QM Aligned Course Design Template

EE 4433: Power System Protection Laboratory

Module Overview / Introduction (ST. 1-8)

Module 02: Laboratory Introduction.

Introduction

The power systems protection laboratory is designed to directly apply theory learned in lectures to devices
that will be studied in the laboratory. Power system protection is concerned with protecting electrical
power systems from faults within the network by isolating the faulted components so as to leave as much
of the remaining the electrical network operational as possible. Moreover, by properly protecting the
system components from overloading, the probability of fires and other catastrophic and expensive system
failures can be minimized.

In understanding power protection, it is necessary to understand what is actually being protected.

Providing superior protection is essential in mitigating the effects of disruptions on system stability. As
such, it is essential for power engineers to understand the concepts and practices underlying power
protection.

Modules Learning Objectives (ST. 2 & 8) What students will be able to do upon completion of the course

Upon completion of this module, you will be able to:

 To see firsthand equipment that we will be studying in this module and their operation and
protection of power systems.
 Understand the operation of each of the equipment.
 Study the characteristics of the equipment within the power systems protection laboratory.

Instructional Materials (ST. 4 & 8)

Lesson 1: Energy System Protection

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Subtheme 1: Energy System Protection

Power system protection is the process of making the production, transmission, and consumption of
electrical energy as safe as possible from the effects of failures and events that place the power system at
risk.

It is cost prohibitive to make power systems 100 percent safe or 100 percent reliable. Risk assessments
are necessary for determining acceptable levels of danger from injury or cost resulting from damage.
Protective relays are electronic or electromechanical devices that are designed to protect equipment and
limit injury caused by electrical failures. Unless otherwise noted, the generic term relay will be
synonymous with the term protective relay throughout this text.

Relays are only one part of power system protection, because protection must be designed into all
aspects of power system facilities. Protective relays cannot prevent faults; they can only limit the damage
caused by faults.

A fault is any condition that causes abnormal operation for the power system or equipment serving the
power system. Faults include but are not limited to: short- or low-impedance circuits, open circuits, power
swings, over voltages, elevated temperature, off-nominal frequency operation, and failure to operate.

Power system protection must determine from measurements of currents and/or voltages whether the
power system is operating correctly. Three elements are critical for protective relays to be effective:
measurements, data processing, and control.

Figure 1 shows a typical application of relays to a power system. This example system contains a single
source that is connected to bus S through a step-up transformer, two transmission lines that connect bus
S to bus R, and a load that is connected to bus R through a step-down transformer.

Figure 1: Example of Power System Single-Line Diagram; Schweitzer&Fleming, 1998.

Breakers A through F provide the control to isolate faulted sections of the power system. Breaker F would
not be required for this example except that customer-owned generation is becoming more common and a
load can change to a source.

The current transformers attached to the relays at strategic points in the power system provide the
necessary instrumentation for relays to determine the presence of faults. Voltage instrumentation for
protection systems may also be required, depending on the relaying scheme used.
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Any number of relay devices may use any single-voltage or current instrumentation device. It is important
that the load or burden the relay devices create does not adversely affect the quality or accuracy of the
measurements by these or other devices.

It is not clear from this diagram what is being protected or what function is being performed. Usually a
designation number is put into the circles that Figure 1 shows as „R‟. The power system protection is
divided into zones based on the type of equipment and location, as shown in Figure 1.

Overlapping these zones increases protection reliability; if one protection system fails to perform, another
is ready to provide the needed protection. Each protection zone consists of a sensing current transformer,
a power control breaker that can deenergize the protected zone. The CTs shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2
have polarity marks to indicate that positive current flow is into the mark. CTs are necessarily outside the
protection zone.

Figure 2: Examples of Zones of Protection, Schweitzer&Fleming, 1998.

Goals of Protection: Maintain the Ability to Deliver Electric Power; Power systems that have evolved in
the 20th century consist of generation plants, transmission facilities, distribution lines, and customer loads,
all connected through complex electrical networks. In the United States, electrical energy is generated and
distributed by a combination of private and public utilities that operate in interconnected grids, commonly
called power pools, for reliability and marketing.

Elsewhere in the world, generation is tied to load through national or privatized grids. Either way, power
flows according to electrical network theory.

Interconnection improves the reliability of each pool member utility because loss of generation is usually
quickly made up from other utilities. However, interconnection also increases the complexity of power
networks.

Power pool reliability is a function of the reliability of the transmission in the individual members.
Protection security and dependability is significant in determining the reliability of electrical service for both
individual utilities and the interconnected power system pool.

