Ressentiment

Hınç ya da burada adını yeni bir an'ın yine ve yeniden yaratılmasının kay-nağında ölçüsüzce büyüyüp genişleyen ve hiç unutulmamış, unutulamaya-cak olanın tutkusu olarak çağıracağımız o eşsiz serzeniş. Unutulmayanın hiç unutulamayışında çoğalıp artan varoluş duygusu, kaynağında öldürme-yen ama ölmeyen de bir umutsuzluk hastalığını yeşertecektir. Bu amansız, lanetli hastalık sonsuzca kök salar birinin yitimli ömrünün yoksu lu oldu-ğu karanlık derinliklere doğru. Bu nedenle, Kierkegaard'da hınç olarak be-liren ya da hınç olarak yorumlanabileceğini düşündüğüm sonsuz ve eşsiz olarak yinelenen yeniyi yaratma duygusunu Greklerin anamnesis, anımsa-ma olarak adlandırdığı şeyle ilişkilendirmek de mümkündür. Ancak böy-lesi bir ilişkilendirmede anımsamanın kökensel bir dönüşüme ihtiyacı ola-caktır. Böylelikle hınç, anımsamanın sonsuz hakikatin ya da hakikatlerin unutulduğu yerden geri çağrılması anlamını, bir araya getiren ve yinele-nerek hep yeni bir an'ı kuşatan güçlü olduğu kadar kırılgan da olan özüy-le dönüşüme uğratır. Bu öyle bir dönüşümdür ki biri olabilmenin derin sı-kıntısını başlangıçta yitmiş, unutulmuş canlılığı ve etkin gücüyle bir ara-ya getirir ve bu yönüyle de umutsuzluğun en arı, en ilksel halini çağrıştı-rır. Umutsuzluk böylelikle, dünyalı varoluşun kısacık ömründe duyup bilip yaşadığı her şeyin yeni başlangıçlarda yoğunlaşan, birleşen, derin ve yıkı-cı hakikatine yinelenerek kucak açmasının asli anlamı olarak belirginleşir.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an explanatory account of the role of emotions in the trade dispute between Japan and South Korea which started in July 2019. Building on an integrated approach to the study of emotions in international relations, it argues that the collective experience of emotions in situations of conflict has to be understood in relation to the moralities assumed by the parties involved. It proposes a theoretical framework combining the concepts of mimetic desire and ressentiment coined by René Girard and Friedrich Nietzsche, respectively, in order to problematize the dialectic of power-justice underlying the processes of legitimation and self-justification by the two countries. In this sense, the strong emotional reactivity between both elites and people in South Korea and Japan can be attributed to the contradictions between the desires for superiority and equality channelled by nation-state-centred narratives. It concludes that ending the cycle of emotional reactivity requires both parties to move toward commitments to justice and empathy at the domestic and international levels.

Vi vil omhandle dannelseskultur og forfaldet ved anerkendende pædagogik: Anerkendende pædagogik hævder: 1) At den voksnes definitionsmagt ikke udvikler børns selvbevidsthed, da retten til selvdefinering er vigtigst, for at skabe en positiv udvikling hos børn. 2) Man mener, at ydrestyringen fjerner ligeværdet i relationen og den voksne derfor skal bekræfte barnets selvopfattelse. Den tese vil jeg argumentere imod med udgangspunkt i 3 teser: (a) Den anerkendende pædagogiks narrativ er et ressentiment. (b) Børn kan godt håndtere ydrestyring. (c) Dannelse skal bygge på ansvar; ikke behag.

This paper considers how Canadian settlers - particularly in predominantly white, rural, and deindustrialized areas - are formed as political subjects invested with an extreme sense of having been injured or made fragile. From this supposed injury settlers engage in a politics of aggression and rancour that regularly targets Indigenous peoples. Developing Nietzsche’s concept ressentiment, I suggest that the processes of subject formation within Canada’s settler colonial project produces subjects who are unwilling and perhaps unable to articulate a politics that contests oppressive power, instead reproducing it.
These reflections on settler anger are grounded in a discussion of an ongoing dispute between the Saugeen Ojibway First Nation and the Township of South Bruce Peninsula over ownership of Sauble Beach. I highlight the ways in which reactionary populism is used by local politicians to evacuate the emancipatory power of popular unrest by intertwining the legitimate grievances of poor and working people suffering under neoliberalism, with an active reinvestment in processes of colonial dispossession that strive to erase, marginalize, and remove Indigenous peoples.

