- Political Philosophy, Rational Choice Theory, Game Theory, Rational Choice Institutionalism, Public Choice, Social Choice Theory, and 26 moreAnalytic Philosophy, Collective Action, Gerald Gaus, Amartya Sen, John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Evolutionary Game Theory, Theories of Justice, Philosophy of Science, Distributive Justice, Economy of Religion, Political Science, Political Theory, Sufficientarianism, Equality, Egalitarianism, Rationality, Libertarianism, Ronald Dworkin, Rational Choice, Global Justice, Moral and Political Philosophy, Contemporary Political Theory, Contemporary Political Philosophy, Justice, and Social Justiceedit
In this article I aim to show that compulsory voting cannot be defended on democratic grounds. In pursuing this task, I first offer a generic account of the democratic argument in favour of compulsory voting, drawing on some of the most... more
In this article I aim to show that compulsory voting cannot be defended on democratic grounds. In pursuing this task, I first offer a generic account of the democratic argument in favour of compulsory voting, drawing on some of the most salient recent defences of a moral duty to vote. I then offer an overarching objection which defeats both the generic form of the democratic argument for compulsory voting and its various operationalizations. The crux of the objection is that the democratic justification of a moral duty to vote is parasitical upon the existence of a moral duty to vote well. This decisively undermines the democratic argument for compulsory voting, since the latter can only be deployed as an enforcement mechanism for a duty to vote, regardless of the substantive content of that vote.
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In this article I aim to provide the first normative discussion of the legalization of barter voting markets, namely markets which allow the trading of votes on issues/elections for votes on other issues/elections. The article is framed... more
In this article I aim to provide the first normative discussion of the legalization of barter voting markets, namely markets which allow the trading of votes on issues/elections for votes on other issues/elections. The article is framed within the wider literature on the legal permissibility of vote buying, with a particular focus on the recent debate between Christopher Freiman and James Stacey Taylor. I argue that while Taylor's objections succesfully defeat Freiman's case in favour of standard voting markets, they are unable to also defeat the type of voting markets outlined here. Furthermore, I argue that there are at least two plausible prima facie reasons to favour the legalization of barter voting markets, grounded in their capacity to contribute to the alleviation of injustice for systematically disadvantaged socioeconomic groups and to their capacity to reduce one form of bad voting, i.e. voting from ignorance.
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In this paper we aim to examine a novel view on distributive justice, i.e. limitarianism, which claims that it is morally impermissible to be rich. Our main goal is to assess the two arguments provided by Ingrid Robeyns in favour of... more
In this paper we aim to examine a novel view on distributive justice, i.e. limitarianism, which claims that it is morally impermissible to be rich. Our main goal is to assess the two arguments provided by Ingrid Robeyns in favour of limitarianism, namely the democratic argument and the argument from unmet urgent needs and the two distinct limitarian views which these arguments give rise to. We claim that strong limitarianism, which is supported by the democratic argument, should be rejected as it fails to fully instantiate the value of political equality, while having some other unattractive implications as well. By contrast, we argue that weak limitarianism, which is supported by the argument from unmet urgent needs, should be endorsed, albeit in a qualified version which also takes responsibility constraints into consideration.
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The ethics of voting have received relatively little attention from philosophers and political scientists, though they are far more complicated than one might have supposed. It is hard to draw a sharp line between the principles that... more
The ethics of voting have received relatively little attention from philosophers and political scientists, though they are far more complicated than one might have supposed. It is hard to draw a sharp line between the principles that might justify adopting or rejecting compulsory voting, and the evaluation of individual and collective behaviour within those rules. Resolving disputes about compulsory voting, therefore, requires us to decide when, if ever, people are morally entitled to vote on sectarian identities and interests, rather than for the ‘common good’ of their fellow citizens; when, if ever, they are morally entitled to vote on altruistic, rather than self-interested, concerns; and when, if ever, they may vote strategically, rather than sincerely. We do not yet have good answers to these questions. Above all, it is difficult to resolve disputes over the ethics of voting in general, and compulsory voting in particular, without relating the conceptions of rights, duty, freedom and equality involved to those in other areas of moral and political philosophy, and to more empirical work on voting, on comparative public policy and political economy. This chapter explains why this is the case.
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Many of the recent methodological debates within political theory have focused on the ideal/non-ideal theory distinction. While ideal theorists recognise the need to develop an account of the transition between the two levels of... more
Many of the recent methodological debates within political theory have focused on the ideal/non-ideal theory distinction. While ideal theorists recognise the need to develop an account of the transition between the two levels of theorising, no general proposal has been advanced thus far. In this paper I aim to bridge this conceptual gap. Towards this end, I first reconstruct the ideal/non-ideal theory distinction within a simplified two-dimensional framework, which captures the primary meanings usually attributed to it. Subsequently, I use this framework to provide an algorithm for the bidirectional transition between ideal and non-ideal theory, based on the incremental derivation of normative models. The approach outlined illuminates the various ways in which principles derived under highly idealised assumptions might be distorted by the circumstances of our current world and illustrates the various paths which we can pursue in moving from our current state of the world to an ideal one.
