Biosecurity, Bioethics, Bioterrorism

While CRISPR-Cas genome editing technology has been heralded as a great ad- vancement for science, human health, bioengineering and medicine, there is a potential dark side of CRISPR genome editing that may be a greater danger to humanity than nuclear weapons. We present some of the more obvious poten- tial military and bioterrorism applications of CRISPR and related genome editing technology. CRISPR weapons have significant advantages over conventional nu- clear weapons. The balance of power based on mutual assured destruction cannot be maintained once CRISPR weapons enter the international arena. Disturbingly, because of the easy entrance to the technology, it opens the door for small organi- zations and countries to enter the international arms arena. The simplicity and ease of development of such weapons makes it essential that CRISPR genome editing technology be carefully applied and regulated.

The paper argues for the centrality of biosecurity education in contemporary national security discourses. It provides an overview of bioweapon and biowarfare from antiquity through modern warfare to the present time. It discusses two historical dual use scenarios—the syntheses of mousepox and poliovirus by life scientists— subsequently leading the dual use dilemma of biotechnology into the arena of public debate on national security. The author argues that given the ease of acquisition, weak control regime, and strategic effectiveness, biological weapons offer itself as the most attractive WMD and thus poses the greatest danger today. Biosecurity, therefore, becomes the greatest security priority. Against the background of the security challenges recent terrorism in the country, and the evident low level of preparedness of our security agencies, the paper posits that active promotion of biosecurity education may be the best approach to biodefense. It lays the responsibility of promoting biosecurity education first, on peace educators, security agencies, life scientists and policy makers as primary stakeholders in the security threat posed by the dual use dilemma of biotechnology to the nation and saddles them with the responsibility. It provides an overview of key document and programs for the promotion and awareness- raising on biosecurity education.

In a world where invasive alien species (IAS) are recognised as one of the major threats to biodiversity, leading scientists from five continents have come together to propose the concept of developing an international association for open knowledge and open data on IAS—termed " INVASIVESNET ". This new association will facilitate greater understanding and improved management of invasive alien species (IAS) and biological invasions globally, by developing a sustainable network of networks for effective knowledge exchange. In addition to their inclusion in the CBD Strategic Plan for Biodiversity, the increasing ecological, social, cultural and economic impacts associated with IAS have driven the development of multiple legal instruments and policies. This increases the need for greater coordination , cooperation , and information exchange among scientists, management, the community of practice and the public. INVASIVESNET will be formed by linking new and existing networks of interested stakeholders including international and national expert working groups and initiatives, individual scientists, database managers, thematic open access journals, environmental agencies, practitioners, managers, industry, non-government organisations, citizens and educational bodies. The association will develop technical tools and cyberinfrastructure for the collection, management and dissemination of data and information on IAS; create an effective communication platform for global stakeholders; and promote coordination and collaboration through international meetings, workshops, education, training and outreach. To date, the sustainability of many strategic national and international initiatives on IAS have unfortunately been hampered by time-limited grants or funding cycles. Recognising that IAS initiatives need to be globally coordinated and ongoing , we aim to develop a sustainable knowledge sharing association to connect the outputs of IAS research and to inform the consequential management and societal challenges arising from IAS introductions. INVASIVESNET will provide a dynamic and enduring network of networks to ensure the continuity of connections among the IAS community of practice, science and management.

This report focuses on the ethical and regulatory issues that arise in the biological sciences as a result of the dual use nature of research in these fields. On the one hand, biological research enables the creation of vaccines yet on the other the creation of new dangerous pathogens.

The Select Agent Program was one of the US government’s legal responses to the mail anthrax attacks in 2001 and to the perceived risks associated with recent developments in synthetic biology. A “select agent” is a microorganism or a toxin whose handling, transportation, and storage are controlled by federal laws. Since its inception, this regulatory framework has fostered opposition from biomedical researchers, partly because of its time-consuming features. As I argue here, however, grounds for resistance have also turned on whether there is anything specific to so-called “pathogenic organisms” that warrants their being classified as select agents. For, while providing a more complex picture of the microbial world, current dynamical perspectives on host-parasite interactions operate as a platform from which to criticize taxonomic lists of select agents. One such perspective, the damage-response framework, developed by immunologist and biosecurity expert Arturo Casadevall, reconceptualises host-agent interactions by situating pathogenicity on a continuum, rather than locating it in a specific structure of either the host or the parasite. This paper illustrates how the damage-response framework provides arguments for rejecting the Select Agent Program, often charged for being blind to biological variation as well as to the context-sensitive nature of infectious diseases and further explores how the threats of naturally emerging diseases and bioterrorism are intertwined by scientists intending to rationalize a relaxation of regulations. Finally, a discussion of the different forms of regulation relevant in this context is introduced. More generally, this article calls attention to ways in which biomedical concepts circulate between science and science policy, and how they shape scientific practices along the way.

