Sarah Kaplan

ABSTRACT Research on managerial cognition and on organizational capabilities has essentially developed in two parallel tracks. We know much from the resource-based view about the relationship between capabilities and organizational performance. Separately, managerial cognition scholars have shown how interpretations of the environment shape organizational responses. Only recently have scholars begun to link the two sets of insights. These new links suggest that routines and capabilities are based in particular understandings about how things should be done, that the value of these capabilities is subject to interpretation, and that even the presence of capabilities may be useless without managerial interpretations of their match to the environment. This review organizes these emerging insights in a multi-level cognitive model of capability development and deployment. The model focuses on the recursive processes of constructing routines (capability building blocks), assembling routines into capabilities, and matching capabilities to perceived opportunities. To date, scholars have focused most attention on the organizational-level process of matching. Emerging research on the microfoundations of routines contributes to the micro-level of analysis. The lack of research on capability assembly leaves the field without a bridge connecting the macro and micro levels. The model offers suggestions for research directions to address these challenges.

This special issue is devoted to exploring new methods for addressing questions in strategic management. This introduction synthesizes the collective contribution of the articles for strategy research. The articles draw on methods from other fields, extending and adapting them to address strategy questions. The innovations provide new, different, or more nuanced measures and findings as compared to prior research. We conclude by discussing more general implications for scholarship in strategic management. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Recently there has been much debate about the usefulness of strategic management education and implicitly about strategy tools and frameworks. Yet, this debate is taking place in the absence of detailed knowledge about how, or indeed, whether, managers use the theoretical tools that they learn. This paper addresses this gap by taking a practice perspective to look at how strategy tools are mobilized inside organizations. Using illustrations from three vignettes of strategy tools in use, we explore how an actor's search for rationality and objectivity through the use of tools is actually a political, symbolic and socially interactive process. We provide a conceptual framework for analyzing strategy tools as key mediators of these contextual and political interests. We offer propositions associated with the functions of tools in use, the contextual factors that shape their use and the types of outcomes that can be examined using a practice lens on strategy making.

One of the great challenges for organizations in the current economy is making strategy under the uncertainties posed by turbulent environments, intensified competition, emerging technologies, shifting customer tastes and regulatory change. Executives often know they must break with the status quo, but there are few signposts indicating the best way forward. A core assumption in much of strategic management research is that more accurate forecasts of future competitive actions or the future value of certain business capabilities will lead to strategic success. Studies have pointed to the abject failure of most forecasting efforts to attain the desired precision. While strategy researchers tell managers they should project into the future, we tell them little about how to do this

... Los mis-Por Sarah Kaplan y Eric D. Beinhocker Page 2. mos protagonistas analizan, por separado, la estrategia corporativa. Descubrimos que la clave para que estas reuniones de revisión dejen de ser simples presen-taciones y se transformen en vehículos eficaces para el ...

comments on earlier drafts of this paper. All errors or omissions remain our own. The entrepreneurship literature typically depicts Schumpeterian entrepreneurs – those in a quest to profit from new technologies – as individuals seeking out pre-existing opportunities and building organizations to create and capture financial profit (Shane 2000; Shane and Venkataraman 2000; Venkataraman 1997). Implicit in this view is the idea that a technology is something to discover rather than something to influence and that technology evolution is exogenous to the entrepreneurial process (as noted by Shah and Tripsas 2007). An alternative perspective argues that technologies are at least partially changeable and that the role of effective Schumpeterian entrepreneurs is to mold them to a particular (exogenously given) institutional environment (Hargadon and Douglas 2001). Either view of technical change (and of the role of entrepreneurship in it) is at odds with findings from studies of the evolut...

Abstract: We propose a new methodology -topic modeling -to evaluate the emergence and interpretation of new technologies and use this approach to examine trends in the field of nanotechnology. We treat patents not as measures of innovation but rather as historical documents written by particular human beings, in particular places, at particular times. We argue that studying the language in patents provides a closer reading of interpretations of an emerging technology than can be obtained through indicators such as USPTO patent classifications. By analyzing the text of the abstracts of 2,826 fullerene patents, we find that interpretations of what this "general purpose technology" was and how it might be used changed over time. Our descriptive results contrast with extant literature on sources and value of inventions.