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In this paper I challenge the claim that each party in the original position will have a first-ranked preference for an identical set of principles of justice. I maintain, by contrast, that the original position allows parties to choose... more
In this paper I challenge the claim that each party in the original position will have a first-ranked preference for an identical set of principles of justice. I maintain, by contrast, that the original position allows parties to choose on the basis of different conceptions of rationality, which in turn may lead to a reasonable disagreement concerning the principles of justice selected. I then argue that this reasonable disagreement should not lead us to abandon contractualism, but rather to reconstruct it in the form of a two-stage process, where parties first build individual preference rankings for alternative conceptions of justice and then work towards a reconciliation of the divergent conceptions that are chosen in the first stage. Finally, I claim that threshold prioritarianism is a strong candidate for selection in this reconciliatory stage, since it manages to address both the legitimate complaints of parties that would prefer a conception of justice focused on the most disadvantaged positions in society and the legitimate complaints of parties that would prefer a conception of justice in which less or no special weight is assigned to the worst-off positions.
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In this paper I aim to examine some problematic implications of the fact that individuals make systematic reasoning errors, for resource egalitarianism. I begin by disentangling the concepts of preferences, choices and ambitions, which... more
In this paper I aim to examine some problematic implications of the fact that individuals make systematic reasoning errors, for resource egalitarianism. I begin by disentangling the concepts of preferences, choices and ambitions, which are sometimes used interchangeably by egalitarians. Subsequently, I claim that the most plausible interpretation of resource egalitarianism takes preferences, not choices, as the site of responsibility. This distinction is salient, since preference-sensitive resource egalitarianism is faced with an important objection when applied to situations in which the empirically reasonable assumption that individuals have different degrees of computational abilities is introduced. I first show that this objection can be raised in cases involving individuals who have incomplete information, but that it ultimately fails for such cases since we can appeal to higher order insurance markets in order to mitigate any initial concerns. I further claim, however, that the objection is much more powerful in cases involving individuals who have different reasoning skills, since the appeal to higher order insurance markets is no longer tenable. Consequently, the ideal principle of justice proposed by Dworkin is met with a new feasibility challenge. Finally, I claim that the problem of reasoning errors and various forms of cognitive biases also affect Dworkin's non-ideal principle of justice, skewing the outputs of the hypothetical insurance mechanism in an unjustifiable manner.
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In this article I aim to explore the link between two normative values, i.e. justice and efficiency, and the New Public Management approach. In pursuing this task I offer several critical arguments against some of the recent justice-based... more
In this article I aim to explore the link between two normative values, i.e. justice and efficiency, and the New Public Management approach. In pursuing this task I offer several critical arguments against some of the recent justice-based objections levied against New Public Management by David Arellano-Gault. I claim that Arellano-Gault's account of the relation between justice and the New Public Management is seriously undermined by two conceptual flaws: (1) a conflation of right-libertarianism, utilitarianism and desert theories of justice and (2) a conflation of the technical/productive sense of efficiency with the social/distributive sense. Furthermore, I maintain that even when the different theories of justice and the different senses of efficiency are properly delineated, the case for necessarily linking NPM to a particular theory of justice is markedly unconvincing.
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In this paper I attempt to refute a recent challenge raised by Michael Otsuka against prioritarianism, according to which the priority view is objectionable since it rejects the moral permissibility of choosing in accordance with rational... more
In this paper I attempt to refute a recent challenge raised by Michael Otsuka against prioritarianism, according to which the priority view is objectionable since it rejects the moral permissibility of choosing in accordance with rational self-interest-understood as maximization of expected utility-in one-person cases involving other-regarding decision-making under risk. I claim that Otsuka's argument is bound to make an illegitimate move which is either to implausibly assume that individuals are risk-neutral or to implausibly assume that the decision-maker in his cases can have accurate information on the attitudes towards risk held by the individual on behalf of whom the decision is taken. I argue, pace Otsuka, that acting in accordance with rational self-interest in cases characterized by these types of epistemic constraints requires that we adopt a view on other-regarding decision-making which takes into account general empirical facts about human nature and that prioritarianism does not conflict with this latter view.
