Elinor Ostrom

Que sont les « communs » ?
La notion ne cesse d’être mobilisée aujourd’hui. Elle traduit le constat d’une évolution des pratiques
sociales : les biens seraient davantage mis en partage. Logiciel libre, habitat participatif, vélos ou voitures en
usage successif, entreprise qui serait le « bien commun » de toutes les parties prenantes : la notion envahit
tous les domaines de la vie, allant de la culture, l’environnement et l’urbanisme à la santé, au travail et à la
technologie. Si la mobilisation est intense, c’est que la notion autorise à penser le changement social sur la
base d’un réinvestissement du collectif, des communautés, du partage et de l’usage. Elle réinterprète les
valeurs fondatrices des sociétés contemporaines. Ainsi, les communs sont irrémédiablement liés au rôle de
l’État, de la propriété et de la démocratie. Ils sont à la fois une réflexion théorique, un débat politique et un lieu
d’expériences citoyennes. Ce dictionnaire, placé à mi-chemin entre le vocabulaire et l’encyclopédie, est un
véritable outil de compréhension du phénomène dans les différents champs où il intervient.
350 entrées ~ 200 auteurs

Cette thèse de doctorat en Études rurales étudie le « Mouvement Terre de Liens » (TDL) tant sur le plan de l’action collective des mouvements sociaux que par la théorie des réseaux sociotechniques. Cette double approche propose dans un premier temps une prise de recul sur les diverses motivations et compositions des luttes foncières citoyennes et paysannes actuelles en France. Puis l’analyse se concentre sur les actions foncières et les structures-outils internes qui sont le coeur de métier de ce réseau national : l’enjeu de favoriser une montée en compétence de militant.e.s et d’habitant.e.s, hors du monde agricole et du monde du développement territorial, sur la gestion collective de fermes : comme par exemple le diagnostic foncier (terres et bâtis) de bénévoles en vue de l’acquisition ou encore l’évaluation des conséquences des pratiques de fermier.ère.s dans le temps sur le sol ou le paysage. Cette description des modes d’action et de mobilisation actuels permet de montrer que cette gestion collective construit les « Fermes TDL » comme des « performances » foncières, de luttes et de soins (care). L’enjeu de ces collectifs est in fine de répondre aux problèmes de l’accès et de la transmission d’exploitations agricoles dites « paysannes » et quant à leurs usages, de multiplier les engagements contractuels ou moraux avec les collectivités locales et surtout avec les fermier.ère.s preneur.euse.s de baux, sur des pratiques environnementales, alimentaires, écologiques et territoriales, – telles qu’elles sont promues par l’« agriculture citoyenne » encore émergente. Ces fermes sont co-construites (TDL et partenaires) comme des communs environnementaux et territoriaux inaliénables, reconnus comme tels partout en France. Dans leurs ancrages aux territoires, ces dispositifs fermiers sont donc aussi des lieux d’enrôlements d’acteurs locaux agissant sur les questions foncières, agricoles ou d’aménagement du territoire, invités à rejoindre le collectif en vue de répondre aux enjeux d’une gestion collective de long terme en bien commun de fermes à transmettre dédiées aux circuits cours de proximité et à l’entretien du paysage. L’aménagement du territoire apparaît comme un point de passage obligé des actions de TDL dans la mesure où les actions collectives, – notamment l’installation d’agriculteur.trice.s dans le cadre d’un cahier des charges et la réparation de droits sur le foncier –, ne peuvent se renouveler que dans la perspective d’une « territorialité du commun ». Cette analyse repose sur trois fermes qui composent l’étude de cas, dont la comparaison retient les dimensions politique, culturelle et identitaire des actions collectives engagées localement, ainsi que leurs traductions « sociotechniques ».

... José Carlos Lázaro da Silva Filho, Faculdade de Economia, Administração Atuária e Contabilidade da Universidade Johannes Küchler, Technische Universität-Berlin – Institut für Management in der Umweltplanung Luis Felipe Nascimento, Escola de Administração da ...

Wall – a radical in my view in his integration of scholarship and Green political and movement activism in the UK – has written a book for other radicals – here I would humbly include myself in this category give my own academic-activist profile – a 'rule book for radicals' based on the ideas of a less than radical thinker (and non-activist) Elinor Ostrom. But then she, and neither Derek nor myself, have a Noble Prize in economics… and in many respects there is no contradiction in drawing radical implications and strategies from someone who themselves is not so inclined. This is the conundrum Wall covers in this admirably short, well-written and sharply observed book. As he puts it, his task is to " make her work accessible and to show those on the left, especially the ecosocialist left, can make productive use of her diverse and provocative thinking " (13).