We are experiencing a technical revolution in biotechnology that will change the way we live as much as any technological advance in human history. Advances in gene sequencing, gene editing, and gene synthesis have shifted our relationship with the building blocks of life. This new science, synthetic biology, is in its early stages but has already created distinct threats and opportunities in US national security. It promises advances in materials science, manufacturing, logistics, sensor technology, medicine, health care, and human augmentation while simultaneously increasing the possibility and severity of man-made pandemics through unintended consequences in genetic experiments or improved bioweapons. This article proposes a National Strategy for Synthetic Biology (NSSB) to defend the homeland and promote American strength by building security into synthetic biology and by making synthetic biology an investment priority. The United States can achieve greater security by regulating and controlling synthetic biology to prevent unintended consequences while investing in people and industries to maintain a security advantage in the field.

Terrorist attacks are increasingly becoming more lethal and less discriminate. The threat of bioterrorism is increasing daily. The ease of production and the broad availability of biological agents and technical know-how have led to a further spread of biological weapons and an increased desire among nations as well as terrorists to have them. Health professionals in emergency departments are expected to play crucial roles in the management of victims of bioterrorism when bioterrorism occurs. This study explored the knowledge, attitudes, and preparedness of emergency department nurses and medical officers (MOs) toward potential bioterrorist attacks in Ghana. This qualitative study utilized focus group discussions and semistructured interviews to explore the knowledge, attitudes, and preparedness of emergency department nurses and MOs toward potential bioterrorist attacks in Ghana. Data were subjected to a qualitative content analysis in which three main thematic categories were developed. These thematic categories are as follows: (a) differences in bioterrorism knowledge between emergency department nurses and emergency department MOs, (b) unprepared emergency department nurses and MOs for care during bioterrorism attacks, and (c) positive attitudes of emergency department nurses and MOs toward bioterrorism preparedness. Although emergency MOs had better knowledge of bioterrorism than their nursing counterparts , both groups of health professionals were unprepared to respond to any form of bioterrorism. Both nurses and MOs indicated the need for staff education and infrastructure readiness to be able to respond effectively to a bioterrorist attack. A well-prepared emergency department and health professionals against bioterrorism could prevent high casualty rates in a bioterrorist attack and also serve a dual purpose of dealing with other natural disasters when they occur.

A growing gap of distrust exists between the people and Western public health systems that grow more complex and antagonistic with each passing year. This distrust and antagonism has greatly accelerated with the arrival of a newly declared pandemic through the global proliferation of SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus and its new disease, COVID-19. The public health system relentlessly blames internet misinformation and conspiracy theories for the distrust, while much of the public cites a much deeper history and track record of medical incompetence, malpractice, corporate and political motivations, corruption, and years of dishonesty by the public health system that has been steadily unravelling for many decades with the rise of chronic disease predating the arrival of the internet. The science and medical industrial complex is rooted in a complex network of interrelationships both official and informal that function like a bureaucracy. These structures naturally bring together problematic elements such as egoic drives based on reputation, profiteering, political agendas, policy, prestige, peer-pressure, political correctness, corruption, intelligence, espionage, and many other obstacles that when left to fester and accumulate within such structures, will undoubtedly work in opposition to its initially-stated purpose of maintaining the health and well-being of its people. This paper will address some of the more intrinsic, causal factors that more appropriately address why so few trust the public health system, institutionalized science, and the medical industrial complex.

In debates over the regulation of communication related to dual-use research, we have to weigh the risks that such communication creates, against the value of scientific autonomy. The censorship of such communication seems justifiable in certain cases, given the potentially catastrophic applications of some dual-use research. But this conclusion gives rise to another kind of danger: that regulators will use overly simplistic cost-benefit reasoning to rationalise excessive regulation of scientific research. In response to this, we show how institutional design principles and normative frame-works from free speech theory can be used to help extend the argument for regulating dangerous dual-use research beyond overly simplistic cost-benefit reasoning, but without reverting to an implausibly absolutist view of scientific autonomy.