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In this paper I seek to assess the responses provided by several theories of sufficientarian justice in cases where individuals hold different conceptions of rationality. Towards this purpose, I build two test cases and study the... more
In this paper I seek to assess the responses provided by several theories of sufficientarian justice in cases where individuals hold different conceptions of rationality. Towards this purpose, I build two test cases and study the normative prescriptions which various sufficiency views offer in each of them. I maintain that resource sufficientarianism does not provide a normatively plausible response to the first case, since its distributive prescriptions would violate the principle of personal good and that subjective-threshold welfare sufficientarianism as well as objective-threshold welfare sufficientarianism committed to the headcount claim do not provide normatively plausible responses to the second case, since their distributive prescriptions would violate the principle of equal importance. I then claim that an objective-threshold welfare sufficientarian view committed to prioritarianism under the threshold offers the normatively plausible response to both cases and therefore resists the challenge raised by scenarios that involve differential conceptions of rationality. ___________________________________________________________________________
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This paper analyzes the distribution of a priori voting power of states and regional groups within the UN Security Council, under the most salient reform proposals of the past decade. The results obtained show that moderate proposals,... more
This paper analyzes the distribution of a priori voting power of states and regional groups within the UN Security Council, under the most salient reform proposals of the past decade. The results obtained show that moderate proposals, which do not seek to expand veto rights, generally yield a higher voting power share for non-veto states in the Council (both individually and collectively), at the expense of veto states, but do not significantly alter the geographical distribution of voting power. By constrast, the more radical proposals, which seek to expand veto rights, yield a more balanced regional representation, but have the adverse effect of concentrating voting power almost entirely in the hands of the small number of states with veto rights, with non-veto states cumulatively holding less than 2% of all voting power shares in the Security Council under the Normalized Banzhaf index and less than 0.01% under the Shapley-Shubik index.
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In this paper we aim to reduce the force of the expensive tastes objection to equality of welfare, by constructing a pluralist welfare egalitarian theory which is not defeated by it. In the first part, we argue that Cohen's condition of... more
In this paper we aim to reduce the force of the expensive tastes objection to equality of welfare, by constructing a pluralist welfare egalitarian theory which is not defeated by it. In the first part, we argue that Cohen's condition of responsibility-sensitiveness is not able to provide a satisfactory rebuttal of the expensive tastes objection for at least a class of theorists of justice, namely those who adhere to a methodologically fact-sensitive view. In the second part, we explore the possibility of constructing a welfare egalitarian theory that gives weight to both equality and efficiency. We propose two alternatives, which integrate a utilitarian constraint and a Weak Pareto constraint on equality and show that both theories consistently differentiate between compensable and non-compensable expensive tastes, but should ultimately be rejected due to other unattractive implications. Finally, we develop a fairness-constrained theory of welfare egalitarianism and suggest that it can distinguish between compensable and non-compensable expensive tastes in both a conceptually consistent and a morally plausible manner, without generating decisive alternative objections.
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In his reply to my article on distributive justice and political ideologies, published in a previous issue of Studia Politica, Valentin Stoian has raised a number of important points and has paved the way for a more in-depth discussion on... more
In his reply to my article on distributive justice and political ideologies,
published in a previous issue of Studia Politica, Valentin Stoian has raised a number of important points and has paved the way for a more in-depth discussion on the concept of distributive justice. Stoian offers three central objections to my arguments. First, he claims that the view of distributive justice which I purport to describe is flawed both because it refers to specific distributive justice theories, not to distributive justice as a field of philosophical investigation, and because it implausibly narrows down the scope of the field due to its incorporation of the notion of a pattern (interpreted in a Nocizkian sense) instead of a distributive principle. Second, he claims that one of the ideologies that I present in my article as being incompatible with distributive justice, i.e. anarchism, cannot be intelligibly discussed within the framework of distributive justice since it belongs to a different field, namely that of political obligations. Third, he claims that I offer an unfair construal of the European Left Platform (henceforth, ELP) manifesto by focusing on a holistic interpretation of Marxism and that under a more adequate account, the ELP is not incompatible with the idea of distributive justice. In this rejoinder I will largely concede the latter point but offer a refutation of the first two objections.
published in a previous issue of Studia Politica, Valentin Stoian has raised a number of important points and has paved the way for a more in-depth discussion on the concept of distributive justice. Stoian offers three central objections to my arguments. First, he claims that the view of distributive justice which I purport to describe is flawed both because it refers to specific distributive justice theories, not to distributive justice as a field of philosophical investigation, and because it implausibly narrows down the scope of the field due to its incorporation of the notion of a pattern (interpreted in a Nocizkian sense) instead of a distributive principle. Second, he claims that one of the ideologies that I present in my article as being incompatible with distributive justice, i.e. anarchism, cannot be intelligibly discussed within the framework of distributive justice since it belongs to a different field, namely that of political obligations. Third, he claims that I offer an unfair construal of the European Left Platform (henceforth, ELP) manifesto by focusing on a holistic interpretation of Marxism and that under a more adequate account, the ELP is not incompatible with the idea of distributive justice. In this rejoinder I will largely concede the latter point but offer a refutation of the first two objections.
