Targeting Peace & Stability Operations Lessons & Best Practices
Volume 7, Issue 1
March 2016
Approved for Public Release,
Distribution Unlimited
FOREWORD
Welcome to the March 2016 edition of the Stability Operations Lessons
Learned and Information Management System (SOLLIMS) Lessons Learned
“Sampler” – Building Stable Governance.
The general structure of the “Sampler” includes (1) an Introduction that
provides an operational or doctrinal perspective for the content, (2) the Sampler
“Quick Look” that provides a short description of the topics included within the
Sampler and a link to the full text, (3) the primary, topic-focused Stability
Operations (SO)-related Lessons Learned Report, and (4) links to additional
reports and other references that are either related to the “focus” topic or that
address current, real-world, SO-related challenges.
This lessons-learned compendium contains just a sample – thus the title of
“Sampler” – of the observations, insights, and lessons related to Building Stable
Governance available in the SOLLIMS data repository. These lessons are worth
sharing with military commanders and their staffs, as well as with civilian
practitioners having a Stability Operations-related mission/function – those
currently deployed on stability operations, those planning to deploy, the
institutional Army, the Joint community, policy-makers, and other international
civilian and military leaders at the national and theater level.
Lesson Format. Each lesson is provided in the following standard format:
- Title/Topic
- Observation
- Discussion
- Recommendation
- Implications (optional)
- Event Description
The “Event Description” section provides context in that it identifies the source
or event from which the lesson was developed. Occasionally you may also see a
“Comments” section within a lesson. This is used by the author to provide
related information or additional personal perspective.
You will also note that a number is displayed in parentheses next to the title of
each lesson. This number is hyper-linked to the actual lesson within the
SOLLIMS database; click on the highlighted number to display the SOLLIMS
data and to access any attachments (references, images, files) that are included
with this lesson. Note, you must have an account and be logged into SOLLIMS
in order to display the SOLLIMS data entry and access/download attachments.
If you have not registered in SOLLIMS, the links in the reports will take you to
the login or the registration page. Take a brief moment to register for an account
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in order to take advantage of the many features of SOLLIMS and to access the
stability operations related products referenced in the report.
We encourage you to take the time to provide us with your perspective on any
given lesson in this report or on the overall value of the “Sampler” as a reference
for you and your unit/organization. By using the “Perspectives” text entry box
that is found at the end of each lesson – seen when you open the lesson in your
browser – you can enter your own personal comments on the lesson. We
welcome your input, and we encourage you to become a regular contributor.
At PKSOI we continually strive to improve the services and products we
provide the global stability operations community. We invite you to use our
website at [ http://pksoi.army.mil ] and the many functions of the SOLLIMS
online environment [ https://sollims.pksoi.org ] to help us identify issues and
resolve problems. We welcome your comments and insights!
________________________________________________________________
FARAH, Afghanistan (8 June 2012). Nancy Abella (U.S. State Department representative)
and U.S. Army Major Melvin Holland (Civil Affairs officer) of Provincial Reconstruction
Team Farah (PRT Farah) met with Farah Provincial Council Deputy Chairman Abdul Hamid
and council member Juma Rafat at the provincial governor’s compound to discuss a
recent trip to Kabul. “The provincial council head, deputy head, and secretary traveled to
Kabul and reported back on several meetings they had with ministers, the first vice
president, and the Meshrano Jirga, which is their equivalent of the Senate in their
parliament, all discussing issues about Farah,” said Abella… “I was impressed. I felt like
they were doing the things that elected representatives are supposed to do.”
(Article and photo by Lt. Benjamin Addison, U.S. Navy, PRT Farah Public Affairs Officer)
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INTRODUCTION
This edition of the SOLLIMS Sampler explores the challenges and complexities
of Building Stable Governance. Along with a selection of thought-provoking
lessons, this Sampler provides an extensive list (on pages 40-42) of references,
documents, and links. Among them you’ll find the following key guides:
“Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction,” USIP/PKSOI
publication, October 2009
“Guide to Rebuilding Governance in Stability Operations: A Role for the
Military?” Derick W. Brinkerhoff, Ronald W. Johnson, and Richard Hill, RTI
International, PKSOI/SSI paper, June 2009
“Guide to Rebuilding Public Sector Services in Stability Operations: A Role
for the Military,” Derick W. Brinkerhoff, Ronald W. Johnson, and Richard Hill,
RTI International, PKSOI/SSI paper, October 2009
“Handbook for Military Support to Governance, Elections, and Media,”
United States Joint Forces Command, 11 February 2010
“Good Governance Makes Sense: A Way to Improve Your Mission,” CivilMilitary Cooperation Centre of Excellence (CCOE), NATO, 31 October 2012
The above-mentioned “Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction”
provides the following description of “stable governance”:
Stable governance refers to an end state where the state provides essential
services and serves as a responsible steward of state resources; government
officials are held accountable through political and legal processes; and the
population can participate in governance through civil society organizations,
an independent media, and political parties.
“Building stable governance” accordingly involves: helping leaders, government personnel, and civil society acquire the skills and tools needed to govern
accountably, participate in political processes, and provide core services for the
population. This might also require helping to build the capacity of informal / nonstate governance institutions to complement formal / state functions.
NATO’s Civil Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence (CCOE) goes one step
further in its publication “Good Governance Makes Sense: A Way to Improve
Your Mission.” It outlines the concept of “good governance,” discusses several
interrelated dimensions of “good governance,” and explains how Civil-Military
Cooperation (CIMIC) personnel can assess, evaluate, and promote various
aspects of “good governance” in particular situations and operations.
The Lesson Report that follows provides further insights and recommendations.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
“QUICK LOOK” (Preview of the Lessons)
Page 5
LESSON REPORT
Page 6
1. GENERAL
Page 6
2. LESSONS
Page 7
a. Governance and Democracy
Page 7
b. Building Governance Capacity in Afghanistan through
the ALBA Program
Page 10
c. Obstacles to Local Governance – Insights from
Eastern Afghanistan
Page 16
d. Making a Viable Peace – Intervention in Kosovo
Page 21
e. Decentralization for Participatory Governance
Page 23
f. Strengthening Public Services in Post-conflict
Page 26
g. Public Sector Reform and State-Citizen Relations in
Sierra Leone
Page 29
h. What Is “Good Enough” for the Military as an End
Point for Governance in Stability Operations?
Page 34
3. CONCLUSION
Page 37
4. COMMAND POC
Page 39
ANNEX A: Related Documents, References, and Links
Page 40
ANNEX B: What Is Good Governance?
Page 43
ANNEX C: Key Partners for DoD in Governance Strengthening
and Support
Page 44
ANNEX D: Military Contribution – Governance and Participation
Page 45
ANNEX E: Preventing Electoral Violence
Page 47
ANNEX F: Previously Published SOLLIMS Samplers
Page 48
Disclaimer: All content in this document to include any publications provided through digital attachment
is considered unclassified, for open access. This compendium contains no restriction on sharing /
distribution within the public domain. Existing research and publishing norms and formats should be
used when citing “Sampler” content and any publications provided.
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“QUICK LOOK”_(Preview of the Lessons)
Click on [Read More ...] to go to full lesson.
-
The development of democratic governments is challenging and will continue to be a
struggle for nations well into the future. [Read More ...]
-
USAID’S Assistance to Legislative Bodies of Afghanistan (ALBA) program has
been active in building governance capacity in the National Assembly (Parliament) of
Afghanistan, yet achievements have been minimal due in part to a 6-month gap that
occurred between the predecessor program and the launch of ALBA, but much more
so due to systemic issues within the Afghan governance sector concerning budget
control and the power of the Executive Branch. [Read More ...]
-
Building local governance in a "conflict-affected" state can be a slow, difficult
process. In Eastern Afghanistan, local governance efforts made only marginal
progress over the 2004-2008 timeframe, with the driving factors proving to be: the
level of security vis-a-vis the insurgent threat, the availability of civil servants, the
level of corruption among government officials, the country's hold-over system for
the administration of local governance, and the availability of resources (both
coalition and host nation) for dedicating to local governance efforts. [Read More ...]
-
The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was successful in establishing a
viable political framework in its initial two years as it avoided a detailed strategy, but
relied instead on the pursuit of multiple, concurrent, and incremental efforts.
[Read More ...]
-
Decentralized government is an effective instrument for building and sustaining
peace in post-conflict countries. Decentralization creates a situation in which
citizens are more engaged in governance and have a forum to air their views on the
development and reconstruction process. [Read More ...]
-
Strengthening public servants' knowledge, skills, networks and attitudes is key to any
improvement in government performance, because it is through public servants that
services are planned and delivered. [Read More ...]
-
Over the 2002-2015 timeframe, Sierra Leone has seen notable progress in public
sector reform and avenues for participation by civil society organizations (CSOs) –
owing largely to donor programs / external assistance. Significant challenges
remain, however, particularly limited government acceptance of inputs/concerns
from CSOs, government favoritism toward a select few CSOs, and capacity shortfalls of CSOs limiting collaboration and influence. [Read More ...]
-
Contemplating the condition of “good enough” for military involvement in stability
operations is very much dependent on the end state strategic criteria and objectives
determined by both the host nation and intervening members in establishing
effective government and governance. [Read More ...]
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U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
U.S. Army War College
22 Ashburn Drive, Upton Hall
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013
1 March 2016
SUBJECT: Building Stable Governance
1. GENERAL
“Building stable governance” is a long-term endeavor. In order to achieve the
desired end-state (i.e., “stable governance”), the following conditions are
imperative:
Provision of essential services – whereby the host nation government
provides basic security, the rule of law, economic governance, and basic
human needs services; essential services are provided without
discrimination; and, the host nation government has the capacity for
provision of essential services without significant assistance from the
international community.
Stewardship of resources – whereby national and subnational institutions
of governance are restored, funded, and staffed with accountable
personnel; the security sector is brought under accountable civilian
control; and, national/subnational resources are protected through
responsible management.
Political moderation and accountability – whereby the host nation
government enables a political settlement of disputes; addresses core
grievances through debate, compromise, and inclusive national dialogue;
and, is able to manage change arising from humanitarian, economic,
security, and other challenges.
Civic participation and empowerment – whereby civil society is
empowered, protected, and accountable; media are present, professional,
and independent of government/political influence; equal access to
information and freedom of expression are upheld; and, political parties
are able to form freely and are protected.
It is not, however, the role of the military to take over the work of local civilian
actors in creating or sustaining the aforementioned conditions. US military
involvement typically takes place within an interagency or “whole-of-government”
context – led by the Department of State and USAID and aimed at ensuring host
nation ownership. Nonetheless, attaining “stable governance” often forms a
crucial element for military mission success in stability operations. The following
lessons are illustrative of these points.
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2. LESSONS
a. TOPIC. Governance and Democracy ( 1346 )
Observation.
The development of democratic governments is challenging and will continue to
be a struggle for nations well into the future. However, the importance of
democratic governments for the well-being of citizens cannot be overstated. In a
world that continues to reshape borders and work through conflict and security
issues while continuing on a path of globalization, democratic governance is the
key to future success.
Discussion.
Governance is hard. Establishing a government that is capable to govern within
the framework of a democracy is even harder. In today’s complex world, the
U.S. and many other western governments seek a more democratic world with
values-based national governments that are freely elected; listen to, support, and
respect their constituents; and, provide their citizens opportunity. Opportunity is
measured in many forms; some include economic development, improved health
and social services, and education. However, opportunity for the “pursuit of
happiness” may be the most self-motivating inspiration that a government can
provide its citizens.
