Luca Lupo

In 1886, Nietzsche felt the need to exercise a retrospective look at the works he had written up to that point. Hence, the writing of a series of prefaces (Vorreden). They can be considered and read as a thematically unified textual body. Rereading them as a unified work allows us to recognise their value as an "autopathobiography". In it, the concepts of health and illness occupy a central position that Nietzschean research has long been questioning. Nevertheless, in reflecting on health and illness, in the Vorreden, Nietzsche also prepares the fundamental epistemological move that will enable him to gradually and increasingly shift his speculative focus from the autoanalytical and biographical to the genealogical plane and authorise him to look at his main object of research, the moral phenomenon, as no other thinker had done before.

Michail Bálint concludes one of his articles with a quotation from
the German mystic Angelus Silesius. Silesius says something
essential about the meaning of the analytic experience and its
conclusion. Through Bálint, in his first seminar, Lacan returns to
Silesius’ text and translates it in an unfaithful manner. Through
this unfaithful translation, Lacan evokes Pindar and Nietzsche
and connects them to Freud, showing the genealogical line of
transformative practices of subjectivity in which psychoanalysis is
inscribed and turning Silesius’ text into a crossroads where
mysticism, analysis and philosophy meet.
Keywords: Bálint; Nietzsche; Silesius; Time; Mystique.

Nietzsche constantly dealt with Stoic thought from his early years until 1888,
oscillating between criticism and appreciation. Necessity and transience are essential
themes of the Stoic tradition that Nietzsche uses and thematises in his
thought. Before being philosophical concepts, necessity and transience are experiences
of existence that need to be prepared for and coped with: hence asceticism as
a philosophical practice, ‘technology of the self’ – as Foucault says – oriented in
this sense. Through precise references to the texts and the reading of some images
(skin, stone, statue ecc.) that Nietzsche uses to characterise the Stoic form of life,
this contribution aims to highlight how Nietzsche uses the cues taken from Stoicism
to reshape the subjectivity and as a lever to free it for the affirmation of amor
fati and the absolute value of immanence.

The experience of war profoundly affected Nietzsche, and a constellation of concepts dealing with conflict and war are constantly present in the philosopher’s language and thought on the ontological, ethical-political and psychological levels. This paper will focus on aspects of the latter two planes, primarily through a commentary on specific passages from The Twilight of the Idols and Ecce homo. In these texts, Nietzsche constructs a metapsychology in which the concept and metaphor of war are central: the strong themes of health and illness, which find expression in the image of the wound, are related to the economy and the ‘war’ dynamic of the psychic structure. The image of the wound evokes the encounter/clash with resistances that represent, for the ‘subjects’ who experience them, occasions through which they can be tested and opportunities for autopoietic transformation before being obstacles to be overcome and liberated. Nietzsche predominantly understands war as an experience of the spirit, but there is also a shadow side to his thinking on the war that takes the form of resistance; a shadow side with which the reader must measure himself and which challenges his hermeneutic and ethical position; a shadow side that appears when Nietzsche’s reflection on war leaves the ethical-psychological plane and moves to the more markedly historical and ethical-political one.
L’esperienza bellica ha inciso profondamente sulla formazione di Nietzsche e una costellazione di concetti che hanno a che fare con il conflitto e la guerra sono costantemente presenti nel linguaggio e nel pensiero del filosofo su più piani: ontologico, etico-politico, psicologico. Il contributo si muoverà in particolare su aspetti di questi ultimi due piani, soprattutto attraverso il commento di alcuni passaggi del Crepuscolo degli idoli e di Ecce homo. In questi testi Nietzsche costruisce una sorta di metapsicologia in cui il concetto e la metafora della guerra sono centrali: all’economia e alla dinamica ‘bellica’ della struttura psichica sono correlati i temi decisivi della salute e della malattia che trovano espressione nell’immagine della ferita. Tale immagine evoca l’incontro/scontro con resistenze che rappresentano, per i ‘soggetti’ che ne fanno esperienza, occasioni grazie alle quali mettersi alla prova e opportunità di trasformazione autopoietica e di realizzazione della propria autonomia e libertà prima ancora che ostacoli da superare. Nietzsche intende prevalentemente la guerra come un’esperienza dello spirito, ma esiste anche un lato d’ombra nel suo pensiero sulla guerra che assume la forma di una resistenza; un lato d’ombra con cui il lettore si deve misurare e che mette alla prova la sua posizione ermeneutica ed etica; un lato d’ombra che compare quando la riflessione di Nietzsche sulla guerra lascia il piano etico-psicologico per spostarsi sul piano più marcatamente storico ed etico-politico.

This chapter centers on three vivid images as a means of focusing on and philosophically grasping the roots of nihilism, that is, its primordial manifestations. Through the examples that will be examined, it will be possible to observe the tormented path that leads from the ego, as an original point of condensation of drives in search of release, to a subjectivity endowed with conscience. Forming the background of this chapter is the mysterious space in which human and non-human lives intertwine. An attempt will be made to answer some decisive ethical questions on which the troubled emergence of conscience turns: do we know what we are doing when we act? What does "knowing what one is doing" mean? The subject who becomes aware of the centrality of such questions, partly thanks to the other, opens the way to a new form of subjectivity and can enter into a constructive relationship with the other.

The aim of this chapter is to highlight how the relationship between the subject and
time both represents the basis of the practice of the self and constitutes the foundation
of another substantive relationship between the subject and truth: one which intersects
the relationship between time and truth. It is through the subject’s representing time
in a certain way, a way which is produced through certain practices of the self, that
it is possible to become aware of the value and meaning of one’s own existence. This
chapter also sets out to emphasize how time and exercises related to the perception of
time actually lie at the very core of Foucault’s reflection on what he calls “the
technologies of the self ” in the ancient world, even though—as I will try to show—
he does not overtly stress or make explicit their crucial importance to his discourse.

