Martin Klein
Universität Würzburg, Philosophisches Institut, Faculty Member
- Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy Of Language, Medieval History, Analytic Philosophy, Scholastic Philosophy, Semantic Externalism, and 17 moreMetaphysics, Medieval Theology, Natural philosophy, Body and Soul, Theoretical Philosophy, Medieval Philosophy, John Buridan, William Ockham, Internalism/Externalism, Hilary Putnam, Philosophical Psychology, Aristotle, Semantics, History of Philosophy, Immortality, Epistemology, and Animal Cognitionedit
- Lecturer (Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter), Universität Würzburg, Department of Philosophy, Research Group "Modes of I... moreLecturer (Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter), Universität Würzburg, Department of Philosophy, Research Group "Modes of Intentionality", 2019–
Research Fellow, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Department of Philosophy (Topoi EXC), 2012–2018
Ph.D. (‘summa cum laude’), Philosophy, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 2016
Thesis on Buridan’s philosophy of mind (committee: Dominik Perler, Martin Lenz & Martin Pickavé)
M.A. (‘with distinction’), double major Philosophy & Mediaeval History, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 2012
(examiners: Dominik Perler & Johannes Helmrath)
Study of philosophy, history and theology in Berlin, Toronto, Groningen and Rome, 2005–2016
Toronto-Rome Diploma Programme in Manuscript Studies, PIMS Toronto, 2016–2018edit
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In our daily lives, we are surrounded by all sorts of things – such as trees, cars, persons, or madeleines – and perception allows us access to them. But what does ‘to perceive’ actually mean? What is it that we perceive? How do we... more
In our daily lives, we are surrounded by all sorts of things – such as trees, cars, persons, or madeleines – and perception allows us access to them. But what does ‘to perceive’ actually mean? What is it that we perceive? How do we perceive? Do we perceive the same way animals do? Does reason play a role in perception? Such questions occur naturally today. But was it the same in the past, centuries ago? The collected volume tackles this issue by turning to the Latin philosophy of the 13th and 14th centuries. Did medieval thinkers raise the same, or similar, questions as we do with respect to perception? What answers did they provide? What arguments did they make for raising the questions they did, and for the answers they gave to them? The philosophers taken into consideration are, among others, Albert the Great, Roger Bacon, William of Auvergne, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, John Pecham, Richard Rufus, Peter Olivi, Robert Kilwardby, John Buridan, and Jean of Jandun.
Contributors are Elena Băltuță, Daniel De Haan, Martin Klein, Andrew LaZella, Lukáš Lička, Mattia Mantovani, André Martin, Dominik Perler, Paolo Rubini, José Filipe Silva, Juhana Toivanen, and Rega Wood.
Contributors are Elena Băltuță, Daniel De Haan, Martin Klein, Andrew LaZella, Lukáš Lička, Mattia Mantovani, André Martin, Dominik Perler, Paolo Rubini, José Filipe Silva, Juhana Toivanen, and Rega Wood.
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Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 124, Leiden: Brill 2019
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This author-meets-critics volume about Robert Pasnau’s After Certainty treats the history of epistemology, from Aristotle to the present. Pasnau presents this history as a gradual lowering of expectations regarding certain knowledge, the... more
This author-meets-critics volume about Robert Pasnau’s After Certainty treats the history of epistemology, from Aristotle to the present. Pasnau presents this history as a gradual lowering of expectations regarding certain knowledge, the culmination of a sea change dating to the early-modern rejection of Aristotelian essentialism. The result, he concludes, is that contemporary epistemology is, more than any other branch of philosophy, estranged from its tradition. Pasnau’s After Certainty draws conclusions that are not just historical, but also systematic, an effort that led to a 2018 Parisian symposium to evaluate the text, collected here as a volume that stands alone as an intriguing work on the history of epistemology or together with After Certainty as an invaluable companion piece.
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In this paper I examine how the medieval distinction between proper and improper signification can give a plausible explanation of both metaphorical use and the usual transformations a language can undergo. I will show how Thomas Aquinas... more
In this paper I examine how the medieval distinction between proper and improper signification can give a plausible explanation of both metaphorical use and the usual transformations a language can undergo. I will show how Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between ordinary ambiguous terms and metaphors, whereas William of Ockham and Walter Burley do not leave room for this dis- tinction. I will argue that Ockham’s conception of transfer of sense through the subsequent institution of words is best thought of as an explanation of how ordinary usage can contain ambiguities, whereas Burley’s conception of transfer of sense without new imposition is more plausible when it comes to explaining metaphors. If metaphorical use is lumped together with equivocation, the account of how they work cannot do full justice to either, an insight that we already find in Peter Abelard, if not in Boethius.
