Carey K Morewedge
Boston University, Marketing, Faculty Member
- Broadly, I study the cognitive and affective processes that are involved in judgment and decision making. My research... moreBroadly, I study the cognitive and affective processes that are involved in judgment and decision making. My research is primarily focused on the psychological processes that are involved in hedonic experiences. How people determine how pleasurable or desirable experiences were, are, or will be. And how these judgments impact their decision making and behavior. For example, one research project examined how psychological processes alone can reduce our desire to eat a food and actual consumption of that food (Morewedge, Huh, & Vosgerau, 2010).
My secondary line of research examines the attribution of intentions—how we decide which entities are capable of intentional behavior, and what thoughts and events were intended. People, for example, are more likely to attribute negative events than similarly positive and neutral events to the intentions of an external agent such as another person (Morewedge, 2009). I also examine the implications of intentional attributions (e.g., Morewedge, Gilblin, & Norton, 2014). One paper examined how the apparently unintended nature of dreams leads people to attribute greater meaning to dreams than to conscious thoughts that have similar content (Morewedge & Norton, 2009).edit
People spend a considerable amount of their time mentally simulating experiences other than the one in which they are presently engaged, as a means of distraction, coping, or preparation for the future. In this integrative review, we... more
People spend a considerable amount of their time mentally simulating experiences other than the one in which they are presently engaged, as a means of distraction, coping, or preparation for the future. In this integrative review, we examine four (non-exhaustive) cases in which mentally simulating an experience serves a different function, as a substitute for the corresponding experience. In each case, mentally simulating an experience evokes similar cognitive, physiological, and/or behavioral consequences as having the corresponding experience in reality: (i) imagined experiences are attributed evidentiary value like physical evidence, (ii) mental practice instantiates the same performance benefits as physical practice, (iii) imagined consumption of a food reduces its actual consumption, and (iv) imagined goal achievement reduces motivation for actual goal achievement. We organize these cases under a common superordinate category and discuss their different methodological approaches and explanatory accounts. Our integration yields theoretical and practical insights into when and why mentally simulating an experience serves as its substitute.
W e examined whether people reduce the impact of negative outcomes through emotional hedging—betting against the occurrence of desired outcomes. We found substantial reluctance to bet against the success of preferred U.S. presidential... more
W e examined whether people reduce the impact of negative outcomes through emotional hedging—betting against the occurrence of desired outcomes. We found substantial reluctance to bet against the success of preferred U.S. presidential candidates and Major League Baseball, National Football League, National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) basketball, and NCAA hockey teams. This reluctance was not attributable to optimism or a general aversion to hedging. Reluctance to hedge desired outcomes stemmed from identity signaling, a desire to preserve an important aspect of the bettor's identity. Reluctance to hedge occurred when the diagnostic cost of the negative self-signal that hedging would produce outweighed the pecuniary rewards associated with hedging. Participants readily accepted hedges and pure gambles with no diagnostic costs. They also more readily accepted hedges with diagnostic costs when the pecuniary rewards associated with those hedges were greater. Reluctance to hedge identity-relevant outcomes produced two anomalies in decision making , risk seeking and dominance violations. More than 45% of NCAA fans in Studies 5 and 6, for instance, turned down a " free " real $5 bet against their team. The results elucidate anomalous decisions in which people exhibit disloyalty aversion, forgoing personal rewards that would conflict with their loyalties and commitments to others, beliefs, and ideals.
From failures of intelligence analysis to misguided beliefs about vaccinations, biased judgment and decision making contributes to problems in policy, business, medicine, law, education, and private life. Early attempts to reduce decision... more
From failures of intelligence analysis to misguided beliefs about vaccinations, biased judgment and decision making contributes
to problems in policy, business, medicine, law, education, and private life. Early attempts to reduce decision biases with
training met with little success, leading scientists and policy makers to focus on debiasing by using incentives and changes
in the presentation and elicitation of decisions. We report the results of two longitudinal experiments that found medium
to large effects of one-shot debiasing training interventions. Participants received a single training intervention, played a
computer game or watched an instructional video, which addressed biases critical to intelligence analysis (in Experiment 1:
bias blind spot, confirmation bias, and fundamental attribution error; in Experiment 2: anchoring, representativeness, and
social projection). Both kinds of interventions produced medium to large debiasing effects immediately (games ≥ −31.94% and videos ≥ −18.60%) that persisted at least 2 months later (games ≥ −23.57% and videos ≥ −19.20%). Games that provided personalized feedback and practice produced larger effects than did videos. Debiasing effects were domain general: bias reduction occurred across problems in different contexts, and problem formats that were taught and not taught in the
interventions. The results suggest that a single training intervention can improve decision making. We suggest its use alongside improved incentives, information presentation, and nudges to reduce costly errors associated with biased judgments and decisions.
