- 177 Livingston St., Sixth Floor
Brooklyn NY 11201 - 718-907-5759
Jacob Remes
New York University, Gallatin School of Individualized Study, Faculty Member
- American History, Canadian History, Critical Disaster Studies, Labor History (U.S. history), Labor History, Urban History, and 9 moreTransnational History, Disaster Studies, Gilded Age and Progressive Era, Urban Agriculture, Food History, Agriculture and Food Studies, Migration History, Labor History and Studies, and Disaster Historyedit
- Jacob Remes is clinical assistant professor in the Gallatin School of Individualized Study at New York University. He... moreJacob Remes is clinical assistant professor in the Gallatin School of Individualized Study at New York University. He teaches and studies the working-class and labor history of North America, with a focus on urban disasters, working-class organizations, and migration. His book, "Disaster Citizenship: Survivors, Solidarity, and Power in the North American Progressive Era" (University of Illinois Press, 2016) examines the overlapping responses of individuals, families, civil society, and the state to the Salem, Mass., Fire of 1914, and the Halifax, N.S., Explosion of 1917. The winner of the Gutman and Forsey Prizes in labor and working-class history, he is past executive secretary of the Labor and Working-Class History Association and was the William Lyon Mackenzie King Research Fellow at Harvard, a Josephine de Karman Fellow, and an American Council of Learned Societies/Andrew W. Mellon Recent Doctoral Recipients Fellow. Before coming to NYU, he was a mentor and assistant professor of history, public affairs, and labor studies at SUNY Empire State College, where he taught in the Metropolitan Center and the School for Graduate Studies. He has also taught at Harvard, Columbia, Duke, and Meiji Universities. He received his B.A. in history from Yale University in 2002 and an M.A. in history (2006) and Ph.D in history (2010) from Duke University.edit
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Since the 1970s, human ecologists, geographers, Marxian political economists and others have insisted that there is no such thing as a 'natural' disaster. This assertion opened a space not only for exploring socioeconomic conditions that... more
Since the 1970s, human ecologists, geographers, Marxian political economists and others have insisted that there is no such thing as a 'natural' disaster. This assertion opened a space not only for exploring socioeconomic conditions that render marginalized populations vulnerable to natural hazards, but also for the formation of a field, the political ecology of hazards. A few political ecologists further interrogated the idea of a natural disaster, asking how different notions of 'the natural' circulate in post-disaster politics and with what effects. This article extends the latter approach by documenting how interconnected categories of 'nature' and 'state' were mutually constituted by narratives of politicians and elites after Chile's 2010 earthquake and tsunami. Drawing on media reports, we identify three distinct pairings of state/nature: (1) nature as manageable and the state as manager; (2) nature as out of control and the state as a police state; and (3) nature as financial opportunity and the state as prudential. Influenced by socioeconomic and historical factors, these state/nature pairings contradicted and reinforced one another in the disaster's aftermath and were deployed to reinforce top-down—rather than democratic—strategies of post-disaster reconstruction. This case offers an unusual approach to disaster politics by tracing how entwined and power-laden categories of state and nature condition the governance of disaster reconstruction processes.
Research Interests:
Popular accounts of the Halifax Explosion of 1917 have placed it in a resolutely nationalist context. But starting from the international ownerships and destinations of the ships that sparked it, the explosion was a transnational event.... more
Popular accounts of the Halifax Explosion of 1917 have placed it in a resolutely nationalist context. But starting from the international ownerships and destinations of the ships that sparked it, the explosion was a transnational event. This article explores how people, money, and ideas crossed and recrossed the border. First, in-kind and monetary relief flowed quickly from the United States, Britain, and Newfoundland. Second, Halifax became a destination for a growing international community of experts in disaster response, as relief experts from New York, Boston, Winnipeg, and elsewhere in North America converged on the city. Finally, survivors used their transnational community of friends and relatives to build political power over the relief process. Migrants living in “the Boston States” created a transnational polity that pressured relief authorities to give more money to their kin still in Halifax. These transnational communities—of international experts and migrant families—helped create a Canada–US relationship from the bottom.
Research Interests: Canadian History, Transnationalism, Disaster Studies, Canadian Maritimes, Transnational History, and 8 moreMigration Studies, Disaster Management, Nova Scotia History, History of Disasters, Historical Disaster Studies, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, Disaster History, and Critical Disaster Studies
When a ship explosion in Halifax Harbor destroyed much of the surrounding area, among the devastated places was Kebeceque, an informal Mi'kmaw settlement in Dartmouth that had been under non-Native pressure for decades. The white owner of... more
When a ship explosion in Halifax Harbor destroyed much of the surrounding area, among the devastated places was Kebeceque, an informal Mi'kmaw settlement in Dartmouth that had been under non-Native pressure for decades. The white owner of the land had long insisted that the Department of Indian Affairs remove the Mi'kmaq who camped on his property; the Mi'kmaq resisted these demands by relying on traditional practices of seasonal transience and innovative forms of leadership. Showman and Native doctor Jerry Lone Cloud led the struggle to stay in Kebeceque. Among a generation of informal leaders, he was emblematic of multiple Mi'kmaw cultural and economic survival strategies.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
The 1925 United Mine Workers strike in Cape Breton was a crucial turning point in the thinking of James Morrison, the bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Antigonish from 1913 to 1950. Before the strike, Morrison had consistently opposed the... more
The 1925 United Mine Workers strike in Cape Breton was a crucial turning point in the thinking of James Morrison, the bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Antigonish from 1913 to 1950. Before the strike, Morrison had consistently opposed the education reforms promoted by his subordinate, Father J.J. Tompkins. The strike encouraged Morrison to fear radical labor unions, which encouraged him accept the creation of the Extension Department at St. Francis Xavier University. This article, drawing largely on Morrison’s correspondence, traces the evolution of Morrison’s thought within the context of eastern Nova Scotia’s labor history.