The expression “morality of custom” first appears in Daybreak and is significantly reproduced in the Genealogy of Morality. A study of texts in which such an expression is used reveals its centrality in the Nietzschean genealogical approach, as well as how it is linked to a decisive comparison with Kant's practical philosophy.

Keywords : morality of custom; genealogy; Kant.


Resumo: A expressão "moralidade do costume" aparece pela primeira vez em Aurora e é significativamente reproduzida em Para a genealogia da moral. Uma pesquisa dos textos nos quais tal expressão é utilizada revela sua centralidade no estudo genealógico nietzschiano, e como ela está ligada a uma decisiva comparação com a filosofia prática de Kant. Palavras-chave: moralidade dos costumes, genealogia, Kant.

The aim of the paper is to try to understand whether and to what extent a form of "relativism" occurs in Nietzsche, moving from the Schopenhauerian roots of Nietzschean thought.
The radical critique and the subsequent detachment from Schopenhauer undoubtedly represent a crucial moment in the theoretical evolution of Nietzsche's thought. Nevertheless, the importance of this fact is likely to hide from the keener eye how certain crucial aspects of  Schopenhauer’s thought continue to be present in Nietzschean theoretical articulation.
Beyond the differences that separate them in fact, many and decisive are the contact points between the two; among others: both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche argue a radical atheism and determinism; a strong theoretical and ethical aristocratism, and both are interested in bringing the ethical investigation on empirical grounds. Above all, both support a common critical and skeptical stance towards Kantian moral absolutism. Such attitude can be thought of as the root of both Schopenhauerian and Nietzschean relativism, a relativism to be understood originally and very generally as opposed to an "absolute" that, declined in terms of "absolute duty" or "absolute knowledge", can be defined by both philosophers as “contradictio in adjecto”.
In the light of the contact points between the two philosophers, finally and in spite of Nietzsche’s implicit claim of originality, Nietzsche’s relativism would seem to be a restatement of Schopenhauer’s.

Attraverso il riferimento ad autori come Burckhardt e a temi fondamentali per la formazione di Nietzsche come la questione dello stile di vita rinascimentale, il contributo indaga il rapporto tra fisiologia e psicologia in chiave etica nell’ultimo pensiero del filosofo, in relazione alla plasmazione della forma di vita. Tra geografia dello spazio e geografia del pensiero la forma della vita si modella attraverso la sperimentazione delle “piccole cose” del quotidiano che ridefiniscono di volta in volta il senso del valore dell’esistenza e la struttura stessa dell’apprendere. Il senso ultimo della riflessione nietzscheana è colto nella operazione di rovesciamento del rapporto mente-corpo, in cui il pensiero della trasvalutazione, come “rivolgimento del punto di vista” viene a consistere e in cui il primato di una concezione complessa, non materialista e non riduzionista della corporeità, sostituisce l’idealismo nella costruzione del rapporto tra uomo e mondo.

The figure of the demon plays a significant role in the work of Nietzsche.2 Nietzsche entrusts to this figure the first, most important and explicit communication of the Eternal Return in the aphorism 341 of The Gay Science.3 What could be the sense of the eternal return revelation entrusted to a demon? When you consider the usual Nietzschean accuracy in the construction of texts and of their texture, it is to rule out the possibility of a simply ornamental use of a literary topos, especially when you consider how crucial this text is. Although this aspect has already been effectively highlighted,4 it is worth returning on our first question about the nature of the demon, starting from its origin and its function in Nietzsche and in the traditions which Nietzsche draws on and to which he refers.
These include in particular the Greek tradition.5 I will try to show how the figure of this demon in the aphorism 341 of The Gay Science refers, above all, to this tradition, particularly to the pre-platonic one. The reference to the Greeks constitutes the background and the main theme of the context in which the eternal return revelation appears in The Gay Science, as it is proved by the succession of the last three aphorisms of the fourth book, where the aphorism 341 occupies a central and strategic position in the textual architecture.
A survey of occurrences makes it plausible that the «epiphany» of the demon in the aphorism 341 can be in continuity with and related to other epiphanies that date back to the period of The Birth of Tragedy. These can therefore be read as anticipations of the text contained in The Gay Science. In this sense, a further aim of my contribution is to show how the main ideas of the aphorism 341 are rooted in the period of The Birth of Tragedy.
Considering these anticipations, the aphorism 341 would be an expression of the tragic thought and of the Dionysian vision and the figure of the demon appearing in this text could be considered a decisive epiphany of the Dionysian and, more generally, of the Tragic. The essential reason for the presence of the demon in the aphorism 341 would be closely linked to the more archaic semantics of the word «demon» and the experience described in the text would have something to do with the experience of the Tragic as a radical experience of temporality and hence of what can be considered the proprium of existence itself.

Self-observation is the subject of paragraph 4 of Kant's Pragmatic Anthropology. Here Kant formulates a clearly negative judgment on the practice of self-observation: in fact, such pratice produces a constitutively unstable knowledge, since the transcendental point of view is exclusively based on the internal sense and carries the risk for those who practice it - on this risk Kant significantly and insistently returns - to lead into fantasy [Schwärmerei] and madness [Wahnsinn].
Even Nietzsche, like Kant, repeatedly showed a critical attitude towards the self-observation. It is a criticism that Nietzsche paradoxically turns to the heart of Kantianism, effectively reducing the Kantian criticism in a form of self-observation and reversing in this way against Kant the theoretical arguments of Pragmatic anthropology. It seems that Nietzsche wants to show how the critical inquiry is essentially based on self-observative assumptions.
The critical attitude of Nietzsche about self-observation, however, does not prevent him to practice it, as evidenced, for example, by many autobiographical attempts that culminate in Ecce Homo. Last Nietzsche's work reaches the extreme limits of self-observation and seems to materialize the risks associated with that practice and evoked by Kant.
The thread that ideally binds Kant and Nietzsche on self-observation is followed and grasped in some Foucault’s texts where he understands the continuity between the two thinkers, both committed to answer the question about the nature of what is human, and recovers the positive and generative aspects of Nietzsche's drift into madness: the same madness that Kant had just seen as a danger and that Nietzsche had expressed and experienced through his work, for Foucault becomes an heuristic and epistemological opportunity.