Public Safety: Relays are designed to deenergize faulted sections as quickly as possible, based on the
premise that the longer the power system operates in a faulted condition, the greater the chance that

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people will be harmed or equipment damaged. In some cases power system stability and government
regulatory commissions set the speed requirements of extra high voltage (EHV) systems.

Because of cost constraints, relays are not designed to prevent the deaths of people or animals who make
direct contact with high voltage lines. Instead, designers use physical separation and insulation to prevent
direct contact. Still, the faster a faulted system element can be detected, isolated, and deenergized, the
lower the probability that anyone will encounter hazardous voltages.

Equipment Protection: The primary function of power system protection is to limit damage to power
system apparatus. Whether the fault or abnormal condition exposes the equipment to excessive voltages
or excessive currents, shorter fault times will limit the amount of stress or damage that occurs. The
challenge for protective relays is to extract information from the voltage and current instrumentation that
indicates that equipment is operating incorrectly.

Although different faults require different fault detection algorithms, the instrumentation remains the same,
namely voltages and currents.

Table 1: Protected Power Systems and Parameters Measured, Schweitzer&Fleming, 2002.

Figure 3: Parameter Symbol Code; Schweitzer&Fleming, 2002.

Power System Integrity: Properly operating relay systems isolate only the portions on the network
directly involved with the fault. If relays operate too quickly or fail to operate, the fault-affected area
expands and some circuits are deenergized.
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Parts of the power system can become isolated from the rest of the network. A large mismatch between
generation and load can put an islanded network in jeopardy of losing the generation control that holds
frequency and voltage within acceptable limits.

Without generation control, the isolated systems will eventually be tripped off by other relays. Widespread
outages caused by cascading voltage or frequency excursions require many work hours to restore power,
which is costly from both a labor and a lost revenue perspective.

Power Quality: The factors measured to determine the quality of power are voltage amplitude, frequency,
and waveform purity. Voltage amplitude quality takes into account persistent RMS value, flicker, and
intermittent dips and peaks, as well as momentary and long-term outages.

Frequency changes at most a few hundredths of a hertz, unless the power system has lost generation
control. Induction motors have the most sensitivity to power system frequency. Waveform purity is largely
a function of harmonic content and is predominantly influenced by load.

The quality of electrical power is an issue for loads that are sensitive to momentary outages and
harmonics. In the past, when loads were primarily resistive and inductive, harmonics were either
inconsequential or nonexistent. Also, momentary outages had little effect on residential customers.
Commercial and industrial customers compensated for momentary outages either with multiple feeds from
the utility power sources or with local generation.

Today, every residential customer knows that there was an outage whether she or he was home to
experience it. Outages affect home computers and the digital clocks on VCRs, microwave ovens, and
other numerous appliances.

Although the inconvenience may seem trivial to the relay engineer and perhaps the actual number of
outages is even less than in years past, the customer may perceive that the power system is not as
reliable today. Good relay selectivity is key to reducing the number of outages and faster relaying
minimizes the duration of power dips.

Protection Quality: There are four primary causes of protection system failures: instrumentation
distortion, control failures, relay equipment failures, and incorrect relay settings. Instrumentation distortion
is usually caused by saturation from excessive inputs or remnant flux. Breaker failures or faults in the dc
controls can cause control failures.

Relay equipment reliability depends on design and manufacturing processes. In addition to overlapping
zones of protection, both redundant and backup protection increase reliability for critical applications.
Improper settings render relay systems useless.

Hence protection systems designers must know which relay is best suited for a particular application and
how to set the relay parameters to obtain the proper selectivity and sensitivity. Proper relay application is
the single most important factor in the quality of power system protection.
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Continuous Improvement: Power systems are not static networks. Transmission lines and generators
are continuously put into or taken out of service. Each change in the network potentially affects the
operations of protective relays. Protection engineers must decide how to alter the relay settings to
compensate for a change in the power network configuration.

Analysis of Data: Each fault tests the power system relays in the vicinity of the fault and presents an
opportunity to analyze the behavior of the entire protection system. The fault location, type of fault, fault
impedance, and relay sensitivity determine which relays respond to the fault.

Relays either operate correctly (including in a timely manner) or incorrectly (including too slowly or too
quickly). Microprocessor-based relays can now report information that provides the data to determine just
how correct the operations were.
Prior to microprocessor-based relays, oscillographs and sequential events recorders were used to
determine the correctness of operations.

Economics of Protection: Plant equipment represents a significant investment to electric utilities.