Se o cristianismo representa a negação absoluta da vida, então é somente mediante uma maldição plena e absolutamente radical do cristianismo que a vida pode ser afirmada de uma maneira igualmente plena e absolutamente radical, pois é somente pelo combate que a vida se supera, e quanto maior o inimigo, maior a superação.

In polemic On the Geneology of Morals, Friedrich Nietzsche argues that Christian valuation as embodied in Christian philosophy is motivated out of ressentiment, a subconscious
value perversion whereby values are devalued and inverted under the conscious guise of the adoption of higher values. Nietzsche cites a remark from Thomas Aquinas as testament to this
value perversion. Nietzsche’s critique of Thomas Aquinas plays a critical role in his overall critique of Christian valuation as being motivated out of ressentiment as well as being
antithetical to classical valuation. This thesis undertakes an analysis of Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of the philosophy of
Thomas Aquinas. The intent of this thesis is to show that according to Nietzsche’s own criteria Aquinas’ thought cannot be demonstrated to be motivated out of ressentiment. Moreover, this
thesis attempts to demonstrate that Aquinas’ thought closely parallels many of the value stances Nietzsche depicts as noble. In this manner, the thought of Thomas Aquinas is presented as a
response to Nietzsche’s polemic, showing the possibility of a Christian philosophy free of ressentiment and consonant with classical, noble valuation.

Why is it that, at a time when countless state officials are apologizing for historic wrongs and insisting that Canada has entered a period of reconciliation, many settlers continue to act towards indigenous peoples with unabated aggression and resentment? This thesis attempts to explain the continual reproduction of settler colonialism through an investigation of the processes involved in the formation of settlers as political subjects. Developing a Butlerean account of the subject, the author suggests that settlers are produced through colonial regimes as political subjects with deep and often unacknowledged investments in the reproduction of systems of oppression that provide for their material and psychic position of privilege. While the instability inherent in such systems ultimately threatens settlers themselves – as seen in the collapsing North American middle class – the fragility and precarity experienced by settlers who are targeted by neoliberal reforms often leads them to reinvest in, and aggressively defend, those very systems of power as a matter of subjective continuity.
The author’s inquiry into these issues emerges from his own experience as a settler, and as an attempt to understand what motivates the aggression and resentment that many elements within his own community direct towards indigenous peoples. Because of these motivations, much of this thesis is grounded in discussions about the ways in which the author’s home community, in the southern Ontario riding of Bruce-Grey-Owen Sound, is predicated in ongoing acts of colonization. From burial ground reclamations, to mob violence, to the problems inherent in combatting white supremacy without at once critiquing settler colonialism, each of the examples brought forward in this thesis attempts to analyze why this community of settlers seemingly throbs with a collective anger and indignation that is continually directed at the Saugeen Anishinaabek.

Following Nietzsche, we can discern two types of therapeutical voice on ressentiment, which find themselves in a polemical relation to one another: The philosopher and the priest. In this paper, I turn to a third polemical voice, embodied by Jean Améry, namely that of the victim who bears witness to his own ressentiment. A dialectical reconstruction of this standpoint within the polemical triangle contributes to the Améry reception in three ways: (1) It is no longer necessary to justify his tactlessness through the exceptional context of the objectively recognized lived experience of victimhood. (2) It shows that Améry’s assumption of his “authentic ressentiment” is not just “anti-Nietzschean” (Jameson, Žižek) but first of all anti-pastoral. (3) Beyond the question of (in)authenticity, this also implies that the political significance of Améry’s testimony lies in its literary and conceptual systematicity no less than as a description of lived experience.