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Com o título de Livro vermelho ou Liber Novus é indicado um conjunto de inéditos de Carl Gustav Jung, publicados a partir de 2009, que concernem um manuscrito caligráfico maior. Estes textos, que, segundo os curadores, contêm as intuições teóricas que constituem a base dos trabalhos junguianos sucessivos, documentam e testemunham a autoanálise que o empenhou por quase vinte anos, de 1913 a 1930, procedendo, mais ou menos secretamente, em paralelo em relação à atividade terapêutica e à produção científica.
Sabe-se quanto o encontro com o pensamento nietzschiano foi decisivo para Jung; são testemunhas disso, a propósito, os seminários que ele realizou entre 1934 e 1939 e dedicados à interpretação do Zaratustra. Marcas da influência dessa obra estão presentes na estrutura, na atmosfera e nos temas do Livro vermelho, assim como referências explícitas ao próprio Nietzsche.
Este trabalho propõe um primeiro reconhecimento de tais marcas, que parecem remeter a uma afinidade de base entre o texto de Nietzsche e o texto de Jung: a hipótese é que ambos compartilhem uma análoga função performativa como dispositivos de representação e, sobretudo, de confronto com a e de produção da verdade. Seguindo esta linha de interpretação, este trabalho propõe a leitura de alguns pontos nodais do Livro vermelho que deixam florescer com maior evidência ecos nietzschianos sobre a questão da verdade.
Indo além da superfície aparentemente estetizante, da obscuridade, dos aspectos místicos, esotéricos e simbólicos dos dois textos examinados – elementos, estes, que alimentam não raramente desconfiança pela abordagem, nutrida por preconceitos de irracionalidade e de polêmicas nunca extinguidas que continuam acompanhando e acomunando os autores – este trabalho propõe, enfim, que o Zaratustra e o Livro Vermelho sejam considerados não somente como narrativas de experiências interiores, mas também como experimentos stricto sensu, como tentativas realizadas por Nietzsche e por Jung sobre si mesmos em vista da compreensão, e, sobretudo, da construção de uma nova forma de vida; experimentos conduzidos com um espírito e com um comportamento que permanecem, na sua essência e na sua inspiração originária, científico-filosóficos.

Palavras-chave: Jung - Nietzsche - Zaratustra - Livro vermelho - alma - verdade.

The figure of the demon plays a significant role in the work of Nietzsche. Nietzsche entrusts to this figure the first, most important and explicit communication of the Eternal Return in the aphorism 341 of The Gay Science.
What would be the sense of the eternal return revelation entrusted to a demon? When you consider the usual Nietzschean accuracy in the construction of texts, it is to rule out the possibility of a simply ornamental use  of a literary topos, especially when you consider the crucial nature of this text. Although this  point has already been effectively highlighted, it is worth returning on our first question about the nature of the demon, starting from its origin and its function in Nietzsche and in the traditions which Nietzsche draws on and to which he refers. These include in particular the Greek tradition.
We will try to show how the figure of this demon in the aphorism 341 of The Gay Science refers, above all, to this tradition, particularly to the pre-platonic one. The reference to the Greeks constitutes the background and the main theme of the context in which the eternal return revelation appears in The Gay Science, as it is proved by the succession of the last three aphorisms of the fourth book, where the aphorism 341 occupies a central and strategic position in the textual architecture.
A survey of occurrences makes it plausible that the “epiphany” of the demon in the aphorism 341 can be in continuity with and  related to other epiphanies that date back to the period of The Birth of Tragedy. The latters  can therefore be read as anticipations of the text contained in The Gay Science. In this sense, a further aim of my contribution is to show how the main ideas of the aphorism 341 are rooted  in the period of The Birth of Tragedy.
Considering these anticipations, the aphorism 341 would be an expression of the tragic thought and of the Dionysian vision and the figure of the demon appearing in this text could be considered a decisive epiphany of the Dionysian and, more generally, of the Tragic. The essential reason for the presence of the demon in the aphorism 341 would be closely linked to the more archaic semantics of the word “demon” and the experience described in the text would have something to do with the experience of the Tragic as a radical experience of temporality and hence of  what can be considered the proprium of existence itself.

                                                        ***

La figura del demone svolge un ruolo significativo nell’opera di Nietzsche. A questa figura Nietzsche affida la prima, più importante e più esplicita comunicazione del pensiero dell’eterno ritorno nell’aforisma 341 della Gaia scienza.
Quale potrebbe essere il senso della rivelazione dell’eterno ritorno affidata a un demone? Se si considera la abituale accuratezza nietzscheana nella costruzione dei testi e della loro trama, è da escludere che si tratti di un uso semplicemente esornativo e accessorio di un topos letterario, tanto più se si pensa alla crucialità del testo in questione. E questo è già stato messo in evidenza con efficacia. Tuttavia vale la pena ritornare sulla domanda e interrogarsi di nuovo intorno alla natura del demone a partire dalla sua origine e dalla sua funzione in Nietzsche e nelle tradizioni a cui Nietzsche attinge e alle quali fa riferimento. Tra queste in particolare la tradizione greca.
Si cercherà di mostrare come la figura del demone presente nell’aforisma 341 della Gaia scienza rinvii soprattutto a tale tradizione, in particolare a quella preplatonica. Il riferimento alla grecità costituisce infatti lo sfondo e il filo conduttore del contesto in cui è inserita la rivelazione del ritorno nella Gaia scienza, come è documentato dalla successione degli ultimi tre aforismi del IV libro, successione nella quale l’aforisma 341 occupa notoriamente una posizione centrale e strategica nella architettura testuale di quel punto nevralgico.
Una ricognizione delle occorrenze rende plausibile l’ipotesi che la “epifania” del demone nell’aforisma 341 possa essere posta in relazione e in continuità con altre epifanie che risalgono al periodo della Nascita della tragedia, e che possono essere lette pertanto come anticipazioni del testo contenuto nella Gaia scienza. In questo senso, obiettivo collaterale del contributo è mostrare tracce del radicamento dell’aforisma 341 nel periodo della Nascita della tragedia.
Alla luce di tali anticipazioni, l’aforisma 341 sarebbe espressione del pensiero tragico e della sua verità dionisiaca e la figura del demone che in questo testo compare, una decisiva epifania del dionisiaco e, più in generale del tragico. La ragione essenziale della presenza del demone nell’aforisma 341 sarebbe strettamente legata alla semantica più arcaica del termine “demone” e l’esperienza descritta nel testo avrebbe a che fare con l’esperienza del tragico in quanto esperienza radicale della temporalità e dunque dell’esistenza in quello che ad essa inerisce in maniera essenziale come ciò che le è più proprio.