to problems in policy, business, medicine, law, education, and private life. Early attempts to reduce decision biases with
training met with little success, leading scientists and policy makers to focus on debiasing by using incentives and changes
in the presentation and elicitation of decisions. We report the results of two longitudinal experiments that found medium
to large effects of one-shot debiasing training interventions. Participants received a single training intervention, played a
computer game or watched an instructional video, which addressed biases critical to intelligence analysis (in Experiment 1:
bias blind spot, confirmation bias, and fundamental attribution error; in Experiment 2: anchoring, representativeness, and
social projection). Both kinds of interventions produced medium to large debiasing effects immediately (games ≥ −31.94% and videos ≥ −18.60%) that persisted at least 2 months later (games ≥ −23.57% and videos ≥ −19.20%). Games that provided personalized feedback and practice produced larger effects than did videos. Debiasing effects were domain general: bias reduction occurred across problems in different contexts, and problem formats that were taught and not taught in the
interventions. The results suggest that a single training intervention can improve decision making. We suggest its use alongside improved incentives, information presentation, and nudges to reduce costly errors associated with biased judgments and decisions.
Research Interests:
Research Interests: Psychology, Cognitive Science, Experimental games, Video Games, Attention, and 16 moreSocial Perception, Affect, Students, Humans, Judgment, Gambling, Female, Male, Reaction Time, Young Adult, ULTIMATUM GAME, Subjective Probability, Adult, Analysis of Variance, Psychological Theory, and Bias (Epidemiology)
Research Interests:
In the current study, a serious game was developed to address a training challenge: teaching players to recognize and mitigate their cognitive biases. Cognitive biases, which are human tendencies to commit systematic errors in thinking... more
In the current study, a serious game was developed to address a training challenge: teaching players to recognize and mitigate their cognitive biases. Cognitive biases, which are human tendencies to commit systematic errors in thinking that lead to irrational judgments, are deeply ingrained and difficult to alter. This paper describes the theory-based approach we employed to create a game for the mitigation of cognitive biases – a challenging and abstract training topic. A cognitive bias framework that relates the target cognitive biases, their causes, and effective bias mitigation techniques was developed and incorporated into the game design. The resultant serious game, titled Missing: The Final Secret (hereinafter: Missing), pairs the most promising mitigation strategies with the primary causes of the targeted cognitive biases and incorporates them into game-play. Further, we present preliminary results from a game efficacy evaluation suggesting that Missing is an effective tool for training cognitive bias recognition and mitigation.
Research Interests:
Research Interests: Obesity, Diet, Multidisciplinary, Emotions, Motivation, and 8 moreAppetite, Humans, Female, Male, Feeding Behavior, Adult, Food Preferences, and Energy Intake
Research Interests: Obesity, Diet, Multidisciplinary, Emotions, Motivation, and 8 moreAppetite, Humans, Female, Male, Feeding Behavior, Adult, Food Preferences, and Energy Intake
Research Interests: Marketing, Psychology, Cognitive Science, Personality, Theory of Mind, and 19 moreCulture, Motion perception, Time Perception, Adolescent, Intention, Humans, Judgment, Female, Animals, Male, Personal Construct Theory, Mental processes, Goals, Acceleration, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Middle Aged, Adult, Human Movement, and Motor activity
Research Interests:
The endowment effect is the tendency for people who own a good to value it more than people who do not. Its economic impact is consequential. It creates market inefficiencies and irregularities in valuation such as differences between... more
The endowment effect is the tendency for people who own a good to value it more than people who do not. Its economic impact is consequential. It creates market inefficiencies and irregularities in valuation such as differences between buyers and sellers, reluctance to trade, and mere ownership effects. Traditionally, the endowment effect has been attributed to loss aversion causing sellers of a good to value it more than buyers. New theories and findings - some inconsistent with loss aversion - suggest evolutionary, strategic, and more basic cognitive origins. In an integrative review, we propose that all three major instantiations of the endowment effect are attributable to exogenously and endogenously induced cognitive frames that bias which information is accessible during valuation.