Research Interests:
Today, nation is often the paramount category organizing scholarship, politics, and other identities. Nations, states, and labor markets are imagined as coterminous; when they are not, it must be corrected or explained. But it has not... more
Today, nation is often the paramount category organizing scholarship, politics, and other identities. Nations, states, and labor markets are imagined as coterminous; when they are not, it must be corrected or explained. But it has not always been so. Studying the Toronto members of the International Typographical Union, this chapter explores the communities in which skilled workers placed themselves in the early years of Canadian confederation: a North American working class, a British imperial nation, and a Canadian polity. As North American workers, they made claims on their employers (for higher wages and shorter hours) and their fellows (to respect their union's authority); as British subjects, they made claims on the larger public (to support their right to organize and strike); and as Canadians, they made claims on their elected officials and the state (to change specific laws). Their group memberships overlapped, and printers accessed them as they found them relevant. As their monthly meeting minutes, their sojourns back and forth across the border, the newspaper they began publishing during an important strike, and their political activism in the election of 1872 show, Toronto's printers operated when neither they nor others expected nation, state, and labor market to be congruent.
Research Interests:
Since the 1970s, human ecologists, geographers, Marxian political economists and others have insisted that there is no such thing as a 'natural' disaster. This assertion opened a space not only for exploring socioeconomic conditions... more
Since the 1970s, human ecologists, geographers, Marxian political economists and others have insisted that there is no such thing as a 'natural' disaster. This assertion opened a space not only for exploring socioeconomic conditions that render marginalized populations vulnerable to natural hazards, but also for the formation of a field, the political ecology of hazards. A few political ecologists further interrogated the idea of a natural disaster, asking how different notions of 'the natural' circulate in post-disaster politics and with what effects. This article extends the latter approach by documenting how interconnected categories of 'nature' and 'state' were mutually constituted by narratives of politicians and elites after Chile's 2010 earthquake and tsunami. Drawing on media reports, we identify three distinct pairings of state/nature: (1) nature as manageable and the state as manager; (2) nature as out of control and the state as a police state; and (3) nature as financial opportunity and the state as prudential. Influenced by socioeconomic and historical factors, these state/nature pairings contradicted and reinforced one another in the disaster's aftermath and were deployed to reinforce top-down—rather than democratic—strategies of post-disaster reconstruction. This case offers an unusual approach to disaster politics by tracing how entwined and power-laden categories of state and nature condition the governance of disaster reconstruction processes.
Depuis les années 1970, des écologistes humains, des géographes, des économistes marxistes et d'autres ont insisté sur le fait qu'il n'y a pas une telle chose comme une catastrophe «naturelle». Cette affirmation a ouvert un espace non seulement pour explorer les conditions socio-économiques qui rendent les populations marginalisées vulnérables aux risques naturels, mais aussi pour la formation d'un champ, l'écologie politique des risques. Quelques écologistes politiques ont encore interrogé l'idée d'une catastrophe naturelle, et demandant comment les différentes notions de «naturel» circulent dans la politique post-catastrophe et avec quels effets. Cet article étend cette dernière approche en montrant comment les catégories reliées entre elles de «nature» et «état» ont été mutuellement constitués par les récits des politiciens et des élites après le séisme et le tsunami de 2010 au Chili. En utilisant les rapports des médias, nous identifions trois paires distinctes de l'Etat/nature: (1) la nature comme gérable et l'état en tant que gestionnaire; (2) la nature comme hors de contrôle et l'Etat comme un Etat policier; et (3) la nature comme une opportunité financière et l'État comme prudentiel. Influencé par des facteurs socio-économiques et historiques, ces appariements Etat/nature contredits et se renforçaient mutuellement dans la suite de la catastrophe. Ils ont été déployés pour renforcer les stratégies top-down (plutôt que démocratique) de reconstruction post-catastrophe. Ce cas offre une approche inhabituelle à la politique en cas de catastrophe, en traçant comment les catégories d'Etat et de la nature sont enlacés et chargés avec le pouvoir, et conditionnent la gouvernance des processus de reconstruction en cas de catastrophe.