L’ultima lezione di Introduzione alla psicoanalisi pubblicata da Freud nel 1932 è dedicata al concetto di Weltanschauung. Per Freud le Weltanschauungen di filosofia, arte e religione sono “illusioni” ostili alla “verità” come concordanza del pensiero con la realtà esterna, fine ultimo e valore assoluto della scienza. L’autore cerca di mostrare come in questa lezione il primato dello spirito scientifico possa essere affermato da Freud solo a costo di una mossa così clamorosa da passare inosservata: la paradossale e sorprendente “rimozione” dell’inconscio in quanto elemento costitutivamente refrattario a forme di razionalizzazione totalizzanti e in grado di minare la credibilità della psicoanalisi come scienza. Sullo sfondo del concetto di Weltanschauung si consuma l’ultimo scontro tra Freud e Jung, che recupera e rilancia la nozione di inconscio in chiave antifreudiana conservandone e ribadendone l’originaria problematicità.

The thought about the body and the body-mind relationship, declined in various ways, crosses the whole of Nietzsche's philosophical journey and represents a decisive stage. This paper will try to focus on it through the reading of a limited constellation of posthumous fragments that are closely interconnected and follow  one of the most well-known passages on the theme of the body in the published works, the section of Thus Spake Zarathustra entitled "About the despisers of the body " [Von den Verächtern des Leibes].
By the reading of the fragments should emerge how the approach to the problem of the body in Nietzsche is i) coupled with a constant reflection on the limits of the language as a device of definition and exploration of the bodily universe; ii ) characterized by a constant methodological caution, revealing that the body remains an open question. The Nietzschean research seems to outline a notion of the body articulated on two levels: the epistemological and the ontological one. On the epistemological level, both "body" and "mind" are conceivable for Nietzsche as "beliefs", as devices to represent the reality: it is therefore to establish which one of the two is more believable as "prerequisite" of the heuristic method. On the ontological level, the body is framed within a naturalist perspective, however not in the sense of a crude substantial materialism, which is likely to appear as a form of metaphysical dogmatism of inverted sign, but rather in the direction of a dynamic and moving vision, where the body is not reduced to a rigid mechanism or a "thing", but should rather manifest itself as multiple and plural event and process, always in becoming and formation, as a place where history, phylogenetic and ontogenetic condense and settle, as embodied and punctual track of surplus and transcendence respect to temporally determined individuals.

This paper attempts to explain Nietzsche’s apparently contradictory understanding of the ‘will’ in Twilight of the Idols. There he repeats his rejection of the traditional sense of the ‘will’ as the ‘principle of action’ of a ‘subject’ and introduces the notion of the ‘innocence of becoming’ to emphasize his insistence on the non-subjective ‘origins’ of action. Yet he also continues to use the term, ‘will’, and attempts to rethink it in terms of a distinction between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ wills that recalls the Aristotelian distinction between enkràteia e akrasìa. The paper argues that Nietzsche thus provides a sophisticated account of the relation between will and time. This account is illuminated in terms of the ability to make and keep promises, and thus to determine future action, that Nietzsche attributes to the ‘sovereign individual’ in the second essay of the Genealogy. It is also compared with Kant’s conception of the will, with a view to showing that Nietzsche differs radically from Kant in considering willing to be an immanent process – one that excludes both a supersensible and atemporal origin of action and any distinction between the plane of intention and that of the realization of action.

I will attempt to show how Schopenhauer’s Transzendente Spekulation über die anscheinende Absichtlichkeit im Schicksale des Einzelnen  inspired the two essays by Carl Gustav Jung, Die Bedeutung des Vaters für das Schicksal des Einzelnen, 1909 (1949)  and Synchronizität als ein Prinzip akausaler Zusammenhänge  (1952) . It should gradually emerge to what extent Schopenhauer’s writing - from a philological and textual perspective and within the framework of the theoretical economy of Carl Gustav Jung’s thought - can be seen as the theoretical hinge between the two Jungian essays which are apparently far from each other, not only in time but also from a thematic point of view.