Re-establishing a government at all levels is extremely challenging. This lesson
was learned in Iraq, once De-Baathification was instituted. This wholesale
dismissal of the government created instability down to the lowest level of
governance within the neighborhoods. While deployed to the east side of
Baghdad, my unit was responsible for the suburb of Zafraniyah. Composed of
three neighborhoods, Zafraniyah is a mixed industrial and agricultural suburb of
the Karadah governance district within Baghdad. Zafraniyah had the ability to
thrive economically with initial assistance from the city and national government.
Although elusive for many, the right to a democratic government is seen as a
legal entitlement by world organizations and western governments. However,
the right to a democratic government, regularly freely elected by the people, with
representation powers, and a voice for the minority, is more than a legal entitlement. It is a human entitlement. This human entitlement is what provides the
impetus for self-determination in the establishment of a nation. My experience in
Iraq was that many wanted a legitimate government that would take care of their
basic needs while promoting opportunity to grow economically. With a stable
government, self-determination drives economic success. At my level, it was
critical to ensure the local government was functioning and considered legitimate
in Zafraniyah. We had to ensure the integrity of a voting process, effective local
neighborhood meetings, and that Zafraniyah leadership provided a unified front
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at district level meetings. As a major hub of potential economic activity, the
neighborhoods had to come together to speak with one clear voice at the district
meetings to ensure the flow of resources.
The establishment and support of fledgling democracies is very challenging and
intensive. This is one of the most critical areas for development, since solid
governance feeds the overall national psyche. There are many reasons for the
lack of democracy. The most inhibiting is the desire for power – controlling
resources to control the population. Power struggles were a constant source of
tension at many district level meetings, putting the fledgling democratic process
at risk. Many countries that are a democracy for a short time period are most at
risk of losing sight of the desire to remain a democracy. This is due to the
inherent risks to personal security, the possible lack of infrastructure, and the
perceived lack of access to resources – especially formerly provided state
resources. Establishing legitimacy is also a major issue for a new form of
government.
In Zafraniyah many of the local neighborhood representatives did not trust the
district council, the city, or the national level government to provide their basic
needs. Bribery was rampant, and there was no system of accountability. There
were three critical areas local citizens felt were not getting enough attention.
They were: security, water/health, and economic development. In order to
establish the credibility of the local government and produce results for the
citizens, we began, on a small scale, a city planning process to compile a list of
projects required in each neighborhood. Once established the local council held
weekly meetings with the public to inform them of the projects and way ahead.
When attending district level meetings, the representatives of Zafraniyah briefed
their projects with the current status and resources needed to move forward. We
then ensured that the neighborhood representatives collaborated, through the
district level, with Baghdad government offices to ensure their projects moved
forward. Many of the projects included rebuilding of essential infrastructure for
the area.
In addition to this process, we recommended that the neighborhoods conduct
local elections to ensure fair representation at the district level meetings. This
was a long process as it involved developing a plan with the local police for
security during the election process, the establishment of voting sites, and a
method of tabulating votes. As well, the local politicians had to develop a way to
communicate with a population that was mostly illiterate. Unique to this part of
the Karadah governance district was the election of women to many of the district
boards and as neighborhood representatives. This demonstrated to the local
citizens that everyone can contribute to the cause of making their lives better
regardless of gender.
Once the local government was established and a process was followed to
interact with higher levels of government, more resources began to flow to
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Zafraniyah. As this continued, many local entrepreneurs started to establish
businesses and hiring local people. This began to build the confidence of the
local population and an understanding of how a democratic process functions.
The local government was seen as legitimate, and conflict among the neighborhoods was resolved locally.
The establishment of a democratic process at the lowest level can build
momentum. However, that momentum can be easily lost, especially when the
security apparatus begins to falter and opportunities become fleeting. After a
generation or so of suffering under a democracy that has lost momentum, it is
possible that some will turn back to their previous form of government if they
have no sense of a positive future. This is especially true if they had not suffered
under the previous establishment. Given this, there is still hope as the
economics of globalization continues to move forward.
Democracies will never go away, and the world will continue to have many points
of transition and governments. Moreover, citizens will continue to learn that a
freely elected government by the people is the best choice for their nation. Iraq
has a great deal of potential; it will flourish under the right government, legitimately elected and representative of the people.
Recommendation.
1. To ensure the stability, integrity, and legitimacy of national governments, it is
important to establish local governance in a manner that is understood by the
local population. All U.S. persons involved in this process require an understanding of the local culture and historical animosities, with a solid understanding
of how governance functions. For the military, this may require instruction on
how to establish local governments and how they tie in to each level of
government above the neighborhood or tribal areas. It also means knowing
and understanding whom to go to for help. In this case, it was leveraging the
Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) to facilitate the process and help
educate local politicians.
2. Foreign aid to nations that develop government based on democratic values
should be increased. Refocus aid away from those that refuse or do not desire
to uphold democratic values with legally elected representation for their people.
This can be done at the local level as well as the national level. In repressive
countries, devise programs to further the ideals of freedom and democracy
though creative means. Enable populations to communicate through various
media platforms – to include through the airwaves.
3. On the global platform, point out governments that continue to repress their
citizens in open forums; hold accountable those governments that are beginning
to slip out of democracy through international pressure. Aggressively use a
whole-of-government approach to entice further reform in non-democratic
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nations. The U.S. cannot do it alone; we must garner the support of international
partners, foreign governments, and the NGO community to facilitate the spread
of democracy and the necessity of good governance.
Implications.
Only when democratic governments are formed will people begin their “pursuit of
happiness” – when this occurs they begin to thrive economically. With positive
economics, people begin to pull themselves out of poverty. Democracy, economic development, and the reduction of poverty are all interrelated. Democratic
governments bring opportunity to those that are without, raise the standard of
living of the poor, and empower women. Women form the corner-stone of the
family and can support their family not just from a maternal aspect but also from
an economic basis. The success and survival of the family is critical to the future
of a nation. True democracies establish systems that enable their population to
better themselves. Global democracy is in the best interests of the U.S. and our
democratic partners.
Event Description.
This lesson is based on readings from U.S. Army War College PKSOI elective
course PS2206 – International Development, and personal experience.
Lesson Contributor: Colonel Wayne Grieme, US Army
b. TOPIC. Building Governance Capacity in Afghanistan
through the ALBA Program ( 2416 )
Observation.
USAID’S Assistance to Legislative Bodies of Afghanistan (ALBA) program has
been active in building governance capacity in the National Assembly
(Parliament) of Afghanistan, yet achievements have been minimal due in part to
a 6-month gap that occurred between the predecessor program and the launch
of ALBA, but much more so due to systemic issues within the Afghan governance sector concerning budget control and the power of the Executive Branch.
Discussion.
USAID's ALBA program, implemented by Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI)
with a budget of approximately $23.4 million, began in March 2013 and will
conclude in March 2017. Its goal is to improve the performance of the National
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Assembly so it can operate as an independent and effective legislative, representative, and oversight body.
ALBA supports both Houses of Parliament – the House of Elders, or Meshrano
Jirga (MJ) and the elected House of the People, or Wolesi Jirga (WJ) – along
with parliamentary and administrative staff, and the 33 commissions of both
Houses. In addition, ALBA works to improve the National Assembly’s public
"outreach" efforts and its coordination with relevant stakeholders at the subnational level. The program also supports legislative reform, including training
parliamentary staff on drafting, analyzing, and reviewing legislation, and it
provides assistance for the National Assembly's "oversight" functions.
ALBA’s predecessor was the USAID-funded Afghanistan Parliamentary Assistant
Program (APAP), which was implemented from 2004 to 2012. APAP operated
on a different model, providing direct, technical support for the development of
legislation. Unfortunately, a 6-month interruption of support to the National
Assembly during the transition between APAP and ALBA resulted in slippage/
loss of certain gains made under APAP. For example, standing commissions are
now unable to routinely prepare and present reports and recommendations on
legislation to the plenary commission, despite procedural rules requiring them to
do so and despite previous gains in this workflow. In the area of legislative
"outreach" to the public/society, a publicly available legislative-tracking website
that was set up and effectively utilized under APAP has been lost.
With regard to "training & education" for building capacity, the Afghanistan
Parliamentary Institute (API) has been the main conduit for training/instruction
delivered to the National Assembly and its staff. Established under APAP and
formally designated an institute of higher education under Afghan law by a
presidential decree on 23 May 2011, API offers various "professional development" and "legislative training" courses. Courses are taught by ALBA technical
staff, partner organizations, local trainers, and international consultants.
Targeted students are Members of Parliament (National Assembly members),
Secretariat staff, Parliamentary Fellows, and advisors from the State Ministry for
Parliamentary Affairs. The primary goal of the training/courses is to increase the
capacity of Members of Parliament and of the National Assembly staff to carry
out their functions. In practice, however, attendance by Members of Parliament
in API courses has been minimal. Instead, they typically seek, and benefit from,
ALBA’s presentations, briefings, and analyses provided directly to priority
commissions of the National Assembly as well as to other parliamentary member
groups.
On the other hand, API training/instruction has been well attended by the
Secretariat staff and Parliamentary Fellows. Results, however, have been
mixed. According to trainee perceptions, API's "professional development"
courses (computer skills, language skills, etc.) have had a positive impact on
developing practical, work-related skills for Secretariat staff personnel. However,
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the "legislative training" courses have been less effective. "Legislative training"
skills can be highly technical and often require the student to have certain
previous governance knowledge. Learning a skill such as "drafting legislation"
requires long-term training and mentoring, preferably by senior legislative staff
members or legislative experts. The short-term training workshops offered by
API have been, by their nature, insufficient to impart the knowledge and skills
needed to effectively draft, analyze, and amend legislation. Hence, the
Secretariat staff, at large, still lacks essential capacity on the legislative process,
including drafting, introducing, and amending legislation.
In contrast to poor results for the Secretariat staff, training of Parliamentary
Fellows has been largely successful. Started by the National Democratic
Institute (NDI) and continued by APAP, the Parliamentary Fellows Program is a
competitive program that introduces talented young Afghan university graduates
to the National Assembly. The fellowship lasts for six months, with the bestperforming fellows offered the possibility of returning for an additional three
months. Throughout the program, fellows participate in foundational API courses
as well as more specific courses relevant to their individual assignments.
Overall, Parliamentary Fellows have notably benefited the Legislative branch,
providing helpful technical and administrative support for Secretariat directorates
and commissions. In a mid-term evaluation of the Fellows Program, "98% of the
supervisors wrote that the fellows are hardworking, quick learners … and 100%
said they are qualified people."
Along with supporting "training & education" of legislative personnel, the ALBA
program has also provided direct "technical assistance" to the National
Assembly, especially on matters concerning the development of legislation.
Commission Support Units (CSUs) have been the primary mechanism for this
"technical assistance" – which has included demand-driven presentations,
reports, and briefings for legislative commissions, usually related to pending
legislation. CSUs are formed on an as-needed basis, typically when priority
legislation emerges (originating mostly from the Executive Branch). CSUs
consist of one ALBA advisor, two Members of Parliament, two commission staff
members (a technical assistant and advisor), one researcher from the Secretariat’s research directorate, and sometimes ministry officials or civil society
representatives. While the ALBA advisor is meant to shepherd the commission
staff members through the process of legislative analysis, in practice the ALBA
advisor conducts the bulk of the work. Although commission staff personnel
are able to contribute to small portions of an analytical report, such as the
legislative history of the draft under consideration, they have not been able
to prepare any substantive analysis. Regrettably, ALBA's "technical assistance"
has not been helpful for ensuring host nation ownership or sustainability; it has
not established a system for inculcating and sustaining critical legislative skills
and task execution. Overall, the immediate needs of Members of Parliament (to
address emerging legislation) have taken priority over sustainability of skills and
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task execution – with ALBA engaging in capacity substitution (doing the work)
vice capacity-building.