I develop a new approach to “resentment” and its role in moral life in early Confucian and modern Western thought, in particular Strawson, Scheler, and Nietzsche. In contrast to modern European discourses of recognition and resentment discussed in the first sections of this chapter, undoing resentment in oneself and in others is a primary element of becoming an ethically exemplary person in early Confucian ethics. Contemporary Western ethical theory routinely relies on the assumption that symmetry and equality are the primary means of undoing the psychological and social fixation involved in resentment, but the asymmetrical recognition of the priority of the other person is necessary for undoing and letting go of resentment in early Confucian ethics. The author(s) of the Analects recognized both the pervasiveness of resentment under certain social conditions and the ethical demand to counter it both within oneself and in relation to others through self-cultivation and ritual propriety. Confucian ethics consequently encompasses a nuanced and realistic moral psychology of resentment and the ethical self-cultivation necessary for dismantling it in promoting a condition of humane benevolence (ren). Benevolence is oriented toward others even as it is achieved in the care of the self and self-cultivation.

Nietzsche ends the section 30 of The Antichrist with the following statement, which reinforces the thesis that the evangel of Jesus is the result of a morbid hyperexcitability and a will to pleasure proper of weakness: “– The fear of pain, even of infinitely minute pain – that can end in no other way than in a religion of love...” To understand this sentence, it is necessary to turn to the posthumous fragment 14 [130] of spring of 1888, in which Nietzsche did a sketch of an attempt of a demonstration of this argument.

Este artículo examina la noción filosófica del resentimiento, pero la aborda como una fuerza generativa en política. No es para justificarlo sino para entender cómo contribuye a articular un pueblo o demos excluyente. Para ello usaré dos distinciones. Una es la que nos ofrece la lengua guaraní entre dos figuras de la primera persona del plural, oré y ñandé, que corresponden al nosotros excluyente o particularista y el nosotros incluyente, respectivamente. La otra distinción es entre emancipación y redención (o salvación secular). El pueblo del resentimiento apuesta por formas excluyentes de la política y por la redención de su particularismo antes que por la emancipación.

El artículo reelabora y desarrolla la última sección de mi “Politics, shamelessness, and the people of ressentiment” (2020).

Inleiding Woede is volgens Aristoteles 'een met pijn gepaard gaande drang naar een zich als zodanig voorgestelde wraakneming wegens een zich als zodanig voorgestelde geringschattende bejegening door mensen die geen legitieme reden hebben om de persoon of een van de zijnen gering te schatten' (Retorica 1378 a 31-33) Martha Nusssbaum citeert deze definitie omdat zij deze als een goed vertrekpunt beschouwt voor de bespreking van woede.(Nussbaum 2016, blz. 28) In navolging van deze definitie liggen bij Martha Nussbaum (2016) woede en wraak in elkaars verlengde. Niet in empirische zin, waar dit verband wel of niet aanwezig kan zijn , maar op begripsniveau. Nussbaum verklaart: ik beschrijf deze emotie als een genus, een geslacht, waarvan ik enkele met elkaar verwante soorten nader toelicht. In één geval ('transitie woede') introduceer ik een technische term om een grensgeval te karakteriseren waaraan één prominente hoedanigheid van het genus (namelijk vergeldingsdrang) ontbreekt.(blz. 301). Frijda (1987) sluit zich aan bij de beschrijving van De Rivera (1977) van de structuur van woede: een boosmakende gebeurtenis is een voorval waarin datgene wat 'behoort' te gebeuren door iets of iemand aangevochten wordt. De essentiële kenmerken in deze beschrijving zijn volgens hem intentionaliteit en beheersbaarheid. Over de handelingsrichting die aan de emotie gekoppeld zou zijn laat Frijda zich niet verder uit. In mijn beschrijving van de emotie woede hoop ik aan te tonen dat woede en wraak fundamenteel verschillend zijn, twee aparte fenomenen/emoties vormen. Verschillende voor deze emotie relevante kwesties, waar Nussbaum haar argumenten aan ontleent, zullen daartoe aan de orde moeten komen. Men denke aan de aard van het door haar veronderstelde cognitieve en eudemonische karakter van emoties, het veronderstelde niet morele karakter van status-en rangschendingen, het negeren van de existentiële betekenis van het 'roes'-karakter van geweldsexplosies.