Nella ricerca genealogica sull’origine dei giudizi di valore, seguendo le tracce “grigie e documentali” lasciate dalle pratiche degli umani nel corso del divenire storico, Nietzsche attribuisce una funzione decisiva al rapporto economico tra debitore e creditore, rapporto fondamentale per il costituirsi dell’ordine morale. L’originalità  dell’approccio di Nietzsche alla questione del rapporto tra debitore e creditore non manca di essere registrata e rilanciata nell’attuale discussione interdisciplinare in ambito di filosofia dell’economia, discussione che la radicalità e il perdurare della crisi in atto hanno intensificato .
È con la Genealogia che la questione economica assume una esplicita rilevanza e una centralità decisiva nel pensiero di Nietzsche. Nei termini in cui è qui delineata, tale questione sembra restare circoscritta nello spazio della seconda dissertazione, isolata rispetto ad altri temi; e non viene più ripresa in seguito né nelle opere, né negli appunti postumi successivi. Se si eccettua questa incursione genealogica, da una ricognizione lessicale sul corpus nietzscheano, emergono soprattutto nel Nachlass sporadici riferimenti significativi ed espliciti all’economia, lontani tuttavia dal tema del rapporto tra debitore e creditore. Nelle pagine che seguono si cercherà di mettere in luce la coerenza tra quest’ultimo tema e altri nodi decisivi del percorso genealogico, rileggendo la relazione signore/schiavo delineata nella prima dissertazione della Genealogia alla luce del rapporto tra debitore e creditore, e di individuare una possibile continuità e integrazione tra il problema economico sollevato nell’opera e altri riferimenti significativi al problema economico presenti soprattutto nei frammenti postumi

Con il titolo di Libro rosso o Liber Novus viene indicato un insieme di inediti di Carl Gustav Jung, pubblicati a partire dal 2009, che ruotano intorno a un manoscritto calligrafico maggiore. Questi testi, contenenti, secondo i curatori, le intuizioni teoriche di fondo alla base dei lavori junghiani successivi, documentano e testimoniano l’autoanalisi che ha tenuto impegnato lo psicologo per quasi venti anni, dal 1913 al 1930, procedendo, più o meno segretamente, in parallelo rispetto all’attività terapeutica e di produzione scientifica.
È noto quanto l’incontro con il pensiero nietzscheano sia stato decisivo per Jung; lo testimoniano, tra l’altro, i seminari da lui tenuti tra il 1934 e il 1939 e dedicati all’interpretazione dello Zarathustra. Tracce dell’influsso di questa opera sono presenti nella struttura, nell’atmosfera e nei temi del Libro rosso, come anche riferimenti espliciti allo stesso Nietzsche.
Questo contributo propone una prima ricognizione di tali tracce che sembrano rinviare a una affinità di fondo tra il testo di Nietzsche e il testo di Jung: l’ipotesi è che entrambi condividano una analoga funzione performativa come dispositivi di rappresentazione ma soprattutto di confronto con e produzione della verità. Nel solco di questa linea interpretativa, il contributo propone la lettura di alcuni snodi del Libro rosso che lasciano affiorare con più evidenza echi nietzscheani sulla questione della verità.
Al di là della superficie in apparenza estetizzante, dell’oscurità, degli aspetti mistici, esoterici e simbolici dei due testi esaminati - elementi questi che alimentano non di rado diffidenza nell’approccio, nutrita da pregiudizi di irrazionalismo e di mai sopite polemiche che continuano ad accompagnare e ad accomunare gli autori - il contributo propone infine di considerare Zarathustra e Libro rosso, oltre che come resoconti di esperienze interiori, come esperimenti in senso proprio, come tentativi condotti da Nietzsche e Jung su sé stessi in vista della comprensione, ma soprattutto della costruzione di una nuova forma di vita; esperimenti condotti con uno spirito e con un atteggiamento che resta, nella sua essenza e nella sua ispirazione originaria, scientifico-filosofico.

This critical note aims at highlighting the main features of the relationship between Emerson and Nietzsche's thought as it emerges from a critical reading of Zavatta's study The challenge of character : Nietzsche reads Emerson. Zavatta effectively uses Nietzsche's notes and glosses on Emerson's works as a thread for his comparison between the two intellectuals, emphasizing how their value is not just on the literary level, but also on the philosophical ground. According to the author, the main merit of Zavatta's work, in comparison with the previous critical interpretations, is that it doesn't use only a historical-philological approach or a philosophical one, but successfully combines both.

Producto de una fina especulación filosófica, ceñida a la base
textual que reivindica la tradición montinariana de estudios de
Nietzsche, este libro explora la dimensión psicológica y ética de
su pensamiento, ligada inseparablemente a una “lectura del
tiempo”. Propone tres vías de acceso: la experiencia y el
manifestarse de la temporalidad para el sujeto; la función
performativa del pensamiento del tiempo en la determinación del
actuar y de la forma de vida, y el papel que desempeña en la
dinámica psico-fisiológica que subyace a fenómenos como la
conciencia y la voluntad.
En un generoso recorrido por los textos del filósofo, en diálogo
con la tradición filosófica y literaria de la antigüedad hasta su
época, el autor ofrece la ocasión de reflexionar sobre aspectos
significativos de la experiencia del tiempo y sus implicancias
concretas en nuestras vidas.

Forme ed etica del tempo propone quattro
aperture prospettiche su un problema
decisivo per Nietzsche: l’esperienza
e il manifestarsi della temporalità per il
“soggetto”; la funzione performativa del
pensiero del tempo nella determinazione
dell’agire e della forma di vita; la funzione
che il tempo svolge nei meccanismi psicofisiologici
alla base di fenomeni come la
coscienza e la volontà; e infine, l’esplorazione
del rapporto tra verità e tempo in
un orizzonte psicoanalitico come quello
di Jung, profondamente segnato dalla influenza
nietzscheana. Una ricognizione
teorica e una ermeneutica il più possibile
attenta alla base testuale e che si richiama
in questo alla tradizione interpretativa
filologica e filosofica della scuola di Mazzino
Montinari e Giorgio Colli

In che modo il caso irrompe e interferisce nella vita e nella ricerca, soprattutto quando assume la forma della scoperta inattesa e della coincidenza significativa? In che modo gli umani che Nietzsche definisce “uomini della conoscenza” si sono rapportati a queste forme dell’esperienza? Attraverso quale grammatica e quale linguaggio è possibile descrivere tali forme e darne conto? Come il rapporto con il caso modifica la percezione che abbiamo di noi stessi come “soggetti” in grado di agire “liberamente”? Il libro è dedicato a queste domande e, per documentare un esempio del modo in cui alcuni uomini della conoscenza si sono misurati con il problema, racconta le origini dell’avventura conoscitiva che, sulle orme di Schopenhauer, ha visto Carl Gustav Jung impegnato nel tentativo di dare un senso all’azione del caso attraverso la formulazione del principio di sincronicità.

