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Fernando Tesón

    Fernando Tesón

    In public political deliberation, people will err and lie in accordance with definite patterns. Such discourse failure results from behavior that is both instrumentally and epistemically rational. The deliberative practices of a liberal... more
    In public political deliberation, people will err and lie in accordance with definite patterns. Such discourse failure results from behavior that is both instrumentally and epistemically rational. The deliberative practices of a liberal democracy (let alone repressive or non-democratic societies) cannot be improved so as to overcome the tendency for rational citizens to believe and say things at odds with reliable propositions of social science. The theory has several corollaries. One is that much contemporary political philosophy can be seen as an unsuccessful attempt to vindicate, on symbolic and moral grounds, the forms that discourse failure take on in public political deliberation. Another is that deliberative practices cannot be rescued even on non-epistemic grounds, such as social peace, impartiality, participation, and equality. To alleviate discourse failure, this 2006 book proposes to reduce the scope of majoritarian politics and enlarge markets.
    to fewer and less ambitious norms. The apparent reduction in scope produced by the latter approach is clearly offset by the fact that the norms it produces have both descriptive and normative functions. The former approach will fail on... more
    to fewer and less ambitious norms. The apparent reduction in scope produced by the latter approach is clearly offset by the fact that the norms it produces have both descriptive and normative functions. The former approach will fail on both counts. State consent must always be included in the definition of the two basic sources of obligation in international law, because it is the only way to (1) produce objectively valid rules and (2) allow for the difference in motivation for norm compliance in customary legal systems as opposed to hierarchies. Because of this, consent in the creation of obligation is not a matter of preference, choice or political predilection. It inevitably constitutes an integral part of the validity and efficacy of the rules of all customary legal systems.
    Economists generally agree that free trade leads to economic growth. This proposition is supported both by theoretical models and empirical data. Further, while the empirical evidence is more limited on this question, the general... more
    Economists generally agree that free trade leads to economic growth. This proposition is supported both by theoretical models and empirical data. Further, while the empirical evidence is more limited on this question, the general consensus among economists holds that trade restrictions are likely to hurt the poor. Even if the latter consensus turns out to be wrong, if free trade leads to superior growth, governments would have more resources to redistribute to the poor. It is surprising then that philosophers and human rights scholars do not advocate liberalizing trade as a way to improve the welfare of the poor as a class. While many scholars in these fields are silent with respect to the effect of free trade on the poor, some actually argue that liberalized trade is harmful for the poor, contrary to the claims of economists. In this article, we argue that any serious scholar concerned with the plight of the poor needs to address the theory and evidence regarding the effects of trade liberalization on economic growth, suggesting that the standard policy prescriptions of the philosophers and human rights scholars are, at best, of second order concern and, at worst, likely to be counterproductive in terms of improving the welfare of the poor.
    I started teaching international law in this country in 1984. I recall reading for the first time Filartiga v. Pena Irala while anxiously preparing for my first class in the sweltering Arizona summer. I was moved. I thought the case... more
    I started teaching international law in this country in 1984. I recall reading for the first time Filartiga v. Pena Irala while anxiously preparing for my first class in the sweltering Arizona summer. I was moved. I thought the case exemplified the best of the American spirit, the universal concern with suffering and human dignity, the longstanding rejection of tyranny — in short, the rare Lockean instincts so prevalent in my adoptive land. Here, you have a lone federal judge in Manhattan allowing redress for brutal acts of a faraway tyrant. This was the first time since Nuremberg that we sensed there was some hope for the oppressed, that perpetrators could no longer trust that their twisted logic of “reasons of state” would grant them impunity for their crimes.
    This article defines and analyzes the philosophical pathology the author labels as "Moral Turn", namely, the assumption that it is possible to address complex socio-eco- nomic problems a priori, disregarding what social sciences... more
    This article defines and analyzes the philosophical pathology the author labels as "Moral Turn", namely, the assumption that it is possible to address complex socio-eco- nomic problems a priori, disregarding what social sciences (especially, economic scien- ce) teach about the circumstances of the problem, the predictable consequences of the various institutional arrangements envisageable, etc. Kant's thinking -with its distincti- ve disdain of all things empirical- constitutes the likely source of this discourse failure. And contemporary philosophy is abundant in "neokantian" thinkers who are persuaded that "once we discover or formulate the right values, we can recommend concrete laws and institutions (empirical information being thus unnecessary)". Rawls, for one, argues that his "difference principle" (which orders the promotion of the least advantaged) ne- cessarily entails the desirability of an interventionist-redistributive state, disregarding empirical surveys showing that free markets could achieve this goal more efficiently.
