Elizabeth Wishnick
Montclair State University, Political Science and Law, Faculty Member
- Columbia University, Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Department Memberadd
- My latest book project, China’s Risk China’s Risk: Oil, Water, Food and Regional Security (forthcoming Columbia Unive... moreMy latest book project, China’s Risk China’s Risk: Oil, Water, Food and Regional Security (forthcoming Columbia University Press) addresses the security and foreign policy consequences of energy, water and food risks in China for its northern neighbors. I also write about contemporary Sino-Russian relations and China’s Arctic strategy. I just started a blog about the consequences of China's resource use and cooperation with other countries: www.chinasresourcerisks.com.edit
Relations between China and Russia have deepened since 2022, although each country is now more careful in messaging, especially to foreign audiences, about their partnership. The priority of Russia for China comes at the expense of its... more
Relations between China and Russia have deepened since 2022, although each country is now more careful in messaging, especially to foreign audiences, about their partnership. The priority of Russia for China comes at the expense of its previous partnership with Ukraine and Chinese economic interests there. China now aspires to take on a role in any future peace process for Ukraine, but Xi and Putin, by and large, speak with one voice on what they call "the Ukrainian crisis." The deepening partnership is reflected in their synergy in the information space, their ongoing cooperation in technology and defense, and energy and agriculture deals. Despite these trends, their partnership is also one of interdependence, whereby Beijing is willing to accept costs to derive perceived benefits. Even as Russia becomes more economically dependent on China, Xi's ability to restrain or even influence Putin's thinking remains untested.
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This month’s meeting between the Chinese and Russian presidents on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Uzbekistan has led to renewed scrutiny of the scope and depth of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership.... more
This month’s meeting between the Chinese and Russian presidents on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Uzbekistan has led to renewed scrutiny of the scope and depth of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership. Xi Jinping referred to Vladimir Putin as his “dear and old friend,” but Putin admitted that Xi had raised “questions and concerns” about Ukraine, though the Russian president also praised China’s “balanced position” on the conflict. Unlike the case of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who clearly stated that “today’s era is not one of war” and urged Putin to end the conflict through dialogue, the details of Xi’s remarks on Ukraine remain unknown. Many observers have filled in the blanks and jumped to the conclusion that Xi has finally broken with Putin over Ukraine. This reflects a misunderstanding of what the “no limits” partnership between Russia and China really means.
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After dismissing the Sino-Russian partnership for the past decade, scholars now scramble to assess its significance. Is the Sino-Russian partnership a transactional relationship, destined for failure as China rises? Is it an alliance? Is... more
After dismissing the Sino-Russian partnership for the past decade, scholars now scramble to assess its significance. Is the Sino-Russian partnership a transactional relationship, destined for failure as China rises? Is it an alliance? Is it based on enduring shared norms or less securely premised on transactional interests? Focusing on what partnership is or is not, while interesting as a scholarly exercise, does not, however, advance our understanding of its mechanisms and impact on East Asia. Following the English School, a perspective on international relations highlighting the role of international society, and especially the writings of Hedley Bull, I argue that Russia and China are seeking to create a society of states that defines a pluralist East Asian order. For Bull, great power management is one of the ways that order is created. Accordingly, I examine how China and Russia manage their relations in East Asia and the impact of their approach to great power management on the creation of an East Asian order.
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After dismissing the Sino-Russian partnership for the past decade, scholars now scramble to assess its significance, particularly with US foreign policy in disarray under the Trump administration. I examine how China and Russia manage... more
After dismissing the Sino-Russian partnership for the past decade, scholars now scramble to assess its significance, particularly with US foreign policy in disarray under the Trump administration. I examine how China and Russia manage their relations in East Asia and the impact of their approach to great power management on the creation of an East Asian order. According to English School theorist Hedley Bull, great power management is one of the ways that order is created. Sino-Russian great power management involves rule making, a distinctive approach to crisis management , and overlapping policy approaches toward countries such as Burma and the Philippines. I conclude with a comparison between Sino-Russian great power management and the US alliance system, note a few distinctive features of the Trump era, and draw some conclusions for East Asia.
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Southern Europe has been a new area of focus for the Sino-Russian partnership in recent years. Cultural and religious ties with Orthodox majority states have long given Russia a special role in the region, but China is a newer player.... more
Southern Europe has been a new area of focus for the Sino-Russian partnership in recent years. Cultural and religious ties with Orthodox majority states have long given Russia a special role in the region, but China is a newer player. Although each country has its
own independent reasons for engaging economically with southern Europe—for China, it is the destination for its Belt and Road Initiative, while for Russia, the region provides a potential alternative to gas supply via Ukraine—increasingly the two countries are
pursuing parallel agendas, involving promoting their own interests at the expense of European unity.
own independent reasons for engaging economically with southern Europe—for China, it is the destination for its Belt and Road Initiative, while for Russia, the region provides a potential alternative to gas supply via Ukraine—increasingly the two countries are
pursuing parallel agendas, involving promoting their own interests at the expense of European unity.
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This paper argues that Russia and China are partners of consequence and that the neglect of the normative dimension of the Sino-Russian relationship has led its impact on global governance to be undervalued and misunderstood. Following a... more
This paper argues that Russia and China are partners of consequence and that the neglect of the normative dimension of the Sino-Russian relationship has led its impact on global governance to be undervalued and misunderstood. Following a constructivist approach, the paper examines the shared norms underlying an ever closer Sino-Russian partnership, despite divergent interests in a number of areas. A first section examines how shared norms lead Russia and China to define their identity similarly, facilitate joint actions, and constrain their individual policy choices.
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In its current configuration, the China-Russia-U.S. triangle operates according to a new logic.
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Partly in response to the U.S. rebalancing to Asia, Chinese leaders have been trying to define Asia for Asians. The Russian pivot to Asia complicates this agenda. On the one hand, Chinese analysts portray Russia as a European power; on... more
Partly in response to the U.S. rebalancing to Asia, Chinese leaders have been trying to define Asia for Asians. The Russian pivot to Asia complicates this agenda. On the one hand, Chinese analysts portray Russia as a European power; on the other, they seek to justify Russia’s legitimate role in Asia.Although some aspects of Russian policy have been at odds with Chinese interests, the recent warming trend in Sino-Russia relations has done a lot to offset these concerns.