Research Interests:
Dual-system models of reasoning attribute errors of judgment to two failures: the automatic operations of a ‘System 1’ generate a faulty intuition, which the controlled operations of a ‘System 2’ fail to detect and correct. We... more
Dual-system models of reasoning attribute errors of
judgment to two failures: the automatic operations of
a ‘System 1’ generate a faulty intuition, which the controlled
operations of a ‘System 2’ fail to detect and
correct. We identify System 1 with the automatic operations
of associative memory and draw on research in
the priming paradigm to describe how it operates. We
explain how three features of associative memory –
associative coherence, attribute substitution and processing
fluency – give rise to major biases of intuitive
judgment. Our article highlights both the ability of System
1 to create complex and skilled judgments and the
role of the system as a source of judgment errors.
judgment to two failures: the automatic operations of
a ‘System 1’ generate a faulty intuition, which the controlled
operations of a ‘System 2’ fail to detect and
correct. We identify System 1 with the automatic operations
of associative memory and draw on research in
the priming paradigm to describe how it operates. We
explain how three features of associative memory –
associative coherence, attribute substitution and processing
fluency – give rise to major biases of intuitive
judgment. Our article highlights both the ability of System
1 to create complex and skilled judgments and the
role of the system as a source of judgment errors.
Research Interests:
The consumption of a food typically leads to a decrease in its subsequent intake through habituation—a decrease in one’s responsiveness to the food and motivation to obtain it. We demonstrated that habituation to a food item can occur... more
The consumption of a food typically leads to a decrease in its subsequent intake through habituation—a decrease in one’s responsiveness to the food and motivation to obtain it.
We demonstrated that habituation to a food item can occur even when its consumption is merely imagined. Five experiments showed that people who repeatedly imagined eating a food (such as cheese) many times subsequently consumed less of the imagined food than did people
who repeatedly imagined eating that food fewer times, imagined eating a different food (such as candy), or did not imagine eating a food. They did so because they desired to eat it less, not because they considered it less palatable. These results suggest that mental representation alone can engender habituation to a stimulus.
We demonstrated that habituation to a food item can occur even when its consumption is merely imagined. Five experiments showed that people who repeatedly imagined eating a food (such as cheese) many times subsequently consumed less of the imagined food than did people
who repeatedly imagined eating that food fewer times, imagined eating a different food (such as candy), or did not imagine eating a food. They did so because they desired to eat it less, not because they considered it less palatable. These results suggest that mental representation alone can engender habituation to a stimulus.
Research Interests:
Salience and satisfaction are important factors in determining the comparisons that people make. We hypothesized that people make salient comparisons first, and then make satisfying comparisons only if salient comparisons leave them... more
Salience and satisfaction are important factors in determining the comparisons that people make. We hypothesized that
people make salient comparisons first, and then make satisfying comparisons only if salient comparisons leave them unsatisfied.
This hypothesis suggests an asymmetry between winning and losing. For winners, comparison with a salient alternative
(i.e., losing) brings satisfaction. Therefore, winners should be sensitive only to the relative value of their outcomes. For losers,
comparison with a salient alternative (i.e., winning) brings little satisfaction. Therefore, losers should be drawn to compare
outcomes with additional standards, which should make them sensitive to both relative and absolute values of their outcomes. In
Experiment 1, participants won one of two cash prizes on a scratch-off ticket. Winners were sensitive to the relative value of
their prizes, whereas losers were sensitive to both the relative and the absolute values of their prizes. In Experiment 2, losers
were sensitive to the absolute value of their prize only when they had sufficient cognitive resources to engage in effortful
comparison.
people make salient comparisons first, and then make satisfying comparisons only if salient comparisons leave them unsatisfied.
This hypothesis suggests an asymmetry between winning and losing. For winners, comparison with a salient alternative
(i.e., losing) brings satisfaction. Therefore, winners should be sensitive only to the relative value of their outcomes. For losers,
comparison with a salient alternative (i.e., winning) brings little satisfaction. Therefore, losers should be drawn to compare
outcomes with additional standards, which should make them sensitive to both relative and absolute values of their outcomes. In
Experiment 1, participants won one of two cash prizes on a scratch-off ticket. Winners were sensitive to the relative value of
their prizes, whereas losers were sensitive to both the relative and the absolute values of their prizes. In Experiment 2, losers
were sensitive to the absolute value of their prize only when they had sufficient cognitive resources to engage in effortful
comparison.