Figures from a representative utility that has a significant amount of hydro-based generation show that 50
percent of the plant investment is allocated to production, 14 percent to transmission, and 27 percent to
distribution.

In actual year-2001 dollars for a moderately sized utility, the investment in transmission and distribution
alone is over one billion dollars. The cost of protection equipment is but a very small part of this
investment.

Capital Expense: A rule of thumb is an installed cost of $30,000 per terminal end regardless of relay type.
If the relaying scheme includes pilot protection, the cost of the communications is an additional expense.

Operating Costs: Operating costs for relays are not the same as operating costs for protection systems.
The former includes the costs of servicing and maintenance. Electromechanical and solid-state relays
(also called static relays) require regular testing to determine their functionality.

This means personnel must go to the substation and take the relay out of service during testing and
calibration. If power system network changes require new relay settings, then personnel must again go to
the substation to make appropriate modifications and tests. The expense of this human power adds to the
operating costs of relays.

Microprocessor-based relays are able to perform self-diagnostics and automated reporting with little or no
additional investment, other than the original cost of the relays. They can be reconfigured remotely for new
power system needs. Some relays have multiple group settings that automatically reconfigure the relays
based on the open or closed position of one or more breakers.

Communication with the relays eliminates service visits to the substation. The self-checking ability of
microprocessor-based relays allows immediate detection of failed relays without waiting for the next
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scheduled maintenance visit or a misoperation to reveal the defective unit. Automation also provides
performance data that is not economically possible with static and electromechanical relays.

The cost of maintaining a protection system includes both the cost of maintaining the relays and the cost
of assessing system performance. Every relay operation tests the protection system by verifying correct
operations or exposing incorrect operations. Each fault has an area of effect where some relays are
expected to operate and others to inhibit operation. If they do not all react correctly to the fault, the
protection system has failed. Various instruments monitor the performance of the protection system, with
varying degrees of expense associated with the cost of data collection and analysis. In the past, relay
operations have been rather binary in that they either trip or don‟t trip.

Today, microprocessor-based relays can also provide information on the certainty of a decision by
recording the type of fault, fault location, and relative strength of the restraint and operate signals. Such
information is invaluable for revealing potential problems and avoiding future misoperations. This analysis
takes time, but the microprocessor-based relay is reducing the required time to achieve improved
performance.

Lifetime Costs: Lifetime costs include the purchase price, the cost of installation, and the operation of the
protection system. The cost of protection must be justified by the value of potential losses from decreased
revenue or damaged equipment. As greater demand is placed upon power systems, the cost of over
tripping (tripping when not needed) is becoming as important as under tripping (slow tripping or not
tripping when needed). Proper protection requires a balance between speed and security, based on the
needs of the system.

Performance Measures: Protection engineers define dependability as the tendency of the protection
system to operate correctly for in-zone faults. They define security as the tendency not to operate for out-
of-zone faults. Both dependability and security are reliability issues.

Fault tree analysis is one tool with which a protection engineer can easily compare the relative reliability of
proposed protection schemes. Quantifying protection reliability is important for making the best decisions
on improving a protection system, managing dependability versus security tradeoffs, and getting the best
results for the least money. A quantitative understanding is essential in the competitive utility industry.

Resolution, Precision, and Accuracy: All too often, these terms are used interchangeably. However,
they describe signals from totally different perspectives. These three attributes of measurement are
completely independent; they are easiest to illustrate with examples from analog metrology.
Resolution is the difference between calibrated markings. For example, an outside thermometer might
have markings every two degrees Fahrenheit, a two-degree Fahrenheit resolution. A higher resolution is
possible by interpolating between markings, but doing so influences precision.

Precision is the ability to achieve repeatability. For analog measurements, precision is actually based
upon both the instrument and the observer. For the instrument, precision is the ability to produce the same

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output every time the same input is applied. Many environmental factors influence the precision of analog
instruments, but friction and temperature tend to dominate.

Observers can also influence precision by their position when making the observation, ability to interpolate
correctly, and judgment skills. Using the thermometer example once again, if 10 different observers are
asked to read the temperature when the outside temperature is exactly 77.20 degrees Fahrenheit and
they all read the same temperature every time, the instrument has high precision. This is true even if they
always read 75 degrees.

Accuracy is the ability to measure exactly. The thermometer in our example has an inaccuracy of 2.2
degrees, even though it has two degrees of resolution and a high degree of precision. Accuracy can only
be determined by calibration using a standard that has a higher degree of accuracy than the instrument
being calibrated. The Air Force calibration laboratories require standards to be at least ten times more
accurate than the instruments being calibrated.
All standards used in those Air Force laboratories are directly traceable to the National Institute for
Standards and Technology (NIST) in Boulder, Colorado. Analog instruments get out of calibration because
of changes caused by temperature, mechanical and electrical stress, and wear from friction.