In his On the Genealogy of Morality Nietzsche famously discusses a psychological condition he calls ressentiment, a condition involving toxic, vengeful anger. My view takes some inspiration from Nietzsche, but this paper is not primarily a work of exegesis. I offer a free-standing theory in philosophical psychology of the familiar state aptly described with this term. In the process of developing my account, I chart the terrain around ressentiment and closely-related and sometimes overlapping states (ordinary moral resentment, envy, vengefulness, anger, and the like). Ressentiment, I shall contend in this paper, is not simply a ten dollar word substitutable for 'resentment,' though it is indeed a species of that genus. On the account I develop, the perception of being slighted, insulted, or demeaned figures centrally in cases of ressentiment. Moreover, ressentiment-like cowardice or lecherousness-is not merely an ethically neutral psychic formation, but is, I suggest, a manifestation of vice.

This essay contributes to and reframes the preliminary scholarly
assessments of President Donald J. Trump’s appeals to rage,
malice, and revenge by sketching the rhetorical dimensions of an
underlying emotional-moral framework in which victimization,
resentment, and revenge are inverted civic virtues. I elaborate on
the concept of ressentiment (re-sentiment), a condition in which a
subject is addled by rage and envy yet remains impotent,
subjugated and unable to act on or adequately express
frustration. Though anger and resentment capture part of Trump’s
affective register, I suggest that ressentiment accounts for the
unique intersection where powerful sentiments and self-serving
morality are coupled with feelings of powerlessness and
ruminations on past injuries. Thus, shifting focus from the rhetoric
of resentment to that of ressentiment explains how Trump is able
to sustain the affective charge of animus without forfeiting the
moral high ground of victimhood to his audience’s “oppressors”—
Democrats, the press, criminals, immigrants, foreign adversaries,
welfare recipients, the Me Too movement, “globalists,” and racial
Others.

This essay delves into Nietzsche’s understanding of the jester in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. I argue here that its existence explains the shifting ethos from tragedy to comedy. The jester in the societal context exhibits the figure of fictionalism that redirects reality into a detour of comic interplays. As such, he embodies fictional overcoming from the modern backdrop. I then employ On the Genealogy of Morals to explain further four principles that aid in taking into effect the birth of the jester. Nietzsche’s critique of morality attacks such principles as ressentiment, guilt and bad conscience taken together, free will, and ascetic ideal. Later, I present a way of going into the shadows as a manner of confronting the jester and overcoming it.

Partire dal punto di vista delle passioni consente di illuminare l’ambivalenza che caratterizza a mio avviso l’età globale: porta- trice di sfide inedite ma anche di nuove potenzialità. Non solo infatti vediamo riaffiorare una passione, come la paura, che assume, come vedremo, una torsione patologica, mostrando il fallimento del progetto stesso della modernità fondato sull’obiettivo di liberazione dell’uomo dalla paura. Ma assistiamo anche al dilagare di quelle passioni “tristi”, come l’invidia e il risentimento, nelle quali sembra risiedere in modo peculiare la caratteristica della contemporaneità. Allo stesso tempo, tuttavia, emergono a livello planetario passioni che hanno una connotazione emancipativa, “passioni di lotta” potremmo dire, come l’ira e l’indignazione, attraverso le quali sembra rinascere, sul piano collettivo, quell’aspirazione verso il meglio che sembrava naufragata insieme
al tramonto delle ideologie.

