Ancient Piracy

The paper examines the upsurge of piracy in the last century of the Roman Republic, to underline its impact on politics. Analysing the testimonials about the period after 105 BC, we can appreciate that as well as interfering in the wars against Mithridates, the fight against the pirates who were also infesting the western Mediterranean, gained a meaningful role in the political agenda. Some prominent figures on the public scene engaged by the institutions to solve the problem, exploited it to gain extraordinary powers that would take on a different meaning depending on the circumstances and their personalities, as shown by Pompey’s command of 67 BC. He took advantage of his skill to dissimulate his ambitions and the auctoritas he enjoyed, to obtain a position that, despite modern historiography’s difficulty with establishing its juridical limits, was the first step in his quest to rise to absolute power. This continued not only the following year with the new command that the Lex Manilia granted him, but also in the next decade when Pompey consolidated his position, taking advantage of the financial difficulties linked to the shortage of food supplies, not unlike those caused previously by the pirates’ incursions. All of this is witnessed on the one hand by Cicero, whose opinion of this figure became gradually more negative in the period from 66-49 BC, on the other by Imperial Age historiography. Centuries afterwards the latter was able to perceive and underline more and more explicitly the subversive novelty of the extraordinary command given to Pompey to eradicate piracy, bringing out its major role in the process leading to the decline of the Republican institutions and the creation of the Principality.

Collection of contributions on the phenomenon of Piracy in the ancient Mediterranean World, with special reference to its development in the Roman Period as well as to some aspects of its evolution from the Middle Ages to the Present, in order to ascertain its impact on the political agendas and the legal systems of different periods.

Cette communication propose de revenir sur le terme « viking » en analysant la notion de piraterie dans les sources norroises. Si les historiens sont familiers des témoignages des victimes de ces pirates du Nord, les sources norroises demeurent encore trop méconnues hors de Scandinavie. Les sagas, chroniques rédigées essentiellement au XIIIe siècle, sont des récits provenant des descendants de ces fameux Vikings et jouissant depuis ces vingt dernières années d’un regain d’intérêt de la part des historiens. 
Le mouvement de piraterie des Vikings, daté approximativement du VIIIe au XIe siècle, marqua profondément le Moyen Âge. De la route de l’ouest (vestrvegr) à la route de l’est (austrvegr), l’œkoumène des Vikings s’étendait de Terre-Neuve à Constantinople et de l’Islande au Maghreb. Ces pirates furent à l’origine de changements dans l’ensemble du monde médiéval : création d’États et de dynasties, consolidation du pouvoir, transfert des richesses, imposition de tributs aux peuples vaincus, explorations, mercenariat, etc. 
Devant la foule de problèmes soulevés par l’étude des Vikings, nous proposons ici de revenir à la notion de piraterie au sein des sources norroises. Nous tenterons tout d’abord de revenir sur la sémantique du mot víkingr et du champ lexical qui lui est associé. Puis à travers divers témoignages issus des sources norroises, nous essayerons de définir les enjeux et modalités de la piraterie vue par les Scandinaves.

Mots-clés : Vikings, piraterie, sagas, histoire maritime.

A la suite de la parution du Dictionnaire sur les corsaires et les pirates ainsi que de l'Histoire des corsaires et des Pirates sous la direction de Philippe Hrodej et Gilbert Buti, en 2013 et en 2016, j'ai décidé de poursuivre le travail de bibliographie car bien  des travaux étrangers (turcs, portugais, danois, norvégiens, espagnols etc), anciens ou récents, m'étaient inconnus et sont à l'honneur dans ma liste. Cette version est arrêtée au 18 décembre 2023. Par rapport à la version d'il y a 1 an, elle comprend environs 6 pages de plus. Cependant tout n'y est pas tant le sujet est vaste. S'il y a des références que vous connaissez et qui n'y sont pas n'hésitez pas à me le dire.