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Long accustomed to a seat on the sidelines of East Asian affairs, Russia now finds itself sought after as an energy and military partner, particularly by Vietnam, but increasingly by a wider range of states in Southeast Asia. Russia’s... more
Long accustomed to a seat on the sidelines of East Asian affairs, Russia now finds itself sought after as an energy and military partner, particularly by Vietnam, but increasingly by a wider range of states in Southeast Asia. Russia’s growing relations with Southeast Asian states, especially in energy and defense, and the development of an alternative northern shipping route to the Malacca Straits are changing perceptions of Russia’s potential role in the region, as Southeast Asian states seek to balance a rising China.
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On May 21, Russia and China concluded ten days of joint naval exercises in the eastern Mediterranean, which included live-fire drills. Although the militaries of the two countries claimed that the naval exercise was meant only to improve... more
On May 21, Russia and China concluded ten days of joint naval exercises in the eastern Mediterranean, which included live-fire drills. Although the militaries of the two countries claimed that the naval exercise was meant only to improve interoperability, their presence in the sea has far broader political implications.
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Mending Fences The Evolution of Moscow's China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin By Elizabeth Wishnick PUBLISHED: July 2014 SUBJECT LISTING: Asian Studies / China, Politics BIBLIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION: 320 Pages, 6 x 9 in ISBN:... more
Mending Fences
The Evolution of Moscow's China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin
By Elizabeth Wishnick
PUBLISHED: July 2014
SUBJECT LISTING: Asian Studies / China, Politics
BIBLIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION: 320 Pages, 6 x 9 in
ISBN: 9780295993874
Format:
Paperback
Hardcover
$35.00
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Mending Fences illuminates the forces driving Moscow’s China policy, from the Ussuri River clashes in 1969 to the "strategic partnership" of the 1990s. Elizabeth Wishnick, noted expert on the Russia and China, analyzes the efforts of Soviet leaders simultaneously to maintain their supremacy in the international communist movement, defend their borders from a perceived China threat, and ensure the compliance of regional authorities in enforcing China policy.
Although a consensus in favor of containing China prevailed within the Moscow policy community throughout the 1970s, major shifts in China policy came with changes in the Soviet leadership, most notably in the mid-1980s. As many Russians became disenchanted with Western models of market democracy and with their country's sharply curtailed role in international affairs in the post-Soviet era, the Yeltsin administration touted a growing "strategic partnership" with China.
Wishnick outlines the successes of Russian-Chinese cooperation and analyzes the main barriers to full-scale partnership, including historical grievances, limited economic ties, tensions in regional relations. Despite ongoing efforts by Russian and Chinese leaders to resolve these issues, she concludes that the future of the Sino-Russian partnership will depend on an unpredictable interplay of forces of domestic and international change.
Mending Fences is the result of a decade of research in Moscow, Beijing, and the regions along the Russo-Chinese border. Fluent in Russian and Chinese, the author has drawn on recently declassified documents from the archives of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the KGB, and the Khabarovsk Regional Communist Party; numerous interviews with influential Russian and Chinese officials and scholars; and regional and national periodicals and books from both Russia and China.
The Evolution of Moscow's China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin
By Elizabeth Wishnick
PUBLISHED: July 2014
SUBJECT LISTING: Asian Studies / China, Politics
BIBLIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION: 320 Pages, 6 x 9 in
ISBN: 9780295993874
Format:
Paperback
Hardcover
$35.00
ADD TO CART
DESCRIPTION
Mending Fences illuminates the forces driving Moscow’s China policy, from the Ussuri River clashes in 1969 to the "strategic partnership" of the 1990s. Elizabeth Wishnick, noted expert on the Russia and China, analyzes the efforts of Soviet leaders simultaneously to maintain their supremacy in the international communist movement, defend their borders from a perceived China threat, and ensure the compliance of regional authorities in enforcing China policy.
Although a consensus in favor of containing China prevailed within the Moscow policy community throughout the 1970s, major shifts in China policy came with changes in the Soviet leadership, most notably in the mid-1980s. As many Russians became disenchanted with Western models of market democracy and with their country's sharply curtailed role in international affairs in the post-Soviet era, the Yeltsin administration touted a growing "strategic partnership" with China.
Wishnick outlines the successes of Russian-Chinese cooperation and analyzes the main barriers to full-scale partnership, including historical grievances, limited economic ties, tensions in regional relations. Despite ongoing efforts by Russian and Chinese leaders to resolve these issues, she concludes that the future of the Sino-Russian partnership will depend on an unpredictable interplay of forces of domestic and international change.
Mending Fences is the result of a decade of research in Moscow, Beijing, and the regions along the Russo-Chinese border. Fluent in Russian and Chinese, the author has drawn on recently declassified documents from the archives of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the KGB, and the Khabarovsk Regional Communist Party; numerous interviews with influential Russian and Chinese officials and scholars; and regional and national periodicals and books from both Russia and China.
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characterized Sino-Russian relations since 1996 is its cross-cutting influence. This chapter evaluates how the partnership fits into key tenets of Chinese foreign policy: peaceful development, win-win diplomacy aiming toward... more
characterized Sino-Russian
relations since 1996 is its cross-cutting influence. This chapter evaluates how
the partnership fits into key tenets of Chinese foreign policy: peaceful development, win-win diplomacy aiming toward multipolarization, and the creation of a harmonious world based on the democratization of international relations. While Chinese leaders note that the Sino-Russian relationship has never been better, the study takes a critical look at the partnership, relying on the increasingly open discussion of its weaknesses among Chinese journalists and scholars, and on a comparison of Russian and Chinese positions on key political and economic issues. Finally, the chapter concludes that while the Sino-Russian partnership has certain distinctive features, it is losing itsprivileged position for China in particular.
relations since 1996 is its cross-cutting influence. This chapter evaluates how
the partnership fits into key tenets of Chinese foreign policy: peaceful development, win-win diplomacy aiming toward multipolarization, and the creation of a harmonious world based on the democratization of international relations. While Chinese leaders note that the Sino-Russian relationship has never been better, the study takes a critical look at the partnership, relying on the increasingly open discussion of its weaknesses among Chinese journalists and scholars, and on a comparison of Russian and Chinese positions on key political and economic issues. Finally, the chapter concludes that while the Sino-Russian partnership has certain distinctive features, it is losing itsprivileged position for China in particular.