Research Interests:
People often resort to superstitious behavior to facilitate goal achievement. We examined whether the specific type of achievement goal pursued influences the propensity to engage in superstitious behavior. Across six studies, we found... more
People often resort to superstitious behavior to facilitate goal achievement. We examined whether the specific type of
achievement goal pursued influences the propensity to engage in superstitious behavior. Across six studies, we found that
performance goals were more likely than learning goals to elicit superstitious behavior. Participants were more likely to
engage in superstitious behavior at high than at low levels of chronic performance orientation, but superstitious behavior
was not influenced by chronic learning orientation (Studies 1 and 2). Similarly, participants exhibited stronger preferences
for lucky items when primed to pursue performance goals rather than learning goals (Studies 3 and 4). As uncertainty of goal
achievement increased, superstitious behavior increased when participants pursued performance goals but not learning goals
(Study 5). Finally, assignment to use a lucky (vs. unlucky) item resulted in greater confidence of achieving performance goals
but not learning goals (Study 6).
achievement goal pursued influences the propensity to engage in superstitious behavior. Across six studies, we found that
performance goals were more likely than learning goals to elicit superstitious behavior. Participants were more likely to
engage in superstitious behavior at high than at low levels of chronic performance orientation, but superstitious behavior
was not influenced by chronic learning orientation (Studies 1 and 2). Similarly, participants exhibited stronger preferences
for lucky items when primed to pursue performance goals rather than learning goals (Studies 3 and 4). As uncertainty of goal
achievement increased, superstitious behavior increased when participants pursued performance goals but not learning goals
(Study 5). Finally, assignment to use a lucky (vs. unlucky) item resulted in greater confidence of achieving performance goals
but not learning goals (Study 6).
Research Interests:
Early investigations of guilt cast it as an emotion that prompts broad reparative behaviors that help guilty individuals feel better about themselves or about their transgressions. The current investigation found support for a more recent... more
Early investigations of guilt cast it as an emotion that prompts broad reparative behaviors that help guilty individuals feel better
about themselves or about their transgressions. The current investigation found support for a more recent representation of
guilt as an emotion designed to identify and correct specific social offenses. Across five experiments, guilt influenced behavior
in a targeted and strategic way. Guilt prompted participants to share resources more generously with others, but only did so
when those others were persons whom the participant had wronged and only when those wronged individuals could notice
the gesture. Rather than trigger broad reparative behaviors that remediate one’s general reputation or self-perception, guilt
triggers targeted behaviors intended to remediate specific social transgressions.
about themselves or about their transgressions. The current investigation found support for a more recent representation of
guilt as an emotion designed to identify and correct specific social offenses. Across five experiments, guilt influenced behavior
in a targeted and strategic way. Guilt prompted participants to share resources more generously with others, but only did so
when those others were persons whom the participant had wronged and only when those wronged individuals could notice
the gesture. Rather than trigger broad reparative behaviors that remediate one’s general reputation or self-perception, guilt
triggers targeted behaviors intended to remediate specific social transgressions.
Research Interests:
When people predict the future behavior of a person, thinking of that target as an individual decreases the accuracy of their predictions. The present research examined one potential source of this bias, whether and why predictors... more
When people predict the future behavior of a person, thinking of that target as an individual decreases the accuracy of their
predictions. The present research examined one potential source of this bias, whether and why predictors overweight the atypical
past behavior of individuals. The results suggest that predictors do indeed overweight the atypical past behavior of an individual.
Atypical past behavior is more cognitively accessible than typical past behavior, which leads it to be overweighted in the
impressions that serve as the basis for their predictions. Predictions for group members appear less susceptible to this bias, presumably because predictors are less likely to form a coherent impression of a group than an individual before making their predictions.
predictions. The present research examined one potential source of this bias, whether and why predictors overweight the atypical
past behavior of individuals. The results suggest that predictors do indeed overweight the atypical past behavior of an individual.
Atypical past behavior is more cognitively accessible than typical past behavior, which leads it to be overweighted in the
impressions that serve as the basis for their predictions. Predictions for group members appear less susceptible to this bias, presumably because predictors are less likely to form a coherent impression of a group than an individual before making their predictions.
Research Interests:
Violations of religious doctrine may not only be perceived to violate the laws of one’s religion, but also to be morally wrong. Just as actions considered acceptable outside of social contexts are often considered unacceptable when they... more
Violations of religious doctrine may not only be perceived to violate the laws of one’s religion, but also to be morally wrong. Just as actions considered acceptable outside of social contexts are often considered unacceptable when they affect other people, believers perceiving God in anthropomorphic terms were more likely to judge violations of their religious doctrine to be morally unacceptable than believers not perceiving God in anthropomorphic terms. Devout Christians reported the extent to
which they endorsed the Christian theological God concept and an anthropomorphic God concept before rating the extent to which they considered actions prohibited by the Ten Commandments to be theologically and morally wrong. Endorsement of both God concepts influenced the extent to which those acts were perceived to violate the tenets of participants’ religion. Only endorsement of the anthropomorphic God concept, however, determined the extent to which those actions were considered morally wrong.
which they endorsed the Christian theological God concept and an anthropomorphic God concept before rating the extent to which they considered actions prohibited by the Ten Commandments to be theologically and morally wrong. Endorsement of both God concepts influenced the extent to which those acts were perceived to violate the tenets of participants’ religion. Only endorsement of the anthropomorphic God concept, however, determined the extent to which those actions were considered morally wrong.