Following the publication of the Dictionary of Privateers and Pirates as well as the History of Privateers and Pirates under the direction of Philippe Hrodej and Gilbert Buti, in 2013 and 2016, I decided to continue the work of bibliography because many foreign works (Turkish, Portuguese, Danish, Norwegian, Spanish etc.), old or recent, were unknown to me and are honored in my list. This version is stopped on December 18, 2023. Compared to the version of 1 year ago, it includes around 6 more pages. However, everything is not there as the subject is vast. If there are any references that you know who are not hesitate to tell me.

En la literatura especializada en la historia Antigua de la Baleares el estudio de la piratería se ha restringido tradicionalmente al análisis de las causas de la intervención militar romana sobre Baliares (Mallorca y Menorca) del 123 a.C. Defendemos que la evidencia tanto material como de los textos clásicos apunta a que esta actividad fue ejercida desde las costas del archipiélago y en sus inmediaciones antes y después de esta fecha. Del mismo modo, en general, el análisis de la participación de los habitantes de las Baliares y Pityusae en la piratería es tratado como una incógnita irresoluble o restringido a una transcripción de las fuentes al respecto. Argumentamos que una visión más amplia lleva a la conclusión de que, como en el caso de otros pueblos costeros del Mediterráneo occidental, los indígenas de las islas practicaron y sufrieron estos asaltos durante la Antigüedad.

After the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BC, a hiatus in political authority occurred in the Mediterranean area. Due to its particular geography, this gap in authority converted Cilicia Trachea into a nest of pirates. As a result piracy spread as far as the western Mediterranean. This situation caused Roman merchants and the trading class tremendous losses. Roman reorganization following the defeat of the pirates in 67 BC brought with it a more stable economic situation. Thus agricultural reform could take place in the more fertile areas of Cilicia. The result was an increase in the production of wine and olive oil, which became the region’s main export items.

The article presents an episode in the history of the ancient city of Joppa (modern-day Tel-Aviv-Yafo) and the Jewish revolt, which took place in Judea between 66 and 74 CE. Despite the city’s destruction at the hands of Roman forces in the autumn of 66 CE, the area was retaken by the Jews in the summer of the following year. Its new inhabitants improvised a fleet to launch sea raids into neighbouring areas. The Roman response to these raids was a penal expedition against the city. It was not the might of the Roman army that put an end to the Jewish fleet, however, but a wind known as the Black Boreas. Joppa itself was again razed by the Romans, who placed a garrison there to prevent the
area from falling into the hands of Jewish insurgents.

This project examines the role that pirates, bandits and other ‘freelance men of violence’ played in the second and first centuries BC.  In this examination, I argue that the role of the ‘freelancer’ needs to be understood as a unified whole, not compartmentalized as three (or more) groups: pirates, bandits and mercenaries.  Throughout the work, I contend that their portrayal by the ancient writers dramatically affects the perceived legitimacy of their actions.  Most modern studies of banditry or piracy (e.g. de Souza 1999, Grünewald 1999, Pohl 1993, Knapp 2011) focus on the ‘real’ bandits and set aside the clear polemic.  I turn to the description and ask what semantic baggage words like latro or leistes carried that they were commonly used as part of invectives. How was freelance plundering considered dishonorable while blatant triumph-hunting was deemed honorable?

The freelancer was, in a form of ancient Realpolitik, generally more acceptable to states than our occasionally-stuffy aristocratic historians would prefer that we believe.  Moreover, states were far more concerned with control of these ‘freelancers’ than in their elimination. Overall, this dissertation shows that the chief semantic burden of terms like latro and leistes are to convey (il)legitimacy: individuals that possess power that they should not.  Condemnation of these figures is not rooted in their actions of plundering (rarely dissimilar from official acts of war) but rather their holding the power to do so in the first place.  In short, this study reveals that the ‘at-large’ soldier was a far more complex and influential character than is normally shown by either ancient or modern historians.