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I examine the connection between the late medieval idea of God’s omnipotence, philosophy’s minimized claim to certainty and thought experiments as established by Hans Blumenberg with regard to his thesis that in the 14th century begins a... more
I examine the connection between the late medieval idea of God’s omnipotence, philosophy’s minimized claim to certainty and thought experiments as established by Hans Blumenberg with regard to his thesis that in the 14th century begins a rehabilitation of theoretical curiosity. Even if medieval thought experiments can do without reasoning about omnipotence, as in Aquinas’ Man-Eater, or such a consideration does not imply that God’s intervention in nature is assumed to be real, as in Occam’s Zombie, Buridan’s reflection on the nature of the human soul is close to the connection asserted by Blumenberg: the natural philosopher includes the miracle of an immortal soul in his philosophy. For him, however, this can only be a thought experiment.
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In this paper, I investigate the metaphysical assumptions that medieval thinkers considered necessary in order to integrate the vegetative powers and pro- cesses into their conception of human beings as composed of a material body and an... more
In this paper, I investigate the metaphysical assumptions that medieval thinkers considered necessary in order to integrate the vegetative powers and pro- cesses into their conception of human beings as composed of a material body and an immaterial soul. My aim is to show that vegetative powers and processes are central to the late medieval debate on faculty psychology and on the unity or plural- ity of substantial forms. The chapter has two parts. First, I present three different accounts of the ontological status of the vegetative powers in relation to the body and the soul, as found in Thomas Aquinas, William of Ockham, and John Buridan. All three maintain that the vegetative powers belong to the soul but disagree as to whether they are identical with it or somehow distinct from it, especially when the soul in question is immaterial. Second, I investigate how medieval thinkers accounted for the metaphysics behind the operations of the vegetative powers in human beings, who are endowed with immaterial souls, in particular when it comes to procreation and digestion. A pressing problem for the vegetative powers of human beings is how they can produce a new substance when this composite is supposed to include an immaterial soul which is not naturally generated. Regarding procreation, one can distinguish two different approaches: dispositional generation of material conditions (Aquinas, Buridan) and substantial generation of the body (Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines). A similar problem for human beings arises in nutri- tion and growth once this process is taken to be some kind of substantial change, namely, the corruption of food and the production of new parts of the living being. Two accounts can be distinguished: (i) “transmateriation” of the matter of food into the nourished body (Aquinas, Buridan) and (ii) generation of parts of the body (Francis of Marchia).
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In fourteenth-century scholasticism, one frequently finds the claim that a crucial characteristic of cognition is the object’s being or appearing in the gaze of the cognizer (esse in prospectu cognoscentis). But what is the nature of the... more
In fourteenth-century scholasticism, one frequently finds the claim that a crucial characteristic of cognition is the object’s being or appearing in the gaze of the cognizer (esse in prospectu cognoscentis). But what is the nature of the object as it appears in the gaze? And what sorts of cognition involve a mental gaze and how does it come about? This paper describes how the explanatory function of the mental gaze varied significantly in the fourteenth century, and how the meaning of the presence of the object of cognition was reversed completely from Hervaeus Natalis through Peter Auriol and on to John Buridan: from universal cognition of an intramental object to singular cognition of an extramental object.
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The problem of human nutrition in medieval natural philosophy was closely connected with metaphysical claims about the human soul. The human soul was considered to be ungenerable and incorruptible, since it is created by God and not... more
The problem of human nutrition in medieval natural philosophy was closely connected with metaphysical claims about the human soul. The human soul was considered to be ungenerable and incorruptible, since it is created by God and not naturally derived from the potency of matter. This raises a question about human nutrition: How can an immaterial soul be engaged in obviously material processes such as nutrition? This problem is particularly pressing for John Buridan (ca. 1300–1358/60), who identifies nutritive powers with the soul; and since the human soul is immaterial, the human nutritive powers are immaterial as well. Though Buridan subscribes to the view that the process of nutrition involves the corruption of food and the partial substantial generation of the soul, he nevertheless believes that general features of nutrition can be explained for human beings. I argue that Buridan conceives of nutrition as a merely material change, a view which is in line with his broader conception of substantial generation and the relation between a substantial form and its coming to existence in suitably disposed matter. Ultimately, the way in which Buridan accounts for nutrition turns out to be another example of a rising dualism between body and soul, pointing to developments some centuries later which will render substantial forms superfluous.