Measurements using digital systems are subject to the same inaccuracies and errors as analog systems
except for friction and mechanical stress. The observer, whether human or machine, depends strictly on
the resolution, precision, and accuracy of the primary instrumentation.

The measurement is only affected by data truncation or errors introduced by communications noise. It
would be a mistake to attribute any higher degree of accuracy to a system than is actually verified through
calibration.

Reliability: Above all else, relays must be reliable, both dependable and secure. This definition of
reliability contains conflicting goals or goals that cannot be mutually maximized. Dependability includes
timely operation, which denotes speedy detection and decision.

The Heisenburg uncertainty principal (the speed of a particle and its position cannot be determined with
the same degree of certainty) can be loosely applied to relaying. The longer one has to make a
measurement, the more accurate the measurement can be (within the limitations of the measuring
equipment) and the more certain the decision that is based upon this measurement.

Relays operate continuously by making correct decisions that discriminate between loads and faults and
discriminate between faults that are in the zone of protection and all other faults. Protection reliability is
affected by equipment failures and by appropriate application and installation.

Determining device reliability is more important for relays that cannot perform self-diagnostics and
alarming. Failure rate (the inverse of device reliability) is usually expressed in mean time between failures
(MTBF). For example, suppose the reliability of a device is expressed with a mean-time-between-failure

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(MTBF) of 100 years. The failure rate is 1/100 failure per year. Therefore, if a system has 300 of these
devices, the expected failure rate is 300·(1/100) = 3 devices per year.

Failure rates are used to determine maintenance intervals to test for failed relays. The optimal
maintenance interval is determined by computing the probability of a failure over an interval, multiplied by
the expected cost of an incorrect operation caused by a relay failure and the cost of maintaining the relay.
The interval that makes the two costs equal is the optimal maintenance interval. The difficulty is
determining the expected cost of an incorrect operation.

The reliability of other equipment besides the protective relay must be considered when computing the
reliability of a protection system. This equipment includes instrumentation, control power (station
batteries), auxiliary control devices, and the primary controls such as circuit breakers. Techniques for
making reliability assessments are described in Section 0.

Three ways of improving reliability for protective relay systems are: redundant systems, backup systems,
and overlapping zones of protection. Critical applications may use all three methods as well as redundant
instrumentation and control circuits. Redundant protection uses multiple installations of identical
equipment, whereas a backup protection scheme uses multiple relays that are based on different
concepts of detecting and identifying faults.

Redundancy: In protection systems, recent use of the term redundant refers to ensuring reliability by
duplicating effort. Systems that are 100 percent reliable do not require redundancy, but few systems are
100 percent reliable. As the cost of protection equipment declines, the feasibility of ensuring reliability by
duplication increases. Two different approaches to improving reliability by redundancy are discussed
below.

Backup Protection: The two most common types of redundancy are dual and parallel redundancy. Dual
redundancy is where two identical units are operated with identical inputs. The outputs are placed in
parallel for added reliability and in series for added security. Parallel redundancy uses two units of
different design but the two units are functionally equivalent. They may or may not use the same inputs
but the outputs are connected as they are in dual redundancy.

Diversity – Overlapping Zones of Protection: Protection systems improve reliability by organizing the
protection function with overlapping zones in such a way that each relay has a primary zone and provides
backup protection for one or more other zones. Relays frequently have multiple operational zones, as
illustrated in Figure 4.

The speed of trips for faults in zone two is generally slower to allow opportunities for other relays that see
the fault in zone 1 to clear the fault. Zone 2 therefore provides backup protection by overlapping other
zones that are normally protected by other relays. Zone 3 sends signals to block other relays from
operating.

Each particular relay has one or more zones of operation. The relay is designed to operate for any fault
within the assigned zone or zones. As figure 2 shows, the zones overlap, so more than one relay may
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operate for a specific fault. figure 4 shows how different zones can be assigned for a relay whose primary
function is to protect the transmission line between breakers A and B. The different zones usually have
different operating times worked out in relay coordination plans.

Figure 4: Zone Assignments for a Three-Zone Relay; Schweitzer&Fleming, 2002.

In the example in Figure4, zone one trips for faults from breaker A to 80 percent of the line length toward
breaker C. Zone two operates for faults beyond bus R including some percentage of the transmission line
between breakers D and B and the transformer supplying the load at bus R.

