be without beginning, for it has already been proved that God's existence alone is without beginning, nor
could
it
have been created,
for everything created

if so,
must be
an
produced by the eternal God; but, the effect make its cause disappear?"
effect
x
how can
Then, also, in mediaeval Jewish philosophy, in consequence of an Avicennian view, the origin of which I have 2 discussed in another place, a distinction is made between
necessary existence per se" and "possible existence />^r se." Necessary existence per se is that which Spinoza would call
"
causa jui y something whose existence is independent of any cause. 3 "Everything that is necessary of existence in respect to its own essence has no cause for its existence in any man1
Cuzari, V,
Cf.
8, 5.
ff.
my
Creseas' Critique of Aristotle , pp. 109-112, 680
Cf. above, p. 127; below, p, 252.
88

x
[ETHICS,
ner whatsoever."
owes
its
Possible existence per se is that which existence to some cause. "Everything that has a
its existence is in respect to its own essence only of existence, for if its causes exist, the thing likepossible wise will exist/' 2 Furthermore, the possible per se is said
cause for
to
become impossible
its
if
in
the absence of the cause

its
upon
which
existence depends, for "if
causes have never
existed, or
they have ceased to
exist, or if their causal re-
lation to the thing has changed, then the thing itself will not
exist/'
3
But,
still,
when
the cause from which
it
follows
by by
its
necessity does exist, then the thing, though only possible its own nature, is said to be necessary with reference to
cause.
It
there
is
may thus be said that within everything possible the distinction of being possible in itself but necessary
with reference to
there
is
its cause. According to this view, therefore, a fourfold classification of being, divided first into two main groups, into that which is causeless and hence
necessary by
existence,
its
and that which requires a cause for its the latter of which being then subdivided into
itself
its
three aspects, namely, possible in itself, necessary by 4 cause, and impossible in the absence of any cause.
This fourfold classification of being
is
reproduced by
divides
all
Spinoza
in Cogitata
Metaphysica^
I, 3,
when he
things into necessary, impossible, possible,
and contingent.
Necessary existence, in Spinoza as in mediaeval philosophy, is exemplified by God. As an illustration for the impossible
Spinoza mentions the "chimera,"
1
which
like the
words "a
Moreh Nebukim^
Ibid., Prop. 19.
II,

J
Ibid.
II,
4 5
See commentary of
Shem-Tob on Moreh Nebukim,

a goat-stag
I,
So
also in Descartes, as, for instance, in the
French version of Meditation III

is
(Oeuvres y IX, p. 34).

(rpa7e\a</>os)
Aristotle's illustration of a non-existent being
and sphinx.
Cf.
De
Interpretatione y
I,
i6a, 16-17;
Physics, IV,
208 a, 30.
PROP, ii]

"
rightly called a verbal being.
189
square nation and

ble"
is
circle
is
exists neither in the intellect nor in the imagi-
The term
"possi-
being brought about or being made necessary by a cause, and the term "contingent" is used by him to designate that aspect of the possible wherein it was said by the mediaevals to be possible in consideration of its own essence. "A thing is said to be possible when we understand its efficient cause, but do not know whether it is determined. Therefore, we may consider that
to be possible
used by Spinoza
in the general sense of
which
is
neither necessary
[i.e.,
by
itself]
nor
impossible [i.e., by itself]. If now we attend merely to the essence of a thing and not to its cause, we say it is contingent;
that
is,
when we
God
and chimeras."
consider anything between the extremes That these two terms "possible" and
for the
"contingent" were meant by Spinoza the possible as used by the mediaevals
may
two aspects of be gathered from
the context of the passage quoted and from parallel passages in the other works of Spinoza. 1 He then makes the following statement: "If any one wishes to call that contingent
which
I call
possible
shall not contradict him.
and possible what I call contingent I For I am not accustomed to dis-
pute about mere names. It will be sufficient if it is only admitted that these arise not because of something real, but
only because of a deficiency in our perception (defect us
nostrae perception is}.' 2 The last statement is a repetition of what is said earlier in the same chapter: "For some, these
1
two terms are considered defects of things, although, they are nothing more than a deficiency in our
(defect us nostri intcllectus)."
1
in truth,
intellect
The
I,
reference
7,
11.
is
no doubt to
Nota
i;
I,
Cf. Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae,
Prop.
Lemma
30
ff.);
I,
'Tractatus
tie
Intellectus Emendatiorie,
i;
53 (Opera, II, p. 19,
Ethics,
Prop. 33,
Schol.
2
IV, Defs. 3 and
4.
Cf. below, pp. 310, 399, 410.

Cf. Metaphysics, V, 30, io25a, 24; below, p. 399, a Cf. Ethics, I, Prop. 33, Schol. i.
and
Cogitata Metaphysica, I, 3. Vol. II, pp. 13, 109, 160.
190
[ETHICS,
controversy between Avicenna and Averroes as to whether possibility is merely a conceptual aspect or a real It is also to be noted that Spinoza's property of being.
the
1
"I lofty declaration here in Cogitata Metaphysica, I, 3, that am not accustomed to dispute about mere names/' as well
as Blyenbergh's statement in one of his letters to Spinoza
that
"you have taught me that one must not quarrel over

2
words/'
is
reminiscent of a similar expression used in

writings. to Spinoza's second proof in the Ethics,
all
3
Hebrew, Arabic, Latin, and Greek philosophic
Coming now
find that
it is
we
replete with
those distinctions and lines of
reasoning which we have abstracted from mediaeval sources. Spinoza refers to the distinction between an internal and an
external cause
when he speaks of
a reason or cause which
"must
outside it."
either be contained in the nature of the thing or lie 4 He also distinguishes between a positive cause
if
and an impedimental cause when he says that

1
a thing
See commentary of
Cf.
Shem-Tob on Moreh Nebukim^

11.
II,
4-5 and
1
24).
Abraham Ibn Daud, Emunah Ramah, I, 6 (p. 20): ... PD3 UPON imjfcnpl Bp PR *D ,n2nnp 00 nr i ? onwi ,DPH nr -prya *w *b DN nnNi If this name does not please you, call it by what"We call soul nefesh. ever other name you like, for we are not sticklers for names." Similarly Algazali in
. .
his Tahafot aI-Fa/asifat y III (ed.
Maurice Bouyges,
which
p. 109,
1.
9), says: \j+~*f
o^*
from
O^-~Jl
the
4it_VjiA
Xi >Ui
1-L*,
in the published Latin translation
Hebrew
tructio Destructionis] is
version of Averroes' Tahajot al-Tahajot (Happalat ha-Happalah, Desrendered as follows: "si autem non appellabilis hoc actionem
non
est disputatio
de nominibus."
OYIDBO JT^
This translation was accessible to Spinoza.

pression in a letter to
p. 269,
11.
H3H ,hy& Hf 1N"lpn *? DW.) ]' Descartes makes use of the same ex-
25-26):
Henry More. Cf. Correspondance, DXXXVII (Oeuvres, V, "Ego vero non soleo quidem de nominibus disputare."
Similar expressions occurring in Greek and in other Arabic sources are quoted
by
S.
Mittelalters, p. 216, n. 13.

disiensis, Scripta
Horovitz in his Die Psychologic bei den jtfdischen Religions-Philosophen des As Greek examples he quotes from Alexander Aphro-
Minora (ed. Bruns), II, p. 183, 1. 17: dvonaruv pb ovv ouSeis <0&'os, and from Galen, Opera (ed. Kiihn), I, p. 155: jutts 5i obSkv diafapdp&a Trpds ro>s,
rd 6v6âra âXXdrroi'ras.
4
"Haec vera
ratio seu causa vel in natura rei contineri debet, vel extra ipsam."
PROP, ii]

it
191
exists, why exists; and if it does not exist, there must be a reason or cause which hinders its existence or which negates it." Furthermore,
"there must be a reason or cause
he follows the main outline of the mediaeval argument for the everlastingness of God when he argues that if a reason
or cause be granted "which hinders which negates His existence ... it
God from
must be
it,
.
.
existing, or
either in the
is
nature
itself
of
God
or
must
lie
outside
that
.
to say, in
another substance of another nature.
But substance
possessing another nature could have nothing in common with God, and therefore could not give Him existence nor
negate
it."
Finally, he reproduces the mediaeval
own
classification of being into necessary, possible,
and his and im-
possible when he states that "the nature of the thing itself and shows the reason why a square circle does not exist the reason, on the other hand, why substance exists follows
.
.
from its nature alone," 3 and when he further says that it is not from its own nature "but from the order of corporeal
nature generally,"
it
i.e., its
cause, that "it
must
it is
follow, either
that a triangle necessarily exists, or that

to exist/'
4
impossible for
But more than

existence of
this.
There
is
a mediaeval proof for the
God based upon
the distinction between neces-
sary existence and possible existence which, as
we
shall
now
1 "Ratio, seu causa dari debet, cur existit; si autem non existit, ratio etiam, seu causa dari debet, quae impedit, quominus existat, sive quae ejus existentiam tollat." 2 "Si ... ratio causa dari possit quae impedit, quominus Deus existat,
. . .
.
vel
quae ejus existentiam
tollat
ea, vel in ipsa Dei natura, vel extra
ipsam dari
deberet, hoc est, in alia substantia alterius naturae. ...

esset naturae, nihil
cum Deo commune
substantia, quae alterius habere, adeoque, neque ejus existentiam
At
ponere, neque tollere posset." " * Ex. gr. rationem, cur circulus quadratus non existat, ipsa ejus natura indicat; Cur autem contra substantia existat, ex sola etiam ejus natura sequitur." .
.
"At
ratio,
cur circulus vel triangulus
existit, vel
cur non existit, ex eorum
natura non sequitur, sed ex ordine universae naturae corporeae; ex eo enim sequi debet, vel jam triangulum necessario existere, vel impossibile esse, ut jam existat."
192
[ETHICS,
proceed to show, served Spinoza as a pattern for his second forms of proof. This mediaeval proof is one of the several
as the cosmological proof. Spinoza, as we has changed it into an ontological proof. In order to recreate the complete setting of this second proof of Spinoza, it is necessary for us to trace the develop-
what
is
known
shall see,
ment of the cosmological proof out of which it has arisen. The cosmological proof is based upon the principle of causalin ity, reasoning from effect to cause, which, when expressed its most general terms, asserts that every form of coming
into being or change requires a cause.
The
principle of
causality alone, however, was not considered sufficient to be used as a proof for the existence of God. It had to be sup2 plemented by some other principle. In Plato that supwas the creation of the world. The plementary principle
cosmological proof as used by him to the following syllogism:

cause.
may
therefore be reduced
Everything that comes into existence must have a
The world came
into existence.
Therefore, the world must have a cause.
This form of the cosmological proof was also used by the
Moslem Mutakallimun and their Jewish followers, among whom it was known as the proof from creation, though its
not always recognized. 3
identity with the Platonic proof from efficient causation was With the denial of a created uni-
verse by Aristotle the cosmological proof assumed a new form. The principle of causality was still retained, but the theory of creation was replaced by the theory of the imposCf. my "Notes on Proofs of the Existence of God Hebrew Union College Annual, I (1924), pp. 584 ff. 3 Timaeus 28 A.
1
in
Jewish Philosophy" in 'The
See
cit. t
my "Notes
on the Proofs of the Existence of God
in
Jewish Philosophy,"
op.
p. 584, n. 44.
PROP, ii]
193
sibility of an infinite regress. In Aristotle two versions of this type of the cosmological proof occur, one couched in terms
of motion and the other in terms of potentiality and actuality. Assuming the world to be a process of motion or a process of
the actualization of the potential, and assuming also that both these processes require a cause and that there can be
no
infinite series of causes of
any kind, the two forms of the
proof run as follows:
A
Every
series of things
moved and moving must have
an unmoved mover.
a series of things moved and moving. Therefore, the world must have an unmoved mover.
The world
is
B
Every
series of transitions
from potentiality into actuis
ality
must have a cause which

is
pure actuality.
The world
a series of transitions from potentiality
into actuality.
Therefore, the world must have a cause which

actuality.
is
pure
given by Aristotle in the 1 Eighth Book of the Physics, the second in the Metaphysics. To these two Aristotelian versions of the cosmological proof
first
is
The
of these versions
Avicenna, and before him Alfarabi, added a third version couched in terms of possibility and necessity. This new version
was introduced by them because they considered it to be more general and more universally applicable than the
It will
diflfer
others.
be noticed that this
new
in
version does not
essentially
from the other two,
for motion, potentiality,
and
possibility are only different

is
ways
which the principle
of causality
1
expressed and are in a sense interchangeable

8,
Metaphysics, IX,
10498, 24
f.,
and XII,
7,
loysb, 3
f.
194
[ETHICS,
In Greek the same term, Siwa/us, means both potentiality and possibility, and Aristotle defines motion as the actuality of that which is potential so far as it is potential
terms.
J
and
it is
also as the actuality of that
which
is
movable so
far as
movable. 2 Maimonides,
who
besides the two Aristotelian
versions of the proof uses also the Avicennian version, introduces the latter by the following remark: "This is taken from the words of Aristotle, though he gives it in a different
From Maimonides it was taken over by Thomas Aquinas, who makes use of it as the third of his five proofs of the existence of God. 4 From him it was passed on into
form."
3
modern philosophy,
sion as his
so that
Kant
uses the Avicennian ver-
model cosmological proof.
We
shall
endeavor to
show that
for it
his
this is also the basis of Spinoza's
second proof.
The Avicennian
knowledge of
it tries
version as reproduced by
was Maimonides from

it is
Maimonides most likely drew Spinoza divided into two parts. In the first
whom
part,
all
to establish the fact that in the universe
among
the things that actually exist there must be one which has eternal existence, inasmuch as it is impossible either that all
things should be eternal or that
all
things should be transient.
In the second part, drawing upon the distinction between

necessary and possible (and also impossible) existence, it tries to prove that the eternal being must have necessary
existence, that
or, as
is
to say,
it
Spinoza would say,

is
must be independent of any cause, it must be causa sui. The proof
based, again, as in Aristotle's versions, upon the impossibility of an infinite regress. Reduced to its syllogistic
for this
form, Avicenna's version of the proof runs as follows:

1
Physics, III,
2
I,
20ia,
IO-H.
Physics, III, 2, 202a, 7-8.
3
*
Moreh Nebukim,
II, i.
Summa Vheologica, Pars I, Quaest. 2, Art. 3.
Cf. Contra Gentiles, Lib.
I,
Cap.
13.
PROP, ii]

series of transitions
195
from possible existence Every into necessary existence must have a cause which has necessary existence.
The world
is
a series of transitions from possible exist-
ence into necessary existence. Therefore, the world must have a cause which has
necessary existence. modification of the Avicennian proof was introduced 1 by Crescas. Crescas denies the impossibility of an infinite series of causes and effects and thereby removes one of the
premises of the Aristotelian proofs of the existence of God in all of its forms. But still he retains the principle of
causality, maintaining that everything possible,
i.e.,
every-
thing which by its own nature may or may not exist, must have a cause to give preference to existence over non-existence.
That cause must
itself
be uncaused, that
is,
it
must
have necessary existence. Once such a cause is given, argues Crescas, it may have an infinite number of effects arranged
not impossible. 2 How Crescas conceived of this possibility does not concern us here. 3 Suffice it to say that on the mere principle of causation, namely, that any series of causes and effects, whether infinite or
in a causal series, for infinity
is
finite,
must have a first uncaused cause, Crescas establishes new cosmological proof for the existence of God. The
characteristic feature of this proof, in contradistinction to the Aristotelian and the Avicennian, as will have been
is the elimination of the principle of the impossiof an infinite series of causes and effects. But still like bility the older Aristotelian proofs it retains the principle of causal-
noticed,
ity,
which principle is couched, as in Avicenna's proof, in terms of possibility and necessity. Truly considered, Crescas'
1
Or Adonai,
Cf.
I, iii, 2.
Or Adonai,
I,
ii,
3.
my
Crescas' Critique of Aristotle, pp. 67-69, 490-497.
196
[ETHICS,
new proof is simply
a restoration of the Platonic proof from
efficient causation or of the proof from creation as used by Moslem and Jewish theologians, the only difference between
them being that whereas the older proof starts with the conception of a universe created in time Crescas' proof starts
with the conception of a universe which

its
own
nature.
Reduced
only possible by to its syllogistic formula, Crescas'
is
proof runs as follows: Every series of possible beings must have a cause
necessary being. a series of possible beings. Therefore, the world must have a cause which
which
is
The world
is
is
necessary being. It is this proof of Crescas that Spinoza quotes, or rather paraphrases, in a letter to Meyer (Epistola XII) at the end of
lengthy refutation of the ancient arguments against infinity: "But here I should like it to be noted in passing that the more recent Peripatetics, as I at least think, mishis
understood the argument of the Ancients by which they strove to prove the existence of God. For, as I find it in the
works of a certain Jew, named Rab Ghasdai,

lows.
If there
is
it
reads as
folall
an
infinite regression of causes,
then
things which exist will be things that have been caused. But it cannot pertain to anything that has been caused that it should necessarily exist in virtue of its own nature. Therefore there
is in nature nothing to whose essence it pertains should exist necessarily. But this is absurd: and there therefore also that. 2 Therefore the force of the argument lies
that
it
not in the idea that

1
it is
impossible for the infinite actually to

first
On
The
this
form of transliteration of Crescas'
name,
original passage in the
Or Adonai^
I, iii, 2,
see below, p. 295, n. i. reads as follows: "Whether
causes and effects are finite or infinite, there is no escape from the conclusion that there must be something which is the cause of all of them as a whole, for if there
were nothing but
effects, those effects
would have only possible existence per sc and
PROP, ii]
197
exist, or that a regression of causes to infinity is impossible, but only in the impossibility of supposing that things which
do not
exist necessarily in virtue of their
own
nature, are not
determined to existence by something which does exist necessarily in virtue of its own nature, and which is a cause,
not an effect/*
evident that Spinoza understood well the portent and significance of Crescas' proof. He only seems to be misIt
is
taken in
its historical
background when he describes
it
as a
restoration of the original argument of the "ancients" (presumably Aristotle and his followers) which was corrupted by
the misunderstanding of the "more recent Peripatetics" (presumably the scholastics). Quite the contrary, Crescas' argument is in direct opposition to the argument of those
"ancients," though
it
may
be considered, as we have pointed
out, as a restoration of an
argument
still
more
ancient,
this cosmological proof of of possibility and necessity and Avicenna couched in terms as modified by Crescas by the elimination of the principle of
namely, that of Plato. are now going to
We
show how
the impossibility of an infinite series of causes and effects was taken up by Spinoza and remodelled into an ontological
proof.
Just as Avicenna begins his proof with a classification of being, so Spinoza begins his proof with a classification of our
ideas of being. Real beings, says Avicenna, fall, in the main, into two classes. There is one being, and one only, whose existence is necessary by his very nature; all others owe their
existence to
some external cause;

if
in
themselves they are only

is
possible; but
the cause of their existence
present they
would thus need something to cause the preponderance of their existence over their non-existence. But that which would bring about this preponderance of their existence
would be the cause of those
effects,
and that
is
what
is
meant by God."
198

is
[ETHICS,
if
are called necessary with reference to their cause, and
that
cause
removed they become thereby impossible. Similarly

classifies
Spinoza
our ideas of being with reference to their
reality or existence as that which is necessary by its own nature and those which by their own nature are only possible,
but become necessary by virtue of some cause from which

they follow by necessity, or become impossible when that cause is absent. To this class belong our ideas of all beings
which require a cause. Only one new class is introduced here by Spinoza, that which is impossible by its own nature, which is contrasted both with that which is necessary by
is possible by its own was not unknown to mediaeval Jewish philosophers, though Spinoza's immediate source may have been Descartes. As an illustration of an idea whose
its
own nature and with

But
that which
nature.
this class, too,
existence is necessary by its own nature Spinoza cites substance or God. A square circle is his example of an idea it is whose existence is impossible by its own nature *
only a "verbal being/' as he says elsewhere. The existence of a circle or a triangle is taken by him as a typical illustration of an idea which in itself has only possible existence and
becomes either necessary or impossible according

is
as the cause
present or absent.
closely following Avicenna.
classification of
Thus far Spinoza has been But when on the basis of this
1
our ideas of
its
own by God
Anything whose nature involves a self-contradiction is called impossible by nature and according to Jewish philosophers cannot be made possible even
in the ordinary course of nature. Cf. Maimonides, Morch Nebukim, I, 75, and Fifth Arguments, and Descartes, Meditationcs, VI (Oeuvrfs, VII, p. 71,
First
11.
18-20).
3
his note in Cogitata Metaphysica, I, I, that
Spinoza does not mention here the illustration of a chimera. Were it not for "by chimera is understood a being which
by nature involves a contradiction," one would be tempted to say that its impossibility is due only to the lack of proper causation and not to a self-contradiction in
its
nature.
PROP, ii]
199
God
being he attempts to construct a proof for the existence of he leaves Avicenna behind. To begin with, like Crescas,
he eliminates the impossibility of an infinite series of causes. But then he leaves Crescas, too. For Crescas still reasons
cosmologically and a posteriori, from effect to cause, from the existence of things possible to the existence of a thing
necessary. But Spinoza starts with an immediately perceived idea of a being whose existence is necessary by its own nature, the clearness and distinctness of which idea is in itself proof
and tries to resolve this immediately perceived truth into an analytical syllogism, which, as we have seen, is the main function of the ontological proof. The passage from the major premise to the conclusion is achieved, as in
for its reality,
proof and as in Anselm's proof, by showing the abof the contrary. Thus the Avicennian cosmological surdity proof as modified by Crescas is transformed by Spinoza into
his first
an ontological proof after the manner of Descartes. Reduced to its syllogistic formula, Spinoza's second proof runs as
follows:
If
we have
a clear
and
is
distinct idea of
God
as a being
whose existence
necessary by His own nature,
then God is immediately perceived by us to exist. But we have a clear and distinct idea of God as a being whose existence is necessary by His own nature.
Therefore,
exist.
God
is
The
basis of the ontological proof, as
we have
seen,
is
our
valid immediate perception of God's existence. This form of the proof merely shows how our valid immediate perception of
God's existence
is
implied in our clear and distinct

is
idea of
God
as a being
whose existence
necessary by His
own
nature.
200

THIRD AND FOURTH PROOFS
[ETHICS,
almost an anti-climax to pass from that involved and complicated second proof of Spinoza to his third and fourth
It
is
proofs which are based
upon a
single source, namely,
Des-
cartes' second proof in Meditation III. There is one phase, however, which is of interest, namely, Spinoza's endeavor to convert Descartes' proof from a cosmological argument, as it is reproduced by him in his third proof, to an ontological
argument, as he gives
seen
it
in his fourth proof.
We have already
has done it with another cosmological argusecond proof. Generally speaking, it may be said that whatever any one may attempt to prove of God demonstratively, a posteriori, can also be proved of him ontologi-
how Spinoza
in his
ment
cally, a priori, if it is assumed that the thing to be proved forms our immediate and self-evidently true idea of God. Now, in his second proof in Meditation III, Descartes takes
the attributes of creation, conservation, or power, just as in his ontological proof he takes the attribute of perfection
and argues that creation, conservation, or must imply existence no less than perfection and selfpower causality. But there is the following difference, as it is at first assumed by Descartes, between creation, conservation, or power, on the one hand, and perfection and self-causality, on the other. The latter two are immediately perceived as our very idea of God and hence they yield an ontological
and
self-causality,
proof, but the former are not immediately perceived as our very idea of God; they are derived demonstratively, a posteriori,
from His actions, and hence they yield a cosmological proof. But here Spinoza seems to argue that power, too, is immediately perceived as our idea of God, just as perfection and self-causality in the view of Descartes, and as greatness view of Anselm.
in the
Why
not then construct an ontologi-
PROP, ii]
201
cal
proof on the attribute of power?
This reasoning marks
the relation between the third and the fourth proofs of Spinoza. In his third proof Spinoza reproduces Descartes'
second proof of Meditation III in its original cosmological form. In his fourth proof he converts it into an ontological
between the third and fourth proofs is clearly brought out in Spinoza's own introductory words to the fourth proof: "In this last demonstration I wished to
proof.
The
relation
prove the existence of God a posteriori,
in
order that the dem-
onstration might be the more easily understood, and not because the existence of God does not follow a priori from
same grounds/' But to come to the proofs themselves. Perhaps by way of general introduction I may say what I intend to do in
the
the next few paragraphs.
I
intend to show, in the
first
place,
that Descartes' second proof in Meditation III is only a modification of the traditional proof from creation. In the
second place,
this
intend to explain
why
Descartes describes
(b)
proof either (a) as a proof
from man's existence or
as
a proof from man's conservation. In the third place, I intend to explain how it happens that this proof is restated by
Spinoza in his third proof as a proof from power. Descartes' second proof in Meditation III is described
by himself as a proof from the individual's consciousness of own existence to the existence of God. It is thus a cosmological proof, reasoning from effect to cause, and, truly speaking, it is only verbally different from the proof of
his
1
creation which, as has already been mentioned, was made use of by Plato and by Moslem and Jewish theologians as well
as
by Christian theologians. The only difference between the old proof from creation and Descartes' second proof is
2
1
Meditationcs, III (Oeuvres, VII, p. 48,
11.
f.).
John of Damascus, De Fide Orthodoxa,
I,
3, First Proof.
201
[ETHICS,
that the older proof argues from the existence of the world whereas Descartes argues from man's own existence or life.
1
change in the vocabulary of the proof, or rather this additional vocabulary, is already to be found in the writings of early authors. St. Augustine, for instance, in rethis
But new
producing the argument from creation, says: "And therefore, whether we consider the whole body of the world
.
. .
or whether
we consider
all life
2
...
all
can only be through

in argu-
Him who
absolutely
is."
Similarly,
Maimonides,
an eternal being in the universe, says: "Consequently nothing whatever would exist [if all things were transient]; but as we see things existing and find ouring for the existence of
selves in existence,
we conclude
there
must be an
1 '
eter-
nal being that
not subject to destruction. 3 An analogy between St. Augustine's contention that we have a conis
sciousness of our
own
existence and a similar contention by
Descartes in his discussion of the nature of the
human mind
has been pointed out by one of his objectors. 4
These quotations are
sufficient to
show that the vocabu-
lary used by Descartes in his second proof in Meditation III has grown out of the older proof from creation. But it can be further shown that there is a structural similarity between
the old argument from creation and Descartes' argument from man's consciousness of his own existence. We have
5 already shown in a previous chapter how the argument for the creation of the world started with the tentative question
Kuno
De
Fischer
designates
Descartes'
I,
i
second
proof as
"anthropological."
sive
Geschichtc der neuern Philosophic^

3
Civitate Dei, VIII, 6:
"Ac
esse
is
(3rd ed., Heidelberg, 1889), p. 308. per hoc sive universi mundi corpus
omnem
logical
*
vitam
nisi
ab
illo
the vocabulary of the argument
non posse, qui simpliciter est." This change in sometimes described as a change from a cosmoVilelo^ pp.
form to a psychological. See C. Baeumker, Moreh Nebukim^ II, i, Third Argument.

Objcctiones Quartac (Ofuvres, VII, p. 197, Cf. above, pp. 98 ff.
11.
320
ff.
4
*
24
ff.).
PROP, ii]

itself or
203
whether the world came into being by

ternal cause.
Similarly, sciousness of his own existence begins with the question, "From whom do I then derive my existence? Perhaps from
by some exDescartes' proof from man's con-
myself or from my parents, or from some other source less He concludes naturally that it must perfect than God?"
r
be derived from God.

Allied with the argument from creation is the argument from the divine government or conservation of the world/ This argument, instead of reasoning from the single and com-
pleted act of creation, reasons from divine providence, that is to say, from God's guidance and governance and conser-
vation of the world.
"Conservation"
is
a mediaeval term
for the continuation of existence after the
and
it is
considered as direct an effect

itself. 4
world was created, 3 of God's causality as
This argument from divine government or conservation of the world is another form of cosmological reasoning, and it was considered as somewhat
the act of creation
even
superior to the argument from creation, for it can be used if the world is supposed to be eternal, inasmuch as
God
1
cause of
2
can be conceived as the governor of the world and the its conservation without the world necessarily hav11.
Meditationes, III (Oeuvres, VII, p. 167,
ff.).
Second Proof: "Secunda ex earum Porro ipsa quoque rerum creatarum compages, conservatione et gubernatione. conservatio, atque gubernatio, nos decent Deum esse, qui universum hoc coagmenI,
John of Damascus, De Fide Orthodoxa,
3,
tarit, sustentet, et conservet, eique provideat." In John of Damascus this proof from conservation and government is distinguished from the proof of design as well as from the proof of creation. Cf. Contra Gentiles, Lib. I, Cap. 13, end.
3
Contra Gentiles, Lib. Ill, Cap. 65: "Conservatio
rei
non
est nisi continuatio
esse ipsius."
4
See Moreh Nebukim,

exists."
1,
69:
"Here
wish to show that
God is
the cause of every
event that takes place

it
in the world, just as
He is
the creator of the whole universe as
now
have already shown, and
Again: "God, however, is himself the form of the universe, as we it is He who causes its continuance and permanency." Cf.
Ethics, I, Prop. 24, Corol.; Epistola 18 (Opera, IV, p. 82, 11. 24 ff. and 4 ff.); Epistola 20 (p. 98, 11. 15 ff. and 33 ff.); Meditationes, III (Oeuvres, VII, p. 49, 11. 5 f.).
204 ing

come
into existence in time.
1
[ETHICS,
Thus we find
that Descartes
proposes a change in the form of his proof from man's existence or creation by transforming it into a proof from conservation, declaring that, even if we assume that we have always existed and need no author of our existence, we still
need an author of our conservation. 2 It might therefore be said that Descartes' argument from man's existence corresponds to the argument from creation and his argument from man's conservation corresponds to the argument from
divine government.
Cartesianae^
I,
Spinoza, in his Principia Philosophiae Proposition VII, explicitly rejects the argu-
and retains only the argument from I, Proposition XI, Third Proof, however, in summarizing Descartes* second proof in Medi" tation III, he continues to use the term existence," which would seem to be a return to the "existence" form of Desexistence
ment from
conservation. Here in Ethics ^
cartes' proof. But "existence" may mean both to "come into existence" and to "continue to exist." In this proof
in the Ethics
it
may
therefore be taken in the latter sense.

it is
deduced, in mediaeval phithe attribute of power, or that possesses He is omnipotent. 3 Though wisdom and will may enter into the act of creation, still it is said that it is through "power"
the act of creation
From
losophy, that
God
that
God
creates. 4
It
is
for this reason that
Descartes speaks
of the
1
"power"
to create or to conserve,
and Spinoza
still
The
compatibility of the belief in the existence of
God with
the belief in the
eternity of the universe is assumed by Maimonides. See Moreh Nebukim^ I, 76, Sixth Argument: "But he seems to forget that we are at issue with those who,
whilst they believe in the existence of God, admit at the same time the eternity of the universe."
2
MeditationeS) III (Oeuvres, VII, p. 49,
11.
12
ff.).
Emunot
Ibid.
we-De'ot, II, 4; Cuzari, V, 18, 7-9. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa I'heologica, Pars
I,
Quaest. 9, Art. 2:
.
.
sed per antequam essent, non erant possibiles esse solam potentiam divinam, in quantum Deus poterat eas in esse producere."
creaturae,
.
"Omnes enim
PROP, ii]
205
more
explicitly says: "posse Proposition XI, Third Proof), and he also speaks of "potentia conservandi" (Prin. Phil. Cart. y I, Prop. VII, Lemma II).
existere potentia est" (Ethics , I,
Descartes* second argument
may
therefore be referred to, as
indeed Spinoza does seem to refer to it, as the argument from power, and it may be considered as one of the variations
of the mediaeval arguments from creation or divine govern-
ment.
Reduced
to its syllogistic formula, Descartes' second arin his third
gument
proof
in
may
Meditation III as restated by Spinoza be given as follows:

in its existence
Everything that continues

a cause.
must have
and the world continue in our existence. Therefore, we and the world must have a cause.
This syllogistic form
Principia.
is
We
clearly brought out in Spinoza's
In the Ethics
it is
somewhat obscured, owing
to
Spinoza's predilection for indirect
proof of the reductio ad
absurdum type of argument. But it can be easily brought into accord with the argument employed in the Principia. It is an a posteriori cosmological argument, pure and simple, different from the arguments from creation or only verbally
,
government.
The proof in the form in which be fully unfolded as follows:
it is
given in the Ethics
may
We
have the idea of the existence of ourselves as
finite
beings and we also have the idea of the existence of God as an infinite being. There are three possibilities as to the truth of these ideas.
First, they are both false,
and therefore
"
nothing exists."
is
Second, only the idea of our own existence

1
true,
and
"Ergo
vel nihil existit."
206 "
therefore,

there
is
x
[ETHICS,
nothing which necessarily exists except-
ing things finite/* Third, both ideas are true, and therefore a "being abso2 lutely infinite also necessarily exists/' The first of these possibilities is to be rejected, for
"we
ourselves exist/'
The second
there
is
possibility
is
to be rejected, for "if, therefore,

exists excepting things
nothing which necessarily

follows that things finite are
infinite
finite, it
more powerful than the

(as
is
absolutely
being, and
this
self-evident)
is
argument is to be understood argument against our being ourselves the authors of our existence. Descartes' argument originally is that if we were ourselves the authors of our existence we should have endowed ourselves with every perfection of which we possessed any idea and which we include
absurd/'
force of this
in the light of Descartes' in
The
in the
our idea of God. Spinoza presents here the same argument form of a reductio ad absurdum. He proceeds as folIf
we must we must be the authors of our own existence. Therefore, the idea we have of our own existence is more powerful than the idea we have of God's
lows:
we
exist
and God does not

s
exist,
then
exist "in ourselves,"
that
is
to say,
existence,
inasmuch as "inability to
exist
is
impotence, and,
on the other hand, ability to exist is power." 6 But we have set out with the assumption that we have an idea of God as
as infinite being
and of ourselves
as finite beings.
Hence, a
self-contradiction.
1
2 3
4
id, quod jam necessario existit, non nisi cntia "Vel Ens absolute infinitum necessario etiam existit."
"Si itaque
finita sunt."
"Atqui nos
"Si itaque
est."
existimus."
entia finita
quod jam necessario existit, non nisi entia finita sunt, sunt ergo potentiora Ente absolute infinite: atque hoc (ut per se notuni) absurid,
dum
5
"Atqui nos, vel in nobis, vel in alio, quod necessario existit, existimus." "Posse non existere impotentia est, et contra posse existere potentia est."
PROP, ii]
207
Consequently, the third possibility must be true, and " therefore the being absolutely infinite, that is to say, God,
necessarily exists/'
x
So much
for Spinoza's third proof.
We
shall turn
now
to
his fourth proof.
Suppose we say that our clear and distinct idea of God

that of a being of the highest power, i.e., of the highest power to create or to conserve, just as Anselm said that it
is is
said that
the idea of the greatest being and as Descartes himself it is the idea of the most perfect being or of a self-
caused being. We should then be able to frame an ontological proof from the idea of God as the cause of existence or
conservation. Descartes himself has already performed this conversion of his second proof into an ontological proof from
siones:
in the following passage in his Primae Respon"Further, because we cannot think of God's existence as being possible, without at the same time, and by
"power"
2
He
taking heed of His immeasurable power, acknowledging that can exist by His own might, we hence conclude that He
really exists
of nature
and has existed from all eternity; for the light makes it most plain that what can exist by its own
exists.
is
power always
And
thus
we
shall
understand that
being of the highest power, not by any intellectual fiction, but because it belongs to the true and immutable nature of that being to necessary existence
comprised
in the idea of a
exist."
Descartes thus has three forms of the ontological

the idea of a most perfect being. the idea of a self-caused being. the idea of a most powerful being.
is
proof:
1.
2.
3.
From From From
What
1
Spinoza
really trying to
do
in his fourth
proof
is
"Ergo ens absolute
infinitum, hoc est (per Defin. 6.)

11.
Deum,
necessario existit."
Oeuvrcs, VII, p. 119,
11
ff.
208
[ETHICS,
simply to reproduce the third form of Descartes' ontological

proof.
Reduced
follows:
If
to a syllogism, Spinoza's fourth
proof runs as
we have
a clear
and
distinct idea of
God
as a being
of the highest power, then ceived by us to exist.
God
is
immediately per-
But we have a
Therefore,
exist.
clear
and
distinct idea of
God
as a be-
ing of the highest power.
God
is
Here, again, the proof merely shows how our valid immediate perception of God's existence is implied in our clear and distinct idea of God as a being of the highest power.
The
valid
basis of the ontological proof, as
we have
said,
is
this
immediate perception of God's existence. There remains now only the last part of the Scholium of Proposition XI to be explained, the part which contains a
provisional objection quoted in the name of "many persons*' against "this demonstration." In order to simplify the discussion of this part of the Scholium, we shall preface it by
a few general remarks. First, the demonstration of which Spinoza says here that its force may not be easily grasped by many persons refers
to the third proof and not to the fourth proof given at the beginning of the Scholium. It will have been noticed that
the fourth proof is not given by Spinoza as an independent proof but as a Scholium to the third proof. And so when he
says in that Scholium that "many persons, nevertheless, will perhaps not be able easily to see the force of this demonstration," the reference
is
to the third proof.
is
Second, the provisional objection raised in the Scholium to be read in the light of Spinoza's discussion in his Scho-
PROP, ii]
PROOFS OF THK EXISTENCE OF GOD

VII
in
209
Hum
to Proposition
I.
Principia Philosophiae Carte-
sianae,
Third, the answer to this provisional objection is to be read in the light of Spinoza's Demonstration of Lemma I of the same Proposition in his Principia. In the chojium to Proposition VII in the Principia y Spinoza discusses Descartes' distinction between "difficult"
(difficile)
and "easy"
(facile)
creation or conservation.
He
interprets these terms as referring to the production of "more perfect" (perfectius) and "less perfect" (imperfectius) things respectively. In this Scholium to Proposition XI here in
the Ethics Spinoza reproduces the same distinction, explaining the expression "more difficult to produce" (factu difficiliores) as referring to
attributes pertain."
that "to which they conceive more By the same token we may say that
the production of that to which they may thus further con-
"easy" production
is
We perceive clude that by his distinction between "more difficult" and "easy" production here Spinoza again means, as in the Principia^ the distinction between the production of the "more
less attributes pertain.
perfect" and the production of the "less perfect."
With
sons"
this distinction in view, says Spinoza,
"many
per-
third proof, it will be recalled, starts with the hypothesis that we have two ideas, one of God as an infinite being and another of man as
will try to refute the third proof.
The
God
a finite being, and proceeds to argue that if man exists and does not exist it will be contrary to the hypothesis. But these "many persons" will say, contends Spinoza, that the
distinction between
God and man
as infinite
and
finite
means
a distinction between infinite perfection and finite perfection or between having an infinite number and a finite num-
ber of properties. But it has just been said that the difference between the "more perfect" and the "less perfect" corre-
2io
[ETHICS,
spends respectively to the difference between "difficult" existence or production and "easy" existence or production. Accordingly, the existence denied of God and the existence
man are of two different kinds entirely, one being "difficult" existence and the other being "easy" infinitely existence. To deny therefore infinitely difficult existence of
affirmed of
God while affirming easy existence of man does not imply a contradiction of our idea of God as an infinite or most perfect
being. Quite the contrary, it is because we conceive of God as an infinite and most perfect being that His existence be-
comes
infinitely
difficult,
and hence He does not
exist,
whereas man, being conceived as finite and imperfect, thereby has existence which is easy, and hence he does exist.
Spinoza could have put into the mouth of these "many persons" the following illustration. Suppose we have two
one of our possessing a million dollars and the other of our possessing one dollar. The first idea is more perfect
ideas,
than the second, inasmuch as more attributes or properties pertain to it. But because the idea of having a million dollars is more perfect their existence is more difficult and consequently they do not exist in our pocket, whereas the idea of having one dollar is less perfect; therefore its existence is
easy and
it
does exist in our pocket.

provisional objection
tentatively raised in
To
this
the
name of "many persons" Spinoza answers by

l
recalling his
old distinction between things "which are produced by external causes" and things "which can be produced by no external cause." Of the former, he argues, it is indeed true
to say that the greater the perfection the more difficult its existence and the smaller the perfection the easier the existence.
Hence the idea of a
million dollars has less possi-
bility of existence than that of one dollar, for the perfection

1
Ethics,
I,
I,
Prop. II, Schol.

i.
Cf. Principia Philosophiae Cartesianac^
I,
Prop. 7,
Lemma
Nota
PROP, ii]

is
211
as well as the existence of a million dollars
not intrinsic.
The
perfections of beings dependent upon external causes are themselves external perfections, and the more of them there
are the
upon
those
external causes.
things
more dependent the existence of the beings becomes "For whatever perfection or reality
may have which
are produced
by external
causes, whether they consist of many parts or of few, they owe it all to the virtue of an external cause, and therefore
their existence springs
cause alone and not from their own."
from the perfection of an external But if you have an

x
out of
idea of anything with a set of internal perfections, growing its own nature, then the possibility of its existence in-
if
creases in proportion to the number of perfections, so that we get an idea of an infinitely perfect being its existence
becomes absolutely necessary. "In an idea or concept of everything, existence either as possible or as necessary is contained." 2 "For, as we cannot affirm existence of nothing, as
we
content to approach zero as
detract from the perfection of a concept and conceive its its limit, so much do we detract
from its possible existence. If we conceive this degree of perfection to be infinitely diminished, even to zero, it will con-
no existence, or but an absolutely impossible one. On the other hand, if we increase this degree of perfection to
tain
infinity
we conceive
that
it
and so
to be absolutely necessary."
has the highest possible existence 3 This kind of internal
perfection which grows out of the nature of things, as distinguished from external "marks of perfection which men
from ignorance and tradition are accustomed to esteem as such," 4 is to be understood only as "so much reality or
being."
infinite
1
God, therefore, who is conceived as having an number of perfections growing out of His own nature,
s
Ethics, I, Prop. 11, Schol.
Principia Philosophiac Cartesianac,
I,
Axiom
3 *
6.
Cf. Prop. 7,
onst.
Ibid.) Prop. 7,
//</.
Lemma I, DemLemma I, Demonst.
Hid.) Prop.
7,
Lemma
I,
Nota
2.
212

1
[ETHICS,
has the most reality and being. You cannot argue, as would those "many persons/' that because God is infinitely perfect
His existence
exist.
is
infinitely difficult,
and hence
He
does not
Only external perfections may be said to increase the difficulty of existence; internal perfections, on the contrary,
increase the possibility of existence. Such internal "perfection consequently does not prevent the existence of a
thing, but establishes
it;
imperfection, on the other hand,
prevents existence, and so of no existence can we be more sure than of the existence of the Being absolutely infinite or
perfect, that
is
to say,
God."
To sum up our main conclusions: Historically there were two kinds of proofs for the existence of God, based upon two kinds of knowledge, indirect and direct. The indirect kind
of knowledge gave us the various cosmological and teleological proofs. The direct kind of knowledge gave us the proofs
based upon revelation, the innateness of the idea of God, and universal assent. The ontological proof as stated by Anselm, Descartes, and Spinoza is not an independent proof.
It
is
only a different
way
upon
the
direct knowledge.
of formulating the old proofs based In Anselm, it is a modified form of

assent.
argument from universal

it is
In
Descartes and
in-
Spinoza
a modified form of the
argument from the
nateness of the idea of God.
Of the
in the Ethics , the first
four proofs for the existence of God given by Spinoza and third correspond respectively to
Descartes' ontological proof in Meditation V and his cosmological proof in the second proof of Meditation III. Descartes' first proof in Meditation III is not reproduced
by Spinoza
and
1
in the Ethics,
but
is
reproduced by him
in the
Short Treatise and in his Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae,

is
referred to in his correspondence

I,
and
in
De
Intellectus
Cf. Ethics ,
Prop.
9.
Ethics,
I,
Prop,
u,
Schol.
PROP, ii]
213
Emendatione
is
"Tractatus. Spinoza's second proof in the Ethics a modification of Descartes' ontological proof in Meditation V, enriched by elements borrowed from a cosmological
in
proof
Hebrew
is
in the Ethics
philosophic sources. Spinoza's fourth proof the conversion of his third proof, which is
cosmological, into ontological form, which conversion

also
was
made by Descartes himself. The idea of God which is assumed

is
in the ontological in
proof
to imply existence
differently phrased
it is
the different
forms of the proof.
In Anselm,
being. In Descartes, it is or of a self-caused being, or of the most powerful being. the first ^ second and Spinoza's three ontological proofs
',
the idea of the greatest the idea of the most perfect being,
make use of three descriptions fourth proofs in the Ethics which may be reduced to two. In the first proof, the idea of God is that of a being whose essence involves existence.
In the second proof,
it is
that of a being whose existence
is
necessary per
se.
These two can be reduced to what Des-
cartes described as a self-caused being. In the fourth proof, it is the idea of a being who is most powerful. This difference
terminology, however, is only verbal. Any other term, such, for instance, as the most real being (ens realissimum), can be used, if it is assumed to be that which is immediately
in
perceived of God, without introducing anything new in the ontological proof. The recurrent claims for the discovery of
new
meet
ontological proofs for the existence of

in
God which we
upon
analysis,
philosophic literature generally prove,
nothing but the substitution of some new terms for such older terms as the greatest, the most perfect, the selfto be
caused, and the most powerful. Oftentimes, these so-called newly discovered ontological proofs are not even ontological,
but rather disguised cosmological proofs.
CHAPTER
VII

I.
THE FRAMEWORK OF
SPINOZA'S UNIVERSE
IN OUR analysis of the Ethics so far we have found that of the first thirteen propositions twelve deal with the traditional
problem of the nature of God, which we have discussed in the chapters on the definition, unity, and simplicity of sub-
and one proposition deals with the proofs of the exGod. The remaining propositions of the First Part of the Ethics similarly deal with a problem which in traditional philosophy would go under the title of the relation of
stance,
istence of
to the world. Spinoza starts out in Proposition XIV with a recapitulation of his denial, both in Short Treatise, I, 2, and in Propositions II-VI in the First Part of the Ethics,
God
of the fundamental belief of
all
mediaeval philosophers that
between God and the world there is a distinction of pure form and matter, the two constituting, as it were, two substances. "Besides God," he therefore maintains, "no substance can be nor can be conceived" (Prop. XIV). His demonstration of this proposition is again a summary of
what he has already
said in the Short 'Treatise,
I, 2,
and
in
Propositions II-VI, namely, if the world were of a nature absolutely distinct from that of God, all the difficulties which the mediaevals themselves had pointed out against the
assumption of the existence of two deities or against the assumption of the emanation of a material world out of an
*
immaterial cause by
2
the
ordinary process of necessary
causality
1
would recur and would be unanswerable (Dem2
Cf. above, p. 83.
Cf. above, p. 88.
PROP. 14]
215
onst.).
He
the nature of the universe, including matter, which
thus concludes that there cannot be anything in is not in
God
himself,
who
according to
all
sole cause of the universe.
"Hence
is
traditional opinions is the it follows with the greatis
est clearness, firstly, that

in
God
one, that
to say (Def. VI),

I).
nature there
1
is
but one substance" (Corol.

to
But
this
" "is absolutely infinite (ibid.), and therefore cannot be fully known by the finite intellect. 2 It is only the in-
one substance or God, again according
all
traditional
opinions,
finite intellect (infinitus intellectus)* i.e., the infinite intellect
of
God
(infinitus
Dei
intellectus) f that
can perceive every-
thing which pertains

its infinite
one substance, that is to say, attributes. The finite "human mind can only get
to this
s
to
know
those things which the idea of an actually existing
body involves, or what can be inferred from this idea." But inasmuch as "this idea of the body neither involves nor expresses any other attributes of God than extension and 6 thought," it follows that the human mind knows God "in
so far only as
tension"
so far as
He is considered under the attribute of exand "under the attribute of thought, and not in He is considered under any other attribute." 8 And
7
so, just as his discussion of the impossibility
of two substances
in the Short 'Treatise culminates in the
statement "that we
9 posit extension as an attribute of God," so also here Spinoza concludes with the statement that "it follows, secondly,
that the thing extended and the thing thinking are either attributes of God or affections of the attributes of God"
(Corol. II).
1
Cf. above, p. 117.
Cf. above, p. 142.

1.
Ethics, II, Prop. 7, Schol. (Opera, II, p. 90,
4).

*
11. 11.
8-9).

Ibid.
Ibid.
(11.
10-13).
i
6
8
18-19).
Ibid.
(11.
28-29).
(11. 23-24). Short Treatise, I, 2,
18.
21 6

last expression,
is
[ETHICS,
The
God,"
a reference to the
"or affections of the attributes of modal system of extension and
thought, which Spinoza describes most fully and clearly in 2 the Short treatise T and his correspondence with Schuller. The full scheme of Spinoza's system of extension and thought
may
be pieced together from these two main sources.

it
is
In
its
bare outline
as follows:
There
is,
to begin with, sub-
stance or
God
with infinite attributes.
Of
these only two
and thought. From these attributes there follows a series of modes, to wit, (i) immediate infinite modes, (2) a mediate infinite mode, and (3)
attributes are
known
to us, extension
finite
modes.
Of
extension, the immediate infinite
mode
is
motion-and-rest; of thought, the immediate infinite mode is the absolutely infinite intellect (intellectus absolute infini-
Only one mediate infinite mode is specifically named by Spinoza, and that is the face of the whole universe (fades totius universi). He does not make it clear, however, whether
tus).
it is
mode
of extension or of thought or of both.
The
finite
modes are the particular things (res particulares}. Substance and its attributes are called by Spinoza natura naturans^ the entire modal system of extension and thought is called by him natura naturata^ and within the latter he distinguishes
between the two
classes of infinite
modes, which he
calls
"general," and the single class of finite modes, which he calls

"particular." As a skeleton framework to hold together and to unify the fragmentary pieces of the visible universe, this scheme of
one of the stages, an advanced stage, to be sure, in the long development of similar schemes since man began to distinguish between the visible and the invisible and to discern behind phenomenal sporadic changes
Spinoza
is
to be regarded as
Ibid. y
1,
8-9.
Epistolae 63-64.
PROP. 14]
217
and a certain causal connection. Any attempt to interpret this scheme of Spinoza as an adumbration of any specific theories of modern science is justifiable in the same sense as the Stoics were justified in transforming the gods and goddesses of Olympia into the natural forces and moral
a certain unity
principles of their
own
philosophy, or as Philo and the medi-
aeval Jewish, Christian, and

fied in investing the
Moslem
God and
theologians were justiof the Bible with signifangels
icances of their
own
all
philosophic principles.
There
is
indeed
a justification in
such attempts at allegorical methods of
interpretation, whether applied to Homer, the Bible, or the works of Spinoza, but only in so far as they are confined to
an effort to show that all these systems of myths, religion, and philosophy were inspired by a common striving to see the universe as a whole and to interpret it as a unit, and how in reaching out for the truth they almost attained it. But the allegorical method of interpretation becomes a perversion of truth when confused with the method of historical research.
The
first
step in understanding any author
is
to find
out what he means by what he says and how he came to say it in a certain particular manner. In Spinoza's skeleton
ditional philosophy,
framework of the universe, the terms used are those of traand the concepts represented by these
terms, as well as the connection between them, are likewise reminiscent of skeleton frameworks of the universe invented
happen to know also that philosothe ages have come to whatever new views phers throughout they have happened to arrive at as a result of criticism of
by
his predecessors.
We
older views and a modification of the views criticized by have already seen how Spinoza's propositions in them.
We
the Ethics so far can be best explained as a criticism and modification of his mediaeval philosophic background.
We
shall therefore try to
show how the
entire
scheme of Spinoza's
21 8
[ETHICS,
theory of extension and thought has grown out of a typical scheme held by mediaeval philosophers.
The mediaeval
skeleton framework of the universe in

its finer
its
bare outline and without any discussion of points starts out, like that of Spinoza, with
finite in
subtle
is
God who
in-
His perfections; but unlike Spinoza's, it assumes God to be pure form, whose sole activity is thinking. The product of God's thinking is an Intelligence, which is likewise pure
form and the activity of which
Intelligence,
is
likewise thinking.
But
this
owing on the one hand, necessary of existence, for it is the inevitable product of divine thinking, and, on the other hand, only
possible of existence, for
to the dual aspect of its existence, being,
by
its
own nature and without
cause
ity in
it
could not have come into being, contains also a dualits nature, the duality of necessity and possibility.
Out of
the necessary element in its nature there emanates another Intelligence, which is again pure form and the activity of which is again thinking; but out of its possible
element there proceeds a sphere which is material and the activity of which is motion. As the astronomy of the Middle
Ages posited a plurality of such concentric celestial spheres, the number of which varied according to different views but
generally spoken of as nine, the process is repeated until we come to the last in the series of the concentric spheres,
is
1
the so-called lunar sphere, and to the last in the series of the Intelligences, generally spoken of as the Tenth or Active
Intelligence.
others, has in
sity.
This so-called Tenth Intelligence, like all the its nature the duality of possibility and necesits
Out of
possibility there arises the underlying genis
eral
matter which
common
is
to all the sublunar things
and
the nature of which
pure possibility
their
and
Then by
1
the motion of the spheres

II, 4.
common
potentiality. circular
Cf.
Moreh Nebukim,
PROP. 14]
219
motion as well as the particular variations in their common circular motion this common underlying matter is predisposed for the assumption of the general as well as the particular forms by which the simple elements and the compound
things are differentiated
among themselves from each
other.
The forms themselves
from the primary forms of the four elements to souls and minds, which are also called forms
flow from the activity of the Tenth Intelligence, 1 which means that they ultimately flow from God.
Thus, according to this scheme, the entire universe divided into matter and form. These two exist together
matter
is
in
the physical part of the universe, but form exists apart from 2 in the world of the Intelligences and in God. While on the whole matter owes its existence to God as its ultimate
does not come directly from God, inasmuch as God is pure form, and by a mediaeval principle, which may be formulated as omne materiale e materially matter cannot arise
cause,
it
from form. Matter

tion at a stage for by what
arises somewhere in the process of emanaremoved from God, and its origin is accounted I have described elsewhere as "emergent
emanation/'
derived his
In order to simplify the process of showing how Spinoza own scheme from the mediaeval scheme, it is necessary for us to separate in the latter its essential from its
non-essential elements.
is
1
The
essential element in the
the main philosophic thesis that

The most obvious
this
God
is
scheme form and pure
sources from which Spinoza could have derived his knowlmediaeval scheme are Moreh Nebukim^ I, 72; II, 4; and Shem-Tob's commentary on Moreh Nebukim y II, 13.
edge of
2
For a difference of opinion, however, with regard
to the immateriality of the
Intelligences, see below, p. 223.