Through the lenses of contemporary terrorism, the paper charts the rise of global resentment against the background of the multiplication and denial of failure. The paper examines resentment and ressentiment as emotional responses to different kinds of failure: failure of justice and failure of recognition, respectively. It then investigates their place in the affective and moral economy of the global age, teasing out their key distinctions and assessing the strengths of the claim concerning an ever expanding diffusion of ressentiment in late modern times. Through inroads into classical and contemporary political theory, the paper seeks to rescue resentment from the relative hegemony of ressentiment. The paper closes with a reading of the Paris terror attacks of 7 January and 13 November that seeks to disentangle the different forms of resentment mobilised in the acts. By raising the issue of the moral value of resentment, the paper ultimately seeks to address the question of how to cope with failure while holding on to emancipatory, counter-hegemonic and self-affirming political practices.

O objetivo geral deste artigo é argumentar que o narrador-protagonista do romance Dom Casmurro é um "homem do ressentimento". Como objetivo específico, avalia como essa temática, abordada por Nietzsche em Genealogia da moral, ressignificou-se na obra de Machado de Assis. Embora o ressentimento de Bento Santiago apresente várias afinidades eletivas com o conceito nietzschiano, ele estrutura-se a partir de questões machadianas específicas, como o ciúme e o prazer das dores velhas.

The current political climate is awash with groups that we might be tempted to label irrational, extremist, hyper-partisan; it is full of echo-chambers, radicalization, and epistemic bubbles. Philosophers have profitably analyzed some of these phenomena. In this essay, I draw attention to a crucial but neglected aspect of our time: the way in which certain groups are fanatical. I distinguish fanatical groups from other types of problematic groups, such as extremist and cultish groups. I argue that a group qualifies as fanatical only if it has features that promote individual fanaticism. But how might a group promote individual fanaticism? I argue that a typical feature of fanatical groups is their tendency to encourage an emotion that philosophers sometimes call “ressentiment,” which differs from ordinary resentment. I explain what ressentiment is, how it can be fostered, and how it can lead to fanaticism. I contend that this account helps us to identify a disturbing and increasingly widespread feature of contemporary social and political groups.

The rise of the radical populist right has been linked to fundamental socioeconomic changes fueled by globalization and economic deregulation. Yet, socioeconomic factors can hardly fully explain the rise of new right. We suggest that emotional processes that affect people's identities provide an additional explanation for the current popularity of the new radical right, not only among low-and medium-skilled workers, but also among the middle classes whose insecurities manifest as fears of not being able to live up to salient social identities and their constitutive values, and as shame about this actual or anticipated inability. This link between fear and shame is particularly salient in contemporary capitalist societies where responsibility for success and failure is increasingly individualized, and failure is stigmatized through unemployment, receiving welfare benefits, or labor migration. Under these conditions, we identify two psychological mechanisms behind the rise of the new populist right. The first mechanism of ressentiment explains how negative emotions-fear and insecurity, in particular-transform through repressed shame into anger, resentment, and hatred towards perceived " enemies " of the self and associated social groups, such as refugees, immigrants, the long-term unemployed, political and cultural elites, and the " mainstream " media. The second mechanism relates to the emotional distancing from social identities that inflict shame and other negative emotions, and instead promotes seeking meaning and self-esteem from aspects of identity perceived to be stable and to some extent exclusive, such as nationality, ethnicity, religion, language, and traditional gender roles.

“Anna Gavalda’nın Onu Seviyordum ve Bir Aradayız, Hepsi Bu Adlı Romanlarında Mimetik Arzu” başlıklı bu çalışma Gavalda’nın romanlarını René Girard’ın Romantik Yalan ve Romansal Hakikat adlı yapıtında açıkladığı üçgen arzu kuramı bağlamında yazınsal açıdan incelemeyi amaçlar.
Nesnenin saymaca bir değere sahip olduğunu, elde edildiğinde bütün değerini kaybettiğini öne süren Girard’ın kuramının örnekleri Gavalda’nın Onu Seviyordum adlı romanında açıkça görülür. Girard’ın kuramı doğrultusunda üçgen arzunun köşelerini oluşturan özne, nesne ve dolayımlayıcı (médiateur) kavramları roman kişilerinin ilişkilerine yansır.
Gavalda’nın Bir Aradayız, Hepsi Bu adlı romanında ise öykünmeci arzu örneklerinin yanı sıra roman kişilerinde ressentiment duygusunun etkin bir rol oynadığı açıktır. Bu romanda dikkat çeken bir başka kavram ise Girard’ın yapıtında değindiği ve Thorstein Veblen’in yapıtlarında açıkladığı gösterişçi tüketim nesnelerinin kişileri etki altına alması ve bunun sonucunda kişiler arasındaki ilişkileri zedelemesidir.