Zone three looks backward toward the source and covers the step-up transformer, plus a percentage of
the transmission line between breaker B and D. After the initial fault, as time passes and the fault persists,
the relay expands its reach by activating more zones of protection. The backup protection provided by this
scheme can be illustrated using the following example. Consider a fault on the transmission line between
breakers B and D. Assume that breaker B operates correctly but breaker D does not.

The relay at breaker A waits until Zone 2 activates, and then trips because it sees the fault on the
increased sensitivity as the reach expands. The fault is now cleared because breakers at A and B are
open. If the fault is closer to breaker B, then the relay at A would not have sufficient sensitivity until the
timers allow Zone 3 operations.

Older relays with limited functionality implemented the various zones of protection using independent
devices. Newer microprocessor-based relays are able to implement the functions of numerous protection,
control, and monitoring devices.

The method of combining component failure rates is called “fault tree analysis,” a concept first proposed
by H. A. Watson of Bell Telephone Laboratories to analyze the Minuteman Launch Control System. This
method, used and refined over the years, is attractive because it does not require extensive theoretical
work and is a practical tool any engineer can learn to use. While computer programs are available to
assist in developing and analyzing complex fault trees, this text shows that small fault trees, which are
easily analyzed manually, are also very useful.

If a device consists of several components, then a fault tree helps us combine component failure rates to
calculate the device failure rate. Refer again to our device that has a failure rate of 1/100 failure per year.
It might consist of two components, each with a failure rate of 1/200 failure per year. Both components
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must operate properly for the device to be sound. The individual failure rates of the two components add
up to the total failure rate of 1/100. We add the component failure rates to obtain the device failure rate if
either component can cause the device to fail.
On the other hand, our device with the 1/100 failure rate might consist of two redundant components each
with a failure rate of 1/10 failures per year. Either component can give the device satisfactory
performance. The product of the individual component failure rates is the device failure rate. We multiply
component failure rates to obtain the device failure rate if both components must fail to cause the device
to fail.

Fault tree analysis is not the only tool used for reliability studies. Among other techniques, the Markov
models compare relative performance of communications-based protection schemes, and predict optimum
routine test intervals for protective relays. Markov models cover the entire system of interest and
incorporate all failure and success modes and transitions.

The outputs of a Markov model are the probabilities that the system resides in any one of the modeled
states. This technique models both normal and abnormal states. Since the Markov technique models the
entire system, model development requires considerable effort, and Markov model analysis typically
requires a computer. Markov modeling also assumes that all state transitions are exponentially distributed,
which is sometimes difficult to justify.

Subtheme 2: Power Labs Protection Overview

Fault Tree Construction: A fault tree, tailored to a particular failure of interest, models only the part of the
system that influences the probability of that particular failure. The failure of interest is called the Top
Event. A given system may have more than one top event that merits investigation.

Figure 5 shows a protective system consisting of a circuit breaker, a CT, a relay, a battery, and
associated control wiring. The fault tree in this figure helps us analyze the chance that the protective
system will not clear a fault.

Figure 5: Fault Tree for Radial Line Protection; Schweitzer&Fleming, 2002.

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The Top Event is a box containing a description of the failure event of interest. This description usually
includes the event that occurred and the maximum tolerable delay for successful operation. For example,
our top event here is “Protection Fails to Clear Fault in the Prescribed Time”.

We assume the power system is faulted and we assume the protection system is intended to detect and
isolate the fault in question in a very short time, usually a few cycles. We wish to know the probability that
the protection system will fail to clear the fault in the prescribed time limitation.

The fault tree breaks down the Top Event into lower-level events. Logic gates show the relationship
between lower-level events and the Top Event. The OR gate in figure 5 shows that any of several failures
can cause the protection system to fail. If the dc system, the current transformer, the protective relay, the
circuit breaker, or the control wiring fail, then the Top Event, “Protection Fails to Clear Fault in the
Prescribed Time,” occurs.

Assume the following chances of failure of the individual devices: 0.01 for the breaker, 0.0001 for the CT,
0.001 for the relay, 0.01 for the battery, and 0.0001 for the control wiring. (These component reliability
estimates are for purposes of this example only. We will develop more substantiated estimates later).

The chance the system will fail to clear a fault is the sum: 0.0212 failures to clear per fault. We can
improve the system by finding better components, which lowers the individual failure rates, by designing
simpler systems, or by adding redundancy.