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... These ideological differences led key Soviet policymakers to overestimate the military threat posed by ... failed to coincide with policies expected of socialist states, they perceived a political ... momentum for the limited... more
... These ideological differences led key Soviet policymakers to overestimate the military threat posed by ... failed to coincide with policies expected of socialist states, they perceived a political ... momentum for the limited rapprochement with China that unfolded during Andropov's rule. ...
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The ink was barely dry on the new Sino-Russian Treaty when the events of 9/11 changed world politics and altered the course of the emerging Sino-Russian partnership. A far cry from the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s, the relationship... more
The ink was barely dry on the new Sino-Russian Treaty when the events of 9/11 changed world politics and altered the course of the emerging Sino-Russian partnership. A far cry from the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s, the relationship between China and Russia grew closer in the 1990s in an effort to counter perceived US unilateralist tendencies in international affairs. Due to conflicting foreign policy interests and difficulties in economic and regional relations, the Sino-Russian parternship remained a limited one. After providing some background on the development of Sino-Russian relations, this article evaluates the prospects for the partnership in the "post-post Cold War world order."
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This article provides a balance sheet for the emerging Sino-Russian strategic partnership and examines its potential as an alliance.5 It is argued that strategic and political concerns bring the two neighbors together, creating the... more
This article provides a balance sheet for the emerging Sino-Russian strategic partnership and examines its potential as an alliance.5 It is argued that
strategic and political concerns bring the two neighbors together, creating the
foundations for an incipient alliance and fertile ground for new triangular
maneuvering. Nevertheless, divergent interests over issues such as Asian security, missile defense, and economic and regional cooperation exert countervailing pressures and set limits to the partnership. Neither the forces bringing
Russia and China together nor the pressures pulling them apart should be
underestimated–the Sino-Russian partnership has real substance but also
many underlying tensions. Domestic developments in China and Russia, and
U.S. policy toward both countries, will be key in setting the parameters for
Sino-Russian partnership in the years to come.
strategic and political concerns bring the two neighbors together, creating the
foundations for an incipient alliance and fertile ground for new triangular
maneuvering. Nevertheless, divergent interests over issues such as Asian security, missile defense, and economic and regional cooperation exert countervailing pressures and set limits to the partnership. Neither the forces bringing
Russia and China together nor the pressures pulling them apart should be
underestimated–the Sino-Russian partnership has real substance but also
many underlying tensions. Domestic developments in China and Russia, and
U.S. policy toward both countries, will be key in setting the parameters for
Sino-Russian partnership in the years to come.
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Now that China is portraying itself as a global peacemaker, taking credit for encouraging Iran and Saudi Arabia to restore their diplomatic relations, will ending the war in Ukraine be next? One year to the day after the Russian invasion... more
Now that China is portraying itself as a global peacemaker, taking credit for encouraging Iran and Saudi Arabia to restore their diplomatic relations, will ending the war in Ukraine be next? One year to the day after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the PRC Foreign Ministry issued a position paper on “the Political Settlement of the Ukraine crisis.”
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With the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in ll sway, China' s plans to expand trade and forti transportation ties with Central and Eastern Europe have been thrown into disarray. Yet, even though the Russian war on Ukraine poses a direct... more
With the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in ll sway, China' s plans to expand trade and forti transportation ties with Central and Eastern Europe have been thrown into disarray. Yet, even though the Russian war on Ukraine poses a direct threat to Xi Jinping' s signature Belt and Road Initiative and harms China' s own economic interests in Ukraine, Chinese leaders have maintained their implicit support for their strategic partner, Russia. China's Eurasian Plans Endangered 6/1/23, 11:17 PM China's Belt and Road Loses a Notch and Gains a Bump-chinaobservers https://chinaobservers.eu/chinas-belt-and-road-loses-a-notch-and-gains-a-bump/ 2/9
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As the world monitors Russia’s military buildup on the Ukrainian border, the actions of China, Russia’s strategic partner, are worth watching as well. China has been Ukraine’s top trade partner since 2020 and views Ukraine as a critical... more
As the world monitors Russia’s military buildup on the Ukrainian border, the actions of China, Russia’s strategic partner, are worth watching as well. China has been Ukraine’s top trade partner since 2020 and views Ukraine as a critical entrepôt for its Belt and Road Initiative ambitions. Agricultural exports from Ukraine have also become important for China in the wake of the China-U.S. trade war, yet Chinese officials have supported Russia – or at least have felt obliged to do so – up to a point. In a January 27 phone call with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that Russia’s “legitimate concerns” needed to be addressed, though he urged all parties to remain calm and avoid inflaming tensions.
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New Directions in the Study of CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY EDITED BY Alastair lain Johnston and Robert S. Ross ... NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY This One ZG5R-YEW-C4JW ... New Directions in the Study of... more
New Directions in the Study of CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY EDITED BY Alastair lain Johnston and Robert S. Ross ... NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY This One ZG5R-YEW-C4JW ... New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy Edited ...
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Interview by Mercy A. Kuo with Dr. Elizabeth Wishnick
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The invasion of Ukraine has fueled hopes in Russia of a reorientation to Asian markets, while also introducing new barriers to Russian relations with many Asia-Pacific states. The Indo-Pacific may be far from Ukraine, but Russia's war has... more
The invasion of Ukraine has fueled hopes in Russia of a reorientation to Asian markets, while also introducing new barriers to Russian relations with many Asia-Pacific states. The Indo-Pacific may be far from Ukraine, but Russia's war has had wide-ranging ripple effects on the region’s energy security, food security, bilateral ties, and geopolitics.