Yet another persistent problem for the ALBA program and the National Assembly
is the continuous drain of talent from legislative staffs that have benefited from
training at API. A significant contributing factor is pay: the salaries for retaining
staff members who have gained skills/proficiencies are inadequate; they can get
better pay elsewhere, so they move. The National Assembly’s budget is the
major obstacle, preventing Members of Parliament and commissions from being
able to increase the salaries for qualified advisors. The National Assembly does
not plan or execute its own budget. The Executive Branch sets the parliamentary
budget and affords the National Assembly little say on how funding is determined. Beyond budget control, Members of Parliament have also complained
that the Executive Branch has hindered basic administrative and logistical
functions of the National Assembly.
With regard to "oversight" functions of the National Assembly, the most active
and important legislative body has been the Parliamentary Anti-Corruption
Caucus (PACC). ALBA’s support to the PACC has not only aimed to help
counter corruption, but has also served the purposes of empowering female
Members of Parliament (as there are 22 female members in the PACC) and
improving governance & transparency. With ALBA’s support, the PACC has
engaged the Executive Branch on numerous issues of governmental misuse of
public property and funds. With ALBA's encouragement, the PACC has also
committed to continual follow-up to ensure that actions are actually being taken
as a result of the caucus’s oversight reports.
With regard to "outreach" activities of the National Assembly, ALBA's support to
the Assembly has included: (1) preparing a number of publications for public
dissemination, including plenary reports and weekly legislative reports; (2) maintaining a legislative tracking matrix; and, (3) streamlining the complaints process.
ALBA has also provided support for the Assembly's provincial outreach events,
including public hearings, town-hall-style meetings, and various conferences.
Unfortunately, the 6-month gap between the end of APAP and the start of ALBA
resulted in some lost ground with respect to transparency of legislative activities.
One of APAP’s key achievements had been the development of a publiclyavailable, online legislative tracking database covering the National Assembly's
actions. That database was available in three languages, and it tracked the
entire process of legislation within the National Assembly. It also offered the
public current legislative information that enabled them to contact Members of
Parliament and staffs and affect the legislative process. Although the database
was available online until early 2013, it has since disappeared.
In sum, the ALBA program has made minimal headway in building governance/
legislative capacity in Afghanistan. The 6-month gap of support to the National
Assembly that occurred during the transition from APAP to ALBA resulted in lost
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ground within the National Assembly that ALBA has been unable to make up.
Even more problematic, systemic issues within the Afghan governance sector
have greatly hindered ALBA’s capacity-building efforts, namely: a disproportionately powerful Executive Branch, no budget independence for the National
Assembly, and problems retaining staff members who’ve gained proficiency –
due to low pay within the Legislative Branch.
Recommendation.
Key recommendations for the ALBA program, as stated in USAID's mid-term
evaluation of the program (see “Event Description” paragraph below) include:
1. Strengthening the Afghanistan Parliamentary Institute (API). ALBA
should take steps to build capacity in API for it to assume responsibility for
providing direct legislative/technical support to the National Assembly. ALBA and
API should review the schedule of upcoming priority legislation, and should then
schedule tailored training & assistance for legislative personnel ahead of those
key activities. Support would include formal training seminars for Members of
Parliament on topics relevant to their respective roles; associated training &
assistance for Secretariat staff personnel; delivery of electronic versions of
templates, forms, and checklists for staff to use as part of the workflow process;
and the institution of periodic performance evaluations of legislative staff focused
on assessment & improvement of job-based skills. Additionally, the APImanaged Parliamentary Fellows program should be expanded, including
increasing the duration of fellowships/training to 9-12 months. [Primary aim of
this recommendation is to ensure host nation ownership and sustainability of
actions supporting the Legislative Branch.]
2. Providing Direct Technical Support to the National Assembly. [This
support is intended to regain and then surpass ground that was lost during the
gap between APAP and ALBA programs. Primary aims are to build capacity in
the National Assembly to conduct "oversight" and "outreach" activities.] With
regard to "oversight" capacity, the ALBA program should use budget activities as
opportunities to strengthen the National Assembly's understanding of its overall
governmental “oversight” authority/roles, and thereby its ability to assert itself in
dealing with the Executive Branch on budget planning and execution. ALBA
should also strengthen the National Assembly's “oversight” capacity by increasing support to the Parliament's Anti-Corruption Caucus and by providing
additional approaches to, and mechanisms for, combatting corruption. With
regard to "outreach" capacity, the ALBA program should help the National
Assembly re-establish the publicly-available, online legislative tracking database,
as well as set up additional commissions to engage in public hearings on
upcoming and pending legislation.
3. Strengthening Efforts in “Institutional Development.” The ALBA program
should develop capacity within the Secretariats to carry out the equivalent
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functions of a Legislative Counsel's Office, with a trained cadre of legal advisors
who can analyze and draft legislation, as well as interpret and explain legal
issues to Members of Parliament.
For governance capacity-building in fragile states, in general, assisting
organizations can take heed of Afghanistan's example, especially that: (a) gaps
in program support can result in significant setbacks, (b) governance reform
requires long-term investments (funds, personnel, training & education, etc.) and
periodic monitoring; and, (c) key program elements should include host nation
ownership, sustainability of systems/processes, and continuous outreach to the
public/civil society.
Implications.
If capacity is not built in the API and the legislative staffs for supporting Members
of Parliament (drafting legislation, tracking legislation actions, interpreting legal
issues, etc.), then the National Assembly will lack a long-term/permanent source
of support & expertise vital to conducting its business. Also, if capacity is not
built in the National Assembly for conducting "oversight" and "outreach" activities,
then opportunities will be lost for improving the Legislative Branch's status in
comparison to that of the Executive Branch, as well as for improving the Legislative Branch’s credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the public.
Event Description.
This lesson is based on "Assistance to Legislative Bodies of Afghanistan (ALBA)
Mid-Term Evaluation (March 2013 - June 2015),” USAID, June 2015.
Comments.
The desired endstate of "stable governance" and the cross-cutting principles of
"host nation ownership" and "legitimacy" are discussed in detail in "Guiding
Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction," USIP and PKSOI, October 2009.
Several lessons on "host nation ownership" and "legitimacy" are provided in the
SOLLIMS Sampler "Cross-Cutting Guidelines for Stability Operations," PKSOI,
July 2015.
The benefits of "outreach" and countering corruption are discussed in "Fighting
Corruption – The 'Common Ground' Approach," SOLLIMS Lesson 731, 7 April
2011.
Lesson Contributor: David Mosinski, PKSOI
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c. TOPIC. Obstacles to Local Governance – Insights from
Eastern Afghanistan ( 713 )
Observation.
Building local governance in a "conflict-affected" state can be a slow, difficult
process. In Eastern Afghanistan, local governance efforts made only marginal
progress over the 2004-2008 timeframe, with the driving factors proving to be:
the level of security vis-a-vis the insurgent threat, the availability of civil servants,
the level of corruption among government officials, the country's hold-over
system for the administration of local governance, and the availability of
resources (both coalition and host nation) for dedicating to local governance
efforts.
Discussion.
Building local governance in eastern Afghanistan during the 2004-2008
timeframe was one of three major efforts, or "pillars", in the counterinsurgency
strategy of Regional Command-East, with the other two being security and
development assistance. Security – building up the Afghan National Army and
the Afghan National Police and conducting operations against various insurgent
groups – was Regional Command-East's priority effort and received the greatest
resources. Development assistance – improving roads, schools, health clinics,
irrigation systems and working with Afghan groups/institutions supporting such
projects – also received considerable resources. Local governance was a distant
third, receiving the lowest level of resourcing.
Challenges to counterinsurgency and stability operations – in general – were:
the size of the area of operations, rugged terrain, harsh winters, the lack of
transportation infrastructure, and societal complexities in this unstable/tribal
state. SOLLIMS Lesson 678 (“Afghanistan: Transformation Challenges, Root
Causes, and Developmental Assistance”) speaks to this latter challenge – where
the central government is weak, tribal actors strong, local groups set in their
ways, and violence pervasive.
During this timeframe (2004-2008), the primary factors specifically affecting local
governance efforts in eastern Afghanistan were: the level of security vis-a-vis
the insurgent threat, the availability of host nation civil servants, the
presence of corruption, the hold-over system for the administration of local
governance, and the availability of resources for local governance efforts.
With regard to the level of security and the insurgent threat, extending local
governance to certain areas of eastern Afghanistan was highly problematic, if not
impossible, given the availability of military resources to provide security and to
deal with insurgent threats. British forces deployed to Helmand Province were
continuously engaged by Taliban forces, particularly when they established a
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presence in the vicinity of district governance facilities. Coalition forces operating
in the Bermel district of Paktika Province experienced numerous major attacks,
and insurgents twice overran the district government facilities. In parts of Kunar
and Nuristan Provinces, particularly in the Pesh, Korangal, and Waygal valleys,
localized insurgencies were very strong, threatening firebases and specifically
targeting and hindering the growth of local governance. In contrast, where
security conditions were favorable, or at least adequate, local governance
efforts were able to make headway and improve over time. 2nd Battalion/27th
Infantry significantly influenced security conditions in Paktika Province by
deploying groups of soldiers to district government centers for weeks at a time,
providing enough security for the nascent district governments to take root. In
Nangarhar Province, where security conditions became very favorable by 2008,
district-level governance was able to expand markedly, owing much to the
dedicated efforts of the Jalalabad Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and a
special troops battalion which conducted security operations in support of
governance. Also, as the host nation's security forces were built and trained over
time, those assets were used increasingly to help provide security for governance, but that process was slow to develop over the 2004-2008 timeframe.
With regard to the availability of host nation civil servants, the huge shortfall/
absence of civil servants severely impeded local governance efforts. Decades of
war had significantly reduced the pool of civil servants in eastern Afghanistan,
most of whom had migrated to Pakistan or other countries. Security risks,
hardship, and low pay were the contributing factors in their failure to return to
their former districts and municipalities in Afghanistan. Compounding the
problem were major deficiencies in governmental infrastructure. In 2004, most
governors occupied physical “compounds,” but they lacked basic equipment and
supplies. At the district level, conditions were worse. Over the 2004-2008
timeframe, recruiting and training of civil servants in eastern Afghanistan was
almost non-existent. One of the very first efforts to address this problem was an
initiative by the government of India, in 2008, to recruit and train 500 civil
servants.
With regard to the presence of corruption, known and perceived corruption of
Afghan officials was a central theme among local communities and local officials
during the 2004-2008 timeframe. Corrupt governors were one of the biggest
obstacles. Mullahs, business groups, and provincial councils publicly and
privately accused provincial governors of corruption. These corrupt provincial
governors appointed many of the district governors (at the level beneath them),
even though by law they were not charged to do so. Many district governors
then lacked legitimacy and were reactive with regard to handling problems in
their districts, rather than being proactive with their communities in planning
projects and priorities. Many Afghan citizens expected coalition forces to end the
wide scale corruption among provincial and district officials. In spite of several
efforts by Defense and State Department personnel to confront provincial officials
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with charges of corruption when there was compelling evidence, not enough
progress was made in this regard.