En un contexto economico agitado, en el que se intensifica la competencia, las tecnologias emergentes ganan fuerza y tanto los gustos de los consumidores como las regulaciones cambian constantemente, uno de los principales retos para las empresas es crear narrativas estrategicas que faciliten la innovacion. El articulo expone las conclusiones extraidas tras observar en profundidad cinco proyectos de estrategia tecnologica, desarrollados en una empresa de tecnologias opticas, desde su concepcion hasta las decisiones criticas tomadas por los directivos en torno a la asignacion de recursos.

Abstract: A cognitive perspective on technical change suggests that actors' interpretations of a technology shape their choices and actions about it and as a result influence the technology's trajectory. Applying a cognitive perspective to the technology lifecycle suggests that diverse technological frames are a source of variation in the era of ferment, that framing activities help drive the achievement of a dominant design when one emerges, and that the intertwining of the technological frames with the industry and organizational architectures ...

‘Nanotechnology’ is often touted as a significant emerging technological field. However, determining what nanotechnology means, whose research counts as nanotechnology, and who gets to speak on behalf of nanotechnology is a highly political process involving constant negotiation with significant implications for funding, legislation, and citizen support. In this paper, we deconstruct a high-profile moment of controversy about nanotechnology’s possibilities: a debate between K. Eric Drexler and Richard Smalley published as a ‘point—counterpoint’ feature in 2003 in Chemical & Engineering News. Rather than treat the debate as a stand-alone episode of scientific controversy, we seek to understand the forces that enabled it to be seen as such an episode. We introduce the term ‘para-scientific’ media to make explicit how certain forms of publication intervene in the dissemination of technical knowledge as it travels beyond its supposed site of production. The existence of para-scientific media is predicated on intimate association with formalized channels of scientific publication, but they also seek to engage other cultures of expertise. Through this lens, we show that Drexler and Smalley were not only independent entrepreneurs enrolling Chemical & Engineering News as a site of boundary work; members of the para-scientific media actively enrolled Drexler and Smalley as part of a broader effort to simplify a complex set of uncertainties about nanotechnology’s potential into two polarized views. In this case study, we examine received accounts of the debate, describe the boundary work undertaken by Drexler and Smalley to shape the path of nanotechnology’s emergence, and unpack the boundary work of the para-scientific media to create polarizing controversy that attracted audiences and influenced policy and scientific research agendas. Members of the para-scientific media have been influential in bounding nanotechnology as a field-in-tension by structuring irreconcilable dichotomies out of an ambiguous set of uncertainties. We conclude with thoughts about the implications of this case study for studies of science communication, institutional entrepreneurship and the ethics of emerging technologies.

This paper reports on a field study of strategy making in one organization facing an industry crisis. In a comparison of five strategy projects, we observed that organizational participants struggled with competing interpretations of what might emerge in the future, what was currently at stake, and even what had happened in the past. We develop a model of temporal work in strategy making that articulates how actors resolved differences and linked their interpretations of the past, present, and future so as to construct a strategic account that enabled concrete strategic choice and action. We found that settling on a particular account required it to be coherent, plausible, and acceptable; otherwise, breakdowns resulted. Such breakdowns could impede progress, but they could also be generative in provoking a search for new interpretations and possibilities for action. The more intensely actors engaged in temporal work, the more likely the strategies departed from the status quo. Our m...

The application of the practice lens to questions of management has been making inroads over the past ten to fifteen years in such fields as technology, knowledge management, and ac- counting. This lens focuses the researcher on developing an account of practices and treats the field of practices as the place to study organizations (Bourdieu, 1977; Feldman, 2003; Giddens, 1984; Orlikowski, 2000; Schatzki, Knorr- Cetina, & von Savigny, 2000). Scholars in this tradition have shown us, for example, how technologies in use (and not ...

... Reviewed by Sarah Kaplan, The Wharton School, Uni-versity of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. ... of practices and treats the field of practices as the place to study orga-nizations (Bourdieu, 1977; Feldman, 2003; Gid-dens, 1984; Orlikowski, 2000; Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, & von ...