Research Interests:
Consumption depletes one’s available resources, but consumers may be unaware of the total resources available for consumption and, therefore, be influenced by the temporary accessibility of resource accounts. Consistent with this... more
Consumption depletes one’s available resources, but consumers may be unaware of the total resources available for consumption and, therefore, be influenced by the temporary accessibility of resource accounts. Consistent with this possibility, consumers
in four experiments perceived a unit of consumption to be smaller and consequently consumed more, when large resource accounts of money, calories, or time (e.g., the money in their savings account) were made temporarily accessible compared
with when small resource accounts were made temporarily accessible (e.g., the money in their wallet). Manipulating the cognitive accessibility of resources available for consumption influences both subjective judgment and behavior.
in four experiments perceived a unit of consumption to be smaller and consequently consumed more, when large resource accounts of money, calories, or time (e.g., the money in their savings account) were made temporarily accessible compared
with when small resource accounts were made temporarily accessible (e.g., the money in their wallet). Manipulating the cognitive accessibility of resources available for consumption influences both subjective judgment and behavior.
Research Interests:
Nostalgic preferences are widespread—people believe past movies, music, television shows, places, and periods of life to have been better than their present counterparts. Three experiments explored the cognitive underpinnings of nostalgic... more
Nostalgic preferences are widespread—people believe past movies, music, television shows, places, and periods of life to have been better than their present counterparts. Three experiments explored the cognitive underpinnings of nostalgic preferences. Participants rated past experiences to have been superior to similar present and recent experiences. These nostalgic preferences appeared to be due to the belief that the atypically
positive experiences that participants recalled at the time of judgment were more representative of their past experiences than of their present experiences.
positive experiences that participants recalled at the time of judgment were more representative of their past experiences than of their present experiences.
Research Interests:
This research examined the effect of alcohol intoxication on the propensity to behave inequitably and responses to inequitable divisions of rewards. Intoxicated and sober participants played ten rounds of a modified ultimatum game in two... more
This research examined the effect of alcohol intoxication on the propensity to behave inequitably and responses to inequitable divisions of rewards. Intoxicated and sober participants played ten rounds of a modified ultimatum game in two studies.Whereas intoxicated and sober participants were similarly generous in the proposals they made to their partners, intoxicated participants more often rejected unfair offers than did sober participants. These results were consistent whether alcohol intoxication was self-determined (Study 1) or randomly assigned (Study 2). The results provide insight into the cognitive processes underlying standards of equity and responses to inequity, and elucidate how intoxication influences these processes and subsequent behavioral responses.
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People exhibit a bias blind spot: they are less likely to detect bias in themselves than in others. We report the development and validation of an instrument to measure individual differences in the propensity to exhibit the bias blind... more
People exhibit a bias blind spot: they are less likely to detect bias in themselves than in others. We report the development and validation of an instrument to measure individual differences in the propensity to exhibit the bias blind spot that is unidimensional, internally consistent, has high test-retest reliability, and is discriminated from measures of intelligence, decision-making ability, and personality traits related to self-esteem, self-enhancement, and self-presentation. The scale is predictive of the extent to which people judge their abilities
to be better than average for easy tasks and worse than average for difficult tasks, ignore the advice of others, and are responsive to an intervention designed to mitigate a different judgmental bias. These results suggest that the bias blind spot is a distinct metabias resulting from naïve realism rather than other forms of egocentric cognition, and has unique effects on judgment and behavior.
to be better than average for easy tasks and worse than average for difficult tasks, ignore the advice of others, and are responsive to an intervention designed to mitigate a different judgmental bias. These results suggest that the bias blind spot is a distinct metabias resulting from naïve realism rather than other forms of egocentric cognition, and has unique effects on judgment and behavior.