With regard to the existing, hold-over system for administration of local
governance, in eastern Afghanistan (actually in most of Afghanistan) the holdover system lacked legitimacy in the eyes of local citizens. Elections were held
in September 2005 to choose provincial council members, but no elections were
scheduled for the lower levels of governance – district and municipality. The
Ministry of Interior (MoI) had been responsible for overseeing/administering
sub-national governance, but it had acquired a reputation for corruption and
inefficiency. To rectify the problem, in August 2007, President Karzai issued a
decree establishing the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG),
with the mandate to:
"consolidate and stabilize, achieve development and equitable economic
growth, and to achieve improvements in service delivery through just,
democratic processes and institutions of governance at the sub-national
level, thus improving the quality of life of Afghan citizens."
IDLG officers began an ambitious program to overhaul governance at the
provincial, district, and municipal levels. They asserted themselves as "supervisors" of local officials. They became involved in interactions, meetings, and
projects between coalition PRTs and local governments. They improved the
coordination among national ministries in Kabul having connections to local
governance. In April 2008, with the support of international advisors, IDLG
officers developed a "Five Year Strategic Work Plan" which outlined goals for
policy development, institution building, and governance, along with entry points
where donors could provide financial and technical assistance. Also, the IDLG
examined various ways to devolve power from Kabul out to the provinces to give
provincial officials greater budgetary and policy authority.
With regard to the availability of resources for governance efforts, there
were significant shortfalls both within the Afghan government and within the
coalition forces for dedicating to local governance efforts. With respect to coalition forces, there were not enough civilian or military political advisors / pol-mil
officers to meet the requirements of building local governance in the many
provinces, districts, and municipalities of eastern Afghanistan. Due to their
limited numbers, political advisors concentrated their efforts at the provincial
level – with less contact and engagement at the district and municipal levels. It
was not until 2009 that the U.S. Embassy in Kabul posted officers at the district
level in eastern Afghanistan. With respect to the Afghan government's
resources, host nation funds and transportation resources to support local
governance initiatives were very inadequate. In early 2008, the IDLG
approached the international community to establish a "governor's fund" for
governance initiatives. With regard to transportation shortfalls, coalition forces
and PRTs helped arranged access to helicopters and aircraft to get new IDLG
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personnel transported to remote provinces (such as Badghis and Zabul), where
dozens of provincial leaders, provincial council members, tribal leaders, and
other local leaders would be assembled for discussions on governance, security,
and development.
The above discussion presents only a snapshot of the many obstacles to building
local governance in eastern Afghanistan during the 2004-2008 timeframe, where
coalition forces made marginal progress in this regard. Nonetheless, it was
commendable progress – considering the resources at their disposal and the
highly demanding, complex environment in which they were operating.
Recommendation.
1. Building local governance cannot progress without having security / a secure
environment. Security highly depends on the cooperation of local groups.
Coalition forces should strive to gain a comprehensive understanding of local
groups during planning for operations. Governance assessments, such as "Local
Governance in Rural Afghanistan" from the Human Terrain System (HTS),
should be developed as early as possible. Coalition forces should also develop a
comprehensive engagement strategy to gain the influence/support of local
groups. Beyond efforts to establish a secure environment, the sustainment of
security will ultimately depend on building the capacity of the host nation's
security forces. Much progress has been made lately in Afghan capacitybuilding, as discussed in SOLLIMS Lesson 712, “The MoDA Program – Building
Ministerial Capacity in Afghanistan.”
2. Building local governance cannot move forward without civil servants. If there
has been an exodus of civil servants, efforts should be made to draw them back
to the host country. Adequate security and sufficient pay must be addressed.
Additionally, to fill any void, coalition forces should work with the host nation
government to recruit and train local citizens to become civil servants. The
establishment of regional civil service academies should be considered.
3. Building local governance requires taking action on cases of corruption. All
military and civilian personnel involved in stability operations should receive
predeployment training on corruption, along with periodic reminders about
corruption awareness and reporting. Coalition forces should conduct an
information campaign to tell the population what is being done about corruption.
4. Building local governance should not ignore the existing, hold-over system for
administration of local governance. It should be examined and revised, as
appropriate. Programs like the ILDG should be developed and implemented as
early as possible. Likewise, district-level elections should be planned and
conducted as early as possible.
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5. Building local governance requires adequate resourcing, especially in the
personnel arena. Coalition forces should be resourced with appropriate numbers
of political advisors / pol-mil officers to cover the local communities in their areas
of operation – as determined through pre-deployment plans and assessments.
Implications.
If a secure environment is not established, then local governance efforts simply
cannot make progress. Moreover, if the civil servant cadre is largely absent and
not rebuilt, and if coalition forces do not have sufficient political advisors to work
with them, then local governance efforts will be severely handicapped and slow
to develop. Significant long-term engagement will be required to overcome these
shortfalls.
Event Description.
This lesson is based on the article "Local Governance and COIN in Eastern
Afghanistan 2004-2008," by Robert E. Kemp, Military Review, Jan-Feb 2011.
Comments.
Related articles and lessons:
"Local Governance in Rural Afghanistan," by HTS-Afghanistan, ISAF Headquarters, Kabul, 26 October 2010. This report provides a baseline guide on
local communities and governance in eastern and southern Afghanistan
“Planning Considerations for Military-Political Engagement in Afghanistan,”
SOLLIMS Lesson 669, 23 August 2010. This lesson addresses the importance
of incorporating local engagement into the planning process for stability opns.
“Afghanistan: Transformation Challenges, Root Causes, and Developmental
Assistance,” SOLLIMS Lesson 678, 20 October 2010. This lesson discusses
challenges to stabilization efforts in an unstable/tribal state such as Afghanistan –
where the central government is weak, tribal actors strong, local groups set in
their ways, and violence pervasive.
“Strengthening Public Services in Post-conflict,” SOLLIMS Lesson 603, 17 March
2010. This lesson cites the importance of re-building a cadre of public servants
for post-conflict countries.
“The MoDA Program – Building Ministerial Capacity in Afghanistan,” SOLLIMS
Lesson 712, 1 March 2011. This lesson discusses the importance of building the
capacity of host nation security forces and their ministries.
“Creating an Epidemic of Unity,” SOLLIMS Lesson 709, 17 March 2011. This
lesson cites one organization's strategy for engaging communities (Iraq context).
Lesson Contributor: David Mosinski, PKSOI
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d. TOPIC. Making a Viable Peace – Intervention in Kosovo
( 1335 )
Observation.
The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was successful in establishing a
viable political framework in its initial two years as it avoided a detailed strategy,
but relied instead on the pursuit of multiple, concurrent, and incremental efforts.
Discussion.
UN Security Council Resolution 1244 provided guidance for UNMIK. The
resolution directed the establishment of an interim civil administration in Kosovo
and that progress be made toward autonomy and democratic self-government.[i]
This presented numerous challenges to a newly formed UNMIK staff that would
be responsible for exercising initial governance over a war torn country, as well
as developing a new political order that would provide a positive future for the
citizens of Kosovo. This could not be accomplished until UNMIK, in conjunction
with the Kosovo Force (KFOR), could stabilize the internal security of the country
and address the pressing humanitarian conditions.
In all, UNMIK was successful in establishing a viable political framework in its
initial two years as it avoided a detailed strategy, but relied instead on the pursuit
of multiple, concurrent, and incremental efforts along several lines of effort
(LOE). UNMIK avoided announcing goals by relying on a certain amount of
ambiguity and allowing progress to accumulate by using a repetitive five-step
process.
Jock Covey, the principal Deputy Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral at UNMIK from 1999-2001 presented five key components for a political
strategy/process – ambiguity, rhetoric, exit strategies, sustainability, and
coercion. These components were critical when considering that there may not
yet be a peace to keep when peacekeepers initially enter a conflict area.
Adversaries and competitors for political control may have entered the peace
process, but with a view towards continuing their wartime goals. Transforming
the way the disputants viewed themselves and the process over time was the
challenge for the UNMIK peacekeepers.
Carrying out the 5-step process time and again, eventually led to the parties
signing the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS). This structure was
designed as a trilateral agreement between UNMIK, Kosovo's Prime Minister
Hashim Thaci, and Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the Democratic League of
Kosovo (LDK) – who came to share responsibility for the admini-stration of
Kosovo. Eventually, moderate Serb leadership also joined the JIAS. By taking
advantage of small victories that compounded over time, UNMIK progressively
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moved towards a self-sustaining government that incorporated multiple and
diverse ethnic groups.
In evolving a political settlement supported by the major actors, Covey noted that
ambiguity was a mediator’s friend.[ii] Avoiding predictions that were generally
wrong, and many times viewed as prescriptions that may be viewed unfavorably
by the parties, and keeping things purposefully a bit “soft” allowed the mediators
to maintain credibility and enabled the process to move forward incrementally.
It was also important to avoid unproductive and potentially frictional rhetoric.
Terms like “multiethnic” and “multiculturalism” were broad goals used in the
Dayton Peace Accords for Bosnia, but proved unachievable there. This led to a
decline in international support for the mission in Bosnia, because the international community eventually viewed the mission as not achieving its goals
of establishing a "multiethnic" and "multicultural" administration. Terms like these
were not used in UNSCR 1244 for Kosovo.
[i] Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic, Leonard R. Hawley, The Quest for Viable Peace, (United States Institute
of Peace Press, 2005), 102.
[ii] Ibid, 103.
Recommendation.
Reduce the motivations for continued violent conflict, and nurture the capacity of
domestic institutions to resolve conflict peacefully. Through such an approach,
the attainment of a viable peace is possible – as seen in Kosovo after 18 months
of the UNMIK intervention.
Implications.
If an alternative approach of demanding immediate results or identifying set goals
is pursued, a mission risks alienating competing groups that have little reason to
lay down their arms and come to the negotiation table.
Event Description.
This lesson is based on The Quest for Viable Peace, by Jock Covey, Michael J.
Dziedzic, Leonard R. Hawley, United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005.
Lesson Contributor: Colonel Bryan O’Barr, US Army
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e. TOPIC. Decentralization for Participatory Governance ( 604 )
Observation.
Decentralized government is an effective instrument for building and sustaining
peace in post-conflict countries. Decentralization creates a situation in which
citizens are more engaged in governance and have a forum to air their views on
the development and reconstruction process.
Discussion.
Overcentralization and monopolization of power by the central government are a
source of conflict in many countries. To counteract the tensions caused by
elitism and authoritarian rule, many post-conflict governments have implemented
decentralization strategies as a means to ensure that services reach communities and that the voices of local people are heard in the development and
reconstruction process. When local governance structures exist, citizens and
groups can articulate their interests, mediate differences, receive services, and
exercise legal rights and obligations.
All the same, there is a case for designing decentralized systems in post-conflict
countries. Decentralization provides a structural arrangement for the orderly
negotiation and shared exercise of power, and it facilitates the involvement of the
local people in policy decisions about their country's development. Moreover, it
offers a means of allocating resources effectively, improving service delivery, and
enhancing the prospects for peace.
Decentralization can take two forms. Under vertical decentralization, the
central government hands down certain powers, functions and resources to local
governments. Under horizontal decentralization, governance responsibilities
are spread more broadly across the society, and civil society organizations (nongovernmental organizations, religious organizations, community groups, etc.) are
empowered to plan and manage affairs themselves. There is a concerted effort
to involve all citizens in public administration, including women, people with
disabilities, youth and other groups that were marginalized before the outbreak of
conflict.
Elements of successful decentralization include: legal frameworks and structural
arrangements; strengthened local government; local government responsiveness
and accountability; civil society organizations and the private sector working in
partnership with local and national governments; and, evidence of government
intent to improve the quality of life in local communities. One of the biggest
challenges to decentralization is the political will of central government leaders to
share power and authority.
