Envy (Psychology)

There is a growing evidence that emotions shape people's reactions to the climate crisis in profound but complex ways. Climate emotions are related to resilience, climate action, and psychological well-being and health. However, there is currently a lack of research about the array of various climate emotions. There is also a need for more integration with general research about emotions. This article conducts a preliminary exploration of the taxonomy of climate emotions, based on literature reviews and philosophical discussion. The term emotion is used here in a broad sense, as is common in climate emotion research. Because of the urgency of the climate crisis and the lack of previous research, this kind of exploration is aimed to be helpful for both practical climate work and for future research which would include more systematic reviews of the topic. Research items which discuss at least five different climate emotions, based on empirical observations, are used as major sources and a table about them is provided. Climate emotions are discussed on the basis of interdisciplinary research. The article considers many aspects of the phenomena of climate anxiety and climate grief.

Envy occurs when a person wants something another person has, whether it is material or perceived success. These feelings have been studied extensively in philosophy and psychology but underestimated in academic environments. Envy arises due to academia's nature and the demand for research outputs, competition for funding, and opportunities for promotion. Envy can benefit educational institutions in moderate doses, as it can positively affect self-regulation and motivation. However, in most cases it negatively impacts relationships, impedes communication, makes teamwork less effective, and affects wellbeing. Different factors enable and exacerbate envy in academic settings, for instance, social comparisons, mental health issues, ethnic prejudice, bullying, or microaggressions. When envy occurs in the workplace, colleagues do not speak to each other with respect and consideration. This negative feeling can affect academics and lead to mental health issues which undermine performance. This paper discusses the impact of these emotions on early career academics in educational technology. Culturally safe practices, reflection and consideration for others, and personal and professional performance are critical factors in preventing envy. The author presents strategies to help academics overcome envy and promote a safe work environment.

Researchers frequently disagree about the latent structure of emotions. Taxometric analysis—a method
for determining whether the latent structure of a construct is best defined as categorical or purely
dimensional—can be a useful tool for resolving these debates. The present study used taxometric analysis
to investigate the latent structure of envy. Scholars disagree about whether envy is necessarily malicious
or whether it can also be benign. Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, and Pieters (2009) claim that benign envy
exists, and that it is distinct from malicious envy. Much of their evidence for this claim relies on latent
class analysis, which can be biased toward creating categories with data that actually vary dimensionally
(Cleland, Rothschild, & Haslam, 2000; Uebersax, 1999). Therefore, taxometric analysis provides a more
conservative test for an underlying categorical structure. A daily diary procedure was used to measure
participants’ day-to-day experiences of envy. The results support van de Ven et al.’s claim that benign
envy exists, and that is distinct from malicious envy.

The Benign and Malicious Envy Scale (BeMaS) is a promising self-report measure forming a counterpoint to the unidimensional approach in dispositional envy assessment. The goals of the present study were to examine the BeMaS’ reliability, structure, and measurement equivalence across four independent groups from the United States, Germany, Russia, and Poland. Confirmatory factor analyses demonstrated that the structure of the BeMaS is two-dimensional and its measurement is reliable. Moreover, multigroup confirmatory factor analysis, supplemented by alignment optimisation, revealed that the scale is invariant by country across all factors regardless of whether a linguistic distinction between the two envy types in the respective language exists. The results speak to the current debate about whether envy should be conceptualised as unitary or as an emotion that occurs in two distinct forms, supporting the latter view. Additionally, country-level differences in envy point to cultural di...

U ovom radu pozornost se stavila na sociološki pristup emocijama koji je često zanemarivan, ali ima svoju iznimnu važnost. Takav pristup se fokusira na zanemarene društvene aspekte osjećaja, uključujući njihovu povijesnu i međukulturalnu varijabilnost, njihovu skrivenu društvenu korisnost, odnos prema društvenom sukobu i promjenama i odnosu emocija i društvenih institucija. Emocije promatramo, dakle, kao reakcije na društvene situacije u kojima se oblikuju socijalnom interakcijom i učenjem. Dalje se rad bazira na emocijama ljubomore i zavisti. Ljubomora je zaštitnička reakcija na percipiranu prijetnju cijenjenom odnosu i njegovoj kvaliteti dok je zavist neprijateljstvo prema nadređenima, prema nekome tko posjeduje više od nas samih ili ima neku prednost koju bi voljeli da je izgubi.