Research Interests:
The results of three experiments reveal that memory for end enjoyment, rather than beginning enjoyment, of a pleasant gustatory experience determines how soon people desire to repeat that experience. We found that memory for end... more
The results of three experiments reveal that memory for end enjoyment, rather than beginning enjoyment, of a pleasant
gustatory experience determines how soon people desire to repeat that experience. We found that memory for end
moments, when people are most satiated, interferes with memory for initial moments. Consequently, end moments are
more influential than initial moments when people decide how long to wait until consuming a food again. The findings
elucidate the role of memory in delay until repeated consumption, demonstrate how sensory-specific satiety and
portion sizes influence future consumption, and suggest one process by which recency effects influence judgments
and decisions based on past experiences.
gustatory experience determines how soon people desire to repeat that experience. We found that memory for end
moments, when people are most satiated, interferes with memory for initial moments. Consequently, end moments are
more influential than initial moments when people decide how long to wait until consuming a food again. The findings
elucidate the role of memory in delay until repeated consumption, demonstrate how sensory-specific satiety and
portion sizes influence future consumption, and suggest one process by which recency effects influence judgments
and decisions based on past experiences.
Research Interests:
Children generally behave more egocentrically than adults when assessing anothers perspective. We argue that this difference does not, however, indicate that adults process information less egocentrically than children, but rather that... more
Children generally behave more egocentrically than adults when assessing anothers perspective. We argue that this difference
does not, however, indicate that adults process information less egocentrically than children, but rather that adults are better able to subsequently correct an initial egocentric interpretation. An experiment tracking participants eye movements during a referential communication task indicated that children and adults were equally quick to interpret a spoken instruction egocentrically but differed in the speed with which they corrected that interpretation and looked at the intended (i.e., non-egocentric) object. The existing differences in egocentrism between children and adults therefore seems less a product of where people start in their perspective
taking process than where they stop, with lingering egocentric biases among adults produced by insufficient correction of an
automatic moment of egocentrism. We suggest that this pattern of similarity in automatic, but not controlled, processes may explain between-group differences in a variety of dual-process judgments.
does not, however, indicate that adults process information less egocentrically than children, but rather that adults are better able to subsequently correct an initial egocentric interpretation. An experiment tracking participants eye movements during a referential communication task indicated that children and adults were equally quick to interpret a spoken instruction egocentrically but differed in the speed with which they corrected that interpretation and looked at the intended (i.e., non-egocentric) object. The existing differences in egocentrism between children and adults therefore seems less a product of where people start in their perspective
taking process than where they stop, with lingering egocentric biases among adults produced by insufficient correction of an
automatic moment of egocentrism. We suggest that this pattern of similarity in automatic, but not controlled, processes may explain between-group differences in a variety of dual-process judgments.
Research Interests:
People typically demand more to relinquish the goods they own than they would be willing to pay to acquire those goods if they did not already own them (the endowment effect). The standard economic explanation of this phenomenon is that... more
People typically demand more to relinquish the goods they own than they would be willing to pay to acquire those goods if they did not already own them (the endowment effect). The standard economic explanation of this phenomenon is that people expect the pain of relinquishing a good to be greater than the pleasure of acquiring it (the loss aversion account). The standard psychological explanation is that people are reluctant to relinquish the goods they own simply because they associate those goods with themselves and not because they expect relinquishing them to be especially painful (the ownership account). Because sellers are usually owners, loss aversion and ownership have been confounded in previous studies of the endowment effect. In two experiments that deconfounded them, ownership produced an endowment
effect but loss aversion did not. In Experiment 1, buyers were willing to pay just as much for a coffee mug as sellers demanded if the buyers already happened to own an identical mug. In Experiment 2, buyers’ brokers and sellers’ brokers agreed on the price of a mug, but both brokers traded at higher prices when they happened to own mugs that were identical to the ones they were trading. In short, the endowment effect disappeared when buyers were owners and when sellers were not, suggesting that ownership and
not loss aversion causes the endowment effect in the standard experimental paradigm.
effect but loss aversion did not. In Experiment 1, buyers were willing to pay just as much for a coffee mug as sellers demanded if the buyers already happened to own an identical mug. In Experiment 2, buyers’ brokers and sellers’ brokers agreed on the price of a mug, but both brokers traded at higher prices when they happened to own mugs that were identical to the ones they were trading. In short, the endowment effect disappeared when buyers were owners and when sellers were not, suggesting that ownership and
not loss aversion causes the endowment effect in the standard experimental paradigm.
Research Interests:
Defaults effects can be created by social contexts. The observed choices of others can become social defaults, increasing their choice share. Social default effects are a novel form of social influence not due to normative or... more
Defaults effects can be created by social contexts. The observed choices of others can become social defaults, increasing their choice share. Social default effects
are a novel form of social influence not due to normative or informational influence: participants were more likely to mimic observed choices when choosing in private than in public (experiment 1) and when stakes were low rather than high (experiment 2). Like other default effects, social default effects were greater for uncertain rather than certain choices (experiment 3) and were weaker when choices required
justification (experiment 4). Social default effects appear to occur automatically as they become stronger when cognitive resources are constrained by time pressure or load, and they can be sufficiently strong to induce preference reversals (experiments 5 and 6).
are a novel form of social influence not due to normative or informational influence: participants were more likely to mimic observed choices when choosing in private than in public (experiment 1) and when stakes were low rather than high (experiment 2). Like other default effects, social default effects were greater for uncertain rather than certain choices (experiment 3) and were weaker when choices required
justification (experiment 4). Social default effects appear to occur automatically as they become stronger when cognitive resources are constrained by time pressure or load, and they can be sufficiently strong to induce preference reversals (experiments 5 and 6).
