Susan Rose-Ackerman
Yale University, Law, Faculty Member
Research Interests:
All representative democracies must balance democratic accountability against the competent implementation of complex statutes. Achieving this balance in administrative law will be aided by drawing on insights from economics and political... more
All representative democracies must balance democratic accountability against the competent implementation of complex statutes. Achieving this balance in administrative law will be aided by drawing on insights from economics and political economy. This important volume collects the best work in this area and is of significance for scholars of public law and economics around the world. The editor’s authoritative selection of papers, anchored in the American system of administrative law, mixes theoretical, legal, and empirical studies by leading interdisciplinary scholars. It thus provides an up-to-date introduction to modern work in the economics of administrative law.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests: Organizational Behavior, Economics, Institutional Economics, Political Science, Economic Theory, and 15 moreLanguage Change, National Economy, Corruption, Bureaucracy, Organizations, Organizational Sociology, Empirical Research, Korruption, Basic Research, Grundlagenforschung, Bürokratie, Economic Behavior, Research Approach, Organisationen, and Research Topic
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
An intense debate has raged for years over Africa’s economic difficulties. Aside from the obvious problems of warfare, drought and disease, the usual suspect is economic policy. However, the record of over a decade of structural... more
An intense debate has raged for years over Africa’s economic difficulties. Aside from the obvious problems of warfare, drought and disease, the usual suspect is economic policy. However, the record of over a decade of structural adjustment efforts is difficult to read. An analysis by the World Bank provides significant evidence that improved policies lead to improved prospects for growth, and that the continuing economic problems in Africa are the result of a failure to carry liberalization far enough (World Bank, 1993). According to that analysis, no African government was rated as having ‘good’ economic policies and only one, Ghana, was deemed ‘adequate’, with an annual growth rate of 1.3 per cent per capita (1987–91). Opponents of World Bank/IMF policy have criticized the Bank’s analysis on numerous grounds, but even World Bank economists mutter that rates of private investment and economic growth are higher in Viet Nam and China (whose economic policies still bear a strong socialist imprint) than almost anywhere in Africa. Something more than standard macroeconomic policy failures must therefore be at work.
Research Interests:
Government contracts, concessions, and the privatization of public assets are often more lucrative than similar private-sector deals. Corruption can allocate these scarce and valuable benefits. Kickbacks at the highest levels of... more
Government contracts, concessions, and the privatization of public assets are often more lucrative than similar private-sector deals. Corruption can allocate these scarce and valuable benefits. Kickbacks at the highest levels of government may corrupt the bidding process in public tenders and privatization processes and hence can affect the cost and quality of major one-of-a-kind infrastructure projects and the benefits that flow from concession contracts and the sale of key state assets. Such “grand corruption” transfers monopoly rents to private investors, in exchange for payoffs to elite, corrupted officials who receive a share of the profits in the form of kickbacks (Moody-Stuart 1997). It can have a major impact on government budgets, on a country's growth prospects, and on the distribution of the gains from government programs and investments. This type of corruption is apparently quite common. In a 2012 survey of three thousand business executives in 30 countries, 27% believed that they had lost a government contract in the previous year because their “competition” had paid a bribe to obtain the contract; the responses ranged from 2% in Japan to 50% in Malaysia. Other evidence of serious problems comes from particular countries. In Brazil, for example, 87% of firms indicated that bribes and nepotism are frequent in government procurement, more than in any other area studied (Weber Abramo 2004), and in a second survey of firms 62% of respondents that had bid for public works had faced requests for bribes (Kroll and Transparencia Brasil 2003: 8). The deals that interest us the most involve large, multinational corporations operating alone or jointly with local partners. This is an important class of cases. There is no definitive measure of the extent and impact of such corruption, but its importance is suggested both by ongoing exposes around the world and by the salience of the OECD Anti-Corruption Convention (see Chapter 14), which requires signatories to sanction overseas bribery. The OECD collects data on transnational firms that were sanctioned in their home countries for paying bribes abroad to get or retain business. According to their data, 57% of the foreign bribery cases resolved between 1999 and 2013 under the OECD Anti-Corruption Convention involved public procurement (OECD 2014: 32, figure 20). Overall, at least 60% of the cases involved firms with at least 250 employees (OECD 2014: 21).