* Cf. my paper, "The Problem of the Origin of Matter in Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy and Its Analogy to the Modern Problem of the Origin of Life," in Pro-
ceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy , p. 602. * Cf. ibid., pp. 603-604.
220

the material
[ETHICS,
hence
directly.
The
universe did not proceed from Him non-essential elements are the assumptions
which happened
to be part of the mediaeval scientific conof the universe, namely, the theory of celestial ception spheres, the theory of the plurality of Intelligences, and the
theory that the universe was finite in extent, being enclosed within an all-surrounding sphere. They were, however, not essential to the scheme itself. The non-essential character
of these scientific assumptions in the mediaeval scheme is attested by the fact that in the history of philosophy, even
before Spinoza, they had been eliminated or modified one by one without affecting the main philosophic thesis of the immateriality of God. The theory of the finite extent of the
was an Aristotelian heritage in the history of philosophy, was attacked by Crescas at the beginning of the fifteenth century, as it was again attacked by Bruno about two centuries later, so that by the time of Spinoza the infinity of the universe was already treated as a philouniverse, which
* 2
sophic commonplace. The theory of celestial spheres was eliminated from consideration in respectable scientific circles with the fall of the Ptolemaic astronomy in the sixteenth century, and even before that time two important features of that theory, namely, the difference between the matter and
the motion of the celestial bodies and those of terrestrial
had been disposed of by Crescas. 3 With the elimination of the celestial spheres there would necessarily have
bodies,
to follow the elimination of the plurality of the Intelligences,
for the
val view
number of the Intelligences, according to the mediae4 itself, was determined by the number of the spheres.
one Intelligence of pure form would have to remain
But
1
still
Cf. my Crescas' Critique of Aristotle, pp. 115-117. 3 Cf. Cf. ibid., pp. 115, ii 8. ibid., pp. 118-120.
<
Cf.
Moreh Nebukim,
II, 4.
PROP. 14]

main
thesis of
221
for as long as the
God
and
for as long as the origin of the material world
as pure form remained was ex-
plained not as an act of special creation out of nothing but as a process of emanation out of the substance of God. Thus
sories
the mediaeval scheme, stripped of its non-essential accesand modified to fit the new scientific conceptions of the universe,
Spinoza as follows: There

activity
is
must have presented itself to the mind of is God, a pure form, whose sole
The product of God's thought is an which is also pure form, but in the nature of Intelligence, which there is a duality of necessity and possibility. Out of
thinking.
this Intelligence
emanates the physical universe,
its
matter
out of the possibility of the Intelligence's nature, and its form, motion, and thought out of the necessity of the Intelligence's nature.
It is this
main
thesis,
which on the whole had survived
all
the changing conceptions of the universe up to the time of Spinoza and from which the intermediary Intelligence was
eliminated only whenever emanation gave place, as, for instance, in the case of Descartes, to a special act of creation
out of nothing, that Spinoza constantly and repeatedly makes the subject of a frontal attack. 1 He does not dwell on the
absurdity of the mediaeval theories of celestial spheres or on the plurality of Intelligences, for these were already dead issues in his own time and were not essential, as we have
seen, to the
main
thesis.
He
does indeed discuss the problem
of infinity, but not especially with reference to the infinite
extent of the universe, but with reference to certain general aspects of the problem which were still vital issues in his own
it only in a letter in which he answers a addressed to him and in a scholium to a proposiquestion tion in which he refutes some unnamed opponents. 2 The
time,
and he does
Cf. above,
Chapter IV.
Cf. below,
Chapter VIII.
222

thesis,
[ETHICS,
main
attacked by him directly. He shows that if God is pure form, then the interposition of another form between God and the universe will not remove the diffi-
however,
is
culty of how matter could arise from form by the ordinary 1 process of necessary causality. As an escape from this diffi-
culty he takes the bold step of
making the material universe
proceed by necessity directly from God, with the inevitable consequence that God himself becomes material, or, to use
own terms, extension becomes an attribute of God. In a letter to Oldenburg Spinoza seems to allude to this method of reasoning leading to his conclusion with regard to extension when he says: "And, on the other hand, things which
his
they [the theologians], on account of their prejudices, regard as created, I contend to be attributes of God, and as misunderstood by them/' 2 The conclusion arrived at by Spinoza that God was material is not new in the history of philosophy. The most
notable exponents of this view in European philosophy are the Stoics, who may have perhaps arrived at their materialism, like Spinoza, as a result of a criticism of the Platonic and Aristotelian dualism. 3 Though the Stoic view was not
unknown to mediaeval Jewish philosophers, for in a work written in Arabic by an unknown Jewish or Moslem author and preserved in a Hebrew translation it is quoted in the
name
of Zeno,
i.e.,
Zeno of Citium, 4
still
ever attempted to bridge the gulf between
none of them had God and the
world by endowing God with materiality. Ibn Gabirol's Fons Vitae, to be sure, is said to have given rise to such a
Cf. above, p. 91. Epistola 6 (Opera, IV, p. 36, 11. 21-23). This explanation for the Stoic materialism has been suggested by Zeller, but Cf. Zeller, Philosophic der Gricchcn, III, i (4th edition), rejected by him.
3 *
ff. English translation: Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, pp. 127 ff. See David Kaufmann, Die Spurtn Al-Batlaj&si's in der jiidischen Religions 1
is
pp. 125
Philosophic (Budapest, 1880).
Hebrew Text,
p. 36,
11.
10
ff.
PROP. 14]

David of Dinant, but
1
223
view
in
representation of the real goes only so far as to assert, as do also

3
from being a true view of Ibn Gabirol. Ibn Gabirol

this is far
Bahya Ibn Pakuda
is
and Judah ha-Levi, that the distinction of matter and form also to be found in the Intelligences or angels, a view
which was taken over from him by Duns Scotus and his followers and maintained by them against Thomas Aquinas.
Leo Hebraeus
refers to this
view and ascribes
it
to
Plato. 4
free
himself, even according to Ibn Gabirol, was of matter. Crescas, to be sure, comes near attributing
God
extension to
God when,
it
after defining space as extension
and assuming
in
to be infinite
and the world to be
in
it,
he
support of his view the old rabbinic dictum that quotes God is the place of the world. 5 Logically, if God is the place
of the world and the place of the world is extension, God must have extension as one of His attributes. But Crescas
stops short of drawing this daring conclusion. God still continues to be to him pure form, and in the problem of creation, in order to bridge the gulf
between the immaterial God
and the material world, he has to resort to the solution of endowing God with will and purpose and design. It is said that in Bruno there is an intimation that extension is one
of God's attributes, 6 but if this really represents Bruno's reasoned-out view, then to say of Bruno, as does Pollock,
Cf. Erdmann, Grnndriss der Geschichte der Philosophic, 192 and 188. But according to Albertus Magnus, David of Dinant's view that God is "principium ma" was due to the influence of Alexander of Aphrodisias: "Alexander teriale omnium etiam in quodam libello quern fecit de Principio incorporeae et corporeae subslantiae,
1
quern secutus est quidam David de Dinanto in libro quern scripsit de TOOT/J, hoc est, de divisionibus, dicit Deum esse principium materiale omnium" (Summa Theologiae,
2
Pars
I,
Tract. IV, Quaest. 20,

I, 6.
Membrum
2,
Quaestio Incidens).
1
Hobot ha-Lebabot,
Cuzari, IV, 3.
* 4
Cf. commentaries
Jol Yehudah and Ozar Nehmad on V,
8, 6.
is
Dialoghi a" //more, III, p. 244 (Bari, 1929).

s
Cf. p. 246, where Avicebron
referred to.
6
Cf.
my
la
Crescas' Critique of Aristotle, p. 123.

11.
Pollock, Spinoza, p. 104. Cf.
De
Causa, III, p. 261,
14-18 (ed. Lagarde).
224

"he rejects the notion of formless matter"
his view.
x
[ETHICS,
is
that
wrong emphasis on
is
What
put the should have been said

to
that he rejects the notion of matterless form. Clearer than all these intimations as to an extended God is the statein a letter to
ment made by Henry More

reads:
Descartes, which
an extended thing/' 2 Spinoza, however, did not come to his view by merely adopting the statements of the Stoics or of Bruno or of More,
to be
"God seems
or by merely carrying out to its logical conclusion the hint thrown out by Crescas. He had been forced to it, as we have
shown and as
in a
previous chapter, by the logic of the situation a result of his thorough and critical examination of
the various mediaeval solutions of the problem of the rise
of matter out of an immaterial God. Finding all the solutions of this difficulty under the theory of emanation unsatisfactory, and refusing to resort to the theory of creation ex nihilo or to the theory of the co-existence of an eternal matter alongside God, he was forced to the conclusion that God
was not immaterial.
II.
PROPERTIES, ATTRIBUTES, AND
MODES
We have thus seen how the main outline of Spinoza's skeleton framework has developed out of the mediaeval framework. We shall now try to show in a similar manner
the development of the individual parts within that framework the infinity of God's attributes, the two known
attributes of extension
and thought, and the modal system
under the two known attributes.

'
Ibid.
Descartes, Correspondance, DXXXI (Oeuvres, V, p. 238, 1. 21): "Res enim extensa Deus videtur esse." Cf. Dunin-Borkowski, Der jungc DC Spinoza, pp.
2
359
*
Cf. above,
Chapter IV.
PROP. 14]
225
infinity of God's attributes is implied throughout the mediaeval discussions of the nature of God, especially in the
1 oft-repeated statement that God is indescribable. A close and almost verbal resemblance to Spinoza's statement as to the infinity of attributes is to be found in Crescas, who, in
The
discussing a certain Talmudic passage in which the excessive enumeration of divine attributes is discouraged, explains it on the ground that such an enumeration "would appear as an
2 His attempt to limit that which is infinite in number.'* Albo puts it still more directly when he says: pupil Joseph "It must be understood that the perfections which exist in
God are unlimited in number, that is to say, they are infinite with reference to their plurality." 3 The term "perfection" is used here by Albo as synonymous with "attribute." With
these mediaeval thinkers, to
separate from the world and to
whom God was immaterial and whom the attributes were
it was only logical that should insist not only upon the infinite degree of perthey fection of each attribute but also upon the infinite number
expressions of divine perfections,
of attributes. For them to say that God possessed an infinite number of attributes meant nothing more than to say that
God's powers and perfections were inexhaustible.

world,
if
But with the gradual disappearance of the separation of God and the
not their complete identification, in the Renaissance philosophy, as for instance in the philosophy of Bruno, and with the general acceptance in opposition to Aristotle of the
belief in
an
infinite
number of
finite attributes to
God
worlds, the ascription of innaturally assumed a new meaning.

it
To
the minds of
some people
of the existence of an infinite

1
must have conveyed the idea number of independent worlds.
Cf. Moreh Nebukim, I, 59. Or Adonai) I, iii, 3 (p. 24a).
'Ibkarim, II, 25.
Cf. above, p. 117.
226

"
[ETHICS,
Thus
God."
his
be constituted as
x
there must Schuller asks of Spinoza whether or not many worlds as there are attributes of
Spinoza tries to set him aright on this point. In answer to Schuller, 2 where reference is made to the SchoII,
lium to Proposition VII, Part

clear that
and
3
in other places
where
the infinite attributes are discussed, Spinoza makes it quite by infinite attributes he does not mean an infinite
number of independent
worlds, but rather an infinite
number
of aspects of one single infinite universe, analogous to the mediaeval conception of the infinite attributes of God.
The
to us.
God, however, are not known some of them we are able to affirm of God, and Only
infinite attributes of
even these, according to the mediaevals, do not tell us anything about the true essence of God. They are only inadequate terms by which we express the various ways in which
God
attributes
manifests himself through nature. The selection of which are admissible of God constitutes one
phase of the problem of attributes in mediaeval Jewish philosophy, and various lists have been drawn up by various
philosophers.
Saadia
enumerates
s
edge. Bahya Ibn Pakuda Ibn Zaddik's 6 eternity.

7
life, power, and knowlmentions existence, unity, and
existence, power, knowledge, abundance, justice, goodness, mercifulness, life,

truth.
list
contains
Judah ha-Levi, dividing attributes into actional, relational, and negational, mentions under them respectively the following groups: (a) making poor and rich, casting
1
Epistola 63. Cf. Short Treatise,
I, i,
Emunot
s
we-De'ot, II,
y
Epistola 64. note 3 (Opera, I, p. 17, 11. 33 4: Q3P1 ,^1D' ,'["!.

8,
ff.).
Hobot ha-Lebabot I, 10: lIDlp ,1R ,NM. 'Olam Katan, III (pp. 57 ff.): ,]Dm ,3'BD ,pH2C
,'n.
,T0y
,DZ>n ,1133
,rMOXD
(a)
DDK
7
Cuzari, II,
i:
,Dp131
(f)
top /JOTI
;
Dim
,
,00110 *]K ^DtfO ,T0yD1 BP11D
rriN ,'n
NIWI
01
PROP. 14]
227
down and
exalting, merciful and gracious, jealous and revengeful, strong, almighty; (b) blessed and praised, glorified, holy, exalted and extolled; (c) living, one, first and last.
Abraham Ibn Daud mentions eight:

*
unity, truth, existence,
eternity,
"We
may
made
to
knowledge, will, and power, but concludes: do not contend that there are no other attributes which
life,
be similarly affirmed of God, provided only that it be clear that they are to be understood in such a way as
2 Descartes likewise imply no plurality in His essence/' enumerates a similar list of attributes "in so far as they may
the light of nature alone/' 3 His list mentions eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, the source of all goodness
be
known by
and
truth, creator of
all
things,
and
infinite perfection.
attributes of
call
Spinoza does not altogether disregard these traditional God. But they are not to him what he would
"the proper attributes of
God"
in the specific sense in
which he uses the term "attribute," namely, "that which

sence."
the intellect perceives of substance, as if constituting its es5 They are called by him propria y "that is to say,
without them
God would
indeed be no God, but
still it is
not they that constitute God: for they reveal nothing of the character of substance, through which alone God exists." 6 The contrast between attributes and properties is also implied in his opening statement in the Appendix to the First Part of the Ethics, where he divides the contents of the First Part into two problems, namely, (i) "the nature of God and
(2) its properties."
7
By "the
(p. 52):
nature of
God" he means
there the attributes.

'
Similarly in the Tractates de Intellectus

,yTIY!
a
M
3 <
Emunah Ramah,
II,
iii
/PIP!
,TROn ,NXO:n ,JlDKn /
,nmn.
ibid. (p. 56).
Principia Philosophiae, I, 22. 28. Short Treatise, I, 2,
Ethics, I, Def. 4.
6
7
Short Treatise,
I, 3,
i,
and note
i.
Cf. above, p. 112.
228
[ETHICS,
Emendatione he says of "one" and "infinite" that "these are not attributes of God which set forth His essence."
x
These properties are further described by Spinoza either as being "an extraneous denomination, such as that He exists
immutable, etc.," or as 2 What he means here having "reference to His activity." by an "extraneous denomination" is not quite clear. But
through himself,
is
eternal, one,
a passage in the Cogitata Metaphysica may throw light upon In that passage, using the traditional term "attribute" rather loosely in the sense of his own term "property," he
it.
enumerates the following eleven properties: eternity, unity,

greatness, immutability, simplicity,
life, understanding, will, concurrence. These, he says, are divided power, creation, by some into incommunicable (incommunicabilia) and com-
a division which he charmunicable (communicabilia) 3 acterizes as "more nominal than real," for all of them are
to be
incommunicable or homonymous, inasmuch as there

in their
can be no similarity
meaning when applied
to
God
and when applied to other beings. Spinoza himself divides them into those which explain God's "active essence"
(actuosam ejus essentiam), such as "understanding, will, life, omnipotence, etc.," and those which only explain "His mode of existence" (ejus modi existendi), such as "unity, eternity,
Now, in his correspondence, Spinoza speaks of the properties as being explanations of the expression 5 necessary existence or of the identity of essence and exist6 ence, the latter of which, as
necessity, etc."
we have shown,
7
is itself
derived
from the nature of necessary existence.

1
Taking, therefore,
I, 2,
76, note z (Opera, II, p. 29).
Short Treatise^
29.
This distinction has been traced by Freudenthal to Thomas Aquinas and HeereCf. "Spinoza
.
boord.
Zcller
und
die Scholastik,"
in Philosophische dufsatze,
Eduard
gewidmetjV. n6.
Cogitata Metaphysica, II,

5
n.
6
Epistola 35.
Epistola 83.
Cf. above, pp. 126
ff.
PROP. 14]
all

we may conclude
is
229
that the "ex-
traneous denomination
these passages together, "
an explanation of God's
"mode
of existence" or of the expression "necessary existence/* And thus Spinoza's properties correspond to what Mai-
monides described as
2
(i)
1 explanation of a name, and (2)
actions,
both of which are distinguished by him from essenIn a letter to Oldenburg, evidently referring of attributes, Spinoza writes: "I say that
tial attributes.
to these lists
many
and
God,
I
all
attributes which they [the theologians of his time] others at least who are known to me attribute to
3 By "things created" regard as things created." (creaturas) he undoubtedly means what Maimonides calls
"actions."
According to Joel the distinction between attributes and

properties referred to by Spinoza
tion
made
is analogous to the distincCrescas between essential attributes and attriby
butes merely as intellectual conceptions. 4 The analogy is wrong on several grounds. First, the intellectually conceived attributes of Crescas
may have
s
a closer relation to
Spinoza's definition of attributes

properties.
than to his definition of

attri-
Second, Crescas' intellectually conceived
butes imply a certain conceptual theory of universals which Spinoza's properties do not. Third, Crescas' intellectually
conceived attributes, as I have shown, are one of several forms of anti-realistic conceptions of attributes in Jewish 6 philosophy, of which Maimonides' "explanation of a name"
is
an extreme type, and which, incidentally,

1
may
be traced to
Moreh Ncbukim,
Ibid.,
I,
I, 51.
*
3
52.
Joel,
Epistola 6 (Opera, IV, p. 36, 11. 19-21). Zur Genesis der Lehre Spinoza s, pp. 19
Cf. above, p. 152.
ff.;
Joachim,
A Study oj the Ethics
of Spinoza, p. 42, n.
s
Cf.
my
n.s.,
Review,
"Crescas on the Problem of Divine Attributes" in Jewish Quarterly VII (1916), pp. 1-44, 175-221. Cf. above, pp. 150 ff.
230

by
Aristotle
also as the explanation of a
[ETHICS,
the nominal definition mentioned
and described
by him
name. 1
The
fact that
Spinoza divides properties into those which are explanations of the expression necessary existence and those which describe actions shows quite clearly that they are traceable to what Maimonides describes as explanations of a name and
actions.
But even
as propria, not all the attributes that
have been
used by the mediaevals with reference to God are of interest to Spinoza. Many of them are only adjectives which happen
to
have been applied to God
in the traditional literature
of
religion.
Spinoza passes them by and confines himself only " We shall not to those which are of a philosophic character.
trouble ourselves very
much about
2
have of God, but

philosophers can
we
tell
shall only inquire briefly into
the ideas that people what the

"
so-called philoattributes which do
us about it."
Of these
sophic propria, or, as
he
calls
them
here,
not pertain to God," he reproduces a list which concludes with the phrase "and so forth": "A being existing through or of itself, cause of all things, omniscient, almighty, eternal,
3 simple, infinite, the highest good, of infinite compassion." In a foot-note to this passage, he describes these attributes
which do not pertain

be attributed to
to
God
as "certain
modes which may
God"
either in consideration of both his
known
attributes, such as eternal, self-subsisting, infinite, cause of all things, immutable, or in consideration of the
attribute of thought only, such as omniscient, wise, etc., or in consideration of extension only, such as omnipresent,
fills all,
etc.
list
of propria under the loose
name
of attri-
butes
is
given in the Cogitata
unity, greatness, immutability, simplicity,

1
Metaphysica, namely, eternity, life, understand-
Analytica Posteriora > II, 10, 93 b, 29-37. Short Treatisf, I, 7, 2.
Ibid.
PROP. 14]
231
1 In a letter to Hudde ing, will, power, creation, concurrence. he enumerates four propria, eternal, simple, infinite, indivisi-
of which are reduced by him to the single property of 2 In a later letter to Hudde he refers not only perfection.
ble, all
"the remaining similar 3 by him to one property. properties In a letter to Tschirnhaus he mentions as properties the asto these four properties but also to
"
and
to their reduction
He exists necessarily, that He is unique, immutable, infinite, etc." 4 In the Appendix to the First Part of the Ethics there is an indirect reference to properties, of which he mentions necessary existence, one, acting by the
sertions "that
necessity of His
in
own
nature, cause of
5
Him, predestination. being given by him in the Short 'Treatise^ the cause of all things, divine providence, and divine prelist
things, all things of three propria is namely, that God is
all
destination.
in traditional philosophy had passed do not according to Spinoza reveal anything of the nature of God. Even in mediaeval philoso-
These propria which

^
for divine attributes,
phy they were taken,

understood
as a rule, as
homonymous terms
to be
in a sense entirely unrelated to their

It
meaning.
was
well, indeed, for the
ordinary mediaevals to give

at this point, for
up
to
their inquiry
about the nature of
God
them God was absolutely distinct from the universe, as pure form must be distinct from matter, and consequently what they called attributes could not tell us anything of the nature or essence of God or what God is. They told us only what He is not or what He does in the world the so-called
1 Cogitata Metaphysica, II, I-H. The origin of this list in various Latin sources given by Freudenthal, "Spinoza und die Scholastik," in Philosophische Aujsatoe
is
Eduard
1 5
Zeller
gewidmet, p. no.
*
Epistola 35.
Epistola 36.
Epistola 83.
Appendix
to Ethics,
I,
I.
Short 'Treatise,
3, 5,
and
6.
232
[ETHICS,
negative and actional interpretations of divine attributes. But according to Spinoza God is as material as the world>
and His essence,
therefore, apart
from His actions, does
re-
veal itself in the nature of the physical universe. God or substance, to be sure, is unknown to us in His infinite fullness,
and even that part of Him which is known to us is known to us only through attributes which are not substance itself but
only "that which intellect perceives of substance/'
2
Still,
the intellect perceives them "as if constituting its essence/' 3 that is to say, as if constituting the essence of substance.
While the mediaevals considered the essence of God unknown, because the knowledge gained of God's essence is
not so positive as the knowledge that one may gain, according to their theory of knowledge, of the essence of other
beings, Spinoza considered the essence of God in so far as it could be known through nature as positive as, and even
more
knowledge one may gain, according of knowledge, of the essence of any partheory ticular being. One must therefore go, according to Spinoza, to the physical universe, to consider its ways, and to be wise
positive than, the
to his
own
as to the nature of
If
God.
are to attempt to reconstruct hypothetically the of Spinoza's study of nature and of his reasoning process which ultimately led him to the discovery of the two known
we
attributes of
Aristotelian
God, we must assume that he started with the method of classifying being. Three classifica-
tions of being are to be found in Aristotle, namely, the ten
categories, substance and accident, and matter and form. Of these three classifications, the first must have been dis-
missed by Spinoza outright as something unuseful for his

purpose.
1
Not only did

I,
it
seem to him, as
to others after
Moreh Ncbukim,
Ethics,
I,
52.
J
Dcf.
4.
Ibid.
PROP. 14]
233
him, to be logically faulty, but it is also reducible to lower forms, for it is based upon the distinction of substance and
the nine categories outside of substance being nothing but an enumeration of various accidents casually 1 The classification of substance and accident, or selected.
accident,
rather of substance and mode, to be sure, is used by Spinoza 2 as the ultimate classification of being in his own system, and rightly so, since in his own system only one substance is
assumed.
In the system of Aristotle, however, where three
kinds of substances are assumed, the classification of substance and accident could not be ultimate, since substance
presupposes already the distinction of matter and form, for the three substances in Aristotle are matter, form, and concrete things composed of matter and form. 3 Spinoza must
have therefore started his revision of the mediaeval scheme with the last of the Aristotelian classifications of being,
namely, matter and form.
Then as a next step, we may assume, Spinoza must have modified Aristotle's classification of matter and form to suit
particular theory of the materiality of God. In Aristotle, as we have seen, matter and form are substances,
his
own
each of them existing "in itself." Though in concrete com4 posite things form does not exist "in itself," for it is inseparable from matter and cannot exist apart from matter, still form can also be pure and exist "in itself" apart from
matter, as in the case of his own God. To Spinoza, however, form could never be pure and exist apart from matter, for even God, he has already shown, must be material. Matter
and form,
therefore, could not be substances;
they could be
only attributes of substance,
such substance, and that

1
is
and there could be only one God. Particular things are not
*
Cf. above, p. 62.
Cf. above, p. 67.
Cf. above, pp. 63 Cf. above, p. 68.
f.
234
CETHICS,
That they cannot be substances he has already shown from the very same terms used in the mediaeval defisubstances.
nition of substance.
1
Then Spinoza must have taken one further step and changed the terms "matter'' and "form" into "extension" " and thought." The reason for his doing so will become clear to us when we consider the ambiguity of the old terms matand form. In Aristotle and throughout the Middle Ages matter and form were correlative terms. They were applied
ter
simultaneously to everything within the hierarchy of beings that lie between the lowest matter and the highest form.
by Spinoza in his own with reference to the two known specific and restricted sense attributes of God without leading to some confusion. It
They could not
therefore be used
was
in
fact this multifariousness of
meaning of the terms
matter and form that led mediaeval philosophers to classify
them according to their different applications and to label them by certain distinguishing adjectives, so that in Thomas Aquinas there are no less than fifty-one varieties of matter and no less than one hundred and twenty-one varieties of form. 2 In order therefore to avoid confusion, Spinoza had to find certain equivalents for matter and form which would have the traditional sanction of expressing the same contrast and which would also stand respectively for one traditional specific matter and for one traditional specific form. Such two terms he found in extension and thought. The
common matter
Aristotle
fact,
it is
underlying the four elements, according to
and
the
his
first
commentators, is something extended; in kind of matter that is extended, and hence
could be called extension.

opinion
1
There
is
indeed a difference of
among
his
mediaeval commentators as to whether

"Materia" under
c
Cf. above, Chapter III.
Cf. L. Schiitz, 'Thomas-Lexikon (1895):
and "Forma" un-
derb.
PROP. 14]
235
extension was the underlying common matter of the four elements itself or whether it was a sort of form of a still
further inextended matter, in which case the underlying
common matter of the four elements would
be
itself composed
of matter and form, respectively known as prime matter (materi a prim a) and corporeal form (forma corporeitatis).
The
roes,
latter
was the opinion of the leading Arabic and Jewish
philosophers, such as Alfarabi, Avicenna, Algazali, Aver-
Joseph Ibn addik, Abraham Ibn Daud, and Joseph Ibn Aknin, though there was a difference of opinion among
them as to the nature of the forma corporeitatis. The origin and history of this controversy about the forma corporeitatis have been discussed by me elsewhere. Crescas, however,
1
argues for the elimination of the inextended prime matter and makes the forma corporeitatis or extension itself at once
the prime matter and the underlying
common matter
of the
four elements. 2
also held, according to the testimony of Isaac Abrabanel, by his son Judah Abra3 banel, better
The same view was
known as Leo Hebraeus, author of the Dialoghi cT Amore. However it is, the common matter underlying the
four elements
inseparable from
as extension.
was conceived to have extension as something it, on which account it could be spoken of
further justification for the substitution of extension for matter by Spinoza was the fact that Descartes
defined matter as extension, 4 though, perhaps, not in the same sense in which Crescas identified the two. The reason
for Spinoza's substitution of
thought for form
ous, for the highest form or God is and throughout the Middle Ages as pure thought.
1
quite obvispoken of by Aristotle

is
Cf.
my
Crescas' Critique of Aristotle in the notes
on pp. 579-590, of which
summary
3
given on pp. 99-101. Ibid.) pp. 102-104, 261-263; notes 26-32 on pp. 598-602.
is
Ibid.) p. 600.
Principia Philosophiae, II, 4, and
cf.
Spinoza, Epistola 83.
236
[ETHICS,
But "extension" and "thought" are abstract terms which

"the
intellect perceives of substance, as if constituting its
1
essence."
It is
only through their respective activities that
they become manifest to our senses. Now, in Aristotle and throughout the Middle Ages God as pure thought was conceived as an active principle. Thought meant thinking, and that process of thinking is always active and is never in a
state of quiescence.
This
is
the trend of Aristotle's stateit
ments when he says of God's thought that

because
it
"thinks
itself
.
.
.
shares the nature of the object of thought. For that which is capable of receiving the object of thought,
is thought. And it is active when it possesses Therefore the latter (possession) rather than the former (receptivity) is the divine element which thought
i.e.
the essence,
this object.
seems to contain."
Maimonides re-echoes these statements
when he
and the
is
declares that
intelligibile"
in action." 3
"God
is
the intellectus^ the intelligent,

is
and that "God
an
intellect
which
Extension or matter, however, is difalways ferent, according to Aristotle and the mediaevals and also 4 It is set it is never active, it is always passive. Descartes;
into motion by an external agent, which ultimately terminates in God, who is the cause of motion in matter, but who is himself not matter and is not in motion. The view is most
clearly set forth
by Maimonides: "The
principles of
any
individual
compound substance are matter and form, and there must needs be an agent, that is to say, a mover which
substratum
in
sets the
motion, and thereby renders
it
pre-
disposed to receive a certain form. The agent which thus predisposes the matter of a certain individual being is called
1
Ethics,
a J *
I,
Def. 4.
Metaphysics, XII, 7, io72b, 19-23.
Moreh Nebukim,
I,
68.
cf.
Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae, II, Prop. 12, and
Descartes, Principia
Philosophiat) II, 36.
PROP. 14]
237
the immediate mover. Here the necessity arises of inquiring into the nature of motion, the moving agent and the thing
moved.
But this has already been explained sufficiently; and the opinion of Aristotle may be formulated in the words
that matter
is
not the cause of
its
own motion.
2
This
is
the
important proposition which leads the existence of the prime mover."
to the investigation of
Spinoza accepts the old philosophic view with regard to God's thought that it is the act of thinking and that God is therefore an intellect which is always in action. But he disagrees with the old philosophic conception of matter as something inert. In one of his letters he directly criticizes
Descartes for maintaining that the variety of things can be
deduced "from extension in no other way than by supposing that this was the effect produced in extension by motion which was started by God," 3 and gives as his own view that it must be "explained through an attribute, which expresses
eternal
and
infinite essence/'
is
Since according to his
own
ex-
view extension
tension
an attribute of
less
God just
as thought
is,
than thought, and just as is so extension is motion, not motion imthought thinking parted to it by an external agent, but something which ex-
must be active no
presses the activity of its own nature. These actional aspects of the attributes of extension and thought are what Spinoza
calls
1
immediate
infinite
I,
modes.
21-25; XII,
6,
Cf. Metaphysics,
3, 9843,
107 ib, 28-30.
Moreh Nebukim^
II,
p.
315. * Letter to Tschirnhaus (Epistola 83). Spinoza's statement that "matter is badly defined by Descartes as extension" is not to be taken literally as an objection to Descartes' identification of matter with extension.
It is to
Introduction, Prop. 25; Crescas' Critique of Aristotle , Letter from Tschirnhaus (Epistola 82).
be taken
in con-
nection with the entire letter of Tschirnhaus and as referring especially to the latter's restatement of the opinion of Descartes that the variety of things can be
deduced "from extension
in no other way than by supposing that this was the effect produced in extension by motion which was started by God." Cf. also the definition of matter in Cogitata Metaphysica, II, 10 (Opera, I, p. 269, 11. 31-33).
238

infinite
[ETHICS,
The immediate
Spinoza
(2)
mode
of thought
is
designated by
in four
ways:
(i) Intellect (Intellectus , Verstaari)*
2 Absolutely infinite intellect (intellectus absolute infinitus). 3 (3) An infinite power of thought (potentia infinita cogitandi). (4) The idea of God (idea Dei).* The term intellectus in the
two designations is to be understood here not only in the sense of the thinking subject but also in the sense of the act of thinking, that is to say, not only in the sense of the
first
intellect, vovs, but also in the sense of intellection, j/irjcns, on the principle reproduced by Maimonides as the common
opinion of the philosophers that "God is the intellectus > the intelligent, and the intelligibile" and that "all intellect is
identical with its action; the intellect in action
different
is
not a thing
is
from
is
its
action, for the true nature

s
and essence of
also re-
the intellect
comprehension/'
6
This principle
is
produced by Spinoza. to Spinoza there is no potential

tellect is actual, 7 it will
When
it
recalled that according
intellect
but that every

subject,
is
in-
become
clear
how
the term intellectus ,
which
literally
means the understanding
used by
of the act of understanding. When, therein the third designation he describes the infinite mode fore, of thought as potentia infinita cogitandi, the term potentia
in the sense
him
not to be taken in the sense of potentiality or faculty or the power to do something but in the sense of the power displayed in doing something, for ordinarily, as says Maiis
monides,
"when we assume
the intellect to be potential,
we
necessarily distinguish two things, the potential and the potential intelligible object." 8
1
intellect
3 <
s
Letter from Schuller (Epistola 63), and Short Treatise, I, 9. * Letter to Schuller (Epistola 64). Epistola 32 (Opera, IV, p. 173,
Ethics, II, Props. 3, 4, Moreh Nebukim, I, 68.
1.
18).
and
8.
Cf.
I,
Prop. 21, Demonst.
6
?
Ethics, II, Prop. 7, Schol.
Cf. below, Vol. II, pp. 24, 45. Cf. below, Vol. II, pp. 24, 45.
Ethics, II, Prop. 48, Schol.,
and Ethics,
I,
Prop. 31, Schol.
Moreh Nebukim,
I,
68.
PROP. 14]

is
239
The mode
active sense of the term intellectus
made
clear
by
Spinoza himself in his description of the immediate
infinite
of thought in the Short Treatise. He says that "it has been from all eternity, and to all eternity will remain im-
mutable.
clearly
...
It has
one function, namely, to understand

all
x The emthings at all times/' phasis in these statements is on the terms "eternity," "immutable/' and "at all times," and they reflect the following
and
distinctly
statements of Maimonides:
"Now
is
it
which always there is in Him at no time a mere potentiality, that He does not comprehend at one time, and is without comprehension at another time, but He is an intellect in action always." 2
is
God
an
intellect
in action,
has been proved that and that

. .
.
Spinoza continues to describe there the function of the

finite
in-
mode
of thought as that "which produces invariably

satisfaction,
an
to
infinite
and most perfect

it
which cannot omit
do what
does."
This seems to
reflect Aristotle's de-
scription of the constant activity of the First Principle or God: "And its life is such as the best which we enjoy, and
enjoy for but a short time. For it is ever in this state (which we cannot be), since its actuality is also pleasure and
.
the act of contemplation
is
what
is
most pleasant and best."
The expression idea Dei we take to be the equivalent of the expression intellectus absolute infinitus as a description of the immediate infinite mode of thought. These two expressions, however, indicate
two
different aspects of that

intellectus, as
immediate
infinite
mode.
The term
we have
seen, literally refers to the thinking subject, the vovs in Aristotle's enumeration of the threefold aspect of God's
thinking, namely, the

1
j>oDs,
the
2
v&rjcns,
and the voyrbv or

I,
Short treatise, Short Treatise ,
I, 9, I, 9,
3.
Moreh Nebukim,
68.
3.
Metaphysics , XII,
7, loysb, 14-24.
240
voovjjitvov.

The term
idea in idea Dei
is
[ETHICS,
a transliteration of
elSos in the specific sense of eldos vorjT&v (forma intelligibilis)* and hence it reflects the object of thought, the vor\rbv or
voovnevov in Aristotle's threefold enumeration.

as in
God,
according to Aristotle,
himself, the thinking subject, object of thought are identical,

absolute infinitus
But inasmuch Maimonides, and Spinoza the act of thinking, and the
the expressions intellectus
identical in meaning, both designating the immediate infinite mode of thought. That the relation between the "idea of God" and the "ab-
and
idea Dei are
solutely infinite intellect"

like that of object of
of course, in
God
was conceived by Spinoza to be thought to the thinking subject, which, are identical, may be shown from the fol.
lowing passage. In Proposition IV of Ethics , II, Spinoza says can be one only." In the Demthat "the idea of God
.
.
onstration of this proposition he proves it by the contention that "the infinite intellect comprehends nothing but the
attributes of
in
God and His
affections,"
it
which are
all
united
God
as one.
This passage makes
considered by as the object of thought to the with which it is identical. Another proofthinking subject text may perhaps be found also in the following passage:
the "infinite intellect"
"idea of
God" was
quite clear that the Spinoza to be related to
"We
must remember,
besides, that our

is
mind,
in so far as it
a part of the infinite intellect of truly perceives things, God (Corol. Prop. XI, Part II), and therefore it must be that the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as true as
2 If in this passage the plural (Dei ideae)." "Dei ideae" means the ideas of God in the "infinite intellect
the ideas of
God
of
it
God"
is
rather than the ideas of
God
in
"our mind," then
quite evident that the relation between the "idea of

Cf. below, Vol. II, pp. 46-48, 93.
Metaphysics, XII, 9, 10753, 3-5.

Ethics, II, Prop. 43, Schol., end.
PROP. 14]
241
God" and
the "infinite intellect of God/' i.e., the absolutely infinite intellect, is like that between the clear and distinct
ideas of our
lation
ject,
mind and our mind, that is to say, like the rebetween the object of thought and the thinking subwhich two are identical in God.
students of Spinoza take the idea Dei as the mediate infinite mode of thought corresponding to the fades totius
universi
Some
extension. 1
which they take as the mediate infinite mode of This view, however, is dictated only by the
necessity of finding a special mediate infinite mode of thought in order to round out the symmetry of the modal system.
No
statement
in
Spinoza could be found which would
defi-
nitely corroborate it. On the contrary, the following passage in the Short Treatise would seem to contradict it. Says
Spinoza:
"And
since, as a
matter of
fact,
nature or
God
is
one being of which infinite attributes are predicated, and which contains in itself all the essences of created things, it
produced in thought infinite idea (oneyndige Idea), which comprehends ob2 The "injective the whole of nature just as it is realiter"
is
necessarily follows that of all this there
an
idea" in this passage undoubtedly refers to the idea and from the context of the passage it is quite clear Dei,
finite
that
this
cannot be a mediate mode of thought, for right after statement Spinoza says definitely: "Wherefore also, in
it
the ninth chapter of the First Part, tion created immediately by God."
I
3
called this idea a crea-
Furthermore, the use
of the idea Dei in the Demonstration of Proposition XXI of Ethics, I, leaves no doubt that it is an immediate rather than
a mediate
1
mode
of thought. 4
Pollock, Spinoza, pp. 187-188, referring also to Ed.
Zeitsehrijt
Bohmer, "Spinozana," in fur Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 42 (1863), pp. 107-116;
1
Joachim,
3
i
Study oj the Ethics of Spinoza, p. 94. Short Treatise, Appendix II, 4 (Opera, I, p.
Ibid. (p. 117,
11.
17,
11.
24-29).
Cf. below, p. 378.
29-31; p. 607,
10).
242

infinite
[ETHICS,
The immediate
Spinoza
in
mode of extension
Motion.
1
is
designated by
rest.
3
two ways:
(i)
(2)
Motion and
The addition of rest to motion must have been suggested to " him by Descartes, who speaks of motion and rest as two 3 Whether Descartes diverse modes of a body in motion." meant by this addition that rest was a real entity, himself
or whether he used
tion
it
which has been raised
only as a rhetorical flourish, is a quesin connection with another pas-
4 But it would seem that Spinoza had sage in Descartes. taken it to mean something positive, in opposition to Aris-
totle
and the mediaevals,
to
whom
rest
was only the privation
of motion. 5
The positive character of rest is affirmed by when he says that "as is self-evident, the same force Spinoza
required to give a body at rest a certain velocity as is required to bring the same body with that given velocity to
is
6
rest/*
or
quantity of motion.
sistance
when he says that "by force we understand the ... In bodies at rest by force of rewe understand the quantity of rest." 7 It is interest-
ing to note that Crescas in his criticism of Aristotle similarly maintains, though in a different sense, that there is a quantity of rest as there
is
a quantity of motion. 8
It
has been
suggested that by motion and rest Spinoza means energy in motion and energy in position, or kinetic and potential
9
energy.
Letter from Schuller (Epistola 63), and Short Treatise, I, 9. Short Treatise, 1, 2, 19, note 7 (Opera, I, p. 25, 11. 26-27); II, notes to Preface; 6 (Opera, I, p. 90, 11. 26-27); U, 20, II, 19, 4, note 4 (Opera, I, p. 98, 1. 35); Appendix II, 15 (Opera, I, p. 120, 1. 24); Ethics, I, Prop. 32, Corol. 2; Epistola 64;
1
Meyer's Preface to Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae (Opera,

3
I, p.
132,
1.
13).
Principia Philosophiae, II, 27.

Pollock, Spinoza, p.
no.
II,
Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae,

Ibid., Prop. 22,
Physics, IV, 12, 22ib, 12-13. Def. 8 (2).
Demonst., and Prop. 37, Corol. Cf. E. Schmitt, Die unendliche
Modi
bei
Spinoza (Leipzig, 1910),
Cf.
my
p. 47, n. 2. Crescas' Critique of Aristotle, pp. 287-288.
Pollock, Spinoza, p. 113.
PROP. 14]
243
In the history of philosophy an immediate creation of God has been sometimes called a son of God. Thus Philo describes the intelligible world,
tion of
which was an immediate crea-
God and
created by
Him
from eternity, as a son of
God, whereas time, which is not an immediate creation of God but is the offspring of the cosmos, is described by him
God. 1 This designation has gone over to Christian theology, and Spinoza refers to the Christian side
as a grandson of
of
it
elsewhere in his works. 2
But
Philo's statement
is
also
3 reproduced by Azariah dei Rossi, and it is also reflected d* Amore.* Following tradition, in Leo Hebraeus' Dialoghi
immediacy of these two modes by saying of motion that it is "a son, product, or effect created immediately by God," and of understandtherefore, Spinoza characterizes the
infinite
ing that it "is also a son, product, or immediate creation of 5 God, created by Him from all eternity/'
Spinoza's God, though He can no longer be contrasted with the universe as the immaterial with the material, can
still
be contrasted with
it
as the simple
whole with the ag-
gregate whole. His God, as we shall show in the next chapter, is not identical with the physical universe. He transcends
it
in a certain special sense of the
term transcendance. 6
And
so, the aggregate totality of the physical universe, in so far as it is the necessary result of the activity of God's attributes
finite
of extension and thought, is called by Spinoza also an inmode of God, but in order to differentiate it from the
it
other infinite modes he calls

distinction between
Quod Deus
a mediate infinite mode. This

infinite
immediate and mediate
modes,
Sit Immutabilis, VI, 31.

I,
Cogitata Mctaphysica,
10;
Epistola 73; Ethics, IV, Prop. 68, Schol.

(ed. Cassel).
'Enayim, Imrc Binah y Ch. 4, p. 100 Diahghi d'Amorc t III, p. 244 (Bari, 1929).
'or
Me
Short Tnatisf,
I, 9,
2-3.
Cf. below, p. 322.
244
[ETHICS,
however, does not occur in all the writings of Spinoza. In the Short Treatise he does not mention it. On the contrary,
the distinction drawn there
finite
is
not between two kinds of inas
in
modes but rather between infinite modes, extension and understanding in thought, and
motion
particular
things, the former of which are immediately created by God whereas the latter are said to be created by God by a sub-
sidiary instrumental cause.
God
is
therefore called
by him
the proximate cause of the infinite modes but the remote But the cause, in a certain sense, of the particular things.
1
distinction between
is
immediate and mediate
infinite
modes
referred to several times in the Ethics?
and a mediate
in a letter to
infinite
mode
is
specifically
named by Spinoza
to that
Schuller.'
The name given by Spinoza

is
mediate
infinite
mode
"the face of the whole universe" (jades
totius universi).*
The phraseology
Biblical
manner
of this expression is reminiscent of the of describing the totality or wholeness of
a certain extent of territory. Thus say "over the entire earth/' it says
when
the Bible wants to
"upon
the face of
all
the
earth," which in the Vulgate is translated by super faciem totius terrae (Dan. 8, 5), or by super faciem universae terrae
(Gen.
(II
7, 3, I
1
Sam. 30,
Zech.
16), or
by super faciem omnis
terrae
Sam.
8, 8,
5, 3).
The term fades may
also reflect
the Greek Trp6<rwjrov in the sense of "person," for the Latin " 5 " has acquired the fades as well as the Hebrew word for face
meaning of "person" under the influence of the Greek term. Accordingly the fades totius universi may mean the whole
universe taken as an individual, in conformity with Spinoza's statement that "we may easily conceive the whole of
1
Short Treatise,
Ethics,
I,
I,
3,
2 (8).
But
cf.
Ethics,
I,
Prop. 28, Schol.
Prop. 23, Demonst.; Prop. 28, Schol.; Appendix (Opera, II, p. 80,
3
1.
17).
t
Ibid.
D.
Epistola 64.
PROP. 14]

l
245
nature to be one individual/*
In coining or adopting this
expression for the mediate modes, Spinoza may have also " " faces been influenced by the Cabalistic term (parzufim, from 7rp6(ra?7roj>), which stands for the mediate emanations
from the Infinite (En Sof) following from Him through the mediacy of the Sefirot. Abraham Herrera in his Puerto, del
y
Cielo refers to these mediate
emanations as the "faces of the
reads:
universe of the infinite." In the Spanish original, the phrase 2 In the Hebrew "parzupim del mundo del ynfinito."
version, the
is
same term "parzupim/' or rather "parzufim,"
In the abridged Latin version made from the He4 brew, the phrase reads: "Personae Systematis(,) Infiniti." Whether Spinoza had before him the Spanish original in
used. 3
manuscript or the Hebrew version printed

1655, twenty
ler,
in
Amsterdam
in
years prior to the writing of his letter to Schul-
dated "29 Julii, 1675," where the phrase "facies totius universi" occurs, it can be easily seen how Herrera's description of his mediate emanations by the phrase "parzupim of
suggested to him the phrase universi" as a description of his own mediate "facies totius
the universe of the infinite
infinite
"
mode.
" is exexpression "the face of the whole uni verse himself as meaning "the whole universe plained by Spinoza
The
which, although it varies in infinite ways, yet remains always the same/' s This explanation, it seems to me, may refer to
two principles
In the
1 2
in Spinoza's philosophy.
first
to
place,
it
may
del Cielo
refer
to the
Cartesian and
Scholium
Lemma
7, after Prop. 13 of Ethics^ II.
Cf. Livro Quarto de
La Puerta
De Abraham Cohen
de Htrrera y Cap. 3,
fol.
HAI'M
3
38b. "
Library of the "Portugeesch Israelietisch Seminarium ETS in Amsterdam. A copy of this passage was made for me through the courtesy
in the
J. S.
MS.
of the Librarian, Dr.
da Silva Rosa.
Sha'arha-Shamayitn,ll,3'. *)1D Porta Cce/orum, II, 3, p. 45.

Kpistola 64.
JW
246
[ETHICS,
Spinozistic principle of the preservation of the proportion of motion and rest. 1 According to this principle, the preservation of the proportion of motion and rest in the parts
composing the body of an individual
results in the preser-
vation of the form (forma) 2 or shape (figurd)* of that individual as a whole. Consequently the preservation of the
proportion of motion and rest in the particular parts which compose the physical universe and constitute it as an individual whole will preserve the face (fades), i.e., the form (forma) and shape (figura), of the universe as a whole. As
we may
ual,
Spinoza says elsewhere: "Thus, if we advance ad infinitum y easily conceive the whole of nature to be one individ-
whose
parts, that
is
to say, all bodies, differ in infinite
4 ways without any change of the whole individual." " In the second place, it may refer to the principle of the
order and interdependence of nature as a whole (totius naturae ordo et cohaerentia) , s fades thus meaning ordo et
cohaerentia.
"
This principle
is
also
spoken of by Spinoza as
"the order of the whole of nature or the connection of

causes'" (prdo totius naturae, sive
causarum connexio)? or as
the fixed and unchangeable order of nature or the chain of natural events" (fixux et immutabilis naturae ordo sive rerum
"
naturae concatenations or as "the concatenation of causes" (concatenatio causarum)* With reference to this principle,
too, nature as a
whole
may
be considered as an individual
as the
consisting of parts,
"inasmuch
power of nature
all
is
simply the aggregate of the powers of

See
her individual
Lemma
7, after
Prop. 13 of Ethics,
II.
Cf. below, Vol. II, p. 69, n. 4.
EthicSy IV, Prop. 39,
Demonst.
See Axiom 3 preceding
Lemma
4, after
Prop. 13 of Ethics,
II.
Scholium to
6
^
Lemma
7, after Prop. 13 of Ethics, II.
tfractatus Thcologico-Politicus,
Ch. 16 (Opera, III, p. 191,
11.
5-6).
Vractatus Theo/ogico-Po/iticus, Ch. 3 (Opera, III, p. 45,

Ibid.,
11.
34-35).
Ch. 4 (Opera,
III, p. 58,
1.
21).
PROP. 14]
x
247
Now, this order of nature, according to Spinoza, may be explained either by the attribute of thought or by the attribute of extension, according as the compocomponents/'
nent parts of the universe are considered either as modes of
2 thought or as modes of extension.
By
the
same token, we
Spinoza the order or the face of be also explained by the joint may activity of both attributes, if the component parts of the universe are considered as modes of both thought and
may
infer that according to
the whole universe
extension.
Consequently, the mediate infinite mode designated by Spinoza as "the face of the whole universe/' if taken with
reference to the principle of the preservation of the proportion of motion and rest, will be a mode of extension only,
but
if
the whole of nature, will be a
taken with reference to the principle of the order of mode of both extension and
thought. As Spinoza does not say that "the face of the whole universe" is a mode of extension only and as he
nowhere
verse"
is
specifically
mentions a mediate
infinite
mode
of
thought, we may conclude
that "the face of the whole uni-
a mediate infinite
mode
of both extension and
thought. In our presentation of the system of infinite modes we have in some respects parted from the interpretations
which one may find in the Spinoza literature, and in some other respects we have placed ourselves on the side of one class of interpreters as against that of another class. 3 Among
the interpreters of Spinoza there are some who take the "face of the whole universe" to be only a mode of exten1
Ibid.,
>
Ch. 16 (Opera,
classification
III, p. 189,
11.
21-23).
For a
of the various interpretations of infinite modes, see

5
ff.
E. Schmitt, Die uncndliche Modi bei Spinoza (Leipzig, 1910), pp.
248
1
[ETHICS,
sion,
but in order to preserve the symmetry of extension and thought, they supply by conjecture the missing mediate
infinite
mode
to
fill
of thought out of other parts of Spinoza's

Spinozistic
expressions have been borthat lacuna in Spinoza's list of infinite up modes: (i) God's idea (idea Dei). 2 (2) "The constant form of reasoned thought or Necessary Logical laws." 3 Supwritings.
Two
rowed
port for the
first
conjecture
is
adduced from the
fact that
certain descriptions of the idea Dei would seem to make it the ideal counterpart of the fades fotius universi. 4 Martineau,
who
is
any textual support
the author of the second conjecture, does not adduce for his view. I am inclined to reject
both these conjectures, for the following reasons.
As we
have already seen, the expression fades totius universi may include both the modes of extension and the modes of
5 Then, as we have also shown, the idea Dei is an immediate mode of thought and the equivalent of the intellectus absolute infinitus. Finally, Martineau's "Neces-
thought.
sary Logical laws" cannot be a mediate infinite mode parallel to the fades fotius universi, for from a statement in
Meyer's Preface to Spinoza's Prindpia Philosophiae Carte-
may be indirectly inferred that the "Necessary laws" are parallel to "motion and rest" and conLogical sequently must be identical with the "absolutely infinite
sianae
it
intellect"
and are therefore an immediate
infinite
mode. The
is
passage reads as follows: absolute, but its extension
"And
is
as the
human body
not
laws of motion and rest,

1
determined according to natural so also mind or human spirit is not

list
See
ibid. y p. 116, n. 4,
where a
is
of authors holding different interpretations
of the fades totius universi

2
^ 4
Cf. Pollock, Spinoza, p. 188. Pollock, Spinoza y p. 187; Joachim, Study oj the Ethics of Spinoza, p. 94. Martineau, Study of Spinoza y p. 200.
given.
Joachim, op. '/., p. 95. Cf. above, pp. 239 ff.
PROP. 14]

is
*
249
absolute but
determined through ideas by natural laws
of thought." In the philosophy of Aristotle and in the Aristotelian philosophy reproduced by the mediaevals sometimes for the pur-
pose of refutation, a distinction
is
drawn between the
uni-
verse as a whole and the particular things within it. The universe as a whole is said to be eternal and immutable, to
have neither beginning nor end, never to have been different nor ever to change, but always to remain the same. 2 The
ever, are different.
particular things in the sublunary part of the universe, howThey are called transient and are said
to be subject to constant change 3 and to the process of generation and corruption. 4 Following tradition, Spinoza simi" general," which are the larly distinguishes between the
infinite
lar
modes, and the "particular," which are the particu5
modes are described by him as and as remaining always the same, 7 whereas the particular things are described by him as "tranwhich did not exist from all time, or have had a sient 8 9 beginning" and as "individual mutable things." But these transient things, according to the mediaeval
things.
infinite
6
The
eternal
and immutable
do not act sporadically and haphazardly. They subject to the necessary and immutable laws which govern the universe as a whole and the influence of which reaches every part of it. This view has been summed up in
Aristotelians,
are
all
the following statement of Maimonides: "This whole order [of the universe], both above and here below, is never dis1
Preface to the Pnncipia Philosophiae Cartesianac (Opera, Aforeh Nebukim, II, 13, Third Theory.
lbid.,\\, 10.
<
I, p.
132,
11.
12
ff.).
/#</., II, 11.
Short Treatise,
I, 8.
i
6 8 9
Epistola 64. Ibid., I, 9. 2 (p. 563). Short Treatise, II, 5, 5 (Opera, I, p. 62, 11. 32 ff.). Cf. 100 (Opera, II, p. 36, 1. 22). Tractatus de Intellects Emendatione,
250
[ETHICS,
turbed or interrupted, and nothing new is produced in it which is not in its nature and nothing happens in it which
Furthermore, even according to Maimonides himself, to whom the world does not follow from God by mere necessity but by knowledge, God's eternal
is
contrary to law."
of such a nature that in determining the changes in particular things it determines them in such a way that
knowledge
is
order."
they follow "according to an imperishable and immutable 2 So also Spinoza maintains that the "individual
mutable things" (haec singularia mutabilia) "are produced and are ordered" according to "fixed and eternal things"
that is to say, the infinite modes, (res fixae aeternaeque) which are of an eternal and immutable nature. The sequence of individual mutable things is, therefore, "to be sought
,
inscribed in them, as
from fixed and eternal things only, and also from the laws 3 it were in true codes."
fixed and eternal things, though they are themselves modes which by definition can neither be nor be cononly
These
ceived without substance, 4 may still be considered with reference to the individual mutable things which are dependent upon them as substance is considered by Spinoza with refer-
ence to modes, that is to say, the individual mutable things can neither be nor be conceived without the infinite modes.
The relation between them, therefore, is like that between substance and mode, namely, the relation between the whole
and the part or between the universal and the
This
5
particular.
"It is the significance of the following passage: indeed be said that these individual mutable things so
if I
may
inti-
mately and
may depend upon those essentially, that are fixed that the former without the latter can neither
so speak,
'
March Nebukim,
Ethics, I, Def.
5.
II, 13.
Ibid., Ill, 21.