Budući da je zavist prijetnja društvenom poretku, zabranjena je u svim društvima, međutim u ovom radu pogled se usmjerava i na dobrobiti koju zavist može donijeti društvu u cjelini kao i društvenom poretku. Zavist je društveno korisna jer strah od zavidnosti pruža
dodatni motiv za ispunjavanje potrebnih normi. Također, pažnja je stavljena i na komparativne razlike koje dolaze u različitim društvima, pa se tako daje jasan prikaz stanja u industrijski razvijenim društvima u odnosu na neka manje razvijena društva.

Zahvaljujući detaljnom opisu ljubomore i vrstama ljubomore o kojima se u radu govori, te s druge strane objašnjenju zavisti i socijalnih aspekata tog pojma, na kraju samog rada daje se uvid u osnovne razlike između ta dva pojma.

RESUMO: O presente trabalho aborda de maneira introdutória uma reflexão sobre a fenomenologia da inveja e suas ressonâncias no campo das relações humanas. Tal escrito, em formato de ensaio, traz alguns referentes no assunto, ajudando-nos a visualizar com um pouco mais de propriedade, esse tema filosoficamente polêmico, porém, infinitamente atraente e que está inserido em nossa realidade. Nesta ocasião, o autor trata de não parcializar uma opinião que dê um rumo pessoal à narrativa, há de se ter em conta o cuidado ético almejado para despersonalizar-se do discurso, levando-se em consideração o conteúdo referencial assimilado, bem como, o caráter experimental na construção de um texto-objeto como primeiro intento de artigo científico.

L'affect de dépersonnalisation n'est pas uniquement une réaction psychique à un environnement défaillant. Il peut aussi être le levier de la création. L’analyse de Virginie Foloppe oscille constamment entre ces deux formes de dépersonnalisation. L'une relève donc de la création, qu'elle aboutisse ou non à une œuvre d'art, quand l'autre s'achève dans une destruction perceptible à travers la destinée tragique d'êtres privés de tout élan vital, après qu'ils aient été confrontés à des traumatismes ; deuil, envie, inceste, viol. L'art cinématographique crée une psyché flottante à même de réfléchir la mémoire sensorielle de situations traumatiques à la violence insoutenable et de nous livrer les moyens d'en sortir. Hitchcock, Vinterberg, et Kim Ki-duk, chacun avec un style singulier, composent des miroirs perceptifs capables de ne pas se confondre avec leur objet, mais de réfléchir l'autre voie de la dépersonnalisation.

La recherche de Virginie Foloppe, docteure en esthétique et sciences de l'art, est pluridisciplinaire : de la fabrique de l'écriture (article, essai, fiction) à celle des images (art digital, art vidéo) en passant par l'enseignement des arts (Panthéon-Sorbonne et Sorbonne Nouvelle) et un diplôme de psychologue clinicienne. Elle a déjà publié aux éditions Les Contemporains favoris : L’hémorragie des contemporaines, Nelly Arcan et Chloé Delaume(2015).