Ressentiment—the hateful desire for revenge—plays a pivotal role in Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals. Ressentiment explains the formation of bad conscience, guilt, asceticism, and, most importantly, it motivates the "slave revolt" that gives rise to Western morality’s values. Ressentiment, however, has not enjoyed a thorough treatment in the secondary literature. This book brings it sharply into focus and provides the first detailed examination of Nietzsche’s psychology of ressentiment. Unlike other books on the Genealogy, it uses ressentiment as a key to the Genealogy and focuses on the intriguing relationship between ressentiment and justice. It shows how ressentiment, despite its blindness to justice, gives rise to moral justice—the central target of Nietzsche’s critique. This critique notwithstanding, the Genealogy shows Nietzsche’s enduring commitment to the virtue of non-moral justice: a commitment that grounds his provocative view that moral justice spells the ‘end of justice’. The result provides a novel view of Nietzsche's moral psychology in the Genealogy, his critique of morality, and his views on justice.

Die Grundfrage der Tagung war: Von wo aus, aus welcher Perspektive, sollen oder können wir das Politische denken: Vom menschlichen, gesellschaftlichen, vergesellschafteten, handelnden Individuum her oder von der Gesellschaft, vom Staat, vom "System"? Nietzsche hat es in einem Nachlaßfragment als "die wichtigste Frage aller Philosophie" bezeichnet, "wie weit die Dinge eine unabänderliche Artung und Ge-stalt haben: um dann, wenn diese Frage beantwortet ist, mit der rücksichtslosesten Tapferkeit auf die Verbesserung der als veränderlich erkannten Seite der Welt loszugehen." Aus welcher Perspektive also können wir uns dem politischen Spielraum, der hier angedeutet wird, nähern? Steht hinter diesem Satz das Projekt einer Kritik der Politik? War Nietzsche ein politischer Denker? Und wenn das bejaht wird: War seine Konzeption des Politischen demokratisch und woran kann das gemessen werden?

This paper shows how Camus takes aim at the heart of Nietzsche's genealogy of morals. To defend his own philosophy of revolt Camus argues against Nietzsche's claim that all rebellion is symptomatic of ressentiment. Specifically, I argue, Camus aims to show that the slave revolt in morality is not necessarily motivated by the malicious envy that Nietzsche and following him Max Scheler call ressentiment. Contra Nietzsche and Scheler, Camus seeks to justify a sharp dichotomy between "rebellion" and "resentment," or in the French between révolte and ressentiment. To establish this dichotomy, however, Camus makes a paradoxical move: he assimilates his 'slave' rebels to Nietzsche's ideal of self-sufficient 'nobility'. I argue that in doing so Camus fails to cleave rebellion from ressentiment. Instead of showing how rebels can negotiate the tension between their demand for justice and the reactive emotions that fuel such demands, Camus tries to claim that they are insulated from ressentiment. Yet, as this paper shows, since claims for justice always spring from and incite reactive emotions, Camus' bid to cleave rebellion from ressentiment collapses. This is not to argue that we must accept Nietzsche's aristocratic claim that the ideal of universal human equality is merely a symptom of envious ressentiment. Rather, it is to suggest that Nietzsche and Scheler's genealogy of morals compels us to acknowledge that rebellion against injustice requires working through envy instead of imagining an impossible transcendence. They challenge Camus' liberal politics with a fundamental question: how can democracies pursue the ideal of equal dignity without exacerbating malicious envy?