Desde la década del 1970, los ecologistas humanos, los geógrafos, los economistas políticos marxistas y otros han insistido que los desastres "naturales" no existen como tal. Ésta afirmación ha abierto un espacio no sólo para explorar las condiciones socioeconómicas de poblaciones que son vulnerables a los riesgos naturales, sino también para la conformación de una línea de investigación, la ecología política de los riesgos. Algunos ecologistas políticos han ido más allá del cuestionamiento sobre la idea de "desastre natural" preguntándose cómo diferentes nociones de lo "natural" ha circulado en las políticas post- desastres y cuales han sido sus efectos. Este artículo se extiende desde este último enfoque, documentando como las categorías interconectadas de "natural" y "estado" se constituyen de manera conjunta entre las narrativas de los políticos y de las elites después del terremoto y tsunami ocurridos en Chile en el 2010. Sobre la base de lo publicado por los medios de comunicación, se identifican tres parejas distintas en que se relaciona estado y naturaleza: (1) la naturaleza como manejable y al estado como gerente o administrador, (2) la naturaleza fuera de control y el estado como un estado policial, y (3) la naturaleza como una oportunidad financiera y el estado como prudente. Influenciado por factores socioeconómicos e históricos, estos emparejamientos estado / naturaleza contradicen y se refuerzan mutuamente una y otra vez en las secuelas de la catástrofe y fueron desplegadas para reforzar estrategias top down, en lugar de estrategias democráticas de reconstrucción post-desastre. Este caso ofrece un enfoque inusual a las políticas de desastres mediante el trazado interconectado de cómo el poder del estado y la naturaleza condicionan la gobernabilidad de los procesos de reconstrucción de desastres.
Depuis les années 1970, des écologistes humains, des géographes, des économistes marxistes et d'autres ont insisté sur le fait qu'il n'y a pas une telle chose comme une catastrophe «naturelle». Cette affirmation a ouvert un espace non seulement pour explorer les conditions socio-économiques qui rendent les populations marginalisées vulnérables aux risques naturels, mais aussi pour la formation d'un champ, l'écologie politique des risques. Quelques écologistes politiques ont encore interrogé l'idée d'une catastrophe naturelle, et demandant comment les différentes notions de «naturel» circulent dans la politique post-catastrophe et avec quels effets. Cet article étend cette dernière approche en montrant comment les catégories reliées entre elles de «nature» et «état» ont été mutuellement constitués par les récits des politiciens et des élites après le séisme et le tsunami de 2010 au Chili. En utilisant les rapports des médias, nous identifions trois paires distinctes de l'Etat/nature: (1) la nature comme gérable et l'état en tant que gestionnaire; (2) la nature comme hors de contrôle et l'Etat comme un Etat policier; et (3) la nature comme une opportunité financière et l'État comme prudentiel. Influencé par des facteurs socio-économiques et historiques, ces appariements Etat/nature contredits et se renforçaient mutuellement dans la suite de la catastrophe. Ils ont été déployés pour renforcer les stratégies top-down (plutôt que démocratique) de reconstruction post-catastrophe. Ce cas offre une approche inhabituelle à la politique en cas de catastrophe, en traçant comment les catégories d'Etat et de la nature sont enlacés et chargés avec le pouvoir, et conditionnent la gouvernance des processus de reconstruction en cas de catastrophe.
Desde la década del 1970, los ecologistas humanos, los geógrafos, los economistas políticos marxistas y otros han insistido que los desastres "naturales" no existen como tal. Ésta afirmación ha abierto un espacio no sólo para explorar las condiciones socioeconómicas de poblaciones que son vulnerables a los riesgos naturales, sino también para la conformación de una línea de investigación, la ecología política de los riesgos. Algunos ecologistas políticos han ido más allá del cuestionamiento sobre la idea de "desastre natural" preguntándose cómo diferentes nociones de lo "natural" ha circulado en las políticas post- desastres y cuales han sido sus efectos. Este artículo se extiende desde este último enfoque, documentando como las categorías interconectadas de "natural" y "estado" se constituyen de manera conjunta entre las narrativas de los políticos y de las elites después del terremoto y tsunami ocurridos en Chile en el 2010. Sobre la base de lo publicado por los medios de comunicación, se identifican tres parejas distintas en que se relaciona estado y naturaleza: (1) la naturaleza como manejable y al estado como gerente o administrador, (2) la naturaleza fuera de control y el estado como un estado policial, y (3) la naturaleza como una oportunidad financiera y el estado como prudente. Influenciado por factores socioeconómicos e históricos, estos emparejamientos estado / naturaleza contradicen y se refuerzan mutuamente una y otra vez en las secuelas de la catástrofe y fueron desplegadas para reforzar estrategias top down, en lugar de estrategias democráticas de reconstrucción post-desastre. Este caso ofrece un enfoque inusual a las políticas de desastres mediante el trazado interconectado de cómo el poder del estado y la naturaleza condicionan la gobernabilidad de los procesos de reconstrucción de desastres.