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In this article I want to answer the question whether, according to Buridan, sense perception is always and necessarily the cognition of one singular object and not of many objects, and how he relates this problem to the metaphysical... more
In this article I want to answer the question whether, according to Buridan, sense perception is always and necessarily the cognition of one singular object and not of many objects, and how he relates this problem to the metaphysical nature of the senses. I shall proceed by arguing against what has been recently claimed in the literature on this matter. First, regarding the cognitive process of sense perception, some scholars think that, although Buridan can give a natural account of the perception of material beings such as horses and dogs, his account reaches the end of the line when it comes to human beings with immaterial sensitive souls. Second, regarding the singular and universal modes of sense perception, some claim that Buridan shows that not only immaterial intellection but also material perception are a type of universal cognition. Third, regarding the nature of cognitive subjects, it has been argued that Buridan should admit that sense perception is singular essentially because of the materiality of the cognitive subject, even though he claims that the opposite is true. Against these interpretations, I will argue that Buridan gives the same explanation for sense perception in human as well as non-human animals in terms of the cognitive process (section 1); he does not claim that sense perception is a type of universal cognition (section 2); however, he is not committed to the view that the material nature of the senses is the fundamental reason for the singularity of sense perception (section 3).
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This issue is dedicated to consciousness in medieval and early modern philosophy of mind. It aims to shed new light on the continuities and innovations during the transition from medieval to early modern philosophy of mind. The four... more
This issue is dedicated to consciousness in medieval and early modern philosophy of mind. It aims to shed new light on the continuities and innovations during the transition from medieval to early modern philosophy of mind. The four papers, by Sonja Schierbaum, Daniel Schmal, Oliver Istvan Toth, and Philipp N. Müller, focus on consciousness and, more specifically, on one of its less frequently considered aspects: memory.
Consciousness and Memory in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, Society and Politics, 2018 Vol. 12 no.2
Consciousness and Memory in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, Society and Politics, 2018 Vol. 12 no.2
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Penultimate version
Published version in: Theologische Literaturzeitung 143 (2018) 12, pp. 1301–1303
Published version in: Theologische Literaturzeitung 143 (2018) 12, pp. 1301–1303
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Against common interpretations of John Buridan’s theory of sense perception and singular cognition I’ll defend the following three claims: First, Buridan gives the same account for sense perception of human as well as non-human animals... more
Against common interpretations of John Buridan’s theory of sense perception and singular cognition I’ll defend the following three claims: First, Buridan gives the same account for sense perception of human as well as non-human animals although the former have an immaterial and the latter a material soul. Second, Buridan does not think that sense perception could ever be a type of universal cognition even though he admits natural appetites, such as hunger and thirst, to be directed in a universal way. Third, sense perception is the paradigmatic case of singular cognition; however, the singularity of sense perception is not essentially due to the material nature of perceptive powers. Eventually, what distinguishes Buridan from other late medieval theories of sense perception is that he sharply differentiates the epistemological question of what it means to perceive something, namely to cognise it singularly, from the metaphysical question of how the intentional phenomenon of singular cognition is realised.
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Part of the Panel "Intentionality and Causality of Rational Appetite in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy" organised together with Han Thomas Adriaenssen and Andrea Sangiacomo, OZSW 2016 Conference
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Thomas Aquinas tried to proof that the human intellect is immaterial because of its peculiar operations of thinking about the natures of all bodies, universals, and eventually itself. The latter inference from quidditative... more
Thomas Aquinas tried to proof that the human intellect is immaterial because of its peculiar operations of thinking about the natures of all bodies, universals, and eventually itself.
The latter inference from quidditative self-knowledge to the immaterial nature of the intellect is particularly interesting. For, Aquinas combines Aristotelian, Neoplatonic and Arabic approaches by making reference to a special kind of intellectual operation: In reflecting upon itself the intellect acquires knowledge of its essence.