On propose dans ce papier un nouveau modèle anthropologique pour la science politique permettant de fonder l’hypothèse de « l’homo emoticus ». Selon Alfred Adler, le comportement humain est déterminé par une lutte continuelle contre un sentiment d’infériorité qui conduit en permanence, suivant un processus de surcompensation, à désirer la puissance ou la supériorité. Il est possible de distinguer quatre facettes du sentiment d’infériorité ressenti par l’homme : le sentiment d’insécurité liée à sa vulnérabilité corporelle, laquelle donne lieu à la peur ; le sentiment de diminution, liée à son infériorité psychologique, laquelle donne lieu à l’envie ; le sentiment de petitesse, liée à sa perfectibilité, laquelle donne lieu à l’admiration ; enfin le sentiment de filialité liée à sa dépendance, laquelle donne lieu à la piété filiale. Ces quatre sentiments s’activent au contact d’un phénomène extra-ordinaire particulier, respectivement, le danger, l’obstacle, la perfection et le don. Ils donnent naissance chez le sujet, respectivement, aux soucis de conservation de soi, d’estime de soi, d’idéal de soi et d’origine de soi. Le sujet met en œuvre un style de vie qui a pour buts finaux la sécurité, la supériorité, la perfection et la filiation. La peur, l’envie, l’admiration et la piété filiale définissent chacune une ligne de conduite expliquant le comportement humain. Elles permettent de décrire les quatre stades de la rencontre avec autrui, suivant qu’on perçoit celui-ci comme un danger, un obstacle, une perfection ou un don, et de décrire ainsi comment se fait la distinction ami/ennemi et le recours à la violence. Elles permettent également d’expliquer le comportement d’attachement à une figure supérieure, suivant que l’on a peur (d’où l’attachement à un protecteur), que l’on envie (d’où l’attachement à un magicien), que l’on admire (d’où l’attachement à un héros) ou que l’on aime filialement (d’où l’attachement à un père), ainsi que les motifs d’association politique en raison d’une émotion partagée : la peur, l’envie, l’admiration ou l’amour filial. Homo emoticus présente donc quatre visages, homo timidus, homo invidus, homo admirator et homo pius, qui permettent de décrire le comportement humain dans pratiquement toutes les circonstances de la vie en société.

This paper presents a new anthropological model for political science that we call « homo emoticus ». According to Alfred Adler, human behaviour is determined by a never ending struggle against inferiority feelings which lead, following a process of overcompensation, to desire power or superiority. We show that inferiority feelings have indeed four major dimensions: insecurity linked to the physical vulnerability, which gives birth to fear ; lessening linked to the psychological inferiority, which causes envy ; smallness linked to the perfectibility, which provokes admiration ; and, finally, filiality linked to the dependency, which engenders filial piety. These four feelings are triggered respectively by one extraordinary phenomenon : danger, obstacle, perfection and gift, which give birth respectively to worries of self conservation, self esteem, self ideal and self origin. The subject develops a life style with four major goals : security, superiority, perfection and filiation. Fear, envy, admiration and filial piety are the emotions which shape the guidelines of human behaviour. They enable to describe the four major steps of the encounter with the other, depending on whether the subject perceives the other as a danger, an obstacle, a perfection or a gift, explaining consequently how friendship, hostility and violence emerge. These emotions reveal the major motives of political association : a common danger, a common obstacle, a common perfection or a common gift. They also explain attachment behaviours to a superior figure, depending on whether the subject is scared (then he needs a protector), he envies (then he needs a magician), he admires (then he needs a hero) or he is grateful (then he needs a father). With these four faces of Homo emoticus, Homo timidus, Homo invidus, Homo admirator and Homo pius, it is possible to describe human behavior in most of situations in life.

The task of studying the impact of social class on physical and mental health involves, among other things, the use of a conceptual toolbox that defines what social class is, establishes how to measure it, and sets criteria that help distinguish it from closely related concepts. One field that has recently witnessed a wealth of theoretical and conceptual research on social class is psychology, but geographers' and sociologists' attitude of diffidence toward this " positivistic " discipline has prevented them from taking advantage of this body of scholarship. This paper aims to highlight some of the most important developments in the psychological study of social class and social mobility that speak to the long-standing concerns of health geographers and sociologists with how social position, perceptions, social comparisons, and class-based identities impact health and well-being.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2017.11.037

In the present essay I would like to explore the different meanings of the emotion named Schadenfreude from a perspective integrating Plato’s and Aristotle’s moral philosophy with the analyses of phenomenological anthropologists such as Scheler, Plessner and Blumenberg. In the first half of my essay I will focus on Aristotle’s distinction between, on the one hand, a pleasure at another’s misfortune which does not necessarily obstruct pity in the opposite position and provides relief from indignation, and a malicious pleasure at another’s misfortune (epichairekakia) understood as the opposite of envy. In the second half of the essay I will examine the link between the joy involved in Schadenfreude and laughter by asking whether and to what extent this contemplative emotion contributes to the emergence of a theoretical attitude.