    The congenital defects of international law (especially the absence of world authority) has led to a kind of scholarship that falls short of intellectually satisfying standards. On one hand, the excessive attachment to sovereignty has led... more
    The congenital defects of international law (especially the absence of world authority) has led to a kind of scholarship that falls short of intellectually satisfying standards. On one hand, the excessive attachment to sovereignty has led scholars to defend political power to an extent that would be unthinkable in other areas of the law. On the other hand, international law scholars abuse the language of law, pretending to find legal certainty where there is none. Nonetheless, the animating ideal - respect for the international rule of law - is worth pursuing notwithstanding these problems.
    The paper briefly argues, against philosophers of global justice, that in order to reduce world poverty, abolishing barriers to trade and immigration is far preferable than establishing a global welfare agency. It suggests that the... more
    The paper briefly argues, against philosophers of global justice, that in order to reduce world poverty, abolishing barriers to trade and immigration is far preferable than establishing a global welfare agency. It suggests that the arguments for internal redistribution cannot be transposed to the international arena, simply because without unrestricted trade there is no way to know if markets have failed. Finally, the paper suggests that free trade economizes on virtue, as it is based on self-interest and not on (forced) altruism.
    The article examines the rationality of persons who support public policies in the name of principles that would be frustrated should those policies be enacted. It shows that, contrary to what Robert Nozick and others have claimed, the... more
    The article examines the rationality of persons who support public policies in the name of principles that would be frustrated should those policies be enacted. It shows that, contrary to what Robert Nozick and others have claimed, the behavior of those agents need not be explained by appealing to symbolic rationality. Instead, it can be explained by standard theories of rationality. Self-defeating political agents typically value their symbolizing, not the symbolized value. The authors distinguish several different cases of self-defeating political agents and suggest that their behavior is better understood by assuming their ignorance, error, or posturing than their concern for symbolized values.
    Over the last twenty years democratic theory has taken a deliberative turn. Some view the theory of deliberative democracy as an essentially leftist project (Fung and Wright, 2003) that carries on the tradition of participatory democracy.... more
    Over the last twenty years democratic theory has taken a deliberative turn. Some view the theory of deliberative democracy as an essentially leftist project (Fung and Wright, 2003) that carries on the tradition of participatory democracy. As a response Rational Choice and Deliberative Democracy, uniquely in the literature, provides a strong critique of deliberation from a libertarian perspective. Pincione and Tesón set out to offer a “sustained critique of deliberative democracy” (p. vii). They come as relative outsiders to the deliberative democracy literature and as a result they are able to give a new perspective on the theory, using insights and drawing examples from economics. They primarily contest the argument that political deliberation leads to epistemically better outcomes, although in later chapters they also address whether deliberative democracy could be justified on other grounds such as autonomy or justice. The authors’ main argument is set out in the first three chapters of the book. They observe that politics suffers from systematic discourse failure, which they define as “the public display of political decisions that are traceable to truth-insensitive processes”. Discourse failure can take various forms. Firstly, scientific theories are often opaque, counter-intuitive and difficult to understand. They explain events using invisible hand explanations, where outcomes are caused by general processes, such as market forces, rather than specific individuals. These theories are less easy to understand than vivid theories which assign causation to actors that are easily observable and use recent facts that are still universally remembered. Discourse failure often results from the use of vivid theories in politics when the correct theories are opaque. Explaining social situations using obscure and abstract, although deeply ingrained, images, such as national interest and sovereignty, is another form of discourse failure.
    ... 14 In the hypothetical examples discussed above, killing Caligula is justified because Caligula is committing a crime against humanity; and killing Vlad is ... To take a real life example: in 1939 Hitler knew, or should have known,... more
    ... 14 In the hypothetical examples discussed above, killing Caligula is justified because Caligula is committing a crime against humanity; and killing Vlad is ... To take a real life example: in 1939 Hitler knew, or should have known, that Winston Churchill would lead Britain to war if ...
    The article counters criticism of liberal democracy in Africa, and proposes that liberal democracy is the best way to address Africa's political and economic problems. It contends that recent democratisation efforts have failed due to... more
    The article counters criticism of liberal democracy in Africa, and proposes that liberal democracy is the best way to address Africa's political and economic problems. It contends that recent democratisation efforts have failed due to the conceptual confusion between majoritarianism and constitutional democracy, where only the latter can ensure freedom and security on the continent. The article goes on to argue for the primacy of individual rights over collective or group rights as the latter increase government control over people's lives. Despotic leaders often misuse group rights and repress the groups that empowered them. Finally, the article rejects as empirically and morally false the view that economic development should be a precondition for democratisation, and that African culture is in some way inimical to liberal democracy.
    This essay examines the discussion of human rights and domestic jurisdiction by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case. Independently of the final verdict about the lawfulness of U.S. help to the contras under principles... more
    This essay examines the discussion of human rights and domestic jurisdiction by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case. Independently of the final verdict about the lawfulness of U.S. help to the contras under principles of either self-defense or humanitarian intervention, the Court’s views on the relationship among human rights, domestic jurisdiction and intervention are wrong in law. Furthermore, the philosophical assumptions of the Judgment are profoundly disturbing. For the reasons set forth below, I submit that the Court’s approach embodies a backward view of international law and justice that was totally unnecessary to the resolution of the case.