‘As proof that sometimes a sceptic needs to let himself go in free reveries before returning, calmed, to the firm ground of “maybe, and maybe not”, I will recount the propositions that my swarming doves recently brought home to me, from the clouds. Firstly: the most common habitual form of knowledge is the unconscious one. Consciousness is knowledge regarding knowledge. Sensation and consciousness have the same essential features and are probably the same thing. […] Good! And now fly away again, my doves, and return to the clouds what belongs to them.’
(KSA 9, pp.438-39, 10 [101], Beginning of 1881) 

This book examines Friedrich Nietzsche’s treatment of ‘consciousness [Bewusstsein]’. The above mentioned posthumous note of the 1881, from which the book takes its title, expresses well Nietzsche’s hesitant and questioning approach to this topic, an approach which is further reflected in the fragmentary presentation of his reflections, in his radically exploratory attitude and his ‘methodological’ concern never to arrive at definitive, dogmatic conclusions. Given this, the book does not attempt to identify a coherent ‘theory of consciousness’ in Nietzsche’s various reflections on this topic, or even a single theme or concern. The book’s main aim is rather to provide an account of Nietzsche’s treatment in all its textual and philosophical complexity, and to reconstruct its development across significant moments in his works and notebooks of the years, 1880-1888.
In particular, the book examines how Nietzsche, having recognised that consciousness cannot be adequately understood in the rigid terms of the psychological and philosophical tradition, develops a conception of consciousness radically distinct from those typical of traditional psychology and philosophy, along with a criticism of the traditional notion of consciousness as a ‘higher’ phenomenon, manifested exclusively by human beings.
Nietzsche begins by adopting a naturalistic position, which, while strongly influenced by the sciences, nonetheless also maintains a consistently critical attitude towards them. Aiming to provide more than a merely psychological understanding of consciousness, he conceives of it as a phenomenon that is constituted simultaneously by drives, processes, and the semiotic-communicative, and that is present in every organic form, albeit to differing degrees.
The book begins with an introduction which examines Nietzsche’s distinctive manner of philosophizing on consciousness, in its philological, philosophical, and scientific aspects. The main body of the book is then concerned with the genetic and philosophical reconstruction of Nietzsche’s reflections on consciousness. In this, the book can be said to have a circular structure, in that it begins with a discussion of the notion of a ‘causality drive [Ursachentrieb]’ introduced by Nietzsche in one of his last works, Twilight of the Idols of 1888, before considering how he treats consciousness and related matters in the preceding years, and concludes by examining his later criticisms of the traditional conception of consciousness.

Specifically, the first chapter considers the notion of conscious experience as constituted by drives that Nietzsche presents in terms of the notion of a ‘causality drive in Twilight of the Idols. The issues raised by this problematic notion lead to an examination of Nietzsche’s notes of the 1880’s, which demonstrates how, for him, drives are a determining factor in the constitution of consciousness and of the states involving which presuppose it.
The second chapter is dedicated to Nietzsche’s understanding of the nature and interrelations of feeling, thinking, and willing. Here particular attention is given to the presentation and analysis of his position regarding the will’s relation to consciousness, and the role played by the former in the constitution of the latter. Nietzsche’s criticism of the traditional notion of the will, and primarily Schopenhauer’s version of it, is also discussed in detail.
The third chapter presents the book’s most significant conclusions. Here the main passages in which consciousness is discussed in the published works and notebooks of the 1880’s are analysed, in chronological order. This analysis thus passes from certain aphorisms and notes of 1881 to a detailed examination of section 354 of The Gay Science, in which Nietzsche argues, among other things, for a continuity between human and animal consciousness and identifies communicative social interaction (here defined as the ‘genius of the species’, appropriating a phrase from Schopenhauer) as the origin of human self-consciousness, in the context of a lengthy discussion of the crucial relationship between language and consciousness.
The final chapter of the book begins by presenting certain passages which exemplify Nietzsche’s consistently sceptical, questioning attitude towards questions regarding consciousness. Two particular issues are then considered, with particular reference to passages and notes of the late-1880’s. Firstly, Nietzsche’s criticism of the traditional notion of consciousness and of the supposed limits of reflective consciousness is considered in terms of the  metaphor of ‘sickness’. Secondly, the chapter considers his criticism of self-consciousness, that kind of self-examination through which consciousness, as an ‘I’, ‘subject’, or ‘agent’, claims to be able to know itself. The chapter, and the book, concludes with an analysis of Nietzsche’s criticism of the Cartesian cogito, which provides him with an exemplary case for arguing for the neglected complexity of the relationship between language and consciousness. He criticises the cogito as consciousness’ false claim to immediate access to itself, as a failed attempt on the part of consciousness to observe itself, and as demonstrating that for consciousness language is unavoidable.

“Free spirits” are the receivers, but also the object of the study of Human, All Too Human. A free spirit is one who is able to “think differently” and liberate himself from tradition (see MA 225). However, such liberation carries uncertainty and is not so easy to achieve as it would appear. The relationship between free spirit and tradition has always been quite ambivalent: if, on the one side, “tradition” is the result of all the prejudices and illusions generated by metaphysics, morality, and religion, on the other side, tradition represents and embodies the very conditions of possibility for the free spirit to “think differently” and, thus, to develop an innovative action. So, in which way and to what extent is such detachment from tradition actually carried out and what kind of freedom is achieved by the free spirit, also in the light of the determinism and immanentist fatalism so many times expressed by Nietzsche?
Through a review of the phenomenology of the free spirit in Human, All Too Human and a glimpse into the references to this figure that were already present in Nietzsche’s notes before he officially broke with his spiritual fathers, this paper will try to focus on the tension between free spirit and tradition, that is a decisive tension also for the future development of Nietzsche’s thinking, from The Dawn to On the Genealogy of Morality.

