- Ferney-Voltaire, France
- Independent researcher / consultant at The Trench specialised in chemical and biological weapon armament and disarmament, terrorism and security policies.edit
The European Union Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium held its 11th Consultative Meeting in Brussels on 15 and 16 September 2022. Its central theme was the “Topicality of multilateral export control regimes”. On the second day,... more
The European Union Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium held its 11th Consultative Meeting in Brussels on 15 and 16 September 2022. Its central theme was the “Topicality of multilateral export control regimes”. On the second day, one of the four breakout sessions addressed the Australia Group, an informal arrangement coordinating technology transfer controls relating to dual-use agents and equipment with potential relevance for developing and producing chemical and biological weapons.
Introducers were Ms Esmée de Bruin (Netherlands), Dr Mónica Chinchilla (Spain) and Ms Élisande Nexon, PharmD (France). I had the honour of moderating the session.
The three speakers have different backgrounds, thus giving the session a distinct multidisciplinary flavour. Ms de Bruin, focusing on the effectiveness of export control regimes in general, approached the Australia Group from economic and international law angles. Dr Chinchilla, an expert in international law, saw in the practice of the Australia Group the emergence of soft law complementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), a near-universal global disarmament treaty. Ms Nexon, a Doctor of Pharmacy with expertise in biosecurity and biosafety and arms control and disarmament, addressed challenges to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) posed by the rapid advances in life sciences and biotechnology industries and how the Australia Group can help mitigating possible security risks. Their introductions engaged the approximately twenty session participants in rich discussions.
The present publication by the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique is the direct result of this breakout session. The different angles to the analysis of the Australia Group with reference to the BTWC and the CWC revealed interesting viewpoints about how an informal arrangement relates to formal and quasi-universal treaties comprehensively banning two discrete weapon categories. Other export control arrangements are either standalone initiatives (e.g. the Missile Technology Control Regime or the Wassenaar Arrangement) or, in the case of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, linked to a non-proliferation rather than disarmament treaty. One of the central questions that came to the fore was whether to try and achieve greater integration and coordination among the four export control arrangements. If so, how might this intent affect the Australia Group that had adjusted its mission to support both global disarmament treaties? The BTWC and the CWC each have an article on international cooperation, development and scientific and technology exchanges for peaceful purposes. During the 1990s and 2000s, many developing countries came to view the Australia Group’s activities as incompatible with the disarmament objectives.
The chapters in this publication are not the presentations made in September 2022. Instead, the authors reviewed their introductions in light of the discussions. They addressed how the Australia Group blends with the broader practice of responsible trade in dual-use commodities to prevent weapon proliferation while supporting the core disarmament goals of the BTWC and the CWC. The question relates to regime development, which in turn implies how the Australia Group can address challenges to its internal decision-making, future objectives and the ambition of global standard-setting concerning the adaptability of both conventions to emerging issues, on the one hand, and the work and experiences of the other export control arrangements given convergences in security matters, on the other hand.
An introductory chapter sets the stage for this discussion by describing the origin of the Australia Group, how its practices evolved, and how with the end of the Cold War the recasting of weapon control problems in terms of proliferation affected the CWC during the negotiation end game and its early implementation.
Jean Pascal Zanders (Ed.), The Australia Group and the prevention of the re-emergence of chemical and biological weapons – Ongoing challenges, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (Paris, April 2024), 54p. (PDF file)
Introducers were Ms Esmée de Bruin (Netherlands), Dr Mónica Chinchilla (Spain) and Ms Élisande Nexon, PharmD (France). I had the honour of moderating the session.
The three speakers have different backgrounds, thus giving the session a distinct multidisciplinary flavour. Ms de Bruin, focusing on the effectiveness of export control regimes in general, approached the Australia Group from economic and international law angles. Dr Chinchilla, an expert in international law, saw in the practice of the Australia Group the emergence of soft law complementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), a near-universal global disarmament treaty. Ms Nexon, a Doctor of Pharmacy with expertise in biosecurity and biosafety and arms control and disarmament, addressed challenges to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) posed by the rapid advances in life sciences and biotechnology industries and how the Australia Group can help mitigating possible security risks. Their introductions engaged the approximately twenty session participants in rich discussions.
The present publication by the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique is the direct result of this breakout session. The different angles to the analysis of the Australia Group with reference to the BTWC and the CWC revealed interesting viewpoints about how an informal arrangement relates to formal and quasi-universal treaties comprehensively banning two discrete weapon categories. Other export control arrangements are either standalone initiatives (e.g. the Missile Technology Control Regime or the Wassenaar Arrangement) or, in the case of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, linked to a non-proliferation rather than disarmament treaty. One of the central questions that came to the fore was whether to try and achieve greater integration and coordination among the four export control arrangements. If so, how might this intent affect the Australia Group that had adjusted its mission to support both global disarmament treaties? The BTWC and the CWC each have an article on international cooperation, development and scientific and technology exchanges for peaceful purposes. During the 1990s and 2000s, many developing countries came to view the Australia Group’s activities as incompatible with the disarmament objectives.