11.
Tractatus de Intellcctus Emendatione t
101 (Opera> II, p. 36,

s
35
ff.).
See above, pp. 74
ff.
PROP. 14]

Hence
251
be nor be conceived.
although they
may
these fixed and eternal things, be individual (singularia), nevertheless,
on account of
will
their presence
everywhere and their extensive
be like universals to us, or so to speak, the genera power, of the definitions of individual mutable things, and proxi-
mate causes of
things." If this interpretation of the passage just quoted is correct, then the "fixed and eternal things" do not refer directly to
all
substance or to attribute but only to the infinite modes, both the immediate and the mediate, though, of course, indirectly
they
may
include also substance and attribute, inasmuch as
they, too, are fixed and eternal and are the cause of the existence of the infinite modes. According to some interpreters
of Spinoza, however, the fixed and eternal things refer directly to substance, attribute,
and even finite modes. 2 The " fixed and eternal things" application of the expression
to the infinite modes, that
is
to say, to the absolutely infinite
intellect,
motion and
rest,
verse, reflects the expression "eternal things"
and the face of the whole uniwhich was
applied by the mediaevals to the Intelligences, motion, and the universe as a whole, when these were assumed with Aristotle to be eternal. 3 The expression goes back to Aristotle
himself. 4 Again, the characterization of the infinite
as singularia in the passage
modes
quoted
is
in
conformity with
what we have said above, namely, that Spinoza's substance or God is in some respect transcending the universe and is
a simple whole as contrasted with the universe, or, as he
1
'Tractatus de Inttllectus
Emendatione,
101 (Opera, II, p. 37,
11.
ff.).
For different interpretations of the meaning of the res fixae et aeternae, see E. Schmitt, Die uncndliche Modi bei Spinoza (Leipzig, 1910), pp. 68-69. J See my Crtscas' Critique of Aristotle pp. 287, 291, and note 18 on p. 645, note 31 on p. 662, note 32 on p. 663. The Hebrew expression underlying "eternal
,
things"
*
is:
D'TOan onain.
IV, 12, 22 ib, 3-4.
rA
del fora, Physics,
252
calls
it,
[ETHICS,
natura naturata^ which is an aggregate whole. Consequently, substance is the only true whole or universal, and
modes are in their relation to it only singularia. In mediaeval philosophy a distinction is made between the possible per se, the possible per se but necessary in consideration of its cause, and the necessary per se. This disthe infinite
tinction
is
based upon an Avicennian proposition which

as follows:
is
"Everything that has a cause for its existence is in respect to its own essence only possible of existence, for if the causes exist, the thing
likewise will exist, but
if
reproduced by Maimonides
the causes have never existed, or
if
they have ceased
to exist, or if their causal relation to the

r
thing has changed, then the thing itself will not exist." The origin, history, and implications of this proposition
have discussed elsewhere. 2 According to this threefold division of possibility and necessity, the particular things are
called possible per se, the celestial spheres are called possible per se but necessary in consideration of their cause, and God
is
called
necessary per se
a division
based
upon the
Aristotelian division of the universe into
the transiently
able. 3
movable, the eternally movable, and the eternally immovSpinoza reproduces this mediaeval threefold division
of possibility and necessity in different connections in several 4 But here he applies it to his theory of places in his works.
infinite
modes.
He
"
and
as
1
"
necessary
changes, however, the terms possible to "transient" and "eternal," with which,
"
we have
5 seen, they are connected.
The
particular things,
Moreh Nebukim^
II,
Introd., Prop.
19; cf.
my
Crescas* Critique of /Iristotle,
P-
332 *
Crescas Critique of
An static
pp. 109-1
Metaphysics, V,
ff.
1
5,
10153, 33-34.
n, 681-685. See Crescas' Critique of Aristotle p. 109 and

>
pp. 680
5
See above, pp.

Cf.
87
ff.
my
Crescas' Critique of Aristotle, pp. 109
ff.
and 680
ff.
PROP. 14]
253
i.e., possible perse. while transient or possible per se, are not to be considered as transient or possible in consideration of their cause. God is
he says, are transient,
The infinite modes,
"Now some objects are in i.e., necessary per se. themselves transient; others, indeed, are not transient by virtue of their cause. There is yet a third that is eternal and
eternal,
imperishable through
time, or have
its
own power and

The
might.
The
all
tranall
sient are all the particular things
which did not
exist
from
had a beginning.
others are
those
modes [marginal note adds: the general modes] which we to be the cause of the particular modes. But the third is God." But while Spinoza operates on the whole with mediaeval conceptions and uses mediaeval terms, he always tries to
have stated
J
emphasize the two points upon which he fundamentally differs from the mediaevals, namely, the necessity of God's
causality and the denial of God's immateriality. This emphasis upon his two points of difference from the mediaevals
be discerned in the explanations he offers for the meaning of the old expression natura naturans as applied to God in contrast to natura naturata as applied to the world.
may
The
distinction between
is
God and
In the
the mediaevals,
twofold.
the world, according to first place, God is the
cause and the world His effect, and by cause they

intelligent cause, a creator, acting
mean an
purpose.
In the second place,
by design and with a God is immaterial and the

is
substances, a superior or immaterial substance as against the world which consists of material substances. These two distinctions between God
all
world material, so that God, if at all, 2 is a substance beyond
He
to be called substance
and the world are sometimes

1
illustrated
62,
11.
by the contrast beCf.

2 (p. 563).
Short treatise, II,

Cf. above, p. 67.
5,
(Opera,
I, p.
28
ff.).
254
[ETHICS,
Whatever the
tween the expressions natura naturans and natura naturata. origin of these two expressions and whatever
their variety of meanings, 1 it is sufficient for our present in purpose to know that they were used by Thomas
Aquinas
a sense which implied the two fundamental distinctions be-
tween
God and
is
the world as
we have
stated them.
2 things that happen naturally,'* by which he means, of course, that God is an intelligent and purposive
says he, versal cause of
called natura naturans because

all
He
is
God, "the uni-
cause.
This universal cause, he says again in another place, belongs "to some superior substance, in which sense God is
said
by some
to be natura naturans''
Spinoza seems to
refer to this last passage
when he says of the natura naturans
that "the Thomists likewise understand

their natura naturans
all
God by
it)
it,
but
was a being
to
(so they called
beyond
substances."
Now, Spinoza wanted

sponded
namely,
to
make
use of these two expressions

in his
as respective designations of
what
philosophy corre-
God and
God
the world in mediaeval philosophy, and the modes. But still he did not want to use
meaning by which they connoted a distincbetween an intelligent cause and a premeditated effect or between an immaterial substance and a material substance. What did he do? He simply revised their meaning. natura naturans as including substance and its atDefining tributes and natura naturata as including all the modes, the
in their old
them
tion
infinite as well as the finite, 5
he describes the differences be-
tween them
1
in
such terms that when we study them closely
Cf. H. Sicbeck, "Ueber die Entstehung der Termini natura naturans und natura naturata" in Archivjur Geschichte der Philosophic > 3(1889-1890), pp. 370 ff. Commcntaria in Librum Btati Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus, Caput 4,
Lection.
3
Summa
fhtologicay
I, 8.
Prima Secundac, Quaest.

s
85, Art. 6.
Short Treatise,
Ibid., I, 8; Epistola 9.
PROP. 14]
255
discover that they are aimed directly against the Thomisconception of the meaning of these expressions. In the first place, wishing to make it clear that, while he retains the
tic
we
original
cause, he does not mean by
meaning of natura naturans as that of a universal it an intelligent and purposive

. . .
cause, Spinoza says that "by natura naturans we are to understand God in so far as He is considered as a free
cause," by which he means to say, in so far as He acts by the necessity of His own nature, 2 whereas "by natura naturata I understand everything which follows from the
*
necessity of the nature of God, or of any one of God's attributes." 3 In the second place, in opposition to the Thomists, who used the two expressions to designate a distinction between God as an immaterial substance and the world as a
material substance, Spinoza, who denies finite substances and considers the distinction between God and the world as
that between substance and mode, explains natura naturans by his own definition of substance and natura naturata by " his own definition of mode. He thus says again: By natura
naturans we are to understand that which

is
is
in itself
and
conceived through itself/* whereas "by natura naturata understand ... all the modes of God's attributes in so
far as they are considered as things which are in God, and which without God can neither be nor can be conceived." 4
Another difference between Spinoza and the mediaevals, again growing out of his attribution of materiality to God,
is
his contention that the
"two
attributes
may
be conceived
as really distinct that is to say, one without the assistance of the other." s This passage, like so many other utterances
'
Ethics >
I,
Prop. 29, Schol.
Ibid., I, Dcf. 7.
3
4 s
lbid. y I, Prop. 29, Schol.
Ibid. t I, Prop. 29, Schol.,

Ibid., I, Prop. 10, Schol.
and
cf.
Defs. 4 and
5.
256
[ETHICS,
of Spinoza, is to be understood as a veiled criticism of the mediaevals- in this case, of their conception of the interrelation of matter and form. According to Aristotle and the
mediaevals, though there exists a pure form, such as God and the Intelligences, still in the physical universe matter and form are only relative terms. Not only does not either one of them exist without the other, but neither one of them can be conceived without the other. Matter is matter only
with reference to some form, and form is form only with reference to some matter. Furthermore, since God is pure form, then matter, under the theory of emanation, must
ultimately have been produced by pure form, and it is form which continues to be the active, producing principle in
non-being; it is inert. It which constitutes the existence of bodies, and it

itself is
1
matter.
Matter
is is
form
form
which
sets
matter
is
in
motion. 2
Form
is
said to exist in matter,
said to exist through form. 3 As against this, Spinoza maintains that extension and thought, which in his 4 philosophy are the successors of matter an^ forrn, are two
and matter
attributes of substance, existing in
it
together from eternity,
each having the same sort of existence as the other, and each having its own independent form of activity, extension that
of motion and rest, and thought that of thinking. Unlike form which produces motion in matter, thought does not
produce motion in extension. Motion is an activity of extension itself. Extension and thought, again, are not cor-
which cannot be conceived but through each can be conceived independently of each other other; they with reference to substance only. Nor does thought exist in
relative terms,
extension any more than extension exists through thought.

1
Cf.
my
Crcscas* Critique of Aristotle, pp. 257
ff.
Ibid., pp. 89, 299,

<
672-673.
Ibid., pp. 99, 257
ff.,
577, n. 15.
Cf. above, p. 234.
PROP. 14]
257
"For
butes
this is the
is
nature of substance, that each of its attriconceived through itself, since all the attributes
which substance possesses were always together, nor could one be produced by another; but each expresses the reality
or being of substance/*
l
But
still,
though distinct from each other, extension and
thought, again unlike matter and form, do not imply a plurality in the nature of substance. The reason why the
mediaevals considered matter and form to constitute a
wherever they existed together is not that they could be physically separated but that they were considered by them two distinct substances, each of which was supposed
plurality
supposed to be in contrast to the other, matter being potential, form actual, matter being the cause of corruption, form the cause of
to exist in itself
3
and each of which was
also
4 But according to Spinoza, extension and generation. thought are not two substances but attributes of one sub-
stance,
and they are only that
"
which
intellect perceives
s
of
substance, as if constituting its essence.*'

trast
There
is
no con-
between them of potentiality and actuality, or of imperfection and perfection. They are both expressing two
different phases of the activity of substance, which in substance itself are one. Consequently, from the fact that the
two attributes are conceived as

is
distinct
from each other
it
not to be concluded that

different substances
"
two
lian
"
after the
they constitute two beings or manner of the Aristote-
and mediaeval matter and form. The independence of each attribute which Spinoza insists upon is merely to emphasize his denial of the interdependence of matter and form
1
Ethics ,
I,
Prop. 10, Schol.

Cf. above, p. 67.
s
Cf. above, p. 113.
Cf. above, p. 236.

6
Ethics,
I,
Def.
4.
258
in

it is
[ETHICS,
mediaeval philosophy;
not an independence which
implies the reality of the attributes in their relation to substance or a reality in the difference between themselves,
with the result that the unity of substance can no longer be logically maintained. The relation of the attributes to
each other
is
of the same order as their relation to substance.
Just as the difference
between attribute and substance
is
only a conception of the human mind, so the difference between the attributes themselves is only a form of conception
in the
human mind,
its
"for this
is
is
the nature of substance, that
conceived through itself." * It is in this sense only that the "two attributes may be conceived as that is to say, one without the assistance of really distinct
each of
attributes
the other."
Still,
while extension
is
an attribute of God,
it
must not
be confused with corporeality in the popular anthropomorphic conception of God. Spinoza dismisses this popular form
of anthropomorphism which imagines "God to be like a man, composed of body and soul and subject to passion," without
much
ado, "for
all
the divine nature

this last
men who have deny that God
in
is
any way looked into 3 Behind corporeal."
statement there are the long discussions of the rabbis
and of
the religious philosophers since Philo, who sought to spiritualize or to explain away the anthropomorphic exall
Maimonides portions of the Bible. them when he emphasizes the importance of "God's incorporeali ty and His exemption from all passions," as doctrines "which must be explained to every one according to his capacity, and they must be taught by way of
pressions in
certain
speaks for all of
<
Ibid.
>
Ibid.
cf.
Ibid., I,
Prop. 15, Schol.
This Scholium belongs to Prop. 14;
Freudenthal,
"Spinozastudien," in Zeitschrift fur Philosophif, 108 (1896), p. 251, of this chapter is a discussion of the first part of this Scholium.
n. 2.
The
rest
PROP. 14]

and women,
to the stupid
259
tradition to children
and igno-
rant/
'
The argument, however, which Spinoza reproduces in the name of philosophers for the incorporeality of God does not
represent any of the standard philosophical arguments re2 produced by Maimonides, but it does represent the argu-
ment quoted with approval by Maimonides in the name of the Kalam. The argument in Spinoza reads as follows: "That He cannot be so they conclusively prove by showing that by body we understand a certain quantity possessing length, breadth, and depth, limited by some fixed shape;
and that
is
to attribute this to
God, a being absolutely
infinite,
the greatest absurdity/' The Kalam argument in Maimonides reads as follows: "If God were corporeal, He would
be
finite,
which
is
true;
a certain dimension
and if He were finite, He would have and a certain fixed shape, which is equally
3
Spinoza's passage is clearly a paraphrase of Maimonides' passage with the additional inclusion of the current definition of "body."
a correct conclusion."
But the mediaevals, proceeds Spinoza, deny of God not only body but also matter and extension in general, and thus
by removing from divine nature "substance itself, corporeal " or extended," they affirm that it was created by God." This leads Spinoza to a recapitulation of his arguments against
creation, namely: if have arisen from Him
God
?
is
Of course,
pure form, how could matter the mediaevals have their
different solutions of the
none of them
vine power
it
problem of the origin of matter; " by what disufficiently explains, however, could have been created." This is quite a good
4 points against creation.
*
summary of his main

1
He concludes,
Moreh Nebukim,
Ibid., I, 76,
I,
35.
Ibid.,
and
II, i.
Third Argument.
Cf. above,
Chapter IV.
260
[ETHICS,
that as he always does after an argument against creation, extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of God."
"
Spinoza then reproduces two arguments by which the philosophers have endeavored to prove the incorporeality of
God:
First, that corporeal substance, in so far as it is substance, consists, as they suppose, of parts, and therefore they
"
deny that
it
can be
infinite,
and consequently that
it
can
pertain to God/' So far I have been unable to find the source of this argument in the form in which it is given here by
Spinoza.
made up
impression is that it is a composite argument of the following parts: (i) The standard argument for the incorporeality of God on the ground that God is one
My
and indivisible, whereas corporeality implies composition and divisibility. Maimonides puts this argument as follows: "There is no unity unless one discards corporeality, for a
corporeal thing is not one, but composed of matter and form, which are two distinct things by definition; and furthermore x it is divisible." Exactly the same argument is given by
Descartes
and
also
by Spinoza
in the Short Treatise*
(2)
The
Aristotelian denial of the existence of an infinite cor4

s
poreal magnitude, which is reproduced by Maimonides and elaborately discussed by Crescas. 6 That this argument is of a composite nature may be inferred from the following
statement with which Spinoza introduces it: "But for the sake of a fuller explanation, I will refute my adversaries
1
arguments^ which, taken altogether (omnia),

Moreh Nebukim,
Cf. below, p. 268.
1
come
to this."
I,
35.
I,
Principia Philosophiae,
Short Treatise ,
23; Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae,
I,
Prop. 16.
I, 2,
18 (Opera,
8 ff.;
I, p.
24,
11.
12-15).
Cf below,
.
p. 269.
Physics, III, 5, 2043,
Metaphysics, XI, 10, io66b,
ff.
Moreh Nebukim, II, Introduction, Prop. I. Or Adonai, I, i, i I, ii, i; cf. my Crescas'

;
Critique of Aristotle, pp. 135
ff.
PROP. 14]

"
al together
is
261
"
Taken
undoubtedly a reference to the com-
posite nature of the argument.
argument
nature
in its
is
as reproduced here in the Ethics
further proof that the is of a composite

l
the fact that in the Short Treatise
it is
reproduced
simple form, without any mention of infinity. "A second argument is assumed from the absolute perfection of God. For God, they say, since He is a being absolutely perfect, cannot be passive; but corporeal substance, " This argument, too, is since it is divisible, can be passive. found in Descartes 2 and in the Short Treatise* and is implied
Maimonides' fourth proof for the existence, unity, and incorporeality of God from the concept of actuality and
in
potentiality.
which
parts of the Scholium to Proposition XV, taken up with a refutation of the alleged arguments against the possibility of an infinite corporeal substance, will be discussed in the next chapter.
is
1
The remaining
Short Treatise,
I, 2,
18 (Opera,
I, p.
24,
11.
11-15).
3 <
Principia Philosophiae, I, 23. 18 (Opera Short Treatise y I, 2,
I,
p. 24,
11.
15-18).
Moreh Nebukim^
II, i,
Fourth Argument.
CHAPTER
VIII
THE arguments
an
infinite corporeal
of his "opponents" against the possibility of substance are introduced by Spinoza
incidentally in connection with his discussion in the Ethics of the traditional rejection of extension as an attribute of
God. The cause of this rejection, declares Spinoza, is to be found in the alleged incompatibility of extension with the
infinity of the divine nature, for extension,
assumed
1
to be
divisible
and consisting of
parts, cannot be infinite.
And
thereupon Spinoza proceeds to adduce, as he says, "one or two/' but actually three, of the "many examples" by which his opponents have tried to show, on the assumption of the
divisibility of corporeal substance, that it could
finite.
not be in-
In the Short Treatise^ however, this traditional argufor the rejection of extension as a divine attribute is
infinity.
is
ment
reproduced without any reference to the problem of
According to
divisible
this earlier version of the
argument, extension
said to be rejected as an attribute of
and consisting of
parts,
2 simplicity of the divine nature. za's refutation of the argument
because, being incompatible with the In both these places Spinoit is
God
an attempt is the same show that extension need not necessarily be divisible and composed of parts. This he does by drawing a distinction between extension as an attribute and extension as a mode and by showing that while the latter is divisible the
to
1
Ethics, I, Prop. 15, Schol.: "First, that corporeal substance, in so far as it is substance, consists, as they suppose, of parts, and therefore they deny that it can be infinite, and consequently that it can pertain to God." 3 Short Treatise,!, 2, 18 (Opera, I, p. 24, 11. 11-15): "For since extension is divisible, the perfect being would have to consist of parts, and this cable to God, because He is a simple being."
is
altogether inappli-
PROP. i5,scHOL.]
In the Short treatise
*
*
263
former
clearly
is
simple.
this distinction is
drawn;
in the Ethics
there
is
only an emphasis on
the indivisibility and simplicity of substance, with the implied inference that modes only are composed of parts and divisible.
But
here, again, in the Short Treatise the refutation aims
to establish
the Ethics
it
merely the simplicity of extension, whereas in aims to establish its infinity as well as its sim-
In the Ethics, furthermore, Spinoza reinforces his plicity. refutation of his opponents by introducing a new distinction,
it
namely, a distinction between quantity regarded "as exists in the imagination" and quantity regarded "as it
former being "finite, divisible,
exists in the intellect/' the
and composed of parts" and the latter being "infinite, one, a distinction, he says, which will be and indivisible" "plain enough to all who know how to distinguish between the imagination and the intellect." 3 Both these distinctions mentioned in the Ethics occur also in two different places in
the Tractates de Intellectus Emendatione. In one place there, Spinoza says that the idea of quantity, if the understanding
(intellectus) forms it absolutely, is infinite, whereas the idea of quantity, if the understanding perceives it by means of a cause, is finite. 4 This distinction is undoubtedly identical
with his distinction between extension as an attribute and

extension as a mode, the former of which is infinite and the latter finite. In another place he speaks of the errors into which those "who do not accurately distinguish between in-
and he mentions as one of the errors their belief that extension must be finite. 5 Finally, these distinctions between substance and mode and between
tellect
and imagination"
easily
fall,
Short Treatise;
I, 2,
21-22 (Opera,
11.
I, p.
26,
1.
11.
6-7).
1.
Ethics, I, Prop. 15, Schol. (Opera, II, p. 58,

Ibid. (Opera, II, p. 59,
i6-p. 59,
i).
3
*
20-32).
108 (Opera, II, p. 39,
11.
Tractates de Intellectus Emendatione,

Ibid.,
4-14).
87 (p. 32,
1.
35-p. 33,
1.
3).
264
intellect
[ETHICS,
tinction,
and imagination, with the addition of a third disnamely, that between the infinite and the indefinite,
occur again in one of Spinoza's letters to Meyer. 1 It is the purpose of this chapter to isolate the problem of
the infinity of extension from the problem of the applicaof extension as an attribute of God, and to place this aspect of Spinoza's discussion of the problem of infinity, both
bility
the
arguments of
his
unnamed opponents and
also
his
criticism thereof, in the light of its historical setting. shall deal here with certain texts of Crescas some of which
We
have already impressed Joel and other students of Jewish

philosophy with their obvious resemblance to certain pas2 As mere parallel sages in Spinoza's discussion of infinity. are interesting enough, if only to increase the passages they
number of such
parallels that
may
be culled from the wide

It
philosophic literature of the Middle Ages. be of somewhat greater significance if it is
may
perhaps
shown that even
Spinoza's refutations are found
among
those offered by
Crescas, but here, too, as we shall see, they may be found also in the works of other writers. But the matter grows in
importance when we notice that the three "distinctions" mentioned by Spinoza in his letter remind one of three refutations by Crescas of three arguments which correspond
respectively to the three "examples" of Spinoza. The matter becomes of still greater importance when, as we hope
show, Spinoza's entire discussion of the indivisibility of infinite extension is found to involve many difficulties which
to
can be cleared up by the aid of a thorough understanding

of Crescas' position on the same subject.
1
Epistola 12.
Cf.
M. Joel, Dow Chasdai Creskas* religionsphilosophische Lehren, p. 22, n. i. Cross-references to Spinoza are also to be found in: M. Schreiner, Der Ka/am in der judischer Literatur^ p. 27, n. 5; I. I. Efros, The Problem of Space in Jewish
a
Mediaeval Philosophy, pp. 93, 97, 107;

Crescas , p. 40, n. 36.
M. Waxman, The Philosophy of Don Hasdai
PROP. 15, SCHOL.]
say that
265
It is safe to
rectly
whomsoever in particular and dihave had in mind when assailing his opSpinoza may
ponents for denying the infinity of corporeal substance, it is ultimately the views and arguments advanced by Aristotle
came out
Aristotle it was who boldly the conception of an infinite which had against been held by some of his predecessors, and it is in his writ-
that he
is
contending with.
With
ings that we find the most elaborate discussion of the subject. a long array of arguments, in which all his characteris-
tic theories of physics and metaphysics come into play, Aristotle exploded the theory of the existence of any possible phase of the infinite. This negation of the infinite, with the
in Aristotle's Physics, Metaand De CaeloJ had passed into the stock-in-trade of physics philosophic lore of mediaeval thought, where it played an
avalanche of arguments found

,
important part,
for it enters as
chief proofs for the existence of
an element into one of the God, namely, the cosmological
infinite regress.
proof based upon the assumption of the impossibility of an A few new arguments against infinity may
have been added later, the old arguments of Aristotle may have been changed, garbled, misinterpreted, split up, and reclassified, but it is always to Aristotle that any mediaeval discussion of the impossibility of an infinite can be traced.
It
is,
therefore, of the
utmost importance
for us to
know
to
what extent the reasons attributed by Spinoza
to his un-
denying the infinity of corporeal substance do actually agree with what we know to be the views
for
named opponents
of Aristotle.
main reason why Aristowas their belief that substance is composed of parts. "Wherefore the corporeal whole heap of arguments," he says, "by which philosophers
If
we were
to believe Spinoza, the
tle
and
his followers rejected infinity
Physics, III, 4-8; Metaphysics^ XI, 10;
De
Caelo,
I,
5-7.
266

to
[ETHICS,
commonly endeavor
finite, falls to
show that extended substance

its
is
the ground by
own
weight, for all these
arguments suppose that corporeal substance is made up of r It would also seem that it is not the mere divisibility parts."
of extended substance that Spinoza understood to be the assumption underlying the arguments against infinity, but
into heterogeneous parts and its comof those parts, so that extended substance, acposition cording to Spinoza, was not considered by his opponents
rather
its divisibility
as a continuous quantity.
Thus he
says:
is
"Wherefore those
of parts or of
who
think that extended substance
made up
not to say madly. It
bodies really distinct from one another are talking foolishly, is as though one should attempt by the
circles to
mere addition and aggregation of many

whole essence/'
make up
a square, or a triangle, or something else different in its 2 He furthermore compares the relation of
the parts of which corporeal substance is supposed to be composed to that of points to a line. "In the same way,
others,
who have persuaded themselves

also find
line is
that a line
is
made
they not divisible to infinity." 3 Finally, Spinoza seems to imply that the assumption of the divisibility of corporeal substance, which is supposed to underlie the rejection of its infinity, is analogous to the belief in the discontinuity of nature as held by those who admit the existence of
up of points, could would prove that a
many arguments by which
a vacuum, and thus he concludes the argument that "since, therefore, it is supposed that there is no vacuum in nature
(about which I will speak at another time), but that parts must be united, so that no vacuum can exist,
all
the
it fol-
lows that they cannot be really separated;

1
that
is
to say,

Ibid. (p. 55,11. 11-16).
Ibid. (p. 56,
11.
1.
i6-p. 56,
1.
i).
' 3
2-4).
PROP. 15, SCHOL.]
it is
267
that corporeal substance, in so far as be divided." '
substance, cannot
And yet how strangely un-Aristotelian are these views attributed by Spinoza to Aristotle. Aristotle, as we know him from his own writings, no more considered corporeal
substance to consist of heterogeneous parts than a line to consist of points, for both body and line are to him continu-
ous quantities and infinitely divisible. "It is impossible," he says, "that anything continuous should be composed of
as, for instance, a line of points, since a line is a continued quantity, but a point is indivisible." 2 And what is true of a line is also true, according to Aristotle, of the " there is the same reasoning with other magnitudes, for
indivisibles;
respect to magnitude, time, and motion; for either each or no one of these consists of indivisibles and is divided into
Following out this line of reasoning, he concludes that "it is also evident that everything which is continuous is divisible into things always divisible." 4 And it is
indivisibles."
because of his belief in the continuity of corporeal substance that Aristotle rejects the existence of a vacuum and maintains "that there is not an interval different from bodies,
an interval which divides the either separable or actual whole body, so that it is not continuous, as Democritus and
or even perhaps Leucippus say, and many other physicists as something which is outside the whole body, which remains continuous." 5 Thus for every view ascribed by Spi-
noza to
his
opponents we
may
find in Aristotle a statement
Spinoza argues that his opponents denied the existence of an infinite because they
1
to the contrary. Then there is another difficulty.
Ethics,
*
I,
Prop. 15, Schol. (Opera,

I, 231.1,
II, p. 59,
11.
16-19).
Physics, VI,
i
24-26.
4
,
a s
Ibid. 2316, 18-20.

Ibid., IV, 6, 213,1,
Ibid., 23 ib, 15-16.
31-2135,
2.
268
[ETHICS,
erroneously believed that infinite substance must be divisible, whereas he maintains that infinite substance is indivisiAristotle himself discusses the possibility of an indivisible infinite substance, but, while admitting that there
ble.
Now,
is
an indivisible substance and that that substance can be
called infinite, he argues that the term "infinite" when applied to that indivisible substance will not mean infinite
except in the sense in which a voice is called "invisible," but that, he concludes, is not what he means by the term "infinite" when he investigates whether an infinite exists.
How
then can Spinoza argue against those who deny the existence of an infinite and at the same time use the term "infinite" in a sense
which
is
explicitly rejected
by
his
oppo-
nents ? Is he not committing here the fallacy of equivocation ? It has been suggested that in attacking his opponents for
conceiving corporeal substance as an aggregate of distinct bodies it was Descartes whom Spinoza was aiming at. 2 In proof of this a passage is cited in which Descartes rejects extension as a divine attribute on account of its divisibility.
A closer examination of this passage, however, will reveal that

while
it
are found "in authors,
contains one of those arguments which Spinoza says by which they endeavor to show that
corporeal substance is unworthy of divine nature, and cannot pertain to it," 3 that argument is not used by Descartes
to prove that corporeal substance cannot be infinite. Descartes simply endeavors to show that inasmuch as extension
is
divisible,
and inasmuch
as divisibility indicates imper-
fection, extension
1
cannot be an attribute of God. 4
This
Ibid., Ill, 5, 2043, 8-14;
a *
Cf.
H. H. Joachim,
I,
Metaphysics, XI, 10, io66b, 1-7. Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, p. 30,
11.
n. I.
Ethics,
Prop. 15, Schol. (Opera, II, p. 58,
13-16).
is
4 Principia Philosophiac, I, 23: "Thus since in corporeal nature divisibility included in local extension, and divisibility indicates imperfection, it is certain that God is not body." Compare Spinoza's Principia Philosophiae Cartfsianae, I, 1
Prop.
6.
PROP. i5,scHOL.]
269
exactly corresponds to the second of the two arguments which Spinoza ascribes, both in the Ethics and in the Short
Treatise, to those
who denied
extension as an attribute of
only that Tschirnhaus said to Leibin the name of Spinoza, that Descartes erniz, evidently 2 But it does roneously attributed divisibility to extension.
It
is
God. 1
in this sense
not
mean
matter and
that Descartes believed in the heterogeneity of its divisibility into irreducible parts on account
of which he had to deny its infinity. Quite the contrary* Descartes believed that matter, whose essence is extension, 3
Furthermore, Descartes was far from considering corporeal substance to consist of parts really distinct from one another, for, by denying the existence of
is
infinite in extent. 4
atoms
and of a vacuum, 6 he held extension

7
to be continuous
cer8
and
infinite in divisibility.
Though he admits "that
tain sensible bodies are

1
composed of
insensible particles,"
Ethics, I, Prop. 15, Schol. (Opera, II, p. 58, 11. 9-13): "A second argument is assumed from the absolute perfection of God. For God, they say, since He is a be-
ing absolutely perfect, cannot suffer; but corporeal substance, since it is divisible, can suffer: it follows, therefore, that it does not pertain to God's essence." Short
treatise, I, 2,
it is
18 (Opera,
I, p.
24,
11.
13-15): "Moreover,
when extension
is
divided
passive,
and with God (who
is
other being, because He is the first the cause." See Wolf's note on p. 178. Cf. above, p. 260. 2 "Extensionem non inferre divisibilitatem, inque eo lapsum esse Cartesium."
Cf.
never passive, and cannot be affected by any efficient cause of all) this can by no means be
K.
I.
Gerhardt, "Leibniz und
Spinoza," in Sitzungsberichte der
kb'niglich
prfussischen Akademie der H'issenschaften zu Berlin, 1889, p. IO 77> reprinted also in I,. Stein, Leibniz und Spinoza, p. 283.
*
Cf. Princtpia Philosophiae, II, 4,

2.
and Principia Philosophiae Cartcsianae,
II,
Prop.
4
Cf. Princtpia
Philosophiae, II, 21, and Principia Phihsophiae Cartesianae,
II,
Prop.
s
6.
Cf. Principia Philosophiae, II, 20,

5.
and Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae,
II,
Prop.
6
Cf. Principia Philosophiae, II, 16-19,

3.
and Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae ,
II,
*
Prop.
Cf. Principia Philosophiae, II, 34,
II,
8
Prop.
5,
Demonst.
Principia Philosophiae, IV, 201.
270
[ETHICS,
he himself takes great pains to point out that these parts are not indivisible and insists that his view has more in common
with that of Aristotle than with that of Democritus.
that
l
All
we may
is
gather, therefore, from Descartes*

is
own
state-
ments
the
that, while extension

it is
divisible
and hence cannot
be applied to God,
same way
as,
not divisible into indivisible parts in according to Spinoza's arguments here

if it
against his opponents, a line would have to be divisible were conceived to consist of points.
It
was thus not
Aristotle
and
his followers
whom
Spinoza
ascribed to his opponents the discreteness of corporeal substance as the reason for their denyits infinity. Still less could he have meant Descartes, for Descartes not only like Aristotle believed in the continuity of extension, but also like Spinoza held it to be infinite. Un-
could have meant
when he
ing
less, therefore,
we
are inclined to say that Spinoza willfully
imposed upon his opponents views which they would disclaim or that he unwarily misunderstood their position, we are bound to look for some new meaning that may lie concealed behind his uttered words.
to find out
We
must particularly try
whether
it is
not possible that Spinoza uses here
the terms "indivisible" and "divisible" in
some
it
special
and
generally unknown
special,
sense, for
it is
in the discovery of
such a
uncommon
use of these two terms,
would seem,
we may find an answer to the questions raised by us. We must therefore acquaint ourselves thoroughly with the sources from which we have reason to believe Spinoza had
that
drawn
knowledge of the ancient controversy about inorder to learn the exact meaning of the terms he uses, to fill out the gaps in his fragmentary statements, and
his
finity in
to restate the full implications of his argument of which words are sometimes mere suggestions.
1
his
Ibid., IV, 202.
PROP. i5,scHOL.]
271
Allowing ourselves to be guided by the gentle hand of Averroes through the uncharted texts of Aristotle's writings,
for
it
was Averroes by
whom
Spinoza's predecessors had
been so wisely guided in their pursuit of the same subject, we may restate for our purpose certain pertinent facts with
regard to Aristotle's conception of infinity, by definition, must be divisible, for "if it
will
(i)
is
An
infinite,
indivisible, it
not be
infinite, unless in the
same manner
as voice
is
Those, however, who say that there is the infinite do not assert that it thus subsists, nor do we investigate it as a thing of this kind, but as that which cannot be passed
invisible.
*
through."
(2)
divisible infinite
must be one of the
fol-
lowing three:
(a)
quantity existing as an accident in a
corporeal subject, 2 corporeal substance.

poreal subject
is
(b)
An incorporeal quantity, (c) An inAn accidental quantity existing in a cor-
dismissed as something irrelevant to the
conception of infinity under discussion. Then an incorporeal infinite quantity is dismissed on the ground that there is no
To quote Averroes: "It cannot be an incorporeal quantity, for since number and magnitude are inseparable from sensible objects, it follows that whatever
incorporeal quantity.
an accident of number and magnitude must likewise be inseparable, and infinity is such an accident, for finitude and
is
infinity are
two accidents existing in number and magnitude, inasmuch as the essence of number and magnitude is not
3
identical with the essence of the infinite."

finite incorporeal
1
Finally, an in-
substance
is
rejected on the ground of the
Physics, III, 5, 2043, 12-14. Cf. Metaphysics ) XI, 10, io66b, 5-7. Cf. Averroes' Middle Commentary on the Physics, Book III, Summa iii, Chapter 4: "If the infinite is divisible, it must inevitably bean incorporeal quantity
a
or a quantity existing in a subject or one of the incorporeal substances." Paraphrased also by Crescas, Or Adonai, I, i, i (p. 4a). Cf. my Crescas Critique of Aristotle,
J
pp. 137 and 330.
Averroes,
loc. cit.
Critique of Aristotle, pp. 137
Paraphrased also by Crescas, he. and 330.
cit. (p.
4a-b).
Cf. Crescas*
272

if it
[ETHICS,
absurdities that would ensue

ible.
were supposed to be divis-
We shall quote
the argument on this last point in three
versions:
evident that
sisting in
In Aristotle the argument is given as follows: "It is also it is not possible for the infinite to be, as sub-
energy and as essence and a principle: for whatever of it is assumed will be infinite, if it is partible: for the part essence of infinite and the infinite are the same, since the
and is not predicated of a Hence it is either indivisible, or divisible into insubject. finites. But it is impossible that there can be many infinites in the same thing. As air, however, is part of air, so likewise infinite is a part of infinite, if it is essence and a principle. It But this is impossiis, therefore, impartible and indivisible.
infinite is essence or substance,
ble, since it is infinite in energy; for it is necessary that it should be a certain quantum." Averroes' version of the same argument runs as follows:
l
"
After
we have shown
that the infinite cannot be an incor-
poreal nor a corporeal quantity, there is nothing left but that it should be an incorporeal substance, of the kind we
intellect, so that the thing assumed to be described as infinite, and infinite being itself are one in definition and essence and not different in reason.
affirm of soul
and
infinite, that
is,
However,
of
if
we assume
the infinite to be of this kind,
its
essence thus being at one with its definition, then, as a result its being infinite, we shall be confronted with the question
it is
whether
divisible or indivisible.
[In the first case,]
if it
be divisible, then the definition of a part and the whole of it will be the same in this respect, as must necessarily be the
case in simple, homoeomerous things. But if this be so, then the part of the infinite will be infinite. For the parts must inevitably either be different from the infinite whole or not
1
Physics, III,
5,
204a, 20-29. Cf. Metaphysics^ XI, 10, io66b, 11-19.
PROP. 15, SCHOL.]
273
be different therefrom. If they be different, then the infinite will be composite and not simple; if they be not different,
then the definition of the part will be the same as that of the whole, for this reasoning must necessarily follow in the case of all things that are homoeomerous. Just as part of air is
air,
and part of
flesh is flesh, so part of infinite is infinite,
forasmuch as the part and the whole in each of these are one in definition and essence. If a difference is found in the parts
of homoeomerous bodies, it is due only to the subject which is the receptacle of the parts and not to the form, for if we
imagine the form of a homoeomerous body without a subject, the parts and the whole thereof will be the same in all respects
and without any
difference.
[In the second case,] if
we say
that the infinite incorporeal substance is indivisible, which must be the case of an incorporeal qua incorporeal, then it
infinite except in the sense in which a point is said to be infinite. In general, the treatment of the existence of an incorporeal infinite is irrelevant to the subject under discussion."
cannot be said to be
This Averroian version of Aristotle's argument is briefly restated by Crescas in the following terms: "Again, we cannot help asking ourselves whether this incorporeal substance
is
divisible or indivisible.
If
it
is
divisible, since it
is
also
incorporeal, simple, and homoeomerous, the definition of any of its parts will be identical with that of the whole, and since the whole is now assumed to be infinite, any part thereof will likewise have to be infinite. But it is of the utmost that the whole and a part thereof should be alike absurdity
[in infinity].
And
must
if it is indivisible,
which, indeed, as an
it infinite,
in-
corporeal, as a point
1
it
be,
we can no
longer call
2
except
is
said to be infinite/'
cit. y
Averroes, he.
quoted
in
my
Or Adonai,
loc. cit. (p. 4:1).
Crescas' Critique ofAristotle, pp. 3 j 1-332. Cf. Crescas' Critique of Aristotle, p. 137.
274
[ETHICS,
The gravamen
of this Aristotelian argument against an
have been gathered, is that if it were divisible its parts would each have to be either infinite or finite, neither of which is possible. It is this
infinite incorporeal substance, as will
argument that is reproduced by Spinoza in his first "example": "If corporeal substance, they say, be infinite, let us conceive it to be divided into two parts; each part, therefore,
will
infinite is
be either finite or infinite. If each part be finite, then the composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If
l
each part be infinite, there is then an infinite twice as great It will be recalled as another infinite, which is also absurd."
that
it
is
by
this
proved
It
is
in Propositions
very same reasoning that Spinoza has XII and XIII that an infinite must
be indivisible. 2
simply a matter of ordinary good reasoning that any
attempt at a refutation of Aristotle's arguments against infinity will have to proceed from his own premises and will
have to use terms
in his
own
sense.
The
infinite will
have
to be a quantitative term, "for it is necessary that it should be a certain quantum," 3 as Aristotle plainly puts it. It will
have to be
divisible.
This at once renders
it futile
to seek to
establish an infinite incorporeal substance which is not quantitative and not divisible and of which the use of the term
infinite
merely means
its
exclusion from
as a point
is
the universe of
finitude in the
same sense
said to be infinite.
The
will
infinite, the existence
of which any criticism of Aristotle
seek to establish, will thus have to be an incorporeal
quantity, inasmuch as an infinite quantity existing as an accident in a corporeal subject has been disposed of by Aristotle himself as something inconsistent with the conception of infinity. /
1
But an
infinite
quantity has been rejected * j

11.
Ethics,
a
I,

*
II, p. 57,
28-33).
Cf. above, pp. 156-157.
Cf. quotation above, p. 272,
PROP. 15, SCHOL.]
275
by
an
Aristotle on the
exists.
The
first
ground that no incorporeal quantity step, therefore, in proving the existence of
infinite will
quantity. will be divisible in conformity with the definition of the term infinite, will at the same time also have to be homoeomerous,
be to establish the existence of an incorporeal Furthermore, this incorporeal quantity, while it
as everything incorporeal perforce must be, and consequently, as a second step, a way will have to be found by which the
parts into which it is divisible will not each be infinite like the whole nor finite unlike the whole.
It is exactly this process of reasoning that is employed by Crescas in his criticism of Aristotle. Endeavoring to show
that an infinite is possible, he first seeks to establish the existence of an incorporeal quantity. He does so by proving, by arguments which do not concern us here, that a vacuum
does exist, not indeed within the universe, dispersed throughout the pores of bodies and thus breaking up their continuity, as was held by Democritus, but rather outside the universe,
the view held by the Pythagoreans. 1 The vacuum is nothing but tridimensional extension, or, as Crescas calls it, "in-
corporeal dimensions'* as contrasted with a

is
2
plenum which
tinction
The significance of this dis"corporeal dimensions/' may be fully appreciated when compared with the
is
view of Aristotle. Tridimensionality, according to Aristotle, either the essence of matter or a form of matter, for there
a difference of opinion among his commentators on that 3 In either case, tridimensionality is always corporeal, point.
is
for
even
if it is
a form of matter, as a form
it
cannot exist
outside the
without matter.
universe
1
But
to Crescas the
vacuum
is
tridimensionality which
',
has an independent,
Cf.
my

I, ii,
i
pp. 53-60.
Cf. Crescas' Critique of Aristotle', p. 187. Cf. Crescas' Critique oj Aristotle y p. 101 and n. 18 on pp. 579-590. Cf. above,
(p. 146).
Or Adonai,
PP- 234-235-
276
[ETHICS,
Furthermore, this incorporeal tridimensionality, argues Crescas, is a continuous quantity, i.e., a magnitude, inasmuch as it is described in terms of a continuis
incorporeal existence.
ous quantity rather than in those of a discrete quantity, for it said to be "great and small" rather than "much and few."
I
As such
that
it
it is
infinite in divisibility.
must likewise be infinite in would have to terminate either at a body or at another vacuum. That it should terminate at a body, however,
limit
it is
But Crescas argues also extent, "for if it had a
impossible.
It will, therefore,
have to terminate at another
2 vacuum, and that will go on to infinity." But here Crescas seems to become conscious of the
diffi-
by ment, against an
culty raised
Aristotle, in Averroes' version of the arguinfinite incorporeal substance.

it is
The
infinite
vacuum
is
divisible, but
also
homoeomerous.
This
being the case, the parts of the infinite vacuum will either be identical with the whole in definition or not. If they are,
then the parts will each be infinite like the whole; if they are not, then the whole will be composed of heterogeneous parts. The passage in which Crescas refutes Aristotle's argument
and
in
which he also seems to touch upon
this difficulty
may
be given here in full: "We say that the argument is fallacious and a begging of the question. For he who assumes the existence of an incorporeal infinite
magnitude likewise affirms
the existence of an incorporeal quantity. By the same token, it does not follow that the definition of the infinite would have
to apply to its parts, just as such reasoning does not follow
in the case
of a mathematical
line.
Nor would
there have to
be any composition in it except of parts of itself." 3 This passage of Crescas is evidently meant to be a refuta1
Or Adonai)
Ibid.
I, ii,
(p. 153).
Cf.
my
Crescas' Critique of Aristotle, p. 189.
' 3
Or Adonai y
loc. cit. (p.
Ha).
Cf. Crescas
Critique of Aristotle , p. 179.
PROP. 15, SCHOL.]
277
argument contained in the passage quoted above from Averroes and of which Crescas himself has given a paration of the
phrase.
It will be recalled that Averroes argues against two alternatives in the case where the infinite is assumed possible to be both homoeomerous and divisible. First, if the parts are each infinite like the whole, then the parts of an infinite
will
be
infinite,
which
is
absurd.
Second,
is
each
finite,
then the infinite whole

is
the parts are composed of dissimilar

if
therefore no longer homoeomerous, which is to the assumption. Now, in this passage Crescas contrary evidently tries to answer both these alternatives. As against
parts and
the
first,
to be of the
he seems to say that though the parts are assumed same kind as the whole, they are not each inwhole, for "it does not follow that the defini-
finite like the
tion of the infinite
would have
to apply to all its parts, just
matical
as such reasoning does not follow in the case of a matheline.'' As against the second, he seems to say that
though the parts are
finite,
the infinite whole would not be
composed of dissimilar parts, for "nor would there have to be any composition in it except of parts of itself."
examine, however, this passage closely, we find reasoning is not quite fully explained. In the first Crescas does not fully explain why in an infinite place,
that
its
When we
which
is
assumed
to be
homoeomerous and
infinite in essence
the parts should not each be infinite like the whole. He merely asserts that it would not have to be so in the case of
an
low
infinite, just as
in
something similar would not have to folthe case of a mathematical line. But we may ask
ourselves:
The
infinite
under discussion
is
infinite in
its
essence just as a mathematical line is linear in its essence, and since the parts of the line are linear like the whole, why
whole?
should not also the parts of the infinite be infinite like the In the second place, when Crescas, arguing appar-
278
[ETHICS,
ently against the second alternative, tries to show that the infinite would not be composed of dissimilar parts even if its
parts were each
to be
is
finite,
he simply says "nor would there have
any composition in it except of parts of itself." What the meaning of this statement? Joel, probably starting with the a priori belief that Crescas
must have used the analogy of the mathematical line in the same way as it is used by Spinoza in his letter to Meyer, paraphrases this passage as follows: "So wenig die Linie aus Punkten bestehe, so wenig habe man sich die unendliche
Ausdehnung aus Theilen zusammengesetzt zu denken."
This paraphrase seems to take the passage as a refutation of an argument which assumes that the infinite is composed of
But as we have seen, quite the conthe analogy of the mathematical line is meant to be trary, a refutation of that part of the argument, paraphrased by
heterogeneous parts.
Crescas himself from Averroes, in which it is urged that if the infinite does not consist of heterogeneous parts, then the
parts of the infinite will each have to be infinite. In order to get at the meaning of this difficult passage
we
call to our aid everything that was possibly known to Crescas about a mathematical line and its definition and out
must
meant by
of this try to reconstruct imaginatively what he could have his allusion to a mathematical line as a solution
infinite.
of the difficulty raised against the existence of an
Two main
known
facts
about a mathematical
In the
first
line
must have been
to Crescas.
place, he
was acquainted with
Euclid's definitions of a line, of which there are two. But it must have been the second of these definitions 2 with which
Crescas operated, for

frequently quoted
1
it is this
second definition which
is
most
in the texts
with which Crescas was ac-
M.
Joel,
Elements,
Don Chasdai Creskas' Book I, Def. 3.
religionsphilosophische Lehren, p. 22.
PROP. 15, SCHOL.]