Through a case study of Egypt’s agri-food industry this paper examines biosecurity as a set of technologies, institutions, and practices that attempt to govern national agri-food industries and global agri-food trade by marrying a political economy perspective and an analysis of ‘nature–society relations’. Consistent with other agri-food industries in the global South, Egypt’s agri-food industry has undergone waves of corporate consolidation during the neoliberal period. By detailing the growth of the poultry industry and the endemic spread of HPAI H5N1 (avian flu), this paper presents an argument that the industry grew and consolidated through emergent and recurrent zoonotic and plant diseases, the management of which has been governed in part by biosecurity measures.

Biopolitics occupies a central role in contemporary debates over new political and governance strategies around the world. Based on the Hobbesian assumption of a “mutual relation between protection and obedience” the sovereign power of modern states seems to be founded with the purpose of the preservation and protection of life. But what happens if we look at the present pandemic, whereby governments are struggling against an “invisible enemy” to pursue this end, facing at the same time the problem of keeping up with the growth that sustains the wealth of our economies? Through the discussion of four contemporary, and often antagonistic, takes on biopolitics – Foucault’s understanding of biopower; Agamben’s critique of the logic of sovereignty; Esposito’s concept of immunitas; and Mbembe’s necropolitics – the aim of my paper will be to shed light on the theoretical implications of the pandemic for the foundations of political authority and the definition of modern sovereignty.

Adli laboratuvarlar, kimi zaman bir cinayetin zanlısını ortaya çıkaran, kimi zaman haksız mahkumiyetle sonuçlanabilecek bir olaya ışık tutan oldukça önemli çalışmaların yapıldığı alanlardır. Çalışılacak örneğin olay yerinden toplanmasından laboratuvara teslimine, laboratuvarda yürütülen çalışmalardan depolamaya kadar titizlikle çalışılır. Daha çok "Delil Güvenliği" prensibi ile çalışılan bu alanlarda biyogüvenliğin sağlanması oldukça önemlidir. Bu çalışma alanlarında olay yerlerinden toplanan örneklerin üzerinde ihtiva edebileceği patojenler ve babalık tayini gibi örnek alma işlemlerinde ortama, çalışana ve topluma bulaşabilecek patojenler ile mücadele için etkin çalışma yöntemleri gereklidir. Patojenlerin özelliklerine göre yüzeyde uzun süreler canlılığını sürdürebildiği, patojene özgü dezenfekte yöntemleri kullanılmadığında bir potansiyel risk olduğu çıkarımı yapılmıştır. Çalışan güvenliği önceliğe alınarak adli genetik laboratuvarı incelemesi yapılmıştır. Patojenlere kasıtsız olarak maruz kalmayı veya bunların yanlışlıkla salınmasını engellemek amacı ile iş akışı ele alınmış, güvenli laboratuvar ortamları oluşturabilmek için biyogüvenlik prensipleri oluşturulmuştur. Laboratuvar analizi yapılarak, "Hata Türü ve Etkileri Analizi" yöntemi ile bir risk değerlendirme çalışması yapılmıştır. Tespit edilen risk faktörlerine göre üç senaryo oluşturulmuştur. Birinci senaryo laboratuvar kurulum aşamasında alınması gereken tedbirleri içermektedir. İkinci senaryo, iş akışında biyolojik bulaşma meydana geldiğinde yapılması önerilen hususlardır. Üçüncü ise, çalışma alanında biyolojik ajan varlığının tespit edilebilmesi için çözüm yollarını içeren senaryodur. "Antikor Tabanlı Patojen Tanıma Sistemi" ve "Hidrojen Peroksik ve Gümüş Katyonlu İyon ile Dezenfeksiyon" için iki cihaz incelemesi yapılmıştır. Patojene özgü çalışmaların yürütülebilmesi amacı ile "Biyolojik Güvenlik Formu" oluşturulmuştur. Bu çalışma ile laboratuvara gelen delil torbasında ve laboratuvar ortamında bulunabilecek patojenlerin tespitinin uygulanabilirliği tartışılmıştır. Patojen varlığı tespit edilerek, patojene özgü alınacak tedbirlere yer verilmiştir. Delil torbasının açılması aşamasından, depolanma aşaması dahil olarak alınabilecek güvenlik tedbirlerine yeni bir bakış açısı sunulmuştur. Anahtar Kelimeler: Adli Genetik Laboratuvarı, Biyogüvenlik, , Biyolojik Ajan, İş Sağlığı ve Güvenliği