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The following are examples of successful decentralization cited in Chapter V of
“Reconstructing Public Administration after Conflict: Challenges, Practices and
Lessons Learned,” by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social
Affairs, February 2010:
South Africa. A highlight was the structural arrangement that facilitated
the formulation of the Integrated Development Plan Representative
Forum. Forum participants included council members, traditional
community leaders, senior officials from municipal government
departments, and representatives from organized stakeholder groups.
Rwanda. The push for decentralization came from the central government
as part of the peacebuilding process. Participatory decision-making,
based on local leadership, was encouraged through the establishment of
Community Development Committees (CDC) attended by all community
members of voting age.
El Salvador. The El Salvador government, supported by the national
association of municipalities, promoted decentralization and community
participation immediately after signing the Peace Accords in 1992.
Programs were established to foster community participation in identifying
priorities, developing local plans, and setting local service requirements.
Recommendation.
Chapter V of “Reconstructing Public Administration after Conflict: Challenges,
Practices and Lessons Learned” offers the following lessons/recommendations:
1. Participatory governance at the local level facilitates the involvement of local
communities in policy decisions about their own development, thereby creating a
shared commitment to peaceful progress that reduces the likelihood of violent
conflict.
2. Successful decentralization depends on political will, civic will and capacity
development at the local level and careful implementation to ensure appropriate
power-sharing arrangements and allocation of resources.
3. Peace cannot be lasting unless both men and women participate in shaping
post-conflict reconstruction and are able to equally enjoy its benefits. Barriers to
women's participation include traditional notions about gender roles, women's
caregiving burdens and their inexperience in leadership positions. Nonetheless,
women's participation can be increased by enacting reforms to end gender discrimination, setting quotas for female representation in government, and undertaking capacity development efforts to strengthen women's leadership skills.
4. Peace cannot be lasting unless minority groups are engaged in post-conflict
governance, especially when ethnic or religious divisions were a root cause of
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the conflict or a contributing factor. It is important to foster dialogue and reconciliation among antagonistic groups, build a shared national identity that trumps
ethnic or religious ties, and take concrete steps (such as constitutional reforms
or the creation of special mechanisms) to protect minority rights and engage
minority groups in participatory decision-making.
Implications.
If recommendations are not adopted:
Central governments are viewed as exclusionary and not fully supporting
a peacebuilding process by including all conflict parties, factions, and
stakeholders. This exclusion builds distrust and lack of confidence in
the central government. Stakeholders will view the central government as
self-serving if local governments, local groups, and municipalities are left
out of the process.
Ethnic, religious, and minority groups will be the main source of conflict as
long as they do not share in power and governance. They are at the
highest risk of being marginalized during post-conflict reconstruction and
development.
Not including gender-specific issues neglects one of the biggest
challenges in many post-conflict areas. The challenges to women's
participation is daunting in those countries where women, historically,
have not had representation in central governments. Gender perspectives
must be included in the formal post-conflict decision-making process to
affect policy and development issues especially when women are head of
household or have the burden of care in many situations.
If recommendations are adopted:
Conflict parties can have a venue to provide input and share in a common
purpose so that they view a “public good” instead of “group interests.”
Minorities and women become invested in development and fostering
reconciliation.
Central governments will have to be committed to training and education if
local governments and groups become more involved in the decisionmaking process and development planning.
Laws and regulations will have to be created or strengthened to protect
minorities and women. That is one step central governments can take to
show their commitment to decentralize governance. This can also help
social cohesion between different groups.
Event Description.
This lesson is based on Chapter V, "Engaging Citizens in Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Decentralization for Participatory Governance," of “Reconstructing
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Public Administration after Conflict: Challenges, Practices and Lessons Learned,”
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, March 2010.
Lesson Contributor: Jaime Apo, PKSOI
f. TOPIC. Strengthening Public Services in Post-conflict ( 603 )
Observation.
Strengthening public servants' knowledge, skills, networks and attitudes is key
to any improvement in government performance, because it is through public
servants that services are planned and delivered.
Discussion.
The success of government in post-conflict society depends on the performance
of the public service in providing critical services to the population and restoring
trust and confidence in governance. This is because the public service constitutes the heartbeat of any government. Public servants pervade the entire
sphere of government action. They are schoolteachers, medical practitioners,
judges, court workers, police officers, military men and women, agricultural
extension workers, road constructors, forestry officers, administrative officials,
parliamentarians, finance officers, planners, etc. They are engaged in every
facet of government activity, but most of them work directly with citizens, to
whom they represent the face of government. Therefore, the quality of public
servants in terms of knowledge, skills, attitudes and networks can make or break
public trust in a post-conflict government.
Post-conflict public administration situations are not always similar. The public
services break down in different ways, depending on the nature of the conflict
and the conditions present afterwards. Consequently, countries will face different
challenges in rebuilding their human resources capabilities, and experience
gained in one situation may not be relevant in another. For example, in South
Africa after the fall of the apartheid regime, the institutions, systems, structures
and even personnel of the public service were in place and intact. But they did
not reflect South African demographics, as the white minority were vastly overrepresented.
The South African situation was different from the one in Rwanda after the 1994
genocide, when most public servants were killed. Most of the rest, particularly
those implicated in genocidal acts, escaped into Zaire (now the Democratic
Republic of Congo) carrying files, records and other movable public service
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assets. When these exiles returned to Rwanda, they took over public offices in
an unauthorized, uncoordinated manner. These new self-declared officials had
to be removed and the vacancies filled in an orderly fashion. By the time the new
regime settled in, knowledgeable and skilled personnel were unavailable, and the
public service's systems and institutions, along with equipment, office space and
logistics, were severely lacking.
A somewhat similar situation existed in Timor-Leste after 1999. An estimated
7,000 Indonesian civil servants had fled the Territory after Indonesian rule
collapsed, and institutions and public records were destroyed or removed. This
left a void throughout government because Indonesian officials had formerly
occupied most of the technical and management positions. There had been
limited development of Timorese skills in administration and governance. Also,
whereas some of the Rwandans who returned after the genocide were eager to
work and reconstruct their country, the Indonesians who fled Timor-Leste had
little interest in returning. When the United Nations took over the administration
of the Territory, there was no such thing as the Timor-Leste public service.
Initially the United Nations had to rely on Member State volunteers, as new
Timorese civil servants were being trained.
Uganda had a very different problem after the civil war that ended in 1986.
Uganda's post-conflict public service was overstaffed; bloated by redundant
positions with overlapping functions. The system was also plagued by poor
remuneration, moonlighting, extensive corruption, and uncommitted personnel.
These examples illustrate the wide variation in human resource capacity in postconflict countries. Not surprisingly, then, approaches to strengthening human
resources within the public service will vary from country to country. Where a
substantial number of personnel have been inherited from the outgoing regime,
the task may be simply to change employees' attitudes towards the new government and towards serving the public. Such was the case in Uganda after 1986.
In situations such as Rwanda, where the public service has been flooded by
returning exiles without the necessary education, skills or experience, then
massive immediate retraining is required, not only to transmit knowledge and
skills but also to cultivate a sense of togetherness and a shared work ethic. In
a situation like Timor-Leste or Kosovo, where United Nations personnel from
different countries and cultures constituted an interim public service, the initial
concern is to help everyone work together harmoniously in a new environment
that is often insecure.
Recommendation.
1. The quality of public servants is crucial to the recovery of a post-conflict
government and the trust that people have in it. This makes capacity-building in
the public service essential for post-conflict recovery. Strengthening public
servants' knowledge, ethics, skills, networks and attitudes is key, because it
is through public servants that government services are planned and delivered,
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critical innovations conceived and realized, needed reforms carried out, and trust
in government restored.
2. The nature of the conflict, the levels of violence and destruction, and the conditions that emerge after the conflict determine the state of human resources in the
public service. Reconstruction efforts must be tailored to the specific situation.
3. Reconstruction efforts should proceed from an accurate count of a country's
public servants and an accurate picture of their knowledge and skills. Because
employee censuses are expensive, they should be planned to fit within the
overall strategy for developing human resources in the public service. In
addition, censuses should be designed for congruence with the local context to
ensure that the government has the capacity to effectively use the data collected.
4. It is highly desirable for oversight of the recruitment process to be managed
by independent bodies such as civil service commissions to avoid cronyism,
nepotism, and other forms of favoritism. But because it takes time to create and
develop such institutions, interim measures need to be devised to address the
immediate challenge of recruiting competent personnel. If merit-based recruitment is introduced early, there is a greater chance of limiting patronage and
other harmful practices and instead ensuring a well-functioning public service.
5. Violence takes a toll on civil servants not only in terms of their numbers, but
also in terms of their behavior and motivation. To rebuild the ranks of qualified
personnel, it is not enough to remedy skills deficits and knowledge gaps. Efforts
must also be made to restore integrity, ethics and professional conduct in the
public service.
6. Diversity within the population should be reflected within the public service.
If both men and women, as well as members of all ethnic, religious and other
groups, are actively included in the government, then conflict is less likely to
erupt. A representative, merit-based, service-oriented public service can provide
a model for participation, inclusive decision-making, reconciliation and social
cohesion, and proactive peacebuilding.
7. Most post-conflict countries lack the financial resources to pay public servants
adequately, and reliance on foreign aid and technical assistance is unsustainable
in the long term. Donors thus need to work strategically with post-conflict
governments to help them develop pay management and incentive systems
that will attract the requisite personnel without overtaxing the budget.
Implications.
1. The security situation will have to improve or be at a level so that public servants can conduct their work in relative safety in order to be effective. This will
be important if public servants have been killed or driven off from their homeland.
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2. Heavy external support will be needed for countries that have undergone
devastating violence and upheaval. Host nation governments will likely not
have the means and resources to organize, train, and mentor public service
personnel following a conflict.
3. Foreign nations will take on many functions of government the longer it takes
for host-nation public servants to fill positions in government and become
proficient. People's attitudes, confidence and support in their government will be
partially affected by who is actually serving their needs. The tipping point is that
stage when the consensus is that their own people are serving their needs
instead of foreigners.
4. Foreign nations will have to recognize and accept that the resulting public
service may not be the one they desire because of ethnic, cultural, or social
factors. The key will be to train people to professional and ethical standards.
Event Description.
This lesson is based on Chapter IV, "Strengthening Human Resources in the
Public Service," of “Reconstructing Public Administration after Conflict:
Challenges, Practices and Lessons Learned,” United Nations Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, March 2010.
Lesson Contributor: Jaime Apo, PKSOI
g. TOPIC. Public Sector Reform and State-Citizen Relations in
Sierra Leone ( 2415 )
Observation.
Over the 2002-2015 timeframe, Sierra Leone has seen notable progress in
public sector reform and avenues for participation by civil society organizations
(CSOs) – owing largely to donor programs / external assistance. Significant
challenges remain, however, particularly limited government acceptance of
inputs/concerns from CSOs, government favoritism toward a select few CSOs,
and capacity shortfalls of CSOs limiting collaboration and influence.
Discussion.
A series of institutional reforms involving public sector agencies and governance
processes were undertaken in post-conflict Sierra Leone to aid post-conflict
recovery. From the outset, Sierra Leone, donors, and development partners
were in agreement that reform of public sector institutions would be critical to
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improving accountability and transparency in governance. In 2002, they
initiated the Public Sector Reform Programme after developing & publishing a
Country Financial Accountability Assessment (CFAA) report. This was followed
by the 2004 National Action Plan (NAP) and the 2009 Integrated Public Financial
Management Reform Project (IPFMRP). This governance reform process for
Sierra Leone involved the enactment of several new laws and legal frameworks –
such as the 2004 Procurement Act, the 2005 Government Budgeting and
Accountability Act (GBCA), the 2004 Local Government Act (LGA), the 2009
Mines and Minerals Act (MMA), and the 2013 Freedom of Information Act (FOI).