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
... NCJ Number: NCJ 049674. Title: CORRUPTION - A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY. ... THE DISCUSSION OF THESE RELATIONSHIPS CONTRASTS OUTRIGHT BRIBERY WITH LEGAL CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND OTHER FORMS OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE. ...
Research Interests:
I. It is well known that the United States has more cars per capita than any other nation in the world, and that each inhabitant con-sumes more energy in a single day than a resident of any other coun-try.' How is environmental... more
I. It is well known that the United States has more cars per capita than any other nation in the world, and that each inhabitant con-sumes more energy in a single day than a resident of any other coun-try.' How is environmental policy shaped in a society such as this one? In ...
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Rose-Ackerman’s collaborations build on her single-authored works and her collaborations have been diverse and mostly one-shot. She has collaborated with senior and junior colleagues including her students, and people with unique... more
Rose-Ackerman’s collaborations build on her single-authored works and her collaborations have been diverse and mostly one-shot. She has collaborated with senior and junior colleagues including her students, and people with unique knowledge of particular countries. Comparative law and poltics are especially appropriate for collaborative efforts.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
... Nevertheless, parliamentary governments used to closed-door rule making, may be reluctant to put the ... In comparison to American practice, the access-to-justice provisions seem limited and constrained. ... This, in turn, may... more
... Nevertheless, parliamentary governments used to closed-door rule making, may be reluctant to put the ... In comparison to American practice, the access-to-justice provisions seem limited and constrained. ... This, in turn, may increase the stability of the rules that are promulgated ...
Research Interests:
In 2002, János Kornai and the author organized a project that sought to confront distrust, corruption, and dishonesty in the transition economies of Eastern Europe. In reflecting on that project, this essay highlights present-day... more
In 2002, János Kornai and the author organized a project that sought to confront distrust, corruption, and dishonesty in the transition economies of Eastern Europe. In reflecting on that project, this essay highlights present-day weaknesses in the region’s transition and stresses equally troubling developments in the United States that could make government less open to input from civil society groups and low-income individuals. Building a trustworthy state and creating social trust remain challenges for committed democrats in both developed and developing societies.
Research Interests:
Impact assessment (IA)in France highlights the tensions between traditional administrative law and modern trends. The expertise of the bureaucracy and its insulation from politics sought to further republican views of the public interest.... more
Impact assessment (IA)in France highlights the tensions between traditional administrative law and modern trends. The expertise of the bureaucracy and its insulation from politics sought to further republican views of the public interest. In principle, IA could be a modern route to that goal. However, faith in the civil service has eroded, and the state now also faces demands for more openness and public participation. These demands for rulemaking accountability support French traditions if one acknowledges that officials need input from outsiders to further the public welfare-not only technical experts, but also ordinary citizens, businesses, and civil society.
Research Interests:
The coronavirus pandemic has created incentives for corruption, fraud, and self-dealing that can be explained by the underlying political-economic incentives at work. Three characteristics of the COVID-19 crisis are especially important.... more
The coronavirus pandemic has created incentives for corruption, fraud, and self-dealing that can be explained by the underlying political-economic incentives at work. Three characteristics of the COVID-19 crisis are especially important. First, the rapidly unfolding pandemic and the accompanying economic recession have led to fierce competition for essential resources. Second, governments have rapidly mobilized public funds (for both healthcare and economic stabilization) at an unprecedented scale, creating opportunities for rent-seeking of many kinds, including outright corruption. Third, politicians, bureaucrats and medical professionals exercise substantial discretion in the allocation of resources. A lack of transparency and weak oversight and enforcement have exacerbated the problems of corruption and fraud, and public measures against these offenses have not kept pace with the developing crisis. The paper discusses how these features interact in procurement processes, in gover...
Research Interests:
La pandemia del coronavirus ha generado incentivos a la corrupción, al fraude y a la auto-contratación que pueden ser explicados mediante los incentivos político-económicos que se tratan en el trabajo. Tres características de la crisis de... more
La pandemia del coronavirus ha generado incentivos a la corrupción, al fraude y a la auto-contratación que pueden ser explicados mediante los incentivos político-económicos que se tratan en el trabajo. Tres características de la crisis de la COVID-19 son especialmente importantes. En primer lugar, el rápido desarrollo de la pandemia y la correlativa recesión económica han conducido a una feroz competencia por los recursos esenciales. En segundo lugar, los gobiernos han movilizado rápidamente fondos públicos (tanto para el sistema sanitario como para la estabilidad económica) en una escala sin precedentes, creando oportunidades de muchos tipos para la captación de dinero fácil, incluyendo las abiertamente corruptas. En tercer lugar, los funcionarios y los profesionales sanitarios ejercen una discrecionalidad sustancial en la asignación de recursos. La pérdida de transparencia y el debilitamiento de la supervisión y del cumplimento de las normas han exacerbado los problemas de corrupc...