Представена е проблематиката на теорията за управлението на общите ресурси и са анализирани двата основни подхода, свързани с нея-подходът през теорията на игрите и перспективата на новата институционална икономика, най-често свързвана с работата на Елинор Острьом. Разгледани са основни въпроси, засягащи ефективното управление на общите ресурси, като е направена съпоставка между централизирания и децентрализирания подход. Ефективното интернализиране на външните ефекти е представено като необходимо условие за успешно управление на общите ресурси. Очертаната перспектива за разглеждане на проблема е пренесена в контекста на трансграничните общи ресурси. 1 Ключови думи: Елинор Острьом; нова институционална икономика; общи ресурси; трагедия на общите пасища; дилема на затворника; външни ефекти; управление; транснационални общи ресурси JEL: P26; P48 Увеличаването и задълбочаването на взаимозависимостта в съвременната система на социално-икономически отношения извежда на преден план редица предизвикателства. В контекста на исторически безпрецедентното нарастване на световното население, както и на динамиката на глобалното производство и потребление, все по-често ставаме свидетели на т.нар. трагедии на общите пасища, при които неефективното управление на общите ресурси води до сериозни екологични и икономически проблеми като замърсяване, деградация на ресурсите и увреждане на екосистеми от ключово значение. Проблематиката на управлението на общите ресурси (common-pool resourses-CPRs) добива все по-голяма тежест както в теоретично, така и в практическо отношение, тъй като поражда редица предизвикателства, произлизащи от * Докторант в СУ "Св. Кл. Охридски", катедра Икономика, alexandram@feba.uni-sofia.bg 1 Alexandra Mirchevska. COMMON-POOL RESOURSE MANAGEMENT: A NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE. THE APPROACH OF ELINOR OSTROM. Summary: The current paper introduces the theoretical approach of Common-pool resource management (CPRM). The paper summarizes the two dominant theoretical paradigms of CPRM theory-the traditional game-theoretic model, on one hand, and the new institutionalist approach mostly associated with the work of Elinor Ostrom, on the other. Through a theoretical comparison between the centralized and decentralized approaches to CPRM a focus on the main property rights distribution dilemma is provided. The paper provides a description of the role of internalization of externalities in achieving an efficient CPR management regime. The presented framework is transferred to the context of international common-pool resource management.

La teoría económica ha clasificado los bienes de forma binaria en públicos y privados por lo cual no ha logrado reconocer el concepto de «bienes comunes» como una categoría específica. En respuesta a ello Elinor Ostrom ha propuesto un enfoque de los bienes comunes que permite visibilizar su especificidad conceptual por medio de una metodología que examina las formas en que los bienes económicos se dan directamente en la realidad, lo que contrasta con la clasificación estándar que deduce sus categorías a partir de una modelación abstracta. De esta forma logró vencer una persistente ceguera conceptual que ha ocultado históricamente el rol específico de los bienes comunes, como realidad económica y espacio asociativo

Abstract: This article, originally a book review written for the first translation of Hardin' Tragedy of the Commons in French, puts in perspective Hardin's famous work with its later developments and criticisms, as well as with the " extension " to the Tragedy of the commons that is included in this volume. The review underlines the fact that Hardin, far from being one of the main contenders of the private property, argues on the contrary that defining collectively the limits of property rights is a necessity. In Hardin's thought, property therefore appears as nothing more than a social institution, and private as well as exclusive property as nothing more than contextual social arrangements.

Résumé Cette recension, publiée à l'occasion de la première traduction de l'ouvrage de Hardin en France, propose une (re)lecture de la fameuse Tragédie des communs, à la lumières de ses développements ultérieurs et des critiques dont elle a fait l'objet. Nous soulignons, entre autres, le fait que Hardin, loin de faire de l'institution de la propriété privée une fin en soi, défend au contraire la besoin de d'imposer des limites collectives aux droits de propriété. La propriété apparaît ainsi comme une institution sociale au sens fort et sa version privative et exclusive n'est que le fruit d'arrangements sociaux spécifiques. Une (re)lecture nécessaire pour les philosophes « La tragédie des communs », article de Garrett Hardin publié pour la première fois en 1968 par la revue Science, a connu un destin extraordinaire, devenant une référence dans des disciplines aussi diverses que l'économie, l'écologie, la géographie, la philosophie, l'anthropologie ou encore le droit. On mesure qui est plus est son succès au fait que son propos a pu être utilisé pour défendre des thèses parfois opposées. On pensera notamment à la façon dont il est devenu à la fois l'argument favori des défenseurs d'une conception libertarienne de la propriété exclusive et de ceux d'une limitation drastique des droits de propriété individuels pour des raisons écologiques. De telles contradictions ne peuvent être que le signe de la richesse du propos de Hardin, ouvert aux interprétations sélectives les plus divergentes. Il est alors nécessaire de (re)lire un ouvrage dont la mention est si fréquente que