Forensic laboratories are areas where very important studies are carried out, sometimes revealing the suspect of a murder, sometimes shelighting an incident that could result in an wrongful conviction. From the collection of the sample from the scene to the delivery to the laboratory, from the work carried out in the laboratory to the storage, it is meticulously studied. It is very important to provide biosecurity in these areas, which are studied with the principle of "Evidence Security". In these areas of study, effective methods of working are required to combat pathogens that can infect the environment, the employee and society in sample processes such as pathogens and pater father determination, which can be contained on samples collected from crime scene. According to the characteristics of pathogens can maintain vitality on the surface for long times, patogen-specific disinfectant methods are not used, there is a potential risk was made. Employee safety was taken first and forensic genetics laboratory examination was carried out. In order to prevent unintentional exposure to pathogens or their accidental release, biosecurity principles have been established to create safe laboratory environments that have been addressed in the workflow. A risk assessment study was carried out with the method "Error Type and Effects Analysis" by laboratory analysis. Three scenarios were created according to the risk factors identified. The first scenario includes measures to be taken during the laboratory installation phase. The second scenario is recommended when biological corruption occurs in the workflow. The third is the scenario that includes solutions for detecting the presence of biological agents in the field of study. wo devices were examined for "Antibody Based Pathogen Recognition System" and "Disinfection with Hydrogen Peroxic and Silver Cation Ion". "Biological Safety Form" was established with the aim of carried out pathogen-specific studies. With this study, the applicability of the detection of pathogens that can be found in the evidence bag and laboratory environment that comes to the laboratory is discussed. By detecting the presence of pathogens, pathogen-specific measures are included. A new perspective has been presented on the security measures that can be taken from the opening stage of the evidence bag, including the storage phase. Keywords: Biosecurity, Forensic Genetics Laboratory, Biological Agent, Occupational Health and Safety

If our potential adversaries are understood, publicity drawing the attention of bioterrorists to plausible bioweapons is the primary contribution the NSABB makes by censorship recommendations. Attempting censorship by attracting the entire world’s attention to information of concern is obviously counterproductive.
It is equally problematic to curb research in an attempt to prevent those outside our borders from understanding how to create bioweapons. That horse is, “Out of the barn and in the next county”. Locking the barn door is not going to change this. Proliferation of molecular biology, vaccine and other knowledge across the world has already taken place. Thus, the best course is to make sure that we understand what human bioterrorists could do as well as we understand what nature can do. To date, nature has been the worst bioterrorist, but in theory human engineering can be worse.
Medicine is biodefense. The focus needs to be on response capability and surveillance, just as in any other infectious disease control. Attempting to track, outwit or contain terrorists should be left to clandestine intelligence services that are equipped to understand and interdict them. Perhaps it is true that such capabilities in our clandestine services are poorly developed or directed. The remedy for that, though, is to work to improve matters by prodding politicians rather than operate independently in attempts at interdiction that may be counterproductive. Science, law enforcement, the military and intelligence services need to work together and understand each other’s appropriate roles.

The rapid pace of life sciences innovations and a growing list of nontraditional actors engaging in biological research make it challenging to develop appropriate policies to protect sensitive infra- structures. To address this chal- lenge, we developed a five-day awareness program for security professionals, including laboratory work, site visits, and lectures.

In this article, we raise ethical concerns about the potential misuse of
open-source biology (OSB): biological research and development that progresses through an organisational model of radical openness, deskilling, and innovation. We compare this organisational structure to that of the open-source software model, and detail salient ethical implications of this model. We demonstrate that OSB, in virtue of its commitment to openness, may be resistant to governance attempts.

Scientific and technological developments in the fields of genetics and biomedicine lead to radical changes in the evolution of humanity. Among these changes there is a risk of biointellectual domination of the entire humankind by a social elite detached from existing social institutions and components, by self enriching, self supplying and self assuring, with new abilities much superior to common individuals, especially through nanogenetic technologic cultivation and selection. This special social category, little by little, as discreetly as possible, begins to gather all characteristics of new biological brunch. Such perturbations threaten for human individual independence and integrity and for family and group life, as
well as global peace and justice. Public opinion is at the beginning of the process of understanding possible negative results of a blind implementation of human genetic engineering.
In this context, it is necessary to found a new branch of bioethical science – political bioethics as an additional innovative bioethical dimension in the applied methodological arsenal of establishing and implementing the theory and practice of humanhood survival. Political bioethics appears as one of
bioethical branches, concerned with the study of different political aspects, implications and consequences of new biotechnological developments.
The biomoralization of political life concerns subordination to higher global imperatives of political will, social strategies and policies. It concerns as well the implementation of bioethical models by replacing and modernizing old non-coevolutive
approaches, values, attitudes in the relationship of human and nature with those which are in tiedconcordance with fundamental purpose of humankind survival.