La envidia como vínculo. Estudio de la envidia desde la filosofía, la psicología, la sociología, la antropología y otras ciencias, afrontándola como una modalidad de relación humana. Propuesta de ética de la envidia. Análisis complementado con múltiples ejemplos del arte y la literatura, especialmente "Mozart y Salieri" de Pushkin (junto a su versión actual "Amadeus" de Peter Shaffer) y "Abel Sánchez" de Miguel de Unamuno.
Envy as a link. Study of envy from philosophy, psychology, sociology, anthropology and other sciences, afrontándola as a form of human relationship. Proposed ethical envy. Analysis complemented with multiple examples of art and literature, especially "Mozart and Salieri" Pushkin (along with its current version "Amadeus" by Peter Shaffer) and "Abel Sanchez" by Miguel de Unamuno.

“Chapter 6” systematizes and analyzes Kierkegaard’s insightful remarks on human affectivity in relation to moral emotions, body, contagion, and collectivity. Following a brief outline of the conceptualization of affects and human affectivity from Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Tomkins, and Massumi, the first part zooms in on empathy and sympathy in two important precursors of Kierkegaard, namely David Hume and Adam Smith. The second part argues for Kierkegaard’s distinctively affective reading of admiration, which I locate in its being fundamentally linked with other emotions such as envy, but also in its being oriented toward the mediocre and base, having a limited motivational capacity, and being highly contagious. Affective admiration is then related to the contemporary discussion on moral exemplars, posing a challenge to the view of the epistemological and moral trustworthiness of admiration in moral exemplarity espoused primarily by Linda Zagzebski. The third part centers on the affective character of Kierkegaard’s crowd psychology. Therein I examine his critical remarks on human collectivity, focusing on such key concepts from his social and political philosophy as “crowd” and “the public.” Reading his philosophy alongside two French theorists of mass society, Gabriel Tarde and René Girard, I draw out Kierkegaard’s great interest in such mimetic terms as magnetism, fascination, somnambulism, scapegoating, and violence.

Dieses Kapitel widmet sich der Auseinandersetzung mit Neid und Eifersucht innerhalb der Philosophie. Nach einer Besprechung der Ähnlichkeiten und Unterschiede zwischen beiden Emotionen (1) werden Neid (2) und Eifersucht (3) getrennt voneinander und jeweils im Hinblick auf ihre Hauptmerkmale, Spielarten und moralische Rechtfertigung untersucht.

Abstract:  Active inoperative mediocrity disorder (AIM syndrome)
The ’pressure for excellence" or inner tension for overcoming the current limitations, is actualized through creativity or, in a vicarious way, through attraction and admiration for excellency in others. lf this ’pressure for excellency’ is  greater than the abilities or possibilities for expression, the frustration may originate neurotic, psychotic or addictive
psychopathology. In the other extreme, the defect or inhibition of the ’pressure for excellence’ also originates pathology, which we term ’mediocrity disorders’ Three forms are described: 1) Simple, almost asymptomatic, with hiperadaptation and lack of originality. 2)
inoperative or pseudo-creative, with passive-aggressive traits and tendencies to reproduce the external manifestations of the normal processes of self actualization. And 3), Active, the malignant form, with exaggeration of  the repetitive and imitative tendencies
of type 2, active impersonation of the external signs of excellency, including pretensions of notoriety and demands for undeserved respect and admiration, and jealous envy against brilliant and excellent people, who are persecuted and destroyed.
Key words: Personality disorder. Creativity. Imposture. Envy. Organisations. Work stress