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În această lucrare intenționez să construiesc o nouă versiune a principiului precauției, ce include considerații legate de eficiență în definiția principiului, versiune ce are avantajul de a elimina o serie de critici aduse împotriva... more
În această lucrare intenționez să construiesc o nouă versiune a principiului precauției, ce include considerații legate de eficiență în definiția principiului, versiune ce are avantajul de a elimina o serie de critici aduse împotriva construcției clasice a principiului precauției. În același timp însă, reconstrucția dezvoltată în lucrare menține un caracter
părtinitor în favoarea status-quo-ului, aspect esențial al principiului clasic al precauției.
părtinitor în favoarea status-quo-ului, aspect esențial al principiului clasic al precauției.
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In this paper I provide a broad evaluation of the place which distibutive justice occupies within the space of political ideologies. Specifically, I decompose the concept of distributive justice into five constituent elements: pattern,... more
In this paper I provide a broad evaluation of the place which distibutive justice occupies within the space of political ideologies. Specifically, I decompose the concept of distributive justice into five constituent elements: pattern, currency, constraints on distribution, site and scope and show the incompatibilites which exist between operationalizations of these elements and various political ideologies. I conclude that social-democracy is the ideology which most faithfully embodies the ideal of distributive justice and that under certain interpretations of its elements, feminism, environmentalism and cosmopolitanism also require distributive justice as part of their ideological cores. I claim that, by contrast, right-wing libertarianism, conservatism, anarchism and monist ideologies are necessarily disqualified by some of the elements of distributive justice and that under mainstream theories on distributive constraints, socialism seems to fall into the same category.
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In this chapter we provide a general introduction to collective action theory. Following Ostrom and Ahn (2009) we differentiate between first and second generation theories of collective action and we divide the chapter into two major... more
In this chapter we provide a general introduction to collective action theory. Following Ostrom and Ahn (2009) we differentiate between first and second generation theories of collective action and we divide the chapter into two major sections according to this delineation. In section (1.2.1) we provide an overview of Olson’s (1965) theory of collective action, which represents the paradigmatic case of theories belonging to the first generation. In this section we provide both the standard view of a collective action problem, as proposed by Olson, the free riding hypothesis, his definition of a public good, his taxonomy of groups and the implications of this taxonomy for collective action, as well as some of the main critiques and refinements of his theory. In section (1.2.2) we describe the standard taxonomy of goods, as used in the bulk of contemporary literature on collective action. This taxonomy departs from Olson’s own classification of goods and draws on a combination of the works of Samuelson (1954) and Musgrave (1959), which is developed into a coherent view by Ostrom and Ostrom (1977), and is particularly important for understanding what types of goods are susceptible to generate collective action problems. In section (1.2.3) we provide an introductory explanation to the standard conceptualization of collective action problems, within a game theoretical framework. In order to do this, we use the classical prisoner’s dilemma game with one individual and one collective player, showing that (at least) in the one-shot game, first generation theories of collective action will predict that the result of the game will be non-cooperation from all players, since that is both the dominant strategy for each player and the Nash Equilibrium.
In section (1.3.1) we provide an introduction to some of the main ideas which characterize the Ostromian theory of collective action, a paradigmatic case for second generation theories, which was developed as a response to the puzzles presented by experimental and empirical evidence of cooperation in collective action dilemmas. In section (1.3.2) we outline the experimental approach to collective action problems, used both as a testing ground for theories belonging to both generations and for theory-building. We describe a classical version of a public goods experiment , as constructed by Andreoni (1995) and summarize the major results obtained in the experimental literature, following Ledyard (1995) and Ostrom (2000). In section (1.3.3) we describe another mechanism for testing and theory-building, used exclusively by second generation theorists, i.e. empirical case studies. We provide some of the main collections of such studies and we gloss over some of the main results obtained. In the final section (1.4) we provide concluding remarks.
In section (1.3.1) we provide an introduction to some of the main ideas which characterize the Ostromian theory of collective action, a paradigmatic case for second generation theories, which was developed as a response to the puzzles presented by experimental and empirical evidence of cooperation in collective action dilemmas. In section (1.3.2) we outline the experimental approach to collective action problems, used both as a testing ground for theories belonging to both generations and for theory-building. We describe a classical version of a public goods experiment , as constructed by Andreoni (1995) and summarize the major results obtained in the experimental literature, following Ledyard (1995) and Ostrom (2000). In section (1.3.3) we describe another mechanism for testing and theory-building, used exclusively by second generation theorists, i.e. empirical case studies. We provide some of the main collections of such studies and we gloss over some of the main results obtained. In the final section (1.4) we provide concluding remarks.