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In the U.S. and Europe, China is seen as Russia’s tacit supporter, but what do Russian experts think? This article examines recent writings and interviews with leading Russian China-watchers. My research finds that they see Russia’s... more
In the U.S. and Europe, China is seen as Russia’s tacit supporter, but what do Russian experts think? This article examines recent writings and interviews with leading Russian China-watchers. My research finds that they see Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as setting limits to Sino-Russian relations, despite recent declarations by Beijing and Moscow
stating otherwise. They conclude that China is likely to prioritize its own interests rather than to support Russia overtly. While some Russian observers emphasize the economic and political difficulties China faces, others point to its potential economic gains. Some Russian Asia experts remain confident that Russia will succeed in avoiding overdependence on Chinese investment, whereas others see China being in a better position to
obtain long-sought economic opportunities in Russia.
stating otherwise. They conclude that China is likely to prioritize its own interests rather than to support Russia overtly. While some Russian observers emphasize the economic and political difficulties China faces, others point to its potential economic gains. Some Russian Asia experts remain confident that Russia will succeed in avoiding overdependence on Chinese investment, whereas others see China being in a better position to
obtain long-sought economic opportunities in Russia.
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The South China Sea might be one of the most contested places on earth, but until last week, at least, one regional player had been conspicuously absent from the fray. Russia had staked out a precarious neutrality, maintaining a... more
The South China Sea might be one of the most contested places on earth, but until last week, at least, one regional player had been conspicuously absent from the fray. Russia had staked out a precarious neutrality, maintaining a longstanding friendship with Vietnam while providing general support for China’s regional positions. On September 12, however, the balance came into question when Russia joined China for eight days of joint naval exercises in Chinese waters near Zhanjiang in the south of Guangdong province, which is the headquarters for China’s South China Sea fleet.
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Russia's cooperative approach to Asia contrasts with its assertiveness in Europe and the Middle East, though the Russian military also has made provocative maneuvers near Japan and US Pacific bases. Ukraine may be far from the... more
Russia's cooperative approach to Asia contrasts with its assertiveness in Europe and the Middle East, though the Russian military also has made provocative maneuvers near Japan and US Pacific bases. Ukraine may be far from the Asia-Pacific, but the Ukrainian conflict also casts a shadow on Russia's Asia policy.
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Russia's contribution to regional security and economic cooperation in Asia remains mixed. Record oil prices in 2006 highlighted Russia's potential position as a key energy supplier, but the government's priority has been on strengthening... more
Russia's contribution to regional security and economic cooperation in Asia remains mixed. Record oil prices in 2006 highlighted Russia's potential position as a key energy supplier, but the government's priority has been on strengthening its hold over the industry, increasingly to the detriment of its foreign energy partners.
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Oil played a big role in Russia's Asian diplomacy as the Khodorkovsky affair led to a rearrangement of Russian oil assets and pipeline plans, with consequences for China and Japan. China and Russia held their first military exercises ,... more
Oil played a big role in Russia's Asian diplomacy as the Khodorkovsky affair led to a rearrangement of Russian oil assets and pipeline plans, with consequences for China and Japan. China and Russia held their first military exercises , reflecting their concern over the impact of the "colored revolutions."
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This chapter in NBR Analysis vol. 13, no. 1 2002 Regional Approaches in Asia Foreign and Domestic Policy Concerns in Russia and China explores the divergent approaches to Russia’s Asia policy in Moscow and the Russian Far East in the... more
This chapter in NBR Analysis vol. 13, no. 1 2002 Regional Approaches in Asia Foreign and Domestic Policy Concerns in Russia and China explores the divergent approaches to Russia’s Asia policy in Moscow and the Russian Far East in the 1990s and early 2000s. Robert M. Hathaway and Robert Sutter are also contributors to the volume.
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Although Russian policymakers have sought to achieve greater balance in Russia's foreign relations with European and Asian states, many Russians remain ambivalent about their country's engagement in Asia, especially the rapidly... more
Although Russian policymakers have sought to achieve
greater balance in Russia's foreign relations with European and
Asian states, many Russians remain ambivalent about their
country's engagement in Asia, especially the rapidly developing
Sino-Russian partnership. Much hailed by Russian and Chinese
national leaders, the increasing salience of China in Russian
foreign policy has led to a debate in the Moscow policy
community and to intense criticism in some of the Russian
border regions
greater balance in Russia's foreign relations with European and
Asian states, many Russians remain ambivalent about their
country's engagement in Asia, especially the rapidly developing
Sino-Russian partnership. Much hailed by Russian and Chinese
national leaders, the increasing salience of China in Russian
foreign policy has led to a debate in the Moscow policy
community and to intense criticism in some of the Russian
border regions
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Despite a close partnership, Russia has remained wary of China's involvement in the Arctic region.
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This article explores how the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has upended and reshaped Arctic security, institutions, and partnerships. With Arctic governance institutions that include Russia, such as the Arctic Council, on pause and... more
This article explores how the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has upended and reshaped Arctic security, institutions, and partnerships. With Arctic governance institutions that include Russia, such as the Arctic Council, on pause and scientific collaboration with Russia interrupted, the military dimension has overshadowed Arctic cooperation-while highlighting the traditional security risks of dependence on fossil fuels and distracting attention from other key Arctic issues such as climate change and the socioeconomic development of Indigenous communities. Russia's ambitions for agency as Arctic Council chair have been thwarted, and Moscow's plans for economic development of the Russian Arctic and Northern Sea Route are in doubt. Although some regional cooperation continues through multilateral agreements, the path forward for dialogue on traditional and nontraditional security in the Arctic remains uncertain.
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This Letort Paper examines the geopolitical implications of China’s growing involvement in the Arctic for U.S. interests. First, the evolution of U.S. Arctic strategy, including its political and military components, is discussed. Next,... more
This Letort Paper examines the geopolitical implications of China’s growing involvement in the Arctic for U.S. interests. First, the evolution of U.S. Arctic strategy, including its political and military components, is discussed. Next, China’s interests and goals in
the Arctic are addressed. A third section examines the Arctic in China’s relations with Canada, Russia, and the Nordic states. This Letort Paper then evaluates the
consequences of China’s expanding Arctic presence for U.S. security interests and concludes with policy recommendations.
the Arctic are addressed. A third section examines the Arctic in China’s relations with Canada, Russia, and the Nordic states. This Letort Paper then evaluates the
consequences of China’s expanding Arctic presence for U.S. security interests and concludes with policy recommendations.