ABSTRACT: This paper reports on the―CEO's-eye-view‖ of the 1990 commercial real estate crisis at Citibank using unique data from CEO John Reed's private archives as well as a series of oral histories conducted with Reed, Board Members, other Citi executives and bank regulators. By mapping out Reed's actions across the processes of strategic renewal at Citibank–the sensing and recognition of the crisis, the development of the strategy and the implementation of the plan–I find that is not just the degree to which he anticipated (or did ...

'...chance favors only the prepared mind.' --Louis Pasteur Senior executives generally agree that crafting strategy is one of the most important parts of their job. As a result, most companies invest significant time and effort in a formal, annual strategic-planning process that typically culminates in a series of business unit and corporate strategy reviews with the CEO and the top management team. Yet the extraordinary reality is that few executives think this time-consuming process pays off, and many CEOs complain that their strategic-planning process yields few new ideas and is often fraught with politics. Why the mismatch between effort and result? Evidence we culled from research on the planning processes at 30 companies (see sidebar, "About the research," on the next page) and work with more than 50 additional companies points to a common dispiriting explanation: the annual strategy review frequently amounts to little more than a stage on which business unit leaders present warmed-over updates of last year's presentations, take few risks in broaching new ideas, and strive above all to avoid embarrassment. Rather than preparing executives to face the strategic uncertainties ahead or serving as the focal point for creative thinking about a company's vision and direction, the planning process "is like some primitive tribal ritual," one executive told us. "There is a lot of dancing, waving of feathers, and beating of drums. No one is exactly sure why we do it, but there is an almost mystical hope that something good will come out of it." But something good ought to come out of it. In a business environment of heightened risk and uncertainty, developing effective strategies is crucial. But how can companies reform the process in order to get the payoff they need? New goals for strategic planning Part of the answer lies in taking a fresh look at the substance of business unit and corporate strategy. But a more important--and often overlooked--element is to rethink the process by which strategy is made. It can even be argued that without a strong process, it is unlikely that the substance will come out right. A key starting point is the acceptance of the counterintuitive notion that the strategic-planning process should not be designed to make strategy. Henry Mintzberg, a professor of management at McGill University, calls the phrase "strategic planning" an oxymoron. (1) He argues that real strategies are rarely made in paneled conference rooms but are more likely to be cooked up informally and often in real time-in hallway conversations, casual working groups, or quiet moments of reflection on long airplane flights. What then is the purpose, if any, of a formal planning process? Our research persuades us that the exercise can add value if it has two overarching goals. The first is to build "prepared minds"--that is, to make sure that decision makers have a solid understanding of the business, its strategy, and the assumptions behind that strategy, thereby making it possible for executives to respond swiftly to challenges and opportunities as they occur in real time. GE Capital, for instance, has consistently proved quicker to react and better able to value acquisition opportunities than have its competitors. Part of this success is due to a strategy process ensuring that GE Capital's executives have a strong grasp of the strategic context they operate in before the unpredictable but inevitable twists and turns of their business push them to make M&A and other critical decisions in real time. The second goal is to increase the innovativeness of a company's strategies. No strategy process can guarantee brilliant flashes of creative insight, but much can be done to increase the odds that they will occur. In addition to formal planning at the business unit level, for example, Johnson & Johnson uses crosscutting initiatives on major issues such as biotechnology, the restructuring of the health care industry, and globalization in order to challenge assumptions and open up the organization to new thinking. …

In this debate about the value of introducing a supposed “practice-based view of strategy,” we respond to Bromiley and Rau’s defense of their approach. Coming from a background of two decades of research on strategy-as-practice, we focus on two major concerns about their initiative. The first is that the very use of the term “practice” would seem to obfuscate more than elucidate, especially given their definition of “practice” which strongly deviates from that already established in the social sciences generally. The second is that, by applying the term “practice” to strategy specifically, it becomes incumbent upon Bromiley and Rau to engage with and build upon the extensive practice-related strategy research that has gone before them.