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Intense hedonic states trigger psychological processes that are designed to attenuate them, and thus intense states may abate more quickly than mild states. Because people are unaware of these psychological processes, they may... more
Intense hedonic states trigger psychological processes
that are designed to attenuate them, and thus intense
states may abate more quickly than mild states. Because people are unaware of these psychological processes, they may mistakenly expect intense states to last longer than mild ones. In Study 1, participants predicted that the more they initially disliked a transgressor, the longer their dislike would last. In Study 2, participants predicted that their dislike for a transgressor who hurt them a lot would last longer than their dislike for a transgressor who hurt them a little, but precisely the opposite was the case. In Study 3, participants predicted that their dislike for a transgressor who hurt them a lot would last longer than their dislike for a transgressor who hurt someone else a lot, but precisely the opposite was the case. These errors of prediction are discussed as instances of a more general phenomenon known as the region-beta paradox.
that are designed to attenuate them, and thus intense
states may abate more quickly than mild states. Because people are unaware of these psychological processes, they may mistakenly expect intense states to last longer than mild ones. In Study 1, participants predicted that the more they initially disliked a transgressor, the longer their dislike would last. In Study 2, participants predicted that their dislike for a transgressor who hurt them a lot would last longer than their dislike for a transgressor who hurt them a little, but precisely the opposite was the case. In Study 3, participants predicted that their dislike for a transgressor who hurt them a lot would last longer than their dislike for a transgressor who hurt someone else a lot, but precisely the opposite was the case. These errors of prediction are discussed as instances of a more general phenomenon known as the region-beta paradox.
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The hedonic benefit of a gain (e.g., receiving $100) may be increased by segregating it into smaller units that are distributed over time (e.g., receiving $50 on each of 2 days). However, if these units are too small (e.g., receiving 1... more
The hedonic benefit of a gain (e.g., receiving $100) may be increased by segregating it into smaller units that are distributed over time (e.g., receiving $50 on each of 2 days). However, if these units are too small (e.g., receiving 1 cent on each of 10,000 days), they may fall beneath the person's hedonic limen and have no hedonic benefit at all. Do people know where their limens lie? In 6 experiments, participants predicted that the hedonic benefit of a large gain would be increased by segregating it into smaller units, and they were right; but participants also predicted that the hedonic benefit of a small gain would be increased by segregating it into smaller units, and they were wrong. Segregation of small gains decreased rather than increased hedonic benefit. These experiments suggest that people may underestimate the value of the hedonic limen and thus may oversegregate small gains.
Research Interests:
Research Interests: Psychology, Cognitive Science, Emotion, Prejudice, Forecasting, and 7 moreHappiness, Motivation, Affect, Humans, Female, Male, and Adult
When people are asked to assess or compare the value of experienced or hypothetical events, one of the most intriguing observations is their apparent insensitivity to event duration. The authors propose that duration insensitivity occurs... more
When people are asked to assess or compare the value of experienced or hypothetical events, one of the most intriguing observations is their apparent insensitivity to event duration. The authors propose that duration insensitivity occurs when stimuli are evaluated in isolation because they typically lack comparison information. People should be able to evaluate the duration of stimuli in isolation, however, when stimuli are familiar and evoke comparison information. The results of 3 experiments support the hypothesis. Participants were insensitive to the duration of hypothetical (Experiment 1) and real (Experiment 2) unfamiliar experiences but sensitive to the duration of familiar experiences. In Experiment 3, participants were insensitive to the duration of an unfamiliar noise when it was unlabeled but sensitive to its duration when it was given a familiar label (i.e., a telephone ring). Rather than being a unique phenomenon, duration neglect (and perhaps other forms of scope insen...