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În acest capitol construim o prezentare introductivă a problemelor de acţiune colectivă ce au ca obiect central bunurile comune. Capitolul este împărţit în două secţiuni. În prima secţiune definim bunurile comune şi ilustrăm o serie de... more
În acest capitol construim o prezentare introductivă a problemelor de acţiune colectivă ce au ca obiect central bunurile comune. Capitolul este împărţit în două secţiuni. În prima secţiune definim bunurile comune şi ilustrăm o serie de situaţii în care gestionarea acestora este problematică. De asemenea, pornind de la exemplul oferit de Hardin (1968) privind supraxploatarea păşunilor, discutăm “tragedia” bunurilor comune, prezentând cele două soluţii clasice propuse pentru ieşirea din dilema socială şi soluţia alternativă propusă de Ostrom (1990). În cea de-a doua secţiune prezentăm Cadrul de Analiză şi Dezvoltare Instituţională propus de Ostrom (2005) ce poate fi utilizat pentru înţelegerea şi soluţionarea problemelor ce apar în gestionarea problemelor de acţiune colectivă, descriind elementele sale componente: variabilele exogene, arena de acţiune, interacţiunile şi criteriile de evaluare.
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În acest capitol, structurat în patru părţi, abordăm problema comportamentului religios din perspectiva economiei religiei. În prima parte discutăm problema religiei pornind de la modelele ce au ca bază cererea religioasă, determinată de... more
În acest capitol, structurat în patru părţi, abordăm problema comportamentului religios din perspectiva economiei religiei. În prima parte discutăm problema religiei pornind de la modelele ce au ca bază cererea religioasă, determinată de indivizii consumatori, i.e. modelul producţiei religioase domestice, modelul capitalului religios, modelul comportamentului normativ şi modelul portofoliilor religioase. În cea de-a doua parte analizăm oferta religioasă, discutând modelele producţiei de bunuri religioase, i.e. teoria firmei şi teoria clubului, distincţia biserică-sectă, tipologia organizaţiilor religioase şi pieţele religioase. În cea de-a treia parte discutăm problema reglementării pieţei religioase în România, iar în cea de-a patra parte prezentăm câteva dintre cele mai importante critici ale abordării.
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Capitolul este împărţit în două secţiuni principale, abordând separat problemele referitoare la mărimea legislativului şi cele referitoare la structura legislativului. În prima secţiune (7.1) discut mărimea legislativului atât din... more
Capitolul este împărţit în două secţiuni principale, abordând separat problemele referitoare la mărimea legislativului şi cele referitoare la structura legislativului. În prima secţiune (7.1) discut mărimea legislativului atât din perspectiva factorilor care determină dimensiunea sa (7.1.1), pornind de la analiza lui Stigler (1976), cât şi din perspectiva efectelor determinate de alegerea unei anumite dimensiuni, în special în ceea ce priveşte relaţia dintre mărimea legislativului şi mărimea guvernământului, cu referire la legea 1/n, legea 1/n inversată şi legea k/n (7.1.2). În cea de-a doua secţiune (7.2) discut structura legislativului, concentrându-mă pe studiile efectelor bicameralismului construite în cadrul teoriei alegerii publice. În acest sens prezint analiza lui Buchanan şi Tullock (1999, [1962]) care arată în ce condiţii bicameralismul poate conduce la creşterea nivelului de reprezentare al intereselor cetăţenilor (7.2.1) continuând cu argumentele lui Riker (1992) şi Levmore (1992) în favoarea introducerii bicameralismului datorită reducerii posibilităţii apariţiei tiraniei majorităţii (7.2.2) şi cu argumentele lui Hammond şi Miller (1987) şi Miller et al (1986) privind reducerea instabilităţii legislative în sistemele bicamerale (7.2.3). În cea de-a treia secţiune (7.3) prezint succint o serie de direcţii alternative de cercetare, din cadrul abordării teoriei alegerii publice, referitoare la mărimea şi structura legislativului.
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In this paper I test the hypothesis according to which the Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) solution concept significantly outperforms the Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) in experimental situations. The testing ground for the... more
In this paper I test the hypothesis according to which the Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) solution concept significantly outperforms the Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) in experimental situations. The testing ground for the hypothesis is an experiment with variations of the RPS game applied in June 2013 to students from various universities in Bucharest. The results of the experiment show that the QRE solution does not perform substantially better than the Nash Equilibrium for two of the three games studied and that it does represent a slight improvement in only one of the games. This result lies in stark contrast to the bulk of the literature developed thusfar on the QRE solution.
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In this paper I discuss a dimension of power distribution in one of the most important international organs tasked with the design and implementation of global governance, namely the UN Security Council. Specifically, I analyze the a... more
In this paper I discuss a dimension of power distribution in one of the most important international organs tasked with the design and implementation of global governance, namely the UN Security Council. Specifically, I analyze the a priori voting power of states and regional groups under various proposals for reforming Security Council membership and voting rules submitted in 2005: (1) the Secretary-General’s In Larger Freedom Report, (2) the G4 draft resolution, (3) the Uniting for Consensus draft resolution and (4) the Ezulwini Consensus draft resolution. In order to accomplish this, I first use the Normalized Banzhaf (1965), Coleman Power to Prevent Action (1971), Coleman Power to Initiate Action (1971) and Shapley-Shubik (1954) indices to identify and understand the changes in voting power of permanent and non-permanent members under proposed reform plans, both individually and cumulatively. Secondly, I use the same measures of power distribution in committees to analyze the shifts in voting power shares of regional groups. The paper can therefore be considered both a contribution to the topic of voting power in the Security Council as well as a contribution to contemporary debates on the obstacles, implications and consequences of a UN Security Council reform.