Let us improve the system by adding a redundant relay. The fault tree of figure 6 contains an AND gate.
This AND gate shows that both protective relays must fail for the event “Relays Fail to Trip” to occur. Our
failure rate for the relays taken together is 0.001·0.001 = 0.000001. The sum implied by the OR gate is
0.0202. The reliability improvement in this case is small, because failures other than those of the relay
dominate the system.

Figure 6: Fault Tree for Radial Line Protection With Redundant Relays, Schweitzer&Fleming, 2002.

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Device Failure Rates and Unavailability: A device failure rate gives us the number of failures we can
expect per unit time. During the useful lifetime of a device, we frequently assume a constant failure rate.
Failure rates can come from theoretical calculations, such as MIL-HDBK-217F [7] parts-count procedures,
or from field experience

For Example; suppose there is an in-service population of 10,000 devices, and we observe 10 failures of
devices in one year. An estimate of the failure rate from these field data is 10/10,000 = 0.001 failures per
year. The reciprocal gives an estimated MTBF of 1000 years. This does not imply that a device is likely to
last 1000 years. Instead it is a reliability figure valid during the useful lifetime of the device.

Our experience with relays shows that the MIL-HDBK-217F parts-count procedure gives very pessimistic
figures. For example, a parts-count analysis might predict an MTBF of 20 years, yet field failure rates
might convert to a field MTBF of 100 years or more. Also, the “217F” parts-count procedure does not
consider manufacturing or design quality.

The strict definition of MTBF is the sum of Mean Time To Fail (MTTF) and the Mean Time To Repair
(MTTR). MTTF is the reciprocal of failure rate. However, MTTR is usually small and, in this text, we
assume MTBF is approximately equal to MTTF.

Failure rates are very useful in predicting maintenance costs, but do not tell the whole story about whether
a device will be available when called upon to perform. Thus we need to consider unavailability, the
fraction of time a device cannot perform. It is without units.

Example 1: Roberts, et al. describe calculating unavailability from a failure rate and the time it takes to
detect and repair a failure

T
q =  = Equation 1
MTBF

where:

q = is unavailability
 = is some constant failure rate
T = is the average down-time per failure
T 1
= = is Mean Time Between Failures
MTBF 

Each failure causes downtime T. Therefore, the system is unavailable for time T out of total time MTBF.
The fraction of time the system is not available is therefore T/MTBF. As an example, consider a protective
relay with self-tests that detect all relay failures. If the relay has an MTBF of 100 years, then it has a failure
rate of 0.01 failures/year.

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First, assume self-tests detect problems within seconds, but it takes two days to repair the failure once it is
detected. If the alarm contact of the relay is monitored, then the relay can be back in service in two days,
and the unavailability is 0.01 failures/year · 2 days = 0.02 days/year.

On the other hand, if the alarm contact is NOT monitored, we must consider how we discover relay
failures. Suppose we test the relay every two years, and repair it the same day we test it. If a test detects
a failure, then on the average the relay was down for a year. The unavailability is 1 year · 0.01 failures per
year = 3.65 days/year.

This is 183 times worse -- so monitoring the alarm contact really pays off!; protection using relays with
self-tests, and with monitored alarm contacts, has better availability if periodic testing is not performed.
This is because one day of service lost to testing every two years is much greater than the expected loss
of service from automatically-detected failures which are promptly (2 days) repaired.

For the purpose of this text, we have estimated some failure rates, downtimes, and unavailability. We
have confidence in our relay failure rates, which we have tracked for years. However, we have less
confidence in other figures, and would appreciate field information that will refine our estimates of the
failure rates of other components.

Reliability Protective Relay Equipment: Based on our field experience, an MTBF of 100 years is
conservative for modern digital relays of quality design and construction. Our products demonstrate a self-
test effectiveness of 80 percent or better.

When loss-of-voltage and loss-of-current monitoring is enabled and monitored in the relay, the coverage
of the relays and their instrument transformers increases to 98 percent effectiveness. These figures and
some other assumptions lead to an unavailability of 100·10 -6. See Reference 4 for a detailed analysis.

Relays can fail to perform because they are applied improperly. Human factors are very
difficult to represent in statistical models; however, based on field experience, we believe
that human factors are of the same order of magnitude as relay failures themselves.
Therefore we will assume the unavailability contribution caused by human error in installing
and setting a relay is also 100·10-6.

Claiming relay unavailability caused by to hardware failures is equal to the unavailability

caused by human failures does not mean that hardware failures and human failures are
equally likely. The time to detect and repair human errors is indefinite while hardware failures
are quickly detected and repaired.