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In a 1987 speech in Murmansk, Mikhail Gorbachev famously called for the Arctic to become a “zone of peace.” Since the end of the Cold War, Arctic states largely succeeded in insulating the Far North from tensions in great power relations.... more
In a 1987 speech in Murmansk, Mikhail Gorbachev famously called for the Arctic to become a “zone of peace.” Since the end of the Cold War, Arctic states largely succeeded in insulating the Far North from tensions in great power relations. However, the crisis between Russia and the West since the onset of the conflict in Ukraine in 2014 threatens to disturb the Arctic peace at a time when cooperation is all the more urgent due to growing challenges to the region from climate change.
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Just after Xi Jinping and Central Asian leaders celebrated thirty years of cooperative relations, unrest broke out in several cities in Kazakhstan on January 2, 2022, beginning in Zhanaozen, an oil town in the west of the country and the... more
Just after Xi Jinping and Central Asian leaders celebrated thirty years of cooperative relations, unrest broke out in several cities in Kazakhstan on January 2, 2022, beginning in Zhanaozen, an oil town in the west of the country and the site of earlier demonstrations. According to Kazakhstani law enforcement, 225 people were killed in the protests.
Research Interests: China and Kazakhstan
Although China is Afghanistan's neighbor, strategic partner, and one of its largest foreign investors, it has kept a low profile overall on Afghanistan compared to other states in the region. This article seeks to understand China's... more
Although China is Afghanistan's neighbor, strategic partner, and one of its largest foreign investors, it has kept a low profile overall on Afghanistan compared to other states in the region. This article seeks to understand China's Afghanistan policy within the context of the Chinese government's overall approach to foreign affairs. A review of China's Afghanistan policy show a reluctant involvement, with domestic economic and security interests leading and foreign policy following. A final section examines the uncertain policy environment that China faces in devising an Afghanistan policy and some of the scenarios that Chinese scholars envisage for Afghanistan post-2014.
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In a speech at Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan on September 5, 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping outlined his vision of a “Silk Road economic belt” that would further integrate Central Asia and China through expanded flows of trade... more
In a speech at Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan on September 5, 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping outlined his vision of a “Silk Road economic belt” that would further integrate Central Asia and China through expanded flows of trade and investment, and enhanced infrastructure links. Guest blogger for Shairbek Juraev.
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This article examines how Afghanistan has shaped China’s economic, political, and security priorities in Central and South Asia. It draws conclusions regarding China’s cooperation in international efforts to end the conflict in... more
This article examines how Afghanistan has shaped China’s economic, political, and security priorities in Central and South Asia. It draws conclusions regarding China’s cooperation in international efforts to end the conflict in Afghanistan and the security environment facing China after the promised withdrawal of United States and NATO forces in 2014.
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Considering China’s unease with a large foreign military presence on its borders, one would expect the U.S. drawdown to be welcomed in Beijing and result in greater U.S.-China cooperation on Afghanistan. However, the U.S. and China have... more
Considering China’s unease with a large foreign military presence on its borders, one would expect the U.S. drawdown to be welcomed in Beijing and result in greater U.S.-China cooperation on Afghanistan. However, the U.S. and China have different goals and timetables regarding this conflict, which pose challenges to their bilateral relationship.
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In this monograph, Elizabeth Wishnick builds on the analysis in her 2002 SSI study, Growing U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia. She contends that by highlighting antiterrorism, the United States addresses a symptom rather than the... more
In this monograph, Elizabeth Wishnick builds on the analysis in
her 2002 SSI study, Growing U.S. Security Interests in Central
Asia. She contends that by highlighting antiterrorism, the United
States addresses a symptom rather than the causes of instability in
Central Asia; thus it is contributing to the radicalization of political
opposition movements and discrediting both democratization
and the U.S. commitment to it. Instead, she argues, the United
States should do more to address the underlying human security
problems in Central Asia, which increase its vulnerability to terrorist
movements.
her 2002 SSI study, Growing U.S. Security Interests in Central
Asia. She contends that by highlighting antiterrorism, the United
States addresses a symptom rather than the causes of instability in
Central Asia; thus it is contributing to the radicalization of political
opposition movements and discrediting both democratization
and the U.S. commitment to it. Instead, she argues, the United
States should do more to address the underlying human security
problems in Central Asia, which increase its vulnerability to terrorist
movements.
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The author argues that by placing a priority on anti-terrorism in U.S. policy toward Central Asia and rewarding Central Asian leaders for basing rights, the Bush administration is shoring up authoritarian regimes and encouraging public... more
The author argues that by placing a priority on
anti-terrorism in U.S. policy toward Central Asia and
rewarding Central Asian leaders for basing rights, the Bush
administration is shoring up authoritarian regimes and
encouraging public distrust of U.S. intentions in the region.
She points out that weak regional security organizations,
contingent support in Russia and China to the expanding
American military foothold in the region, and instability in
Central Asia will pose considerable challenges for the U.S.military. In conclusion, the author recommends an
emphasis on rapid deployment from existing bases in
Turkey rather than continued basing in Central Asia, a
more coherent regional strategy and improved foreign area
expertise for the Central Asian region, and a multilateral
approach to addressing instability in the area.
anti-terrorism in U.S. policy toward Central Asia and
rewarding Central Asian leaders for basing rights, the Bush
administration is shoring up authoritarian regimes and
encouraging public distrust of U.S. intentions in the region.
She points out that weak regional security organizations,
contingent support in Russia and China to the expanding
American military foothold in the region, and instability in
Central Asia will pose considerable challenges for the U.S.military. In conclusion, the author recommends an
emphasis on rapid deployment from existing bases in
Turkey rather than continued basing in Central Asia, a
more coherent regional strategy and improved foreign area
expertise for the Central Asian region, and a multilateral
approach to addressing instability in the area.
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This article reflects on the 6th Ulaanbaatar Dialogue in June 2019 and debates in Mongolia about membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
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The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy depicts China and Russia as presenting a joint challenge to U.S. interests, influence, and security. Unlike in the 1950s, when the United States was able to exploit the divisions between the two... more
The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy depicts China and Russia as presenting a joint challenge to U.S. interests, influence, and security. Unlike in the 1950s, when the United States was able to exploit
the divisions between the two countries, the differences in Chinese and Russian interests today only serve to enhance their combined challenge to the United States. That challenge is visibly manifest in the case of the North Korean nuclear crisis.