1
279
quainted.
This definition reads:
"The
extremities of a line
are points." In the second place, Crescas was well acquainted with Aristotle's statements that a line is a continuous quan2
tity
and that "everything which
is
continuous
is
divisible
into things always divisible/' 3 According to these statements, then, a line is divisible into parts which are lines, and
presumably a line can also be said to be composed of those lines into which it is divisible. Now the following question
be raised against these statements of Aristotle. Since the parts into which a line is divisible and of which they are also composed are according to Aristotle lines, they must also
may
be defined as
line,
lines.
But by Euclid's second
definition of a
the extremities of a line are said to be points. Consequently, if a line is divided into as well as composed of lines, a line must be also divided into and composed of points.
contrary to Aristotle's statement that a line continuous quantity and does not consist of points. 4
this
is
But
is
This question must have undoubtedly been in the mind of Crescas when he made his allusion to the definition of a
mathematical
line.
In his brief statement that the definition
of the parts, of both the infinite and the line, is not identical with that of the whole and that both would not be composed
except of parts of themselves, he gives us some clue as to

this question would be. He would answer that incorporeal quantities, which are continuby saying ous and homoeomerous like a mathematical line and the
what
his
answer to
it
infinite
vacuum, have no
in discrete quantities,
different units, or in
parts. Parts are to be found only such as number, which is made up of corporeal continuous quantities where
the parts differ from the whole in accidental qualities, as,

1
Averroes* Epitome of the Physics, III (Hebrew version), p. rob.
Cf. Isaac
Israeli, Sefer Yesodot, II, p.

3
45
(ed. Fried).
*
Physics, VI,
Ibid.,
i,
2313, 24.
Ibid.,
VI,
I,
ijib, 15-16.
VI,
I,
ijia, 24-26.
280

an actual
line
[ETHICS,
for instance, the parts of
which
differ
from the
in
whole
line as
in length.
If Aristotle does speak of a
mathematical
is
being infinitely divisible, the divisibility
merely
thought and
in capacity; in reality infinite divisibility
means
nothing but a denial that the line consists of parts different from the whole. Or, to put the matter in other words, in the
case of a discrete quantity, or of a corporeal continuous quantity, the whole is both divisible into parts and composed of those parts into which it is divisible; but in the case
of an incorporeal continuous quantity, while the whole is infinitely divisible into parts, it is not composed of those
parts into which it is infinitely divisible. In the case of the former, the parts are actual and co-exist with the whole; in
the case of the latter, the parts are only potential and do not co-exist with the whole. This is what is behind Crescas'
statement that the definition of the whole need not necessarily
apply to the parts, for the parts are never actual and do never co-exist with the whole, and this is also what he
not composed "except of parts of itself," i.e., of parts which do not exist outside the whole or beside the whole. If Crescas had carried out
is
means by saying that the whole
his
argument
in full
discussion as to "whether the formula
he would have drawn upon Aristotle's [i.e., definition] of the
* parts must be present in the formula of the whole or not," in the course of which discussion Aristotle says: "For even
if
the line
when divided
passes
away
into
its
halves, or the
man
into bones
and muscles and
flesh, it
does not follow that
they are composed of these as parts of their essence, but rather as matter; and these are parts of the concrete thing, but not of the form, i.e., of that to which the formula refers." *
Metaphysics, VII, 10, 10346, 23-24. Metaphysics, VII, 10, 10353, 17-21. This interpretation of Crescas' passage fully worked out in my Crescas' Critique oj Aristotle ^ pp. 391-394.
2
is
PROP. 15, SCHOL.]
281
In other words, to be divisible does not always
mean
to be
composed.
The essential point in Crescas' answer to Aristotle's argument rests, as we have seen, upon the distinction between the vacuum outside the world and the plenum within it, or between incorporeal extension and corporeal extension. The answer given by Spinoza to the same argument, reproduced by him in his first "example/' is based upon a similar distinction. What Crescas calls incorporeal extension or vacuum or space logically corresponds to what Spinoza calls extended substance or the attribute of extension, and what Crescas calls corporeal extension corresponds to what Spinoza calls To both of them, the the particular modes of extension.
1
former
is infinite,
whereas the latter

it is
is finite.
Spinoza thus
"
ex-
says in his letter to Meyer, and "
in
answer
to the first
ample
mentioned
upon a
infinite
failure to
argument is based "between that which must be distinguish

in the Ethics, that the
very nature, or in virtue of its definition, and that which has no limits, not indeed in virtue of its esits
from
sence, but in virtue of

his
its
cause."
From
a comparison of
subsequent elaboration of this distinction in the letter with his corresponding discussion of the same distinction in
the Ethics* in the Short Treatise^ and in the Tractates de Intellectus
Emendatione
it is
clear that the distinction
is
that
between extension as an attribute and as a mode. That the latter is described by the expression "in virtue of its cause"
may
1
be explained by the fact that Spinoza regards the relation of substance to mode as that of cause to effect. 6
Cf. Crescas' Critique of Aristotle t pp. 116-118. Kpistola 12 (Opera, IV, p. 53, 11. 2-5). Ethics, I, Prop. 15, Schol. (Opera, 11, p. 58, 1. i6-p. 59, 21-22 (Opera, I, p. 26, 11. 6-17). Short treatise, I, 2,
1.
19).
Tractatus de Intellects Emendatione,

Cf. above, p. 76,
108 (Opera, II, p. 39,
11.
4-14).
and below,
p. 324.
282

his
[ETHICS,
With
adoption of the old distinction between the two
his description thereof.
kinds of extension, Spinoza also follows his predecessors in But before we take up this point,
to explain Spinoza's use of the terms
we have
"
indivisible
"
and "divisible
"
in these descriptions.
We have seen how
the
term "divisible"
bility.
First, it
may may apply
apply to three different kinds of divisito
what the mediaevals would
call
an incorporeal continuous quantity, such as Crescas Vacuum or a mathematical line, which is free of any accidents. This is
said to be divisible to infinity into parts which are homogeneous with the whole, that is to say, a vacuum into vacuums and
a line into lines. Second,
it
may apply to what
the mediaevals
would
a corporeal continuous quantity which is subject to qualitative or quantitative accidents. This is said to be
call
divisible into parts
the whole differ
which while not generically different from from it and from one another by certain
qualitative or quantitative accidents. Thus, to use the illustration given by Averroes in the passage quoted above,
while parts of air are air and parts of flesh are flesh, the parts differ from the whole and from one another in size or quality
or in
some other accident. Third,

is
it
may
apply to a discrete
said to be divisible into parts which are with the whole and of which the whole is comheterogeneous posed. Now, the first of these three kinds of divisibility is
divisibility only in potentiality but not in actuality, for no actual division into infinity is possible. To say therefore of a thing that it is potentially infinitely divisible is tantamount
quantity which
to saying that actually
it
is
indivisible.
In fact, Aristotle
defines a continuous quantity as that which is divisible, describes such a quantity also as indivisiinfinitely
himself,
who
not being infinitely divisible in actuality. "Since, however, the term indivisible (adialptrov) has two meanings, according as a whole is not potentially divisible,
its
on account of
PROP. 15, SCHOL.]
is
283
ble or
is
actually undivided, there

*
nothing to hinder us
this pas-
from thinking an indivisible whole, when we think of length

(that being actually undivided)/'
Drawing upon
sage of Aristotle,
indivisible
is
Thomas Aquinas
is
threefold, as
is
similarly says: said in De Anima^ III.

is
"Now
the
First,
the continuous
indivisible, since actually it

.
.
.
although potentially divisible.

visible
is
The
undivided, third kind of indi-
what
is
altogether indivisible, as a point
and unity,
which cannot be divided either actually or potentially/' 2 Now, in order to remove the difficulties we have pointed
out at the beginning of the chapter with regard to Spinoza's reproduction of the views of his opponents and also in order
the infinite extension which Spinoza affirms to be of the same kind with reference to divisibility as that which
to
make
Aristotle denies,
we must assume
that
when Spinoza
an
in his
arguments
against Aristotle's denial of
infinite extension
it
insists that extension is indivisible
he does not mean that
is indivisible like a point, that is to say, indivisible even potentially, but rather that it is indivisible like a continuous
quantity in Aristotle's
that
it is
own
indivisible in actuality.
use of the term, which means He is thus not arguing
against Aristotle from a new assumption which Aristotle would not admit, but he is rather arguing against him from
Aristotle's
own assumption. And, similarly, when he argues that his Aristotelian opponents believe that extension is divisible and is composed of parts, he does not mean to say
that they believe that extension
1
is
divisible into,
and com-
De /4nima,
III, 6, 430!), 6-8.
Theologica^ Pars I, Quaest. 85, Art. 8: "Dicitur autem indivisibile uno modo sicut continuum tripliciter, ut dicitur in 3 de Anima (text. 23 et deinceps)
:
Summa
est indivisibile, quia est
indivisum in actu,
licet
sit divisibile in
potentia.
Tertio
modo
dicitur indivisibile
quod
est
omnino
indivisibile, ut
punctus et unitas,
quae nee actu nee potentia dividuntur" (quoted (1895), un der "indivisibilis").
also
by
Schiitz in
Thomas -Lexikon
284

of,
[ETHICS,
posed
heterogeneous parts as
to say
is
what he means
were a discrete quantity; that, thinking as they do of extenif it
sion only as that
which
is
subject to accidental differences,
they believe it to be divisible into parts which are quantitatively different from one another, and from such an assumption they argue against the existence of an infinite extension
as one would argue against the infinite of a line or of matter if one started out with the divisibility assumption that a line is composed of points and that matter is composed of heterogeneous atoms dispersed in a
in
the
same way
vacuum.
this:
The
is
point which
have been trying
to
make
is
When
extension
is
opponents with a belief that Spinoza divisible, he does not mean to say that extension
charges his
held by them to be divisible into indivisible parts. What he means to say is that in their use of the divisibility of ex-
argument against its infinity they failed to distinguish between extension as an attribute, or what the
mediaevals would
as a
call
tension as an
an incorporeal extension, and extension

it is
mode, or
what the mediaevals would

former, because
tension.
The
a corporeal exdivisible into homogeneous

call
parts, can be called indivisible, and can therefore be infinite. The latter, however, because it is divisible into parts which
are quantitatively different, cannot be infinite. The attribute of extension is described by Spinoza in the
same terms
in which the infinite incorporeal substance is described in the passage quoted above from Averroes. It is "infinite from its very nature, or in virtue of its definition"
or "in virtue of
tension
it is
its
essence."
Like Crescas' incorporeal ex-
continuous and has no parts, for "part and whole are not true or real entities, but only things of reason, and
consequently there are in nature
1
[i.e.,
substantial extension]
11.
2-5).
PROP.
5 ,scHOL.]
285
neither whole nor parts." x It, therefore, "cannot be divided into parts, or can have no parts "; 2 but, as we have already pointed out, by this Spinoza simply means what Aristotle
would have sometimes described as being continuous and infinitely divisible and what Crescas would have characterized as not being
mode
" and divisible 3 just as any corporeal object, in parts the view of his predecessors, is divisible either into heterogeneous parts or into parts which are qualitatively or quanti.
composed except of parts of itself. The of extension, on the other hand, is "composed of finite
.
.
tatively different from each other. "Further/' says Spinoza, "as regards the parts in nature, we maintain that division, as has also been said already before, never takes place in substance, but always and only in the modes of substance.
want to divide water, I only divide the mode of 4 substance, and not substance itself/' Similarly, in the pasThus,
if I
sage quoted above from Averroes, we read: "Just as part of air is air, and part of flesh is flesh, so part of infinite is infinite, forasmuch as the part and the whole in each of these
and essence. If a difference is found in the parts of homoeomerous bodies [like air and flesh], it is due only to the subject which is the receptacle of the parts and not to the form, for if we imagine the form of a homoeomerous body without a subject, the parts and the whole
are one in definition
thereof will be the same in

difference/'
all
respects
and without any
be sure, Bruno, too, in his criticism of Aristotle's rejection of infinity dwells upon the absence
To
of parts in the
1
infinite,
but there
is
more
in Spinoza's state-
3
*
I, 2, 19 (Opera, I, p. 24, 11. 19-21). Kpistola 12 (Opera, IV, p. 53, 11. 12-13). Ethics, I, Prop. 15, Schol. (Opera, II, p. 59, 11. 2-3).
Short Treatise,
Short Treatise,
Cf.
I, 2,
21 (Opera, IV, p. 26,
11.
6-1
1).
The same illustration from

1.
water occurs also

5
in Ethics, I, Prop. 15, Schol. (Opera, II, p. 59,
35~p. 60,
1.
3).
De rtnfnito
universo et
Mondi,
Dial. II, p. 337 (ed. Lagarde).
286

is
[ETHICS,
merit than in Bruno's, and the excess of Crescas.
strongly reminiscent
Thus when Spinoza maintains

ence of an
against Aristotle the existdivisible.
infinite, indivisible extension, he does not reject
Aristotle's conception of the infinite as
something
The
indivisibility of his extension
is
not like the indivisibility
of a point, but rather like the indivisibility which Aristotle sometimes applies to a continuous quantity which is otherwise described by him as infinitely divisible. Again, when he charges his opponents with considering extension as divisible
points, he does not mean that they held extension to be a discrete quantity, similar to the discreteness of a line if it were supposed to consist of points; he only means to say that, denying the existence of pure
and composed of distinct
extension, they considered extension divisible and composed of parts on account of the qualitative or quantitative differences in the parts of the material subject in which it existed,
in the
and thus they argued against the infinity of extension same way as one could argue against the infinite divisimatter
if
bility of a line or of
one started with the assumption
that a line was composed of points and that matter was up of heterogeneous parts dispersed in a vacuum.
made
Against the existence of an
infinite extension there is an-
other argument the purpose of which is to show that the assumption of an infinite would give rise to the absurdity of one infinite being greater than another. This argument appears under various forms in many works of Hebrew and
Arabic philosophic literature, and it also occurs in the writings of Bruno. We shall restate here two versions of this
argument.
One
1
version
is
found
in
in Saadia,
by Crescas, and
Emunot
we-De'ot,
Bruno.
in Gersonides, followed In Gersonides, the argument is

(4).
I,
3,
Eighth Theory
PROP. 15, SCHOL.]
287
illustrated by the movements of the heavenly spheres and is aimed against the eternity and hence the infinity of time in
the past. Several propositions are assumed in this argument. First, some of the heavenly spheres move faster than others.
Second, in the same given time, the fast-moving spheres perform a greater number of rotations than the slow-moving.
Third, one infinite cannot be greater than another. Out of these propositions the argument may be formulated as follows:
If time be infinite in the past, then the fast-moving
number of
and slow-moving spheres will have performed an infinite rotations. But since the number of rotations of
the fast-moving sphere
must be greater than that of the slow-
moving, one
be greater than another. 1 In Bruno's argument the same difficulty is raised, but the illustration is taken from the division of infinite distance into an infinite
infinite will
number of paces
Spinoza's second
(or feet)
and an
"
infinite
number of
miles.
example follows closely these two arguments, resembling in form more that of Bruno than that of " Gersonides. Again, if infinite quantity is measured by
equal parts of a foot each, it must contain an infinite number of such parts, and similarly if it be measured by equal parts
Milhamot Adonai, VI, i, 1 1 (pp. 341-342) "Having laid down these premises, I contend that, if past time were infinite in quantity, it would follow that there could be no swift motion and slow motion among the spheres. The argument runs as
1
:
"
follows: The number of rotations performed by the swift-moving sphere in the past time, which is assumed to be infinite, must of necessity be infinite, and the same must be true of the number of rotations performed by the slow-moving sphere.
But inasmuch
infinite
as one infinite
number cannot be
greater nor smaller than another
number, it will follow that no one sphere is of swifter motion than another, for if one sphere moved more swiftly than another, the number of rotations of the swift sphere would of necessity be greater." This argument is reproduced in Or Adonai, III, i, 3 (p. 643).
Dial. II (p. 338): "El. Particolarmente di quello fare proposito nostro de gl' infiniti passi, et infinite migla che uerrebono un infinite minore, et un* altro infinite maggiore nell' immensitudine de 1'uniuerso."
3
De I* infinite universe etMondi,

al
che fa
Cf.
on the same page: "la dimensione
infinita
non 6 meno de
infiniti piedi,
che de
infinite migla."
288
[ETHICS,
of an inch each; and therefore one infinite number will be r twelve times greater than another infinite number." In his answer Bruno endeavors to show that in the infinite
there can be no distinction of
number and measure. "It
is
an absurdity to say that in the infinite one part is greater and another is smaller, and one part has a greater proportion
to the
whole and another a smaller/'
numerable and the immeasurable there

or less, few or
is
Again: "In the inno place for more
measure."
any distinction of number or is also made by Galileo: "These are some of those difficulties which arise from dis-
many, nor
for
similar statement
courses which our finite understanding makes about infinites, by ascribing to them attributes which we give to things finite and terminate, which I think most improper, because
not with
those attributes of majority, minority, and equality agree infinites, of which we cannot say that one is greater
sort of
4 than, less than, or equal to another." Exactly the same answer is given by Crescas to Gersonides' argument,
contains some of the same expressions: "The fast spheres will, indeed, in a certain time perform the same number of rotations that slow spheres will
and, strangely enough,
it
perform
1
in a greater time,
I,
when
the
11.
number of
33-37).
their rota-
Ethics,
2

pp. 337-338:
II, p. 57,
Op.
cit. t
"Essendo che implica contradittione che ne
1'infinito
sia
parte maggiore, et parte m'more, et parte che habbia magglore et minore proportione a quello."
3
De Immense
"
et
Innumerabilibus,
II, 8
(Opera Latina,
I, i, p.
284):
Innumero nempe atque immense non

Esse potest
pluris, modici, pauci,
locus ullus
Quae numeri
(English
p.
1
et
atque minoris, mensi discrimina cernimus esse."
translation
quoted
from
J.
Lewis
Mcln tyre's Giordano Bruno,

Nuove
Scienze,
I,
88.)
Discorsi e Dimostrazioni matematiche intorno a due
in
Le
Opere di Galileo Galilei (Firenze, 1890-1909), Vol. 8, p. 77, 11. 35 ff., quoted by Bertrand Russell in his Scientific Method in Philosophy p. 192, from Tho. Weston's
,
translation, p. 47.
PROP. i5,scHOL.]
289
of such a kind as can be described by the terms much and few, great and small, within a certain time limit, that is
tions
is
the number and the time are finite, and due to the fact that the fast sphere and the slow sphere cannot perform the same number of rotations
to say,
this
when both
is
indeed
in equal time.
is infinite,
But when the time
or the
number of rotations
neither of these can be described by the terms
much and
few, great and small, equal and unequal, for all these terms are determinations of measure, and measurabil-
ity does not
apply to an
ensue
if
both the fast
Hence, no absurdity will and the slow spheres have performed

infinite.
an
infinite
number of
number of
their rotations
rotations in the past, inasmuch as the cannot be properly described as
x great and small and unequal." similar distinction is to be discovered in Descartes' dif-
ferentiation between the infinite

illustrations he gives
it
is
and the
indefinite.
From
the
clear that
by the indefinite he
means that whose parts cannot be expressed by any number.
He
no
furthermore describes the indefinite as that which has

limits only "in a certain sense,"
is
from which
it
may
be
inferred that the real infinite
that which has no limits.
The
difference between the indefinite
and the
infinite, ac-
cording to Descartes, is whose parts cannot be expressed by any number and that which has no limits. By this distinction Descartes, like
therefore a difference between that
Crescas and Bruno, disposes of such questions against the existence of an infinite as, e.g., "whether the half of an infinite line is infinite."
2
The other
1
version of the argument

i,
is
found
in
Avicenna,
Or Adonai,
5,
III,
(p. 670).
I,
Principia Philosophiac,
Schol.
26,
II,
Prop.
* Al-Najat, II: Physics (Rome, 1593), p. 33, reproduced in Carra de Vaux's Aviccnnc> p. 201.
290
1

4
[ETHICS,
Saadia and Bahya, 2 Abraham ibn Daud, 3 and Crescas cites it in the name of Altabrizi in an Altabrizi.
Algazali,
abridged and modified form.

"
We
quote
it
here from Crescas:
Suppose we have a line infinite only in one direction. To this line we apply an infinite line [which is likewise infinite
only in one direction], having the finite end of the second line fall on some point near the finite end of the first line.
It
would then follow that one
infinite
[i.e.
the
first line]
would be greater than another infinite [i.e., the second line]. But this is impossible, for it is well known that one infinite
cannot be greater than another/'
s
refutation given by Crescas of this argument is again based upon the distinction between the infinite in the sense
The
of the indefinite or of its being incapable of measurement and the infinite in the sense of its having no limits. To quote:
impossibility of one infinite being greater than another is true only with respect to measurability, that is to say, when we use the term greater' in the sense of being greater
'
"The
by a certain measure, and that indeed

an
infinite is
immeasurable.
is impossible because In this sense, to be sure, the
first
one-side infinite line [in Altabrizi's argument] will not be greater than the second one-side infinite line, inasmuch as
is
neither of them
the
first line is
measurable
in its totality.
Thus indeed
not greater than the second, though it extends the second on the side which is finite." 6 What Crescas beyond is trying to do is to point out the possibility of an extension
1
Ma fyajid al-Falasifah,
347we-De'ot,
I, 3,
II,
(p. 126),
quoted by
(3);
me
in Crescas* Critique of Aris-
totle, p.
2
Kmunot
Eighth Theory
Robot ha-Lebabot>
I, 5.
J
*
Emunah Ramah, I, 4. Commentary on Maimonides' Twenty-five

',
Propositions, Prop.
I,
quoted
in
my
5
Or Adonaiy Or Adonai>
I, i, I, ii,
I i
pp. 145-146. (p. 5a-b). Cf. Crescas' Critique 0} Aristotle ^ p. 149. Cf. Crescas' Critique oj Aristotle > pp. 190-191. (p. 153).
PROP. 15, SCHOL.]
in the sense that its parts
291
which
cannot be equated with or explained by any number and still is not infinite in the sense that it has no limits. Such, for instance, are the
is infinite
lines in Altabrizi's
but
argument, which are infinite on one side on the other. When two such immeasurable but limfinite
ited infinites are given, then while indeed one of
them cannot
be conceived as greater than the other in the sense that the total number of its parts can be expressed by a number which
is
greater,
still it
in
the sense that
can be conceived as greater than the other it can extend beyond the other on the
infinite
limited side.
The reason why one immeasurable
can-
not be said to be greater than another, says Crescas, is that their parts cannot be expressed by any number and therefore the terms great
It
is,
and small are inapplicable to them. " " as a refutation of his second therefore, example
Spinoza
in his letter to
in the Ethics that
Meyer charges
his
opponents with the failure to make a distinction "between that which is called infinite because it has no limits, and that
whose parts we cannot equate with or explain by any number, although we know its maximum and minimum/' concluding " that, had they made such a distinction, they would also have
1
understood which kind of

than another
infinite
can be conceived as greater
infinite, without any complication, and which cannot be so conceived." 2 The wording of Spinoza's answer
is
strikingly reminiscent of both Crescas and Descartes. Back again to Aristotle, byway of Averroes, Altabrizi,
for the source of Spinoza's third
and
"exCrescas, we must go ample." In the De Caelo, Aristotle advances a series of arguments to prove from the circular movements of the heavenly spheres that the heavens cannot be infinite, for if they were
infinite
they could not revolve in a

11.
circle.
One of
11.
these
Fpistola 12 (Optra, IV, p. 53,
5-8).
Ibid. (p. 53,
14-15).
292

1
[ETHICS,
arguments, reproduced by Crescas from Averroes, runs as

follows:
Let Let
Let
ACE be an infinite circle. CA and CB be infinite radii. CA revolve on its centre C.

CB
be fixed.
Let
If an infinite sphere could rotate
upon
itself,
then
CA
would sometimes have to fall on CB. But the distance AB is infinite, and an
cannot be traversed.
infinite distance
Consequently, CA could never fall on CB. Hence, no infinite body could have circular motion.
An argument advanced by Altabrizi seems

tion of this Aristotelian argument.
It is
to be a modifica-
more general than
the Aristotelian argument in that it is detached from the illustration of the movements of the spheres. Crescas reproduces it in the name of "one of the moderns" as a rein-
it
forcement of Aristotle's argument. In Crescas' restatement read as follows: "The same difficulty [according to this
version of the argument] would arise in the case of any two

lines
common point if they were supposed distance between any two such lines at the point where they are intersected by a common chord would undoubtedly increase in proportion to the extension
emerging from a
to be infinite.
The
of the lines, and as the lines are assumed to be infinite, the

distance between
1
them would
Cf.
likewise have to be infinite.

27 ib, 27-27 2a, 7; Crescas' Critique
Or Adonai,
I, i,
(p. 73).
De
Cae/o,
I, 5,
of Aristotle, pp. 169 and 379-380.
PROP. 15, SCHOL.]
z
293
the
if
In almost exactly But this is self-evidently impossible." same terms Spinoza states his third "example." "Lastly,
from one point of any infinite quantity it be imagined that two lines, AE y AC which at first are at a certain and determinate distance from one another, be infinitely extended, it is plain that the distance between B and C will be continually increased, and at length from being determinate will be
y
indeterminable."
tion
In his answer Crescas again brings into play the distincbetween the infinite and the indefinite. He endeavors
show that while any given distance between any two points in the infinitely extending lines must be finite, the distance between them may be said to be infinite in the sense that whatever distance we take there is always a greater distance beyond it. It is analogous to what Aristotle says of magnitude and number that, while they are both finite in actuality
to
they are
infinite in capacity, in so far as
magnitude
is infi-
nitely divisible
and number
is
infinitely addible.
is
They
is
are
in this sense infinite, "for the infinite
not that beyond
which there
is
nothing, but
3
it is
that of which there

in part:
always
something beyond."
[infinitely] in the
[infinitely],
To
quote him
as
"To
this the
opponent of Aristotle
but
it
may
answer that distance increases
same manner
number
is
said to increase
bility of infinite
always remains limited. That the possiincrease is not incompatible with its being
actually limited may be seen from the case of infinite decrease, for the examination into contraries is by one and the
same
science. 4 It has
it is
been demonstrated
in the
book on Conic
Sections that
r
possible for a distance infinitely to decrease

Cf. Crescas' Critique of Aristotle^ pp. 171
IT, p. 57,
11.
Or Adonai,
Ethics,
I,
loc. cit.
and 381-382.
a 3
Prop. 15 (Opera,
37
ff.).
Physics, III, 6, 207.1, 1-2.

Cf. Metaphysics,
XI,
3,
06 1 a,
19.
294

still
[ETHICS,
is
and
never completely to disappear. 1
It
assume, for instance, two lines which, by

they are extended, are brought
other, and
infinity.
still will
how
possible to much farther

to
by so much nearer
each
If,
never meet, even if they are produced to in the case of decrease, there is a certain distance
in
it
which always remains and does not disappear, a fortiori

the case of increase
should be possible for a distance,

. .
though
infinitely increased,
is
This, to be sure,
2 always to remain limited. remote from the imagination, but reason
3 compels us to assume it." Now, Spinoza does not furnish us with any direct answer to the third "example," though his distinction between the
infinite
and the
indefinite
may
apply to
it.
But when he
Meyer that his opponents failed to dis" between that which we can only undertinguish, thirdly, stand but cannot imagine, and that which we can also imsays in his letter to
4
agine,"
last
may we
not assume that
it is
a reminiscence of the
statement by which Crescas concludes his lengthy refu-
tation of the
third
full
argument which is the exact prototype of the "example"? Had Spinoza taken the trouble to give a expression to what he had in mind when he quoted remi-
niscently this third distinction, he would undoubtedly have given us a paraphrase of this last quoted of Crescas' refutations, as
he did,
in part, at least, of his
two other
distinc-
tions; or, perhaps, he

1
would have gone

Theorem
13.
still
further and said

des figure's,
Apollonius, Conic Sections, II,
See
Munk, Guide
I,
p. 410, n. 2.
2
Or Adonai, I, ii, I Or Adonai, he. cit.
(p. i6a).
(p. i6b).
Cf. Crescas' Critique of Aristotle, p. 207. Cf. Crescas' Critique of Aristotle, p. 21 1, That the
last
ment and not merely

remarks:
statement of Crescas about imagination and reason refers to the entire arguto the passage immediately preceding it may be gathered from
Maimonides, who, speaking of the problem cited from the Conic Sections, similarly "This is a fact which cannot easily be conceived, and which does not
come within
the scope of the imagination" (Moreh Nebukim, Epistola 12 (Opera, IV, p. 53, 11. 8-10).
I,
73, Prop. 10).
PROP. 15, SCHOL.]
295
with a generous but rather patronizing gesture:
Nam,
ut
ipsam apud Judceum quendam Rab Ghasdaj

y
vocatum, re-
sic sonat.
The
transliteration of IJasdai ('KIDF!)
method of
transliterating the
Hebrew
Ilet
(!"!)
by "Ghasdai" follows Spinoza's own by gh. Cf. his Compendium Gram-
matices Linguae Hebraa, Cap. II (Opera, I, p. 288, 1. 18). The form "Jacdai" (Opera, IV, p. 61, 1. 35) which occurs in Leibniz's copy of the letter evidently represents the Spanish-Portuguese transliteration of the name.
ments published by Fritz Baer

the
name
is
In old Spanish docuDie Juden im Christlichen Spanien, I (1929), usually written "Azday." But the following forms also occur: "Adin his
zay"
(p. 712),
"nAzday"
generally
(pp. 499, 676), "Azay" (pp. 616, 723), "Azdray" (p. 1000), "Nazday" (p. 699). In these documents the personal name is followed by the surname "Cresques," but it occurs also without it (pp.
"Atzay"
(p. 676),
dola's
In Giovanni Francesco Pico della Miran741, 1000), as here in Spinoza's letter. Examen Doctrinae Vanitatis Gentium, VI, 2, the name is transliterated
"Hasdai" and
is
not followed by the surname.

Cf.
references to Crescas in the works of Isaac ben
Nor is the surname given in the Shem-Tob and Shem-Tob ben
Joseph ben Shem-Tob.

2
my
Crescas
11.
Critique of Aristotle, pp. 32-33.
17-18).

I.
MATERIALITY AND CAUSALITY OF GOD
AFTER
God
recapitulating his position as to the materiality of in Proposition XIV, Spinoza proceeds in logical order
is
to state his conclusion that there
nothing in the material

it
world which
is
not in God,
or, to
put
is, is
in the
words of
his
God, and nothing can either be or be conceived without God." Taken by itself, this proposition would seem to be nothing but a repetiProposition XV, "whatever
in
own
tion of the ordinary assertions of the
omnipresence of
God
which are current
in the literature of
Spinoza himself acknowledges as
much when
every religion. he says that
In fact,
"like Paul, and perhaps also like all ancient philosophers ... I assert that all things live and move in God; and I
would dare Hebrews as

tions/'
r
to say that
far as
it is
agree also with
all
the ancient
possible to surmise
from their tradi-
By
"all
ancient philosophers"
refers in his
refers not only to the Stoic poets
whom
Paul himself
he undoubtedly Aratus and Cleanthes, to statement "as certain also
2 poets have said," and not only to the Stoics in general, whose God was material like the God of Spinoza, but also to those who like Aristotle conceived of God as
of your
own
immaterial, for, though immaterial and hence separated from the universe, that God was still He in whom the universe could be said to have
its
formal, efficient, and
being, inasmuch as He was final cause. 3 Similarly by the "anits
cient
1
Hebrews" Spinoza does not

a
refer only to the teachings

3
Epistola 73.
Acts
17, 28. Cf.
Commentaries ad loc.
Cf. below, p. 302.
PROPS. 15-18]
297
of the
Bible but also, and perhaps more particuto the teachings of Judaism at the time of Paul, in its larly, Palestinian and Hellenistic branches, for the omnipresence
Hebrew
of
The
emphasized by both of these branches of Judaism. on this point, used by both the rabbis and Philo, is the statement which is quoted constantly in
is
God
classic expression
the Middle Ages by Jewish as well as Christian philosophers, 1 namely, that God is the place of the world. The belief in the omnipresence of God has continued to be a religious common-
place in Judaism as well as Christianity and Mohammedanism, and has been maintained by every shade of religious
opinion, though, perhaps, not always without some slight shade of logical inconsistency. The most pertinent passage for our present purpose, both on account of its source and on
account of
Hymn
its phrasing, of Unity, which

all
. .
is
is
the following quotation from the included in the Jewish liturgy:

fillest all;
"Thou encompassest all, Thou art in all.

.
and
and since Thou
art
Thou
art not separated or
detached
from anything, nor is any place empty or devoid of Thee. Thou art and existeth in all; all is Thine, and all is from
.
Thee."
'
But while the proposition taken by itself contains nothing new, it is used by Spinoza in a different sense. He himself alludes to that difference in its use when he says in his reference to Paul and all ancient philosophers that he agrees
with their assertion, "though in another way." What the difference between them is becomes clear in Proposition XV,
for this proposition
is
to be understood as a criticism of the

in first affirming that all things are
is
mediaeval inconsistency
in
God and
1
then denying that matter
in
God. For when
ii,
i;
Genesis Rabbah 68, 9 ft al., Philo, De Somniis, I, 11; Crescas, Or Adonai, I, Leibniz, Nouveaitx Essais, II, 13, 17. Cf. my Crescas' Critique of Aristotle,
>
pp. 123, 201.
Shirha-Yihud,
III.
298

all is
[ETHICS,
the mediaevals reiterated their statements that
God
is all
and
from God and
in
reservation with regard to matter was not from God nor

side of
nihilo,
God, they had to make a mental matter. God was not matter, and
in
God, according
to Aristotle;
God. Matter existed by the it was created by God ex
according to the generally accepted view of all the three religions; it appeared somewhere in the process of
emanation, according to the emanationists. The statement that God is all and all is from God and in God could not be
taken in
its full
and
literal
sense that
"
whatever is,
is in
God
"
except by one
terial.
who
like
Spinoza asserted that
God was ma-
means to assert, only this that Proposition that matter as well as form is in God, or does it namely, mean more than this? Does it not mean a complete denial
But
is it
XV
of the separation of God from the world, with the inevitable consequence of the disappearance of God as a distinct being
either in thought or in reality?
In the history of philosophy Spinoza's conception of God has been characterized by different names. In his own day, it was called deism of the type that flourished then in France,
1
and
it
was
this
also stigmatized as a disguised kind of atheism.
3 imputation of atheism was renewed by Jacobi, Hegel quibbled about its being akosmism rather than atheism. 4 Novalis met the charge of atheism by declaring Spinoza
When
man a declaration which explains use of the term God rather than its meanSpinoza's profuse ing. The term pantheism is the one which has been most
a God-intoxicated
5
1
Epistola 42.
3
Kpistola 43.
Veber die Lehre des Spinoza in briefen an den llerrn Moses Mendelssohn, 1785.
p. 74;
Werke (1819), Vol. IV, i, p. 216. Encyclopddie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, I, 50 (ed. Bolland), Vorlesungen uber die Geschichte der Philosophie (ed. Bolland), p. 891.
Cf. Jacobi's
4
5
Schriften (ed. Paul
Kluckhohn, Leipzig [1892]), Vol.
Ill, p. 318,
253.
PROPS. 15-18]

it.
299
often applied to
ings of Spinoza
Avenarius,
who
has stratified the writ-
on the basis of the use of the terms Na-
ture, God, and Substance, just as the higher critics stratify the Pentateuch on the basis of the use of the terms Jehovah
and Elohim, has discovered three phases
in
the develop-
ment of Spinoza's pantheism, which he designates by the

and Substantive All-in-one
will find it
following terms: Naturalist All-in-one, Theistic All-in-one, l a distinction in which one
hard to discover any difference.
Windelband
these subtleties aside and declares outright that Spinoza's conception of God is "complete and unreserved
brushes
all
pantheism."
The problem before us, however, is not to devise a fitting term by which Spinoza's conception of God can be adequately described, but rather to find out whether his God is absolutely
identical with the aggregate totality of particular things or
whether
He does in some way transcend it. When we leave what others have said about Spinoza's God and turn to what
he himself has said about Him, we find that the matter does not become any clearer. Though he makes reference to the
characterization of his religion as one which "does not rise above the religion of the Deists," 3 he does not definitely
disclaim
Perhaps he saw no need of disclaiming it, since the author of that statement had done it himself when he
it.
said that "unless
am
mistaken
in
my
conjecture, this
man
does not include himself in the ranks of the Deists, and does not allow men to return to the least bit of religious worship." 4
Nor does he
1
disclaim the charge of atheism except in so far as

All-Einheit^ Thcisitischc All-Einheit, Substanzialistische
ersten
Naturalistischc
All-
Einheit. Cf.
R. Avenarius, Ucbcrdie bcidcn
Phasendcs Spinozischcn Pantheis-
mus
2
(Leipzig, 1868).
Gtschichte der Philosophic (jrd edition), p. 336; English translation,

J
A History
of Philosophy y p. 409.
4
Epistolae 42 and 43.
Epistola 42.
300
the term

meant
in his
[ETHICS,
inordinately honors this evidence from silence are his positive statements. While in one place he asserts that "those who think that the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus rests
man who is "wont to desire No more conclusive than and riches."

time a
x
on
this,
namely, that
God
and nature (by which they mean a certain mass, or corporeal 2 matter) are one and the same, are mistaken/' in another place he asserts that "I could not separate God from nature
as all of
still
have any knowledge have done/' 3 and in another place he identifies the terms God and nature.
I
whom
All that one can with certainty gather from these passages
is
that while Spinoza did not identify God with nature conceived as an inert mass of matter, he did identify Him with
it when conceived in all its infinite attributes. Nor, finally, can we get more light on the question from his statement that "the universe is God," s for here, too, the statement may merely mean, as may be judged from the context, "that
things [that is to say, including matter] emanate neces6 But does it also mean that sarily from the nature of God."
all
God
is
nothing but the aggregate of particular things which
constitute the universe?
light
Since the uttered statements of Spinoza do not throw any on the question, we shall try the use of the historical
method in order to solve our problem. We shall give an analysis of the salient features of the traditional conception of God which Spinoza constantly uses as the target for
critical
his criticism.
it
We
shall also try to find
out what elements of
he criticized and ultimately rejected. Finally we shall try to reconstitute Spinoza's conception of God out of those
1
Kpistola 43.
3
Kpistola 73.
Kpistola 6. Short Treatise, Epistola 43.

Ibid.
I, 2,
12 (Opera,
I, p.
22,
11.
9-13).
PROPS. 15-18]

God which were
tries to
left
301
elements of the traditional

uncriticized.
by him
is
The God of tradition whom Spinoza sometimes depicted by him disdainfully

morphic crudity as
1
dethrone
in all his
anthropo-
He was
vulgar.
But
this
may
pictured in the minds of the be considered only as an occasional
departure from what is really his general practice. As a rule, the conception of God which he criticizes is that of the philosophers, of the "men who have in any way looked into the
divine nature/'
*
This conception of
God
is
marked by two
All the
main
characteristics, immateriality
and
causality.
problems raised about the nature of God by philosophers throughout the Middle Ages can be grouped together under
these two terms.
rise to
bility,
The
immateriality of
God
it is
which gives
His unity, simplicity, immutability, and incomparaout of which springs the complexity of problems which
go under the general name of attributes. But such a conception of God's immateriality takes God completely out of the universe, which is not what the mediaeval philosophers
wanted
to do.
And
so,
immediately after they establish
the absolute immateriality of God, they turn around and try to introduce God back into the universe by establishing a
certain causal relation between them.
sality of
It
is
through the cauis
God
that the world comes into being and
ruled
and guided by Him. God's omnipresence, omniscience, omnipotence, and benevolence of which they all speak are
nothing but different ways of expressing the fact of divine
These, then, are the two main characteristics of of traditional philosophy. Now Spinoza's criticism of this conception of God in Ethics, I, falls into two parts,
causality.
the
God
corresponding to these
1
its
two main
characteristics,
immate-
E.g., Ethics,
>
I,
Prop. 15, Schol.
Ibid.
302
riality

and
[ETHICS,
causality. The first fifteen propositions are all a of the immateriality of God, culminating in Propcriticism in the statement that "whatever is, is in God," osition
XV
which, as we have shown, means that everything, including matter, is in God. Beginning now with Proposition XVI to
the end of the First Part, he criticizes the old conceptions of the causality of God. In this chapter, however, we shall deal
only with Propositions XVI-XVIII. In order to be able to follow Spinoza's criticism, we must first give a formal statement of what the mediaevals meant
by divine
into four:
final.
causality.
Causes have been divided by Aristotle
the material, the formal, the efficient,
and the
Beginning with this commonplace of philosophy, the mediaevals asked themselves which of these causes God is.
He
cannot be the material cause, they said, for
God
is
im-
material.
He must
is
therefore be the three other causes.

this point.
Mai-
monides
worth quoting on
its
"It has been shown

except the First the
in the science of physics that everything,
origin material, the formal, the efficient,
Cause, owes
to the following four causes
and the
final.
These are
itself
is
sometimes proximate, sometimes remote, but each by called a cause. They also believe and I do not
their belief
final cause.
differ
from
formal, and
that God, blessed be He, " r
is
the efficient,
Now,
in
seen, Spinoza
opposition to the mediaevals, as we have already makes God a material cause. Again, in opposi-
unmakes God
Spinoza then to him, if he were to retain the Aristotelian terminology, would be a material,
as the final cause.
tion to the mediaevals, as
we
shall see subsequently,
God
formal, and efficient cause.

Aristotle
But
this
terminology even in
was not unalterably fixed. The final and efficient causes are identified by him with the formal cause, and thus
1
Morch Nebukim,
I,
69.
PROPS. 15-18]
303
the only real contrast between causes is that of the material and formal. 1 This identification of the three causes is found
also in
Maimonides.
2
in natural things the efficient, formal,
"Aristotle has already explained that and final causes are
how in Spinoza's reasoning, of the old Aristotelian terms matter and with his discarding form, the old designation of causes as material and formal " In creation," he says, "no other causes likewise disappears. concur except the efficient one." 3 God is therefore spoken
identical."
We
can readily see
of by him as the efficient cause, for even as a material and formal cause, it is only through the active properties of ex-
cause
tension and thought that God is conceived as cause. Efficient is thus to him the most applicable description of God,
efficient in the
all
most general sense of active and as the sum of conditions that make for causality. There is a suggestion
of this kind of reasoning in Spinoza's statement that "since substance is the principle of all its modes, it may with greater
right be called active than passive."
4
But
in
order to show
the difference between his conception of God as efficient cause and that of the mediaevals, he analyzes their conception of efficient cause and tries to show in what respect he de-
parts from them. In the Short treatise, where an entire chapter is devoted to the explanation "that God is a cause of all things," 5
Spinoza borrows a current eightfold classification of the Aristotelian efficient cause, which has been traced to the
work of
1
Dutch philosopher by the name of Burgersdijck, 6

327-330 (3rd
edition).
Zeller, Philosophic der Griechen, II, 2, pp.
English trans-
lation, Aristotle, I, pp.

3
355~35 8
Moreh Nebukim,
Short Treatise, Short Treatise,
III, 13.
I, p.
Cogitata Mctaphysica, II, 10 (Opera,

I, 2, I, 3.
I,
268,
11.
11.
25-26).
4
s
25 (Opera,
I, p.
26,
29-31).
Cf. A. Trendelenburg, Historische
Institution** Logicae, Lib.
Cap. XVII.
304
to

in
[ETHICS,
show "how and
what sense God
is
a cause." This eight-
fold classification, with the exception of the eighth, which appears later in the Scholium of Proposition XXVIII, is em-
bodied
in
Propositions
XVI-XVIII
of Ethics,
I.
The
is
corre-
spondence between them, preliminary to our discussion of

the meaning of these seven kinds of efficient cause,
here-
with given:
Ethics, I
Short 'Treatise,
7.
I,
Prop. Prop.
Prop.
XVI XVI
XVI
XVI
Universal cause
Corol.
i.
Emanative, productive,
active, efficient cause
2
Corol. 2 ....
Corol. 3. Corol. i
.
4.
Cause through himself

(essential) First, initial cause
Prop. Prop. Prop. Prop.
6.
5.
XVII XVII XVIII
Corol. 2.
3.
2.
Principal cause Free cause Immanent cause
However, while Spinoza has borrowed the scheme and terminology of the classification from Burgersdijck, he has made
free use of
this
list
it
for his
are
own purpose. The causes enumerated in what the mediaevals themselves would have
ascribed to God, but when used by Spinoza there is an implication that these causes are more truly applicable to his
own conception
But
let
of God's causality than to theirs. us follow out this implied contention of Propositions XVI-XVIII that only God as conceived by Spinoza is in the
true sense a universal,
efficient, essential, first,
principal, free,
and immanent cause.

Beitrage zur Philosophic, Vol. Ill, p. 317 (Berlin, 1867); Ch. Sigwart, Benedict de Spinoza's kurzer Tractat (2nd ed.), p. 171; A. Wolf, Spinoza's Short Treatise, pp.
spondence of Prop.
3
Sigwart seems to have overlooked the correcit., p. 172. 6 and Corollary i of Prop. 16 in the Ethics to the 7th and ist classifications in the Short Treatise.
1
Cf. Sigwart, op.

1
uytv/oejende, daarstellende, doende, werkende.
PROPS.
5-i 8]
305
the mediaevals, from the principle that God is a pure simple form and that "a simple element can produce only " a simple thing it appeared as an inevitable conclusion that,
To
necessary emanation was to be the theory explaining the origin of the world, the direct emanation from God must be
if
one simple Intelligence and that matter must therefore emerge subsequently in the process. According to this view,
1
while of
all
God may
indeed be considered as indirectly the cause
the variety of material things, He is directly only the cause of one simple thing. In this sense, then, God is
really
what was
called a particular cause as contrasted with
a universal cause, for the latter kind of cause meant the 2 Thus while the mediaeability to produce various things.
vals
would undoubtedly
3
insist
upon
calling
God
a universal
cause,
they could not
really call
Him
a universal cause in
the strict sense of the term.
direct cause of both extended
But to Spinoza, since God is the modes and thinking modes,
God
can truthfully be called a universal cause. Furthermore, Spinoza's God can be called a universal cause
with more right than the God of the mediaevals for still another reason. Though the mediaevals believed like Spinoza that God is infinite, still they did not believe, for reasons
we
all
shall discuss later, that
God
ever did or ever will create
the infinite things which He has in His mind and which might be created. The world is finite as contrasted with God
*
was a. particular and not did not create everything that was in His mind. But to Spinoza, just as from the two known
is infinite.
who
Their
God
therefore
a universal cause, since
He
attributes arise the
the infinite attributes, which are

1
known modes of the world, so also from unknown to us but which

2
Moreh Nebtikim,
I,
22.
Short Treatise,
p. 254, n. 2.
I,
3,
2 (7).
*
4
Cf. quotation from Cf. below, pp. 314
Thomas Aquinas,
ff.
above,
and 411
ff.
306
exist
[ETHICS,
and are conceived as an idea in the infinite intellect of God, arise an infinite number of modes unknown to us. The world is as infinite as God, though only two of its modes are
1
known
XVI.
to us,
true sense of the term.

It
is
and God therefore is a universal cause in the This is what lies behind Proposition
fullest expression
a denial of the mediaeval view that the world
of God's being. If the world were finite, he argues, then God could be called only a particular cause and not a universal cause. But the
is finite
and not the
world
is
not
finite,
for
"from the necessity of the divine
numbers of things in infinite ways (that is nature to say, all things which can be conceived by the infinite intellect) must follow" (Prop. XVI). Hence God can be truly
infinite
called a universal cause.
But in what manner do the modes follow from God? In the Middle Ages it was said that they follow from God by the process of emanation, and emanation was defined as a
special kind of efficient causation
which applies exclusively
to the action of an immaterial agent
upon a material
object.
is
"Inasmuch
as
it
has been demonstrated that
God
incor-
poreal and has also been established that the universe is His work and that He is its efficient cause ... we say that the
universe has been created by divine emanation and that God is the emanative cause of everything that comes into God then is called by the mediaevals being within it."
l
the efficient cause only in a restricted sense, in the sense of
emanative cause.
But
to Spinoza, that distinction
between
the act of a corporeal agent and the act of an incorporeal agent does not exist. He therefore declares unqualifiedly
that
"God
is
the efficient cause,'*
that
is
to say, the efficient
cause
1
in its general unrestricted sense. and

66.
*
In the Short Treatise

II, 12.
i.
Cf. Epistolae 63, 64, Ibid.
Moreh Nebukim,
Ethic s^
I,
Prop. 16, Coroi.
PROPS. 15-18]

still
307
that
he makes his point
clearer
when he says
God
can be called indifferently the "emanative," "productive," "active," or "efficient" cause, all of which "we regard as one
and the same, because they involve each other." Probably the mediaevals themselves would subscribe
self (per se y essentially),
to
Spinoza's next statement that "God is cause through himand not through that which is acci-
dental (per accidens)."*
But
still,
since the world of
which
they maintain God is the cause is unlike God in nature, God being immaterial and the world being material, then, despite their protestations, God must be considered not as an essential cause but as
an accidental cause, for one of the mean-
ings of essential cause, and the one which Spinoza has found in Bergersdijck and Heereboord, is that the cause produces
something of its own kind. When the cause produces something which is not of its own kind, it is called accidental
Consequently, since according to the mediaevals the world which was produced by God is not of His kind, for God is immaterial and the world is material, God then is
cause. 3
only an accidental cause. Similarly the mediaevals would whole-heartedly subscribe to Spinoza's fourth characterization of divine causality contained in his declaration that
cause.'*
4
In fact,
God
"God is absolutely the first has been called the first cause ever
God
But behind this statement of Spinoza's that the "absolutely" first cause there is an unexpressed argument that the mediaevals could not with full right call
since Aristotle.
is
1
Short Treatise
Ethics,
I,
',
1,
1
3,
2 (i).
Prop.
6, Corel. 2.
Cf. Burgcrsdijck, Institutions Lo$icae, Lib. I, Cap. XVII, Theor. XV-XVI; Heereboord, Hermcneia Logica, Lib. I, Cap. XVII, Quaest. XVI: "Similiter, cum animal sibi simile generat, dicitur causa per sc generati animalis; cum generat
monstrum,
Ethics,
dicitur causa per accidens."

I,
Prop.
6,
Corol. 3.
308
their

God
an absolutely
is is
[ETHICS,
first
cause.
Spinoza, a distinction
causes.
made between two kinds

is
In the source used by of first
One
called the absolutely first cause (causa absocalled a first cause in its
lute prima)
and the other
own kind
(causa prima suo genere). An absolutely first cause is described not only as a cause which is the first in a series of
causes, but also as one which
else.
1
is
in
no way dependent upon
In fact, absolute independence of anything anything else, whether external to God or within Him, is what the
mediaevals themselves
as the first cause
in
insist upon when they describe God and as necessary existence. 2 It is with this
mind
He
that Spinoza argues here against the emanationists. seems to say: Inasmuch as according to the emanationists
God
could not produce matter directly by himself but only through His emanations, i.e., the Intelligences, God is de-
pendent, as it were, on his own emanations. He is therefore not an absolutely first cause. It is only Spinoza's God who
produces everything directly by the necessity of His own nature and is in no way whatsoever dependent upon anything else that can be rightfully called an absolutely first cause.
II.
GOD
AS FREE CAUSE
l
and first, God is also a and free cause. 3 With these Spinoza introduces principal another one of his fundamental departures from mediaeval
Besides universal\
efficient , essential\
philosophy. of freedom
On
may
the whole, Spinoza's views on the problem be treated under three headings: i. The
definition of the terms "free"

1
and "necessary."
I, I,
2.
How
Cf. Burgersdijck, Institutions Logicae, Lib.
Cap. XVII, Theor.
1-2; Heereboord,
Hcrmeneia Logica, Lib.
Cap. XVII, Quaest.
XXIX, XXVI; idem.
Meletemata Philosophica, Disputationts ex Philosophia Selcctae, Vol. II, Disp. XVII. a Cf. Ma)?a$id al-Falasijah, II, ii, 5-6 (pp. 139-140): "He [who is described as having necessary existence] does not depend upon anything else." Cf. also Emunah
Ramah,
II,
(p. 47),
Ethics,
I,
quoted below, Vol. II, p. 40. Prop. 17 and Corol. r-2; Short Treatise,
I,
3,
2 (3-5).
PROPS.
5-i 8]
309
in
our interpreta3. tion of Proposition XVII we shall deal only with the first two topics, leaving the third topic to be discussed in our interpretation of the next group of propositions.
is free.
God
How man is not free.
Here
His own understanding of the terms
free
and necessary
is
made
and
quite clear free which exists

is
by Spinoza himself: "That thing is called from the necessity of its own nature alone,
itself alone.
determined to action by
is
That
thing,
on
the other hand,
which by another is fixed and prescribed manner/'

to this definition?
called necessary, or rather compelled, determined to existence and action in a

x
But how did Spinoza come and simply to explain the metaphysical and philological reasoning which had led
We shall
try briefly
Spinoza to formulate this definition. The problem of freedom is sometimes discussed by the mediaevals as a problem of possibility. The question whether
anything is absolutely free is thus stated as a question whether anything is absolutely possible. In Crescas, for
instance, the headings over the chapters on freedom read: "An exposition of the view of him who believes that the
nature of possibility exists/' "An exposition of the view of him who believes that the nature of possibility does not
There is a suggestion of this method of formulatthe problem of freedom in the Short Treatise where in the ing chapter on "Divine Predestination" Spinoza raises the
exist."
2
question "whether there are in nature any accidental things, that is to say, whether there are any things which may hap-
The phraseology used here pen and may also not happen." reflects the Aristotelian definitions of the accidenby Spinoza tal and the possible. The former is reproduced by Crescas
'
as that which
1
"has
7.
I, 6,
in itself the possibility

a
of being and of
Ethics,
*
I,
Def.
Or Adonai,
II, v, 1-2.
Short Treatise,
2.
3 io

x
[ETHICS,
not being'*;
the latter
is
given by Aristotle himself as that

2
which
"may
either be or not be."
have already called attention on several occasions to the mediaeval threefold division of possibility and necessity,
namely,
(i) possible
We
per
se y (2) possible
per
se
but necessary
necessary per se. We have also called attention to the fact that Spinoza has made
in consideration of its cause,
and
(3)
use of this threefold classification and that he has designated the possible per se by the term contingent and the possible
per
but necessary in consideration of its cause by the 3 Now, the question raised by the general term possible.
se
mediaevals through Crescas whether the nature of the possible exists really means whether pure possibility, i.e., possibility per se y exists.
Crescas' answer
is
in the negative.
There
is
for for everything a cause

in
nothing in nature which can be described as pure possibility, can be found. So actually nothing
nature
possible per se; everything which necessary in consideration of its cause.
is
is
se is se
possible per Possible per

it is
does not represent an actual thing in nature;
only a
logical distinction
secundum
quid.*
It is this
conception of
the possible per se as merely a logical distinction secundum quid that must have led Spinoza to designate it by the term
contingent, which, in Spinoza's definition of it, appears also as purely a logical distinction in things. According to this
view, then, actually existent things fall only under two divisions, those which are necessary by their cause and those which are necessary by their own nature. These two meanings of necessary, in fact, correspond to two out of the five meanings that Aristotle attaches to the term. That which
1
Or Adonai,
I, i, 8.
Cf.
my
Crescas' Critique oj Aristotle , p. 249
and
p. 551, n. 2;
Physics, VIII, 5, 2565, 9-10.

a * <
Metaphysics t IX, 8, io5ob, 1 1-12. Cf. Crescas' Critique oj Aristotle, p. 551, n. 3. Cogitata Metaphysica, I, 3; Ethics, IV, Defs. 3-4. Cf. above, pp. 188 ff. HD 1X3. Cf. Or Adonai, II, v, 3: ... nrn33 .
.
.
PROPS. 15-18]
is

its
311
cause corresponds to necessary in the necessary by Aristotle describes as compulsory, 1 and that sense which
which
is
necessary by
its
own nature corresponds
to necessary
in the sense
which Aristotle describes as that which cannot
be otherwise. 2
What
is
Spinoza does, then, in his definition of

its
freedom
call
call
in the Ethics is to simplify the terminology
that which
that which
necessary by
elsewhere, "is only, pelled. or no other than [the status of being] the first cause/' 3 This on the whole corresponds to the mediaeval definition of
is necessary by its "True freedom/* says Spinoza
and to and to cause necessary or com-
own nature
free
freedom. "Free will/* says Judah ha-Levi, "qua free will, has no compulsory cause." 4 Similarly Crescas defines free will as the ability "to will and not to will without an external cause/'
s
This definition of freedom

in in
is
applied by Spinoza to
Corollaries.
God
Proposition Starting out the proposition itself with the statement that God's
its
XVII and
two
action flows from His own nature and is without compulsion, he further explains in the first corollary that the compulsion comes neither from without nor from within Him, that is to
say,
God
concludes
cause.
is generally called a principal cause, and the second corollary that only God is a free All these would on their positive side seem to be
is
what
in
merely a reassertion of views commonly held by mediaevals. But as elsewhere, Spinoza's statements here have also a negative side
and are intended

it is
to
emphasize something
in this case,
in opposi-
tion to the mediaevals.
have to guess what

negate.
1
He makes
it
Fortunately, that he wants to emphasize and clear for us in his Scholium.