This paper, prepared for the 2012 Conference on Earth Systems Governance in Lund, Sweden, explores a possible new local-to-global system for the equitable governance of the “common pool resources.” As normally understood, the “Commons” refers to resources that are owned or shared among communities. Such resources (forests, fisheries, etc.) when located within national boundaries are subject to that country’s laws. Areas beyond national jurisdiction, including the high-seas, Antarctica, the ocean sea-bed, outer space and the Earth’s environment, are known as “Common Heritage of Mankind” (CHM) and subject to Public International Law (PIL). The object and subject of traditional PIL is the nation-state. However, since the 1972 Conference for the Human Environment, individuals and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO’s) have been legally recognized under PIL as having direct responsibility for protection of the global environment, by working for transparency and accountability in its management. With this opening for direct participation by individuals and NGOs in working for sustainable management of the global Commons, it may be now feasible to extend the precedents identified by Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom for successful economic governance of local common pool resources to wider CHM areas. A recently developed legal concept – nondominium – offers a framework for recognizing user rights toward this end. Combining Ostrom’s principles with this new approach for shared use of the Commons promises to give a more solid legal grounding for the 5 “As” (Architecture, Adaptiveness, Accountability, Allocation and Access) in the governance of the global commons for the benefit of humanity."

Esta investigación se basa en una revisión de literatura sobre los aportes de Elinor Ostrom y otros autores sobre la gobernanza de bienes comunes y el desarrollo sostenible. Desde las primeras investigaciones en los sistemas policéntricos hasta sus estudios de los sistemas de riego en Nepal, bajo un marco de análisis institucional y de la teoría de juegos, Ostrom destaca la importancia del capital social (con base en la confianza y reciprocidad), las redes y formas de participación y las instituciones desarrolladas por quienes son partícipes del recurso de uso común, como las formas más eficientes de gestionarlos y con mejores resultados para alcanzar el desarrollo sostenible. Destaca además la importancia de la tecnología para apuntalar la eficiencia sobre los bienes comunes, en conjunto con el capital social (por ejemplo, sobre el bien común agua, en mejoras y aplicación de eficientes sistemas riego), como respuesta ante los desafíos que implican el cambio climático que vive el planeta y la mayor demanda de alimentos. Palabras clave: Ostrom, instituciones, agua, sistemas de riego, tecnología, cambio climático RESUMEN ABSTRACT This research is based on a literature review of the contributions of Elinor Ostrom and other authors on the governance of common goods and sustainable development. From his early research on polycentric systems until her studies of irrigation systems in Nepal, under a institutional analysis and game theory framework, Ostrom highlights the importance of social capital, based on trust and reciprocity, networks and forms of participation and institutions developed by those who are participants in the common pool resource, as the most efficient way to manage them, and with better results for the achievement of sustainable development. In addition, the author highlights the importance of technology to underpin efficiency in common goods in conjunction with social capital (for example, water, in improvements and application of efficient irrigation systems), as a response to the challenges posed by climate change and the increased demand for food.

ABSTRACT Traditional economic models of how to manage environmental problems relating to renewable natural resources, such as fisheries, have tended to recommend either government regulation or privatisation and the explicit definition of property rights.These traditional models ignore the practical reality of natural resource management. Many communities are able to spontaneously develop their own approaches to managing such common-pool resources. In the words of Mark Pennington: ‘[Professor Ostrom’s] book Governing the Commons is a superb testament to the understanding that can be gained when economists observe in close-up detail how people craft arrangements to solve problems in ways often beyond the imagination of textbook theorists.’In particular, communities are often able to find stable and effective ways to define the boundaries of a common-pool resource, define the rules for its use and effectively enforce those rules.The effective management of a natural resource often requires ‘polycentric’ systems of governance where various entities have some role in the process. Government may play a role in some circumstances, perhaps by providing information to resource users or by assisting enforcement processes through court systems.Elinor Ostrom’s work in this field, for which she won the Nobel Prize in economics in 2009, was grounded in the detailed empirical study of how communities managed common-pool resources in practice.It is essential that we avoid the ‘panacea problem.’ There is no correct way to manage common-pool resources that will always be effective. Different ways of managing resources will be appropriate in different contexts – for example within different cultures or where there are different physical characteristics of a natural resource.Nevertheless, there are principles that we can draw from the detailed study of the salient features of different cases to help us understand how different common-pool resources might be best managed; which rules systems and systems of organisation have the best chance of success or failure; and so on.Elinor Ostrom’s approach has been praised by the left, who often see it as being opposed to free-market privatisation initiatives. In fact, her approach sits firmly within the classical liberal tradition of political economy. She observes communities freely choosing their own mechanisms to manage natural resource problems without government coercion or planning.In developing a viable approach to the management of the commons, it is important, among other things, that a resource can be clearly defined and that the rules governing the use of the resource are adapted to local conditions. This suggests that rules imposed from outside, such as by government agencies, are unlikely to be successful.There are important areas of natural resource management where Elinor Ostrom’s ideas should be adopted to avoid environmental catastrophe. Perhaps the most obvious example relevant to the UK is in European Union fisheries policy. Here, there is one centralised model for the management of the resource that is applied right across the European Union, ignoring all the evidence about the failure of that approach.