Governance reform in Sierra Leone also included the restructuring of the
National Electoral Commission (NEC) in 2002 and the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) in 2008 – for the purpose of enhancing citizens’ participation and
reducing government corruption, respectively. Since 2002, the NEC has
conducted six nationwide elections – presidential and parliamentary elections in
2002, 2007 and 2012, and local government elections in 2004, 2008 and 2012.
Most election observer missions rated these elections as free, fair and credible.
Although elections saw notable successes, electoral reform in Sierra Leone still
has significant challenges, evidenced by high election-related violence surrounding the 2008 local government elections and the 2012 national elections. With
regard to countering corruption, Transparency International has reported a
number of success stories since 2009: increased accountability in governance,
the recovery of over $2 million in public money, and the removal of high-ranking
officials. However, the level of official and unofficial corruption in Sierra Leone
remains high.
A key feature of governance reform in Sierra Leone has been the institutionalization of public consultation in government policy decisions, such as in preparing
the annual national budget, formulating economic and development policy plans
(poverty alleviation policies), and enacting parliamentary statutes. A ‘public
consultation’ clause has been incorporated in the templates for a majority of
Sierra Leone’s government policymaking processes at national, provincial, and
chiefdom levels – fulfilled through parliamentary public hearings, local councils,
town hall meetings, district budget oversight committees (DBOCs), chiefdom
councils, and ward development committees (WDCs) (ward meetings). This
institutionalization reflects the desires/influence of donors, implementation of their
peacebuilding agenda for increasing the role of civil society in governance, and
the expanded interests and voices of the CSOs themselves.
Governance reforms have also focused on creating and expanding opportunities
for CSOs to engage with the government throughout public policy processes.
Three donor-funded initiatives were introduced to support and improve the
government’s engagement with CSOs in this regard:
1) ENCISS initiative. The ENCISS program is a capacity-building initiative for
civil society groups aimed at strengthening citizens’ access to information, their
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participation in decision-making processes, and improving accountability in
governance. It seeks to improve state-citizen dialogue on government policies,
especially those dealing with poverty reduction, decentralization, and local governance. The program also focuses on enhancing the organizational capacities of
excluded groups (poorest communities, women, and people with disabilities) to
improve their abilities to design and implement effective projects, and to strengthen their knowledge of accountable governance. The UK and the European
Commission have funded ENCISS; Christian Aid manages the program.
2) Open Government Initiative (OGI). This program was designed to improve
transparency, accountability, and responsiveness in governance through fostering inclusive and open dialogue between government and citizens; providing
responses to citizens’ questions and concerns by relevant government officials
and agencies; and, providing periodic feedback by elected representatives
to their constituents. The operational strategies include periodic town hall
meetings, parliamentary sittings in provincial town headquarters, national and
community radio, and publication of policies and programs at district level.
UNDP initially funded and managed ODI, but Sierra Leone's government took
over management of OGI in 2010 and integrated it into government consultation
mechanisms.
3) Civil Society Platform. In 2012, UNIPSIL facilitated establishment of a
Civil Society Platform comprising about 100 CSOs. The aim of the platform is
to promote sustained engagement, coordination, collaboration, and shared
experiences and expertise among CSOs, and to encourage interaction with the
Sierra Leone government, the UN, donor agencies, and international organizations operating in country through monthly meetings. The Civil Society Platform
played an important role in the run-up to the 2012 elections through the UNIPSIL/
UNDP-funded election support program.
Although public sector reform in Sierra Leone has included numerous programs
to strengthen state-citizen relations and to improve governance, these programs
have encountered the following challenges:
Firstly, the government’s track record of citizen engagement and consultation
in policy process (including the government-run OGI) is known for heavy politicization and limited inclusiveness. Engagement is primarily conducted only with
the “pro-government” groups/CSOs. According to one civil society member: “the
government has its own civil society … there are organizations and CSO activists
that are pro-government and get invited to government consultation, access
grants through the government, included on government delegations … for
example, the head of the Health for All Coalition never criticizes the APC government because he receives grants from them.” Another CSO member noted that:
“since the government took over the OGI, it ceased to be a platform for civil
society to interact with government; it has been used for perverted purposes
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ing agenda … no criticism of the government is allowed in OGI activities but only
praising the APC … it lost its credibility after UNDP withdrew.”
Secondly, the institutional capacity shortfalls of a majority of CSOs in Sierra
Leone limit the scope and possibility of functional engagement with the government and of constructive influence on public policies. Donors’ capacity-building
initiatives for CSOs have had limited impact. For instance, the Civil Society
Platform was unable to address many of the fundamental organizational weakness of CSOs in Sierra Leone, including weak reporting systems, poor project
implementation capacity, weak political influence and alignment, and duplication
of effort. A 2014 assessment of CSOs found that despite growth in numbers of
CSOs, the civil society sector continues to face acute structural deficits, including
weak internal governance processes in many CSOs, a weak resource base that
compromises CSO effectiveness, and poor networking and collaboration among
CSOs.
Thirdly, a considerable number of CSOs have expressed frustrations over
the low uptake of suggestions put forward during public policy consultations.
Although CSO advocacy has led to policy amendments in a couple of cases,
many CSOs claim that government engagement in CSO consultation is limited
to a few marginal issues, and even where engagement takes place, it is a mere
formality with policy choices seemingly predetermined by government or donors.
As evidence, no consultations occurred on the following policy issues of
importance to CSOs: the introduction of a 17% goods and sales tax, increases
in university fees, the signing of mining license agreements, and the displacement of communities in mining areas.
Finally, many CSO members have noted that CSO engagement and participation in public policy processes has been more effective when backed up by the
threat of, or actually conducting, public demonstrations (strikes) to demand policy
changes. Evidence suggests that citizens’ engagement with state institutions
and businesses is highest when issues central to their livelihoods are affected.
The strike cases recorded thus far have been directly triggered by socioeconomic
issues such as trade, jobs, working conditions, pay, displacement, land, and the
negative impacts of mining on the environment. Similarly, certain violent protests
were attributed to the perceived inadequate response by the government to the
Ebola epidemic.
Overall, significant progress has been made in Sierra Leone in the governance
sector – namely, institutional reforms of public sector agencies and of government policy processes. Various avenues for CSO involvement/consultation have
been established and are being used. CSOs are visible and active in public
policy debates and policy formulation processes in both the executive and
legislative branches of government. The fact that citizens have sometimes been
able to force changes in policies by threatening or conducting strikes equates to
CSO action/expression and government recognition/response. However, chalTable of Contents | Quick Look | Contact PKSOI
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lenges still to be overcome include limited uptake/acceptance of inputs from
CSOs, especially from CSOs seen as not “pro-government,” and capacity shortfalls of CSOs for greater networking/collaboration and influence.
Recommendation.
Based on their analysis of public administration reforms and state-citizen
relations in Sierra Leone, the authors of the report “Striking for Engagement:
State-Citizen Relations in Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone” (See “Event
Description” paragraph below) offer the following recommendations for
donors/organizations assisting Sierra Leone and more broadly – for donors/
organizations implementing programs in other fragile states as well:
1. Focus on indirect approaches (i.e., to address key issues and areas of tension
between citizen groups and the government) to improve state-citizen relations in
fragile states. State-citizen relations in conflict-affected states are often shaped
by indirect events/issues (socioeconomic issues impacting livelihoods, land
issues, displacement, health concerns/crises, etc.), and less by official channels
and institutional reforms.
2. Invest in programming to support and build state-citizen relations during and
after crises (health crises, natural disasters, public agitations/protests, etc.).
3. Identify and support citizens’ formal and informal channels of communication
with the government.
4. Ensure that donor programming for improving state-citizen relations is guided
by a political-economy analysis to identify issues fundamental to citizens’
livelihoods, and less by generic templates (e.g., public consultation mechanisms,
commissions, etc.).
5. Periodically analyze and adjust donor funding mechanisms, scale, and trends
in relation to impact on state-citizen relations.
6. Support and strengthen citizens’ capacity to engage with and monitor policy
implementation (not just policy formulation).
Implications.
If donors do not analyze and incorporate the key issues and concerns of citizen
groups/CSOs while formulating and implementing governance reforms in fragile
states, then opportunities to build state-citizen relations will be lost, as well as
chances to improve the legitimacy of government institutions and processes.
Mechanisms/avenues for CSO inputs/consultations in government policy
processes and decision-making are helpful; however, periodic assessments of
their utility and effectiveness are even more important.
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Event Description.
This lesson is based on the report “Striking for Engagement: State-Citizen
Relations in Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone,” by Olawale Ismail, International
Alert, May 2015.
Comments.
The following lessons provide examples of effective programs/interventions that
targeted state-citizen relations, participation, and legitimacy:
“Fighting Corruption – The 'Common Ground' Approach,” SOLLIMS lesson 731,
7 April 2011.
“Civil Society Capacity for Action for Peacebuilding – Kenya,” SOLLIMS lesson
702, 15 March 2011.
Lesson Contributor: David Mosinski, PKSOI
h. TOPIC. What Is “Good Enough” for the Military as an End
Point for Governance in Stability Operations? ( 1071 )
Observation.
Contemplating the condition of “good enough” for military involvement in stability
operations is very much dependent on the end state strategic criteria and
objectives determined by both the host nation and intervening members in
establishing effective government and governance.
Discussion.
The functions of a state, according to PKSOI’s “Governance Guide” (“Guide to
Rebuilding Governance in Stability Operations: A Role for the Military?”), are
dependent on three core functions: 1) effective service delivery; 2) responsiveness to the citizenry; and, 3) security. These three core functions speak to the
ability of the government to adequately address and execute USIP/PKSOI's
Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Recontruction (i.e., Rule of Law; Safe
and Secure Environment; Social Well-Being; Stable Governance; Sustainable
Economy) [see Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction] to enable
a transformed stable government. More specifically, however, the core functions
further require the legitimacy of a functioning government. Legitimacy, as outlined by the PKSOI “Governance Guide,” constitutes more than just a functioning
government but the interaction and activities associated with good governance.
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The “Governance Guide” states, “Governance refers to the processes and rules
through which state and non-state actors in society wield power and authority
and how they enact governmental policies and decisions.”
In addressing stability operations which clearly encompasses governance, DoD
Instruction 3000.05 indicates stability operations are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. However, the same guidance also
indicates the military will perform all tasks necessary to maintain order when
civilians cannot do so and specifically addresses the fact that stability operations
tasks include helping to develop government institutions. Over the past decade,
U.S. military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan has seen significant military
support and engagement in all five pillars of stability operations. While security
has been a driving force for military support, limited civilian resources have also
driven the requirement, as DoD Instruction 3000.05 states, “to help secure a
lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces.”
Determining the “end point” for military operations is largely contingent then on
addressing not only the strategic “back-home” political considerations, but also
the advice and guidance of military commanders on the ground. Some military,
civilian and host-nation leader considerations include: the dynamics influencing
conflict (both peaceful and violent); transitioning efforts from military to civilian
control; and, analyzing the associated tradeoffs and risks with maintaining a
military presence vice withdrawing forces (PKSOI “Governance Guide”).