*
we do not
J
s
Metaphysics, V, 5, 1015.1, 16. Short Treatise, I, 4, 5.
Ibid., 34.
4
Cuzari, V, 20.
Or Adonai,
II, v, 3 (p.
48 b).
312
[ETHICS,
On
the whole, the mediaevals would have subscribed to
Spinoza's proposition that "God acts from the laws of His own nature only, and is compelled by no one." x In fact, in
the
Hymn
we
of Unity, which
is
incorporated in the Jewish

it:
liturgy,
find a statement that reads almost like
"Thou
wast not compelled to perform Thy work, nor wast Thou in need of any help." 2 But still the mediaevals considered
God's causality as an act of will, power, or intelligence. Will, power, and intelligence are the three terms which are generally
used by mediaevals
in
connection with creation, 3 with
the proviso, of course, that all the three are identical in God. 4 It is by means of will or power or intelligence that the mediaevals find themselves able to resolve all the difficulties about divine causality. The mediaeval philosophers, for instance, admit that God cannot "produce a square the di-
agonal of which
bilities."
5
Still
God
same
that
as
He
if
its side, or similar other impossithe question is raised that "to say of can produce a thing from nothing is ... the
is
equal to
when
we were
to say that
He
could
produce a
square the diagonal of which is equal to its side, or similar 6 impossibilities," or "what has made God create at one time
rather than at another,"
"He
willed
it so;
or,
they answer to this question that His wisdom decided so." 8

7
As against this, Spinoza opposes his own view of causality, and in the process of unfolding it he emphasizes, allusively, to be sure, the distinction between his view and theirs. The
1
Ethic 3 >
I, Prop. 17. Shir ha-Yihud, V.
Emunot
we-De'ot, II, 4; Cuzari, V, 18, 7-10;
Moreh Ncbukim,
II, 18,
Second
Method.
Cf. above, p. 204.

53.
I,
Moreh Nebukim, II, Ibid. II, 13, and cf. Moreh Nebukim, II,
y
Cf. above, p. 155. 75,

i; I,
75, 5; III, 15;
Emunot
wt-De'ot, II, 13.
13,
Second Theory.
f.
Ibid. y II, 14.
Cf. above, p. 100. Cf. above, pp. 100
lbid. y II, 25.
PROPS. 15-18]
313
fundamental difference, out of which all others arise, is his elimination of will and design from the causality of God. This is what he means when he says in the first corollary of
Proposition XVII that "there is no cause, either external to God or within Him, which can excite Him to act." By a
cause within
nation of will
nihilo
God
he means will and design. With the elimiand design from the nature of God, creation ex
becomes an impossible act, as impossible as any of the things which the mediaevals themselves considered impossible, such, for instance, as the assumption that "God
could bring about that it should not follow from the nature of a triangle that its three angles should be equal to two
'
right angles."
Then Spinoza takes up another point. One of the reasons that led the mediaevals
to
to attribute
God
intelligence
opposite alternative, for to
and as a result of this, "we must remove from God anything that looks like an imperfection in Him." 3 Abraham Herrera, in his unpublished Tuerta
2
an imperfection in be "free from imperfections,"
was the utter absurdity of the deny them of Him would imply His nature. God, according to them, must
will
and
del Cie/o, of which a printed Hebrew version has existed since 1655, puts the matter in the following way: "The
eternal and omnipotent God, whom we call the First Cause, acts not from the necessity of His nature but by the counsel
of His intellect, which is of the highest order, and by the choice of His free will," 4 for "to an Agent who is first and
most perfect we must attribute that kind of action which on account of its superiority and priority excels any other kind
of action, and that
1
is
the voluntary kind of action, for

2
it is
Ethics^
'
'I,
I,
Prop. 17, Schol.
'Ikkarim,
I,
15;
Moreh Nebukim^
I,
35.
'IMarim, 11,7. 11,7Sha'ar ha-Shamayim^ III,

6,
beginning.
3H

all
[ETHICS,
the natural and necessary actions and does in fact constitute their entelechy and the realization of
more perfect than

their perfection."
refers
undoubtedly to Herrera that Spinoza "I know, indeed, that there are many says: who think themselves able to demonstrate that intellect of
It is
when he
the highest order and freedom of will both pertain to the nature of God, for they say that they know nothing more
perfect which they can attribute to 2 the chief perfection in ourselves."
Him
than that which
is
But Spinoza goes still further in his criticism of Herrera. Herrera touches upon a question which had been constantly raised in the Cabala, namely, whether God could create the infinite number of things which are in His intellect
or whether His power of creation was limited to that which He has created. The question is stated by Moses Cordovero
as follows:
adepts in
it
by which some of the Cabala have been perplexed, namely, whether the
shall raise a question
"We
Infinite, the
in
King of Kings, the Holy One, blessed be He, has His power to emanate more than these Ten Sefirot or
express ourselves in this way. The question is a legitimate one, for inasmuch as it is of the nature of His benevolence to overflow outside himself, and inasmuch as it
not, if
is not beyond His power, it may be properly asked why He has not produced thousands of millions of emanations. It should indeed be possible for Him to produce many times
we may
Ten
Sefirot in the
same way
as
He has produced
this
world."
made: and by
In the discussion of this question by Herrera two points are First, that "if God had acted from His own nature
necessity,
is
He would
have inevitably produced everyinfinite/'

4
thing that
1
in
His power, which would be

3
Sec-
Ibid.)
3
Argument IV.
Ethics,
I,
Prop. 17, Schol.
Pardes
Rimmonim
II, 7.
Shaar ha-Shamayim,
III, 6,
Argument
III.
PROPS.
5-1 8]
315
has created by will and design, He has purond, since posely created only a part of that which is in His intellect,
God
in order to
"We
shall
be able to create other and more perfect things. say briefly, that it is because He does not act by
the necessity of His infinite nature that the Infinite, blessed be He, even though He is infinite, has not brought into exist-
ence or created an infinite number of things in an infinite time, which He comprehends and includes in His immovable
produced them in positions, and places, into which His

eternity, nor has
He
infinite superficies, infinite
power and
has brought times and
magnitude extend.
by and purpose, and it is because of this that into existence and created finite things in
in finite places,
He
acts only
the freedom of His will
He
finite
and to these things and into these things only extended himself, so that He might be superior to His creatures not only in an infinite degree of perfection but
has
He
also in infinite power,
and
if
He
ever wills
He may
create
other things more excellent and greater and in more suitable, wider, and longer places and positions, all of which He com-
prehends and includes most perfectly in His eternity and greatness. This view offers more easily [than any other view] a vindication of the infinite power and nature of the First
Cause, namely, the view we have maintained that for every one of the created things, however excellent it may be, He
is
able to produce something

is
more
excellent/'
similar
Metareproduced by Spinoza "If God acts from necessity, He must have created physica. a a duration than which no greater can be conceived/*
argument
in the Cogitata
That Spinoza had
in
mind the statements we have just

is
re-
produced from Herrera

'
evident from
"
his following
summary
of the views of his opponents:

Ibid., Ill, 7.
3
But although they conceive
Cogitata Metaphysica y II, 10.
316
[ETHICS,
God
theless
as actually possessing the highest intellect, they neverdo not believe that He can bring about that all those
things should exist which are actually in His intellect, for they think that by such a supposition they would destroy His power. If He had created, they say, all things which are
in
His
intellect,
He could have created nothing more, and

God
this,
they believe, does not accord with

then they prefer to consider
God's omnipotence; so
as indifferent to all things,

x
and creating nothing excepting that which He has decreed to create by a certain absolute will.** Spinoza's own criticism of this solution of the problem is that it virtually sacrifices God's power in order to retain His perfection. "Therefore, in order to make a perfect God, they are compelled to
incapable of doing all those things to which His extends, and anything more absurd than this, or more power opposed to God's omnipotence, I do not think can be
2
make Him
imagined."
having gone to all the trouble of intelligence and will, explain them away as terms. They say "there is nothing in common homonymous There is only between His essence and our essence.
after
The mediaevals,
ascribing to
God
a resemblance between
are different."
is
3
them
in
name, but
in essence
they
Similarly of will they say that "the term will homonymously used of man's will and of the will of God,
there being no comparison between God's will and that of man." 4 Spinoza restates this view in great detail in the Scholium to Proposition XVII, in the course of which he
explains the homonymous use of terms by the illustration of " the term "dog," which is used for the celestial constellation
of the
1
Dog and
I,
the animal which barks."

a
This illustration
ff.
Ethics y
Prop. 17, Schol.

III, 20.
is
Ibid.
Cf. below, pp. 411
Moreh Nebukim,
Ibid., II, 18,
Second Method.
similar illustration
mentioned
in Cogitata Metaphysica, II, 11.
PROPS. 15-18]
is

*
317
and in Maimonides and Averroes. 2 The introduction here on the part of Spinoza of the discussion about the homonymity of will and intellect when applied to God, which, as we have seen, is nothing but a restatement of the common mediaeval view, would seem to be entirely
found
in Philo
superfluous unless we assume that he wanted to make use of it afterwards as a refutation of the mediaevals in their
attribution of will and intellect to God.
refutation occurs in the Scholium.
However, no such Probably what Spinoza
meant
say
to
convey
to the reader,
so, is
that since intellect
though he does not definitely and will are to be applied to
God
only homonymously, they are meaningless terms, and consequently God's activity might as well be described as
following from the necessity of His nature. This in fact " Since ... it is is what he argues in one of his letters:
is
admitted universally and unanimously, that the will of God eternal and has never been different, therefore they must
is the necessary ask them whether you the divine will does not differ from the human will, they
also
admit (mark
this well) that the

.
. .
world
effect of the divine nature.
For
if
will reply that the
former has nothing
in
common
with the
latter except in
God's
the
if
will,
name; moreover they mostly admit that understanding, essence or nature are one and
3
same thing."
the will of
God
is
Spinoza's contention in this passage that eternal then the world must be admitted
to be the necessary effect of the divine nature reflects Maimonides' elaborate arguments on the incompatibility of the assumption of an eternal will of God and the belief in crea-
tion
1
by
design.
Df
Plantations
Noe XXXVII,
y
155.
Maimonides, Mi Hot ha-Higgayon, Ch. 13; Averroes, Epitome of the Isagogc (Mabo in Kol Meleket Higgayon, p. 2b). Cf. note in Klatzkin's Hebrew translation
2
of the Ethics (Torat ha-Middot),

3
p. 348.
4
Epistola 54.
Moreh Nebukim^
II, 21.
318
[ETHICS,
opposite of will and design, in the Middle Ages, is not only necessity but also chance. Thus Maimonides, in clasof creation, mentions in opposisifying the various theories
tion to intelligent creation not only the Aristotelian theory of necessity but also the Epicurean view of accident and chance. 1 The difference between chance on the one hand,
will and necessity on the other, is that chance denies the existence of a cause at all in creation, whereas will and
The
and
necessity both assume the existence of a cause, though each " But it would conceives the cause to act in a different way.
be quite useless to mention the opinions of those who do not recognize the existence of God, but believe that the existing
state of things
is
the result of accidental combination and
separation of the elements and that there is none that rules or determines the order of the existing things." 2 Spinoza
and necessity and makes the interesting observation that if God is assumed to act by a will whose laws are unknown to us, His activity really amounts to chance: "This
similarly tries to differentiate between chance
in
one of
his letters
already impels
me
briefly to explain
my
opinion on the
question whether the world was created by chance. My answer is that, as it is certain that Fortuitous and Necessary
are two contrary terms, it is also clear that he who asserts that the world is the necessary effect of the divine nature
also absolutely denies that the world was made by chance; he, however, who asserts that God could have refrained from
creating the world
is
affirming, albeit in other words, that

3
it
was made by chance/'
So also
in
asks his correspondent: "Tell me, I seen or read any philosophers who hold the opinion that the
1
another letter Spinoza pray, whether you have
Ibid. y II, 13
and
20;
cf.
Emunot
we-De'ot,
1, 3,
Ninth Theory; Cuzari, V,
20.
Moreh Nebukim,
Epistola 54.
II, 13.
PROPS. 15-18]
319
world was made by chance, that is, in the sense in which you understand it, namely, that God, in creating the world,
and yet transgressed His own of these statements is, as is quite implication evident, that the attribution of will to God really amounts to the denial of causality and to the explanation of the rise
had
set himself a definite aim,

x
decree."
The
of things by chance.
III.
THE MEANING OF IMMANENT CAUSE
is reaffirmed by on several occasions in a positive way, as, for inSpinoza " of every existing thing there is stance, when he says that
His denial of chance or of causelessness
some certain cause by reason of which it exists." 2 He further" more defines the cause of a thing by the statement that if
were impossible that the thing reminiscent of Crescas' statement in " his definition of a cause that should the cause be conceived
this [cause] did not exist it
3
should exist,"
which
is
not to exist the effect could not be conceived to exist."
Now,
causes, according to Aristotle, are either external (ecros) to the thing 5 or present (evvirapxovTa) within the thing. 6 So also Spinoza on several occasions asserts that "we must look
for this cause in the thing or outside the thing,"
several other occasions he speaks of external causes. 8
and on and internal

7
What
these internal
explanation. formal causes as internal, whereas the efficient cause

Epistola 56.
Ethics, I, Prop. 8, Schol.;
cf.
and external causes are needs some Aristotle himself designates the material and
is
de-
Epistola 34;
Short Treatise,
I, 6,
2.
Short Treatise,
I, 6,
4.
Or Adonai,
7
I,
i,
3.
Cf.
my
Metaphysics, XII, 4, 10700, 23. Ethics, I, Prop. 8, Schol. 2; Short Treatise,

Epistolae 34 and 60.
Crescas' Critique of Aristotle, p. 221. 6 Ibid., 22.
4; Epistola 34. I, 6, Ethics,!, Prop. 11, Schol.; Ill, Prop. 30, Schol.; Ethics, III, Affectuum Defini-
tiones, 24, Expl.;
320
scribed

1
[ETHICS,
by him as external. But inasmuch as the efficient cause is said by Aristotle to be sometimes the same as the formal cause, 2 the efficient cause may thus according to him
be both an internal and external cause. Although Aristotle does not give any concrete examples of what he means by
external
and
from
his
own
internal causes, such examples may be gathered writings as well as from the writings of his
followers.
Of an
external cause the following are two examples: First, a physical object which is spatially external to an-
other physical object. Thus Maimonides, drawing upon Aristotle, says that "everything must needs have a mover,
which mover
e.g.,
be either outside the object moved, as, the case of a stone set in motion by the hand, or within
may
the body of a living being," which In a passage corresponding to this Aristotle says that "of those things which are moved essentially, some are moved by themselves (vet)' aurou, i.e., by
the object moved, as,
e.g.,
is
moved by
its soul. 3
an internal cause) and others by something else"; 4 and later, in explanation of things which are moved by something else,
he says: "Thus, a staff moves a stone, and
s
is
moved by
hand, which is moved by a man." Second, an incorporeal being, like God, causing motion in a corporeal object. In this case, says Maimonides, the term
"external"
is
6
is
to be taken in the sense of "separate,"
that
in-
to say, separate
from body (xupiaros rov awâros) or
corporeal.
Similarly of an internal cause two examples

1
may
be found.
Metaphysics, XII, 4, royob, 22
ff.
Physics, II, 7, 198*1, 24-26.

Ibid., VIII, 5, 256a, 6-8.
Moreh Nebukim,
II,

s
<
Physics, VIII, 4, 2545, 12-14.
6
7
>-
Moreh Nebukim,
II, I:
^"03,
OJ^
xw/n<rr6s
PROPS. 15-18]

body and
is
321
First, the soul which exists in the
inseparable
from the body and is the cause of its motion. We have already quoted above a statement from Maimonides where
the soul
is
called an internal cause of motion.
In a corre-
sponding passage Aristotle similarly illustrates those things which contain in themselves the principle of motion by the
example of the motion of an animal.

to species
Second, universal concepts such as genus with reference and both of them with reference to the individual
species combined make up a definition are therefore related to the essence defined as cause to
essence.
Genus and
and
for a good definition, according to Aristotle, must not only set forth the fact but it should also contain (kvv2 This Aristotelian view is Ttoipxtw} and present the cause.
effect,
implied in Maimonides' contention that God cannot be " there are defined by genus and species on the ground that no previous causes to His existence by which He could be
defined/'
totle
is
Furthermore, since a definition according to Arisof the form, 4 it may be called a formal or internal
is
cause.
It
to be
noted that Aristotle uses the same term
ivvirapxtw in describing both the nature of the causality of the definition and the nature of the cause which he calls internal (twirapyuv).
he does not mean
evident then that by internal cause only a cause which inheres in the effect,
It is
but also a cause
in
which the
effect inheres.
is
The
essential
characteristic of an internal cause therefore

it is
the fact that
inseparable from its effect, either as the soul is inseparable from the body or as the definition is inseparable from the definiendum, for, as says Aristotle, the whole is in its
1
Physics, VIII, 4, 2546, 15-16. De Anima, II, 2, 4133, 15. Cf. Analytica Pos(eriora y II, 10, 9jb, 38
ff.
Moreh Nebukim,
I,
52. Cf.
I, p.
Munk, Guide desfcgarcs,
I, p.
190, n. 3; Friedlander,
Guide oj the Perplexed, 4 Metaphysics, VII,
178, n. 2.
II, 10363, 28-29.
322
[ETHICS,
parts and the genus is in the species just as the parts are in 1 the whole and the species is in the genus.
Middle Ages we meet with a contrast between immanens in such expressions as actio transient and actio immanens or causa transient and causa immanens* These two terms reflect Aristotle's external (CKTOS) cause and internal (tvvirapxuv) cause. That this is so we have the testimony of Spinoza himself, who
Now,
in the
the terms transicns and
says:
(which
"immanent (inblyvende} is all the same to me)/'
or internal (innerlyke) cause The term immanens , there-
fore, by analogy with Aristotle's term tvvirapxuvy describes not only a cause which resides in the effect but also a cause in which the effect resides, for the essential meaning of an
immanent
its effect.
cause, as
we have
said,
',
is its
inseparability from
The
term transcendent
however, does not mean
Middle Ages the same as transient. It means to be logically greater or more general, especially to be logically greater and more general than the ten categories so as not to be contained under them. 4 In this sense it is used in the enumeration of the so-called transcendentales which are rein the
by Spinoza. The term transcendens is thus neither synonym of transient nor the opposite of immanens. In fact, in the case of an immanent cause of the second kind we have mentioned, i.e., immanent in the sense in which the genus is the immanent cause of the species, the cause,
ferred to
5
the
though immanent,
as
1
may
also be called transcendent in so far

its effect.
it is
more general than
The conception
of a
2 3
Cf. Physics, IV, 3, 2ioa, 17 and 19. Cf. R. Eucken, Geschichte der philosophi sc hen Terminologie, p. 204. Cf.
Short Treatise, II, 26, J (Opera, I, p. lio, 11. 22-23). W. Hamilton, Lectures on Logic, I, p. 198 (ed. 1866); C. Prantl, Geschichte der Logik, III, p. 245; R. Eucken, Geschichte und Kritik der Grundbegrife der
4
Gegenwart, pp. 79-80. s Ethics, II, Prop. 40, Schol.

pp. I23f.
I;
I, 6.
Cf. below, Vol. II,
PROPS. 15-18]

is
323
transcendent immanent cause

terms.
thus not a contradiction in
In the light of this discussion, when Spinoza says here in Proposition XVIII that "God is the causa immanens and
not transiens of
all
things/'
we may ask
ourselves in which
of their two senses does he use the terms immanens and

transiens.
It is quite clear that when he denies that a causa transiens of all things he means to say that
God God
is
is
neither a spatially external cause of all things nor a separate immaterial cause of all things. It is equally clear that when
he affirms that
does not
God
that
is
the causa immanens of

is
all
mean
God
in all things after the
things he analogy of
the soul in the body in the Aristotelian manner of expres1 sion, though among the Stoics God's immanence in the world
expressed in terms of His being the soul, the mind, or the reason of the world, and hence of His being in the world only
is
as a part of
it.
Proposition
XIV
of Ethics,
I,
where Spinoza
things are in God, and similarly the two Dialogues in the Short Treatise, where he likewise says that all things are in God as parts are in the whole, make it quite
says that
all
clear that the
immanence of God does not mean that God

body, but rather that
is
is
in all things as the soul is in the
all
things are in
God
as the less universal
in the
more universal
or, to use Spinoza's
own
expression, as the parts are in the
1 The general misunderstanding of Spinoza's description of God as an immanent cause by taking it in the sense that God is a cause who resides in His effects
after the analogy of the soul in the body occurs already in John Colerus' biography of Spinoza, published in Dutch in 1705; "In order to understand him, we must consider that . the immanent cause acts inwardly, and is confined without
. .
Thus when a man's soul thinks of, or desires something, it is or remains in that thought or desire, without going out of it, and is the immanent cause thereof. In the same manner, the God of Spinoza is the cause of the universe " wherein He is, and He is not beyond it. (English translation: The Life of Benedict
acting outwardly.
de Spinoza, London, 1706, reprinted at The Hague, 1906, pp. 67-68.) 2 Cf. Zeller, Die Philosophic der Griechen, III, I, pp. 140-142; p. 151 (4th edition).
324
whole. of
all
1

Spinoza's statement that God is the things is thus not an assertion that
all
[ETHICS,
immanent cause
God
is
identical
with the aggregate totality of

that
God
is
only a denial the external and separable and hence immaterial

things;
it is
cause of all things. Inseparability from the effect, as we have seen, is the essential characteristic of Aristotle's internal
cause. Spinoza makes the meaning of this term clear when " he defines the immanent cause negatively as that which by
no means produces anything outside itself 2 and as that in which "the effect remains united with its cause in such a
"
way
that together they constitute a whole." 3 therefore says that all things are in God he the same thing as when Aristotle says that
in a genus. 4
When
man
Spinoza
means exactly
exists in
animal as a species
that
all
things are in God again exactly the same thing as when Aristotle says that the 5 "part is in the whole" and as when Burgersdijck says that "animal is a whole per se in respect to man and beast," 6 that
is
he further says as parts are in the whole he means
And when
to say, the species as parts in a whole.
man and
It is in this sense that
beast exist in the genus animal God is the im-
manent cause of
genus
is
all things; He is their internal cause as the the internal cause of the species or the species of
the particulars and as the whole is the internal cause of its parts. Now the universal, even though it does not exist separately from the particulars, is not logically identical with
of the particulars, for to Spinoza the universal is an ens rationiSy which means that it has a certain kind of conthe
sum
ceptual existence, even though conceptual in the sense that

Cf. above, pp. 74 ff. Cf. also Epistola 32 to Oldenburg. 12 (Opera, I, p. 30, 11. 24-25). Short Treatise, I, First Dialogue,
Ibid.,
it
Second Dialogue,
3 (p. 31,
11.
20-22).
s
Physics, IV, 3, 2ioa, 17-18. Institutiones Logicae, Lib. I, Cap.

cst
Ibid., 16.
XIV,
p. 52 (ed.
Cambridge, 1680): "Animal
totum [per
se] respectu
hominis et bestiae."
PROPS. 15-18]
is

the mind, as
325
invented
by
we have shown
in
our discussion of
1 his definition of attribute.
corresponding conceptual distinction
Consequently there is to be a between God and the
aggregate totality of modes. Being thus the immanent cause of all things in the sense that He is inseparable from
them but still logically distinct from them, God may also be said to transcend them according to the old meaning of the
term
tinct
"
transcendence," namely, that of being logically dis-
and more general. With the totality of modes or what Spinoza calls the fades totius universi God is not identical;
He
is
identical only with himself.
With
reference to the
totality of modes God is therefore called an immanent cause, but with reference to himself He is called causa sui y which,
as
we have already shown, 2 means
the denial of any kind of
cause whatsoever, whether external or internal.

tinction implied in Spinoza's thought
This
dis-
between one kind of
whole, God, which transcends its parts and is their cause, and another kind of whole, the fades totius universi, which is the sum of its parts, is clearly stated by Proclus: "Every
wholeness
(6X6717$) is either prior to parts or consists
of parts.
... A whole
fore, is that
according to subsistence (/ca0' i;7rapu>), there-
to
which consists of parts, but a whole according cause (/car' airiav) is that which is prior to parts." 3
a question may be raised. If God is related to the of modes as the universal to particulars or as the totality whole to the parts, then inasmuch as the universal as well
But here
God which
as the whole has only conceptual existence, the existence of Spinoza has sought to establish is only a con-
ceptual kind of existence, conceptual, presumably, in the sense of being invented by the mind. God is thus an ens rationis
1
Cf. above, pp. 146
ff.
Cf. above, p. 127.
Institutio fheohgica,
LXVII
(in Plotini
Enneades^ ed. Creuzer et Moser,
Paris, 1855).
326
[ETHICS,
reale. But this would seem to be contrary to trend of Spinoza's proofs for the existence of God, the whole which was to establish God as an ens reale*
and not an ens
This question
is
raised
by Spinoza himself
in
the First
Dialogue
Desire.
in the Short 'Treatise.
He
puts
it
in the
mouth of
"Methinks," says Desire, "I see a very great confusion in this argument of yours; for, it seems you will have it that the whole must be something outside of or apart from
its parts,
which is truly absurd. For all philosophers are unanimous in saying that the whole is a second intention (tweede kundigheid), and that it is nothing in nature apart
"
from human conception (begrip)" 2 The "second intention is the scholastic intentio secunda which is applied to such universals as genus
and
said
species,
and what Desire
is
arguing
is
by Spinoza to be the whole, is nothing but an ens rationis or intentio secunda like a universal and
that God,
is
who
God cannot
Spinoza to say, "outside of or apart from its parts. In his answer in the First Dialogue, speaking through the
character of Reason, Spinoza first disclaims the imputation that he considers God as a whole "outside of or apart from its parts" by pointing out the difference between a transeunt
therefore be, as Desire erroneously assumes "
cause
and an immanent cause and by insisting that an immanent "by no means produces anything outside itself." Then in the Second Dialogue, speaking through the char-
acter of Theophilus in answer to another question raised by Erasmus, he states that though the whole like the universal
is
an ens rationis there are two differences between them.
First,
"the universal
(algemeeri)
results
from various
disin-
connected individuals, the whole, from various united

1
Cf. above, pp. 161
ff.
2 3
Short Treatise
Cf.
-,
First Dialogue,
10.
y
R. P. M. Fernandez Garcia, Lexicon Scholasticum Philosophico- < Thcologicum

Cf. below, Vol. II, p. 122.
p. 361.
PROPS. 15-18]

'
327
Second, "the universal only comprises parts of the same kind, but the whole, parts both the same and
dividuals."
different in kind/'
2
These two
differences,
it
may
be re-
marked
incidentally, reflect
two of the several senses of
the term whole discussed by Aristotle. Corresponding to Spinoza's description of the whole in the first difference,
there
is
.
means
the following passage in Aristotle: "A whole (6\ov) that which so contains the things it contains
. .
that they form a unity," in the sense of
"making up
the
is
unity between them," as "the continuous and limited

whole, when
there
is
a unity consisting of several parts pres3 ent in it." Corresponding to Spinoza's description of the universal in the second difference, there is Aristotle's stateto the effect that the
ment
is
whole
in the sense
of the universal
said of a thing which comprises parts which are of the same " kind and have common characteristics, for universal (jca06Xoi>),
is denominated as being a and a whole because they contain many things, are predicated of particulars, and are all one according to the predicate. Thus man, horse, and God are all of them one, because they are all living things." 4 Inasmuch as the whole and the universal despite their being both entia rationis are admitted by Spinoza to differ from one another on two points, we may also argue on behalf of
and, in short, that which
certain whole, are universal
Spinoza that this particular whole, namely God, though it may be called an ens rationis like any universal, differs from
universals on still a third point, namely, that it is called an ens rationis only in the sense that its real existence can be discovered only by the mind, by the ontological proofs based
upon the adequacy of the idea of God

1
in
our mind. In truth,
Short Treatise,
Ibid.
I,
Second Dialogue,
9.
3 3
Metaphysics, V, 26, icxrjb, 27-28, 28-29, 32-33.

Ibid., 29-32.
328

God
is
[ETHICS,
Attributes, on the other hand, have no reality apart from God; they are said to be perceived by the intellect or the mind in the sense that they are in-
however,
an ens
reale.
Or, to make use of a modern distinction, or substance or the whole is according to Spinoza a concrete or real universal, whereas attributes are according
vented
by the mind.
God
to
him only abstract

IV.
universals.
GOD
AS CONSCIOUS CAUSE
the different terms describing God's causality which Spinoza has discussed, accepting some of them and
Among
him.
rejecting others, the term "conscious" is not mentioned by shall try to show that though Spinoza explicitly
We
denies that
acts
God
acts
by
will
and design,
insisting that
still
He
the
by the necessity of His own nature, he

is
admits that
God
a conscious cause.
In Aristotle as well as
among
mediaeval philosophers, conscious causality by itself did not imply will and design, nor did it exclude necessity. Thus
Aristotle's necessary activity of
God, which was without
design, was
a conscious sort of activity. The contempla2 tion of himself is the activity which Aristotle ascribes to God.
still
furthermore described by " the act of contemplaAristotle as an act of pleasure, for tion is what is most pleasant and best." 3 Still this conis
This self-consciousness of
God
and is unacMaimonides explains the design. companied by difference between unconscious necessary activity and conscious activity
is
a necessary sort of activity
will
and
scious necessary activity as follows:
cause
is
said to act
by necessity and unconsciously when the effect follows from it "in the same manner as the shadow is caused by a body, or heat by fire, or light by the sun." A cause is said to act
1
Cf. above, pp. 146

Ibid.)
ff.
Metaphysics, XII, 9, 1074!}, 33-35.
XII,
7,
i072b, 24.
PROPS. 15-18]
329
by necessity but consciously when the effect is said to follow from it in the same way as "when we say that the existence of the intellect necessarily implies the existence of
the intelligible object, for the former is the efficient cause of the latter in so far as it is an intelligible object/' But
Maimonides goes further and explains that although Aristotle admitted consciousness on the part of God, and ascribed to Him a certain self-satisfaction with His activity, " we do not call this design and it has nothing in common with design," inasmuch as "it is impossible for Him that He should wish "For example, man is pleased, satisfied, to be different/ and delighted that he is endowed with eyes and hands, and it is impossible that he should desire it to be otherwise, and yet the eyes and hands which a man has are not the result of his design, and it is not by his own determination that he has certain properties and is able to perform certain actions/' This would seem to be also the position of Spinoza. God is a necessary cause acting without will and design but still
1
a conscious cause. Not only does Spinoza's theory of the attribute of thought and his belief in the unity of nature 2 point to that conclusion, but his description of the function of that infinite mode of thinking as producing invariably " "an infinite or most perfect satisfaction 3 is almost a verbal reproduction of Aristotle's or Maimonides' characterization
of the consciousness of the activity of God. Indeed Spinoza denies of God the emotions of joy and sorrow when he says that "God is free from passions, nor is He affected with any
affect of joy or sorrow,"
4
but
this
sciousness he ascribes to
sciousness
God must
merely means that the conbe unlike our own con-
mediaevals.
1
Indeed
view which was commonly held by the in the Cogitata Metaphysica he refers
a
More/i Nebukim, II, 20. Short Treatise I, 9, 3.

',
Cf. below, Vol. II, pp. 13 ff. and p. 337. Ethics, V, Prop. 17. Cf. below, Vol. II, pp. 283
ff.
330 "
to
[ETHICS,
personality" (personalitas) as a term which theologians apply to God and dismisses it as something of which he is un-
able to form a clear and distinct concept. Still he makes it quite clear that God knows himself and that His understand-
ing by which
and power by which
He knows himself does not differ from His will He created the world, that is to say,
1
God
1
conscious of himself, but His consciousness of himself does not imply design and purpose.
is
Cogitata Mctaphysica y II, 8. In connection with this attempt to solve the problem of the consciousness of Spinoza's God, compare the discussions in the following works: A. Trendelenburg, Historischc Beitrage zur Philosophic (1855), II, pp. 59 ff.;
seligkcit
neuendeckter Tractat von Go//, dcm Menschen und desen GliickM. Joel, Zur Genesis der Lehre Spinoza s (1871), pp. 13-17; G. Busolt, Die Grundzuge der Erkenntnisztheorie und Metaphysik Spinozas ( 875), pp.
C. Sigwart, Spinoza
(1
866) , pp. 94-95
F. Pollock, Spinoza (1880), pp. 352 ff.; J. Martineau, Study of Spinoza (1882), pp. 334 ff.; E. E. Powell, Spinoza and Religion (1906), pp. 47 ff.; E. Lasbax,
117
ff.;
La
Hierarchic dans /'Univers chez Spinoza (1919), pp. 187
ff.;
H. Hoffding, Spinozti
Ethica (1924), pp. 49- 50.
CHAPTER X
THE
next group of propositions of Part I and the subsequent parts of the Ethics are strewn with references to eternity and duration. By way of general introduction we shall discuss here Spinoza's definitions of these two terms, and with
them
also his definition of time.
I.
THE STORY OF DURATION
is
" right to their originals," by which he meant, as he proceeded to explain, "sensation and reflection," which to him were the
original sources of
all
When Spinoza's contemporary Locke discovered that there some reason in the general impression that duration, time, " and eternity have something very abstruse in their nature," he suggested a way out of the difficulty by tracing them
An equal abstruseness confronts one in reading the variety of statements in which Spinoza contrasts the terms duration, time, and eternity. In our attempt to clear up this abstruseness, we may perour knowledge.
1
nals of these terms
haps equally follow Locke's advice to turn right to the originot indeed to the originals in the sense
of what Spinoza considered as the sources of our knowledge, but rather to the originals in the sense of the literary sources on which Spinoza drew in his discussions of the
meaning of these terms. Here no less than in the other problems which we have already examined Spinoza operated with terms and ideas which had been long in vogue in the philosophic literature with which he was acquainted, modi1
Locke, Essay Concerning
Human
Understanding,
II, 14,
2.
332
fying

them whenever he had reason
to to
[ETHICS,
them
new
uses in his
own
do so and turning scheme of reasoning. particular
The
task which
we have
set ourselves in this chapter, there-
analyze briefly the historical background of the of duration, time, and eternity, to show that there meaning are certain common principles underlying all the mediaeval
fore, is to
discussions on the
meaning of these terms, however differently expressed they may be in language and phraseology, to collect all the historical strands, and out of them to weave together Spinoza's conception of duration, time, and eternity. In Plotinus' elaborate discussion on time there is a hissurvey of all the views that make time dependent motion. Among these he reproduces Aristotle's view on upon " time which in his paraphrase reads that time is the number
torical
The original definition of time by Aristotle, in its locus classicus, reads in full that "time is
or measure of motion/'
f
number of motion according to prior and posterior/ 12 The addition of the term "measure" by Plotinus may be explained on the ground that the term number in the definition
this,
the
according to Aristotle himself, not to be taken in its ordi3 nary meaning, and that the term measure is sometimes subis,
stituted
by Aristotle
for the
term number. 4
Rejecting the
it
Aristotelian definition of time, Plotinus defines
as some-
thing independent of motion. Perhaps it will help us to understand how time is conceived by him apart from motion if we recall that motion does not appear in the first
two of Plotinus' emanated stages of being, which
in
order of
priority are: (i) the Intelligence (VoOs), (2) the universal soul 0/wxi) T P KOV/JLOV), and (3) the all-encircling celestial
sphere (7repi0opd).
1
Motion appears only
in the sphere,
For
cd.
but
Enneads,
III, vii, 8 (ed.
Creuzer et Moser, Paris, 1855).

all
J
Volkmann
22ib,
7.
(I-eipzig, 1883) raise

a
chapter numbers by one in

1-2.
subsequent references to Enneads.

Ibid., IV, 12,
Physics, IV,
u, 2190,
Ibid., 4-9.
DEF. 8]
333
time appears, according to Plotinus, in the universal soul. Repeating Plato's statement, which appears also in a modified form in Philo, that time is the image of eternity, 1 Ploti-
nus identifies time with the
life
of the universal soul
in
contradistinction to eternity, which is identified by him with the life of the Intelligence. 3 Now, the life of the universal
soul has a certain kind of extension (idcrra(ns) 4 sion
s
and succes-
is a process of transition from one act of thought (diavoia) to another, 7 the unity of which exists only by virtue of a certain kind of
(c(/>e?)s).
It
is
varied (aXAr?) 6 in
its
nature. It
continuity
(cruj/exeta).
.
It is a
. .
continuous acquisition of exAll these character-
istence (wpoo'KT&tJLei'oi'
kv TO; cli/cu). 9
izations of the
life
of the universal soul are true also of time,

life.
which
is
identical with that
It is
"the
life (fany)
of the
soul consisting in the movement by which she passes from one state of life (0los) to another," I0 or, it is "the length of
the life" of the soul, "proceeding in equal and similar changes advancing noiselessly," and "possessing a continuity of
energy" ((rvvex& T T W tvepydas exo^). But this kind of time which proceeds "in equal and similar changes advancing noiselessly" cannot by itself become fixed
11
<>
and
definite;
12
it
cannot be measured and divided into definite

to be
portions.
For time
measured and divided there must
be an external standard of measurement, which external standard is the movement of the all-encircling sphere. "So
that
1
if
some one should say that the movement of the sphere,

y
fimacus jyD; Enneads
III, vii,
urn llercs Sit,
XXXIV,
vii, 10.
165,
Procemium; Philo, DC Eo> $uis Rcrum Diviand DC Mutationc Nominum, XLVII, 267.
J
F.nncads, III,
Ibid., III, vii, 2, end.
Ibid., Ill, vii, 10 (p. 177,
1.
29).
6
Ibid.
Ibid.
(1. (1. (1.
25).
Ibid.
Ibid.
(1.
(1.
28).
27).
10
42).
Ibid.
47).
I I
IK*.
(11.
32-33).
/to/., Ill, Vii,
P I78,11.3-4 ).
.
Ibid.
(11.
30-30.
334
[ETHICS,
after a certain
manner, measures time as much as possible,
by its quantity indicating the corresponding quantity of time, which cannot in any other way be grasped or conceived, he
indeed will not adduce an absurd explanation of time." l The time which we use, then, in our daily course of life is
essentially the
same
from
as the time
which
is
an image of eteroff
nity;
it is
it
differs
it
not in kind but only in degree, in that
a certain definite portion of it,
measured
by the move-
ment of the
course of
it is
sphere. Thus,
i.e.,
in opposition to Aristotle, Plotinus
maintains that time,
the time which

or
made life, is only measured not generated by motion. 2 And in still another respect Plotinus differs from Aristotle. According to Aristotle, time is primarily defined as the measure of motion, though
but
he declares that
in a
use in our daily manifest by motion,
we
secondary sense it may also be said that time is measured by motion. 3 But according to Plotinus, time is primarily measured by motion. "Hence some philosophers have been induced to say that time is the measure of motion instead of saying that it is measured by motion." 4 Finally, it is Plotinus* contention that inasmuch as time is
within the universal soul,
to
within the universal soul, the universe, which is said to move may on that account also be said
move and
What we
time
is
have its being within time. out of this analysis of Plotinus' discussion of get that there are two kinds of time. One is indefinite
to
5
time; the other
is
definite time.
Both of these kinds of time
are genetically independent of motion. They are essentially the same: the life of the world soul and an image of eternity. But definite time has some connection with motion in so
'
Ibid.
(11.
48-52).
a
3
<
52-54). Physics, IV, 12, 22ob, 14-16. Cf. Cre seas' Critique of Aristotle , p, 646, n. 22. Enneads, III, vii, 12 (p. 179, 11. 21-23). (P- ! 7 8 , ! 26). Ibid., Ill, vii, 10 (p. 177, 11. 21-23);
(ii.
ibid.
"
DEF. 8]
335
measured by it. The main contrasts between the Aristotelian and the Plotinian definitions of definite time are
far as it is
(i) according to Aristotle time is generated motion; according to Plotinus, time is only made maniby fest by motion; (2) according to Aristotle, time is the measure of motion; according to Plotinus, time is measured by
thus twofold:
motion.
Plotinus, as will have been noticed, uses the
same term
time for both definite time and indefinite time. But an enigmatic passage in the Encyclopaedia of the Il}wan al-afa, x which we are going to show to contain a formulation of Plotinus' definition of time, supplies us
with a special term for
indefinite time.
The Ihwan al-afa enumerate
four definitions of time.
Two
of them, the second and third in their enumeration, read as follows: "It is also said that time is the number of a duration which
2
the motions of the celestial sphere; or, it is said that time is is numbered by the motions of the celestial
sphere/*
The
first
of these definitions
is
clearly the Aristo-
telian definition
reproduced only
in part, as in Plotinus,
and
definition,
with the use only of the original term number. The second it will be noticed, is just the reverse of the first.
In the
first, it is time which numbers motion; in the second, motion which numbers time. The contrast, then, is just
it is
1 The development of the conception of duration in Arabic and Hebrew philosophic texts presented in the succeeding pages has already been discussed by me on several occasions in the following places: "Note on Crescas' Definition of Time" in the Jewish Quarterly Review, n. s., (1919), pp. 1-17. This was revised,
and incorporated in the notes to Prop. XV in Crescas' Critique of Aristotle, especially in note 9 on pp. 636-640 and in note 23 on pp. 651-658, and in the Introduction on pp. 93-98. It was also used by me in "Solomon Pappenheim on Time and Space and His Relation to Locke and Kant" in Jewish Studies in Memory of Israel Abraham (1927), pp. 426-440. The subject is presented here in revised, enlarged, and new form. 3 Fr. Dieterici, Die Naturanschauung und Naturphilosophie der Araber, pp. 1415; Arabic text: Die Abhandlungen der Ichwdn Es-Safa, p. 35.
amplified,
336
like the

one made by Plotinus between
his definition
[ETHICS,
and that
of Aristotle. Again, like Plotinus this definition also implies that there are two kinds of time, one indefinite and the other
definite,
and that the
indefinite time
becomes
definite
by
the motion of the sphere. But more than Plotinus, this definition gives a special name to the indefinite time. It calls
it
duration.
If
we assume
then, as
in doing, that the
Ihwan al-afa's
we are certainly justified definition is a brief formu-
lation of Plotinus* lengthy discussion on time, then we may restate Plotinus* conception of time as follows: The essence
of time
is
duration, which
is
independent of motion and
exists within the universal soul.
fixed portion of duration
Time is only a definite and determined by motion.

consider Plotinus as the source
If this
is
true, then
we may
of a variety of definitions of time which occur alike in mediaeval Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin sources as well as in modern
philosophy and in which the term duration, sometimes under the guise of other terms, appears as something independent of motion. Such definitions, of course, do not always repro-
duce Plotinus accurately or even follow him completely. They are changed, modified, become combined with other
and completely lose their original form. But can always be traced, I believe, to Plotinus, and with a they little effort their variations from the original Plotinian definidefinitions,
tion can always be accounted for. I shall try to reproduce a few examples of the variety of forms which this Plotinian definition of time has assumed in Arabic, Hebrew, Latin, and
other philosophic writings down to the time of Spinoza. We shall first deal with Arabic and Hebrew texts, and then
with texts in Latin and other languages. In surveying the Arabic and Hebrew philosophic texts we may discover three sets of definitions in which the influence
of Plotinus
is
recognizable or the term duration
is
made
use
DEF. 8]
of.

first set,
337
the Plotinian conception of time, either mention of the term duration or without it, is used, with the
In the
inition.
as in the Ifrwan al-afa, in opposition to the Aristotelian defIn the second set, the Plotinian conception of time,
out
again either with the mention of the term duration or withit, is used in combination with the Aristotelian definition,
and
as
term duration
supplementary to it. In the third set, the is embodied within the phraseology of a cur-
rent definition of time which, not unlike that of Aristotle,
made time dependent upon notion. Of the first set of definitions we have an example in " Saadia's reference to one who imagines that time is external to the sphere and that the world is within it." From the
T
context
it is
is it
definition
unmistakably clear that the contention of this that time is by its nature independent of motion
has been put forward in opposition to the defiThe statement that "time is external
and that
nition of Aristotle.
to the sphere
and the world
is
within it"
is
reminiscent of
"
similar statements
sphere exists
avrrj Kal
made by Plotinus, namely, that and is moved within time" (tv xpbvq yap
is
the
Kal
ean
Kal Kivelrai) 2 or that the activity of the soul
constitutes time and "the universe
within time"
(6 de tv
similar allusion to the Plotinian conception of time as opposed to that of Aristotle is found in Altabrizi. He enumerates four definitions of time.
Three of these
either identify
But one of it belong to motion. these, the fourth one, states that time is neither a body nor
time with motion or
4 anything belonging to a body.
1
make
This,
it
seems to me,
is
Etnunot we-De'of,
I, 4.
3
*
Enneads,
Ibid.
(1.
III, vii,
(p. 178,
11.
17-18).
26).
Commentary on Maimonides* Twenty-five
Propositions, Prop. 15.
Cf.
my
Crescas* Critique oj Aristotle^ pp. 635-636, 656.
338
[ETHICS,
merely another way of saying that time is neither motion nor anything belonging to motion, for body is that which alone has motion. To deny that time is dependent upon
motion
is,
therefore, merely to repeat Plotinus' contention
against Aristotle.
An
found
tion,
echo of the Plotinian conception of time

in Crescas.
may
be also
defini-
Openly rejecting the Aristotelian

l
he defines time as "the measure of the duration of

rest
motion or
between two instants/'
He
furthermore
indicates the significance of this definition as an attempt to free time from motion when he says, again in opposition to
Aristotle, that as a result of his
in the soul. It
new
definition, time exists
only may be remarked here that by "soul" Crescas does not mean the universal soul of Plotinus, but
human soul. But when Crescas further argues, as a consequence of his definition of time, that there had existed time prior to the creation of the world, 2 the implication is that prior to the creation of the world time, or rather
rather the
duration, existed in the
ing to the views of Philo
mind of God as did eternity accordand Plotinus. Time in the created
world, however, is essentially not different from time or duration before the creation of the world. It is not generated
by motion, but only measured by motion. Crescas could thus repeat with Philo and Plotinus that time is an image of
eternity.
Of the second set of definitions we have a good example in Maimonides. Though following Aristotle in saying that time is an accident of motion 3 and hence could not have existed
prior to the creation of the world,
Maimonides
states that
we
may
1
have
in
our mind an idea of a certain duration which

ii,
Or /ldonai
I,
u.
Cf.
my
Crescas' Critique of Aristotle, pp. 289,

3
651-
658,93-98.
3
Ibid.
Moreh Nebukim^
II,
DBF. 8]
339
existed prior to the creation of the world. He calls that dura" tion a supposition or imagination of time but not the reality
of time."
Maimonides' "supposition or imagination of

"
time" seems to be the same as Plotinus' image of eternity," i.e., a duration which is independent of motion. But whereas
Plotinus "image of eternity" is time itself and is essentially of the same nature as eternity in so far as both are inde1
pendent of motion, Maimonides' "imagination of time" is essentially different from time; it is only a pseudo-time, inindependent of motion, whereas time, properly so called, is generated by motion. The Plotinian time is thus combined by Maimonides with the Aristotelian time and
as
it is
asmuch
made to supplement it. The view of Maimonides is adopted by Albo, and is restated by him in a new way. He says there are two kinds of time. One is "unmeasured duration which is conceived only
thought and which existed prior to the creation of the world and will continue to exist after its passing away." " This he calls absolute time," in which there is no distinction
in
of equal and unequal or of before and after, and which he identifies with what Maimonides has described as an "imagination of time."
The
other kind of time
is
that which
is
"numbered and measured by the motion of the sphere, to which are applicable the distinctions of before and after, of equal and unequal." 2 These two kinds of time, as I have
said in the case of
Maimonides, are undoubtedly the
result
of a combination of the Aristotelian time and the Plotinian

time.
Examples of the third

definition
'
set of definitions are to
be found
in
the works of several authors.
Saadia has two versions of a

(i)
which belongs
II,
1
to this type:
"Time
is
nothing
Ibid., II, 13.

,
8.
Cf.
my
Cre seas' Critique of Aristotle t p. 658.
340

x
[ETHICS,
(2)
but the extension of the duration of bodies."
"The
es-
sence of time is the duration of these existent things." 2 Abraham bar Hiyya, in whose text there is a doubtful reading of one word, gives a definition of time which like the definitions of Saadia reads either (i) "that time is nothing but
" the extension of existent things" or (2) that time is nothing but a term signifying the duration of existent things." 3 Similarly Algazali gives a definition, evidently meant by
him
to be a paraphrase of Aristotle's definition,
which reads
a term signifying the duration of motion, that that is to say, the extension of motion/' 4 It will be noticed that the common element in all these definitions is the use of the
"
time
is
terms extension and duration and that these terms extension
and duration are used
in
connection with "bodies,"
or "existent things," or "motion," all of which means the same thing, for by "existent things" here is meant "bodies,"
All these definitions, despite use of the term duration, or extension, imply the detheir pendence of time upon motion, and may be traced, I believe,
to a definition the phrasing of which reads that time is the extension (biaarrHJia) of motion, and which is attributed by
and "bodies" have "motion."
Plutarch and Stobaeus to Plato and by Simplicius to Zeno and is included by Plotinus among the definitions which
make time dependent upon motion. 5

Throughout my discussion of Arabic and Hebrew texts I have used the term duration. Now, this term, derived from " " the Latin durare^ literally, to be hardened," and hence, to
continue, to last, to remain," has been used in the Middle
1
Emunot
we-De'ot, II,
y
u.
lbid. y I, 4.
Hegyon ha-Nefesh I, p. 2a. Maka$id al-Fala sifah, II, iii (p. 192). Cf. De P/acitis, I, 21, and Eclogae, I,
Enneads^ III,
vii, 6.
8, in Diels,
Doxographi Graeci,
i,
p.
318;
Simplicius on Categories in Zeller, Philosophic der Griechen y HI,

edition);
p. 184, n. 6 (4th
DEF. 8]

in
341
Ages
in a certain technical sense in
connection with time. In
Hebrew, no more than in Greek, however, is there any term of the same derivative technical meaning which is etymologically of the same origin. But the texts which I have discussed contain three Arabic and eight Hebrew terms which, though etymologically unconnected with the Latin duratio, can be shown from their context and implications to have the same technical meaning as the Latin duratio. These three Arabic and eight Hebrew terms can be
Arabic and
arranged etymologically in three groups. (i) The terms in the first group all go back to a root meaning "to stretch, to
1
extend," and are used in philosophic Arabic and Hebrew as some of the equivalents of the Greek Stdcrrcuns, "extension,"
which, as
we have
seen, occurs in Plotinus as one of the char(2)
acteristics of indefinite time.
The term
in the
second
group comes from a root meaning to join, to keep together," and is the equivalent of the Greek <7i>j>ex 6a > "continuity," which, again as we have seen, occurs in Plotinus as one of the
characteristics of indefinite time.
(3)
"
The terms
in the third
group go back to roots meaning
"
to remain, to survive, to
exist," and are the equivalents, though not etymologically of the same origin, of the Greek (rwexeia, and reflect the expressions of continuity and existence used by Plotinus in
connection with indefinite time.

philological digression will
The importance
in
of this
come out
our discussion of
Latin texts which

1
we now
begin.
The
I.
three groups of terms are as follows: <** (Ihwan al-Safa and Algazali), mD,ny (Hebrew translations of Algazali).
jloi^l (Maimonides), "]E?Dn (Samuel Ibn Tibbon's translation of Maimonides
and Albo), JTD'N

II.
lii
(IJarizi's translation
of Maimonides).
(Saadia),
DVp,
JTntttPn (Judah Ibn Tibbon's translation of Saadia),
(Abraham bar
in.
Cf.
IJiyya).
ropmnn (Crescas). my Crescas' Critique of Aristotle, pp. 638, 639, 655,
656.
342

I
[ETHICS,
In Latin philosophic texts, as far as
have been able to
examine them, we find on the whole the conception of duration combined in a variety of manners with the Aristotelian
definition of time.
good example of
it is
to be
found
that
in
Augustine's treatment of time. Augustine starts out by saying that time
is
"by
is
which we measure the motion of bodies."
In this he
But he certainly following the phraseology of Aristotle. does not stop with this. He soon asks himself what time is
in itself.
2
Aristotle.
In this again he is repeating a question raised by He then proceeds to show that time cannot be
identical with the
motion of a body, 4
in
which again Aristotle
an accident of motion but
himself would agree with him, for to Aristotle time is only is not motion itself. 5 But still it
would seem that Augustine means to deny by his statement more than the identification of motion and time. It would
to make time more independent of mowas done by Aristotle, though still not altogether independent of motion as was done by Plotinus. That time was not according to Augustine altogether independent of motion and hence purely subjective in its nature is evidenced
seem that he means

tion than
by the
fact that
when he suggests
that time
is
a certain
kind of "stretching out" (distentici) he immediately adds that he does not know of what it is a stretching out and
marvels "if
it
be not of the mind

It
is
itself."
His answer to
itself,
this is in the negative.

in effect,
not of the mind
he says
but
I
it is
rather in the mind.
mind, that
measure
my
times."
"In thee it is, O my Time indeed is the measit is
ure of motion, as said Aristotle, but

1
not motion
26.
itself
but
Confessions, XI, 23.
Ibid.,
*
XI, 23 and
3 s
Physics IV, 10, 2i7b, 32.

',
Physics, IV, 10, 21 8b, 9-18.

Ibid.,
XI,
27.
DEF. 8]
343
only the
I
memory
I
of motion that time measures.
"In
thee,
say,
in
measure times. The impression which things make thee as they pass by doth still remain, even when the things
do
still
themselves are gone, and this impression it is which, being * Thus a connection of time with present, I measure."
is
assumed by Augustine, but a connection not with is still present, but with the image of motion which exists in the mind after the motion itself is gone. This is far from the purely ideal conception of time which intermotion
motion that
preters of Augustine generally attribute to him. It is certainly unlike the purely ideal conception of time which we
find in Plotinus
tion
and Crescas and in the pseudo-time or durawhich according to Maimonides and Albo existed prior to the creation of the world. It is nothing but a modification
of Aristotle's definition of time which must have been suggested to Augustine by Aristotle's own contention that in
some respect time
2 exists only in the soul.
For our immediate purpose, however, the chief importance of Augustine's discussion of time consists in the term distentio
which he uses on several occasions
of time. 3 In this word distentio ,
in describing the
nature
it
seems to me, we
may
discern a technical term used as the equivalent of duratio. The term distentio is the equivalent of the Greek 5cdcrraort,s,
and
it
will
traceable to the
be recalled that terms meaning "stretching out" Greek SiAoracris were used in Arabic and
Hebrew
itself is
texts for duration
and that the term
5ta0Ta<ris
used by Plotinus as one of the characteristics of his
indefinite time or duration.
The
Aristotelian definition of time

'
use of the concept of duration in connection with the is to be found in the writings
ibid.
3 3
Physics > IV, 14, iija, 16-23.