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Les « esprits libres » sont les destinataires, mais aussi les objets d’étude de Humain, trop humain. Un «esprit libre» est celui qui est à même de « penser différemment » en s’écartant de la tradition (cf. MA 225). Il s’agit toutefois d’un écart incertain et moins facile qu’il ne paraisse. Le rapport entre l’esprit libre et la tradition est marqué par une ambivalence de fond: si, d’une part, la « tradition » est l’ensemble des préjugés et des illusions générés par la métaphysique, la morale et la religion, d’autre part celle-ci représente et incarne les conditions de possibilité qui ont fourni à l’esprit libre les instruments pour «penser différemment», à savoir, ce qui rend possible son action novatrice. Comment et jusqu’à quel point, alors, ce dégagement de la tradition a-t-il véritablement lieu et quel est le genre de liberté accomplie par l’esprit libre, compte tenu aussi du déterminisme et du fatalisme immanentiste exprimé plusieurs fois par Nietzsche?
A travers une relecture de la phénoménologie de l’esprit libre dans Humain, trop humain et une incursion sur les traces des renvois à cette figure qui sont présents dans les notes de Nietzsche avant qu’il ne prît officiellement congé de ses pères spirituels, notre réflexion essayera de cerner la tension entre esprit libre et tradition, une tension tout aussi décisive dans le développement successif de la pensée de Nietzsche, de Aurore à la Généalogie de la morale.

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L’astuzia della tradizione. Fenomenologia dello spirito, libero

“Spiriti liberi” sono i destinatari ma anche gli oggetti dell’indagine di Umano, troppo umano. È “Spirito libero” chi è in grado di  “pensare diversamente” e distaccarsi così dalla tradizione (cfr. MA 225). Tuttavia si tratta di un distacco incerto e meno facile di quanto appaia. Il rapporto dello spirito libero con la tradizione è segnato da una ambivalenza di fondo: se infatti, da una parte, “tradizione” significa l’insieme dei pregiudizi e delle illusioni generate da metafisica, morale e religione, dall’altra la tradizione rappresenta e incarna le condizioni stesse di possibilità che hanno fornito allo spirito libero gli strumenti per quel “pensare diversamente” che ne permette l’azione innovativa. In che modo e fino a che punto allora, tale svincolamento dalla tradizione si consuma davvero e quale tipo di libertà è realizzata dallo spirito libero, anche alla luce del determinismo e del fatalismo immanentistico espresso più volte da Nietzsche?
Attraverso una rilettura della fenomenologia dello spirito libero in Umano, troppo umano e una incursione sulle tracce dei riferimenti a questa figura presenti negli appunti già prima che Nietzsche prendesse ufficialmente congedo dai suoi padri spirituali, il contributo cercherà di mettere a fuoco la tensione tra spirito libero e tradizione, tensione decisiva anche nel successivo sviluppo del pensiero di Nietzsche da Aurora a Genealogia della morale.

L’ultima lezione di Introduzione alla psicoanalisi pubblicata da Freud nel 1932 è dedicata al concetto di Weltanschauung. Per Freud le Weltanschauungen di filosofia, arte e religione sono “illusioni” ostili alla “verità” da intendersi come concordanza del pensiero con la realtà esterna, fine ultimo e valore assoluto della scienza. L’autore cerca di mostrare come in questa lezione il primato dello spirito scientifico possa essere affermato da Freud solo a costo di una mossa così clamorosa da passare inosservata: la paradossale e sorprendente “rimozione” dell’inconscio in quanto elemento costitutivamente refrattario a forme di razionalizzazione totalizzanti e in grado di minare la credibilità della psicoanalisi come scienza. Sullo sfondo del concetto di Weltanschauung si consuma l’ultimo scontro tra Freud e Jung, che recupera e rilancia la nozione di inconscio in chiave antifreudiana conservandone e ribadendone l’originaria problematicità.

DEMON AND DEMONIC BETWEEN APOLLONIAN AND DIONYSIAN
 
Socratic  (Platonic)  image par excellence,  the demon is an intermediate entity which preferably  manifests himself into liminal spaces : at the boundary between consciousness and the unconscious , between waking and sleeping , between clarity and obscurity .
Suspended in between the divine and the human , granting the connection of both;  inner voice and destiny that occurs unexpectedly interrupting the ordinary temporality ; the personification of all that  is indefinable and ambivalent , on the threshold that separates ( and linking ) the visible and the invisible,  the demonic is also an expression of Eros and of the Dionysian spirit , the unspeakable originating source of the individual feeling, thinking and acting.
After dedicating  aphorism 340 of The Gay Science to the death of Socrates, in the next famous aphorism, as if to show a paradoxical and surprising continuity in discontinuity , Nietzsche entrusts to a demon [ Dämon ]  the revelation of his thought of the eternal recurrence .  The reference to the demonic element in the heart of his most important and crucial thought drives us to question the meaning and origin of this image in those texts where Nietzsche’s relationship with the Greek world becomes closer.

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“Démon” et “démonique” entre l’apollinien et le dionysiaque

Image socratique (platonicienne) par excellence, le démon est une entité intermédiaire qui élit les zones liminaires pour se manifester, une lisière entre la conscience et l’inconscient, entre la veille et le sommeil, entre la clarté et l’obscurité. Entité suspendue entre le divin et l’humain qui est à même d’assurer le contact entre le deux, voix intérieure et destin qui se manifeste de manière inattendue en interrompant la temporalité ordinaire, personnification de ce qui est indéfinissable et ambivalent située sur le seuil qui sépare (et qui unit) le visible et l’invisible, le démonique est aussi l’expression de l’eros et de l’esprit dionysiaque, point d’origine ineffable de la pensée et de l’action individuelle.
Après avoir consacré à la mort de Socrate l’aphorisme 340 du Gai savoir, dans le célèbre aphorisme suivant – comme pour indiquer une continuité paradoxale et surprenante dans la discontinuité – c’est à un démon [Dämon] que Nietzsche attribue la révélation de la pensée de l’éternel retour. Ce renvoi au démonique au cœur de la pensée décisive et plus importante pour Nietzsche conduit à s’interroger sur le sens et l’origine de cette image dans les textes où le philosophe se confronte de manière plus serrée avec la grécité.