Uno de los problemas que más preocupan a Elinor Ostrom (1933-2012)3 es el de comprender la naturaleza y evolución de las instituciones. En el plano teórico, los científicos sociales frecuentemente sobreestiman su comprensión teórica de los problemas y subestiman la complejidad e incertidumbre de la realidad social, ofreciendo soluciones simples a problemas complejos. Ostrom advierte una y otra vez sobre el peligro de esta excesiva certidumbre en modelos y soluciones simples. En contra de esta lectura que empobrece la realidad social, Ostrom, en Explicando la diversidad institucional (2005), aspira a comprender la existencia de “estructuras dentro de estructuras”. Los problemas complejos demandan explicaciones y soluciones complejos.
Ostrom considera que ninguna disciplina o teoría puede responder de manera aislada a este reto. Con ese espíritu, Elinor Ostrom, Vincent Ostrom y colaboradores construyen el programa de Análisis y Desarrollo Institucional (ADI). Este programa tiene como uno de sus objetivos esenciales superar las barreras creadas por los diferentes lenguajes asociados tanto a diferentes niveles de análisis como a diferentes disciplinas científicas. El ADI se conceptualiza  como  un marco de trabajo  y una  teoría  de  teorías; cuenta con distintos niveles y distintos grados de especificidad teórica que permiten la integración de una familia de teorías y modelos. Todos habitamos  el  mismo  mundo  y  necesitamos  resolver  conjuntamente  problemas complejos e inciertos. Esta es la razón de naturaleza ontológica que justifica construir un marco de trabajo unificado. Ostrom considera que sí es posible trabajar juntos, y su marco ADI es una alternativa con la que se ha experimentado  durante  más  de  treinta  años  con  un  éxito  notable  para comprender y ayudar a resolver problemas de acción colectiva, en múltiples situaciones, regiones y países.
El ADI se caracteriza en primer lugar como una empresa científica “analítica” que busca descomponer la complejidad en sus componentes más sim-ples, para luego, de manera inversa —camino de lo simple a lo complejo—, explicar cómo, a partir de los patrones de interacción y de la agregación de agentes, emerge una estructura jerárquica y multinivel relativamente desacoplada. Para Ostrom, estas dos estrategias de explicación causal descendente y ascendente son clave para el análisis de las instituciones en cuanto sistemas complejos.
En esta travesía intelectual, Ostrom utiliza la teoría de la elección racional para, por una parte, identificar los componentes simples o bloques de construcción universales y, por otra, construir una sintaxis y gramática pro-funda de las instituciones.4  Sin  caer  en  la  tentación  de  las  explicaciones teóricas reduccionistas, Ostrom busca reconstruir la complejidad multinivel de la realidad social. En este camino de explicación causal ascendente, Ostrom encuentra valiosas imágenes, conceptos y analogías de la ciencia de la biología y de la teoría de los sistemas complejos adaptables. Resulta por ello significativo preguntarse: ¿qué papel desempeña la teoría de la elección racional yde los sistemas complejos adaptables en el marco de trabajo de Ostrom.

Elinor Ostrom's contributions to the understanding self-organization in collective action processes are discussed from a complexity theory perspective. It is argued that complexity researchers can learn from Ostrom's theory building process, as well her conceptualization of the conditions of self-organization in the management of common-pool resources. Her focus on self-organization helps rectify the problems with the assumption in the mainstream policy analysis that policy processes can be explained with external causes. The conceptual problems in her utility maximizing rational actor assumption and the potential for conceptual advancements in her recognition of complexity concepts are discussed. It is argued that Ostrom's conceptual framework is sophisticated, but it lacks a dynamic understanding of the micro–macro relationships in complex governance systems, and that complexity theory offers the conceptual tools to remedy this problem. Complexity theory concepts like self-organization can help us better understand gov-ernance processes. Self-organization is not original to complexity theory; the concept has a long history and it has been used by other theorists as well. It is important to trace the lin-eage of the concept and acknowledge the contributions of others, so that the contributions of complexity theory can be distinguished. In this paper, I focus on the works of the late Elinor Ostrom, not only to recognize her contributions, which are substantial, and show how complexity theorists can learn from them, but also to highlight the shortcomings in her conceptualizations and point to the areas in which complexity theorists can offer better conceptualizations. Ostrom's primary contribution is her demonstration that self-organization happens under specific conditions and within specific domains in collective action processes. She and her colleagues conceptualized and empirically verified the conditions of self-organization particularly in the management of common-pool resources (Ostrom, 1990, * I want to express my appreciation for Stefan Verweij's insightful and incisive comments on an earlier version of this paper and the two anonymous reviewers' helpful comments and guidance on the submitted version of the paper.