It is also key to highlight that current doctrine, specifically, JP 3-0 and JP 5-0,
does not adequately address the complexities of end state determination. While
properly addressing the requirement to update key inputs and outputs throughout
the dynamic planning process, the current JP 5-0 still lacks a critical discussion
outlined by Greenwood and Hammes in their December 2009 Armed Forces
Journal article, “War Planning for Wicked Problems:” “Ill-structured problems
have no 'stopping rule.' By definition wicked problems have no end state.” The
authors further critically submit that current doctrine continues to focus on
“developing an end state for every plan.” Indeed it does. JP 5-0 states a military
end state “is the required conditions that define achievement of all military
objectives” and should be included in planning guidance and the commander’s
intent statement.
JP 5-0 requirements for end state determination do not, however, go without
solid justification. JP 5-0 justifies the requirement for a clearly articulated end
state, supporting what any professional military leader seeks in a campaign; an
end state “promotes unity of effort, facilitates synchronization, and helps clarify
(and may reduce) the risk associated with the campaign or operation.” Despite
the operational goodness of a clearly identified end state, what joint doctrine fails
to capture is how extremely difficult end states are to achieve, influenced by a
changing enemy environment, available resources, national will, strategic leader
personalities, and, ultimately, political aims and influences.
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Recommendation.
Greenwood and Hammes (in “War Planning for Wicked Problems,” Armed
Forces Journal, December 2009) argue that a military planner, in dealing with
wicked problems, must seek a “good enough” solution, not developing a
definitive end state, but instead, thinking of it as sustaining a “steady state” over
the long term. This applies to considerations of all five pillars, governance
included, in achieving conflict transformation.
Implications.
Scholars, both civilian and military alike, will most assuredly continue to write
literary commentary on the quality and contributions of joint doctrine in achieving
strategic objectives and “end state” determination. This commentary and critique
is beneficial and does, in the long run, add to the collection and summary of
operational lessons learned. For today’s campaign planners, USIP/PKSO's
Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Recontruction and joint doctrine are
good beginning points for understanding and applying concepts to conflict
termination and end state determination. But, effective interagency planning
and integration, and an absolute avoidance of a solipsistic attitude regarding
adversary will and intent, ultimately evolve from a combination of study,
experience, and leadership.
Event Description.
This lesson has been developed for U.S. Army War College PKSOI elective
course PS2219 – Peace & Stability Operations: Concepts and Principles. It is
based on the following references:
“Guide to Rebuilding Governance in Stability Operations: A Role for the Military?”
Derick W. Brinkerhoff, Ronald W. Johnson, and Richard Hill, RTI International,
PKSOI/SSI paper, June 2009
“Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction,” USIP and PKSOI,
October 2009
“DoD Instruction 3000.5 Stability Operations,” Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy [USD(P)], 16 September 2009
“JP 3-0 Joint Operations,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 August 2011
“JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 August 2011
“War Planning for Wicked Problems,” T.C. Greenwood and T.X. Hammes, Armed
Forces Journal, December 2009
Lesson Contributor: Colonel Brent Grometer, US Air Force
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Page 36 of 48
3. CONCLUSION
Building stable governance – helping leaders, government personnel, and civil
society acquire the skills and tools needed to govern accountably, participate in
political processes, and provide core services for the population – is typically a
complex, long-term undertaking.
General guidance for building stable governance (Guiding Principles, USIP/PKSOI):
Act only with an understanding of the local context. Understand the
specific and unique governance needs of the host nation. Programs
aimed at strengthening governance must be based on in-depth needs
assessments and specific knowledge of the host nation’s historical,
cultural, societal, economic, and political background. This understanding
should include input from the host nation population from various sides of
the conflict and marginalized groups such as women, minorities, youth,
and the poor.
Prioritize to stabilize. Prioritize governance functions that support the
delivery of essential services and contribute to political settlements.
Focus on producing political settlements that help resolve conflicts that
were not addressed in a peace agreement or a mandate. Think hard
about the protection of critical state resources – human, natural, financial,
cultural, and infrastructure – that are necessary to prevent and mitigate
conflict. Priorities should ultimately be determined by their potential to
prevent conflict and increase the strength of nonviolent political settlements.
Use a conflict lens. All choices in governance affect power relationships.
The choice of an interim minister, the location of a municipal center, the
adoption of a regulation, or the award of a contract to a local business has
the ability to exacerbate tensions or address and resolve internal conflicts.
Be sure to identify and understand the specific sources of conflict and
motivations for violence to ensure that governance reform efforts do not
reignite violent conflict.
Recognize interdependence. The widely understood core functions of
governance – security, the rule of law, meeting basic human needs, and
economic governance – are intertwined like a rope. Failure to provide one
will unravel the ability to provide the others. The administration and
delivery of humanitarian assistance and basic services to the population,
for example, depends on adequate security for civilians and some basic
rule of law system that prevents banditry and looting of critical supplies
and resources. All of these core services depend on sound economic
management and governance.
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Additional points from the lessons in this Sampler:
Local governance / Local understanding. To ensure the stability,
integrity, and legitimacy of national governments, it is important to
establish local governance in a manner that is understood by the local
population.
Governance capacity-building programs. Key program elements
should include host nation ownership, sustainability of systems/processes,
and continuous government outreach to the public/civil society.
Security / secure environment. Building local governance cannot
progress without having security – i.e., establishing and maintaining a safe
and secure environment. Security provides the cornerstone for stable
governance – affording government institutions the opportunity to grow/
develop and ensuring the safety of new political leaders and processes.
Conflict resolution. Reduce the motivations for violent conflict, and
nurture the capacity of domestic institutions to resolve conflict peacefully.
Pursue multiple, concurrent, and incremental efforts.
Decentralization. Successful decentralization depends on political will,
civic will, and capacity development at the local level, along with careful
implementation and monitoring to ensure appropriate power-sharing
arrangements and allocation of resources.
Public servants. Strengthening public servants' knowledge, ethics, skills,
networks and attitudes is essential, because it is through public servants
that government services are planned and delivered, critical innovations
conceived and realized, needed reforms carried out, and trust in government restored.
State-citizen relations. Identify and support citizens’ formal and informal
channels of communication with the government. Support and strengthen
citizens’ capacity to engage in and monitor public policy implementation,
as well as to hold government accountable.
End-state for governance. Seek a “good enough” solution, not developing a definitive end-state, but instead, plan for sustaining a “steady state”
over a long term.
Through wider dissemination of the aforementioned lessons and guidance,
through their inclusion in leader education programs, and through senior leader
emphasis, significant impacts can be made during the course of future stability
operations – to the benefit of all involved in the mission, especially the people of
the host nation.
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4. COMMAND POC
Publication prepared by: Mr. David Mosinski, PKSOI Lessons Learned Analyst.
PKSOI reviewer: Mr. Dan French, Chief, Lessons Learned Branch.
Contact info: Email: usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.sollims@mail.mil
Phone: (717) 245-3031
DSN: 242-3031
>>>>>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------<<<<<
Source: “Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction,” USIP and PKSOI, Oct 2009
U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)
Director
COL Dan Pinnell
Chief, Proponency and Stability
COL Mark Haseman
Chief, Proponency
COL Brian Hammer
Chief, Lessons Learned Branch
Dan French
Lessons Learned Analyst
David Mosinski
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Annex A
Related Documents, References, and Links
[Ensure you are logged in to SOLLIMS to access these items.]
Guides/Handbooks
“Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction,” USIP and PKSOI,
October 2009
“Guide to Rebuilding Governance in Stability Operations: A Role for the
Military?” Derick W. Brinkerhoff, Ronald W. Johnson, and Richard Hill, RTI
International, PKSOI/SSI paper, June 2009
“Guide to Rebuilding Public Sector Services in Stability Operations: A Role for
the Military,” Derick W. Brinkerhoff, Ronald W. Johnson, and Richard Hill, RTI
International, PKSOI/SSI paper, October 2009
“Handbook for Military Support to Governance, Elections, and Media,” United
States Joint Forces Command, 11 February 2010
“Good Governance Makes Sense: A Way to Improve Your Mission,” CivilMilitary Cooperation Centre of Excellence (CCOE), 31 October 2012
“Corruption Threats & International Missions: Practical Guidance for Leaders,”
Transparency International UK, September 2014
Studies/Reports/Articles
“Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance,” Kenneth
Katzman, Congressional Research Service, 28 July 2014
“Avoiding Praetorian Societies: Focusing U.S. Strategy on Political Development,” PKSOI paper, Bruce Ferrell, March 2014
“The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): Origins, Characteristics, and
Institutional Authorities,” L. Elaine Halchin, Congressional Research Service,
27 April 2007
“The De-Baathification of Iraq,” Ryan Pavel, University of Michigan, April 2012
“Effective Governance in Challenging Environments,” Mireille Affa'a Mindzie,
George Mukundi Wachira, and Lucy Dunderdale, International Peace Institute
(IPI), 11 December 2014
“Elections in Post-Conflict Countries – Lessons Learned from Liberia, Sierra
Leone, DR Congo, and Kosovo,” report of a ZIF/KAIPTC Seminar, 12-14
June 2008
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“Good Governance, Rule of Law, Transparency, and Accountability,” Michael
Johnston, Colgate University, 11 June 2003
“Governance in Afghanistan: Looking Ahead to What We Leave Behind,”
Colin Cookman and Caroline Wadhams, Center for American Progress, May
2010
“Governance Interventions in Post-War Situations: Lessons Learned,” Vibeke
Wang, Astri Suhrke, and Elling N. Tjønneland, Chr. Michelsen Institute, May
2005.
“Helping Build Democracy that Delivers,” Center for International Private
Enterprise (CIPE), 15 November 2007
“Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights,” Kenneth Katzman,
Congressional Research Service, 12 August 2014
“ISAF Lessons Summary #2: Building Effective Government,” Kevin Doyle,
PKSOI, 12 June 2013
“Learning from Iraq,” A Final Report from the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction, March 2013
“Lessons Learned in Preparing and Conducting Elections in Afghanistan,”
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Audit 10-16,
9 September 2010
“Participatory and Inclusive Constitution-Making: Giving Voice to the
Demands of Citizens in the Wake of the Arab Spring,” Jason Gluck and
Michele Brandt, USIP, 29 January 2015
“Political Transitions after Peace Agreements: The Importance of Consultative
and Inclusive Political Processes,” Katia Papagianni, Journal of Intervention
and Statebuilding, volume 3, number 1, March 2009
“Reconstructing Public Administration after Conflict: Challenges, Practices
and Lessons Learned,” United Nations, March 2010
“Status of Developing Afghan Governance and Lessons for Future
Endeavors,” Steven H. Sternlieb, Stability Journal, 18 May 2013
“Strategic Lesson Number 3: Developing and Implementing an AntiCorruption Strategy,” David Mosinski, PKSOI, 1 March 2012
“Transition to Local Governance,” SOLLIMS Sampler, PKSOI, October 2010
“USAID/Iraq Broadening Participation through Civil Society Project Final
Performance Evaluation Report,” USAID, 2 November 2015
“What Is Good Governance?” United Nations Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), 23 January 2007
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Journals/Periodicals
“New Routes 1/2012; Elections: Free, Fair – and Nonviolent? Life & Peace
Institute, February 2012
“Winter 2015 Insights Newsletter – Preventing Election Violence,” USIP,
13 March 2015
US Government Documents
“Deepening U.S. Government Efforts to Collaborate with and Strengthen
Civil Society,” memorandum signed by the President of the United States,
23 September 2014
“Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks,” [includes section on “Governance and Participation”], US State Department Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), April 2005
US Military Doctrine
“ADP 3-07 Stability,” Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), August
2012
“ADRP 3-07 Stability,” HQDA, with change 1, 25 February 2013
“ATP 3-07.5 Stability Techniques,” HQDA, August 2012
“FM 3-07 Stability,” HQDA, June 2014
“FM 3-57 Civil Affairs Operations,” HQDA, with change 2, 18 April 2014
“JP 3-07 Stability Operations,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, 29 September 2011
Websites
Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC)
SOLLIMS (includes “Governance” libraries and “Counter Corruption” portal)
Transparency International
UNDP - Democratic Governance and Peacebuilding
USAID - Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance
US Department of State - Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
World Bank - Worldwide Governance Indicators
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Annex B
What Is Good Governance?