In Thursday's talk, I will focus on the depiction of Illyria and the Illyrians' failure to comply with a changing set of Roman rules.  I argue that the wars in Illyria provide some of the earliest evidence that Roman attitudes regarding the normal conduct of war were changing, despite later historians' insistence that no such thing was happening.

In antiquity, the lines between soldier, bandit and mercenary were blurred.  Soldiers could become foreign mercenaries; mercenaries could turn bandit; bandit groups could be hired as auxiliaries.  But in many cases, the term which our aristocratic historians chose to use was politically motivated. 
What were the concerns that these historians sought to explain with this terminology?  In some cases, they were ethnic—a desire to promote the discipline of civilized Greeks and Romans over the cheating ambuscades of German and Illyrian barbarians.  In other cases, they were intended to change the stature of the enemy—greater skill would be needed to fight an army of soldiers than a gang of bandits (even if they were the same people).  In still others, we see evidence of class conflicts—the poor, needing to be paid to provide service in wartime, were seen as less loyal to their country than those who had estates to support them.  This presentation will outline several examples of how the ancient historians ‘spun’ events through nomenclature to ensure history told the correct ‘truth’.

This article discusses the uprising of Anicetus, which took place during the so-called ‘Year of Four Emperors’ (68-69). The rebellion spread over the north-east part of the former Kingdom of Pontus, which had been previously incorporated into the Roman Empire by the emperor Nero. The uprising itself was quickly suppressed by the Roman forces in autumn 69.

One of the most interesting figures of Roman history with respect to the construction of historical memory is L. Licinius Lucullus. Although remarkable for his military success and appreciated for his generosity towards the inhabitants of the provinces subject to the Romans, which dedicated to him some inscriptions that are monumenta in his memory, his tendency to excess and extravagance was significantly recorded in certain literary sources producing a distinctly chiaroscuro portrait. The evaluation of his conduct seems contradictory already in Cicero who tends to denigrate Lucullus in some harangues for his rapacity but later praises his military success when convenient to do so for his own personal advantage. In addition, Cicero censures Lucullus in some ethical-political treatises written after the latter's death. Some of the oscillations in the evaluation of Lucullus can be attributed to the political conflicts of late-Republican Rome but his fame, judged in a favourable light by Augustus (ILS 60), underwent alternate phases which reveal the tendency to judge him by comparing him to Pompey (cf. Velleius Paterculus) and more generally to attempt to reconcile his image as brave leader with that of a deplorable member of the Senate. The dual nature of Lucullus was already clear in his biography by Plutarch, which reveals the perception of much conflicting information on his public and private life, which was also judged in different ways in the Imperial Age and in Late Antiquity. More generally, the analysis of passages concerning Lucullus reveals that the primary agents responsible for his chiaroscuro image were his contemporaries and political enemies and also provides the opportunity to observe the various historical, social and cultural factors, which together contributed to preserve the memory of a man who was more than his deplorable behaviour.

Rome, which had not dealt sufficiently with Asia Minor due to her internal problems and external threats at the end of the 2nd century, has turned her face again to the East considering the piracy as most urgent problem to be intervened, after famous statesman Marius overcomes these problems. Because piracy, which became widespread on the southern shores of Asia Minor during the period of Roman struggle against the external threats, expanded its influence as far as the shore of the Province of Asia. Therefore famous orator Marcus Antonius has set sail against the pirates with a fleet, which has substantially derived from Roman allies in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is observed that after the return of Marcus Antonius from the expedition, a wide range of legal regulations was conducted in Rome about the provinces and allies, which has been neglected for a long time, in Asia Minor and broadly in the east of Adriatic. In this law, called as the Lex de Provinciis Praetoriis, it is stated that the province of Cilicia has founded as a second Roman province in Asia Minor and Lycaonia will remain within the borders of Asian province. The article in the law indicating that these measures have been taken for the interests and safety of the Romans and also friends and allies of Rome in the Eastern Mediterranean, is particularly important. With this law, which seemingly introduced by popular politicians, who supported Marius at the peak of his power, Roman merchants and businessmen were protected on one hand, while the power of Rome was once more emphasized in Greek world, which was neglected for some time.