To address this challenge, U.S. policymakers must keep the dynamic of Sino-Russian cooperation regarding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) firmly in mind. To better inform that discussion, this brief
outlines Chinese and Russian interests in the region, examines how those interests play out in the case of the North Korean nuclear crisis, and provides an assessment of implications for the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK). The brief concludes with a list of relevant congressional initiatives to address these challenges.
the divisions between the two countries, the differences in Chinese and Russian interests today only serve to enhance their combined challenge to the United States. That challenge is visibly manifest in the case of the North Korean nuclear crisis.
To address this challenge, U.S. policymakers must keep the dynamic of Sino-Russian cooperation regarding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) firmly in mind. To better inform that discussion, this brief
outlines Chinese and Russian interests in the region, examines how those interests play out in the case of the North Korean nuclear crisis, and provides an assessment of implications for the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK). The brief concludes with a list of relevant congressional initiatives to address these challenges.
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The Korean peninsula is one of many areas where President Vladimir Putin sees Russia playing a key role in conflict resolution. This chapter evaluates the progress achieved in Russian diplomacy on inter-Korean relations, focusing on the... more
The Korean peninsula is one of many areas where President Vladimir Putin sees Russia playing a key role in conflict resolution. This chapter evaluates the progress achieved in Russian diplomacy on inter-Korean relations, focusing on the period from 2000-2003. While Moscow has aspired to mediate in conflicts in inter-Korean relations, such as the 2002-03 crisis, Russia's role thus far has been limited and is likely ro remain so due its relative lack of leverage.
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The chapter addresses the domestic, international, and regional factors that shaped Russian-North Korean relations in the 1990s and early 2000s.
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This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY
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Page 1. The Pacific Review, Vol. 22 No. 4 September 2009: 401428 Competition and cooperative practices in Sino-Japanese energy and environmental relations: towards an energy security 'risk community'? Elizabeth Wishnick ...
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This article reexamines the conventional wisdom that characterizes Sino- Japanese energy relations as predominantly competitive, but views Sino-Japanese environmental relations as essentially cooperative. Using sociological theories of... more
This article reexamines the conventional wisdom that characterizes Sino-
Japanese energy relations as predominantly competitive, but views Sino-Japanese
environmental relations as essentially cooperative. Using sociological theories of
risk, it is argued that Sino-Japanese cooperation is more likely in both the energy
and environmental areas when common risks are perceived and relative gains are
minimized. Despite their many conflicting strategic, political, and economic interests,
as energy importers who are vulnerable to supply interruptions in the Middle
East and competitors for global energy supplies, China and Japan share common
risks to their energy security. Consequently, there actually may be increasing opportunities
for China and Japan to address their common concerns through bilateral
and multilateral cooperative practices, such as common positions on pricing
or energy conservation initiatives. Although one would expect China and Japan to
highlight their mutual interests in tackling environmental problems such as air pollution, in fact relative gains often impede cooperation. Japan increasingly views China as an economic competitor and is reducing environmental aid, while China continues to set a priority on economic growth, which sets limits on the use of costlier
Japanese green technologies. By examining a selection of scholarly articles, reports
and newspaper articles by Chinese and Japanese analysts, as well as material from
interviews in Beijing and Tokyo in May–June 2007, the paper shows how environmental and energy issues in Sino-Japanese relations may be framed as threats, requiring counter-measures, or common risks, which can be addressed through cooperative practices. Lastly, the paper discusses the possibility of the development of
an energy security ‘risk community’ as cooperative practices develop between China
and Japan. Nonetheless, conflicting political interests, strategies, and self-images, accentuating relative gains, may provide obstacles to their cooperation in both energy
security and environmental protection.
Japanese energy relations as predominantly competitive, but views Sino-Japanese
environmental relations as essentially cooperative. Using sociological theories of
risk, it is argued that Sino-Japanese cooperation is more likely in both the energy
and environmental areas when common risks are perceived and relative gains are
minimized. Despite their many conflicting strategic, political, and economic interests,
as energy importers who are vulnerable to supply interruptions in the Middle
East and competitors for global energy supplies, China and Japan share common
risks to their energy security. Consequently, there actually may be increasing opportunities
for China and Japan to address their common concerns through bilateral
and multilateral cooperative practices, such as common positions on pricing
or energy conservation initiatives. Although one would expect China and Japan to
highlight their mutual interests in tackling environmental problems such as air pollution, in fact relative gains often impede cooperation. Japan increasingly views China as an economic competitor and is reducing environmental aid, while China continues to set a priority on economic growth, which sets limits on the use of costlier
Japanese green technologies. By examining a selection of scholarly articles, reports
and newspaper articles by Chinese and Japanese analysts, as well as material from
interviews in Beijing and Tokyo in May–June 2007, the paper shows how environmental and energy issues in Sino-Japanese relations may be framed as threats, requiring counter-measures, or common risks, which can be addressed through cooperative practices. Lastly, the paper discusses the possibility of the development of
an energy security ‘risk community’ as cooperative practices develop between China
and Japan. Nonetheless, conflicting political interests, strategies, and self-images, accentuating relative gains, may provide obstacles to their cooperation in both energy
security and environmental protection.
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This article examines the impact of past extraction methods and present inattention to resource maintenance on the protection and development of the Russian Far East's natural resources. I focus on the forestry sector in particular... more
This article examines the impact of past extraction methods and present inattention to resource maintenance on the protection and development of the Russian Far East's natural resources. I focus on the forestry sector in particular because of the great importance of forest resources to environmentalists and developers alike. While the Russian Far East contains some of Russia's last remaining old-growth forests, the forestry sector is also of prime interest to developers-in attracting foreign investors, it ranks among the top five sectors in the Russian economy. Foreign investors have been mainly interested in extracting raw materials from the Russian Far East for processing in their home countries. Although this type of cooperation meets the short-term economic needs of the region, debates are taking place in the Russian press about the need to balance pressing needs for investment in resource extraction with the development of high quality processing industries and environmental protection in the Russian Far East.
