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The article reconstructs and critically assesses some of the most recurring arguments in legal and political philosophy to the effect that social rights are different in structure from, and necessarily incompatible with, the more familiar... more
The article reconstructs and critically assesses some of the most recurring arguments in legal and political philosophy to the effect that social rights are different in structure from, and necessarily incompatible with, the more familiar civil and political liberties. The author shows that social rights and civil and political liberties have in common more than meets the eye, and so they are different in degree rather than in kind. Moreover, while these rights can certainly happen to conflict one against the other in particular instances, they prove not only to be compatible but even mutually reinforcing as far as their respective axiological foundations are concerned.
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The paper assesses the widespread use of the test of proportionality in fundamental rights adjudication. While constitutional and human rights courts all over the world appear to be consistently engaged in deploying the test of... more
The paper assesses the widespread use of the test of proportionality in fundamental rights adjudication. While constitutional and human rights courts all over the world appear to be consistently engaged in deploying the test of proportionality in order to assess the permissibility of a given rights limitation, this approach is under severe criticism insofar as it is considered an attack to the very idea of fundamental rights. The paper will discuss this criticism of the use of proportionality, and will provide a defense of its use by courts in light of some basic features of the contemporary discourse of fundamental rights.
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Questo intervento è la mia replica al dibattito sul mio libro Teoria analitica del diritto I. La norma giuridica, al quale hanno partecipato Gaetano Carlizzi, Vincenzo Omaggio, e Vito Velluzzi. Colgo l’occasione di questo intervento, e... more
Questo intervento è la mia replica al dibattito sul mio libro Teoria analitica del diritto I. La norma giuridica, al quale hanno partecipato Gaetano Carlizzi, Vincenzo Omaggio, e Vito Velluzzi. Colgo l’occasione di questo intervento, e delle perspicue osservazioni emerse nel dibattito, per chiarire un paio di punti specifici del mio libro, e per ritornare sul progetto complessivo che lo anima. This is my rejoinder to the debate with Gaetano Carlizzi, Vincenzo Omaggio, and Vito Velluzzi on my book Teoria analitica del diritto I. La norma giuridica. I gladly use this opportunity, and the insightful remarks provided by my commentators, to clarify a couple of points that I already made in my book, and to restate the general jurisprudential project thereof.
The essay argues that the rule of recognition, as it has been conceived by H. L. a. Hart, is either a redundant, and hence mostly useless, concept, or it is a concept with limited explanatory potential in either case, at best a concept... more
The essay argues that the rule of recognition, as it has been conceived by H. L. a. Hart, is either a redundant, and hence mostly useless, concept, or it is a concept with limited explanatory potential in either case, at best a concept whose scope is much narrower, in contemporary legal systems, than the one envisaged by Hart. it will also be argued that the rule of recognition, if subject to a possible (and plausible) reformulation, can nevertheless play a significant, non-redundant role. This, however, will require to assign the rule of recognition a rather different job than the one proposed by Hart, as well as by most post-Hartian positivist literature, namely it will require to locate the rule of recognition not in the theory of the legal system, but in the theory of legal reasoning. * professore di Filosofia del diritto, università di palermo. email: giorgio.pino@unipa.it. indirizzo: diGispo, sezione diritto e società, università di palermo piazza Bologni 8, 90134, palermo. ri...
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El objeto de este breve texto es poner de relieve alguna duda acerca de un específico, aunque no marginal, aspecto de la compleja teoría de los derechos fundamentales construida por Ferrajoli: el problema del conflicto entre derechos... more
El objeto de este breve texto es poner de relieve alguna duda acerca de un específico, aunque no marginal, aspecto de la compleja teoría de los derechos fundamentales construida por Ferrajoli: el problema del conflicto entre derechos fundamentales. En primer lugar, ofreceré un sumario bastante genérico sobre la presencia (por lo menos aparente, o potencial) de conflictos entre derechos fundamentales en el panorama constitucional contemporáneo. De ahí pasaré a ilustrar la estrategia elaborada por L. Ferrajoli para argumentar la tesis de la ausencia o, al menos, la extremadamente reducida y marginal presencia de los conflictos entre derechos fundamentales. Por último, mostraré algunas posibles críticas a la estrategia de Ferrajoli.