However, as I will show in my paper, it is doubtful whether Aquinas’s proof is successful. On the one hand, in some versions of his proof Aquinas does not seem to proof but merely presuppose the immaterial nature of the human intellect. On the other hand, even if the proof is valid, it is questionable whether it is sound. For, the cognitive process by my means of which the intellect turns to itself is obscure. Hence, for good reasons some 14th century thinkers, among them John Buridan, did not accept Aquinas’s proof.
The latter inference from quidditative self-knowledge to the immaterial nature of the intellect is particularly interesting. For, Aquinas combines Aristotelian, Neoplatonic and Arabic approaches by making reference to a special kind of intellectual operation: In reflecting upon itself the intellect acquires knowledge of its essence.
However, as I will show in my paper, it is doubtful whether Aquinas’s proof is successful. On the one hand, in some versions of his proof Aquinas does not seem to proof but merely presuppose the immaterial nature of the human intellect. On the other hand, even if the proof is valid, it is questionable whether it is sound. For, the cognitive process by my means of which the intellect turns to itself is obscure. Hence, for good reasons some 14th century thinkers, among them John Buridan, did not accept Aquinas’s proof.
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Leuven Workshop on Fourteenth-Century Philosophy KU Leuven, 4-6 June, 2015 In this talk I want to show that there is a late medieval substance dualism which, however, did not evolve in the context of philosophy of mind, but rather... more
Leuven Workshop on Fourteenth-Century Philosophy
KU Leuven, 4-6 June, 2015
In this talk I want to show that there is a late medieval substance dualism which, however, did not evolve in the context of philosophy of mind, but rather from theological debates on Christ’s body in the Eucharist. It is my suspicion that, eventually, substantial form pluralism collapses into substance dualism. If this is true the Eucharist, once again, proves to be a significant transformer of hylemorphism.
KU Leuven, 4-6 June, 2015
In this talk I want to show that there is a late medieval substance dualism which, however, did not evolve in the context of philosophy of mind, but rather from theological debates on Christ’s body in the Eucharist. It is my suspicion that, eventually, substantial form pluralism collapses into substance dualism. If this is true the Eucharist, once again, proves to be a significant transformer of hylemorphism.
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This talk was part of the panel session "Psychology and epistemology in the later Middle Ages" (together with Han Thomas Adriaenssen and Sander W. de Boer) at the OZSW 2014 conference at Radboud University Nijmegen, 7-8 November. In this... more
This talk was part of the panel session "Psychology and epistemology in the later Middle Ages" (together with Han Thomas Adriaenssen and Sander W. de Boer) at the OZSW 2014 conference at Radboud University Nijmegen, 7-8 November.
In this talk I claim that, according to John Buridan, it is problematic to infer from the immateriality of the human intellect to its epistemic abilities and vice versa. Hence, proofs of the nature of the human intellect cannot rely on arguments from cognition with regard to, e.g., universal cognition or self-knowledge.
In this talk I claim that, according to John Buridan, it is problematic to infer from the immateriality of the human intellect to its epistemic abilities and vice versa. Hence, proofs of the nature of the human intellect cannot rely on arguments from cognition with regard to, e.g., universal cognition or self-knowledge.
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Abstractionist accounts of universal cognition of substances seem to fall victim either to Peter Geach’s critique that it is incomprehensible how substantial information should be gained from sensory accidental impact only. Or, if there... more
Abstractionist accounts of universal cognition of substances seem to fall victim either to Peter Geach’s critique that it is incomprehensible how substantial information should be gained from sensory accidental impact only. Or, if there is already substantial impact at the sensory level, this raises the problem of classificatory or conceptual sensing not strictly distinguished from intellectual cognition, as Peter King has pointed out. As I argue in this paper, John Buridan’s cognitive psychology can solve both problems: Essential information is given in the senses, though implicitly (pace Geach), which is unproblematic (pace King), given Buridan’s naturalistic considerations of intellectual abstraction.
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In this paper I claim that, in the late Middle Ages, hylemorphism transforms into substance dualism. This transformation originates against the background of the Eucharist in the discussion about the plurality and unity of substantial... more
In this paper I claim that, in the late Middle Ages, hylemorphism transforms into substance dualism. This transformation originates against the background of the Eucharist in the discussion about the plurality and unity of substantial form a human being contains. I argue that the pluralistic outcome is a kind of substance dualism, insofar as body and rational soul are treated as really distinct parts that are essentially unified in a human being while being ontologically independent entities that have an actuality on their own.