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Since the SARS epidemic in 2003, the international community has urged Chinese leaders to do more to address infectious diseases. This paper looks at two cases in which the Chinese government securitized infectious disease (SARS and avian... more
Since the SARS epidemic in 2003, the international community has urged Chinese leaders to do more to address infectious diseases. This paper looks at two cases in which the Chinese government securitized infectious disease (SARS and avian influenza) and examines the pros and cons of securitization. It is argued that the reactive mobilization involved in a securitizing move runs counter to the preventive risk management strategy needed to address infectious diseases. Although the Copenhagen School favours desecuritization as a return to normal practices, in the Chinese cases desecuritizing moves proved detrimental, involving cover-ups and restrictions on activists pressing for greater information. The article begins by examining the contributions of the Copenhagen School and sociological theories of risk to conceptualizing the security challenges that pandemics pose. Although analysis of the cases of SARS and avian influenza gives credence to criticisms of this approach, securitization theory proves useful in outlining the different stages in China's reaction to epidemics involving reactive mobilization and subsequent efforts to return to politics as usual. The second section examines securitizing and desecuritizing moves in Chinese responses to SARS and avian influenza. Each case study concludes with an assessment of the consequences for health risk management in China. The reactive mobilization implicit in Chinese securitization moves in the two cases is contrasted with the preventive logic of risk management. A third section draws out the implications of these cases for theories of securitization and risk. It is argued here that when securitization has occurred, risk management has failed. Although Copenhagen School theorists see the return to politics as usual-what they call 'desecuritization'-as optimal, this turns out to be far from the case in China during SARS and avian influenza, where the process involved retribution against whistleblowers and new restrictions on health information. In conclusion, the article argues that alternatives to securitization, such as viewing health as a global public good, would require a prior commitment to risk management within affected states.
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This chapter examines Chinese migration to the Russian Far East in terms of the securitisation/desecuritisation dynamics elaborated by the Copenhagen School. Although this framework is useful in describing the tendency by Russian national... more
This chapter examines Chinese migration to the Russian Far East in terms of the securitisation/desecuritisation dynamics elaborated by the Copenhagen School. Although this framework is useful in describing the tendency by Russian national and regional officials to securitise Chinese migration to the Russian Far East, it fails to explain the lack ofurgency in the response by these same leaders to the alleged threat posed by migrants from China. The chapter finds that Russian officials on the national and regional levels use the language of security to depict the consequences of Chinese migration, but, instead of enacting the urgent policy measures one would expect once an existential threat
is identified, these officials have taken incremental steps to regulate crossborder flows. Moreover, the same Russian politicians who securitise Chinese migration to the Russian Far East when addressing Russian audiences call for increased regional cooperation when visiting China or meeting with Chinese leaders. The chapter argues that the Copenhagen School's focus on security as intersubjective, without seeking to determine the presence of actual security threats and responses to them, provides only half the picture and fails to explain
the complicated array of responses to Chinese migration within Russia.
is identified, these officials have taken incremental steps to regulate crossborder flows. Moreover, the same Russian politicians who securitise Chinese migration to the Russian Far East when addressing Russian audiences call for increased regional cooperation when visiting China or meeting with Chinese leaders. The chapter argues that the Copenhagen School's focus on security as intersubjective, without seeking to determine the presence of actual security threats and responses to them, provides only half the picture and fails to explain
the complicated array of responses to Chinese migration within Russia.
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This chapter examines the relationship between migration and economic security, focusing on the political, economic, and social factors inducing CHinese people's migration to the Russian Far East and on Russian reactions to their... more
This chapter examines the relationship between migration and economic security, focusing on the political, economic, and social factors inducing CHinese people's migration to the Russian Far East and on Russian reactions to their presence. It is argued that inadequate economic security in dongbei motivates Chinese traders to try to improve their circumstances by seeking temporary employment across the border. Residents in the Russian Far East, however, interpret the stteps that Chinese traders take to improve their economic secuity as a threat to their own economic security, creating an 'economic security dilemma' with adverse consequences for Sino-Russian relations.
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Research Interests: Food Safety and China
This chapter uses concepts of biopower, biosecurity, and human security to highlight the conflicting interests at stake in Chinese food security priorities. After explaining how food security encompasses food safety, the chapter then... more
This chapter uses concepts of biopower, biosecurity, and human security to highlight the conflicting interests at stake in Chinese food security priorities. After explaining how food security encompasses food safety, the chapter then examines food security in China as a human security issue and the consequences of food security issues in China for other countries, especially the U.S. and Japan.
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... These ideological differences led key Soviet policymakers to overestimate the military threat posed by ... failed to coincide with policies expected of socialist states, they perceived a political ... momentum for the limited... more
... These ideological differences led key Soviet policymakers to overestimate the military threat posed by ... failed to coincide with policies expected of socialist states, they perceived a political ... momentum for the limited rapprochement with China that unfolded during Andropov's rule. ...
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Taiwan and Estonia are known as digital democracies facing threats from neighbors exploiting the vulnerabilities stemming from their degree of digitalization. Nevertheless, in their responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, Taiwan and Estonia... more
Taiwan and Estonia are known as digital democracies facing threats from neighbors exploiting the vulnerabilities stemming from their degree of digitalization. Nevertheless, in their responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, Taiwan and Estonia have highlighted the strengths of digital democracy in combating a non-traditional security threat without employing the strong-arm tactics of authoritarian states. The goal of the article is to distinguish between vulnerability in cyberspace and digital power and put forward a conception of digital power to explain how Estonia and Taiwan were using their digital prowess to combat COVID-19. We argue that on one hand, their reliance on cybertechnology makes them particularly vulnerable to cyberattacks, but on the other their digital power enhances their global stature and domestic capacity to address threats such as COVID-19. The article starts by engaging with the ongoing academic debate on the concept of digital power and its political core. In the ...
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This article examines how Afghanistan has shaped China’s economic, political, and security priorities in Central and South Asia. It draws conclusions regarding China’s cooperation in international efforts to end the conflict in... more
This article examines how Afghanistan has shaped China’s economic, political, and security priorities in Central and South Asia. It draws conclusions regarding China’s cooperation in international efforts to end the conflict in Afghanistan and the security environment facing China after the promised withdrawal of United States and NATO forces in 2014.