... Collections: Science Technology and Society's Nanotechnology and Society Workshops. ID Code: 44. Deposited By: Michelle Sagan Goncalves. Deposited On: 17 Mar 2009 13:21. Last Modified: 25 Mar 2009 14:31. Repository Staff Only: item control page. ...

Scholars of technical change have long been interested in understanding the ways in which new technologies shape and are shaped by firms and industries. Much attention has been focused on the three fundamental questions in the field – How do technologies evolve? How do producers respond to technical change? How do users adopt and adapt to new technologies? The phenomena represented by these questions are complex, in large part because of the high degree of uncertainty inherent in periods of technical change. It seems likely in these situations that the actors’ cognitive frames of the technology and environment should play a critical role in determining outcomes. Yet, despite an increasing interest in cognition in management research, cognitive perspectives have made only small inroads into an understanding of these questions individually and as they relate to each other. In this paper, we develop a model of producers and users as interpretive systems that interact to shape the evolu...

Turning conventional wisdom on its head, a Senior Partner and an Innovation Specialist from McKinsey & Company debunk the myth that high-octane, built-to-last companies can continue to excel year after year and reveal the dynamic strategies of 'discontinuity 'and creative destruction these corporations 'must' adopt in order to maintain excellence and remain competitive. In striking contrast to such bibles of business literature as In Search of Excellence ' 'and Built to Las 't, 'Richard N. Foster and Sarah Kaplan draw on research they conducted at McKinsey & Company of more than one thousand corporations in fifteen industries over a thirty-six-year period. The industries they examined included old-economy industries such as pulp and paper and chemicals, and new-economy industries like semiconductors and software. Using this enormous fact base, Foster and Kaplan show that even the best-run and most widely admired companies included in their sample are ...

One of the great challenges for organizations in the current economy is making strategy under the uncertainties posed by turbulent environments, intensified competition, emerging technologies, shifting customer tastes and regulatory change. Executives often know they must break with the status quo, but there are few signposts indicating the best way forward. A core assumption in much of strategic management research is that more accurate forecasts of future competitive actions or the future value of certain business capabilities will lead to strategic success. Studies have pointed to the abject failure of most forecasting efforts to attain the desired precision. While strategy researchers tell managers they should project into the future, we tell them little about how to do this

Previous research on breakthrough innovations has used patent data to identify them and assess their impact. The main proxy for breakthroughs uses forward citation counts, where patents at the top of the distribution are considered breakthroughs. Scholars have found this metric correlates with the economic value of patents (i.e., stock market valuations), yet, it does not tell us much about their technological content. We propose a new methodology (topic modeling of patent texts) to distinguish cognitive from economic breakthroughs. In our test case analysis of 2,826 nanotechnology patents, we find that cognitive breakthroughs are more likely to be highly cited, yet the mechanisms that produce cognitive and economic breakthroughs are quite different. Moreover, patents that are cognitive as well as economic breakthroughs have a bigger and more enduring impact on future inventions. This approach gives us traction in understanding the emergence and evolution of technologies over time.

We propose a new methodology – topic modeling – to evaluate the emergence and interpretation of new technologies and use this approach to examine trends in the field of nanotechnology. We treat patents not as measures of innovation but rather as historical documents written by particular human beings, in particular places, at particular times. We argue that studying the language in patents provides a closer reading of interpretations of an emerging technology than can be obtained through indicators such as USPTO patent classifications. By analyzing the text of the abstracts of 2,826 fullerene patents, we find that interpretations of what this “general purpose technology” was and how it might be used changed over time. Our descriptive results contrast with extant literature on sources and value of inventions.

While innovation has increasingly become a collaborative effort, there is little consensus in research about what types of team configurations might be the most useful for creating breakthrough innovations. Do teams need to include inventors with knowledge breadth for recombination or do they need inventors with knowledge depth for identifying anomalies? Do teams need overlapping knowledge to integrate insights from diverse areas or does this redundancy hamper innovation by creating inefficiencies? In this paper, we offer evidence that the answers to these questions may depend on the characteristics of the technologies. Focusing on the degree of modularity and the breadth of application in patent data, we identify empirical patterns suggesting that differing team configurations are associated with different technological domains.