In this chapter we provide a general introduction to collective action theory. Following Ostrom and Ahn (2009) we differentiate between first and second generation theories of collective action and we divide the chapter into two major sections according to this delineation. In section (1.2.1) we provide an overview of Olson’s (1965) theory of collective action, which represents the paradigmatic case of theories belonging to the first generation. In this section we provide both the standard view of a collective action problem, as proposed by Olson, the free riding hypothesis, his definition of a public good, his taxonomy of groups and the implications of this taxonomy for collective action, as well as some of the main critiques and refinements of his theory. In section (1.2.2) we describe the standard taxonomy of goods, as used in the bulk of contemporary literature on collective action. This taxonomy departs from Olson’s own classification of goods and draws on a combination of the works of Samuelson (1954) and Musgrave (1959), which is developed into a coherent view by Ostrom and Ostrom (1977), and is particularly important for understanding what types of goods are susceptible to generate collective action problems. In section (1.2.3) we provide an introductory explanation to the standard conceptualization of collective action problems, within a game theoretical framework. In order to do this, we use the classical prisoner’s dilemma game with one individual and one collective player, showing that (at least) in the one-shot game, first generation theories of collective action will predict that the result of the game will be non-cooperation from all players, since that is both the dominant strategy for each player and the Nash Equilibrium.
In section (1.3.1) we provide an introduction to some of the main ideas which characterize the Ostromian theory of collective action, a paradigmatic case for second generation theories, which was developed as a response to the puzzles presented by experimental and empirical evidence of cooperation in collective action dilemmas. In section (1.3.2) we outline the experimental approach to collective action problems, used both as a testing ground for theories belonging to both generations and for theory-building. We describe a classical version of a public goods experiment , as constructed by Andreoni (1995) and summarize the major results obtained in the experimental literature, following Ledyard (1995) and Ostrom (2000). In section (1.3.3) we describe another mechanism for testing and theory-building, used exclusively by second generation theorists, i.e. empirical case studies. We provide some of the main collections of such studies and we gloss over some of the main results obtained. In the final section (1.4) we provide concluding remarks.

În acest capitol construim o prezentare introductivă a problemelor de acţiune colectivă ce au ca obiect central bunurile comune. Capitolul este împărţit în două secţiuni. În prima secţiune definim bunurile comune şi ilustrăm o serie de situaţii în care gestionarea acestora este problematică. De asemenea, pornind de la exemplul oferit de Hardin (1968) privind supraxploatarea păşunilor, discutăm “tragedia” bunurilor comune, prezentând cele două soluţii clasice propuse pentru ieşirea din dilema socială şi soluţia alternativă propusă de Ostrom (1990). În cea de-a doua secţiune prezentăm Cadrul de Analiză şi Dezvoltare Instituţională propus de Ostrom (2005) ce poate fi utilizat pentru înţelegerea şi soluţionarea problemelor ce apar în gestionarea problemelor de acţiune colectivă, descriind elementele sale componente: variabilele exogene, arena de acţiune, interacţiunile şi criteriile de evaluare.

The social-ecological systems framework (SESF) is arguably the most comprehensive conceptual framework for diagnosing interactions and outcomes in social-ecological systems (SES). This article systematically reviews the literature applying and developing the SESF and discusses methodological challenges for its continued use and development. Six types of research approaches using the SESF are identified, as well as the context of application, types of data used, and commonly associated concepts. The frequency of how each second-tier variable is used across articles is analyzed. A summary list of indicators used to measure each second-tier variable is provided. Articles suggesting modifications to the framework are summarized and linked to the specific variables. The discussion reflects on the results and focuses on methodological challenges for applying the framework. First, how the SESF is historically related to commons and collective action research. This affects its continued development in relation to inclusion criteria for variable modification and discourse in the literature. The framework may evolve into separate modified versions for specific resource use sectors (e.g., forestry, fisheries, food production, etc.), and a general framework would aggregate the generalizable commonalities between them. Methodological challenges for applying the SESF are discussed related to research design, transparency, and cross-case comparison. These are referred to as "methodological gaps" that allow the framework to be malleable to context but create transparency, comparability, and data abstraction issues. These include the variable-definition gap, variable-indicator gap, the indicator-measurement gap, and the data transformation gap. A benefit of the framework has been its ability to be malleable and multipurpose, bringing a welcomed pluralism of methods, data, and associated concepts. However, pluralism creates challenges for synthesis, data comparison, and mutually agreed-upon methods for modifications. Databases are a promising direction forward to help solve this problem. In conclusion, future research is discussed by reflecting on the different ways the SESF may continue to be a useful tool through (1) being a general but adaptable framework, (2) enabling comparison, and (3) as a diagnostic tool for theory building.