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In the past year, China’s Central Asia policy has weathered several external and internal shocks, which have proven to be interconnected in unexpected ways. Although some differences emerged between China and Central Asian states over... more
In the past year, China’s Central Asia policy has weathered several external and internal shocks, which have proven to be interconnected in unexpected ways. Although some differences emerged between China and Central Asian states over Russia’s support for the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the financial crisis provided an opportunity for China to deepen its economic engagement in the region, particularly in the energy sector. Economic integration has turned out to be a double-edged sword for China domestically, however. On the one hand, expanding energy ties with Central Asian neighbors has facilitated Beijing’s domestic goal of developing its western provinces and turning Xinjiang into a new center for the Chinese energy industry. On the other hand, economic development has highlighted inequalities within the province and unleashed social tensions that erupted into riots in the provincial capital of Urumqi in July 2009. The interethnic violence in Xinjiang may have lon...
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: This Letort Paper examines the geopolitical implications of Chinas growing involvement in the Arctic for U.S. interests. First, the evolution of U.S. Arctic strategy, including its political and military components, is discussed. Next,... more
: This Letort Paper examines the geopolitical implications of Chinas growing involvement in the Arctic for U.S. interests. First, the evolution of U.S. Arctic strategy, including its political and military components, is discussed. Next, Chinas interests and goals in the Arctic are addressed. A third section examines the Arctic in Chinas relations with Canada, Russia, and the Nordic states. This Letort Paper then evaluates the consequences of Chinas expanding Arctic presence for U.S. security interests and concludes with policy recommendations.
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In a 1987 speech in Murmansk, Mikhail Gorbachev famously called for the Arctic to become a “zone of peace.” Since the end of the Cold War, Arctic states largely succeeded in insulating the Far North from tensions in great power relations.... more
In a 1987 speech in Murmansk, Mikhail Gorbachev famously called for the Arctic to become a “zone of peace.” Since the end of the Cold War, Arctic states largely succeeded in insulating the Far North from tensions in great power relations. However, the crisis between Russia and the West since the onset of the conflict in Ukraine in 2014 threatens to disturb the Arctic peace at a time when cooperation is all the more urgent due to growing challenges to the region from climate change.
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Partly in response to the U.S. rebalancing to Asia, Chinese leaders have been trying to define Asia for Asians. The Russian pivot to Asia complicates this agenda. On the one hand, Chinese analysts portray Russia as a European power; on... more
Partly in response to the U.S. rebalancing to Asia, Chinese leaders have been trying to define Asia for Asians. The Russian pivot to Asia complicates this agenda. On the one hand, Chinese analysts portray Russia as a European power; on the other, they seek to justify Russia’s legitimate role in Asia.Although some aspects of Russian policy have been at odds with Chinese interests, the recent warming trend in Sino-Russia relations has done a lot to offset these concerns.
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Long accustomed to a seat on the sidelines of East Asian affairs, Russia now finds itself sought after as an energy and military partner, particularly by Vietnam, but increasingly by a wider range of states in Southeast Asia. Russia’s... more
Long accustomed to a seat on the sidelines of East Asian affairs, Russia now finds itself sought after as an energy and military partner, particularly by Vietnam, but increasingly by a wider range of states in Southeast Asia. Russia’s growing relations with Southeast Asian states, especially in energy and defense, and the development of an alternative northern shipping route to the Malacca Straits are changing perceptions of Russia’s potential role in the region, as Southeast Asian states seek to balance a rising China.
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Southern Europe has been a new area of focus for the Sino-Russian partnership in recent years. Cultural and religious ties with Orthodox majority states have long given Russia a special role in the region, but China is a newer player.... more
Southern Europe has been a new area of focus for the Sino-Russian partnership in recent years. Cultural and religious ties with Orthodox majority states have long given Russia a special role in the region, but China is a newer player. Although each country has its own independent reasons for engaging economically with southern Europe—for China, it is the destination for its Belt and Road Initiative, while for Russia, the region provides a potential alternative to gas supply via Ukraine—increasingly the two countries are pursuing parallel agendas, involving promoting their own interests at the expense of European unity.
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The South China Sea might be one of the most contested places on earth, but until last week, at least, one regional player had been conspicuously absent from the fray. Russia had staked out a precarious neutrality, maintaining a... more
The South China Sea might be one of the most contested places on earth, but until last week, at least, one regional player had been conspicuously absent from the fray. Russia had staked out a precarious neutrality, maintaining a longstanding friendship with Vietnam while providing general support for China’s regional positions. On September 12, however, the balance came into question when Russia joined China for eight days of joint naval exercises in Chinese waters near Zhanjiang in the south of Guangdong province, which is the headquarters for China’s South China Sea fleet.
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Russia’s cooperative approach to Asia contrasts with its assertiveness in Europe and the Middle East, though the Russian military also has made provocative maneuvers near Japan and US Pacific bases. Ukraine may be far from the... more
Russia’s cooperative approach to Asia contrasts with its assertiveness in Europe and the Middle East, though the Russian military also has made provocative maneuvers near Japan and US Pacific bases. Ukraine may be far from the Asia-Pacific, but the Ukrainian conflict also casts a shadow on Russia’s Asia policy.
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ABSTRACT This paper argues that Russia and China are partners of consequence and that the neglect of the normative dimension of the Sino-Russian relationship has led its impact on global governance to be undervalued and misunderstood.... more
ABSTRACT This paper argues that Russia and China are partners of consequence and that the neglect of the normative dimension of the Sino-Russian relationship has led its impact on global governance to be undervalued and misunderstood. Following a constructivist approach, the paper examines the shared norms underlying an ever closer Sino-Russian partnership, despite divergent interests in a number of areas. A first section examines how shared norms lead Russia and China to define their identity similarly, facilitate joint actions, and constrain their individual policy choices. For Russia, elaborating its own unique identity is crucial to its claim to global status, though complicated by interactions with multiple ‘Others.’ Russia's effort to engage Asian partners is often viewed as hedging against China, but as second section argues that Russian engagement in Asia is better understood in terms of Russia's effort to define an Asian identity. A third section highlights the securitization/desecuritization dynamic in Sino-Russian economic relations. Xi Jinping's efforts to redefine China's global role reinforces its tendency to desecuritize the vulnerabilities that lead China to seek economic cooperation with Russia. Russia, fearing becoming a ‘resource appendage’ of China, then securitizes economic relations with China.
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... While the islands lie on the Chinese side, Khabarovsk Krai Governor Viktor Ishaev adamantly refuses to return them, for fear that his regional capital would become a vulnerable border outpost. Ishaev acknowledges the importance ...