    This chapter lays the foundation of the argument for part I. It starts by rejecting the distinction between offensive and defensive wars. All justified wars are wars in defense of persons. Humanitarian intervention, therefore, has the... more
    This chapter lays the foundation of the argument for part I. It starts by rejecting the distinction between offensive and defensive wars. All justified wars are wars in defense of persons. Humanitarian intervention, therefore, has the same rationale as national self-defense. Humanitarian intervention is defined as a war to defend persons attacked in their territory by their own government or other political group. The chapter also locates war as part of a coercion continuum, and claims that the justification of coercion depends crucially on the principle of proportionality. This means that coercion to remedy rights violations will be justified if it incurs an acceptable cost. Because war is an extreme form of coercion, it will be justified only when the predictable costs are morally unacceptable.
    RECENT EMPIRICAL RESEARCH HAS CONFIRMED what most of us suspected: some humanitarian interventions succeed, others fail.1 Neither optimistic liberal interventionism nor pessimistic realist noninterventionism have carried the day. Taylor... more
    RECENT EMPIRICAL RESEARCH HAS CONFIRMED what most of us suspected: some humanitarian interventions succeed, others fail.1 Neither optimistic liberal interventionism nor pessimistic realist noninterventionism have carried the day. Taylor Seybolt lists as reasonably successful interventions the protection of Kurds in northern Iraq in 1992,...
    The marriage between international law and ethical theory has a long and venerable tradition. Grotius, the father of international law, conceived of the law of nations as an integral part of the law of nature. By the 19th century,... more
    The marriage between international law and ethical theory has a long and venerable tradition. Grotius, the father of international law, conceived of the law of nations as an integral part of the law of nature. By the 19th century, however, the joint rights of nationalism, positivism, and relativism have all but destroyed references to the philosophical underpinnings of the discipline in international legal scholarship. While moral philosophy is now routinely part of the debates in areas such as constitutional or criminal law, international law lags behind in this respect. With few exceptions, current international legal scholarship is mired in a theoretical framework formed by a mix of so-called realism and old-fashioned positivism, both of which exclude independent philosophical analysis. Moral philosophy is necessarily part of the articulation of international legal propositions. For example, in attempting to define the concept of custom, are instances of state practice to be perc...
    series of armed incursions against American military bases resulting in firelights with very sophisticated forces. The second important factor was that the Panamanian National Assembly, at the urging of Noriega, passed a provision that... more
    series of armed incursions against American military bases resulting in firelights with very sophisticated forces. The second important factor was that the Panamanian National Assembly, at the urging of Noriega, passed a provision that declared a state of war against the United States. I shall read you two parts of this to demonstrate the language. The last part of the preamble says "that Ordinal 5 of Article 153 of the Constitution of the Republic of Panama and Numeral 2, Paragraph D, Subparagraph 1.1.2 of Agreement No. 6 issued by the General State Council on 9 November 1989 empowers the ANRC to declare war. It is resolved: To declare the Republic of Panama in a state of war for the duration of the aggression unleashed against the Panamanian people by the U.S. Government." The next paragraph adds: "To face this state of war," and it appoints Manuel Noriega as "maximum leader" in a phrase reminiscent of Adolph Hitler. This action is certainly something...
    The chapter examines three issues addressed in the literature. The first is the objection that governments cannot be trusted with making these intervention decisions. The chapter accepts the force of the objection, but argues that such... more
    The chapter examines three issues addressed in the literature. The first is the objection that governments cannot be trusted with making these intervention decisions. The chapter accepts the force of the objection, but argues that such government failure must be part of the proportionality calculus. The second issue is whether consent matters for intervention. The chapter claims that the consent of the victims' fellow citizens is irrelevant, as is the consent of the incumbent regime and its supporters. And finally, the chapter proposes an alliance of rights-respecting governments as the more plausible institutional alternative to approve and supervise justified interventions.
    Traditionally, the problem of the basis of obligation in international law has been framed in terms of the following questions: Why is international law binding? Why should states obey international law? Or, what is the source of the... more
    Traditionally, the problem of the basis of obligation in international law has been framed in terms of the following questions: Why is international law binding? Why should states obey international law? Or, what is the source of the binding force, or the "reason of validity" of international law?' The question of obligation seems to many an important one, and distinguishable from the analogous question of the duty of obedience in domestic law, for this reason: under the doctrine of state sovereignty, if the nation-state is sovereign and independent, how can it possibly be subject to a higher authority, to a superior legal system?2 The issue also has relevance in light of the problem of cultural diversity. One could perhaps rely on some notion of common traditions, cultural identity, or shared values to explain and justify domestic political obligation.3 Relativists, however, believe that those elements are absent at a global level. Individuals and national communities...

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