The path undertaken by social movements and the Municipality of Naples regarding the commons in the last ten years (2011-2021) comprises several administrative acts. The aim of this report is to illustrate some key passages of this journey. Our first aim is to encourage the transplantation and adaptation of this path in different European contexts. We are convinced that the hybridisation of “good practices” is not a matter to be developed only between local administrations; quite the contrary, true hybridisation will only occur if citizens themselves, in their social and associated formations, design, claim and build shared practices of self-government and direct actions on mutualism and solidarity.Claiming rights from grassroots beyond national borders and share this kind of alternative governance between cities of different countries is an important path for removing the barriers of mistrust and racism that are fuelled by nationalism in Europe because constitutes a pattern of joint living values and principles. These practices may include (but are not primarily formed of) administrative acts that enable the construction of urban and rural commons. In this work, thus, we do not intend to illustrate an “exceptional” method that is better than others, but rather we try to show how a good practice was born and has been pursued not only by innovative administrative-legal acts, but also by errors, uncertainties, and interpretative turns arising from interactions, and not infrequently the clash, between citizens and public institutions. This is the true value that has characterised the Neapolitan experience of the commons, and this is what we would like to highlight here. The following text will be divided into six sections. The first section will be dedicated to an introduction to the theme of Urban commoning in a broad perspective. Sections 2 to 5 will be dedicated to the presentation of the “Institutional Path of the Urban Commons” in Naples. In this part, a first attempt to generalize the steps of the path will be presented. Section 5 will be devoted to the presentation of further Administrative Acts and to a brief presentation of other examples of Civic Use in Italy and abroad. Finally, the conclusions will attempt to answer a few but central questions about the Neapolitan model of commons articulation, and thus provide some urban policy.

In this paper I will analyse and question the idea of “right to landscape” firstly by focusing on the concepts of common good/commons/common pool resources. Regarding the distinction among the previous three terms, I will take inspiration from the work by E. Ostrom (1990; 2009), by considering how she changed the idea of commons and the management of CPRs, after the great debate that the topic crated in the sixties (see Hardin 1968). The analysis of old and new commons shows that there is a specific idea of state, society, politics embedded in the different approaches in analysing and managing landscape. Furthermore, the management of landscape is related to a philosophical idea of state, values and democracy (Olwig, 2003; 2013).
Nowadays the political implications of the concept of commons/common good are various. Through the concept of commons, several authors question the liberal theory of state in the management of land, and the fact that private property was often considered the only solution for both poverty’s problem and management of CPRs (see Caffentzis 2004; Hardt and Negri 2009; Harvey 2011; De Bollier 2012; Angelis 2013;). The literature on the concept of commons is currently thriving, and in this paper I focus on the specific relationship between landscape and commons (see also Menatti, 2013; 2014). In the contemporary era the main issues relative to commons are the exhaustion of natural resources and the safeguarding of cultural and natural heritage (both material and immaterial). I state that one of the ways to safeguard landscape is to consider it a common good and also a possible human right. The question is not trivial and it is open to debate. I will analyse in this respect the Unesco document called Florentine Declaration on Landscape (http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/943/). But it is important to remind that already in the European Landscape Convention landscape is characterised as common good (ELC: Preamble). The Unesco Convention clearly starts from these premises and tries to give a wider and more universal (but not homologated) definition of landscape. Relying upon a concept of landscape that is holistic, historical, dynamic, multicultural and adaptive, it encourages intergovernmental, transnational and public-private cooperation. And by stating that: “landscape is a common good, the right to landscape is a human necessity” it opens the debate for a new range of theoretical possibilities.
The literature about this topic is scarce, although the book edited by the Cambridge Centre for Landscape can be considered an important precursor (see Egoz, Makhzoumi, Pungetti 2013). The crucial point analysed in the recent literature is the link between human rights and landscape. The right to landscape does not concern only conflict zones or native areas but, also and more comprehensively, everyday landscapes and environments that are threatened and damaged. In such a way thinking about landscape can be transformed into thinking about the ‘right to landscape’, for everyone and every society. On these bases I will argue how the idea of landscape as human right can implement and complete the debate about landscape and common good/commons.