Resumen
La 'presión por la excelencia', o tensión interna que fuerza a la superación del estado actual, es un rasgo propio de la condición humana, que se actualiza directamente mediante la creatividad, o de manera vicariante indirecta, a través de los distintos aspectos del interés, el aprecio o la aspiración hacia lo excelente. Cuando esta " presión por la excelencia " supera las posibilidades de expresión, pueden aparecer distintos tipos de patología, de tipo neurótico, psicótico o adictivo. En el polo opuesto, el defecto o inhibición de la presión por la excelencia también origina patología de tipo caracteríal, que hemos denominado "-trastornos de mediocridad". El tipo 1 o forma simple es prácticamente asintomático, caracterizado por hiperadaptación y falta de originalidad. El tipo 2, forma inoperante o pseudo-creativa, añade rasgos pasivo-agresivos y tendencias miméticas a reproducir las formas externas de los procesos normales de actualización. El tipo 3, o mediocridad inoperante activa (MIA), es la forma más maligna, con exacerbación de las tendencias repetitivas e imitativas, exagerada apropiación de los signos externos de creatividad y excelencia, ansia de notoriedad que puede llegar hasta la impostura, (pretender ser algo que no es) y, sobre todo, intensa envidia hacia la excelencia ajena, que procura destruir por todos los medios a su alcance.
Palabras clave: Trastorno de personalidad. Creatividad. Envidia. Estrés laboral.

This paper concerns the conflict between loving and envious feelings in the Philebus and the Phaedrus. The Greek word phthonos, used by Plato in different contexts, characterizes emotions that contemporary theories classify as envy, Schadenfreude and jealousy. My claim is that in the Philebus Plato characterizes phthonos mainly qua Schaden-freude (an emotion which plays an important role in comedies). In this case the rivalry towards friends and neighbors neither stops at emulation, nor is explicitly experienced as malicious envy, and laughter offers the opportunity to feel pleasure at the other's misfortune without experiencing guilt or shame. In the Phaedrus, phthonos initially refers to the jealousy felt by the older lover towards his beloved. As the dialogue progresses, however, Socrates highlights the important role played by malicious envy when the love described is blind to transcendent beauty. Reference is made to Aristotle's account of emotions in the Rhetoric, and to Plutarch's treatise On Envy and Hate for valuable insights towards differentiating envy from other negative emotions.

Il saggio si occupa dell'invidia (phthonos) nella concezione di Aristotele e di Plutarco, e della sua collocazione da un lato rispetto all'odio, e dall'altro rispetto alle altre emozioni che riguardano i beni di fortuna altrui, come l'emulazione, l'indignazione, la pietà. Nella prima parte del saggio si analizza la differenza fra odio e invidia in Plutarco, e si studia il rapporto fra indignazione, invidia e pietà in Plutarco e in Aristotele. Nella seconda parte, a partire dalla distinzione di Gabriele Taylor fra invidia oggettuale e invidia di stato, si analizza il rapporto fra avidità e invidia in Platone e in Aristotele. Nell'ultima parte si mostra il ruolo della speranza nella differenziazione aristotelica fra emozioni competitive, analizzando i capitoli che Aristotele dedica ai vecchi e ai giovani nella Retorica, ed evidenziando la contrapposizione fra emozioni che sono alimentate dalla speranza ed emozioni, come l'invidia, in cui la speranza è assente.

American advertisers consistently advanced the aspirational class status of owning cars for women. With imagery ranging from the Cinderella fairy tale to European landmarks, the promise of achieving a high status through the purchase of a car beckoned. A small case study of Cadillac's luxury advertising explores how the company used prestige to attract both women and African Americans and found loyalty. However, their car dealers fundamentally disdained both groups of consumers. This article examines how automotive advertisers encouraged women to strive to boost or maintain their family's class status and shifted their idealized portrayals from women taking drives in the country and playing golf to showcasing women transporting family members to the train station, school, and sporting events. Drawing on research from the Ford archives, popular magazines, and transportation libraries, this article analyzes the tropes advertisers employed to signify the wealth of the car owner.