Assume human failures take 1 year to detect and repair and are 100 times less likely than
relay hardware failures. In this case, unavailability caused by human failures would be:

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 relay 1 1
q= x1year = x . 10-6 (Equation 2)
100 100year 100

Table 2 show summarizes the unavailability of commonly-used equipment in power system protection in
descending order of unavailability.

Table 2: Unavailability of Several Protection Components; Schweitzer&Fleming, 2002.

Fault Tree Analysis: After entering basic event data, analysis of the fault tree shown in figure 5 is very
straightforward with a single simplifying assumption known as the rare event approximation. It ignores the
possibility that two or more rare events can occur simultaneously. For two events, each of which occurs
with probability less than 0.1, the rare event approximation produces less than 5 percent error.

Figure 7: Fault Tree for Tone/Microwave Based POTT Scheme With Redundant
Relays Power System Protection; Schweitzer&Fleming, 2002.

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Dependability: Dependability is the ability to detect and respond to a fault in a correct and timely manner.
Dependable operation requires that the fault be detected (sensitivity), that detected faults in the protection
zone be differentiated from those outside the protection zone (selectivity), and that the detection and
discrimination effort be fast enough to be of value (speed).

A completely dependable relay will always trip properly for a detected fault. This degree of dependability
is obtained at the expense of an increased probability of operations when not required.

Sensitivity: is critical to being able to detect high-impedance faults. There are three components to a
measurement, accuracy, precision, and resolution. These components are independent qualities of a
measurement.

Selectivity: Selectivity is important for relays to be able to discriminate between load and faults and to
distinguish one fault location and/or type from another. Sensitivity, or lack thereof, limits selectivity.
Consider the two fault locations on either side of breaker 2, represented by F1 and F2 in the system
shown in figure 8.

The relay to the right of breaker 1 will not be able to discriminate between the two faults by direct
measurements of current and/or voltage alone.

Figure 8: Sensitivity Limits Selectivity for Faults F1 and F2; Schweitzer&Fleming, 2002.

Protective relaying plays a vital role in detecting a fault or disturbance in power systems and in isolating
local parts of the network in a timely fashion.

Proper operation of the protective relays avoids damage to the utility equipment, reduces electricity
interruptions to wider areas and more customers, and also minimizes hazards to utility personnel.
Because of the importance of protective relaying, the theories of protecting a power system are usually
introduced to electrical engineering students within or power system protection course.

Future engineers must have knowledge that goes beyond more theory as Power System Protection is a
compulsory subject for electrical engineering. This aims to provide students with the knowledge and
exposure of electrical power protection equipment.

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A power system protection lab is very important in providing a better understanding for the subject of
power system protection.

Laboratory experiments play a vital role in improving the learning experience of students and are very
useful for educational purposes, so improvements in this area of education are important; when working in
the power system protection laboratories, students can apply theory taught in lectures on designing the
proper settings for physical relays and observe their operation.

Usually the Power System Protection Laboratories is equipped with the protective relays for protection of
generators, advanced numerical based relays for protection of transmission lines, fuses, magneto thermal
switches, and differential magneto thermal switches to protect distribution systems.

Engineers apply these fundamentals of protection theory to detect faults in generators, transmission lines,
and distribution systems, the labs gives operator the opportunity to become familiar with the capabilities of
these intelligent electronic devices through experiments in relay programming and logic, event reporting
and analysis, fault detection and clearing, relay-operated circuit breakers, and communication-based
protection schemes, all in the context of modern microprocessor relays.

Introduction to the protective relays: one of the most important equipments employed in the protection
of power systems are protective relays. These are one of the most flexible, economic and well-known
devices that provide reliable, fast and inexpensive protection.

The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) defines a relay as an electric device that is
designed to respond to input conditions in a prescribed manner and, after specified conditions are met, to
cause contact operation or similar abrupt change in associated electric control circuits. A note adds:
Inputs are usually electric, but may be mechanical, thermal or other quantities or a combination of
quantities.

The IEEE defines a protective relay as a relay whose function is to detect defective lines or apparatus or
other power system conditions of an abnormal or dangerous nature and to initiate appropriate control
circuit action.

Protective relays and their associated equipment are compact units of analog, discrete solid-state
components, operational amplifiers, and digital microprocessor networks connected to the power system
to sense problems. These are usually abbreviated simply as relays and relay systems. They are used in
all parts of the power system, for the detection of intolerable conditions, most often faults.

Protection is the science, skill, and art of applying and setting relays or fuses, or both, to provide
maximum sensitivity to faults and undesirable conditions, but to avoid their operation under all permissible
or tolerable conditions.