La tesis doctoral lleva a cabo un exhaustivo estudio sobre cómo el concepto de reciprocidad está siendo utilizado por  diferentes propuestas económicas para ampliar los márgenes de la racionalidad económica preponderante, basada en el supuesto individualismo y autointerés de los agentes. Su principal objetivo es, partiendo de ahí, mostrar por qué y en qué sentido es necesario reconceptualizar la racionalidad económica para estar a la altura tanto de lo observado en diferentes experimentos de laboratorio con juegos de estrategia como de lo exigible y deseable por una sociedad madura, plural, con un nivel de desarrollo moral postconvencional.
En este sentido, apoyándose en diferentes experimentos de laboratorio llevados a cabo a través de la 'teoría de los juegos', la 'teoría de los juegos evolutivos' y la 'neuroeconomía', así como en distintos estudios de campo realizados en contextos concretos de actividad humana, el estudio muestra cómo tras el uso continuado de la reciprocidad por parte de los agentes económicos subyace una heterogeneidad motivacional y comportamental que hace inconsistente el supuesto egoísmo universal sobre el cual se sustenta y justifica la teoría económica preponderante. Pero además, apoyándose en una ética de la razón cordial, este trabajo de investigación defiende que la 'reciprocidad' también mantiene unos mínimos normativos que constituyen su horizonte de sentido y que, por consiguiente, deben ser tenidos en cuenta a la hora de abordar la ampliación de los márgenes de la racionalidad económica.
De este modo, la conclusión final de esta tesis doctoral es que la reconceptualización de la racionalidad económica debe estar orientada tanto por esos sentimientos y emociones que modulan el comportamiento y la toma de decisiones del agente económico como por los principios, normas y valores morales que constituyen la altura moral post-convencional de las sociedades plurales. Esto es, una 'racionalidad económica recíproca' a la altura de lo empíricamente observable y de lo moralmente exigible y deseable por la sociedad.

This paper argues that in spite of a seemingly shared historical background, the studies on the commons around Ostrom since the 1980s and their inscription within international development policies have no connection whatsoever with the movements for the common that appear in the 2000s in the context of the neoliberalization of States. Historical and sociological analysis shows, on the one hand, that the commons refer to an intervention aimed at structuring the community-based management of resources in the global South, and intended as a shift away from public intervention by the State and towards a deepening of the market economy. On the other hand, the common constitutes a social fact, an original practice developed by certain social groups, in States that favoured market players and ceased serving the public interest, which dedicated itself to the exercise of a ‘social sovereignty’ within a non-State public space.


Plan :
Ostrom and the developmentalist policy of the commons
        The formation of development commons
        Ostrom and Public Choice theory
        The commons and the governing of subaltern populations
The common as an exercise of social sovereignty: the case of the Water war in Bolivia
        Water war in Bolivia: from usos y custombres to lo común
        The emergence of lo común in the course of the conflict
        A new politics of the common?

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Prominent radical democrats have in recent times shown a vivid interest in the commons. Ever since the publication of Governing the Commons by Elinor Ostrom, the commons have been associated with a self-governing and self-sustaining scheme of production and burdened with the responsibility of carving out an autonomous social space independent from both the markets and the state. Since the commons prove on a small empirical scale that self-governance, far from being a utopian ideal, is and long has been a lived reality, a few authors have attempted to turn them into the conceptual matrix of their own account of radical democracy. Negri and Hardt, on one hand, Laval and Dardot, on the other, have jointly coined the term 'the common' (in the singular) to suggest that the self-governance quintessential to the commons could be turned into a general democratic principle. Though this is an attractive theoretical prospect, I will contend that it fails to account for an important contradiction between the two theoretical frameworks it connects. Whereas the governance of the commons depends on harmonious cooperation between all stakeholders which in turn relies on a strong sense of belonging to a shared community, radical democracy is highly suspicious of any attempt to build a totalizing community and constantly emphasizes the decisive role of internal agonistic conflicts in maintaining a vibrant pluralism. I will further contend that the short-sightedness of radical democrats on this issue may be partially explained by the strong emphasis in the commons literature on a related but distinct conflict, that which opposes the commoners to the movement of enclosures. I will argue, however, that this conflict is not of an agonistic nature and does little to preserve the dynamism and the constant self-criticism proper to the radical democrat regime.

Elinor Ostrom's share of the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics is cause for celebration among supporters of the commonwealth and democracy alike. While her work provides powerful conceptual resources for sustaining shared resources, it also points toward a democratizing politics that has large implications for overcoming the bitter divisions in today's political landscape and making significant changes in contemporary societies as well. This essay from 2011 in The Good Society puts Ostrom's highly generative concept of polycentric governance of common pool resources into conversation with the public work theory of democracy as the work of publics creating a common world to highlight a renewed "commonwealth politics," different than the mass politics of much of the left which sees government as the central actor and the grievance politics of much of the right which sees government as the enemy of people's initiative. Written in the early years of the Obama administration, it highlights commonwealth themes in Obama's 2008 campaign and speeches as sources of hope. But it also argues that "we the people" -- not any politician - have to be the ones to make such politics come alive on a large scale. This has never been more true than in 2022.