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“Demone” e “demonico” tra apollineo e dionisiaco
Immagine socratica (platonica) per eccellenza, il demone è una entità intermedia che predilige le zone liminari per manifestarsi: il confine tra coscienza e inconscio, tra veglia e sonno, tra chiarezza e oscurità. Sospesa tra il divino e l’umano e in grado di garantire il contatto tra l’uno e l’altro, voce interiore e destino che si manifesta inatteso interrompendo la temporalità ordinaria, personificazione di ciò che è indefinibile e ambivalente, sulla soglia che separa (e congiunge) il visibile e l’invisibile, il demonico è anche espressione dell’eros e dello spirito dionisiaco, punto d’origine ineffabile del sentire, del pensare e dell’agire individuale.
Dopo aver dedicato alla morte di Socrate l’aforisma 340 della Gaia scienza, nel celebre aforisma successivo, quasi a indicare una paradossale e sorprendente continuità nella discontinuità, Nietzsche affida significativamente a un demone [Dämon], la rivelazione del pensiero dell’eterno ritorno. Il riferimento al demonico nel cuore del pensiero più decisivo e più importante per Nietzsche spinge a interrogarsi sul senso e l’origine di questa immagine nei testi del filosofo in cui più serrato è il confronto con la grecità.

With the title of "Red Book" or "Liber Novus" we denote a set of unpublished works of Carl Gustav Jung, issued since 2009, moving around a major calligraphic manuscript. These texts contain, according to the editors, the theoretical insights that are the foundation of the following Jungian works, and they document and demonstrate the self-analysis that the psychologist performed for nearly twenty years, from 1913 to 1930, proceeding more or less secretly, in parallel to the therapeutic activity and scientific production.
It is well known that the encounter with the Nietzschean thought was crucial to Jung: which is proved, among other things, through the seminars held by him between 1934 and 1939 and dedicated to the interpretation of Zarathustra. Traces of the influence of this work are present in the structure, atmosphere and themes of the Red Book, as well as explicit references to Nietzsche himself.
This paper proposes a preliminary survey of these elements, that seem to refer to a basic affinity between Nietzsche's text and the text of Jung: the assumption is that both share a similar performative function as devices of representation, but also of confrontation with the truth and production of the truth. In accordance with this line of interpretation, this contribution proposes the reading of some passages of the Red Book, reminiscing with high evidence echoes of Nietzsche on the question of truth.
Beyond the surface of apparent aestheticism, the darkness, the mystical esoteric and symbolic aspects of the two texts examined - elements that often feed a distrust approach, nourished by prejudices of irrationalism and never dormant controversies that continue to follow and bring together the authors - this paper finally suggests to consider Zarathustra and Red Book, more than reports of inner experiences, as experiments in the proper sense, as attempts of Nietzsche and Jung on themselves in view of the understanding, but most of all of the construction, of a new form of life; experiments conducted with a spirit and an attitude that is, in its essence and in its original inspiration, authentically scientific and philosophical.

René Girard devotes several essays to the figure of Nietzsche: the analysis of the relationship between Nietzsche and Wagner is central, a relationship which Girard interprets in terms of "mimetic rivalry", according to his famous theory. Starting from a re-reading of some texts of Nietzsche, especially Ecce homo, through a critical approach to Girard's analysis, the author tries to show how the relationship between Wagner and Nietzsche keeps in itself something that goes beyond the narrow biographical and psychological space where it runs the risk of being confined: behind the histrionic and narcissistic style (up to the paroxysm) that may mislead a superficial reading, the last Nietzsche's works strive to overcome the resentment, the subordination to the model of "genius," the narrow boundaries of subjectivity. The desire to stop “wanting to be someone else" guides Nietzsche, challenging the readers to achieve a honest vision of themselves, and a superindividual, oceanic view of the world which makes the navigation of the fragile vessel of the I very difficult, when it does not ultimately lead to shipwreck.

“Vor dem Gesetz”. Anatomy and destinies of the “Sittlichkeit der Sitte”

It is fascinating to think that the famous invitation to “slow reading” in his preface to Morgenröthe of 1886, results from the surprise that must have caught Nietzsche himself in front of his own work, with all its extraordinary analytical and conceptual condensation and with all the richness and variety of its perspectives. One example is aphorism 9 where Nietzsche submits to a detailed and thorough analysis the dynamics and the psychological and spiritual implications that revolve around the concept of "Sittlichkeit der Sitte", to which the following Genealogy of Morality refers to.
The author of this essay intends to underline how Nietzsche highlights the complexities of some essential structures of moral phenomena. These structures have basically got to do with i) the idea of change/transformation, “static vs dynamic”, translated into historical terms as a conflict between “Ancient” (tradition) and “New”; ii) the relationship between the individual and the community and related forms of the “law” (particularly important from the religious point of view as marked by feelings of devotion); iii) the mechanisms of rewards and punishments as a consequence of obedience or transgression to the law; iv) the structures of relationships and the mechanisms of power connected to those structures.
Strictly related to the universe of the "Sittlichkeit der Sitte", the figures of Paul of Tarsus and Luther - revolutionary and mad figures in the context of established morality - play a decisive role. These “direction modifiers” of morals come from the very hearth of the “old world” and they are still linked to that world by a sort of morbid psycological tie where obedience and revolt mingle, feed and reinforce each other. Their very uneasiness and unrest become paradoxically resultful as they break through history and determine the passage to new orders thanks to the repertoir of ascetic “technologies of the sacred”.