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Spontaneous thoughts, the output of a broad category of uncontrolled and inaccessible higher order mental processes, arise frequently in everyday life. The seeming randomness by which spontaneous thoughts arise might give people good... more
Spontaneous thoughts, the output of a broad category of uncontrolled and inaccessible higher order mental processes, arise frequently in everyday life. The seeming randomness by which spontaneous thoughts arise might give people good reason to dismiss them as meaningless. We suggest that it is
precisely the lack of control over and access to the processes by which they arise that leads people to perceive spontaneous thoughts as revealing meaningful self-insight. Consequently, spontaneous thoughts potently influence judgment. A series of experiments provides evidence supporting two hypotheses. First, we hypothesize that the more a thought is perceived to be spontaneous, the more it is perceived to provide
meaningful self-insight. Participants perceived more spontaneous kinds of thought (e.g., intuition) to reveal greater self-insight than did more controlled kinds of thought in Study 1 (e.g., deliberation). In Studies 2 and 3, participants perceived thoughts with the same content and target to reveal greater
self-insight when spontaneously rather than deliberately generated (i.e., childhood memories and impressions
formed). Second, we hypothesize that the greater self-insight attributed to thoughts that are (perceived to be) spontaneous leads those thoughts to more potently influence judgment. Participants felt more sexually attracted to an attractive person whom they thought of spontaneously than deliberately in
Study 4, and reported their commitment to a current romantic relationship would be more affected by the spontaneous rather than deliberate recollection of a good or bad experience with their romantic partner in Study 5.
precisely the lack of control over and access to the processes by which they arise that leads people to perceive spontaneous thoughts as revealing meaningful self-insight. Consequently, spontaneous thoughts potently influence judgment. A series of experiments provides evidence supporting two hypotheses. First, we hypothesize that the more a thought is perceived to be spontaneous, the more it is perceived to provide
meaningful self-insight. Participants perceived more spontaneous kinds of thought (e.g., intuition) to reveal greater self-insight than did more controlled kinds of thought in Study 1 (e.g., deliberation). In Studies 2 and 3, participants perceived thoughts with the same content and target to reveal greater
self-insight when spontaneously rather than deliberately generated (i.e., childhood memories and impressions
formed). Second, we hypothesize that the greater self-insight attributed to thoughts that are (perceived to be) spontaneous leads those thoughts to more potently influence judgment. Participants felt more sexually attracted to an attractive person whom they thought of spontaneously than deliberately in
Study 4, and reported their commitment to a current romantic relationship would be more affected by the spontaneous rather than deliberate recollection of a good or bad experience with their romantic partner in Study 5.
Research Interests:
Research Interests: Marketing, Psychology, Cognitive Science, Cognition, Behavior, and 17 moreSocial Cognition, Culture, Dreams, Motivation, Information, Cross-Cultural Comparison, Humans, Anchoring, Reasoning, Female, Male, Attribution, Attitude, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Adult, Asian Continental Ancestry Group, and Unconscious Thought Theory
Research Interests: Marketing, Robotics, Psychology, Cognitive Science, Social Cognition, and 19 moreMagnetic Resonance Imaging, Social Perception, Motivation, Brain Mapping, Social behavior, Computers, Brain, Humans, Female, Male, Young Adult, Social Environment, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Adult, Analysis of Variance, Psychological Theory, Social Behavior, Boolean Satisfiability, and Object Attachment
Research Interests: Marketing, Psychology, Cognitive Science, Personality, Theory of Mind, and 19 moreCulture, Motion perception, Time Perception, Adolescent, Intention, Humans, Judgment, Female, Animals, Male, Personal Construct Theory, Mental processes, Goals, Acceleration, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Middle Aged, Adult, Human Movement, and Motor activity
Overprecision is the most robust type of overconfidence. We present a new method that significantly reduces this bias and offers insight into its underlying cause. In three experiments, overprecision was significantly reduced by forcing... more
Overprecision is the most robust type of overconfidence. We present a new method that significantly reduces this bias and offers insight into its underlying cause. In three experiments, overprecision was significantly reduced by forcing participants to consider all possible outcomes of an event. Each participant was presented with the entire range of possible outcomes divided into intervals, and estimated each
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The present study demonstrates how the emotional content of search terms and their eventual results affects the breadth of a users' search for information. We observed the quantity of results selected by users. In a random sample of... more
The present study demonstrates how the emotional content of search terms and their eventual results affects the breadth of a users' search for information. We observed the quantity of results selected by users. In a random sample of queries from the Microsoft LiveSearch search engine, 7,021 queries were evaluated using a dictionary with valence and arousal ratings. The number of search results selected was regressed on the valence and arousal of the search terms. We additionally observed users' selection of results based on the position in the search results. Using the same sample, result placement was regressed on the valence and arousal level of the search terms. Results from quantity of search results selected shows that negative search terms result in an overall larger number of selections made than positive search terms. For position-based selections, we found that the selection of the first result is affected by an interaction of valence and arousal. Specifically, us...