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In this paper I use the concept of hypothetical insurance mechanism to build a welfarist sufficientarian threshold, which I show to be non-arbitrary, non-ambiguous, genuine choice-sensitive and robust to changes in assumptions about the... more
In this paper I use the concept of hypothetical insurance mechanism to build a welfarist sufficientarian threshold, which I show to be non-arbitrary, non-ambiguous, genuine choice-sensitive and robust to changes in assumptions about the formal rationality of individuals. In the first part of the paper I present the most salient versions of welfarist thresholds discussed in sufficientarian literature, i.e. Harry Frankfurt’s (1987) contentment threshold, Roger Crisp’s (2003a) compassion threshold set by an impartial spectator, Robert Huseby’s (2010) two-tiered subsistence/contentment threshold and Yitzhak Benbaji’s (2006) three-tiered personhood/pain/luxury threshold, and go on to individually criticize all of them. In the second part of the paper I provide a restatement of welfare as second-order preference satisfaction in order to properly describe Slotean satisficiency. I show, contrary to Pettit (1984), that Slotean satisficiency can represent a sound definition of formal rationality, and therefore it cannot be used as a basis for rejecting sufficientarianism as Arneson (1999) implies that it could be. Subsequently, I launch a broader attack on all versions of welfarist thresholds, showing that objective-sufficientarian thresholds need to make implausible uniformity assumptions about formal rationality on the pain of violating the weak Pareto principle and that subjective-sufficientarian thresholds need to make them on the pain of violating the Rawlsian generality condition. In the third part of the paper I construct an alternative sufficientarian threshold, using the concept of hypothetical insurance mechanism, which responds to the above mentioned criticism and has the added value of preserving genuine choice-sensitivity. In the last part I present some concluding remarks and potential critical directions.
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In this paper I aim to show that Dworkin’s theory of egalitarian justice is internally inconsistent when we take into account differential endowments in rationality, construed as a personal resource of individuals. My argument is... more
In this paper I aim to show that Dworkin’s theory of egalitarian justice is internally inconsistent when we take into account differential endowments in rationality, construed as a personal resource of individuals. My argument is developed in three stages. In the first part I claim that the Dworkinian cut wrongly conflates preferences and choices and that the two are conceptually distinct, with the former one being the proper site of responsibility in Dworkin’s theory. In the second part I claim that Dworkinian egalitarianism can adequately face the challenge of informational constraints, by appealing to a second-order insurance market which provides policies against the possibility that individuals are faced with incomplete information when confronted with a gamble. However, in the third part I argue that egalitarianism, as understood by Dworkin, cannot make the same appeal to higher order insurance markets when individuals have imperfect decision-making abilities, since (1) they cannot be provided with an equal opportunity to insure and (2) bad brute luck compensation for differential rationality endowments cannot be enacted without contradicting other principles essential to Dworkin’s theory, such as the equal voice requirement or the requirement that people pay the price of the life they decide to lead.
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The purpose of this chapter is twofold, seeking both to provide an introduction to game theory (5.1) and to analyze one of the most important problems in political science, i.e. the evolution and sustainability of cooperation, within a... more
The purpose of this chapter is twofold, seeking both to provide an introduction to game theory (5.1) and to analyze one of the most important problems in political science, i.e. the evolution and sustainability of cooperation, within a game theoretical framework (5.2). The first part is divided into five sections, in which I discuss the elements of games (5.1.1), the forms of games (5.1.2), a classification of games (5.1.3), the two best-known solution concepts for games, namely the elimination of dominated strategies and the Nash equilibrium (5.1.4) and five of the most important types of games used both in game theory in general and in this volume, namely the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Coordination games, the Stag Hunt, Chicken and the Hawk-Dove game. The second part is divided into three parts, in which I discuss Axelrod’s approach to the evolution of cooperation (5.2.1), Binmore’s criticism of Axelrod’s methodology and results (5.2.2.1) and, briefly, some of the lines of research generated by Axelrod’s works (5.2.2.2).
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In this chapter I discuss current economic approaches to the study of terrorism, focusing in particular on economic models of terrorist behavior. In the first two sections I provide an outline of the chapter and describe the main... more
In this chapter I discuss current economic approaches to the study of terrorism, focusing in particular on economic models of terrorist behavior. In the first two sections I provide an outline of the chapter and describe the main characteristics of terrorism, as they are interpreted in the economic approach. In the third section, which represents the central part of the chapter, I discuss the most salient economic models of terrorist behavior, starting from models which analyze terrorism as a rational choice of organizations, i.e. Crenshaw (1990), Pape (2003) and Enders and Sandler (2002), continuing with models which analyze terrorism as a rational choice of individuals, i.e. Caplan (2006), Wintrobe (2002) and Azam (2005) and ending with models inspired from the economy of religion, i.e. Berman (2003), Berman and Laitin (2005) and Iannaccone (2006). In the fourth section I discuss three alternative directions which are of considerable significance in the economy of terrorism, namely economic modeling of terrorist tactics, economic approaches to the determinants of terrorism and economic approaches to the targets of terrorism.