In 102 B.C.E., the Romans sent Marcus Antonius Orator to Cilicia with an army, opening a new theater of campaigns. The timing seems strange: in 102, Rome had a manpower shortage and Roman forces were still bogged down in Gaul, Sicily, and quite probably Africa. I argue that the beginning of Roman involvement in Cilicia was rooted in Roman reactions to the ongoing struggles in Sicily and a Roman perception (whether true or false) that the slave wars in Sicily were actually instigated by Easterners. Moreover, this perception continued to affect Rome’s legislation in and control of Cilicia for years afterward.

This article contrasts and compares the romance and the reality regarding ancient piracy, drawing on writings of Herodotus, Homer, Thucydides, Xenophon and Plutarch. The essential part of this paper is a juxtaposition of romanticised image perpetuated by classical authors such as Homer or Plutarch with the historical records of piratical life in antiquity. Moreover, Ormerod's pivotal work Piracy in the Ancient World is re-evaluated...

Rad ispituje prisustvo robova iz jadranskih oblasti u klasičnoj Grčkoj, kao prilog tekućoj debati o rasprostranjenosti i opštem značaju ilirskog gusarenja in prehelenističko doba. Tradicionalna istoriografija drži da je postojalo rašireno, zapravo "endemsko" gusarenje od strane Ilira vekovima pre potvrđenih aktivnosti ilirskih gusara u vreme kralja Agrona, u drugoj polovini III veka p.n.e. Ako je ovo zaista bio slučaj, očekivali bismo da je delovanje ovih gusara ostavilo značajan trag na trgovinu robovima u klasično doba. Međutim, ispitivanje raspoloživih izvora (stara atička komedija, prozna književnost, robovski natpisi iz Laurijskih rudnika, atičke stele, liste robova sa Hiosa, atinski pomorski katalozi itd.) pokazuje da je njihovo prisustvo bilo minimalno. Neki robovi poreklom iz Ilirije se spominju na atičkim stelama i praktično nigde drugde, a njihov broj je mali u poređenju sa masama anadolskih i tračkih robova. Sačuvani izvori impliciraju da nije postojao značajniji izvoz robova iz Ilirije u klasično doba i da je, shodno tome, i ilirsko gusarenje imalo relativno skromne razmere.

[Only Abstract Uploaded]
A common assertion in modern scholarship is that no triumphs could be celebrated for defeating bandits, slaves or pirates, no matter how important they were.  The ancient evidence, however, stems from a short passage of Valerius Maximus (2.8) and is loosely supported by Crassus failing to win a triumph over Spartacus and Pompey’s eastern triumph being reconfigured as a triumph over Mithridates.  As Valerius Maximus is elsewhere hostile to Pompey, this is hardly the strongest of evidence.
This paper calls into question whether this rule was in fact a true rule rather than an observation by Valerius (cf. Beard 2007 for a similar criticism) and further examines what glory and honor Roman commanders could gain from the defeat of such unsavoury foes.  In fact, it is readily apparent that many Romans sought out battles against such foes for the glory and prestige of the expected victory, for which victories an acclamation, a public thanksgiving, or an ovation were not celebrations to turn up one’s nose at lightly.
In re-examining the lesser military celebrations, I argue that many Romans of the first century, including famous figures like Pompey, Caesar, and Cicero, actively sought honor in defeating the dishonorable and public favor in defeating the nefarious, and thus sought to villainize the groups they fought against.  If regarded as unworthy of celebration, these politics of portrayal would be counterproductive.  Thus, I argue Valerius is not accurately representing the rules of the triumph (always a political football) but rather a romanticization of what he thought the rules should be based on the mores of his own day.