Confessions y XI, 23, end, and 26.
344

all
[ETHICS,
of almost
only to what
the leading scholastics. Confining ourselves is common to all of them, we may discern in
them the following general characteristics. Duration is assumed by them as a genus of which time is a species, for they
speak of duration as being of three kinds, (a) eternity, (if) aevum, and (c) time. While time is generally defined after
1
Aristotle as being the measure of motion, duration is conceived as something independent of motion. Two definitions
of duration
may
is
be discerned in their writings.
One
reads
that duration
tion of existence.
the permanence or perseverance or continua2 The other reads that it connotes a certain
succession. 3
Both these expressions, "permanence or perse-
verance or continuation of existence" and "succession," as will be recalled, are used by Plotinus among his characterizations of his indefinite time,
is
the underlying meaning of
and the first of these expressions some of the terms used by Araconcept of duration.
I
bic
1
and Hebrew authors
for the
One
Cf. Suarez, Disputation*-s Metaphysicac, Disp. L, Sec.

in
II, i:
"Primo, ac praeci-
pue dividitur duratio

simpliciter dicta."
. . .
creatam et increatam.
i:
Duratio incrcata est aeternitas
"Duratio igitur creata dividi potest primo in perDividitur ergo ulterius duratio creata permanens in durationem immutabiliter natura sua permanentem, quae aevum appellatur, et
Sec. V,
. .
manentem
et successivam.
in earn quae licet permanens sit." Sec. VIII, i: "Agimus ergo de duratione habente continuam successionem, de qua Philosophi disputant cum Aristotele in 4. Phys. co quod tempus, Physicum motum consequi videatur." Cf. also Marc.
. . .
Anton. Galitius,
Summa
Totius Phtlosophiae Aristotelicae

in scholis versatis
I, I:
ad mentem
S. Bonaven-
turae, Pars I, Lib. IV, Tract. II, Quaest. Ill:
"Tres durationes communiter a Docpatentissimum esse opinor." "Dicitur enim durare res, quae in sua
toribus assignari solere,

a
omnibus
Cf. Suarez, op.
'/.,
Disp. L, Sec.
existentia perseverat:
unde duratio idem esse censetur, quod permanentia in Bonaventura, Commcntaria in Qiiatuor Libros Scntcntiarum, Lib. II, Dist. XXXVII, Art. I, Quaest. II: "Continuatio in esse non est aliud quam duratio." a Cf. Suarez, op. cit. Disp. L, Sec. II, i: "Est ergo prima opinio Ochami, et Gaesse."
t
supra dicentium, durationem distingui ab existentia, quia existentia significat absolute, et simpliciter rem esse extra suas causas: duratio vero dicit existentiam
brielis
vel possit coexistere res, quae durare quod duratio dicat existentiam, quatenus apta est ad coexistendum successions " Cf. also Lon Mahieu, Franfois Suarcz, p. 374.
dicitur:
connotando successionem, cui vel coexistat,

vel aliter,
DEF. 8]
345
gets, however, the impression that these typical scholastics did not consider duration as something purely subjective, any more than Augustine did. Whatever they believed the
seem to have some kind of objectivity. All their discussions on that point would seem to be attempts at different interrelation of duration to its object to be, they
it
attached to
pretations of Aristotle's statement that time, in so far as it 1 is the number of motion and not motion itself, is in the soul.
The
tion
is
scholastic distinction between duration
pears also in the discussions of Descartes

defined by Descartes as a
and time apand Locke. Dura-
mode
of consideration of
2 Whether the the perseverance in the existence of a thing. thing is moved or unmoved it has duration, and duration
of the same kind.
Time, however, applies only to things in and is defined by him as the measure of motion. 3 motion, Locke follows on the whole the same tradition, but instead
of defining duration, like Descartes, as the perseverance in existence, he defines it as the distance (= extension, Stdoracris)
by
the train of ideas
between any parts of that succession furnished to us which constantly succeed one another
4
in the
understanding.
It will
have been noticed that the

in
two characteristic expressions used by Descartes and Locke

in their definitions of duration,
existence
"
namely, "perseverance
definitions
and "succession/* correspond exactly to the two of duration which we find among the scholastics
to Plotinus.
and which can be traced
Furthermore,
if
we
substitute Plotinus' "soul" for Locke's "understanding," we shall find that Locke's characterization of duration is
reminiscent of Plotinus' characterization of indefinite time.

1
Physics, IV, 14, 22ja, 16-23.
'
J 4
Ibid.,
I, 55.
and
I,
57.
Essay Concerning
Human
Understanding
II, 14,
1-3.
346

1
[ETHICS,
This idea of succession which constitutes duration, continues Locke, is not derived from motion. Time, however, is connected with motion, and
is
defined by
him
as duration
measured by motion. 2
The cumulative
effect of all these definitions of
time in
the Greek, Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin philosophic traditions, from Plotinus down to Locke, stands out clearly in its main outline. There is duration. This duration is not generated
by motion.
nus
it is
It
is
something generated
in the
mind. In Ploti-
In Augustine it is identified with memory or the impression of things gone that remains in the mind. In Maimonides and Albo, who call it
said to be in the universal soul.
either an imagination of time or absolute time,
to be
it is
also said
something which
is
formed
in
our mind.
In Crescas,
similarly said to be in the soul. In Locke it is said to the human understanding, consisting of the train of be in
time
is
ideas within
it. Furthermore, this duration exists apart from the physical world. In Saadia it is said to be external
to,
that
is
to say apart from, the sphere.
In Altabrizi,
it is
said not to belong to anything corporeal.
In Maimonides,
have existed prior to the creation of the world. In Descartes and Locke it is said to apply to things which have no motion. Finally, this duration is considered as something indefinite and indeterminate. Time is
it is
Crescas, and Albo
said to
generally taken to differ from duration.

as to
Though
is
there
is
no
general agreement tion or not, it is generally agreed that time applies to things which have motion. It is considered as a definite portion of
whether time
generated by mo-
motion, and this definiteness,

attained by
1
it
is
generally admitted,
is
its
being measured by motion.

3
Ibid.,
6.
Ibid.,
17
and
19.
DEF. 8]

II.
347
DURATION AND TIME
IN SPINOZA
mould of thought that we must cast Spinoza's on duration and time. In presenting the subexpressions
It is in this
ject,
first deal with those aspects of duration in contrasted with time, leaving for subsequent discussions all the other aspects of it in which it is contrasted
we
shall
which
it is
with eternity.
The fullest definition of duration is given by Spinoza in the Cogitata Metaphysica. * "Duration," it reads, "is the attribute under which we conceive the existence of created
actuality." Substantially it reechoes one of the two types of definitions of duration which we have reproduced above from scholastic
things, in so far as they persevere in their
own
authors and and in sua
in
which continuatio in
esse y
permanentia in
esse,
existentia perseverat are the expressions indis-
criminately used.
The immediate
seem
to be
literary source of Spinoza, however,

in the following
would
found
statement of Descartes:
merely think that the duration of each thing is a mode under which we shall conceive this thing, in so far as it perseveres to exist."''
Still
"We
that of Descartes
when we compare closely Spinoza's definition with we shall notice three differences. First,
Descartes
it it
calls duration a "mode," whereas Spinoza calls an "attribute." Second, Descartes only says in so far as perseveres to "exist," whereas Spinoza uses first the term
"existence" like Descartes, but then adds the term "actuality" in the statement "in so far as they persevere in their own actuality/* Third, Descartes simply says "thing,"
whereas Spinoza speaks of "created" things.

1
The
question
2
I, 4.
I, 55.
348

is
[ETHICS,
was merely as a matter of free paraphrasing that Spinoza happened to make these three verbal changes or whether there was some well thought out reason which led him to introduce them. With respect to the substitution of the term attribute for mode, we shall try to show that it was done by Spinoza at
before us
whether
it
the suggestion of Descartes himself.
While
in his
formal definition Descartes calls duration a
mode, elsewhere he refers to it indiscriminately as belonging " either to modes of things" (rerum modos) or to "affections of things" (rerum ajjectiones). Modes and affections are used
1
by Descartes as interchangeable terms, both of them in contrast, on the one hand, to "things" and, on the other hand, to "eternal truths which have no existence outside our
2
thought."
Now, according
to Descartes, while the terms
modes, qualities (or affections), and attributes are on the whole analogous in meaning, still they are used in different
senses
when they
are considered with reference to their ap-
3 plication to substance.
Consequently, though in his formal definition of duration, as we have seen, he uses the term "mode" and elsewhere he also refers to it as an "affection,"
he
insists that the

it
most proper term
to be used in connec-
tion with
is
"attribute."
"And
them
in
even
in
created things
that which never exists in

existence
and duration
in
any diverse way, like the existing and enduring thing,

4
should be called not qualities or modes, but attributes."

1
My
statement
I,
is
based upon the following consideration.
In Principia Philo-
sophiae,
48, Descartes divides all objects into (i), things, or (2), affections of* things, and B, eternal truths having no existence outside our thought. Then he
proceeds to say: "Of the things we consider as real, the most general are substance, duration, order, number." I take it that of these four examples, the first, substance, is an illustration of A (i), things, whereas the other three, duration, order, number,
are illustrations of
(2), affections
of things.
Later
in 50, instead
of "things and
affections of things," he uses the expression "things or

'
modes of things."
Ibid.
Ibid., I, 48.
Ibid.,
I,
56.
DEF. 8]
349
Spinoza thus had very good reason for substituting the term "attribute" for "mode" in the definition of duration.
Still
occasionally he slips back to the use of the term "affec1
tion," which to him as to Descartes is synonymous with "mode." Thus in the following passage he says: "For, as was noted in the first Part of the discussion, duration is an
affection (ajfectio) of existence."
Similarly, Spinoza had a very good reason for introducing the term "actuality" to explain the term "existence." The
term "existence," when used by Spinoza or

in the definition of duration,
his predecessors
was meant
to emphasize
two
was meant to emphasize that things. it was existence and not motion that was required for the conIn the
first place, it
ception of duration, inasmuch as duration was independent of motion. This, as we have seen, is the common characteristic of duration throughout the history of that term. Descartes
makes himself explicit on that point when he says, "For we do not indeed apprehend that the duration of things
3
is different from that of things which are In the second place, it was meant to emphasize that there is no duration in beings which have no existence, as, for instance, fictitious beings and beings of
which are moved
not moved."
reason.
and "entia rationes."

self
Suarez definitely excludes from duration "ficta" 4 Now, the word "existence" by itsufficient as
would perhaps have been
an emphasis of
the second point.
Still, in order not to leave
any room
for
in their
doubt, Spinoza adds the phrase "in so far as they persevere own actuality ," that is to say, the existence must be
is only in thought. It not impossible that in phrasing this definition Spinoza was Cf. below, Vol. II, pp. 193-194.
3 I
an actual existence and not one which

is
(Opera,
I, p.
250,
11.
13-14).
I, 57. I, i.
Suarez, op.
cit.,
Disp. L, Sec.
350
[ETHICS,
directly influenced by Suarez, who insists that duration is to be attributed to a thing which exists in actuality. 1 The same
idea that duration requires an actually existent object is ex" Duration pressed by Spinoza also in the following manner:
is
an affection of existence, not of the essence of things." a " " By essence he means the concept of a thing which may
or
may
not have existence outside our mind.
In the same
vein he also says: "The duration of our body does not denor upon the absolute nature pend upon its essence of God the body is determined to existence but
.
.
The duration, therefore, of our and action by causes. body depends upon the common order of nature and the constitution of things." 3 The dependence of duration upon
.
.
actually existing things is clearly expressed in the following passage: "Before creation no time and duration can be
imagined by us. ... Hence duration presupposes that things either have been created before it or at least exist with it." 4
that Plotinus gives as one of the characterof his indefinite time or duration that it is "a continuity " " " " of energy." 5 Energy may mean there actuality as well
It
may be recalled
"
istics
as
activity."
same token, the introduction by Spinoza of the qualifying term "created" in the expression "of the existence of created things" had a certain definite purpose. Indeed
By
the
means by
1
But Spinoza something different. By the term "created" Spinoza does not mean here the traditional conception of
Suarez uses
it it
Ibid.\ "Igitur in
also in connection with duration. 6
universum durare solum tribuitur

cit.
t
rei
existens est." Cf. Galitius, op.

ratio est
2
3
Pars
I,
Lib. IV, Tract. II, Quaest.
actu existenti, et prout "

I,
2:
Du-
pcrmanentia
rei in
suo esse actual!, quieto, et perfecto."

I.

Ethics, II, Prop. 30,
Demonst.
On essence and existence, see also below, p.
383.
Cogitata Mttaphysica, II, 10.
5
6
See above, p. 333. See quotation above,
p. 344, n. i.
DEF. 8]

its
351
creation with
inevitable implication of
he means by it conceived as having duration must have their existence dependent upon a cause, irrespective of the question whether
in time ex nihilo.
What
coming into being is that the things
they had a beginning in time or not. Or, as Spinoza himself says, duration is to be attributed to things "only in so far as
their essence is to be distinguished
from their existence/'

is
'
that
their
this
is
to say, in so far as their existence
not necessary by
own nature but must be brought about by a cause. If is the meaning of Spinoza's statement, we can find a his-
background for it. It corresponds to the contention of Suarez that even if the angels or the heavens were assumed to have been created by God from eternity, they would still have
torical
duration, inasmuch as they would still have been called created 2 beings in so far as their existence is conditioned by a cause.
Spinoza's definition of duration as an attribute, or mode, or affection of existence may bring up the question of the relation of duration to existence. Are they identical, or is
there
is
some
difference
between them? and
if
the latter,
what
the difference?
To
question explicitly. the scholastics, and Spinoza must have been conscious of it, for some statements in his writings, as we shall try to
be sure, Spinoza does not raise this But the question had been raised by
show, seem to aim at

is it
it.
The question
as to
"how
duration
related to existence," as stated by Suarez, reads: "whether is something distinct from the thing itself, or whether it is
it."
3
completely identical with

1
Three views are reported.

ab
Cogitata Metaphysica, II, I. Cf. use of "created" below, p. 383, n. 5. Op. cit., Disp. L, Sec. Ill, v: "Unde si Deus creasset angelum, ut coelum
aeterno, non esset in eo durationis principium, et nihilominus duratio eius creata

esset, et essentialiter differens
*
ab aeternitate."
Disp. L, Sec. I, i: "Hinc ergo nascitur difficultas, quomodo duratio ad existentiam comparetur; an scilicet, sit aliquid distinctum ab ipsa re, aut prorsus idem sit." Cf. Galitius, op. cit., Pars I, Lib. IV, Tract. II,Quaest. II: "An duratio
Op.
tit.,
realiter differat
ab existentia?"
352

differ
is
[ETHICS,
According to some, duration and existence

other in re and realiter, that
from each
1
to say, they are separable
and each of them can be conceived without the other. Others, as Bonaventura, Banez, and other Thomists, consider the difference between them as a modal difference, like that which exists between a substance and a mode or between two modes. 2 Suarez, Scotus, Occam, and Biel, however, consider duration and existence as being inseparable
though
distinct
from each other, the distinction between

reason. 3
Similarly Descartes, after disof distinction, the real, the modal, cussing the three kinds and that of reason (ratione), the last of which he defines as
them being one of
that "between substance and some one of
its
attributes
not possible that we should have a distinct knowledge of it,'* 4 concludes that "because there is no substance which does not cease to exist when it ceases to
without which
it
is
endure, duration
is
only distinct from substance by reason."
Evidently drawing upon these discussions, Spinoza likewise says: "From which it clearly follows that duration is distinguished from the whole existence of a thing only by reason. For, however much duration you take away from any thing,
so
existence you detract from it." In the light of this statement, when Spinoza chose to
much
of
its
define duration as an "attribute" of existence, he used the
term attribute
defines
it
in the strictly technical sense in
which he
namely, as a purely subjective aspect of the thing of which it is used. This is an indirect corroboration of our interpretation of Spinoza's attribute as
in the Ethics^
something purely subjective.

1
Suarez, op.
1 3
/.,
Disp. L, Sec.
II.
f.;
Leon Mahieu, Francois Suarez, pp. 372 Cf. Le"on Mahieu, pp. 373 f. Principia Philosophiae, I, 60 and 62.
Cf.
Ibid., I, 62.
6
Galitius, he.
cit.
I, 4.
DEF. 8]
353
In the passage just quoted, Spinoza, as will have been noticed, uses the expression "the whole existence of a thing"
when he wishes
reason.
to prove that duration differs
from existence
only by expression "the whole of existence" of course, that there may be a part of existence and implies, hence a part of duration. This leads Spinoza in the passage
The
quoted to introduce
his definition of time. It is possible, he says, to take off a certain portion of the duration of a thing. But "in order to determine this we compare it with the
duration of those things which have a fixed and determinate * Or as he says motion, and this comparison is called time."
in
another place:
"No
time because
less,
we imagine some
one doubts, too, that we imagine bodies to move with a velocity
we
or greater than, or equal to that of others." 2 Here then have a definition of time in terms of duration the like of
which we have already met in Plotinus, in the Arabic Ihwan al-afa, in the Jewish Crescas, and in many scholastics. Spinoza's contemporary Locke, as we have seen, restates it.
His immediate source, however, must again have been Descartes in the following passage: "But in order to com-
prehend the duration of
all
things under the
same measure,
usually compare greatest and most regular motions, which are those that create years and days, and these we term time." 3
we
their duration with the duration of the
Essentially, thus, time and duration, according to Spinoza, are the same. Time is not a new attribute of things, it is
not different from the attribute of duration, nor does it add anything to duration. It is only a definite portion of duration
measured by motion.
Thus Descartes: "Hence
this
[time]
adds nothing to the notion of duration, generally 4 And so also Spinoza: taken, but a mode of thinking."
1
Ibid.
I, 57.
Ethics, II, Prop. 44, Schol. Ibid.
354
"
[ETHICS,
Therefore, time is not an affection of things but only a of thought or, as we have said, a being of reason; it is a
mode mode mode
of thought serving to explain duration/' Thus duration is a mode of existence, and time
of duration.
It is
is
analogous to the successive relations be-
tween time, motion, and body in Aristotle. Motion, according to the mediaeval Aristotelian phraseology, is an accident
of body and time is an accident of motion. 2 Substitute the terms duration and existence respectively for motion and
body and the term mode

analogy.
for accident
and you get a perfect

Everything which
The upshot
of all this discussion
is this.
may be conceived of as existing or as not existing, depending upon some cause for its existence, has existence superadded
by Spinoza a created thing. Now, existence of a thing merely means the fact that the concept which we form in our mind of a thing has an
to its essence.
is
Such a thing
called
object outside our mind to correspond to it. The concept is the essence of the thing; the outside reality is the existence of the thing. Now the mind in which the concept is formed
does not create the existence.
The
existence
is
given.
it
But
when
hends
in its
the
it
existence, compresomething enduring, as something persevering actuality, and it cannot perceive it otherwise. Existas
mind comprehends that given
ence does not appear to the mind as a point, but as some sort of extension. This conception of the mind of the external existing object as
actuality, or, in other words, this attribute
something persevering in its own under which we

is
conceive existence,
is
that which
called duration.
Duration
thus refers only to things which have existence, and then only to the existence of such things and not to their essence. "It
1
Cogitata MttapJtysica,
I, 4.
Moreh Nfbukim,
II, 13, First
Theory.
DEF. 8]

it
355
should be noted under duration, as
will
it
be of use when
is
below we are discussing eternity, that
conceived as
greater and less and as if it were composed of parts, and then r Note only as an attribute of existence and not of essence/'
the expression "as if it were composed of parts/* for duration according to Spinoza is a continuous quantity and does not
of discrete parts such as moments. 2 Or, again, " Spinoza speaks of duration as existence considered in the 3 abstract, as if it were a certain kind of quantity."
consist
If
we were now
to
compare Spinoza's and
Aristotle's
conceptions of time with respect to the problem of their subjectivity and objectivity, we should find that there is
little
difference.
partly ideal.
latter's
Both assume time to be partly real and In so far as Aristotle's motion and Spinoza's
real.
existence are outside the mind, the former's time and the
duration are
In so far as the measure of time
of Aristotle and the duration of Spinoza are conceptions of the mind, they are both ideal. In fact the same dual nature of time
we
shall find
throughout the mediaeval definitions,
despite the controversies among their various proponents on that point. None of the mediaevals believed in the absolute ideality of time.
The only
ideal time
place
is
Not even Augustine went where we find a conception
as far as that.
of absolutely
where time can be conceived to
exist in a
mind
which has existence without a body and without a physical world to draw its thoughts from, such as God and Plotinus'
universal soul.
Of such
a nature
is
the time of Plotinus,
existence prior to the creation of the world, the imagination of time of Maimonides, and the
the time of Crescas, in
its
absolute time of Albo.

1
Cogitata Metaphysiea,
1
I, 4.
Epistola 12.
356
[ETHICS,
have been found
Exactly the same definitions of duration and time which in the Cogitata Metaphysica are to be found
1
in Spinoza's letter to
Meyer.
Using there the term

"
"
modes
"
as the equivalent of the expression
created things" in the
Cogitata Metaphysica, meaning thereby something whose essence does not necessarily involve existence, he says that " we can only explain duration is that by means of which the existence of modes." He then goes on to say that from
duration, there arises time of determining duration, concluding that purpose " time is merely a mode of thinking or, rather, of imagining." 2 The additional phrase "or, rather, of imagining" is of no
the fact that
for the
we can determine
special significance here.
It is
probably nothing but a reminis-
cent expression of Hobbes' statement that "time is a phantasm of motion." 3 Hobbes himself meant by phantasm not
"imagination" as opposed to "thought," but rather imagination in the general sense of not being "the accident or
affection of any body" and of not being "in the things without us, but only in the thought of the mind." 4 This is exactly
what Spinoza meant by suggesting "imagining"
as an alter-
native for "thinking." It is not impossible, too, that the use of the term "imagining" by Spinoza is a faint reminis-
cence of the Platonic and Plotinian saying that time "image" of eternity.
is
the
thus assumed by Spinoza to have two characteristics. First, the existence of an object which is said to be conceived under the attribute of duration must be only
Duration
is
a possible existence, depending upon God as its efficient 5 cause, which he describes in the Cogitata Metaphysica by
the term "created things" and in his letter to

1
Meyer by
the
Fpistola 12.
Ibid. (Opera, IV, p. 57,
11.
*
3
7-8):
"cogitandi, scu potius imaginandi
Modos."
Elementa Philosophiae, Pars II, Cap. VII, 3. s See Ibid. below, Vol. II, pp. 80 ff.
DEF. 8]
357
This differentiates duration from eternity, which we shall discuss later. Second, duration is to be conceived as unlimited, unmeasured, and undetermined. This
differentiates duration from time.
term "mode."
These two characteristics
of duration are contained in the term "indefinite" which
Spinoza uses in his definition of duration in the Ethics. "Duration," he says, "is the indefinite continuation of exr Note incidentally his use of the term "continuaistence."
tion," which, as will be recalled, like the terms
"permanence"
in
and "perseverance,"
definition of duration.
is
used by the scholastics
their
In the explanation to this definition in the Ethics Spinoza, it seems to me, is trying to bring out the double meaning of the term "indefinite" as corresponding to the two characteristics of duration. In so far as duration applies to existence which is not necessary by its own
nature, Spinoza says, "I call it indefinite because it cannot be determined by the nature itself of the existing thing." In so far as duration is unlimited and unmeasured and is, as
we have
definite
seen above, "the whole existence of a thing" and not merely a portion of it, Spinoza says that he calls it in-
"because
it
cannot be determined ... by the
effi-
which necessarily posits the existence of the thing but does not take it away." By the "efficient cause" he
cient cause,
means here God, who

cause of
lect."
3
all
The
" described by him as the efficient things which can fall under the infinite intelimplication of the statement here that if durais
tion were not indefinite

(tollit)
God would have
been taking away
statement
the existence of the thing can be explained by the in the Cogitata Metaphysica that "however much
of duration you take away (detrahis), so do you take away from it."
*
1
much
of
its
existence
Ethics, II, Def. 5.
Ethics,
I,
Prop. 16, Corol.
i.
I, 4.
358

it is
[ETHICS,
Time, as we have seen, does not
differ essentially
from
duration; only a limited portion of duration. Spinoza thus sometimes speaks of duration as "indefinite time"
(tempus
indefinitutri),
and contrasts
1
it
with "finite time"
(tempus finitum), "limited time" (tempus limitatum) y and
And, vice versa, he (tempus definitum). " of time as "determinate duration (duratio speaks also determinata)? It is for this reason that Spinoza sometimes
"definite time"
3 speaks of "duration or time" as if the two terms meant to him the same thing. In this indeed Spinoza is really reverting to Plotinus' use of the term time and also to those
Jewish philosophers who used the term time for that motionfree time which, as we have been trying to show, is known
in scholasticism
under the name of duration.

III.
ETERNITY
its
The term
eternity started on
career in the history of
philosophy with two meanings. Like the twofold meanings with which so many of our other philosophic terms have
be designated Briefly stated, the difference between these two meanings is as follows. To Plato eternity is the antithesis of time and it means the exclusion
started
their historical
careers,
they
may
the Platonic and the Aristotelian.
of any kind of temporal relations. To Aristotle eternity is only endless time. The question before us is, how did it happen that eternity, which prior to Plato, for all we know, had
meant simply endless

exclusion of time?
time,
came
to
mean with Plato
the
to this question seems to be that the term has acquired its new meaning in Plato from the eternity nature of the eternal beings to which it was exclusively ap1
The answer
Ethics, III, Prop. 8 Ethics,

I,
and Dcmonst.
"
Ethics,
I,
Prop. 21, Demonst.
Def.
8.
DEF. 8]
359
plied by him.
Beginning as an adjective of those eternal beings, designating only one of their characteristics, namely,
that of ceaseless existence,
it
came
to be used, as
it
so often
happens with terms, as a surrogate for those beings. Those "eternal beings" became simply "the eternals" by the same
process that "port wine' became simply "port." The adjective eternal thus became with Plato a substantive, the eternals. In this capacity of a substantive, the term eternal
1
was used by Plato not only

ence but as inclusive of
all
in the sense of ceaseless exist-
the other properties which characterized those beings for which the term eternal substituted. The new and enlarged concept formed out of the term etercharacteristics
became in fact a sort of epitome of all the which the ceaseless existing beings were by In other differentiated from the other kinds of beings.
nity as a surrogate
words,
it
tween
his
epitomized to Plato all the essential differences beworld of ideas and his world of sense.
all
This process of investing the term eternity with
the
connotations of the eternal beings to which it happened to be exclusively applied went on, as we shall try to show, throughout the history of philosophy, and it is the tracing of
this process that constitutes the history of the term.
To
Plato the differences between the world of ideas and
the world of sense
may
be
summed
up, for our present pur-
pose, under two headings. In the first place, the world of ideas is beginningless, whereas the world of sense had a be-
ginning in an act of creation. In the second place, the world of ideas is immovable, immutable, and indivisible, whereas
The
subject to motion, change, and division. ideas, therefore, which alone in the opinion of Plato were eternal in the original sense of beginningless became the the world of sense
is
Eternals, and the term eternity, because of its exclusive application to the ideas, came to include in its meaning all the
360

in
[ETHICS,
other characteristics of the ideas.
stand
Eternity thus came to Plato for permanence, unity, immutability, identity, and indivisibility. It was no longer infinite time, but rather
freedom from any sort of temporal relations, for time to Plato, as later to Aristotle, was connected with motion. The
relation of time to eternity was conceived by him as that of the world of sense to the world of ideas. Time was thus
described by him as the moving image of eternity. To Aristotle, however, there was more than one kind of
1
beginningless being. The universe as a whole, the celestial spheres, motion, the immaterial Intelligences, and the Im-
movable Mover were all eternal beginning and no end. Eternity,
in the sense of
having no
therefore,
had with him as
many meanings
plied.
as the
number of beings
to
When
applied
to which it was apthe universe or to the movable
meant nothing but infinite time, and this was inseparable from motion. For while indeed, argues Aristotle, the object which has infinite motion cannot truly
spheres, eternity
be described as being in time, which in the strict technical sense of the term means to be comprehended by time and
transcended by
time in the
it,
it
is
still
less technical
described by him as being in sense of being with time, that is to
2 say, of being when time is. When, however, eternity is applied to immovable beings, as God or the Intelligence, it of necessity means a negation of temporal relation, for there
can be no time when there
is
no motion.
While Aristotle
himself does not say anything on this subject beyond the statements that the universe, circular motion, the spheres,
and God are
all
eternal, this inference
is
certainly to be
derived from his statements.'

s,
*
37 D.
Physics, IV, 12, 22ia, 9-11.
Crejcas' Critique of Aristotle , pp. 287, 646, n. 21. Cf. also Aristotle's discussion of the meaning of a.i&v in Df Caelo, I, 9, 2793, 22-33.
Cf.
my
DBF. 8]

Plotinus as to Aristotle there
is
361
To
more than one kind of
being which has a beginningless existence, for the process of emanation is continuous and therefore the sphere is as
eternal, in the sense of having no beginning, as the universal soul, as the intelligible world, as the Intelligence, and as the
One
Aristotle he does not apply the term eternity to all of these types of being. Rather like Plato he applies it exclusively to what in his system corres-
or God.
But unlike
to the world of ideas in the system of Plato, to the intelligible world, to the Intelligence and the One. Eternity
ponds
according to him
Intelligence.
ity,
is
identical with
God.
It
is
the
life
of the
It
is
"life consisting in rest, identity,

2
uniform-
The universal soul, however, has no but time, or, as we have preferred to call it, indefieternity nite time or duration, whereas the sphere and everything that is moved with it and through it has definite time. Though
and
infinity/*
time
is
endless to Plotinus,
is
still it is
not eternity, for eternity,
as in Plato,
is
essentially of a different nature than time and an exclusion of any kind of temporal relation.
Among
soul
Jewish and Arabic philosophers, the Aristotelian

Intelligences as well as the Plotinian universal
Intelligences, the
and Plotinian
became the
number of which were
determined by the number of the celestial spheres and which were identified with the angels of the Bible and functioned
as the cause of the motion of the celestial spheres. 3 But with their rejection of the Plotinian emanation and their
acceptance in
its
place of the theory of creation,
God
be-
came the only being who had endless existence and thereby He also became the exclusive possessor of the attribute of eternity. Eternity could then have been used by them as a
1
Enneads,
III, vii,
4 (cd. Creuzer ct Moser, Paris, 1855).

11.
-'
Ibid., 10 (p. 177,
34-35).
Cf. above, p. 218.
362
[ETHICS,
surrogate to God and as an epitome of all His attributes. Still the problem of creation was for them a vital subject of
discussion and in the course of that discussion they had to deal with Aristotle's theory of the eternity of the world and
its
of motion, and this called for the use of the term eternal in Aristotelian sense of infinite time. Thus the term eternity
had
to be used
by them both with reference
to
God and
with
reference to other beings which were supposed by Aristotle to be of endless existence. The result was that the term
eternity
had
for
and the
this
Aristotelian.
them two meanings, again the Platonic On the one hand, it meant the excluit
sion of time; on the other,
meant
infinite time.
Owing
to
double meaning of the term, Jewish philosophers always
God
took great pains to explain that when eternity is applied to it does not mean infinite time but rather freedom from
temporal relations.
We may illustrate this generalization by a brief analysis of the discussion of the attribute of eternity which occurs in the writings of some of the leading Jewish philosophers. It usually takes the form of an explanation of the terms
"first"
and "last," the use of which
is
the Biblical
way
of
1 expressing the eternity of God, that is to say, eternity a pane ante and a parte post. In their explanation of these Biblical terms, Jewish philosophers endeavor to emphasize that these
two terms should not be taken literally to mean beginningless and endless time but should be taken rather as implying
God's exclusion from any kind of temporal relation. Both Bahya and Maimonides insist upon this point and
suggest that the term "first" should be taken as a negation either of God's having anything prior to Him, as Bahya
2
expresses himself,
1
or of His having been created, as Maia
Cf. Isaiah 44, 6.
Robot ha-Lcbabot,
I, 6.
DEF. 8]

1
363
it. Similarly, Judah ha-Levi speaks of God as transcending all relations of time and explains the terms " " and "last" not as affirmations of literal priority and first
monides puts
posteriority but rather as negations of God's having been 2 preceded by anything and of His ever coming to an end.
most interesting passage
for
our purpose
is
is
that of Abra-
ham Ibn Daud where

the attribute 'eternal/
eternity
directly identified with
immovability and immutability.
"When we
ascribe to
we only mean thereby
that
God He was
immovable, that He is immovable, and that He will be immovable. You already know that by motion we mean change from one state to another." 3 Crescas, though on account of
his defining time as duration
no objection
4 tion, follows
to the use of divine attributes
independent of motion he has which imply dura-
Maimonides
in interpreting the
s
term "first"
in
the sense of being "uncreated."
The most
interesting passage for our purpose, however,
is
that of Albo.
"First" and "last," he says, mean absolute
6 independence of any temporal relations. Albo, as we have already seen, distinguishes between two kinds of time: one,
absolute time or duration, which

definite
is infinite,
and the other,
is finite. Eternity as applied to God, 7 according to him, excludes duration as well as definite time. The reason given by him why God alone of all beings is de-
time, which
scribed as eternal
is
that
God
alone of
sary existence by virtue of His own beings have only possible existence by their
1
beings has necesnature, whereas all other

all
own
nature. 8
March Nebukim,
I, 57.
Cuzari, II,
1.
Emunah Ramah,
II,
iii
(pp. 54-55).
Or Adonai^ I, iii, 3 (p. 236). Cf. my "Crescas on the Problem of Divine Attributes" in the Jewish Quarterly Review^ New Series, VII (1916), pp. 181-182. 5 Or Adonai, I, iii, 3 (p. 24b). Cf. my "Crescas on the Problem of Divine Attributes," p. 207, n.
'
in.
6
8
'/0rfV0,
Ibid.
II, 18.
Ibid.
364

to
[ETHICS,
Or
put
1
it
in other words, eternity

in
cording to Albo, because

identical.
God
applied to God, acessence and existence are

is
by Albo as idenand immutability, 2 terms which remind us tity, uniformity, of those used by Plotinus as well as Plato in his characterizaEternity
is,
therefore, defined
tion of eternity.
The
per
se y
use of eternity as a description of necessary existence i.e., of the identity of essence and existence, may be
also found in Altabrizi. which he adduces there
Among
is
one which reads that
the four definitions of time "
time exists
in itself, is neither a body nor anything belonging to a body, but is something which has necessary existence by virtue of
I have suggested elsewhere that the last statement was taken from the Plotinian definition of eternity and was
itself."
4 misapplied by Altabrizi to time. In exactly the same sense is the term eternity used in mediaeval Latin philosophic texts. It is applied exclusively
to
God and
it is
relations.
If other beings are
defined as the exclusion from any temporal assumed to have an endless
existence, they are not described as eternal but by some other term. If the same term eternal is applied also to other
beings, then the term when applied to God is said to have a special meaning. In either way, eternal as applied to God means more than the mere negation of beginning and end.
means immovability and necessity of existence. contrast between eternity and time as that between permanence and motion is suggested by Augustine when he speaks of eternity as the "ever-fixed" (semper stantis) and of time as the "never-fixed" (numquam stantis] s or when he says that "time does not exist without some kind of
It
The
Ibid.
ibid.
Altabrizi,
Commentary on Maimonides* Twenty-five

n.
Propositions, Prop. 15.
Cf.
5
my
Crescas' Critique of Aristotle , p. 662, n. 29.
Confessions y XI,
DEF. 8]

*
365
change caused by motion, while in eternity there is no Boethius expresses the distinction between eterchange."
nity and infinite time in the following statement: "Philosophers say that ever (semper) may be applied to the life of the heavens and other immortal bodies. But as applied to God
it
has a different meaning/' 2 Though the world, according to Aristotle, "never began nor were ever to end, and its
did endure with infinite time, yet it is not such that it 3 In order not to confuse eternity ought to be called eternal/'
life
with
infinite
time he suggests two different terms for them.
if we will give things their right names, followPlato, let us say that God is eternal and the world ing
"Wherefore,
perpetual."
of Augustine and Boethius are re-echoed throughout the history of mediaeval philosophic writers. Eternity and time are considered to be of essentially different
natures,
The views
and
in
order to take care of the duration of beings
which can be described by neither eternity nor time, the term aevum is generally used. A list of scholastic views on
5 But for our present purpose eternity is given by Suarez. Suarez' own view on eternity is of significance, for, like Albo, he identifies it with necessary existence per se. He argues
that eternity is not only a negation of God's having been created, or of His having a beginning and end, or of His
being subject to motion and change, but that it has a positive meaning in so far as it expresses the necessity of the existence
of
God by His own

existence.
6
1
essence,
i.e.,
the identity of His essence
and
DC De
Civitatc Dei,
XI,
6.
3 *
Stewart and Rand, pp. 20-21. Consolatio Philosophiae, V, 6, ed. Stewart and Rand, pp. 400-401.
frinitatey IV, ed.
Ibid., pp.
402-403.
5 6
Disputationes Metaphysicac, Disp. L, Sec. III.

Ibid., Disp. L, Sec. Ill, x.
366

similar definition also occurs in
[ETHICS,
cabalistic
work
Puerto, del Cielo.
Abraham Herrera's The author quotes Plato,
Plotinus, Boethius,
Torquato Tasso, and Ficino on the mean-
ing of eternity. He himself defines it as his contemporary Suarez and as Albo do, as meaning existence which is neces-
sary by
its
own
ence, for, as he says, 1 per se is eternal/'
nature, or the identity of essence and exist" every essence that is necessary and
Whatever sources Spinoza had consulted about eternity he must have received the following general impression. Eternity as applied to God does not mean merely endless time. It is used as an epitome of the main distinguishing characterdifferentiated from other beings. These distinguishing characteristics are summed up under two headings, both going back to Aristotle. First, God is
istics
is
by which God
immovable, whereas everything

eternity
is
else is
movable, and hence
said to
mean immovability, immutability,

and
all
manence,
with
it.
indivisibility,
Second,
God
perthe other negations that go has necessary existence, whereas other
beings have only possible existence. Accordingly eternity is also said to mean, as in Albo, Suarez, and Herrera, the necessary existence of God or, which is the same thing, the
identity of essence
and existence
in
Him.
Following these
traditional views on eternity, Spinoza gives his tion of the term.
own
defini-
begin with, eternity is not merely beginningless and endless time or duration. "It cannot therefore be explained
To
by duration and time, even
if
duration be conceived without
2 Indeed, in common speech, we speak beginning or end/' of the eternity of the world when we mean its eternal dura-
tion in time, but this

1
is
an erroneous use of the term.
It is
Sha'ar ha-Shamayim y III, 4.

Ethics, I, Def. 8, Expl.
DEF. 8]
367
only because of a defective terminology that "we say that the world has existed from eternity." * As we have seen,
Boethius has already tried to remedy this defect by introducing the use of the term perpetual. An equally defective use of the term eternity, says Spinoza, is when it is used with
reference to things which do not exist, as the essence of things is eternal, although
when we say "that we do not think of
the things as ever existing." 2 The reference in this passage is undoubtedly to the use of the term eternal with reference
to the axiomatic truths
which
exist only as concepts of the
mind, as, for instance, in the expression "eternal truths" used by Descartes. The particular Cartesian passage which
in mind is probably the following: "When we that it is impossible that anything can be formed apprehend of nothing, the proposition ex nihilo nihilfit is not to be con-
Spinoza had
sidered as an existing thing, or the mode of a thing, but as a certain eternal truth which has its seat in our mind, and is
a
common
Thus
notion or axiom."
eternity, like duration
and time,
call
which
exist, or, as
Spinoza would
refers only to things them, real beings. But
inasmuch as
into those
real beings are divided, according to Spinoza,
"whose essence involves existence," i.e., God or Substance, and those "whose essence involves only a possible existence,"
first
4
kind of real being.
eternity, says Spinoza, applies only to the Accordingly Spinoza reverts to a
definition of eternity the like of
which we have found

in Spinoza's
in
Albo, Suarez, and Herrera.
Now,
terminology
the expression essence involving existence has the same meaninfinite in the ing as causa sui or being causeless or infinite
sense of undetermined
by a
2
5
cause. 5
Hence Spinoza
defines
eternity as an "attribute under which

1
we conceive
the inI,
Cogitata Mctaphysica, II, Cogitata Mctaphysica,
I.
Ibid.
49.
I, i.
Cf. above, pp. 127, 138.
368

of God."
'
CETHICS,
in
finite existence
"
Infinite
"
is
used here
the
sense of causeless, in contrast to "created," which, as

seen,
is
we have
of "caused/*
eternity
is
used by him in his definition of duration in the sense 2 Similarly in a letter to Meyer he says that
the only term which explains the existence of it means "the infinite enjoyment of
substance, and hence

existence, or (in
finite existence
awkward Latin) essendi." Here, too, by inhe means existence undetermined by a cause.
3
The
flects
expression existendi or essendi Jruitio undoubtedly rethe expression plentitudo essendi which is used by
in his definition of eternity.
*
Suarez
is
also to be
found
in his
implication formal definition of eternity in the
The same
Ethics, which reads as follows: "By eternity I understand existence itself (ipsarn existentiarri), so far as it is conceived necessarily to follow from the definition alone of the eternal
5 I take the ipsam in ipsam existentiam not only as thing." a reflexive and emphatic pronoun but in the sense of existen-
tiam per se or per essentiam, the equivalent of the expression ipsius esse per essentiam which occurs in Suarez' definition
of eternity. 6 The existence of
plies differs
God
to
which alone, then, eternity apall

it is
from the existence of
to Spinoza, not only in that
other beings, according identical with His essence

in a different
but also in that
it is
known and demonstrated
manner from that of

are three
the existence of other beings. the

2
There
ways
in
which the existence of a thing
may
be
known,
1
according to Spinoza:
I, 4.
way
of perception, the
Cf. above, p. 351. Cogitata Metaphysica, Epistola 12: "hoc est, infinitam existendi, sive, invita latinitate, essendi
fruitionem."
< Suarez, Disputationes Mctaphysicae y Disp. L, Sec. Ill, x: "Estenim aeternitas duratio ipsius esse per essentiam: unde sicut ille esse est ipsa plentitudo essendi,
ita aeternitas est (ut ita

s
dicam) ipsa plentitudo durandi."
Ethics, I, Def. 8.
Cf. quotation in note 4 above.
DEF. 8]
369
his well-known way of reason, and the way of intuition in the case of all other three stages of knowledge. Now,
beings, their existence is known by the first two kinds of knowledge, either by direct perception or by indirect proof
a posteriori.
The
existence of eternal truths, the axioms and
common
eternity
notions, are perceived directly as intuitions, or

call
what
Descartes would
I
" Spinoza thus says: By understand existence itself, so far as it is conceived
innate ideas.
necessarily to follow from the definition alone of the eternal thing, for such existence, like the essence of the thing, is
conceived as an eternal truth."

eternal truths
is
The comparison with

is
meant
is
to bring out the fact that the exist-
ence of
God which
identical with His essence
known
as the essence of the eternal truths.
But there
intuitively is a
difference between the eternal
God and
the eternal truths.
In the eternal
God
there are both essence and existence,

identical.
though the two are
In the eternal truths there
is
3 only essence; there is no existence in them. In Albo's discussion of the eternity of God, we have seen, not only time but also duration is excluded as an admissible
In scholastic philosophy, however, the admissibility of duration as a fitting attribute of God was a mooted point. Suarez quotes Aureolus as being opposed to
the attribution of duration to God.
attribute of God.
He
himself
is
in
favor
Spinoza likewise raises the question in Cogitata Metaphysica^ II, I, and like Albo and Aureolus he denies the appliof
it.
4
God. The passage in which the discussion is contained, however, seems to refer to certain definite texts which at the present writing I am unable to
cability of duration to
identify.
'
'
ff.
Ethics,
I,
Def.
8,
and Expl.
Cf. above, p. 367, notes 1 and 3. Suarez, op. cit. t Disp. L, Sec. Ill, n.
CHAPTER XI
MODES
XIX to XXXVI, despite their external apof disjointedness and incongruity, have in reality, pearance like all the other groups of propositions we have already treated, a logical order of sequence. They fall into six groups, dealing with the following topics: I. Eternity of God (Props.
PROPOSITIONS
XIX-XX).
XXIII).
II.
III.
and Eternal Modes (Props. XXIThe Nature of Modes in General (Props.

Infinite
XXIV-XXVII). IV. Finite Modes (Props. XXVIIIXXIX). V. Intellect, Will, and Power (Props. XXXXXXV). VI. Purposelessness (Prop. XXXVI and AppenAll these six topics may be subsumed under one dix).
general topic which, like that of the preceding group of propositions (Props. XV- XVIII), is the causality of God,
XXXVI
Propositions XIX-XXIX dealing with the effects of God's causality, that is to say, modes, and Propositions and Appendix dealing with the necessary and pur-
XXX-
poseless nature of God's causality. Furthermore, not only are the propositions under each of these topics logically coherent in themselves, but there is also a logical transition
from one topic to another.
The subject of Propositions XIX-XXIX is the description of the modal system of the universe. Having already dealt with the nature of God and His attributes, His existence and
His causality, Spinoza now undertakes to present a complete and systematic view of his conception of the modes. If we
may
use here Spinoza's own expressions which we have already discussed previously but which in the Ethics are not
PROPS. 19-29]
MODES
may
371
introduced by Spinoza until later in the course of the propositions
under consideration, we
say that the Ethics so

it
far has dealt with natura naturans\
from now on
will deal
with natura naturata.
In our chapter on Extension and
Thought we have already discussed quite fully Spinoza's system of modes as they are treated by him in his writings outside the Ethics. That chapter may serve us now as a general introduction to the subject. In this chapter we shall draw upon it only in so far as it will be necessary for us to explain the order and the meaning of the propositions before us, but we shall give fuller consideration to those phases
of the problem which appear for the
propositions. To describe the
first
time
in
these
simpler language, the world as it is seen, perceived, and thought of by us, the most natural method for Spinoza would have
modal system of the universe
or, in
been to start with that which we ordinarily think of as directly
known
to us, namely, individual things,
and work up gradu-
ally to that
indirectly.
which we ordinarily think of as known to us only He could have done so without the sacrifice of
the use of his
own
terminology.
He
could have started with
an enumeration and classification of individual things or finite modes and then reduced them to two classes, extended
things and thinking things. He could have then considered the totality of these individual things as constituting the infinite physical universe and called it by his own expression " " the face of the whole universe and described it in his own
way
as a mediate infinite
and eternal mode. He could have
then explained the behavior of the finite modes within the totality of the universe on the basis of two principles, motion-
and understanding, on the other, and described these again in his own way as immediate infinite and eternal modes. Then he could have gone further
and-rest, on the one hand,
372
[ETHICS,
and shown how these two activities are the expressions of two aspects of a single self-subsistent whole transcending the
aggregate totality of the individual modes and called that transcendent whole substance and the two aspects, of which
and understanding are expressions, the To have done so attributes of extension and thought. would have followed the a posteriori method used by Spinoza
motion-and-rest
adherents in the Middle Ages. But Spinoza considered himself bound by the self-imposed a Substance is priori reasoning of his geometrical method.
Aristotle
and by
his
more immediately known
to us, according to him, than the
individual things, and the source of knowledge by which it From the definition of is known to us is the most reliable.
substance the nature of the entire universe follows by necessity as the properties of a triangle follow from the definition
of a triangle. Spinoza, therefore, preferred to start with substance or God and to work gradually downward to individual things. Spinoza is reported to have remarked to Tschirnhaus that while most philosophers begin with creal a remark which, it must be said, tures he began with God describes only his method of exposition but not necessarily
manner in which he has arrived at his scheme. But departing though he did from most philosophers, Spinoza was not altogether without a model.
the
His model
as a
is
emanation with
its initial
the theory of emanation. This theory of monism is not only taken by him
model
is
for his
own system
in preference to the
dualism
which
co-existence of the universe with God, but, as
implied in the Aristotelian theory of the eternal we have seen

it is
on several occasions,
1
also used
by him
as the
main
target
Gerhardt, "Leibniz und Spinoza," in Sitzungsberic hte der koniglich prcussischcn Akademie der Wissemchajten zu Berlin, 1889, p. 1077. Cf. below, See K.
I.
Vol. II, p. 4.
PROPS. 19-29]
MODES
There
373
of his criticism.
are, of course, fundamental differ-
which
ences between the prototype and the copy, chief among is the nature of God, which is pure thought according
to the emanationists but
according to Spinoza.
both thought and extension Barring this fundamental difference

is
between them, the respective schemes in both systems are parallel to each other. There is God as the starting point of
both systems. The two immediate
in Spinoza,
and eternal modes namely, the absolutely infinite intellect and motion-and-rest, correspond respectively to the Intelligences and
infinite
the circular motion of the spheres in emanation. Spinoza's "face of the whole universe" corresponds to the outermost celestial sphere which encloses the totality of the physical
universe according to the emanationists, with the difference that the former was considered as infinite whereas the latter
was considered
as finite.
And
then, within the universes of
both these systems there are individual things. Another important element of emanation retained by Spinoza is its terminology. When choosing his terms carehe always speaks of things as following (sequi) from the nature of God or from His attributes. This reflects the terms
fully,
1
"proceeding" generally used
and "following by necessity"

in
which are
uses
Hebrew
philosophic literature in connec-
tion with the process of emanation.
Even when he
3
some
other term, such as that
God "acts"
(agit)
or "to be pro-
duced" (product) by God, 4 it is to be understood in the sense that it follows by necessity from the nature of God. The term cause which Spinoza applies to God is likewise to be understood in the logical and geometrical sense, that is to
1
N2T.
Cf.
Emunah Ramah,
Cf.
II, iv, 3.
II, 22.
3"nrV, fjL.
Ethics,
I,
March Nebukim,
Prop. 17; IV, Praef.
374
[ETJHCS,
say, in the sense in
which the premise of a syllogism is said to be the cause of its conclusion and the definition of a triangle is said to be the cause of its properties. The term
1
"cause" (causa)
"reason*
(ratio),
to Spinoza means the same as the term which two terms are sometimes connected
I
by him by the co-ordinating conjunction "or/' so that the causality he affirms of God is not meant to be understood as
2 In this respect, indeed, his implying temporal sequence. of God's causality corresponds exactly to that conception of the emanationists as it is characterized by Maimonides
in the following passage:
"It
is
clear that
when
Aristotle
says that the first Intelligence necessarily follows from God, that the second necessarily follows from the first, and the
third from the second
was
first in
existence
a necessary result.
... he does not mean that one thing it came the second as ... By the expression 'it necessarily
and then out of
follows' he merely refers to the causal relation; he
means
to
say that the first Intelligence is the cause of the existence of the second, the second of the third, and so on .; but none of these things preceded another, or has been in exist. .
ence, according to him, without the existence of that other.
one should say, for example, that from the primary qualities there follow by necessity roughness, smoothness, hardness, softness, porosity, and solidity, in which case no
It
is
as
if
person would doubt that though ... the secondary qualities follow necessarily from the four primary qualities, it is
impossible that there should exist a body which, having the primary qualities, should be denuded of the secondary ones." 3
The same
1
idea,
it
may
be added,
is
reflected in Spinoza's use

1.
Ibid., I, Prop,
n, Demonst.
26).
2 (Opera, II, p. 52,
31 et pass.};
n.
IV, Praef.
(Opera, II, p. 206,

a
3
1.
Cf. Joachim,
Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, p. 54,

II, 21.
Moreh Nebukim,
PROPS. 19-29]
MODES
l
375
2
of the expression prior in nature he applies to God.
or prior in causality
his
which
But whatever the
differences
between
God and
the
God
of tradition, Spinoza seems to say at the beginning of this new chapter in the Ethics that his God does not differ from
the traditional God in the matter of eternity. "God is eternal," or, since God's attributes are nothing but certain 3 aspects of His essence, "all His attributes are eternal/'
Now,
meant three
eternity in the history of philosophy, as we have shown, things. In the first place, it meant necessary
existence per se y or the identity of essence and existence. In the second place, it meant immutability. Then, in the third
place, it meant, at least in Spinoza's assertions that the eternal existence of God is an eternal truth, to be immediately
known as an intuition. 4 In the first two propositions of this new chapter in the Ethics, therefore, Spinoza reiterates these
it
three implications of the term eternity. In the first place, means necessary existence per se y or the identity of essence
and
existence,
"for
God
is
substance, which necessarily

it
exists, that is to
say a substance to whose nature
pertains
and furthermore, "the existence of God and His essence are one and the same thing." 6 In the second place, eternity means immutability, hence "it follows that God is immutable, or (which is the same thing) all His attributes
to exist,"
5
are immutable."
In the third place, the eternal existence

it is
of God
ately
may
be called an eternal truth in so far as

as an intuition, for
is
8
immedilike
known
"the existence of God,

It
is
His essence,
1
an eternal truth."
i.
in this respect only,
Ethics,
2
I,
Prop.
Cf. above, p. 77.
*
s
Ibid., I, Prop. 17, Schol. (Opera, II, p. 63, 1. 7): "prior causalitate." Cf. above, p. 369. Ibid., I, Prop. 19.
Ethics,
I,
Ibid., I,
8
Prop. 19, Demonst. Prop. 20.
Ibid., Corel. 2.
I.
Ibid., I, Prop. 19, Schol.;
Prop. 20, Corol.
376

in respect
[ETHICS,
and not
of lack of reality, that Spinoza calls the

eternal truth.
l
existence of
God an
Again, preserving the vocabulary of emanation, Spinoza speaks of his modes as things which follow from God. But
inasmuch as unlike the emanationists Spinoza does not take to be pure thought but rather as possessing an infinite number of attributes of which the two known ones are
God
thought and extension, he does not speak of a single mode following from God but rather of various modes following respectively from the various attributes. Still like the emanationists
he
must be
istics
insists that each mode following from an attribute similar to the attribute from which it follows in
certain essential characteristics.
These
essential characterinfinite.
he sums up
in
two terms, eternal and
By
the
term eternal
in its application to
modes, however, he does not
eternity in all the three senses which it has in its application to God. For one thing, it cannot mean necessary existence per se or the identity of essence and existence, for the
mean
existence per se and their existence For another thing, it is not identical with their essence. cannot mean the immediate perception of the modes as an
eternal truth, for they are known only through their cause. " " Eternal in this case means only to be immutable, or to exist
forever, as Spinoza directly expresses himself in Proposition
modes have no necessary
XXI,
tion
or to have indeterminate existence or duration, as he
Demonstration of Proposiwhere he describes the opposite of it to have "determinate existence or duration/' Similarly by the term infinite which he applies to this mode he does not mean inindirectly expresses himself in the
XXI
finity in the sense
as their cause.
perfect, the
1
"Infinite" in this case
of causelessness, for the modes have God means to be the most

its
most complete and the greatest of
kind, that
Cf. above, pp. 367, 369.
PROPS. 19-29]
is
MODES
377
to say, that which cannot be limited by another thing of the same nature, or what Spinoza elsewhere describes as the
"infinite in its
own
kind."
That
this is
what Spinoza means
by the term infinite as applied to modes may be gathered from the first part of the Demonstration of Proposition XXI. It is in the light of these remarks, therefore, that we may
full meaning of Proposition XXI: "All which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute things of God must forever exist, and must be in finite that is to
understand the
say, through that

finite."
same attribute they are What he means to say is this: They
eternal
and
in-
are eternal only
in the sense of existing forever or of
being immutable, and
they are also infinite only in the sense of being unlimited by another thing of the same attribute.
by eternal and infinite when immediate modes Spinoza does not mean the same as when these terms are applied to God, he could just as well have said in Proposition XXI that all things which
It
is
true, of course, that since
applied to the
follow from
cannot be eternal and
the absolute nature of any attribute of God infinite. But he chose to phrase his
proposition in positive terms evidently because he wanted to emphasize the ever-existence and the infinite perfection of
these immediate modes, for
it is
in these respects that
he
will
want
later to differentiate
them from individual things or finite
modes. Another plausible reason for his choosing to phrase the proposition in positive terms is that by affirming that the modes
who contended
possible, for,
are infinite in perfection he indirectly hit at the mediaevals " that the existence of an infinite effect is im-
were
it
to exist,
it
would be
like its cause."
The Demonstration of Proposition XXI follows Spinoza's favorite method of demonstration by proving the impossibil1
Ibid., I, Def. 6, Expl.
Cf. above, p. 136.