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"In this paper I analyze Bilgili's critique of Dawkins' The God Delusion, showing that almost all of the logical fallacies supposedly identified by Bilgili are in fact sound arguments. I further show that Bilgili's paper is severely... more
"In this paper I analyze Bilgili's critique of Dawkins' The God Delusion, showing that almost all of the logical fallacies supposedly identified by Bilgili are in fact sound arguments. I further show that Bilgili's paper is severely biased toward one position of the debate and lacks the objectivity required to discuss important metaphysical issues such as the existence of God. The paper is structured into three main parts. In the first part I identify a number of general problems existing in Bilgili's paper, namely the perpetration of the hasty generalization fallacy, the creation of straw man arguments through the constant misrepresentation of Dawkins' positions when they target issues which are not directly related to the existence of God and the ad hominem arguments brought by Bilgili against Dawkins. In the second part I analyze Bilgili's claims of uncovering thirteen logical fallacies in Dawkins' book and show that twelve of the claims are unfounded, with only one of the claims being partially justified. In the third part I analyze the only argument presented by Bilgili in favour of the existence of God, which I term the argument from stronger implications, and I show that it belongs to a sub-class of Pascal Wager's type of arguments, going on to discredit both of them by following Oppy's line of reasoning. "
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"In the present paper we analyze two prominent global distributive justice theories, i.e. Pogge’s Global Resource Dividend theory (1994) and Dorsey’s maxificing welfarism (2005) under an assumption of bounded rationality. We consider that... more
"In the present paper we analyze two prominent global distributive justice theories, i.e. Pogge’s Global Resource Dividend theory (1994) and Dorsey’s maxificing welfarism (2005) under an assumption of bounded rationality. We consider that the agencies responsible for distributing resources are informationally constrained in regard to the assessment of economic positions in society and cognitively constrained in regard to the decision making process within the agency. We argue that under these conditions the distributive patterns prescribed by both theories can be severely distorted. Further, in Dorsey’s case bounded rationality can even lead to a complete failure of the theory, since not only are the resulting distributions sub-optimal if we introduce the possibility for a single mistake in the identification process, but they can also be completely redundant by prescribing distributions which are not capable of lifting a single citizen to the minimum level required for the fulfillment of basic needs. We further show that for both theories the identification problem becomes more severe and that the agencies are more susceptible to make mistakes in circumstances of extreme poverty, i.e. the circumstances primarily targeted by the theories. Aside from this main result, we also obtain three secondary results: 1. we extend the ongoing debates in political philosophy between ideal and non-ideal theories and in particular between fact-insensitivity and fact-sensitivity, 2. we provide a preliminary defense of a proportional distributive principle for global justice and 3. we provide a new starting point for the construction of arguments regarding the nature of the agency (e.g. global government, national governments, UN institutions, international NGOs) entitled to distribute resources in global justice theories.
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In this paper I demonstrate that the distribution of voters influences the theoretical predictions formulated through the directional model of spatial analysis, thereby refuting the claims made by Macdonald, Listhaug and Rabinowitz (1991)... more
In this paper I demonstrate that the distribution of voters influences the theoretical predictions formulated through the directional model of spatial analysis, thereby refuting the claims made by Macdonald, Listhaug and Rabinowitz (1991) who argue that the distribution of voters is only relevant for proximity-based models. Further, I show that the boundary of the region of responsibility is not always the ideologically dominant position, as Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989) originally assert, this situation appearing only as a special case, determined by the fact that the area encompassed between the graph of the voter distribution function and the x-axis is numerically higher between the boundary of the region of responsibility and the point of origin then between the most extreme point of the ideological dimension and the boundary of the region of responsibility. Finally, I improve the full proportionality theorem by specifying the necessary conditions for each position described in the theorem to become ideologically optimal.
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In this paper I provide an argument supporting Downs’s defense of political party attempts to construct weakly integrated ideologies, i.e. supporting certain policies which contradict the assumed ideological mainstream. In this respect I... more
In this paper I provide an argument supporting Downs’s defense of political party attempts to construct weakly integrated ideologies, i.e. supporting certain policies which contradict the assumed ideological mainstream. In this respect I employ a simplified version of the Davis-Hinich-Ordeshook proximity model in order to identify the voting mechanisms of individuals which analyze party policies as part of their electoral decision-making process. I conclude that although the main reason for occasional policy defections from the conventional ideological program is the fact that voters attach different weights to each policy dimension, uncertainty is in its turn a key factor in this respect.