A short campaign in 123 BC brought the Balaeric Islands, off the coast of Spain, under Roman control.  Once a Carthaginian outpost and for a long time a recruiting ground for skilled slingers, the Balearics had otherwise been ignored since the Second Punic War.  The main accounts of this campaign are those of Florus and Strabo, though Florus was likely influenced by Livy and Strabo by Posidonios.  My paper takes these different accounts, and uses them to highlight the different motivations these writers had and how our sources sought to write history to prove or reflect their academic and moral theories.  In keeping with their motivations, Strabo sought to explain this war in a way that made sense to his ethnographic and geographic theories, while Florus sought to show how Rome stood as a great civilizer by building cities where there were none and eradicating piracy regardless of whether there was any piracy to eradicate.  In particular, it is interesting how the nature of pirates changes to suit the historians.
As Thucydides might have said, the causes of the campaign are uncertain, but the pretext was clear.  The inhabitants of the islands were either pirates themselves or were sheltering and trading with Ligurian pirates, and (Q. Caecilius) Metellus, the governor of nearer Spain, then invaded the islands.  There was little resistance, and Metellus, now ‘Balearicus’ founded two colonies, settling them with three thousand veterans gathered from Nearer Spain.
Strabo doubts the truth of this, and tells us that foreigners were jealous of the richness of their lands, and we know Metellus had both a force of soldiers at hand desirous of plunder and a family reputation to uphold.  This Metellus might even be guilty of the same sort of triumph-hunting Appian would accuse his cousin, Metellus Delmaticus, of pursuing in his campaign of 119.  According to Morgan (1969), any pirates Metellus sought were likely not the native Baleares, but Ligurians and Sardinians made homeless by recent campaigns in their homelands.  Moreover, the Massiliotes may have started the accusations of piracy, and, indeed, may well have been who Strabo (and Posidonius) had in mind when saying that ‘their lands had been lusted after for many years’.  For Morgan, these factors point to Strabo’s account as being truer and more nuanced than that of Florus.
I will not attempt to verify Morgan’s account, but rather, I would like to focus instead on our sources’ biases, which led to differing accounts.  Strabo clearly doubts that the Baleares were pirates, but is at pains elsewhere to emphasize that pirates come from impoverished locales and also that the Balearics were fertile lands.  Thus, the Baleares, if pirates, would prove to be an unpleasant counterexample to Strabo’s theory.  Strabo suggests instead that avarice led Metellus to fabricate charges against the Baleares.  Florus insists that they were pirates, and savage and cityless as well.  This is a surprising claim, as the Phoenicians had established a colony at Ibiza around five hundred years earlier.  Yet Florus regularly demonizes Rome’s enemies, particularly the Gauls, to show the benefit of Roman might and Roman rule.  Overall, his account is entirely in keeping with his imperialist agenda.
Interestingly, Florus does admit to the same pretext and cause as Strabo, however, when it comes to the 69-67 campaign in Crete by the nephew of Balearicus, Creticus. (1.42)  ...bellum...sola vincendi nobilem insulam cupiditas fecit.  If he was willing to attribute one island invasion to avarice, why not another?  So Florus implies that the Cretans did not deserve their invasion, but the Baleares did.  There is another key difference for the campaigns:  the Balearics are ‘unsettled’ while Crete possessed famed cities like Knossus and Kydonia.  The ‘cityless’ description of the Balearics has been overlooked, but is a feature stressed by Florus.  For Florus, the Romans’ introduction of the city to these islands is a great benefit that contrasts sharply with the Roman takeover of settled (and civilized) Crete.
This campaign serves as an excellent example of how history could serve an alternate agenda.  It is hardly surprising that different authors had different motivations, but understanding those motivations is quite useful.  In particular, these historians had different conceptions of civilization and piracy.  For Strabo, pirates committed piracy because of the poverty of their land, and thus, the Baleares was unsuitable to be so described.  For Florus, the Baleares were savages needing the nurturing influence of Roman rule.  The piracy then served for Florus as a proof of their savagery.