È il peccato di Lucifero geloso dell'uomo, quello di Caino verso Abele, quello di Saul nei confronti di Davide, ma anche quello di Grimilde per Biancaneve. Se è vero che ogni vizio comporta piacere, ciò non vale per l'invidia, veleno dell'anima che genera tormento e sofferenza: si soffre per il bene e la felicità altrui, vissuti come una diminuzione del proprio essere e segno del proprio fallimento. L'invidia nasce sempre dal confronto. Perché lui/lei sì e io no? Una domanda che deve restare segreta, perché rivela la propria inferiorità. Dall'antichità alle società moderne, dalla fiaba fino alle veline dei nostri giorni, l'autrice insegue questa passione "triste" - ma non priva di violenza quando si trasforma in risentimento - che inquina le relazioni, depotenzia l'Io, paralizza le energie.

In the last few years the topic of envy has been addressed in an increasing number of studies from different theoretical perspectives. However this subject has received a relatively scant attention in management studies, notwithstanding the fact that envy is quite widespread within organizational contexts. In an attempt to bridge this gap, this paper aims to address the theme of envy in the workplace from a management perspective. The hypothesis at the heart of this contribution is the following: under some circumstances workplace envy represents a critical issue to business organizations, in that it may affect the development and the value-creation potential of a company's human capital and relational capital. This hypothesis will be dealt with through a qualitative research approach: firstly, a review of the literature on envy, from an interdisciplinary perspective, is presented; then the topic of envy in the workplace will be analyzed and its organizational effects outlined; finally some useful tools for the management of envy in the workplace will be proposed.

Envy within borderline personality organization; Its formation and expression in individual and social psychology.

Universitè Sorbonne
Nouvelle- Paris 3

France Paris.

ABSTRACT: Melanie Klein was a brilliant psychoanalyst who remarkably studied closely how envy could generate
psychological discomfort in several degrees. This research is approached from her principles of psychoanalytic thought with Otto Kernberg’s self and object theory and Jacques Lacan psychoanalytic theory. I’ve been studying new findings in how envy operates in patients with severe personality disorders (borderline personality organization) and, particularly, eating disorders. I started this research with a clinical foundation for eating disorders/severe personality disorders and afterward in individual clinical practice.

Key Words: Melanie Klein, Psychoanalysis, Otto Kernberg, Jacques Lacan, Severe personality disorders

In October 2019, Chile experienced the most violent urban uprising in its history. Adam Smith’s psychology of social recognition based on the distinction of ranks can explain it. For Smith, the poor are invisible, and the rich are looked at and admired. Nevertheless, the desire for recognition is universal, so the poor want to be admired too. The poor are marginalized because the rich do not recognize their dignity, but the poor believe they deserve recognition. Violence emerges from the resentment of the poor for their lack of visibility, triggered by adhesion to sects that inculcate antisocial moral and false beliefs against the elites.

A partire dal mito del pomo della discordia, la bellezza di cui tratta il saggio di Elena Pulcini è quella intorno alla quale si innesca la competizione riferita da secoli al mondo femminile come una sua caratteristica. Perciò essa si intreccia con l’invidia, passione triste per eccellenza, unico vizio senza piacere. Attraverso letteratura, cinema e famosi serial televisivi, l’Autrice cerca di verificare se quest’idea sia davvero soltanto uno stereotipo. Sicuramente esso è corrispondente al senso di impotenza femminile prodotto dalla società nella sua storia. Così l’invidia si diffonde maggiormente tra le donne perché è una passione “democratica”, cioè prospera solo tra eguali. E come la bellezza, ossessiva e competitiva, aumenta di valore nella società dello spettacolo, così cresce anche l’invidia. Ma una resistenza è sempre possibile: rivendicare l’unicità della propria storia e della propria identità, una specie di resistenza melvilliana à la Bartleby, col suo “preferirei di no”.