12.
Abraham Herrera, Sha'ar ha-Shamayim> V,
378

namely, the impossibility
\sfinite
[ETHICS,
ity of the opposite/
"
that in
some
attribute of
God something which
and has a determi-
nate existence or duration follows from the absolute nature
of that attribute/* For the purpose of his discussion he takes up the mode of the attribute of thought, which he designates
(idea Dei) but by which he means the same as by what he describes elsewhere 2 and asks the reader as the "absolutely infinite intellect,"
here by the
name
of the "idea of
God"
to observe that the
same reasoning
is
true of the other im-
mediate modes, such, for instance, as motion-and-rest in the

attribute of extension.
stration
to the
is
constructed. It
But note how carefully this demonfalls into two parts, corresponding
in the proposition,
two terms used

In the
namely,
infinite
and
eternal.
first
part he
finite.
tries to
show that the im-
mediate modes cannot be
In the second part he tries to show that they cannot have a "determinate duration."
The immediate modes which in Proposition XXI Spinoza has shown to be eternal and infinite are designated by him n Proposition XXII as the modification (modificatio} by
which attributes are modified, and he tries to show also that the mediate mode, which he elsewhere designates by the
name
of the "face of the whole universe,"
must
likewise
of course, in as we have seen, he uses these terms with reference to which, modes. But instead of the term eternal which we should
infinite, in the particular sense,
be eternal and
expect here he uses
the expression to exist necessarily (necessario existere), by which, however, he means the same thing. Evidence that by the expression to exist necessarily
now
he means the same as by the term eternal preceding proposition may be found in the following passage in the demonstration of the next proposition: "If
in this proposition
in the
1 *
Cf. above, pp. 97, 183. Cf. above, p. 344.
Cf. above, pp. 238
ff.
PROPS. 19-29]
MODES
379
a mode, therefore, be conceived to exist necessarily and to be infinite, its necessary existence and infinitude must be con-
God or perceived through it, conceived to express infinitude and necessity of existence, that is to say, eternity." x In the light of these " Whatever remarks, we may now read Proposition XXII:
cluded from some attribute of
is
in so far as it
follows from
any attribute of God,

infinitely,
in so far as it is
modified
by
a modification which through the
same
attribute exists
necessarily
and
must
also exist necessarily
and
infinitely." What he means to say is this: The modes which follow from the immediate modes must be eternal and in-
immediate modes themselves. Thus there are two kinds of eternal and infinite modes, namely, immediate and mediate. In our discussion of the preceding two propositions, for the sake of clearness and in view of the fact that we have
finite like the
already given a complete discussion of the subject in a previous chapter, we have used the terms immediate modes and mediate modes. Spinoza himself, however, has so far used
neither of these terms.
In fact, in none of the propositions
proper of the Ethics has he so far used the term mode. He has always spoken generally of things following from God or from the nature of any of God's attributes, though the term
affection (ajfectio) in the sense of
in a proposition.
2
To
introduce the term
mode has been used by him mode and to distin-
guish among modes which are infinite and eternal between those which are immediate and those which are mediate is the
purpose of Proposition XXIII. In this proposition, dealing again with the infinite and eternal modes and using again the
term "to exist necessarily" for "eternal," he introduces for the first time the term "mode": "Every mode which exists
1
Ethics,
a
I,
Prop. 23, Demonst.
Ibid., I, Prop, i; cf. Prop. 4,
Demonst,
380
necessarily

and
infinitely
[ETHICS,
must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from some attribute modified by a modification which exists necessarily and infinitely/' which the Demonstration explains to mean "either immediately or mediately" and refers in connection with the former to Proposition XXI and in connection with the latter to Proposition XXII. These two
references
make
it
clear that Proposition
XXI
deals with
immediate
XXII
and eternal modes whereas Proposition deals with mediate infinite and eternal modes.
infinite in these three propositions
Thus
we have an
outline of
Spinoza's theory of infinite and eternal modes and of their classification into immediate and mediate. But the names of
these
modes
name
are not given by him. He mentions here the of only one of these immediate infinite and eternal
this, too,
modes, and
in thought.
only indirectly, namely, the idea of God
Another name
as well as
all
eternal
mode
and eternal modes is seen, in one of his letters.
immediate infinite and names of the other infinite supplied by Spinoza, as we have already
for this
the
In our statement that the term eternal
modes does not mean the same
as the term eternal
when applied to when ap-
plied to God, especially in so far as in the later case the term means the necessary existence per se or the identity of es-
sence
and
existence,
It
is
we have anticipated Propositions
XXIV-XXVII.
evidently because in the preceding has given no hint of this changed meanpropositions Spinoza ing of the term except only, as we have suggested, indirectly
when he speaks
in Proposition
XXI
of existing forever as
an alternative of eternal, or when he speaks in the Demonstration of the same proposition of "determinate existence
or duration" as the opposite of eternity, that he
1
now
feels
Cf. above, p. 216.
Cf. pp. 238, 242, 244.
PROPS. 19-29]
MODES
381
that an explanation of the term eternal as applied to modes is due. And so immediately after he has completed his outline of his theory of the infinite and eternal modes he proceeds to say that these modes, though called eternal, have no necessity at all of their own nature but that in every-
thing they are and in everything they do they are to be considered as having been determined by God as their cause.
the causality of God, it may be recalled, has been described by Spinoza by seven characteristic terms, among which he mentions the following three, namely, that God
Now,
is
(i)
an
efficient cause, (2)
free cause. 1
spects the
tions
an immanent cause, and (3) a As distinguished from God in these three remodes are now shown by Spinoza in Proposi-
XXIV, XXV, and XXVI
as their efficient
free cause.
dependent upon Him cause, their immanent cause, and their

to be
In the
efficient
first place, he says in Proposition XXIV, God is the cause of the modes. But before we go further with
the proposition, we must point out the relation between Spinoza's use of the term efficient cause and the use of the
same term by
the mediaevals.
In Maimonides, for instance,
means primarily the cause that into being, and is distinguished by him from brings things the term formal cause which means the cause that preserves the existence of things after their having come into being. God is, however, according to him both the efficient and the
the term efficient cause
cause of the
formal cause of the universe, inasmuch as God is both the commencement of the existence of things and the
cause of the continuance of the existence of things. Thus arguing against those who maintained that the world could continue to exist even without God once it had been produced by " God, he says that they would be right, if God were only the
1
Cf. above, pp. 304
ff.
382
efficient

cause and
if
.
[ETHICS,
the continuance of the existence of the

. .
God, produced thing were not dependent upon Him. however, is himself the form of the universe, as we have already shown, and it is He who causes its continuance and
x
permanence."
The same
idea that
God
is
both the cause of
the creation and the cause of the permanence of the universe
runs throughout scholastic philosophy, though a different terminology is used. In Thomas Aquinas the cause of the
permanence of the universe
is
called causa essendi, whereas

is
the cause of the creation of the universe
called causa
fiendi* In Duns Scotus both these causes, which he calls causa conservans and causa produc en s respectively, are said to
be subdivisions of the efficient cause. 3
Similarly Descartes
speaks of God not only as the cause of the creation of the world but also as the cause of its conservation. 4
Reflecting this historical background and using, like Duns Scotus, the term efficient cause to include both the cause of
creation
and the cause of conservation, Spinoza says that
are dependent upon God as their efficient cause, for inasmuch as "the essence of things produced by God does
modes
not involve existence," 5 "God is the cause not only of the commencement of the existence of things, but also of their
continuance
in existence."
In the course of his discussion
Spinoza refers to the scholastic expression causa essendi, mentioned by us before, as a description of the continuance
of the existence of things. Essendi, in the scholastic use of the term, means existendi, as has been pointed out by Spinoza
himself in a letter to Meyer, 7 and

1
is
therefore to be translated
Moreh Nebukim,
I,
69.
^heologica, Pars I, Quaest. 104, Art. I, Conclusio and ad 2. In Octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis Quaestiones, Lib. II, Quaest. 8, Mcditationes, III (Oeuvres, VII, p. 49, 11. 12 ff.).
Ethics, I, Prop. 24.
6
1.
Summa
No.
5.
* 7
Ibid., Corol.
3).
Cf. above, p. 108, n. 4,
and
p. 141, n. 4.
PROPS. 19-29]
MODES
383
by "existence" rather than by "essence/* though the latter resembles it more closely etymologically.
In the second place, Spinoza wants to say, the modes are dependent upon God as their immanent cause. He does not,
however, say so in these very words. What he says reads that "God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of
x things, but also of their essence/* how in Spinoza's mind to say that
But we
shall try to
show
is
God
is
the cause of the
essence of things was the equivalent of saying that the immanent cause of things.
God
essence of things in Aristotle and throughout the subsequent history of philosophy meant the concept of things as it is formed by its definition. Thus the essence of man is
The
animality and rationality, inasmuch as man is defined as a rational animal. But animality, which is the genus of man, is considered by Aristotle as the cause of man, and that kind
of cause, as we have shown, is called an immanent cause in the sense that the effect resides in it. 2 Consequently, if the
Aristotelian theory of definition is followed, namely, that a thing is defined by its genus, it may be said that the genus is the cause of the essence of the species, or, to express it
differently, the essence of the species
is
dependent upon the

rejects this
genus as its
immanent
cause.
Now, Spinoza
Aristotelian theory of definition, "although," he says, "all the logicians admit this," 3 and sets up in its place a new
exist
theory according to which modes or things "which do not 4 5 through themselves" or which are "created" are
be defined "only through the attributes whose modes they are, and through which, as their genus, they must be
to
1

3
<
Cf. above, pp. 323
ff.
Short treatise,
Ibid.,
10.
I, 7,
9.
Tractates de Intellects Emendation e ,
96 (Opera,
II, p. 35,
1.
12).
Cf. above,
PP- 35<>-35
384

r
[ETHICS,
understood/'
"
"
or,
2
as
he
proximate
or
theory, man is as a combination of the

sion
According to this not defined as a rational animal but rather

efficient
"
sometimes says, through their

"
3
cause.
modes of God's
and thought,
4
or, as Spinoza himself says,
attributes of exten" the essence of
man
consists of certain modifications of the attributes of

Still,
God."
to the
while Spinoza differs from his predecessors as
to the nature of a definition, he does not differ
from them as
meaning of the term essence. The essence of a thing is still to him the concept of a thing attained by what he considers to be the definition of a thing, namely, the attributes
of which the thing
5
is
a mode, for
"a
said
definition, if
it is
to be
perfect," he says, "must explain the innermost essence of a
thing."
as its
But the attributes are

cause.
6
be related to the definiendum as
its
is
by Spinoza himself to genus and consequently
immanent
Spinoza
thus enabled to speak of
the attributes or of substance or of God, just as his predecessors speak of the genus, as the cause of the essence of the
definiendum y
definiendum.
7
or,
rather,
as
the
immanent cause of
the
But still, unlike the Aristotelian definition which merely states what a thing is but does not affirm that
exists,
it
definition affirms
Spinoza's theory of definition maintains that a what a thing is as well as that it exists, for
"given the definition of a thing, there should be no possibil8 ity of questioning whether it exists." Though he says else-
where that
"
involve existence,"
1
the essence of things produced by God does not 9 he does not mean that there is a possiI,
Short Treatise,
7,
10.
',
Tractatus de Intellectus Emendations
96 (Opera ,
II, p. 35,
1.
13).
Epistola 60 (Opera , IV, p. 270, Ethics, II, Prop. 10, Corol.
1.
22).
Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione,

Cf. above, pp. 324, 328. Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione,
9
95 (Opera,
7
II, p. 34, 1. 29). Cf. above, p. 124. II, p. 35,

11.
97 (Opera,
31-32).
Ettiics, I,
Prop. 24.
PROPS. 19-29]
MODES
385
bility of questioning whether they exist; he only means that their existence is not determined by their own nature but by
their cause.
Consequently, unlike the genus in the Aristote-
lian definition, the attributes, or substance, or
God, or the
proximate or the efficient cause in Spinoza's definition are the causes of both the existence and the essence of the thing
defined.
Hence
in
wishing to say that the modes are dependis
ent upon
tion
God
as their efficient cause Spinoza says in Proposi-
XXV
that
"God
the efficient cause not only of the
existence of things, but also of their essence."
In the third place, says Spinoza, modes are dependent
upon God as their only free cause. We already know that by the term free cause Spinoza means that "which exists from the necessity of its own nature alone, and is determined to action by itself alone," and that when he speaks of God 2 he means that God alone as being the only free cause "acts from the laws of His own nature only, and is com3 The modes, on the other hand, not being pelled by no one." are determined in their action by some cause. This free, conclusion with regard to modes is summed up by Spinoza in two statements in Proposition XXVI, first, in a positive statement, "a thing which has been determined to any action was necessarily so determined by God," and second, in a negative statement, "that which has not been thus
J
determined by
God
cannot determine
itself to action."
Now this proposition, both in its positive and in its negative statements, would on the whole have been admitted by
Talmudic
the mediaeval Jewish theologians and philosophers. In the literature there occur such sayings as "everys is in the control of God," 4 "everything is foreseen," thing
'
Ibid., I, Def. 7.
Ibid., I, Prop. 17, Corol. 2.
Ibid. y I, Prop. 17.
Eerakot 33 b, and parallels.

ty
III, 15.
386

"
[ETHICS,
it is
and
no one on earth bruises

x
his finger, unless
decreed in
heaven."
In the philosophic literature it is generally maintained that everything has a cause which ultimately goes back to God as the first cause. Thus Judah ha-Levi sums
up the position of Jewish philosophers by saying that whatever one may think of freedom of the will, it is generally admitted that nothing happens which does not come either directly or indirectly under the decree or determination of
God. 2
Similarly
Maimonides maintains "that God
is
the
efficient cause of the particular events that take place in the world, just as He is the efficient cause of the universe as a
But still, while they would have admitted both these parts of the proposition, they would have insisted that man has freedom of the will. The Talwhole as
it
now
exists."
mudic statement that "everything is in the control of God" adds "except the fear of God," 4 and the statement that "everything is foreseen" adds "yet freedom of choice is
s Similarly in the philosophic literature the principle given." of freedom of the will is maintained. Now this freedom of the
will,
niscience
according to its protagonists, does not exclude the omand hence the foreknowledge of God. How these
two can be reconciled constitutes the problem of the freedom of the will. Various solutions of this problem are offered. It is sometimes said that while God has foreknowledge of
man's choice
is
it
knowledge no foreknowledge of man's choice, but it is argued that such a lack of foreknowledge is no defect in God. 7 Sometimes it
is
1
not causative. 6 Or
does not determine that choice, for God's it is admitted that God has
argued that while indeed both the principle of man's

Hullin jb.
a 4
&
Moreh Nebukim, Abot> HI, 15.
I,
69.
Cuzari t V, 20. Berakot 3jb.
6
7
Emunot
Emunah Ramah,
wf-De'of, IV, 4; Cuzari, V, 20. II, vi, 2 (p. 96).
PROPS. 19-29]
MODES
387
freedom and the principle of God's foreknowledge are to be admitted, there is no contradiction between them, for God's
knowledge is a homonymous term and is absolutely unlike human knowledge. Now, all these, Spinoza must have
1
mind, are a sort of specious reasoning and special pleading which do not really remove the essential difficulty. To say that God's knowledge is not causative or
argued
in his
that God has no foreknowledge is to deny God's omnipotence and omniscience, and to say that God's knowledge is different from ours is tantamount to an admission that the problem is unsolvable. If God's omnipotence and omniscience
are to be maintained, then
God must be
also
the cause of every
future event and

event.
He must
it is
If despite this
will,
have foreknowledge of that maintained that man has freedom
of the
then
it
means that man can render indeterminate
that which has been determined by God. It is this pointed argument against the mediaeval position on the freedom of
the
human
to
will that
Proposition XXVII
that
Spinoza had in mind when he said in " a thing which has been determined
itself
by God
any action cannot render
indeterminate."
infinite
Spinoza has thus explained the two sets of

eternal modes, those which
attributes of
in so far as
and
God and
immediately follow from the those which follow from His attributes
modes.
they are modified already by the immediate But the world which Spinoza has undertaken to
describe does not consist wholly of infinite and eternal modes. The modes which come directly under our observation are
what Spinoza
things (res singulares)^ and these are neither infinite in the perfection of their nature nor
calls individual
eternal in the duration of their existence.
They
are rather
imperfect and transient things. Consequently, after having shown in Proposition XXV that God is the efficient cause not
1
Moreh Nebukim,
III, ao.
388
[ETHICS,
only of the existence of the infinite and eternal modes but also of their essence, he derives therefrom in the Corollary
of the same proposition that "individual things are nothing but affections or modes of God's attributes, expressing those
attributes in a certain
and determinate manner." The impliis
cation of this statement

existence
that
God
is
also the cause of the
and of the essence of
finite
modes.
When
in the
next proposition he states in a general way that God is the cause of the action of a thing, he similarly means to assert
that
God
is
the cause of the action of the infinite and eternal
modes
as well as of the finite
and transient modes.
Thus
individual things, like the infinite and eternal modes, follow from God and are determined by God in their existence,
essence,
and
action.
But
if
individual things follow from God, then, since
God
be
is infinite,
where does
rise
their finiteness
come from?
It will
recalled that both in his criticism of the emanationist ex-
planation of the
of matter out of an immaterial

for the infinity
2
God
and
in his
own argument
and eternity of
Spinoza insisted upon adherence to the principle of necessary causality, namely, that the effect must be like the cause, so that cause
strict
the immediate and mediate
modes
mutually implicative concepts and one can be known by the other. 3 How then on the basis of this principle can Spinoza assert that finite things follow from
and
effect are
the infinite
God? Spinoza
is
thus
same problem
as the emanationists
now confronted with the when these latter found
themselves called upon to explain the rise of matter the which Spinoza thought he had solved for good problem when he endowed God with the attribute of extension. The
1
Cf. above, Chapter IV. Cf. above, pp. 377~378. Ethics, I, Def. 4. Cf. above, p. 90.
PROPS. 19-29]
MODES
returns to
389
problem now
him not
in the
form of how material
things arose from an immaterial cause but rather in the form of how finite things arose from an infinite cause.
That Spinoza was conscious of

dent.
it
this problem is quite eviIn the Second Dialogue in the Short Treatise he puts " in the mouth of Erasmus, who asks, if the effect of the
.
inner cause cannot perish so long as its cause lasts; then can God be the cause of all things, seeing that
.
how
many
again stated by him, not indeed directly in the form of a question but rather indirectly in the form of a positive statement, in the Demonthings perish?"
is
The same problem
finite
stration of Proposition XXVIII in Ethics ^ I: "That which is and which has a determinate existence could not be
produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God, for whatever follows from the absolute nature of any attriIn both these places is infinite and eternal." solution for the problem is offered. In the Second Dialogue of the Short Treatise^ Erasmus, speaking for Spinoza, says that "God is really a cause of the effects which
bute of
God
the
same
He
tions except His attributes alone;
has produced immediately, without any other condiand that these cannot
perish so long as their cause endures; but that you cannot call God an inner cause of the effects whose existence does
immediately, but which have come into some other thing, except in so far as their being through causes do not operate, and cannot operate, without God, nor also outside Him, and that for this reason also, since
not depend on
Him
The same explanation

Treatise, I, 8,
they are not produced immediately by God, they can perish." is given by Spinoza himself in Short
where he says that the individual things are the "general mode," which expression is used produced by by him there to include both the immediate and mediate
infinite
modes, though he mentions there only the immedi-
390
[ETHICS,
ate modes. 1 Similarly in the Scholium to Proposition XXVIII of Ethics, I, Spinoza maintains that God is the absolutely
proximate cause (causa absolute proximo) of the immediate modes, that He is only the proximate cause in its own kind (causa proxima in suo genere) of the mediate ininfinite
finite
the literal sense of the term,
modes, but that in distinction to these, though not in He is the remote cause (causa
2
remota) of the individual things.

also says in Proposition
In addition to
as follows:
all this,
he
XXVIII
"An
individual
thing, or a thing which is finite and which has a determinate existence, cannot exist nor be determined to action unless
it
which
be determined to existence and action by another cause is also finite and has a determinate existence, and
again, this cause cannot exist nor be determined to action unless by another cause which is also finite and determined
to existence
and
action,
and so on ad infinitum" Taking
all
these passages together
we may
tion of the rise of finite things as follows:
restate Spinoza's explanaFinite things folinfinite

effects.
in
low directly from finite causes. These finite causes are number and form an infinite series of causes and
infinite series of finite causes follows
This
from the mediate

follows from the
turn,
infinite
mode. This mediate
infinite
mode
in
immediate infinite modes, which, directly from God.

1
their
follow
Cf. above, pp. 216, 249. From the reading of the opening lines of the Scholium as given in Gebhardt's
edition (Opera, II, p. 70, 11. 2-4; cf. editor's discussion on p. 352), it is clear that "quaedam a Deo immediate produci debuerunt" (1. 2) refers to the immediate
infinite
modes and that "et

infinite
alia
mediantibus his primis"
(11.
3-4) refers to the
mediate
modes.
When,
therefore, Spinoza says later "that of things im-
mediately produced by
own kind"
(11.
5-7),
it
the proximate cause in of proximate cause is found in Heereboord's Mclttcmata Philosophica, Disputationes
God He is the proximate cause absolutely, and not in their may be inferred that of the mediate infinite modes God is their own kind. The distinction between these two senses
XXII.
Cf. also above, p. 308.
ex Philosophia Selectae t Vol. II, Disp.
PROPS. 19-29]
MODES
391
The analogy between
this explanation of the rise of finite
things in the system of Spinoza and the explanation for the rise of material things in the system of emanation is quite
complete. Just as the emanationists speak of material things " " " as proceeding or as "following by necessity from God, so also Spinoza speaks of finite things as "following" from
God.
Just as the emanationists start out with the principle that "the direct emanation from God must be one simple
and nothing else," 2 so also Spinoza starts out with the principle that "whatever follows from the absolute
Intelligence,
nature of any attribute of God is infinite and eternal." 3 Just as the emanationists account for the rise of material
things by interposing immaterial Intelligences between God and matter, so also Spinoza accounts for the rise of finite
things by interposing infinite modes between God and finite modes. Finally, just as the emanationists arrange all the
sublunar existences, in a series of causes and
material things, from the celestial spheres to the lowest of effects, so also
all
Spinoza arranges
the finite modes in a series of causes

difference between
and
effects.
The only
them
4
is
that accord-
ing to the emanationists,
who
follow Aristotle in his denial

effects,
of an infinite series of causes and
this series is finite,
whereas according to Spinoza, who, by his own statement, 5 admits with Crescas the possibility of an infinite series of
causes and effects, 6 this series is infinite. The gist of both these explanations is that material things and finite things
which cannot be conceived to follow directly from God can

be conceived to follow indirectly from
1
Him
if
we only
II, 22.
inter-
Cf. above, p. 373.

Ethics, I, Prop. 28,
Moreh Nebukim,
*
<
Demonst.
II, I, 993a, 30 ff. Epistola 12. Cf. above, pp. 195 ff. Cf. my Crescas' Critique of Aristotle, pp. 68-69; 225-229; 490, n. 13; 496,
Metaphysics,
392

finite things
[ETHICS,
pose between these material or of intermediate causes.
and God a buffer
But
still
it
is
hard to see how a buffer of intermediate
For, truly speaking, any exoffered in solution of the problem of the rise of planation finitude in Spinoza or of the rise of matter in emanation must
causes can solve the problem.
from the
not only show that finitude or matter does not come directly infinite or the immaterial cause but it must also
either one of these can
show how
all
come
at
all,
seeing that
things, according to both these systems,

infinite or the
must ultimately
as their
be traced to the
cause.
immaterial
1
God
is
prime
This
is
the very reasoning employed
by Maimonides
also the very
in rejecting necessary
emanation, and this
reasoning by which Spinoza was forced to the conclusion that God is material. 2 The absence of any attempt on the
it
part of Spinoza to explain his position on this point, or, as may be phrased, the absence of any explicit statement of
a principle of individuation (principium individuationis] in the philosophy of Spinoza, makes one wonder whether this
failure of his to offer
fact that he did not think
any explanation was not due to the it was necessary for him to do so.
He may
have
felt
explanation for either
quite justified in dispensing with such an one of the following two reasons
either because he relied
upon
his readers to be able to find
among
the several solutions evolved in the course of the his-
tory of philosophy by the various monistic systems, in explanation of their common difficulty as to how the many
arose from the one, a solution which would apply to his own particular problem as to how the finite arose from the infinite,
or because he relied
upon them
between
to discover for themselves

his
some
1
essential difference
II, 12.
own
particular kind of
Moreh Ncbukim,
Cf. above, p. 106.
Cf. above, Chapter IV.
PROPS. 19-29]
MODES
the other kinds of
393
the former
monism and
monism by which
to the difficulty which required a shall, special principle of individuation for its solution. therefore, first canvass the various solutions of the common
was rendered immune
We
systems to see if any of them could be used by Spinoza, and then, in the event of our failure to find any solution which could be suitably used by him, we
difficulty of monistic
is not something about Spinoza's conof God which disposes of that common difficulty of ception monistic systems without any recourse to a special principle
shall try to see if there
of individuation.
of the explanations of the origin of the many which to monistic systems in the history of philosophy to regard the many as unreal and as having only an illusory
One
is
is
common
existence.
In European philosophy this tendency appears with the Eleatics and recurs under different forms in the
various idealistic systems. Some interpreters of Spinoza x finite modes to be of a similar nature. But passages " in which Spinoza couples affections" with "substance" as the two things which exist outside the mind, in contrast to
take his
attributes which he uses as an alternative term for substance,

clearly indicate that he considered the
modes
as
something
having reality outside the mind like substance itself, and as being unlike the attributes, which he considered only as aspects under which substance appears to our mind.
The only
difference that Spinoza finds between the reality of substance and the reality of modes is that the former is due to the
necessity of its own nature whereas the latter is due to the existence of substance. The finite modes are no less real to
him than the infinite and eternal modes. Another explanation which occurs in the history of philosophy in answer to the problem of how the many arose from
1
Ethics,
I,
Prop. 4, Demonst.; Prop. 28, Demonst.
394
[ETHICS,
the one or the individual from the general consists in an attempt to accredit all these to matter. According to this
explanation, all that is necessary is to account for the origin of matter, but once matter is accounted for, either by the theory of its co-eternal existence with God or by the process of emanation or by the belief in a special act of creation ex nihihy there
tibility,
is
a ready explanation for
all
divisibility, individuality,
and
in
the change, corrupfact for all the
changing phenomena of the visible world. It is thus that mediaeval philosophers speak for Aristotle and for themselves of matter as the principle of individuation. Spinoza, however, could not offer matter as his principle of finitude, for if matter is taken as a principle of individuation it is only
because
is
it is
considered as something which by
its
very nature
potential, passive, imperfect, and is consequently the cause of divisibility and corruptibility. But Spinoza's matter, being extension and an infinite attribute of God, is none of
1
these,
and cannot therefore out of
its
own nature become
the principle of finitude.
another explanation occurs in the history of philosophy which has a direct bearing upon Spinoza's problem here,
Still
for the
is
problem which the explanation was meant to solve formulated as here by Spinoza in terms of the rise of the
This explanation may be designated by the Cabalistic Hebrew term Zimzum,* i.e., contraction. The theory of Zimzum has a long history and is susceptible
finite
infinite.
from the
of various philosophic rationalizations, but we shall quote here a brief statement of its original and unadulterated
meaning from Abraham Herrera's Puerto, del Cielo. Starting with the statement that "from an infinite power, it would seem, an infinite effect would necessarily have to follow/'
Herrera proceeds to say with the Cabalists that "in a certain
1
Cf. above pp. 237, 257.
PROPS. 19-29]
MODES
active force
It
finite effects/*
x
395
manner God had contracted His

order to produce
reference to this problem of the rise infinite that Solomon Maimon made in one of his works the
and power in must have been with of the finite from the
cryptic remark that the view of Spinoza "agrees with the 2 In his opinion of the Cabalists on the subject of Zimzum. autobiography, Solomon Maimon similarly calls attention to
1 '
Zimzum
the analogy between Spinoza and the Cabalistic principle of in the following passage: "In fact, the Cabala is
nothing but an expanded Spinozism, in which not only is the origin of the world explained by the contraction (Einschrdn-
kung
Zimzum) of the divine

its
ery kind of being, and
being, but also the origin of evrelation to the rest, are derived from
a special (besonderri) attribute of God." 3 However, Spinoza could have made no use of this theory of contraction in the
solution of his problem of the rise of the finite from the infinite, for Zimzum as a solution of the problem implies that the infinite cause is an intelligent agent, and it is in this sense
that
it is
who
insists
generally used among the Cabalists, but to Spinoza, upon the necessary nature of the divine causality,
such an assumption is entirely inadmissible. To quote again from Herrera: "The second reason on account of which it
is
manner contracted and
possible for us to maintain that the Infinite had in some limited himself in order to enable
himself to produce finite and limited emanations is that the act of contraction is an act by means of His intelligence and
His
will."
Finally,
1
among
the various formulations of the theory of
Sha'ar ha-Shamayim^ V, 12.

Cf.
Solomon
I,
Maimon's Hebrew commentary
Gib'at
ha-Moreh on Morch
Ch.
Nfbtikim^
3
74.
I,
(1792), p. 146.
*
Salomon Maimon' s Lcbcnsgeschichte von ihm sclbst beschricben, Part English translation by J. C. Murray, Boston, 1888.
XIV
Sha'ar ha-Shamayim t V, 12.
396
[ETHICS,
emanation which are advanced as explanations of the problem of the origin of matter there is one which, by analogy with one of the present-day solutions of the problem of the
origin of
life
known
as
1
"emergent evolution," we
may
call
"emergent emanation/' It assumes indeed, as do all theories of emanation, that God is immaterial and that matter does not therefore arise directly from God. Still it does not arise
from anything external to God. Nor does it arise by the will of God. It arises because in the process of emanation a new cause inevitably makes its appearance. This new cause does
is
not proceed from God nor does it come from without, but the necessary concomitant of a new relation which, not
its
present in God, appears in the
nature of
first Intelligence by the very an emanation and hence, unlike God, being having only possible existence. This theory says in effect that matter is not the resultant of spiritual causes, but rather an
emergent, arising as something unpredictable out of a new relation which makes its appearance in the emanated Intelligence.
Now
such an unpredictable new relation appears also
in Spinoza's
immediate
infinite
modes, and
it
appears in them
by the very circumstance that their existence is dependent upon God as their cause, and hence, unlike God, they have
only possible existence. Out of this new relation or condition, not present in God but present in the immediate infinite
modes, Spinoza might say, there arise the finite modes. Logically this would be a tenable explanation. But if we assume this explanation to have been satisfactory to Spinoza
to account for the rise of finite
modes from an
infinite
God,
why should he not have accepted it also as satisfactory to account for the rise of material things from an immaterial
1 Cf. my paper "The Problem of the Origin of Matter in Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy and its Analogy to the Modern Problem of the Origin of Life" in Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy (1926), pp. 602 ff.
PROPS. 19-29]
MODES
397
against the
God? What then becomes of his main argument immateriality of God? If Spinoza did refuse to
accept this
sort of reasoning as an explanation of the rise of matter
out of an immaterial cause, we must assume that he would also refuse to accept it as an explanation of the rise of finite
modes out of an infinite cause. Inasmuch as none of these
historical solutions could
be
fittingly used by Spinoza, let us now look for some difference a difference that between Spinoza and the emanationists
would be sufficiently valid to dispose of the difficulty with which we are now contending. Such a difference can be found if we only free Spinoza from the encumbrance of the traditional terminology which he
affects, for, in
truth, while he uses emanationist terms he
does not
When
from
really
exactly what the emanationists mean. " " the emanationists speak of things as proceeding
or as
mean by them
"
God
mean
following by necessity" from God, they that there is an actual egression of something
1
from within
in
God which on
its
departure from
God assumes
Though that departure is not time nor in space, still logically the world follows from God in some order of succession and is outside of God. The Intelligences are thus conceived as proceeding
a nature unlike that of God.
from
God and
from the Intelligences, and within the spheres appears matter which is not contained in God. In such a conception of succession, the appearance of matthe spheres as proceeding
ter,
indeed, has to be accounted
for.
When Spinoza,
however,
as following (sequi) from God or as being produced (froduci) by God, or when he speaks of God as acting (agif) or as a cause, all these expressions, as we have shown above, 2 mean nothing but that the modes are con-
describes the
modes
tained in the substance as the conclusion of a syllogism

1
is
Cf. above, p. 373.
Cf. above, p. 373.
398

its
[ETHICS,
contained in
are contained in its definition.
premises and as the properties of a triangle 1 There is no such thing as
the procession of the finite from the infinite in Spinoza. God or substance is to him an infinite logical crust which holds
together the crumbs of the infinite number of the finite modes, and that crust is never broken through to allow the
crumbs to escape or to emanate. Infinite substance by its very nature contains within itself immediate infinite modes, and the immediate infinite modes contain within themselves
mediate
infinite
modes, and the mediate
infinite
modes con-
tain within themselves the infinite
number
of finite modes,
last are arranged as a series of causes and effects. In such a conception of an all-containing substance there can be no question as to how the finite came into existence out of an
which
infinite
any more than there can be a question as
to
how
subits
stance
came
is
into existence.
it
Substance
is
causa sui y and
nature
such that
involves within itself three orders of
immediate infinite, mediate infinite, and finite. modes The question as to how things come into existence can logically appear only within the finite modes, and the answer to this, as given by Spinoza, is that each finite mode comes into existence by another finite mode, and so on to infinity, but
is ultimately contained in God, who causa sui, through the mediate and immediate infinite modes. Things are finite by the very fact that they are parts
the entire infinite series
is
of a whole which
is infinite.
Spinoza has thus proved that both the infinite modes and the individual things are determined by God in three respects, viz., in their existence, in their essence, and in their action. As a result of this he concludes in Proposition
XXIX
things are determined from the necessity of the divine nature to

1
that "in nature there
is
nothing contingent, but
all
Cf. Ethics,
I,
Prop. 17, Schol., and above, p. 90.
PROPS. 19-29]
MODES
in a certain
399
exist
and act
manner." Three statements are
contained in this proposition. In the first place, it denies contingency, or, as he calls it elsewhere, the existence of
"accidental things," which are defined by him as those 1 or of which, through "a things which have "no cause"
the order of causes is condeficiency in our knowledge cealed from us." * Accidental things are similarly defined by Aristotle as those things which have no determinate
.
. .
cause. 3
In the second place, since there are no accidental things in nature but everything in nature is determined in
existence and action
if
its
by
a cause, there
is
no freedom
in
nature, by freedom is meant, as it is defined by Spinoza, that which exists and acts by its own nature and without
4 any other cause. In the third place, all the causes in nature are traceable to one cause, which is the necessity of the divine
nature.
This concludes Spinoza's treatment of the modes.

all
Taking now
infinite,
the
modes
together, the finite as well as the
he contrasts them with substance and attributes, the former natura naturata and the latter natura calling naturans. 3 Similarly in the Short 'Treatise he makes the same
classification at the beginning of his
treatment of the modes. 6
But we have already discussed
this
matter quite
7
fully in the
chapter on Extension and Thought.

1
Short Treatise
Ethics ,
I,
-,
I, 6,
2.
2 3
Prop. 33, Schol.
Cf. above, p. 318. i. Cf. Cogitata Metaphysica,
I, 3,
and above,
p. 189.
*
5
Metaphysics, V, 30, 10253, 24. Cf. Ethics, I, Def. 7.

Ibid.,
I,
Prop. 29, Schol.

I, 8.
ff.
Cf. above, p. 390, n.
i.
6
7
Short Treatise,
Cf. above, pp. 253
CHAPTER
XII

I.
INTELLECT, WILL, AND

in Proposition
in nature, that
POWER
that there
is is
THE
statement
XXIX
noth-
determined by everything ing contingent a cause, and that the causes are traceable to God reflects on
the whole the mediaeval philosophic position. When Crescas raises the question whether pure possibility exists in nature,
he sums up the case for the negative by the statement that
"in the case of

causes
all
corruption, their existence

.
. .
things that are subject to generation and is necessarily preceded by four
and when we inquire again into the existence of these causes, it is also found that they must necessarily be and when we look for other preceded by other causes
. . .
causes for these causes, the same conclusion follows, until the series of causes terminate at the Prime Being who is x Similarly Maimonides states that necessary of existence."
"when we have found for any existing thing those four causes which are in immediate connection with it, we find
for
them again
causes,
and
for these again other causes,
and
so on until
at
we
arrive at the first causes/'
and then
finally
God. 2 But the mediaevals, after having asserted the existence of this causal nexus, try to break the nexus at two
points,
ity of
by introducing a certain kind of design

a certain
in the causal-
God and
amount of freedom
in the action
of
man. Spinoza will therefore now try to eliminate both design in God and freedom in man and will insist upon an un1
Or Adonai> II, v, 2. Cf, above, Moreh Nebukim, I, 69.
p. 309.
PROPS. 30-36]
401
interrupted sequence of causal continuity. Here in the last seven propositions and Appendix of the First Part of the
Ethics^
which deals with God, he
tries
primarily to eliminate
two propositions of the Second Part, which deals with man, he tries to eliminate freedom in man.
design in
God;
later in the last
The
tion, is expressed
design in God's actions, especially in the act of creaby the mediaevals in terms of certain
creation.
attributes which they find to be implied in the divine act of Thus Saadia derives from the fact of creation that
God
1 power, and knowledge. Judah ha-Levi derives from the same fact that God has knowledge, power, life, and 2 will. Maimonides insists that creation must be an act of
has
life,
and design, 3 which, according to his own statements, 4 imply also life, knowledge, and power. These four attributes then are what according to the mediaevals raise the
will
actions of
God above
His causality the result of
mere mechanical process and make will, intelligence, and purpose.
In desiring to show that the causality of
God
is
a neces-
sary process Spinoza subjects these attributes to a critical examination with a view to finding out what they may actually mean when applied to God. He does this in two
ways.
First,
he
tries to
prove that on the showing of the
understanding of the meaning of the attributes of intellect, life, and power by the mediaevals themselves God's action
must be a necessary
lowed above
in the
action. This
method of attack he has
fol-
Second, of these attributes of intellect, will, and power, he again tries to show that God's action is a
unfolding his
Scholium to Proposition XVII.
own conception
This
is
necessary action.
Propositions
1
what he
is
proposing to do
now
in
XXX-XXXIV
y
before us.
3
Emunot we-De'ot Morth Nebukim^
II, 4.
Cuzari, V, 18, 7-9.

7*V/., II, 19; I, 53.
II, 19
and
21.
402
[ETHICS,
In both these places, it will be noticed, Spinoza deals only with three out of the four attributes enumerated by the mediaevals, mentioning only intellect, will, and power, leaving out life. The reason for his not mentioning life
but
"
may
the
perhaps be found
in the fact that
Spinoza defines
life
as
power (vim) through which things persevere in their existence," and "moreover, the power by which God perseveres in His existence is nothing else than His essence." Now,
r
the "ability to exist"
is
defined by Spinoza himself as

life
"power"
(potentia)*
is
Consequently,
(potentid).
It
(vita) y
according
to Spinoza,
power
may
therefore be conlife
cluded that the omission of the attribute of

in the propositions before us
is
by Spinoza
due to the
fact that he has
under the attribute of power. In his first kind of argument in the Scholium to Proposition XVII, as we have already seen, Spinoza has arrived
included
it
believe that intellect, will,
at the conclusion that, from the point of view of those who and power pertain to the nature
it
of God,
would have
to follow that
"God's
intellect, will,
and power are one and the same thing." On the whole, this represents exactly the views of Saadia, Maimonides, and the
other Jewish philosophers, all of whom maintain that these attributes are one and the same in God. To quote a short
passage from Maimonides:

[i.e.,
"You must know
that
wisdom
[and for that matter also will and in reference to God are not different from each other." 3 power] Similar statements as to the identity of intellect, will, and
intellect]
and
life
power in God are made by Spinoza in his Cogitata Metaphysicaf and there, too, he is merely repeating the common mediaeval view. In the Scholium to Proposition XVII,
1
3
*
Moreh Nebukim,
Ethics, I, Prop, n, Demonst. 3. Cogitata Metaphysica, II, 6. I, 53. Cf. quotations from Saadia and Albo above, p. 155.
Cogitata Metaphysica, II, 7, note,
and
8.
PROPS. 30^36]

tries to establish the necessity
403
therefore, he
of God's causality
this commonly accepted mediaeval view and contending that if intellect and will pertain to the essence of God and are one, then these attributes must be homonymous terms, and hence meaningless terms, and consequently
by arguing from
to say that God acts by intelligence and will to saying that God acts by necessity. 1
to establish this necessary causality of
is
tantamount
tries
But here in these Propositions XXX-XXXI V Spinoza
not by arguing from the generally accepted mediaeval view but by arguing against it. In the first place, he seems to say, the three
God
by which the mediaevals try to characterize the of God are not of the same order. Indeed, "the causality 2 power of God is His essence itself," but as for intellect and
attributes
they do not pertain to the essence of God. Intellect and will, which are the same, 3 are nothing but modes of
will,
God.
What
kind of
mode
the intellect, or, rather, the ab-
solutely infinite intellect,
Spinoza.
It is the
has already been explained by immediate mode of thought correspondis,
ing to motion ar\d rest, which are the immediate extension. 4 So is also will an immediate mode of
mode
of
thought. Consequently, "will and intellect are related to the nature
of
God
as
motion and
rest/'
are the immediate
mode
except that will and intellect of the attribute of thought whereas
motion and
extension.
rest are the
immediate mode of the attribute of
Now, the attribute of thought in its self-conscious has as the direct object of its knowledge the essence activity 6 of God himself and through God's essence also the modes.
1
Cf. above, p. 317.

11.
Cf. also Bruno,

a
De
I'
infinite untvcrso et
Mondi, Dial.
I,
p. 316,
*
21-31 (ed. Lagarde).
Cf. Prop. 17, Schol.
Ethics, II, Prop. 49, Corol.;

11.
p. 62,
s
28-29).
I,
Tractatus 'Theologico-Politicus, Ch. 4 (Opera, III, Cf. above, p. 216.

-i
Ethics,
Prop. 32, Corol.
2.
404

intellect,
[ETHICS,
The
however, not pertaining to the essence of God and being only a mode of thought, cannot have the essence of God as the object of its knowledge. But still, the object of
tellect itself.
its
knowledge must be something that exists outside the inSince, however, outside the intellect there is
nothing but God or (which is the same thing by Def. IV) His attributes and their modes, 1 and since furthermore the
intellect
the object of
cannot comprehend the essence of God himself, its knowledge must be the attributes of God
and their affections, not only the attribute of thought, of which it is itself a mode, and the modes of thought, but also the attribute and modes of extension. 2 This is what is meant by Proposition XXX: "The actual intellect, whether finite or infinite/' that is to say, whether the human intellect or
tributes of
the absolutely infinite intellect, "must comprehend the atGod and the affections of God, and nothing else/'
The terms "actual

tial
intellect'* (intellectus actu)
and "poten-
intellect" (intellectus potentid) used by Spinoza in this proposition are a mediaeval heritage, and are to be found in
Arabic, Hebrew,
back to
neLy
Aristotle's vovs tvtpydq. (or e^reXexti^t)
and Latin philosophy, but ultimately go and vovs dvvafrom the terms
"
active
and these are
to be distinguished
and "passive intellect" (intellectus passivus) which go back to the Greek *>oDs 7rou)Ti/c6s and vovs 7ra0r;Tt/c6s. 4 The terms "actual" and "potential" describe two states of the intellect, one before the act of thinking, when the intellect is a mere capacity, and the other
intellect" (intellectus agens)
1
Ethics y
I,
Prop. 4, Demonst.
are:
(i)
Cf. above, pp. 142
f.
The Hebrew and Arabic terms
^yisn ÔPH, J*AJU
JiJl;
(2)
4
ran
fen
-JiJU
jaJl.
are:
(i)
The corresponding Hebrew and Arabic terms

jsJl;
( 2)
7yi3n 7DBH,
JUJl
7y>n
7Dtpn,
J.AJLJI
PROPS. 30-36]
405
in the act of thinking,
when
the intellect
is
an actuality. The
is
nature of these two states of the intellect

Aristotle in
discussed by
in
De Anima^
III, 4, the
most pregnant passage
which
it
is
tially all
the following: "The intellect is in a manner potenobjects of thought, but is actually none of them until
'
thinks/*
An elaborate
in
discussion of this distinction

in a
is
also
to be
found
Maimonides
chapter which has been
several occasions. 2 But, as " " himself says, he uses the expression actual intellect Spinoza not because he agrees with Aristotle and the mediaevals that
drawn upon by Spinoza on
there is a "potential intellect" but rather for the purpose of emphasizing the fact that the intellect is to him always that which Aristotle and the mediaevals would describe as actual,
"
that
is
to say, the act of understanding itself (ipsa scilicet

3
intellectione) ."
modes whereas power is intellect and will belong
Furthermore, says Spinoza, since intellect and will are identical with the essence of God,
to natura naturata^ whereas power, be said to belong to natura naturans* by implication, may Hence the significance of Proposition XXXI, that "the
actual intellect, whether

will, desire, love, etc.,
it
be
finite or infinite,
together with
must be
referred to the natura naturata
and not
to the natura
naturans" The mention of desire and
love in this proposition together with will and intellect is in accordance with Spinoza's habit of referring to desire and
love as
lect, it
modes
may
or of thought. 5 Will and intelbe recalled, are considered by Spinoza as modes

either of will
4
of thought and as identical with each other. Spinoza's denial of will as pertaining to the essence of God
and
1
his relegation of
68.
it
to the realm of
modes
leads
him
De Anima,
Ethics,
I,
III, 4, 429!), 30-31.

I,
Moreh Nebukim,
Cf. above, pp. 238-239; below, Vol. II. pp. 24, 45.
Prop. 31, Schol.

4,
Short Treatise, II, 2,
and
16,
8.
Ethics, II, Ax. 3.
406
[ETHICS,
directly to a denial of the mediaeval attribution of freedom of the will to God. As a prelude to what the mediaevals
meant by attributing freedom of will to God, we may first make clear what they meant by will and by freedom of the will in general. The best definition of will for our present
purpose
the will
is
is
the
same
that given by Maimonides. "The true essence of the ability to will and not to will.'' * Practically definition is also given by Descartes: "The faculty
of will consists alone in our having the power of choosing to do a thing or choosing not to do it (that is, to affirm or deny,
2 to pursue or to shun it)." Spinoza, as we shall show on a later occasion, reproduces this definition when he says that
"by will I understand a faculty of affirming or denying/' The implication of this definition is that there is no will unless
that possibility of choice between willing and not willing. An eternal and immutable will, therefore, is a contradiction in terms, according to Maimonides. 4 As a result
there
is
of this definition, no act of the will can be an eternal and immutable act; it must have a beginning and end or it must
Now, proceed the mediaevals, if the changes which by definition must occur in any act of the will are brought about by external causes the will is said to
be not
the will
free.
be an intermittent act.
But
if
ternal causes but

is
they are brought about without any exby the very nature of the will itself, then
"Free will/' says Judah ha-Levi, "qua no compulsory cause." s Similarly Crescas de" to will and not to will fines absolutely free will as the ability 6 without an external cause/' These definitions, in fact, corcalled free.
free will, has
1
Moreh Nebukim, Meditationes, IV

p. 167.
II, 18,
Second Method.
11. 21-23). Short Treatise, II, 16,
(Ocuvrc, VII, p. 57,
Ethics, II, Prop. 48, Schol.;
2.
Cf. below, Vol. II,
* s
Moreh Nebukim,
Cuzari, V, 20.
II, 21.
Or Adonai,
II, v, 3 (p.
4 8b).
PROPS. 30-36]
407
respond to Spinoza's
is
own
1 definition of freedom.
But while
in nature in general, it is
no such
free will,
and while
admitted by the mediaevals, there in the case of man the question
of freedom constitutes one of their major problems of philosophy, with reference to God, they all maintain that He acts
from the freedom of His
will.
Says again Maimonides: "If
this will pertained to a material thing, so that the object
sought after by means of that will was something outside the thing, there would then be a will which would change according to obstacles and newly arising circumstances. But the will of an immaterial being, which in no sense has for its
object any other thing,

it
is unchangeable, and the fact that one thing and tomorrow it wills another thing does not constitute a change in the essence of the being nor
now
wills
does
it
lead to the assumption of the existence of another
cause [external to it]." 2 As against this the position taken by Spinoza may be summed up as follows: Granted that God
is free,
that freedom cannot be called freedom of the will; for

for the inadmissibility of will in
will,
he maintains, cannot pertain to the essence of God.
The argument
God
is
given in Proposition
XXXII.
pertain to the essence of God. identical with the infinite intellect, following immediately from the attribute of thought. Being a mode of thought, it
Will, says Spinoza, cannot It is only an infinite mode,
determined by thought as its cause, just as the finite will is determined by a series of causes, which series is infinite, according to Spinoza himself, or
is
of any individual being
3 according to the mediaevals. Having a cause, will can no longer be called free. Hence, "the will cannot be
finite,
called a free cause, but can only be called necessary."