Written at a time of crisis in the project of social and political modernity, Fyodor Dostoevsky’s 1864 novel Notes from Underground offers an intriguing parallel for the twenty-first century lone-wolf; it portrays an abject, outcast, spiteful unnamed anti-hero boiling with rage, bitter with resentment and on the verge of radicalisation. A Girardian reading of the poetic truths contained in Dostoevsky’s work is able to provide important keys to explain the contemporary transformation from ‘fourth-wave’ religious terrorism to ‘fifth-wave’ lone-wolf terrorism. Such a reading argues that it is mimetic rivalry – rather than much-trumpeted forms of religious violence or cultural differences – that fuels the triangular relation between governments, terrorists and civilian victims at heart of terrorist acts. This approach is further able to blend social inquiry with an account of the individual, in fact anthropological, conditions of lone-wolf terrorism by tracing the globalisation of resentment and the individualisation of violence to the hyper-mimeticism characterising the globalisation of late modernity. Finally, a mimetic reading of ‘fifth-wave’ terrorism accounts for the turbulence of a global politics in which victimhood and scapegoating no longer have the ability to stabilise social order and warns against a future where violence proliferates and escalates unchecked.

Confirmation bias and shamelessness are freeing many from the burden of embarrassment, and that this is creating a mode of public reason that distrusts evidence and gives an aura of respectability to a conspiratorial fringe. Shamelessness is also fostering an exclusionary demos of ressentiment. I don’t mean a demos in Jacques Rancière’s sense of the word. Politics for him is always about emancipation; it sets up an apparatus of dissensus aimed to redress a wronging of equality.4  Ressentiment is different. It is a negative emotion close to pettiness that feeds a demos that is resistant to embarrassment. This demos harnesses the power of ressentiment to mount a politics of redemption that is more exclusionary than inclusive.

I look at confirmation bias and shamelessness to discuss changes in the etiquette of public discourse. I will then examine the demos of ressentiment using the Guaraní language to distinguish two forms of the pronoun we, oré and ñandé, to distinguish the exclusionary and inclusive we of redemption and emancipation, correspondingly.

Bu çalışmada René Girard’ın insan arzusunun kökenleri ve işleyişini tasarımladığı mimetik kuramı çerçevesinde yönetmen Tayfun Pirselimoğlu’nun Pus (2009), Saç (2010) ve Ben O Değilim (2013) filmlerindeki erkek karakterler çözümlenmiştir. Ele alınan filmlerin ortak özelliği erkek ana karakterlerin sosyo-ekonomik yapının en altında yuvalanan, hem maddi hem de kişiler arası ilişkiler açısından mağdur-kurban konumuna yerleştirilen ‘omega erkek’ler olmalarıdır. Pirselimoğlu’nun omega erkeklerinin duygudurumları Girard’ın mimetik kuramı ve bu kuram bağlamındaki ressentiment çerçevesinde incelenmiştir. Girardcı yaklaşımın toplumsal cinsiyet perspektifiyle melezleştirilmesi yoluyla metin analizi gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bu bağlamda, erilliğin yitimini deneyimleyen erkek karakterlerin hayata karşı ressentiment dolu oldukları sonucuna varılmıştır. Hâkimiyeti altında oldukları iktidarsızlık hissinden başka bir erkeğe dönüşerek kurtulmak isterler ve kimliklerini ressentiment duygusuna göre oluştururlar.

This study analyzes the male characters in director Tayfun Pirselimoğlu’s films Pus (2009), Saç (2010), and Ben O Değilim (2013) within the framework of René Girard’s mimetic theory, which is based on the origins and the functioning of human desire. The common feature of the films is that the main characters are 'omega males' nestled at the bottom of the socio-economic structure and placed in the position of victim in terms of both economics and interpersonal relations. This study examines the mood states of Pirselimoğlu’s omega males within the framework of ressentiment in Girard’s mimetic theory and conducts a textual analysis that pairs this Girardian approach with a gender perspective. It argues that Pirselimoğlu’s male characters experience the loss of masculinity and are full of ressentiment toward life; they desire to get rid of the feeling of impotence by transforming into other men, and they form their identity through the emotion of ressentiment.