To facilitate the rapid detection of a future bioterrorist attack, an increasing number of public health departments are investing in new surveillance systems that target the early manifestations of the bioterrorism-related disease. Whether this approach is likely to detect an epidemic sooner than reporting by alert clinicians remains unknown. The detection of a bioterrorism-related epidemic will depend on population characteristics, availability and use of health services, the nature of an attack, epidemiologic features of individual diseases, surveillance methods, and the capacity of health departments to respond to alerts. Predicting how these factors will combine in a bioterrorism attack may be impossible. Nevertheless, understanding their likely effect on epidemic detection should help define the usefulness of syndromic surveillance and identify approaches to increase the likelihood that clinicians recognize and report an epidemic

This article explores common organizational pressure points for ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence communities in their ability to understand, prevent and disrupt potential emerging bio-threats and risks. The acceleration in the
development of synthetic biology and biotechnology for legitimate markets (e.g. pharmaceuticals, food production and energy) is moving faster than current intelligence communities’ ability to identify and understand potential bio-threats and risks. The article surveys several political leadership and intelligence governance challenges responsible for the current sub-optimal development of health security intelligence capabilities and identifies possible policy suggestions to ameliorate challenges.

Access to scientific knowledge is a slippery slope in which the concept of dual-use research comes into play.  The scientific community's outcry for accessibility to publications has shined light on the rising issues surrounding censorship from various institutions and the underlying implications of dual-use research in regards to national security vs. academic freedom. I aim to suggest that a particular traditional 'top-down' approach in the traditional hierarchy of institutional research and publication is adverse in effect on the ethics of research censorship and offer policy revisions to remedy the structure.

Biological threats pose significant risks to national and international security. A deliberate release of biological agents whether by terrorist groups or individual perpetrators constitutes an immediate threat to the life and health of the people. Many biological agents can spread infectious diseases or cause illness in humans. In the 21 st century, infectious diseases are the second leading cause of death worldwide. Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic highlights the unsettled problems in the arena of biosecurity and health security. Moreover, the rapid development of biotechnology leads to an increased threat of biological weapons. Therefore, this article articulates how a state can effectively protect the health and life of its citizens from these threats. The main objective of this paper is to encapsulate the perilous weaknesses in existing preparedness for countering biological risks. Similarly, it explores the policies and capabilities of Pakistan for tackling the growing biological threats. Finally, this paper explores the severe gaps in policy for countering biological risks, particularly in Pakistan.

The article examines the moral questions that arise from the military use of enhancement
technologies and claims that emerging biotechnologies can help improve the attitudes and
capabilities of the soldiers without jeopardizing their integrity and humanity. Even if the
military use of enhancement technologies is considered ethically justifiable, our conclusion is
that soldiers should ever be compelled to take drugs or receive biotechnological treatments they
object to.

Amid the renewed concern in the last several years about the potential for life science research to facilitate the spread of disease, a central plank of the policy response has been to enact processes for assessing the risks and benefits of “research of concern.” The recent controversy regarding a proposed redaction of work on the modification of a H5N1 avian influenza virus is perhaps the most prominent such instance. And yet, a noteworthy feature of this case is its exceptionalness. In the last 10 years, life science publishers, funders, and labs have rarely identified any research as “of concern,” let alone proposed censors. This article takes this experience with risk assessment as an invitation for reflection. Reasons for the low number of instances of concern are related to how the biosecurity dimensions of the life sciences are identified, how they are described, how the assessments of benefits and risks are undertaken, how value considerations do and do not enter into assessments, as well as the lack of information on the outcomes of reviews. This argument builds on such considerations to examine the limitations and implications of the risk–benefit experiment of concern framing, the politics of expertise as well as the prospects for alternative responses.