This paper explores a possible new local-to-global system for the  equitable governance of the “common pool resources.” As normally understood, the “Commons” refers to resources that are owned or shared among communities. Such resources (forests, fisheries, etc.) when located within national boundaries are subject to that country’s laws. Areas  beyond national jurisdiction, including the high-seas, Antarctica, the  ocean sea-bed, outer space and the Earth’s environment, are known as “Common Heritage of Mankind” (CHM) and subject to Public International Law (PIL). The object and subject of traditional PIL is the nation-state. However, since the 1972 Conference for the Human Environment, individuals and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO’s) have been legally recognized under PIL as having direct responsibility for protection of the global environment, by working for transparency and accountability in its management. With this opening for direct participation by individuals and NGOs in working for sustainable management of the global Commons, it may be now feasible to extend the precedents identified by Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom for successful economic governance of local common pool resources to wider CHM areas. A recently developed legal concept – nondominion – offers a framework for recognizing user rights toward this end. Combining Ostrom’s principles with this new approach for shared use of the Commons promises to give a more solid legal grounding for the 5 “As” (Architecture, Adaptiveness, Accountability, Allocation and Access) in  the governance of the global commons for the benefit of humanity.

Internationally funded carbon forestry projects have become a central concern of scholars and policy makers working on global climate change mitigation. The anticipated impacts of carbon forestry projects on forest-dependent communities have been debated in terms of normative concerns of equity and justice. We offer a positive and arguably more robust theoretical argument supported by case-study evidence to demonstrate that for effective emission reductions, the stakes of local communities must be built into carbon forestry projects. We also contribute new insights and suggest specific institutional mechanisms to restructure the monitoring arrangements for effective and efficient carbon forestry."

Virtue ethics interprets human action as pursuing good ends through practices that develop qualities internal to those final goals. The philosophical approach has been identified as critical of economics, leading in turn to the innovative response that by viewing the market as mutually beneficial exchange, economic practice is in fact defendable on virtue ethics grounds. This defends economics using arguments drawn from virtue ethics, but there is a need also to explore space for virtue ethics within economic theory. Examining key contributions of Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya Sen and Elinor Ostrom, the article notes that virtue ethics' appreciation of persons' communicability of ends is increasingly being relied upon within economics, though sometimes under different names. Its strength to interdisciplinary work between economics and philosophy lies in presenting a methodology able to capture how human beings are capable of, though not fixated on, cooperation.

The article “The tragedy of the commons” by Garrett Hardin is a central reference in the contemporary debates on property, environment, and the economy of material and immaterial resources. Its main thesis is the incompatibility between common property and sustainability. Although this text is one of the most influential of the last decades, we have very few elements on the historical processes that shaped its production and reception ; on its author Garrett Hardin, his biographical trajectory, his political motives, his involvement in the political and intellectual struggles of the second half of the twentieth century. This article aims at historicizing the contemporary debates on the political economy of the commons, by providing this historical perspective. We analyze, in particular, the biopolitical project underlying the Hardin’s involvement in the environmental movement and the influence of the Cold War intellectual culture on the framing of his theories on resources and property. This article also aims at providing a contribution to the general history of neo-liberalism, when applied to natural resources and environment.

This essay uses a modified version of the Social-Ecological Systems framework to elucidate and interpret the complex political, ecological and social systems that comprise the use of genetic engineering in food production in the United States. Building from an understanding that actor support and participation is critical to the success of any system of resource governance, the essay first performs an analysis of the action situation of GE plants and foods, using California Proposition 37 as a case study. Then, the essay assesses the results of an exploratory questionnaire distributed to actor-consumers in Northfield, MN and East Aurora, NY, to determine how actor-consumers in the United States form their opinions of, and act toward, GEOs. The work evaluates how carefully the governance structures and discourse around GE crops and foods reflect actor-consumer attitudes and knowledge. Although public discourse preceding the vote on mandatory labeling initiatives like Proposition 37 can be polarized, this analysis finds that actor-consumer opinions on GEOs in the U.S. are moderate, and that they differ with demographic changes in gender, scientific knowledge, perceived information, trust in the federal government and religiosity. The analysis finds that actor-consumer views and knowledge are inadequately integrated into GE governance, even in action situations where actor-consumers are given the democratic opportunity to vote on specific governance protocols. The essay concludes that the failure to integrate actor-consumer understanding originates in a definition and boundary problem that obstructs the efficacy of local knowledge in the system.