Protection System in Power System: In the Figure 1 the basic connection of protection relay has been
shown. It is quite simple. The secondary of current transformer is connected to the current coil of relay
and secondary of voltage transformer is connected to the voltage coil of the relay. Whenever any fault
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occurs in the feeder circuit, proportionate secondary current of the CT will flow through the current coil of
the relay due to which mmf of that coil is increased.

This increase sufficient to mechanically close the normally open contact of the relay. This relay contact
actually closes and completes the DC trip coil circuit and hence the trip coil is energized.

The mmf of the trip coil initiates the mechanical movement of the tripping mechanism of the circuit breaker
and ultimately the circuit breaker is tripped to isolate the fault.

Conclusion:

Learning Activities and Learner Interactions

Activity 1.1 (ST. 3, 5, 6  8)

Objective:

Upon completion of this module, you will be able to differentiate the concepts of work and unit work,
understanding the fact that he being true and that he being false to using traditional procedures

Students Instructions:

1. Read every argument cautiously.

2. Understands every argument and compares with the awarenesses got in the module.
3. Naturalize if the argument is true or false and chose the reply according to its standard.
4. For this activity you will only get one attempt.
5. The deadline for the activity is indicated on Tools-Calendar in the blackboard platform.

a) These tests and checks aren´t basic (but not exhaustive) to the majority of installations, while
numerous other tests and rules are included in the regulations to cover particular cases.
1. True
2. False

b) Start each wire upstairs and push it between to the up. This way, you do not use a ladder to push the
wire up between floors.
1. True
2. False

c) The African bushmen and orient middle aborigines are examples of societies whose existence
depends on an economy of hunting and food gathering in its simple form.
1. True
2. False
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 d) Caves were accepted as dwellings, perhaps because they were ready made and required little or no
construction..
1. True
2. False

e) Refer to society evolution without a decent place to live, people can be productive members of
society, children can learn, and families can prosper.
1. True
2. False

f) The housing similarities among civilizations separated by vast distances may have been a result of a
shared heritage, common influences, or chance.
1. True
2. False

Activity 1.2 (ST. 5, 6  8)

Objective:
Upon completion of this module, you will be able to indicate introduction thermal engineering system.

Students Instructions:
1. Read every argument cautiously.
2. Understands every argument and compares with the awarenesses got in the module.
3. Choosing the stock option from the list the coherence in every argument.
4. For this activity you will only get ___attempts, _____ point each item.
5. The deadline for the activity is indicated on Tools-Calendar in the blackboard platform.

1. The circuit starts at the ______________ ______, loops in and out of ________ ________ and,
finally, returns to the consumer unit to terminate in the same terminals as ______ __________.

a. base fuse / socket / start box

b. transformer base / current box / step closure
c. consumer unit / each socket / it started
d. consumer unit / each plug / shut-off valve

2. If your _____________ are protected by ________________, removing the appropriate fuse

____________________ the circuit from incoming service.

a. Circuits / fuses / disconnects

b. Fuses / switch / start
c. socket / bulb / plug
d. on off / fuses / connections
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3. If you have any doubt ________________ fuse or breaker protects which circuit, shut off all current
coming into your home at the main ___________________ while you're at your service panel, spend
another moment to prevent ___________________________.

a. below / disconnect / tranquility

b. about which / disconnect / possible a disaster.
c. referring to this / connect / total disaster
d. between two objects / connected / possible approach

4. You locate the circuit ___________________ that contrlols the power coming into the house, see if
there is any room left for the circuit ________________ you need.

a. switch box / breakers

b. fuse / fuse box
c. bulb base / bulb
d. switch / fuse box

5. Never work on _______________, _______________, ______________, or appliances when you're

wet or standing on a damp spot..

a. laptop / internet / antenna

b. kitchen / bedrooms / bathrooms
c. laundry box / garage / attic
d. wiring / accessories / switches
References (ST. 4  8)
Required Resources:

Electric Wiring: Domestic Thirteenth edition Brian Scaddan IEng, MIET; Design and Verification of
Electrical Installations, 17th Edition IEE Wiring Regulations; British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Scaddan, Brian (2008)

Additional Resources:

Step-By-Step Guide Book Co. Step by Step Guide Book on Home Wirinig; P.O. Box 70865; Salt Lake
City, Utah 84170; Ray McReynolds (1994)

IEC voltage standards and recommendations, Electrical Installation Guide, (Schneider, 2016)
Electric Wiring-Domestic, Scaddan (2008).

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