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Hilary Putnam presents his idea of semantic externalism as a necessary break with the Aristotelian tradition of meaning. But is it really true that one cannot be an externalist regarding the question what determines the content of our... more
Hilary Putnam presents his idea of semantic externalism as a necessary break with the Aristotelian tradition of meaning. But is it really true that one cannot be an externalist regarding the question what determines the content of our linguistic expressions and at the same time be committed to the Aristotelian semiotic triangle? As I argue in this paper, William Ockham’s considerations of imposition and distinct signification of words present an account of semantic externalism within the Aristotelian semantic model.
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Medieval scholastic philosophers at the universities of Paris and Oxford from 1200 to 1350 engaged in complex discussions about the nature of conscious experience. The conference aims to connect these insights and arguments from medieval... more
Medieval scholastic philosophers at the universities of Paris and Oxford from 1200 to 1350 engaged in complex discussions about the nature of conscious experience. The conference aims to connect these insights and arguments from medieval texts to current philosophical discussions on consciousness.
Orgainzers: Peter Hartman (Chicago), Martin Klein (Würzburg), Jordan Lavender (Purdue)
The conference is founded by NEH Collaborative Research Grant #RZ-292749-23.
More information can be found on the conference website: https://phartman.sites.luc.edu/mtc2024/index.html
Orgainzers: Peter Hartman (Chicago), Martin Klein (Würzburg), Jordan Lavender (Purdue)
The conference is founded by NEH Collaborative Research Grant #RZ-292749-23.
More information can be found on the conference website: https://phartman.sites.luc.edu/mtc2024/index.html
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Summer Module Course "Affective Intentionality in Medieval Philosophy and Phenomenology", University of Würzburg, Department of Philosophy July 26–30, 2021 Application Deadline: March 31 Further information and registration:... more
Summer Module Course "Affective Intentionality in Medieval Philosophy and Phenomenology", University of Würzburg, Department of Philosophy
July 26–30, 2021
Application Deadline: March 31
Further information and registration: https://www.philosophie.uni-wuerzburg.de/studium/summer-module-course-affective-intentionality/
July 26–30, 2021
Application Deadline: March 31
Further information and registration: https://www.philosophie.uni-wuerzburg.de/studium/summer-module-course-affective-intentionality/
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Die Forschergruppe "Modi der Intentionalität" (Uni Würzburg) lädt ein zu einer gemeinsamen Lektüre von Petrus Aureoli Einführung: Prof. Dr. Florian Wöller (Kopenhagen) Do, 23.01.2020, 18:15 Uhr Universität Würzburg, Institut für... more
Die Forschergruppe "Modi der Intentionalität" (Uni Würzburg) lädt ein zu einer gemeinsamen Lektüre von Petrus Aureoli
Einführung: Prof. Dr. Florian Wöller (Kopenhagen)
Do, 23.01.2020, 18:15 Uhr
Universität Würzburg, Institut für Philosophie
Residenz, Raum 28
Bei Interesse wenden Sie sich bitte an Martin Klein für die zu lesenden Texte
Einführung: Prof. Dr. Florian Wöller (Kopenhagen)
Do, 23.01.2020, 18:15 Uhr
Universität Würzburg, Institut für Philosophie
Residenz, Raum 28
Bei Interesse wenden Sie sich bitte an Martin Klein für die zu lesenden Texte
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In his 1956 book Das Gemüt, Stephan Strasser presents an original phenomenological investigation into human happiness and pleasure. We will examine Strasser's theory of happiness in more detail and reveal how he incorporates important... more
In his 1956 book Das Gemüt, Stephan Strasser presents an original phenomenological investigation into human happiness and pleasure. We will examine Strasser's theory of happiness in more detail and reveal how he incorporates important phenomenological insights from Thomas Aquinas' theory of the passions of the soul. Both Strasser and Aquinas view happiness as the fulfillment of intentional striving and differentiate between various feelings associated with the pursuit and attainment of a goal, such as joy and pleasure. However, while Aquinas believes that only an imperfect form of happiness can be attained in this life, Strasser aims to determine the essence of the highest form of happiness possible for human beings as the felt anticipation of perfect happiness in the future. Strasser, therefore, interprets Aquinas' theory through the lens of an existential-phenomenological approach.