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En el ensayo Constitucionalismo principialista y constitucionalismo garantista, Luigi Ferrajoli ofrece una oportuna clarificación teórica y conceptual sobre el así llamado neoconstitucionalismo. Por mi parte, en esta contribución... more
En el ensayo Constitucionalismo principialista y constitucionalismo garantista, Luigi Ferrajoli ofrece una oportuna clarificación teórica y conceptual sobre el así llamado neoconstitucionalismo. Por mi parte, en esta contribución intentaré desarrollar algunas observaciones sobre tres puntos acerca de los cuales me encuentro en relativo desacuerdo con el análisis de Ferrajoli: el tratamiento de la distinción entre reglas y principios, la interpretación de la práctica de la ponderación, y el problema de la separación entre Derecho y moral. Además, ofreceré un panorama de los significados del (neo)constitucionalismo, y, respecto a tal panorama, consideraré el modo en el cual Ferrajoli sitúa su propia posición teórica.
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Artosi, A., Baghramian, M., Barberis, M., Bianchi, C., Coliva, A., Dell'Utri, M., et al. (2010). Il Relativismo: temi e prospettive (PG Maniaci Giorgio, a cura di). Roma : Aracne. ... Artosi, A; Baghramian, M; Barberis, M; Bianchi,... more
Artosi, A., Baghramian, M., Barberis, M., Bianchi, C., Coliva, A., Dell'Utri, M., et al. (2010). Il Relativismo: temi e prospettive (PG Maniaci Giorgio, a cura di). Roma : Aracne. ... Artosi, A; Baghramian, M; Barberis, M; Bianchi, C; Coliva, A; Dell'Utri, M; Frega, R; Lecaldano, E; O' ...
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Che cosa è un diritto indisponibile? E può un diritto essere indisponibile? A queste domande il saggio cerca di rispondere impiegando un apparato concettuale di tipo hohfeldiano, in primo luogo; e in secondo luogo, utilizzando la presunta... more
Che cosa è un diritto indisponibile? E può un diritto essere indisponibile? A queste domande il saggio cerca di rispondere impiegando un apparato concettuale di tipo hohfeldiano, in primo luogo; e in secondo luogo, utilizzando la presunta categoria dei diritti indisponibili come banco di prova per la teoria della volontà e la teoria dell'interesse.
What is an inalienable right? Can a right be inalienable? This article seeks the answers to these questions, in the first place, by employing a hohfeldian-type conceptual apparatus. Secondly, it uses the supposed category of inalienable rights as a test-case for the will theory and the interest theory of rights.
What is an inalienable right? Can a right be inalienable? This article seeks the answers to these questions, in the first place, by employing a hohfeldian-type conceptual apparatus. Secondly, it uses the supposed category of inalienable rights as a test-case for the will theory and the interest theory of rights.
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Sostenere una tesi interpretativa ricorrendo ad un argomento ex auctoritate vuol dire affermare che quella tesi è corretta perché è già stata sostenuta da qualcuno, la cui autorità è dunque invocata a sostegno della tesi. Nonostante... more
Sostenere una tesi interpretativa ricorrendo ad un argomento ex auctoritate vuol dire affermare che quella tesi è corretta perché è già stata sostenuta da qualcuno, la cui autorità è dunque invocata a sostegno della tesi. Nonostante l’apparente stranezza, argomenti di questo tipo sono ampiamente utilizzati nelle argomentazioni giudiziarie e dottrinali, ma poco studiati dalla teoria dell’interpretazione e argomentazione giuridica. Questo saggio si propone di colmare questa lacuna.
To argue ex auctoritate in favour of a certain interpretation means that that interpretation is to be deemed correct just in virtue of the fact that said interpretation has already been endorsed by somebody – whose authority is thus called upon in order to substantiate the correctness of the interpretation at stake. While this way of arguing may seem somewhat odd, it is rather widespread in both judicial and doctrinal writings, and at the same time it is rather neglected by the theory of legal interpretation and legal reasoning. The essay tries to fill this gap.
To argue ex auctoritate in favour of a certain interpretation means that that interpretation is to be deemed correct just in virtue of the fact that said interpretation has already been endorsed by somebody – whose authority is thus called upon in order to substantiate the correctness of the interpretation at stake. While this way of arguing may seem somewhat odd, it is rather widespread in both judicial and doctrinal writings, and at the same time it is rather neglected by the theory of legal interpretation and legal reasoning. The essay tries to fill this gap.