In this paper, I use Sontag’s arguments to think about the man-made epidemic central to
Margaret Atwood’s MaddAddam Trilogy (2003-2013), in which an ingenious geneticist tries to
create a Utopia by synthesizing a virus to exterminate nearly all humans. I argue that this depiction
of bioterror and genocide has its roots in the 19th century, and it is linked to the appearance of
Epidemic Cholera and Terrorism in Literature. I will discuss similar plot devices in Well’s The
Stolen Bacillus (1893) and War of the Worlds (1898), and then pass to the depiction of epidemics as
tools of war, in Salgari’s La Rivincita di Yanez (1913), and genocide, in London’s The Unparalleled
Invasion (1912). Finally, I will explore the idea put forward by different scholars (Lamb 2016,
Totaro 2005, Gomel 2000) that, in Literature, the concepts of Utopia and Genocide – and,
increasingly in the Anthropocene, Biological Warfare - are profoundly linked.

Background

The widespread sharing of biological and biomedical data is recognised as a key element in facilitating translation of scientific discoveries into novel clinical applications and services. At the same time, twenty-first century states are increasingly concerned that this data could also be used for purposes of bioterrorism. There is thus a tension between the desire to promote the sharing of data, as encapsulated by the Open Data movement, and the desire to prevent this data from ‘falling into the wrong hands’ as represented by ‘dual use’ policies. Both frameworks posit a moral duty for life sciences researchers with respect to how they should make their data available. However, Open data and dual use concerns are rarely discussed in concert and their implementation can present scientists with potentially conflicting ethical requirements.


Discussion

Both dual use and Open data policies frame scientific data and data dissemination in particular, though different, ways. As such they contain implicit models for how data is translated. Both approaches are limited by a focus on abstract conceptions of data and data sharing. This works to impede consensus-building between the two ethical frameworks. As an alternative, this paper proposes that an ethics of responsible management of scientific data should be based on a more nuanced understanding of the everyday data practices of life scientists. Responsibility for these ‘micro-movements’ of data must consider the needs and duties of scientists as individuals and as collectively-organised groups.


Summary

Researchers in the life sciences are faced with conflicting ethical responsibilities to share data as widely as possible, but prevent it being used for bioterrorist purposes. In order to reconcile the responsibilities posed by the Open Data and dual use frameworks, approaches should focus more on the everyday practices of laboratory scientists and less on abstract conceptions of data.

En el año 1999, una micro-noticia circuló en varios diarios norteamericanos: “En el 2006, la Armada Americana (US Army) recibirá de la firma farmacéutica Dynaport, de Virginia, 300.000 dosis de vacuna contra la viruela”. Si ejercitamos ligeramente nuestra memoria, debemos recordar que el último caso de variola major (la forma más grave de la viruela) reportado por la Organización Mundial de la Salud (OMS) fue el 16 de octubre de 1975 en Bangladesh. Sin embargo, ya en los 70, se había declarado a la viruela como una enfermedad completamente erradicada...

Abstract
              The fear that terrorists will turn to weapons of mass destruction is real. Even before September 11, 2001, we were reminded that our security could be compromised. In 1995 we saw it in Tokyo with the deadly nerve gas, sarin, released in a crowded Tokyo subway. 1984 in The Dallas, Salmonella typhimurium was used by the Rajneeshee religious cult to contaminate restaurant salad bars and a city water-supply tank. About 751 people were poisoned during a one-month period.
            This article will elaborate on the role of the military medicine at Bioterrorism attack.      The aim of this study to describe the role of the military medicine to prevent  Bioterrorism attack
            Military Medicine took part in the fight against Bioterrorism from the current pre and post-attack Bioterrorist  and when attacking Bioterrorism,curative post Bioterrorism attack to do to hospitality and forensic process,decontamination area.
Keywords: , Bioterrorism ,War of terror ,Military Medicine.

This paper begins by outlining the origins of the concept of the dual-use dilemma and its manifestation in 21 st century discussions. The article subsequently highlights the limitations of this framing when thinking about the governance of dual-use issues. To this end, the paper examines the recent events surrounding the moratorium on H5N1 research and the subsequent re-evaluation of publication and information dissemination policies. It is hoped that this paper will introduce those working on the interface between science, policy and ethics to the complex and challenging nature of the dual-use issue. It is also hoped that this work will, in a modest way, contribute to the development of thinking in a way which de-emphasizes the idea of dual-use being an unresolvable (and perhaps ungovernable) ethical dilemma and encourages thinking about progressive approaches to minimizing the misuse potential of life sciences.