This article elaborates on the relationship between witchcraft and envy. It points out how much of tradition in parts of Africa is oriented to avoiding envy and suggests that countering the fear of envy is vital to community development on the continent. Tackling envy, being a theological task, points to the central role of mission that has too often allowed such vital objectives to be clouded by secular thinking.

El propósito del presente trabajo es dar a conocer un epígrafe latino desconocido hasta la fecha. Se trata de un texto inciso sobre un clavo de bronce, hoy depositado en The Hunt Museum, Limerick (Irlanda). El epígrafe así como la propia pieza que le da soporte habían sido asignados a un contexto masónico o tabernario propios de época moderna. Sin embargo, consideramos que se trata de un texto mágico de carácter profiláctico procedente de la provincia romana de Africa, compuesto en latín vulgar y datable en los siglos IV-V d. C., y destinado a repeler a los envidiosos. // The goal of this paper is to offer a lecture of an unpublished Latin inscription carved on a bronze nail that is currently kept at The Hunt Museum, Limerick (Ireland). The allegedly incomprehensible text and its medium had been previously related to a Modern Age masonic and/or drinking context. However, we propose to read the inscription as a 4th-5th century A. D. protective text against envious people, which was written in Vulgar Latin and engraved
on a magical nail from the Roman province of Africa.

Envy seems to include the desire to eliminate inequality: the subject's unequal (namely, inferior) position compared to the object's position. In consequence, people raise two different claims regarding the envy-inequality relation: (a) the basis for envy is a concern for equality (and thus a reason for condemning this concern); and (b) reducing inequality will reduce envy (thus a reason for praising the concern for equality). The two claims constitute what seems to be the moral paradox of envy, namely, the fact that envy is morally condemned despite the apparent presence of an important moral component, namely, the desire to eliminate in-equality. I believe that both claims are erroneous. I shall argue that envy does not involve a moral egalitarian concern and that reduced inequality does not lead to less envy-on the contrary, in most cases it raises the intensity of envy.

The paper critically discusses the thesis, originally put forth by Taylor (2006), that there is a (mostly benign) form of envy whose target is the good possessed by someone else. Section 2 analyzes the distinction between object-envy and state-envy, discusses the connection between object-envy and benign envy, and develops the ethical consequences that follow from the thesis that envy is never benign. Section 3 presents a thought experiment with five variations developed from the basic elements of object-envy: an agent, a good the agent desires but lacks, and a person who possesses the good. The variations generate emotions like longing, sadness, happiness for, admiration, covetousness, self-disappointment, but they do not generate envy. Section 4 concentrates on envious self-reproach and shows that its nature and genesis are different from the self-disappointment one may experience in other forms of self-assessment. Section 5 argues that the so-called sour-grape syndrome serves different goals when it is connected to a good one lacks and when it is connected to envious comparisons. Section 6 maintains that what looks like benign envy can be better understood as emulous admiration. In conclusion, the paper argues that object-envy is not a useful concept. The desired goods are not valued in themselves when a person feels envy. Rather, they are taken to signal the superior recognition enjoyed by someone else within the reference group that is currently deemed important by the agent.

Speakers of many languages tend to use pairs of words such as emotion/feeling or jealousy/envy interchangeably. This paper explores the differences in the way in which the emotional states of jealousy and envy are understood (in the Croatian language ljubomora and zavist) and the influence of culture on the expression of these states. First, we establish the cultural framework that significantly shapes the experience and expression of emotional states, and summarize cognitive aspects of the two emotions. Second, we demonstrate that Croatian 19th- and 20th- century belles lettres differentiate between the two in the way it is described in sciences. Third, a psycholinguistic questionnaire was used to investigate features of the conceptual content from 209 high school students. Finally, the results were compared with the empirical corpus analysis of the linguistic constructions of emotional categories. Complementary methods used in this research show indications of an ongoing semasiological change of ljubomora and zavist in a significant part of Croatian speakers.