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests: International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies, Violence, International Studies, International Development, and 13 moreInternational Security, Conflict, Political Science, Peacekeeping, Post-Conflict State Building, Liberal Peacebuilding, Language Change, Peacebuilding, Corruption, Anti corruption, Peace Conflict Studies, Post conflict reconstruction and development, and Routledge
Research Interests:
L’interet accru porte a la procedure de l’etude d’impact en France illustre les tensions entre les conceptions traditionnelles du droit administratif et les tendances contemporaines. L’expertise de la fonction publique et son isolement... more
L’interet accru porte a la procedure de l’etude d’impact en France illustre les tensions entre les conceptions traditionnelles du droit administratif et les tendances contemporaines. L’expertise de la fonction publique et son isolement par rapport aux questions politiques quotidiennes visaient traditionnellement a preserver la vision republicaine francaise de l’interet general face aux pressions partisanes et court‑termistes des acteurs politiques. Alors que la confiance dans la fonction publique fait l’objet d’une constante erosion, l’Etat se trouve face a une aspiration grandissante a plus d’ouverture et de participation publique d’une part, et a une demande accrue de justification plus systematique et objective de l’action publique d’autre part. Les developpements a venir ne sont pas clairement definis, mais tous les elements sont reunis pour consolider les recentes reformes qui confirment une montee en puissance de l’etude d’impact dans le processus d’elaboration des politiques publiques.
Research Interests:
Page 1. USED CARS AS A DEPRECIATING ASSET SUSAN ROSE ACKERMAN' University of Pennsylvania Previous econometric studies have shown that the prices of used cars decline with age at a constant exponential rate ...
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
This paper investigates how different electoral rules influence political corruption. We argue that closed-list proportional representation systems are most susceptible to corruption relative to open-list proportional representation and... more
This paper investigates how different electoral rules influence political corruption. We argue that closed-list proportional representation systems are most susceptible to corruption relative to open-list proportional representation and plurality systems. This effect is due to the use of closed party lists and geographically large districts. We also examine interaction effects between electoral rules and other institutional forms, namely presidentialism, federalism, and bi-cameralism. We test our main predictions, the proposed causal mechanism, and interaction effects empirically on a cross-section of 105 countries, controlling for economic, political, and social background factors. The empirical findings strongly support our theoretical hypothesis that closed-list PR systems, especially together with presidentialism, are associated with higher levels of corruption. This result is robust to different model specifications and deleting influential observations. To the best of our know...
Research Interests:
... Such plans need not be incompatible with a civil service system which attempts to isolate 1. This view is based on Max Weber's theory of bureaucracy. See Bendix; Gerth and Mills: 196-244; and Kronman. Page 3. REFORMING PUBLIC... more
... Such plans need not be incompatible with a civil service system which attempts to isolate 1. This view is based on Max Weber's theory of bureaucracy. See Bendix; Gerth and Mills: 196-244; and Kronman. Page 3. REFORMING PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY / 133 ...
Research Interests: Law and Applied Economics
The Politics of Precaution by David Vogel, and the edited volume, The Reality of Precaution each compare the United States with Europe over a range of regulatory areas. Vogel claims that the US and Europe changed places in recent years... more
The Politics of Precaution by David Vogel, and the edited volume, The Reality of Precaution each compare the United States with Europe over a range of regulatory areas. Vogel claims that the US and Europe changed places in recent years with Europe becoming more precautionary than the US. The edited volume covers a wider range of topics and finds that the results are mixed. The evidence of diversity in the edited volume appears convincing, but this essay argues that both volumes too narrowly focus on the precautionary principle. Rather it argues for a broader context that confronts precaution both with the proportionality principle, which is a mainstay of European Union law, and with the limitations of cost/benefit analysis and Impact Assessment. It unpacks the normative underpinnings of these concepts to suggest a broader frame for policy analysis.