1
Ethics, I, Def. 7.
Cf. above, p. 311.
Moreh Nebukim,
II, 18.
*
*
Cf. above, p. 196.

Ethics,
I,
Prop. 32, and Demonst.
4o8

it
[ETHICS,
Furthermore,
follows "that
x
God
does not act from free-
dom
of the will,"
for will does not pertain to
His essence
but is only a mode which by its very nature must have a cause and cannot therefore be free. To say that God acts
God
will has no more meaning than to say that from freedom of motion, since both are modes 2 respectively of the attributes of thought and extension. One of the implications of the mediaeval view that God
from freedom of
acts
acts from freedom of will
is
that the world could have been
produced by God
than that in which
of this view
is
in
it
another manner and in another order
has been produced. A brief statement to be found in Herrera's Puerto, del Cielo.
In his fourth argument in proof that God acts from freedom of the will he says that "such free action was the beginning of all the things which were produced and caused by God
when
it
was so decreed by His
will,
and by the same token
God could have omitted to bring them into existence or He could have brought other things into existence, and even now after having brought these things into existence, He can still change them, destroy them, and then bring
them back
into existence,
all
according to His free choice
and will/' 3 But perhaps

are
more pertinent for our present purpose the statements made by Maimonides, in which he constill
trasts Aristotle's theory of necessity with his own theory of creation by will and design, for in these statements we shall find the background not only of the view which Spinoza re-
jects but also the view which he adopts as his own. Restating Aristotle's view, Maimonides says that "it is the view
of Aristotle that this universe proceeded from the Creator by way of necessity, that God is the cause and the world is the
1
Ibid., Corol.
i.
Ibid., Corel. 2.
Sha'ar ha-Shamayim y III,
6.
PROPS.
3036]

this effect is a necessary one;
409
it
effect,
and that
and just as
cannot be explained
why God
exists or
how He
exists in this
particular manner, namely, being one and incorporeal, so it cannot be asked concerning the whole universe why it
exists or
how
it
exists in this particular

i.e.,
manner.
For
it is
necessary that the whole,
the cause as well as the effect,
should exist in this particular manner; it is impossible for them not to exist, or to be different from what they actually are. This leads to the conclusion that the nature of everything remains constant, and that nothing changes
in
l
its
nature
Maimonides maintains as any way/' own view that "we who believe in creation must admit that God could have created the universe in a different manner as regards the causes and effects contained in it." 2 Or
against this
his
As
again: "We, however, hold that all things in the universe are the result of design, and not merely of necessity. It is possible that He who designed them may change them and
conceive another design.
Not every
design, however,
is
subject to change, for there are things which are impossible 3 by their nature and cannot be altered, as will be explained/*
The
exceptions referred to here by Maimonides are those things which he himself and other mediaevals consider as
impossible on account of their involving a contradiction in their definition, such as, e.g., a square the triangle of which
is
equal to
its side. 4
With
view
in
this as his
background Spinoza formulates
his
own
Proposition XXXIII, aligning himself with Aristotle as against Maimonides: "Things could have been produced
by God
in
in
no other manner and
in
no other order than that
which they have been produced/* Direct references to controversies on this point are made by him in his Short
1
Moreh Nebukim,
Ibid., II, 19.
II, 19.
Ibid. y III, 13.
Cf. 17.
Cf. above, p. 312, n, 5.
4 io
freatise.
1

-,
[ETHICS,
In the Short Treatise furthermore, there is a passage 2 Here in parallel to the demonstration of this proposition. the Ethics the most important part of the discussion is given
In the first Scholium Spinoza explains the " of the terms "necessary/* impossible/' "possible/' meaning " and contingent/' which we have already discussed on several occasions. 3 But the introduction of these terms right after
in
two
Scholia.
the proposition, which
is
undoubtedly directed against the
passage we have quoted above from Maimonides, is significant, for in that passage of Maimonides, as we have seen, reference is also made to the nature of the impossible.
Spinoza seems to challenge Maimonides as follows: You say that while indeed in nature there are certain things which
absolutely necessary, but everything in it is possible or contingent, inasmuch as everything in nature, according to you, can be
are impossible, there
is
nothing in
it
which
is
changed or come into existence without any previous cause but by the mere will of God. As against you I say that in
nature there are only things impossible and things necessary, but nothing that is absolutely possible or contingent.
The second Scholium falls into three parts, as follows: (i) From the beginning of the Scholium to "Neither is
should here repeat those things which are said in the Scholium to Proposition XVII" (Opera, II,
there
any need that

1.
p. 74,
2o-p. 75,
1.
3).
(2)
From
"
But
for the sake of those

.
. .
who
and
differ
will
.
.
from me*' to "and hence

.
God's
is
intellect
must have been
different,
which
absurd"
(Opera, II, p. 75, 1. 3~p. 76, 1. 3). (3) From "Since, therefore, things could have been produced by God in no other manner or order" to the end of the Scholium (Opera, II,
p. 76,
1
1.
4-1. 34).
I,
Short Treatise,
Ibid.,
4,
11.
3 and
7 (Opera,
I, p.
37,
3
(p. 38,
33
ff.).
11. 16 ff., p. 38, 11. 30 Cf. above, pp. 188 ff.
ff.).
PROPS. 30-36]
411
part Spinoza deals with a problem which he has already dealt with before in the Scholium to Proposition XVII, but he restates it here in a different form. On
In the
first
the previous occasion the problem was presented by him in the form of a question as to whether God has produced all the things which are actually in His intellect. Here the
problem is presented by him in the form of a question as to whether God has produced all the things in as high a degree of perfection as they are actually in His intellect. In a some-
what
similar
physica: could be given He necessarily diminished His own power." Both these phases of the problem, however, are combined by
'
way "If God
the problem is stated in the Cogitata Metacreated a duration so great that no greater
says: "But now, again, there is the controversy whether, namely, of all that is in His idea, and which He can realize so perfectly, whether, I
him
into one in the Short Treatise
when he
say, He could omit to realize anything, and whether such an omission would be a perfection in Him/' 2 In the passage from Herrera, which I have quoted as the literary back-
ground of Spinoza's discussion
in the
XVII, 3
it
may
also be noticed that the
Scholium to Proposition two phases of the prob-
Not only does Herrera say that only a those things which are in the intellect of limited God have been produced by Him, but he also maintains that
lem are combined.
number of
number of things produced are not of the highest of perfection, for God, according to him, can still prodegree duce things of higher perfection. In his argument in the first
this limited
part of the Scholium here Spinoza repeats in the main the arguments employed by him in the first part of the Scholium
to Proposition
XVII; he only changes

2
for perfection. His opponents say, he argues here, that

1
the term omnipotence if the

I, 4,
Cogitata Metaphysica, II, 10. Cf. above, pp. 314 ff.
Short Treatise,
3.
4 I2
[ETHICS,
things produced by God are of the highest perfection, then God could no longer produce things which are more perfect,
and if He could not do so, it would be an imperfection in Him. As against this Spinoza contends, in effect, that, quite the contrary, it is the perfection of God that must lead one to
say that the things already produced by Him are of the highest perfection, for if He could have produced more perfect
things and did not produce them, then His failure to produce them would have to be accounted for by some imperfection in
His nature, the imperfection either of incompetency or of
A similar argument is put in the mouth of Aristotle Maimonides in the following passage: "For, according by to this theory, God, whom every thinking person recognizes to be endowed with all the kinds of perfections, is in such a relation to the existing beings that He cannot change in them
ill-will.
anything.
will
make any change, and
Aristotle says that God does not try to that it is impossible that He should
anything to be otherwise from what it is. If it were possible, it would not constitute in Him greater perfection; it
might, on the contrary, from some point of view, be an
'
imperfection." In the second part of the Scholium here Spinoza takes up again the main proposition, namely, "that things could be
created in no other
it
against his
mode or order by Him," and tries to prove opponents from their own admission "that
God's essence." Now, the main point
his
in this
will pertains to
premise admitted by
as
its
opponents,
if
we take Maimonides
is
chief exponent, is that while the will of God eternal with God, the world is not eternal, for will
coits
by
very nature means the ability to will to do a thing at one time and not to will to do it at another time, 2 and to adopt
1
Moreh Nebukim^
11.
II, 22.
Cf. Bruno,
De
3
I'infnito univcrso et
Ibid., II, 18.
Mondi
Dial. I,
p. 317,
I ff.
(cd.
Lagardc).
PROPS. 30-36]
413
one course or the other by an act of decree or decision; but, they contend, inasmuch as in the case of God the decree or
decision
it
is
entirely independent of anything external to
Him,
does not produce any change in His essence.
Spinoza raises the following question: (decretumY of God to make things in the manner and order in which they are, when did it take place? There are three
this
against This decree
As
possible assumptions:
before the things
(i) It
could have taken place shortly
were produced by God. (2) It could have co-existed with God from eternity, without any possibility
its
being changed even by the will of God. (3) It could have co-existed with God from eternity, but with the possiof
being subject to change by the will of God prior His having produced the things. Spinoza, in the course of his discussion, examines all these three assumptions and
bility of its
to
tries to
show
either that they are untenable or that they

set
prove just the opposite of what his opponents have

to prove.
out
begin with, the first assumption is untenable even according to the mediaevals themselves, for, according to Maimonides and others, prior to creation there was no time;
To
what there was then may be or, if you choose, eternity,

2
called an "imagination of
in
time"
which there
is
no
before nor
after. Spinoza thus says: "But since in eternity there is no when nor before nor after, it follows God that
.
had not existed before His decrees, and could never

without them."
3
exist
Then, proceeds Spinoza, if the second assumption be true, it will prove his own contention against his opponents.
1
Hebrew and Arabic

III, 17).
'
equivalent:
n"VH
J-Vi,
U**.
(Cnzari, V, 19;
March
Nebukim,
J
J
Iâriniy
Ethics,
I,
Cf. above, p. 339. II, 18. Prop. 33, Schol. 2 (Opera, II, p. 75,
11.
12-15).
4 i4
If things

it
[ETHICS,
which
have come into existence exactly in the manner in had been decreed by God from eternity and if God
"
could not have changed that decree, then things could have been produced by God in no other manner and in no other
This order than that in which they have been produced/' to reflect the second assumption, it may be remarked, seems
following statement in Heereboord:
"
What God
does in time
But Spinoza seems to differ has decreed from eternity." from Heereboord as to the meaning of this statement. According to Heereboord, this statement does not mean that "God accomplishes things in time in the order in which He
has decreed them from eternity"; 3 it only means that "God produces in time the things which He has decreed from
as He has decreed to produce According to Spinoza, the order as well as the nature of things has been decreed from eternity. In Proposition
He
eternity
and He produces them
them."
XXXIII
he speaks of the unchangeability of the manner (modus) and order (ordo) in which things have been produced, and in Scholium II, evidently in direct opposition to Heereboord, he speaks of both the nature of things (rerum naturd) and their order (ordo) 5 as having been decreed by God from
eternity.
There
is
nothing
left
therefore for his opponents but to
adopt the third assumption, namely, that God himself could have changed His eternal decree prior to the creation of
the world so that the world could have been created other-
wise than the

1
way
it
had been decreed from
eternity.
As
Ibid., II, Prop. 33. Meletemata Philosophica, Disptitationcs ex Philosophia ê/ectaf, Vol. XXIV, ix: "Uti quid Deus facit in tempore, ita ab aeterno decrevit."
2
II,
Disp.
J
4
Ibid.-.
"Quo
Ibid.:
"Quas
facit."
ordine res Deus decrevit ab aeterno, eo in tempore exequitur." res decrevit ab aeterno et quales decrevit faccre, eas et tales
16-17, 20.
in
tempore
3
Optra,
II, p. 75,
II.
PROPS. 30-36]

raises four objections, which, it
415
against this, Spinoza

selves.
must
be said, have not passed unnoticed by the mediaevals themFirst,

it
implies that prior to creation there could have
been a change in God's will and hence also in His intellect with which His will is identical. Maimonides himself has
discussed this problem and admits that such a change in
will is possible inasmuch as it is not determined by external cause. 1 any Second, if such a change in God's will was possible before creation, why should it not be possible now after creation?
God's
Here, too, Maimonides would say that if God willed it and if it served any purpose He could change the order of nature even after its creation, except in things which are impossible
by
their
own nature and would

2
involve a contradiction in
their definition.
Third, Maimonides as well as

"
that
all
God
is
is
an
intellect
which always
other philosophers agrees is in action, and that

3
But to say that potentiality at all." God changes His will or intellect implies a change from potentiality to actuality, which is contrary to their own premthere
in
ise.
Him no
who
This argument, too, has been discussed by Maimonides, tries to show that in an incorporeal agent a change from non-action to action does not imply a transition from
potentiality to actuality. taken as an illustration.
"The ... It
active intellect
is
may
be
an evident fact that

.
the active intellect does not act continually
and yet
Aristotle does not say that the active intellect is changeable, or passes from a state of potentiality to that of actuality,
although
1
it
produces at one time something which

II, 18.
it
has not
Moreh Ncbukim,
Ibid., It, 19;
Cf. above, pp. 101
ff.
III, 25.
Cf. above, p. 312.
'
Ibid., I, 68.
Cf. above, p. 239.
4l 6

x
[ETHICS,
In fact, Spinoza himself makes use of produced before." this statement of Maimonides in the Short Treatise. "Furthermore, of such an agent who acts in himself it can never
is
be said that he has the imperfection of a patient, because he not affected by another; such, for instance, is the case
2
with the intellect/'
Fourth, Maimonides and
all
the other mediaevals admit
that God's will and intellect are identical with His essence. 3
To
say therefore that His will could change would imply

This, too,
is
that His essence could also change.
answered
by Maimonides. "Similarly it has been shown by us that if a being [like God] acted at one time and did not act at another, this would not involve a change in the being itself." 4
In the third part of the Scholium Spinoza combines all the three phases of the problem and asserts (i) that "things
order," (2) that
intellect,"
could have been produced by God in no other manner or God created "all things which are in His
and (3) that the things created were created "with the same perfection as that in which they exist in His intellect." All these three principles are included in what Spinoza
calls necessity, by which he means that things cannot be otherwise than what they are, that they cannot be more than they are, and that they cannot be more perfect than
are in opposition to of necessity are divided by conception Spinoza into two classes. The first class is characterized by him as the view which makes everything dependent upon " the will of God
they
are.
The mediaeval views which
this
alone" (Dei tantum voluntas) or upon "a certain indifferent
God's will" (indiferens quaedam Dei voluntas) or upon God's
"good pleasure"
1
(ipsius beneplacitum).
Method.
According to
this
Ibid., II,
1
3
8, First
Short Treatise,
I, 2,
Moreh Ncbukim,
Ibid., II,
1
I,
24 (Opera, I, p. 26, 11. 23-26). 53 and 68. Cf. above, pp. 155, 317, 402.
8,
Second Method.
PROPS. 30-36]
417
view not only are things in themselves neither perfect nor imperfect, but they are also neither good nor evil. They are so only by the will of God alone, and therefore if God had
willed
is
He could have made them otherwise. The
second class
1
characterized by him as the view of those "who affirm that God does everything for the sake of the good/ Spinoza's characterization of these two mediaeval views reflects again
Maimonides' discussion of the difference between the view

of the
Mohammedan
to the Ashariya everything
Ashariya and his own view. According is the result of God's will alone;
it is
and two views wisdom. The essential difference between these is the question whether the things created by God and the commandments revealed by Him are the work of an arbitrary will of whether they are created and revealed for the sake of some purpose. "Purpose" is another word used by Maiaccording to Maimonides,
the result of both will
1
for what Spinoza calls here "the good/' for, as says Maimonides, "we call 'good' that which is in accordance with the object we seek." 2 Similarly Heereboord says that
monides
"the good is the formal reason of the final cause." 3 All " that these go back to Aristotle's definition of the good as
which
all
4 things aim at."
In Maimonides'
own words
the
Asharian view
is
de-
scribed as the view of those thinkers
"who assume
that
God
does not produce one thing for the sake of another, that there are no causes and effects, but that all His actions are
the direct result of the will of God, and no purpose can be for them, nor can it be asked why He has made this
for He does what pleases Him, and it is not to be considered as the result of some kind of wisdom." s
* *
found
and not that;
Ibid., Ill, 25 and 26. Ibid., Ill, 13. Meletemata Philosophica, Disputationes ex Philosophia Stlectae, Vol. XXIII, ii: "Bonitas ergo formalis ratio est causae finalis."
*
II,
Disp.
Nicomachean Ethics,
I, I,
iO94a, 3.
Moreh Nebukim,
III, 25.
41 8

is
[ETHICS,
His own view
which
God
wills to
described by him as follows: "The things do are necessarily done; there is nothing
that could prevent the realization of His will. God, however, wills only that which is possible; not indeed everything
that
is
possible, but only such things as

l
His wisdom decrees
upon." only question to be asked," says Maimonides in another place, "is this: What is the cause of this design?
"The
The answer
a purpose
to this question
is
is
that
all this
2
has been
made
for
which
unknown
to us."
In criticizing both these views, Spinoza dismisses the first one by summarizing his previous contention that a change in God's will is unthinkable. Still, though he is opposed to
this view, he considers
it
nevertheless "at a less distance
from the truth" than the second view, which he proceeds to refute in the following statement. "For these seem to place
something outside of God which is independent of Him, to which He looks while He is at work as to a model, or at which He aims as if at a certain mark. This is indeed nothing else than to subject God to fate, the most absurd thing which can be affirmed of Him. Therefore it is not
. . .
worth while that

surdity."
should waste time in refuting this ab-
There
it
is
seems to
more hidden away in this statement than what convey to the mind of the casual reader. We may
all its implications by making Spinoza address Maimonides directly and speak out all that was in the back of his mind when he gave utterance to this statement. Spinoza seems to address Maimonides as follows: You say that things do not depend upon an arbitrary will
try to unfold
of
God
but upon a rational
will,
which you
call
wisdom, so
that everything created by is guided by a purpose or

1
God
*
has a purpose. God, then, His Wisdom, the nature of by

Ibid., II, 19.
Ibid.
PROPS. 30-36]

is
419
is
which you say
unknown
to us, but
which you maintain
not external to Him.
It is well for
you
to seek refuge out of
But those predecessors of the rabbis, aye, and the philosophers, too, whose trayours, ditional teachings, from which you refuse to depart, are responsible for
to
all
the difficulties into which your leads you by pleading ignorance.
own philosophy
so often
know what
all
your philosophical difficulties, did confess that divine Wisdom was and the purpose for
which
things were created. They say that the Wisdom, in person in the eight chapter of the Book of Proverbs, is the Torah, or the Law of Moses, and it is the
which speaks
Torah which is regarded by them as the purpose for which the world was created. Furthermore, this Torah, though
1
not considered in Judaism to be eternal, existed, according to its beliefs, before the creation of the world, and it is said that
God
consulted
it
2 as to the creation of the world,
and that
it
model according to which the world was created; as the rabbis say: "God looked into the Torah " and created the world. 3 Not only your rabbis but also
served
as a sort of
in the
Him
your philosopher Philo speaks of Wisdom and of the Logos same way as the rabbis speak of the Torah, namely,
you yourself insist upon Wisdom with the essence of God. But it is these identifying
course,
as divine instruments of creation. 4
Of
do not take these statements

traditional utterances about
literally.
You
Wisdom
in
the sense of the
Torah that
behind your statements that things were created for some unknown purpose and by some unreally
lie
Or Adonai
II, vi, 4,
D'DP
however,
exist."
3
1D"pri3
N7 (Pesahim
quoting as proof-text the rabbinic dictum mill 68b), which he evidently takes to mean "but for
the Torah, heaven and earth would not have come into existence." The dictum, may mean "but for the Torah, heaven and earth would not continue to
*
Pirke de-Rabbi Eliezer, Ch.

Sit y
3.
and parallels. De Eo: Quis Rerum Divinarum Herts

Genesis Kabbah,
I, i,
XLI,
199;
De Cherubim
et
Flam-
meo Gladio y
XXXV,
ii4.fi.
Cf.
Drummond,
Philo Judaeus, II, pp. 205-206.
4 20

divine wisdom.
[ETHICS,
Stripped of this metaphysical garb with which you have clothed these ancient utterances, your own statements "seem to place something outside of God
is independent of Him, to which He looks while He work as to a model, or at which He aims as if at a certain mark/* But furthermore, Spinoza seems to say to Maimonides, if the Torah is that which God consulted and by which God was guided in creating things, then your God is governed by a Torah or Wisdom or Logos just as some philosophers,
known
which
is
at
say the Stoics, maintain that the world is governed by fate (fatum, 17 cijuapjLte^r/). "This indeed is nothing else than
to subject
God
in
it.
to fate."
statement
intelligible
makes Spinoza's enough. But there may be even more

This by
itself
than that
the universe. 1
Stoics speak of fate as the Logos of Similarly Philo refers to the Logos as that
call
The
"which most men

therefore
fortune (rux??),"
fortune probably
3 being here an interchangeable term with fate.
What Spinoza
would seem to say to Maimonides is this: Since the Stoic and the Philonic Logos, which is sometimes used
as the equivalent of
is
is
when God
Logos,
nella
or your Torah, is called fate, said to be ruled by the Torah or Wisdom or the
really said to be ruled
Wisdom
He
combines the terms
"
by fate. In fact Campa" " " wisdom and fate when he
speaks of the maintenance of things by the power of

necessity, by His wisdom or fate
(faturri),
God
or
and
finally
by His
love or ordinance. 4
1
Cf. Zeller, Philosophic der Griechen, III,

Stoics , Epicureans,
I, p.
161, n, 2 (4th ed.).
English
translation:
a
3
and
Sceptics, p. 161, n. 3.
$uod Deus
$it Immutabilis,
XXXVI,
176.
>
Vol.
4
De Augmentis Scientiarum, III, 4 (Works London, I, p. 569): "quas uno nomine Fatum aut Fortunam vocabant." Reproduced by Erdmann, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, I,
Cf. Francis Bacon,
1857,
246.
4,
based upon Campanella's Philosophia Universality VI, Proem.
PROPS. 30-36]
421
Spinoza would not shrink from the use of the term " "fate in its strictly Stoic sense of a universal and inscrutable law that governs
6,
all
Now
things.
In fact in Short Treatise^
I,
he practically uses the term "fate" when he describes the contents of the chapter in which he denies the existence of any
by the title "On Divine Predestination." But what he insists upon saying here is that while all things and all actions, in so far as they follow with inevitable necesaccidental things
sity
from the nature of God,

fatalistic necessity,
have a
may be said in a certain sense to God himself must be conceived
and as not being subject to any fate. This was difficult to be grasped by his corand on several occasions in letters to Ostens respondents, and Oldenburg Spinoza felt called upon to explain himself. To quote a few characteristic passages from these letters:
as absolutely free
distinction evidently
"The
basis of his
away God's
tirely false.
argument is this, that he thinks that liberty, and subject Him to fate. This For I assert that all things follow with
take
en-
is
inevi-
table necessity from the nature of God, just as all assert that it follows from the nature of God that He understands himself."
I
Again: "I want to explain here briefly in what sense maintain the fatalistic necessity of all things and of all
*
For I do in no way subject God to fate, but I conceive that evervthing follows with inevitable necessity from the nature of God, just as all conceive that it follows from
actions.
the nature of
self."
*
God
himself that
He
should understand him-
which do not pertain to God, power, as we have already pointed out, is admitted by Spinoza to pertain to the essence of God and to be identical with His essence. Hence Proposition XXXIV: "The power
will,
Unlike intellect and
of
1
God
is
His essence
itself."
a
Power, as we have elsewhere

Epistola 75.
Epistola 43.
422

1
[ETHICS,
remarked, means to Spinoza the ability to exist and the
Hence Spinoza defines God's power here in the demonstration of the proposition as that "by which He himself and all things are and act/'
ability to bring things into existence.
identity with the essence of God Spinoza tries to solve again the problem which he has discussed in Scholium II to Proposition XVII and
its
From
this definition of
power and from
in the third part of the
Scholium to Proposition XXXIII,
namely, whether God created all things which are in His intellect. His answer is in the affirmative. Hence Proposition
XXXV:
"Whatever we conceive
In the Short
to be in
God's power
necessarily exists."
same view by saying: do what He does." 2

II.
"We
he expresses the that God cannot omit to deny

^Treatise
FINAL CAUSES
It
may
"cause"
to
be recalled that the mediaevals apply the term God in three out of its four Aristotelian senses.
God
is to them the efficient, formal, and final cause, but not the material cause, of the world. 3 In opposition to them, Spinoza made God also the material cause of the world, and
by further reducing the formal

throughout
Proposition
his discussion
XV
to the efficient cause, he has of the causality of God, from to XXXV, elaborated in great detail his
conception of the efficient causation of God. In the course of his discussion he has also refuted the views of those who,
having denied the principle of causality altogether, attributed the succession and change of things either to chance 4
or to the direct intervention of God's arbitrary will. 5 The latter view, which is discussed by him in the last part of
1
Cf. above, pp. 204-205. Cf. above, p. 302.

Cf. above, pp. 416
ff.
Short treatise,
I, 4,
I.
Cf. above, p. 318.
PROPS. 30-36]
423
Scholium
II to Proposition
XXXIII,
led
him
to touch
upon
the problem of final causation, without, however, going into a full discussion of the problem. Now, at the conclusion of the
first
Part of the Ethics, Spinoza wanted to come out with
a formal denial of the mediaeval view as to the existence of

final
But following his general custom in the propositions of the Ethics, instead of directly opposing the mediaevals, he states his own position in positive terms, but in such a manner as to contain an indirect denial of the
causes.
causes in nature. 1
commonly accepted belief in final The oppositional views in the

final
history of philosophy to
causes
may
be
the view that everything
God, which, as we
headings. First, the result of the arbitrary will of have seen, Maimonides attributes to the
is
summed up under two
Mohammedan
is
Ashariya. Second, the view that everything the result of chance and accident, which, again, Maimon2 ides attributes to the Epicureans. Spinoza, as we have seen,
has discussed both these views and rejected them. 3 The method by which he now tries in Proposition XXXVI to
reject final causes altogether
is
by reducing every
final
cause
events constantly and resucceed one another, he seems to say, it is not to peatedly be explained in terms of final causes, namely, that the first
to an efficient cause.
When two
event aims
at,
or
is
made
to serve, the second event as its
to be explained rather solely in terms of efficient causes, namely, that the second event follows by
purpose, but
it is
necessity from the nature of the
from whose method of eliminating

exists
1
event, for "nothing nature an effect does not follow/' This

first
final
causes by reducing
them
to
On
Brunner, Probleme der

(Heidelberg, 1928).
a *
the general problem of final causes in the philosophy of Spinoza, see Peter 'Tcleologic bei Maimonides y Thomas von Aquin und Spinoza
Cf. above, p. 318.
Moreh Nebukim,
II, 13.
ff.
Cf. above, pp. 416
4 24
efficient

causes
is
[ETHICS,
already indicated in the Cogitata Metaphysica: "Second, I say that in creation no causes concur except the efficient one. I might have said that creation
x A still negates or excludes all causes except the efficient." clearer statement to the same effect occurs in the Preface
to Ethics, IV:
"A
final cause, as it is called, is nothing,
therefore,
but
human
desire.
house to live
in, in
so far as
it is
Therefore, having a considered a final cause, is

.
merely
cause/'
this particular desire,

2
which
is
really
an
efficient
This
in fact is
Aristotle's
own
nothing but a logical corollary from denial of design and purpose in God's causal-
ity, which Spinoza seems to be stressing in this proposition against Aristotle. For Aristotle, though he denies design
and purpose
in the causality of
God,
still
maintains that
there are final causes in nature, a logical inconsistency which Maimonides makes much of in his defence of the belief in
creation. 3
Thus both Maimonides and Spinoza

to
see the in-
attempt uphold the existence of final causes in nature while denying at the same time the
consistency in Aristotle's
existence of design in God, but as they are in disagreement as to which of these two premises is correct, they arrive at
two diametrically opposite conclusions.
Maimonides
starts
with the Aristotelian premise that there are final causes in nature and therefore argues, as against Aristotle, that there must be design in the causality of God. Spinoza, on the other
hand, starts with the Aristotelian premise that there

design in the causality of
is
no
therefore argues, also against Aristotle, that there cannot be final causes in nature. This denial of final causes by Spinoza re-echoes, on the
God and
whole, Francis Bacon's condemnation of the search of final

1
Cogitata Metaphysica y II, 10.
Opera,
3
II, p. 207,
11.
Moreh Nebukim,
II,
2-4 and 9-11. 20 ff.
APPENDIX]
425
1 causes in the realm of physics. But unlike Bacon, who ad" mits that final causes are true and worthy to be inquired in 2 metaphysical speculations'* and that they are perfectly com-
patible with efficient or physical causes, "except that one declares an intention, the other a consequence only," 3 Spinoza eliminates them even from metaphysical speculations.
If this
is
Appendix
to Part I,
is,
the meaning of the last proposition, then the which deals exclusively with the problem
with the exception of the introductory a scholium to the last proposition of paragraph, really Part I. In the Appendix, Spinoza starts out with a restateof final causes,
which men commonly suppose" with regard to The passage which follows falls into two parts and betrays the influence of two different sources. The first part restates the view of those who hold "that all things in nature, like men, work for (propter) some end; and indeed
ment of that
final causes.
"
it
thought to be certain that God himself directs all things to some sure end (ad cerium aliquem finem)" The
is
immediate source of this view is the following passage in Heereboord: "All natural things work for (propter) some end,
or, rather,
by God
they work to some end, since they are directed to an end pre-determined for each thing (ad finem
4
The second part of the passage adds singulis praefixum)." " for it is said that God has made all things for man, and man
worship God." The immediate source of this statement seems to be a combination of the following pasthat he
may
sages in Saadia and Maimonides.

as follows:
1
"Should
it
Saadia's passage reads occur to one to ask for what reason
Df Augmentis
Ibid., Ill, 4
Scientiarum, III, 4.
I,
(Works, London, 1857, Vol.
p. 570; Vol. IV, p. 364).
Ibid.
4
XXIV,
Melctemata Philosophica^ Disputationcs ex Philosophia Selectae, Vol. II, Disp. i: "Res omnes naturales agunt propter finem, aut potius agunturad II,
finem, quatenus a
Deo
diriguntur ad finem singulis praefixum."
426
did
.
.

God
.
[ETHICS,
create
The
these things, three answers may be given. third answer is that He created the beings for their
all
own
direct them in that benefit and In another place Saadia states Him/' they might worship " that although we observe that the created beings are many the end of all of them is man/'- Maimonides' passage,
benefit so that
He might
l
which there seems to be an allusion to the statements quoted from Saadia, reads as follows: "But of those who
in
accept our theory that the whole universe has been created from nothing, some hold that the inquiry after the purpose
is necessary, and assume that the universe was created for the sake of man's existence, that he might only 3 It must, however, be remarked that, conworship God."
of creation
trary to what may be inferred from Spinoza's statement here, neither Saadia nor Maimonides is in the least dog-
matic about this view.

exists for the
Maimonides
for
definitely rejects the
view that the universe exists
man's sake and that
man
own
purpose of worshipping God, and gives as his view that "we must in continuing the inquiry as to the
purpose of creation at last arrive at the answer that it was the will of God or that His wisdom decreed it." 4 Even Saadia
gives as his first answer to the question as to the purpose of " creation the view that God created things for no purpose at
all
...
for
5
God
is
above any consideration of external
purpose."
Spinoza's own discussion of the problem is divided by himself into three parts. First, how man came to the idea
of final causes.
final causes.
Second, arguments against the existence of Third, certain erroneous conceptions to which
rise.
the idea of final causes gave

1
Emunot wf-De'ot, I, 4. March Nebuktm, III, 13. Emunot we-De'ot, I, 4.
Ibid.> IV, Introduction.
Ibid.
APPENDIX]

final
427
In his account of the origin of the belief in
causes
and
his explanation of the question
"why
all
are so naturally
inclined to
embrace it," Spinoza does nothing more than transform the reasons which his predecessors had used as
for the existence of final causes into
arguments
so-called
motives for
their belief in final causes.
He
seems to say to them: Your
arguments
for the existence of final causes are
nothing but the expressions of your desires and wishes which you put in the form of logical arguments. Or to put it in other words, Spinoza tries to show that what the mediaevals call reasons are only different forms of rationalization.
Take
the conception of final causes in
human
actions,
Spinoza seems to argue, and you will find that even there, where final causes are generally assumed to exist beyond
any shadow of a doubt, their existence may be questioned. For what basis is there for this general belief that man does
everything for an end, if not the belief that man is free to choose from two alternatives that which is profitable to him.
Let us then consider what
is
meant by
this
freedom of choice.
The
best description, Spinoza would seem to argue, is to be found in Saadia, who says that it is a matter of common ob-
servation that
seize or set loose,
that he can speak or remain silent, this without being conscious of any and "r force that could restrain him from carrying out his desire.
feels
all
"man
is that feeling of being able to choose without conscious of any compulsion to make the choice. being This choice, furthermore, is supposed to be made in considera-
Freedom then
end which man has in view, and it is this of an end which is generally taken to establish supposition the existence of final causes in human action. But, says
tion of a certain
Spinoza,
1
is it
not possible that the consciousness of freedom
ibid., IV, 4 .
428
is
[ETHICS,
only a delusion based upon the ignorance of the true causes that really determine one's action, and therefore the
belief that also a delusion based
one acts for a certain purpose or final cause is upon an ignorance of the real causes,
which are always efficient causes, that really necessitate one's action? "It will be sufficient/' says Spinoza, "if I take here
as an
that
man
axiom that which no one ought to dispute, namely, is born ignorant of the causes of things, and that he
has a desire, of which he is conscious, to seek that which is profitable to him. From this it follows, firstly, that he thinks
himself free and, secondly, it follows that man does everything for an end." It must, however, be remarked that Spinoza had been anticipated by Crescas in the suggestion that the conscious. . .
ness of freedom
may
be a delusion.
ment
for
freedom from the fact that
In discussing the arguman is not conscious
of any compulsion in making a decision, Crescas says that in making a choice, is unconscious of "though man,
any
compulsion and restraint, it is quite possible that, were it not for some cause that compels him to choose one of the
alternatives, he
would
desire both alternatives alike."
Spinoza continues with the same method of argument with which he had started. Taking the traditional
philo-
sophic evidences for design in nature from which the mediaevals tried to prove creation and the existence of an intelligent
them into psychological motives which have induced man to attribute the delusions of his own freedom and of the purposiveness of his own actions to nature
deity, he transforms
and God. The traditional philosophic view is summed up by Maimonides in the following passage: "Aristotle repeat2 edly says that nature produces nothing in vain, that
1
is
to
Or Adonai,
II, v, 3.
Dt
Caelo,
I,
4, 2713, 33;
De Anima,
III, 9, 432*), 21.
APPENDIX]
429
say, every natural action must necessarily have a certain object. Thus, Aristotle says that plants were created for
the sake of animals; and similarly he shows in the case of some other things that one exists for the sake of the other. This is still more obvious in the case of the organs of animals.
Know
that the existence of such a final cause in the various
parts of nature has compelled philosophers to assume the existence of a primal cause apart from nature, namely, that which Aristotle calls the intelligent or divine principle, which
divine principle creates one thing for the purpose of another. And know also that to those who acknowledge the truth,
the greatest of all arguments for the creation of the world is that which has been demonstrated with regard to natural things, namely, that every one of them has a certain purpose
and that one thing
exists for the sake of another."
All this,
says Spinoza, is simply a projection of man's own purposes into the actions of other human beings and into nature, for
"by
and
" necessarily judges that of another thus also "it comes to pass that all natural objects are
his
own mind he
as
considered
means
for
Furthermore, since
as
man
obtaining what is profitable." has falsely considered these things
some end, he thought "it was impossible to had created themselves," and so again by an analogy of his own experience he inferred "that some ruler or rulers of nature exist, endowed with human liberty, who have taken care of all things for him, and have made all
means
to
believe that they
things for his use."
The
allusions in this passage to the pas-
sages quoted from Maimonides are quite apparent. Spinoza finally concludes his argument with a condemnation of the
by Maimonides, namely, that "nature does nothing in vain," as an attempt to show "that nature, the gods, and man are alike mad."
Aristotelian principle quoted
x
Moreh Ncbukim,
III, 13.
430
[ETHICS,
naturally expect that in discussing design in nature Spinoza would resuscitate the old problem of evil
One would
which philosophers before him had found at variance with the assumption of design and providence in nature. Spinoza introduces this problem with an enumeration of the so-called
physical evils which are similarly discussed by Maimonides 1 in connection with the problem of final causes and design, 2 and in connection with the problem of divine knowledge. " The evils which Spinoza happens to mention, storms, earthquakes, diseases/' are reminiscent of the list of evils
arise
earthquakes, 3 But when Spinoza pretends to restorm, and lightning/' produce the mediaeval explanation of evil by saying that "it was affirmed that these things happened because the
[i.e.,
.
mentioned by Gersonides, "from the mixture
in
which are included

diseases]
.
.
evils
which
gods were angry either because of wrongs which had been inflicted on them by man, or because of sins committed in the
method of worshipping them," he does not do justice to their case. Maimonides, Gersonides, and others had more
subtle solutions for the problem of evil. This explanation that physical evil is a divine retribution
which Spinoza rightly or wrongly reproduces as the only or the chief explanation that had been advanced for the problem, leads him to revive the old quesfor
moral
evil or sin,
tion, already raised in the Bible, especially in the
Book of
religious
Job, and repeated throughout the history of Jewish

literature
the literature of other religions, namely, that our observation does not confirm the belief that physical evil is proportionate to moral evil, for "experias well as in
ence/* says Spinoza, "daily contradicted this, and showed

1
Ibid., Ill, 12.
'
Ibid., Ill, 16, end.
Milhamot Adonai, IV, 3 (pp. 160-161);
Introduction to his
Commentary
on Job.
APPENDIX]
431
infinity of examples that both the beneficial and the injurious were indiscriminately bestowed on the pious and
by an
the impious." Parallel passages in which the problem is stated in similar terms can be picked up at random in almost
any mediaeval work dealing with
this
problem.
But
I shall
quote here only the following passage from Crescas: "The great difficulty which cannot be solved completely ... is the ill-order which is believed to exist in the world from
the fact of our observation that
like the
many worthy people are dust at the feet of unworthy ones, and, in general,
why
there
is
the question
a righteous
man who
fares
badly
r
and a wicked man who fares well, a question by which prophets and philosophers have been perplexed unto this day."
solutions are offered for this problem. Maimonides, for instance, enumerates four theories, the Aristotelian, the
Many
finds that
Scriptural or his own, the Mutazilite, and the Asharian, and Job and his three friends, Eliphaz the Temanite,
Bildad the Shuite, and Zophar the Naamathite, are respec2 tively the spokesmen of these four views. Spinoza seems
to
sum up
all
the solutions of the problem in the following
general statement: "Hence it was looked upon as indisputable that the judgments of the gods far surpass our comprehension." It is quite possible that this is all that the
various solutions ultimately amount to. Strictly speaking, however, the solution mentioned here by Spinoza as typical
of
the solutions would, according to Maimonides, represent only the view of Zophar the Naamathite or of the
all
Ashariya. In the second part of the Appendix
we may
discern four
arguments
1
against final causes.

II,
ii,
Or Adonaiy IV, 2 (p. I 5 6).

3
i (p. 35b).
Cf.
Moreh Nebukim y
III, 19;
Milhamot Adonai y
Moreh Nebukim^
III, 17
and
23.
43*

first
[ETHICS,
two arguments seem to be directed against two statements made by Heereboord. First, "the end is prior in works in intention to the means." Second, "God
*
. .
The
a most eminent
himself
.
.
an end, not one which way God has done all things for His
for
is
outside
own sake
not that
.
. .
made
stood in need of those things which which view the scholastics explain in the
He
He
fol-
lowing manner: God has done all things for an end, not of want but of assimilation/' that is to say "in order to benefit other things which are outside himself," 2 by assimilating
them
to himself,
i.e.,
by making them
like himself.
Metaphysica> where Spinoza does not choose to enter into controversy with those "who ask
Now,
in the Cogitata
whether
God had
not determined for himself beforehand
an end for the sake of which

is
He had
created the world," he
quite willing to say that "a created object is one which presupposes for its existence nothing except God," and to
statement by the explanation that "if God had predetermined for himself some end, it evidently was
supplement
this
God by which He was
not independent of God, for there is nothing apart from influenced to action." 3 But here in
if it
the Ethics he rejects any conception of end, even
be
nothing apart from God himself. Heereboord's first statement which declares the priority of the end to the means
characterized by Spinoza as one which "altogether turns nature upside down," for it makes the things which are imis
1
XXIV,
3
Meletemata Philosophica^ Disputationts ex Philosophia Selectae y Vol. vni: "Finis est prior in intentione quam media."
II,
Disp.
non quod istis, propter se quod Scholastici enunciarunt hoc modo; Deus omnia quae fecit, indigeret fecit propter finem, non indigentiae, sed assimilationis, . ut bene aliis faciat, quae sunt extra se, rebus." Cf. Baensch's note to this passage in his translation
fecit
.
. . . .
Ibid., Disp. XXIV, vi-vn: finem, non qui extra se sit. . . .

.
"Deus
modo eminentissimo
agit propter
Deus omnia
of the Ethics.
*
Cogitata Mttaphysica, II, 10.
APPENDIX]
433
mediately produced by God to exist for the sake of things produced by Him last. The second statement is simply
dismissed by him as a verbal quibble and he insists that "if
God works to obtain an end, He necessarily seeks something of which He stands in need/' and thus "this doctrine does
away with God's perfection." The third argument deals with
the concurrence of
the scholastic theory of

is
God
(concursus Dei), of which there
an
elaborate discussion in Heereboord. 1
This theory, which is stated by Descartes in several different connecrepeatedly 2 tions, is explained in Spinoza's restatement of Descartes
to
mean
that "each single
moment God
continually creates
things as if
anew," from which it follows "that things in themselves have no power to do anything or to determine
is
themselves to any action."

cartes' principle
A similar explanation of Desgiven by Blyenbergh in a letter to Spinoza:

3
"Following your assertion, creation and preservation are one and the same thing, and God makes not things only,
but also the motions and modes of things, to continue in their own state, that is, concurs in them." From this Blyenbergh infers "that nothing can happen against the will of in the Ethics he illustrates the theory of concurrence by the following example: "For, by way of example, if a stone has fallen from some roof on somebody's
God." 4 Here
head and
did not
so
1
killed
him, they
will
demonstrate
kill
in this
manner
For
if it
that the stone has fallen in order to

fall for
the man.
that purpose by the will of God,
how
could
many
circumstances concur through chance (and a
numDisps.
Meletemata Philosophica> Disputationes ex Philosophia Sclcctae^ Vol.
I,
VI1-XII.
a Principia Philosophiac, II, 36. For other references to Descartes and parallel passages in scholastic authors, see Gilson, Index Schofastico-Carttsicn, 81, and cf. IIO-II2.
Cogitata Mctaphysica, II, 11.
Epistola 20.
434

1
[ETHICS,
He concludes by her often simultaneously do concur)?" characterizing the exponents of this view in the following words: "And so they all fly to God, the refuge for ignorance/'
a
similar description of the Asharian view that
every occurrence is determined by the direct intervention of God's absolute will is given by Maimonides in the following passages: "For example, when a storm or gale blows, it causes undoubtedly some leaves of a tree to drop, breaks off some branches of another tree, tears away a stone from a
heap of stones,
stirs
them, and up the sea so that a ship goes down with the whole or
raises dust over herbs spoils
and
3 Now the Mohammedan Ashariya part of her contents." "admit that Aristotle is correct in assuming one and the same
cause [the wind] for the fall of leaves [from the tree] and for the death of a man [drowned in the sea]. But they hold at the same time that the wind did not blow by chance; it is
God
that caused
it
to
move;
fall;
it
is
not therefore the wind

fell
that caused the leaves to
each leaf
caused
it
according to
the divine decree;
it is
God who
to fall at a certain
time and in a certain place; it could not have fallen before or after that time or in another place, as this had previously
been decreed."
fourth argument 5 is directed against the alleged evidence of design that may be discerned in the structure of the
The
yet more easily comprehend that the world was given by the immortal gods to men, if we examine thoroughly into the structure of the body and the form and
perfection of
1
human body. "But we may
Cicero makes use of this sort of evidence.
human
1.
nature."
1.
Among
a
the several examples

11.
Opera,
3
II, p. 80,
35~p. 81,
2.
Ibid., p. 81,
10-11.
Moreh Nebukim,
Ibid.,
III, 17,
Second Theory.
Third Theory.
II, p. 81,
11.
Opera,
ff.
De Natura Deorum,
II, 54,
133.
APPENDIX]
435
which indicate design in the structure of the human body he mentions the delicate structure of the eye, which he deThe same evidence is used also by scribes in some detail.
1
Maimonides. Like Cicero, he
illustrates
it
by a description
of the structure of the eye, and then concludes: "In short, considering the humor of the eye, its membranes and nerves,
with their well-known functions, and their adaptation to the purpose of sight, can any intelligent person imagine that all
this is
to our
due to chance? Certainly not view the result of the action of an

.
but
is
according
2
intelligent being/'
Spinoza's answer to this alleged evidence of design is that it is based on ignorance, for "when they behold the structure
they are amazed; and because they are of the causes of such art, they conclude that the ignorant body was made not by mechanical but by divine or superof the
natural art/'
human body,
Note the
difference between
Maimonides'
passage and Spinoza's passage
in the choice of an oppositional
term to "intelligent being" or "divine art." In Maimonides the oppositional term is "chance," i.e., without any cause;
in
Spinoza
it
is
"mechanical art,"
i.e.,
necessary efficient
Maimonides, however, was not ignorant of "mechanical art" as a possible alternative for "chance" in opcausation.
position to "intelligent being," for between his premise that the structure of the eye could not be the work of chance and
his conclusion that
it
must be the work of an

"
intelligent
agent he inserts the statements that this is an artistic organ" " ization and that nature has no intelligence and no organizing faculty, as has been accepted by all philosophers," and it is in consequence of this that we must assume that it is
the
work of an
intelligent
agent.
maintains that the

'
artistic organization
In short, Maimonides of the structure of
Ibid., II, 57,

a
142.
III, 19.
Moreh Nebukim,
436

"
[ETHICS,
chance the eye eliminates not only the assumption of of a "mechanical art/' and points but also the assumption
to a "divine art" as its only possible explanation. In the third part of the Appendix Spinoza shows how from
"
the conception of final causes and from the belief that all things are made for man there has been formed the conception of good, evil, order, confusion, heat, cold, beauty, and deformity. Here, too, Spinoza is transforming a statement
used by those
into an
who
believe in the existence of final causes
argument against them. The statement which must have given rise to Spinoza's argument here is found in Heereboord. He says: "The end produces the means; not only
does it produce them, but it also endows them with goodness, l In his criticism of this statement measure, and order/'
Spinoza
is
evil in all their variety of
trying to establish the principle that good and forms are only relative to man
"they do not reveal the nature of anything in itself, but only the constitution of the imagination." This is not an especially new view. Maimonides has fully developed it, and the following are a few characteristic expressions used by him:
All "Evils are evils only in relation to a certain thing. evils are privations. ... It cannot be said of God that He
.
His works are all perfectly good." directly creates evil. In letters to Blyenbergh Spinoza uses almost the same ex. .
pressions as Maimonides: "But I for my part cannot admit for the evil in that sin and evil are something positive
. . .
it [Adam's disobedience] was no more than a privation of a more perfect state which Adam had to lose through that action." 3 "I think that I have sufficiently shown that that which gives its form to evil, error, or crimes does not con1
Meletemata Philosophica, Disputationes ex Philosophia Selectae^ Vol.
II,
Disp.
XXIII, vn: "Finis causat media, nee causat solummodo, sed dat illis bonitatem, a March Nebukim, III, 10. mensuram, et ordinem."
a
11.
10-11; p. 91,
11.
4-6).
APPENDIX]
sist

l
437
anything which expresses essence, and that thereSimifore it cannot be said that God is the cause thereof/' in Cogitata Metaphysica he repeats the words of Mailarly
in
monides
in saying that "a thing considered in itself is called neither good nor evil, but only in respect to another being, which it helps to acquire what is desired, or the contrary/' 2
The direct influence of Maimonides upon Spinoza's treatment of evil is evident beyond any doubt in Short 'Treatise,
I, 4.
Spinoza raises there the question how it is possible for a perfect God to permit confusion to be seen everywhere in
nature. The term "confusion" reflects the expression "absence of order" used by Maimonides 3 and its similar expression "ill-order" which occurs frequently in Gersonides
and Crescas. 4 Spinoza denies that there

nature.
is
real confusion in
What we
call
confusion
certain general ideas which

perfection.
we
simply a deviation from have set up as exemplars of

is
then dismisses the existence of general ideas, referring in the course of his discussion to those who say that "God has no knowledge of particular and transient
He
which in their opinion are and concludes that "God then is the cause imperishable," Now, of, and providence over, particular things only."
things, but only of the general,
Maimonides, in a similar way, after discussing the problem whether Providence extends only to the species or also to
the individuals, 5 proceeds to say that "species and other general ideas are only things of reason, whilst everything
that exists outside the
mind
is
an individual object, or an
aggregate of individual objects. This being granted, it must be further admitted that the divine influence, which exists
1
Epistola 23.
3
y
Cogitata Metaphysica ,
1
I, 6.
MorehNebukim,ll\ 19: 1HD Tiyn, fUi^ âc. Milhamot Adonai> IV, 2 (p. 156); Or Adonai y II, ii, 2 (p. 35b): "ttlDH March Nebukim, III, 17.
JJV1.
438
in

human
species, that
is,
[ETHICS,
union with the

that
the
human
intel-
lect, is
that which exists in union with the individual intelis
lects,
to say, that
x
which emanates
in
Reuben, Simeon,
Levi, and Judah."
More
that these things of reason/' would seem to are not real things, only things draw upon Maimonides* statement "that species and other
those
"
especially, Spinoza's reference to
who
follow Aristotle/'
who "say
general ideas are only things of reason." This conception of the relativity of good and evil
in the Short Treatise
is
ex-
pressed by Spinoza that they are "entities of reason" (entia rationis) as opposed to "real entities" (entia rea/ia), for among the entities of
evil
by the statement
reason, he says, are included all relations, and "good and 2 are only relations." Here in the Ethics^ however,
Spinoza goes still further and calls good and evil "entities (entia) not of the reason (rationis) but of the imagination
"
(imaginationis)
The Appendix is concluded by Spinoza with the question "'why God has not created all men in such a manner that
3 they might be controlled by the dictates of reason alone." The question is an old one. Judah ha-Levi, for instance, puts
way: "Would it not have been better or more commensurate with divine wisdom, if all mankind had been
it
in this
4 Descartes, too, has raised it. guided in the true path?" "And, finally, I must also not complain that God concurs
with
in
me
in
I
which
forming the acts of the will, that is the judgment 5 But "I nevertheless perceive that go astray."
God
1
could easily have created

I
still
me
so that
never could
err,
although
Ibid.
2
remained
free
and endowed with a limited
Short Treatise
',
I, 10.
11.
Cf. above, pp. 161-162.
Opera,
Cuzari,
II, p. 83,
I,
26-27.
26-28).
*
s
102.
Mcditationes,
IV
(Ocuvrcs, VII, p. 60,
11.
APPENDIX]

x
439
knowledge/'
is it
Spinoza has raised the same question also
"Against all this others object: how that God, who is said to be supremely perfect, possible and the sole cause, disposer, and provider of all, nevertheless permits such confusion to be seen everywhere in nature? " 2 Also, why has He not made man so as not to be able to sin ?
in the Short Treatise:
The
question was also addressed to Spinoza in a letter by

3
Blyenbergh. Two answers to this question given by Descartes are use of by Spinoza.
First,
made
Descartes denies that acts of error and sin have any " these acts are positive existence with reference to God, for
entirely true
and good, inasmuch

is
as they
4 depend on God."
This answer
Ethics.
6
in his letter to Blyenbergh, 5
followed by Spinoza in the Short Treatise, and in the Second Part of the
"
As regards the other quote the Short Treatise: God has not made mankind so that they [objection], why should not sin, to this it may serve [as an answer], that whatever
is
To
7 only said with reference to us." Second, Descartes maintains that error and sin were made possible by God for the special purpose of adding to the per-
said about sin
is
And it is easy for me to understand that, in so far as I consider myself alone, and as if there were only myself in the world, I should have been much more perfect than I am, if God had created me so that
fection of the universe as a whole.
I
"
could never
it is
err.
Nevertheless
cannot deny that
in
some
sense
a greater perfection in the whole universe that cer-
ibid. (p. 61,11.9-11).
Short Treatise, I, 6, 6. Epistola 22 (Opera, IV, p. 142,

Meditationes,
11.
26
ff.).
11.
IV
28-29).
Epistola 23 (Opera, IV, p. 147, 11. i ff.). Props. 33 and 35. Cf. below, Vol. II, pp.
7
in
ff.
Short Treatise,
I, 6,
8.
440

exempt from error
all
[ETHICS,
tain parts should not be
as others are than

'
that
parts should be exactly similar."

it is
This answer in
given by Descartes is not reproduced and he did not reproduce it for the self-evident by Spinoza, reason that he did not believe that anything was created by
the form in which
God
close
for
as a whole.
any purpose, even for the perfection of the universe But there is in Spinoza an answer which upon a examination appears to be only a revised form of this
Error and sin exist in the world, he because they are to contribute to the
answer of Descartes.
argues in effect, not
perfection of the whole universe but because their exclusion from the world would be contradictory to the conception of
as infinitely great and powerful. Given a God whose greatness and power are infinite, he seems to argue, such a
God
God must
be able to produce by the necessity of His nature everything conceivable, and that includes also sin. This is
the meaning of the following concluding
passage in
the
Appendix: "I give but one answer: Because to Him material was not wanting for the creation of everything, from
the highest down to the very lowest grade of perfection; or> to speak more properly, because the laws of His nature were so ample that they sufficed for the production of everything
which can be conceived by an

1
infinite intellect.
11.
"
Meditationes,
IV

11.
17-23).
'
Opera, II, p. 83,
27-32.

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m< OU_160797m

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY kS8f(> Call No. /fJ G Accession No, {/

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA

LONDON HUMPHREY MILFORD

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

HARRY AUSTRYN WOLFSON

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

BY THE PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE

PRINTED AT THE HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE, MASS., U.S.A.

modern metropolis, such

student would undoubtedly think of

the light of whatever associaOf course, there is no such pre-

we have compared him. But,

than Goethe has had

would be carrying the analogy of the

that the philosopher in his interpretabound by the truth of scholarship as the

poet in his imagery

by the truth of science.

to a philosopher of the past

should maintain that

superciliously disregard its objective as established by research, or indolently make no

acquaint ourselves with

or blissfully keep ourwhat is often called

form of presentation must

It is this threefold task that

set ourselves in the

on the one hand, an

presented themselves to Spinoza,

problems, to set forth their salient features, to construct

statements which we have before us in the Ethics.

emerges as a logically conis

work throughout which there

order and sequence

assume meaning and

and the philosophy

of Spinoza, as a systematic whole and in

his other writings in so far as

they are related to

work an abundance of undreamed-of new material,

useful or necessary to quote is to be considered a forerunner of Spinoza or as having had a domiit

nant jnfluence upon

V, and VIII were published

"Spinoza the Last of the

begin with the word "Spinoza."

also deeply indebted to

am profoundly grateful. I am Miss Christabel Garner, of the Har-

vard University Press, for her searching reading of the proofs

for valuable suggestions.

HARRY AUSTRYN WOLFSON

Hebrew and Latin

literatures the sources of

literature as the basic source of Spinoza's

of philosophy, be studied, 14.

Classification of Spinoza's writings, 32.

Titles of his works, 35.

Historical background for the variety of literary forms

ployed by Spinoza, 39.

Analysis of the geometrical method and