I argue that envy is not so much an unpleasant complex emotion or feeling but rather a moral-psychologically highly interesting attitude and strategy, which consists in denying another person the acknowledgment she actually deserves for certain reasons. I will analyze this strategy in more detail by referring to Immanuel Kant's concept of self-love and rationalizing. By focusing on the cognitive and propositional structure of envy, I reveal and further analyze its implicit propositional structure. I  argue that envy is a kind of moral self-deception. Finally, I argue that envy understood in this way is characterized by a paradox, which consists in the fact that we never consciously and willingly envy another person so that the speech act "I envy you" entails a performative contradiction.

Drawing on prevalent Euro-American folk models, extant theories of envy in the social sciences tend to reduce it to an emotion embodied in individual subjects, who are believed to envy those who have more and those who are hierarchically superordinate. Yet envy can also be viewed as a social, intersubjective phenomenon-one potentially incorporating humans and various other-than-human entities into complex and unpredictable relationships involving occult phenomena like witchcraft and the evil eye as well as entire families, regions, and abstract identity categories of ethnicity, gender, and class. The tension between ethnographic accounts of envy in the Middle East and Middle Eastern accounts of envy provides an opportunity to explore the phenomenon of "envying down" and an underappreciated, recursive dimension of envy: envying the efficacy of other people's envy. Envy is revealed to be reflexive, relational, and often institutionalized-even within the institution of ethnography itself.

Basic principles behind prime divider societies (big gap btw small elite and large population of commoners. Demotic principles opposed to prime divider society, and in millennial forms involve dismantling the inegalitarian structures. Enlightenment as a secular form of demotic religiosity.

This paper shows how Camus takes aim at the heart of Nietzsche's genealogy of morals. To defend his own philosophy of revolt Camus argues against Nietzsche's claim that all rebellion is symptomatic of ressentiment. Specifically, I argue, Camus aims to show that the slave revolt in morality is not necessarily motivated by the malicious envy that Nietzsche and following him Max Scheler call ressentiment. Contra Nietzsche and Scheler, Camus seeks to justify a sharp dichotomy between "rebellion" and "resentment," or in the French between révolte and ressentiment. To establish this dichotomy, however, Camus makes a paradoxical move: he assimilates his 'slave' rebels to Nietzsche's ideal of self-sufficient 'nobility'. I argue that in doing so Camus fails to cleave rebellion from ressentiment. Instead of showing how rebels can negotiate the tension between their demand for justice and the reactive emotions that fuel such demands, Camus tries to claim that they are insulated from ressentiment. Yet, as this paper shows, since claims for justice always spring from and incite reactive emotions, Camus' bid to cleave rebellion from ressentiment collapses. This is not to argue that we must accept Nietzsche's aristocratic claim that the ideal of universal human equality is merely a symptom of envious ressentiment. Rather, it is to suggest that Nietzsche and Scheler's genealogy of morals compels us to acknowledge that rebellion against injustice requires working through envy instead of imagining an impossible transcendence. They challenge Camus' liberal politics with a fundamental question: how can democracies pursue the ideal of equal dignity without exacerbating malicious envy?

With this article, I wish to introduce the concept of ‘faith envy’. From time to time, both believers and non-believers envy those who have faith or more faith. People envy, for example, Muslims or Charismatics for the significance and certainty of their convictions in their lives. I propose using ‘faith envy’ as an angle to investigate faith and religious language. This perspective opens up important new questions about faith. If we look at faith from this angle, we see aspects of faith that remain obscure in many debates on religion, aspects beyond historical or factual matters. Firstly, I explore what it is exactly that is envied in faith envy. Secondly, I argue for the use of the concept ‘envy’ rather than ‘jealousy’ or ‘admiration’ in this context. Thirdly, I indicate how using the concept of faith envy may open up new theoretical perspectives on faith and in particular the nature of religious language. I show how the lives and works of Sören Kierkegaard, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Simone Weil are illuminated by looking at them as people who envy faith.
I conclude this article by providing some impressions of what novel perspectives using the concept of faith envy may bring to light.