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In questo contribuito metterò in evidenza e discuterò alcune tesi, sostenute tra gli altri da Luis Prieto, relativamente alla nozione di superiorità della costituzione, e al rapporto tra controllo giudiziario di legittimità costituzionale... more
In questo contribuito metterò in evidenza e discuterò alcune tesi, sostenute tra gli altri da Luis Prieto, relativamente alla nozione di superiorità della costituzione, e al rapporto tra controllo giudiziario di legittimità costituzionale delle leggi e democrazia. Sono questioni che riguardano aspetti non secondari dell’edificio dello Stato costituzionale contemporaneo, e su entrambe si è molto dibattuto negli ultimi decenni. Per parte mia, proverò a mostrare che la nozione di superiorità della costituzione per un verso è concettualmente indipendente dalla nozione di “rigidità” della costituzione, mentre per altro verso è concettualmente (e non solo pragmaticamente) collegata all’esistenza di un controllo di costituzionalità. Il saggio si conclude con qualche riflessione su un possibile modo di riconciliare democrazia e controllo giudiziario di costituzionalità.
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In che senso Riccardo Guastini è un giuspositivista?
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The author replies to four commentaries to his book il costituzionalismo dei diritti (il Mulino, 2017) taking the chance to further clarify his own stance on some topics discussed thereby.
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the article reconstructs and critically assesses some of the most recurring arguments in legal and political philosophy to the effect that social rights are different in structure from, and necessarily incompatible with, the more familiar... more
the article reconstructs and critically assesses some of the most recurring arguments in legal and political philosophy to the effect that social rights are different in structure from, and necessarily incompatible with, the more familiar civil and political liberties. The author shows that social rights and civil and political liberties share much more traits than meets the eye, and so are different in degree rather than in kind. Moreover, while these rights can certainly happen to conflict one against the other in particular instances, they prove not only compatible but even mutually reinforcing as far as their respective axiological foundations are concerned.
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The essay reviews the issue of the legal relevance of religious identity, and of its possible scope, from the standpoint of the values that underpin contemporary constitutional States (equality, liberty, dignity, secularism). The essay... more
The essay reviews the issue of the legal relevance of religious identity, and of its possible scope, from the standpoint of the values that underpin contemporary constitutional States (equality, liberty, dignity, secularism). The essay will try to show that, in the light of the aforementioned values, religious identity has in fact legal and constitutional relevance. This does not imply, however, that legal claims based on religious identity should receive absolute legal protection – rather, they are bound to be consistently balanced against other constitutionally relevant rights and interests.
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The essay discusses the import of the separability thesis both for legal positivism and for contemporary legal practice. First, the place of the separability thesis in legal positivism will be explored, distinguishing between " standard... more
The essay discusses the import of the separability thesis both for legal positivism and for contemporary legal practice. First, the place of the separability thesis in legal positivism will be explored, distinguishing between " standard positivism " and " post-Hartian positivism ". Then we will consider various kinds of relations between law and morality that are worth of jurisprudential interest, and will explore, from a positivist point of view, what kind of relations between law and morality must be rejected, what kind of such relations should be taken into account, and what kind of such relations are indeed of no import at all. The upshot of this analysis consists in highlighting the distinction between two different dimensions of legal validity (formal validity and material validity respectively), and in pointing out that the positivist separability thesis can apply to formal validity only; on the contrary, when the ascertainment of material validity is at stake, some form of moral reasoning may well be involved (and, here and now, necessarily is involved). The essay concludes with some brief remarks on the persisting importance of the positivist jurisprudential project.
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Scientific interpretation, decisional interpretation, creative interpretation. The article critically reviews Riccardo Guastini's theory of legal interpretation, as it is now exposed in the recent book Interpretare e argomentare. While... more
Scientific interpretation, decisional interpretation, creative interpretation. The article critically reviews Riccardo Guastini's theory of legal interpretation, as it is now exposed in the recent book Interpretare e argomentare. While broadly sympathetic with Guastini's jurisprudential project, the author tries to highlight some weaknesses in his conceptual framework – namely, regarding the distinction between " scientific " and " decisional " interpretation, the distinction between interpretation properly understood and creation of new law, and the concept of interpretive creativity. Keywords: legal interpretation, framework of possible meanings, acknowledging existing law vs creating new law
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Avviso di selezione pubblica per l'ammissione ai corsi di dottorato di ricerca (XXXVII ciclo formativo-A.A.
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Avviso di selezione pubblica per l'ammissione ai corsi di dottorato di ricerca (XXXVI ciclo formativo-A.A. 2020/2021)
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Avviso di selezione pubblica per l'ammissione ai corsi di dottorato di ricerca (XXXVIII ciclo)