Although “good governance” depends on cultural values and perceptions, the
following characteristics are a way to explain what “good governance” entails:
1. Participation. Participation by both men and women is a key cornerstone of
good governance. Participation could be either direct or through legitimate
intermediate institutions or representatives. Participation needs to be informed and
organized. This means freedom of association and expression on the one hand and
an organized civil society on the other hand
2. Rule of Law. Good governance requires fair legal frameworks that are enforced
impartially. It also requires full protection of human rights, particularly those of
minorities. Impartial enforcement of laws requires an independent judiciary and an
impartial and incorruptible police force.
3. Transparency. Transparency means that decisions taken and their enforcement
are done in a manner that follows rules and regulations. It also means that information is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by
such decisions and their enforcement. It also means that enough information is
provided and that it is provided in easily understandable forms and media.
4. Responsiveness. Good governance requires that institutions and processes try
to serve all stakeholders within a reasonable timeframe.
5. Consensus-oriented. Good governance requires mediation of the different
interests in society to reach a broad consensus in society on what is in the best
interest of the whole community and how this can be achieved. It also requires a
broad and long-term perspective on what is needed for sustainable human development and how to achieve the goals of such development.
6. Equity and Inclusiveness. A society’s well-being depends on ensuring that all
its members feel that they have a stake in it and do not feel excluded from the mainstream of society. This requires all groups, but particularly the most vulnerable,
have opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being.
7. Effectiveness and Efficiency. Good governance means that processes and
institutions produce results that meet the needs of society while making the best use
of resources at their disposal. The concept of efficiency in the context of good
governance also covers the sustainable use of natural resources and the protection
of the environment.
8. Accountability. Accountability is a key requirement of good governance. Not
only governmental institutions but also the private sector and civil society organizations must be accountable to the public and to their institutional stakeholders.
Accountability cannot be enforced without transparency and the rule of law.
Source: “What Is Good Governance?” United Nations Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), 23 January 2007.
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Annex C
Key Partners for DoD in Governance Strengthening and Support
The Department of State (DOS) has overall policy lead for the USG’s statebuilding, governance strengthening, and election support efforts. Within the
DOS, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) promotes
democracy, the protection of human rights, respect for international religious
freedom, and worker rights globally.
The American Embassy (AMEMB) is one of the primary conduits for planning
and coordination. The Country Team will generally have at least one political
officer, a USAID field mission director, and a public diplomacy officer. These
officials will be best positioned to advise on the current situation as well as on
programs already sponsored by the host government, the USG, and other
bilateral and international donors.
The US Agency for International Development (USAID) is the USG’s lead
implementing agency for post-conflict development assistance.
o USAID’S Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance
(DCHA) promotes democratic and resilient societies. The Bureau’s Center
of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DRG)
generates and disseminates knowledge about the global advancement of
democracy, human rights, and governance; elevates their role in key
USAID, USG, and multilateral strategies; and, provides technical support to
USAID missions implementing programs in these areas. The Bureau’s
Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation (CMC) serves as USAID’s primary
point of contact with the Department of Defense.
The World Bank provides financial and technical assistance to developing
countries around the world. In addition to funding development efforts, the World
Bank provides analysis, advice and information to member country governments.
In the areas related to governance, the World Bank staff offers advice and help to
governments in the preparation of draft legislation, institutional development
plans, country-level strategies, and implementation action plans and can assist
governments in introducing new policies or programs. Of particular interest to
US military planners, the World Bank publishes the annual Worldwide Governance Indicators, one of the most comprehensive cross-country sets of governance and anticorruption indicators currently available.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the UN’s global
development network of over 166 offices and global partnerships with democratic
governance institutions. In the governance area, the UNDP provides core
services to support national processes of democratic transitions that focus on:
o providing policy advice and technical support
o strengthening capacity of institutions and individuals
o advocacy, communications, and public information
o promoting and brokering dialogue
o knowledge networking and sharing of good practices
Sources: “Handbook for Military Support to Governance, Elections, and Media,”
United States Joint Forces Command, 11 February 2010, and USAID website.
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Annex D
Military Contribution – Governance and Participation
Support national constitution processes. When the Host Nation (HN)
has no government, as may be the case during immediate post-conflict reconstruction or interventions in failed states, developing a national constitution is
typically an important first step to establishing a foundation for governance
and the rule of law. This may also be a key part of the process for achieving
political settlement. An inclusive and participatory constitutional process that
helps build broad based consensus on the country’s political future may help
prevent the reemergence of violent conflict. The military can support this
process both with Civil Affairs (CA) functional expertise, as required, and the
provision of security and logistic support for key constitutional processes such
as debates and balloting. Efforts to support national constitution processes
are led in the USG by USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), with support from DOS’ Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor (DRL).
Support transitional governance. Prior to the return or establishment of
viable HN control over ungoverned areas (UGAs), a transitional, interim
government may be required. This transitional government may be a transitional military authority, normally established following the military defeat of
the adversarial government, a transitional civilian authority, normally established in failed states in which security is not the overriding concern, or a
transitional HN government. The military may support transitional governments through civil-military operations (CMO) support to civil administration
(SCA) as well as providing security to governmental leaders and institutions
of all branches of the government. Efforts to support transitional governance
are shared between DOS and DoD, with leadership depending on the
circumstances.
Support local governance. Even before national governance institutions
and processes are established, the joint force should support the establishment of effective governance at the local level. Local governments are
necessary to restore and protect the essential services that provide the basic
foundations of security and economic stabilization. Additionally, finding
political solutions at the local level tends to inform the search for a political
settlement at higher levels. The military support to local governance may
include restoring essential services as required, providing CMO SCA, or
providing security to governmental leaders and institutions of all branches of
the government. Local governance support is led by DCHA, with support
from DRL.
Support anticorruption initiatives. Corruption undermines confidence in
the state, impedes the flow of aid, concentrates wealth into the hands of a
generally unelected, unaccountable, and illegitimate minority, and provides
elites with illicit means of protecting their positions and interests. It provides
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insurgents, and sometimes legitimate opposition groups, information
detrimental to long-term stability. At the same time, the political elites who
benefit from corruption and oppose anticorruption initiatives may be the
same elites with whom intervening forces must work toward political settlement; this requires a delicate balance in governance programs. Support to
anticorruption initiatives is led by DOS’ Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), with support from DCHA and Department of
Justice (DOJ).
Support elections. The ability of the state and its local subdivisions to
stage fair and secure elections is a significant milestone toward establishing
legitimate, effective governance. While civilian agencies and organizations
that maintain strict transparency guide the elections process, military forces
provide the support that enables broad participation by the local populace.
This certainly includes security, but may also include logistic support.
Support to elections and other participation programs is led by DCHA with
support from DRL.
Source: “JP 3-07 Stability Operations,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, 29 September 2011.
Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan (29 March 2014). Brigadier General Daniel D. Yoo,
Commanding General, Regional Command Southwest (RC Southwest), greets Amir
Mohammad Akhundzada, Nimroz Provincial Governor. The leaders met for a security
“shura” to discuss presidential elections and polling station security measures. “To
build a nation we need to earn the people’s trust,” said Akhundzada. “It means everything
earning their trust. We need to build their confidence in our government, the country and
Afghan National Security Forces in order to be successful.”
(Article and photo by Sgt. Frances Johnson and Sgt. Jessica Ostroska, RC Southwest)
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Annex E
Preventing Electoral Violence
1. Start early. Analysis, planning, and implementation of measures for the
prevention of electoral violence should begin 24-48 months in advance of elections.
2. Use a "Governance and Electoral Cycle Approach." Electoral system reform,
political party reform, constitutional reform, and legal reform can all contribute to
reducing the likelihood of electoral violence.
3. Effective, early, and joint analysis is critical; scenario planning can help.
Analysis should be carried out early in the following four categories: (1) structural/
primary causes of instability and root causes of conflict (e.g., deep-seated inequalities between ethnic groups); (2) other/secondary drivers of conflict and instability
(e.g., hate speeches); (3) election-specific causes (e.g., lack of trust in Electoral
Management Bodies); and, (4) conflict handling capabilities (e.g., national, state/
county, and district/community capacities for preventing and mitigating violence).
4. Infrastructure for Peace (I4P). Standing capabilities in the form of peace
committees, joint operating centers, and trained mediators can all help to address
tensions and prevent or reduce cases of violence.
5. Development of national strategies helps. All relevant ministries and state and
non-state actors with mandates for elections, peace building, or dealing with possible
violence should be included in developing national strategies for elections.
6. Use social media and media campaigns to raise people's awareness of the
costs and impacts of violence and to promote violence-free elections.
7. Engage, mobilize, and empower the broad majority of the population to
actively participate in peaceful elections.
8. Train and prepare police and security forces to use non-violent responses for
election scenarios.
9. Set up effective early warning and critical incident mapping systems for
elections – in order to map developing situations where tensions are escalating,
allowing for rapid and appropriate responses.
10. Prepare governmental and civil society peace capacities – from local peace
teams to networks of mediators – to engage in emergent and actual cases of
violence.
11. Coordinate. Establish coordination mechanisms among the many different
actors involved in peace building and electoral support.
Source: “A Way Forward to Peaceful Elections,” Paul van Tongeren and Kai BrandJacobsen, in New Routes, 1/2012.
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Annex F
Previously Published SOLLIMS Samplers
(available in SOLLIMS library)
Shifts in United Nations Peacekeeping (Feb 2016)
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance: Concepts, Principles and Applications
(Dec 2015)
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance [Foreign Disaster Relief] (Sep 2015)
Cross-Cutting Guidelines for Stability Operations (Jul 2015)
Lessons on Stability Operations from U.S. Army War College Students
(May 2015)
Security Sector Reform (Feb 2015)
Reconstruction and Development (Nov 2014)
Women, Peace and Security (Aug 2014)
Lessons on Stability Operations from U.S. Army War College Students
(Jul 2014)
Overcoming “Challenges & Spoilers” with “Unity & Resolve” (Apr 2014)
Improving Host Nation Security through Police Forces (Jan 2014)
Key Enablers for Peacekeeping & Stability Operations (Oct 2013)
Lessons On Stability Operations from U.S. Army War College Students
(Aug 2013)
Multinational Operations (Jul 2013)
Leadership in Stability Operations: Understanding / Engaging the People
(Apr 2013)
Protection of Civilians (Jan 2013)
Medical Assistance / Health Services (Oct 2012)
Reconciliation (Jul 2012)
Civ-Mil Cooperation (Apr 2012)
Building Capacity (Jan 2012)
Ministerial Advising (Oct 2011)
Fighting Corruption (Apr 2011)
Economic Stabilization (Jan 2011)
Transition to Local Governance (Oct 2010)
Rule of Law and Legitimacy (Jul 2010)
Protection of Civilians in Peacekeeping (Jun 2010)
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