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In this paper the author analyzes the nature of the legislative process which takes place within the European Parliament by studying the bilateral interactions among its relevant decisional groups, i.e. the parliamentary groups. In this... more
In this paper the author analyzes the nature of the legislative process which takes place within the European Parliament by studying the bilateral interactions among its relevant decisional groups, i.e. the parliamentary groups. In this sense, the author uses a methodological approach inspired from game theory, describing these interactions in the form of non-cooperative games similar in structure and function to the “negotiator’s dilemma” model proposed by Lax and Sebenius. Through comparing at a theoretical level the optimal strategies employed by parties in national parliaments with a majority-supported government with the optimal strategies employed by groups in the European Parliament the author concludes that the level of bilateral cooperation in the EP surpasses the one existent in national legislatures as cooperation is induced through the systemic relation developed among the groups as well as through institutional and ideological factors.
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In this paper we provide a theoretical framework for interpreting the reiterated failure of liberal parties in a series of Central European states (namely Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). We argue that the... more
In this paper we provide a theoretical framework for interpreting the reiterated failure of liberal parties in a series of Central European states (namely Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). We argue that the directional model of spatial analysis elaborated by Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989) and Macdonald, Listhaug and Rabinowitz (1991) can be an efficient instrument used for understanding why liberal parties are not able to perform as well as their opponents in elections, our hypothesis being, in consistency with the theoretical predictions made by the directional model, that political parties which ideologically diverge from the center without becoming too radical are more likely to increase their electoral percentage then parties which converge toward the ideological center. We test and partially confirm our hypothesis by comparatively studying the ideological shifts and electoral percentages of liberal parties within the 5 states mentioned above across a period of five consecutive elections, proving that a correlation between ideological shifts and electoral percentages exists in the sense predicted by the directional model for a large majority of cases.
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In this paper I intend to demonstrate that the libertarian minimal state proposed by R. Nozick has a detrimental influence on the positive liberty of its citizens. The central argument revolves around the negative consequences which... more
In this paper I intend to demonstrate that the libertarian minimal state proposed by R. Nozick has a detrimental influence on the positive liberty of its citizens. The central argument revolves around the negative consequences which natural monopolies imposed by private agents in the libertarian free-market have on the welfare of citizens and through this mechanism on their positive liberty. By contrast I argue that a situation where economies of scale are monopolized by the state and not by private agents determines the emergence of a superior socio-economical situation as the state does not become trapped in a prisoner’s dillemma game, unlike private agents which will have incentives to adopt free-rider strategies and exploit all sectors over which they hold a monopoly.
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Volumul Alegere rațională și comportament electoral explorează aspecte fundamentale ale democrației moderne având ca punct de reper abordarea economică 1 a comportamentului electoral al actorilor politici – votanții și... more
Volumul Alegere rațională și comportament electoral explorează aspecte fundamentale ale democrației moderne având ca punct de reper abordarea economică 1 a comportamentului electoral al actorilor politici – votanții și partidele/candidații. Capitolele 1 și 2 vizează problema deciziei de a vota, capitolele 3-5 analizează modul în care votanții își construiesc preferințele pentru partidele politice precum și modul în care acestea din urmă își aleg pozițiile ideologice, iar capitolul 6 tratează problema influenței instituțiilor electorale asupra comportamentului strategic al actorilor politici.
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Collective action problems are ubiquitous in situations involving human interactions and therefore lie at the heart of economy and political science. In one of the most salient statements on this topic, Elinor Ostrom (co-recipient of... more
Collective action problems are ubiquitous in situations involving human interactions and therefore lie at the heart of economy and political science. In one of the most salient statements on this topic, Elinor Ostrom (co-recipient of the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences) even claims that "the theory of collective action is the central subject of political science". The current volume, Modern Dilemmas: Understanding Collective Action in the 21st Century, is a collection of essays which target the problem of collective action from both a theoretical and applied perspective. The volume consists of four parts, each of these providing insights into different research fields. Thus, the first part, Theoretical Approaches, offers a guideline to the study of collective action in public choice theory and rational choice institutionalism and shows how it can be connected to other research programs such as constructivism, social network analysis and contractualism. The second part, Collective Action and Responsibility, tackles issues specific to political philosophy such as collective and individual responsibility and the morality of free-riding behavior. The third part, Collective Action and Public Policies, presents empirical studies on collective action in relation to educational policies, health policies and policies which target food security. Finally, the fourth part, Collective Action, Political Institutions and Social Movements, consists of various studies on classical problems of collective action such as political protests and revolutions, but also problems which are not traditionally associated with collective action such as party funding and the role of international organizations in economic recessions. The multidisciplinary character of the volume therefore makes it an interesting reading for students and scholars working in a number of different areas of study, such as political science, economy, political philosophy, public policies, comparative politics and international relations.