The chapters in this publication are not the presentations made in September 2022. Instead, the authors reviewed their introductions in light of the discussions. They addressed how the Australia Group blends with the broader practice of responsible trade in dual-use commodities to prevent weapon proliferation while supporting the core disarmament goals of the BTWC and the CWC. The question relates to regime development, which in turn implies how the Australia Group can address challenges to its internal decision-making, future objectives and the ambition of global standard-setting concerning the adaptability of both conventions to emerging issues, on the one hand, and the work and experiences of the other export control arrangements given convergences in security matters, on the other hand.
An introductory chapter sets the stage for this discussion by describing the origin of the Australia Group, how its practices evolved, and how with the end of the Cold War the recasting of weapon control problems in terms of proliferation affected the CWC during the negotiation end game and its early implementation.
Jean Pascal Zanders (Ed.), The Australia Group and the prevention of the re-emergence of chemical and biological weapons – Ongoing challenges, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (Paris, April 2024), 54p. (PDF file)
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The threat of biological disease has been significantly raised in the public consciousness in the past few years. Where previously state-run programmes were the most significant concern, increasingly policy makers are focusing on the... more
The threat of biological disease has been significantly raised in the public consciousness in the past few years. Where previously state-run programmes were the most significant concern, increasingly policy makers are focusing on the threat that access to biological weapons by non-state actors can pose. The establishment and maintenance of effective regimes to prevent the spread of biological weapons requires efforts by different actors at different levels. Civil society organizations can play an important role in mobilising public awareness and increasing knowledge on preventing the spread of biological weapons. The establishment of a specific network to further these aims - the Bioweapons Prevention Project - has given civil society organizations a clear focus and direction for their efforts.
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The changing relationship between the West and the Soviet Union contributed directly to the origination and unfolding of the Kuwait crisis. The rapidly receding threat from the East also demanded a major review of the Western military... more
The changing relationship between the West and the Soviet Union contributed directly to the origination and unfolding of the Kuwait crisis. The rapidly receding threat from the East also demanded a major review of the Western military posture on the one hand and political consultation between governments and organisations on the other. Not in the least, institutional survival of many structures, both active or in virtual hibernation, was at stake. The second Gulf war caught them unprepared to play a significant role. In 1990, the new Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals had two platforms for consultations between East and West, namely the Council of Europe and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Neither contributed significantly to the management of the Kuwait crisis. In fact, that management was - except for the USSR’s specific role - characterised by a US-led division of labour with each Western country participating individually. Even the United Kingdom and France had little choice but to place themselves under American command. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) played an atypical role during the entire crisis. Created specifically to meet military aggression from Communist East Europe, its application of force was territorially limited. NATO-led operations were thus only conceivable in case of Iraqi attacks against Turkey and then only to restore Turkey’s territorial integrity. Nonetheless, divisions assigned to NATO and stationed in Germany participated in the liberation of Kuwait. Always remaining under national control, their transfer to the Gulf, in a sense, compared with Washington’s relocation of troops and equipment to the Vietnam theatre of war more than two decades earlier. Bilateral agreements with NATO partners furthermore enabled the United States to mount air strikes against Iraq from within Europe. By contrast, the smaller European NATO member-states had to coordinate their military contribution within the West European Union (WEU), whose charter did not impose any territorial limitations on interventions. If anything, the Gulf crisis proved that the complexity of consultations among the different, but partially overlapping political and security organisations may constitute a serious handicap should Europe ever be forced to respond decisively to an external security threat.
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Research Interests: Biochemistry, Bioinformatics, Evolutionary Biology, Environmental Science, Developmental Biology, and 15 moreClimate Change, Computational Biology, Biotechnology, Cancer, Biology, Cell Cycle, Ecology, Drug Discovery, Evolution, Astrophysics, Functional Genomics, Astronomy, DNA, Cell Signalling, and Earth Science
On 16 March 1990, the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) and the Groupe de Recherche et d'Information sur la Paix (GRIP) organized the 2nd Annual Conference on Chemical Warfare on the theme: "Chemical Weapons Proliferation:... more
On 16 March 1990, the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) and the Groupe de Recherche et d'Information sur la Paix (GRIP) organized the 2nd Annual Conference on Chemical Warfare on the theme: "Chemical Weapons Proliferation: Policy Issues Pending an International Treaty". The crisis over the chemical production plant at Rabta in Libya (1989) pointed to the alarming extent of the problem of chemical weapons proliferation. To curb the transfer of production facilities and raw materials for chemical weapons, export controls are needed on international and national levels. The accent of the Brussels conference was on problems involving the implementation of such control mechanisms. The first part of the present publication analyses the mechanisms behind the Imhausen/Rabta affair and the way in which the government of the Federal Republic of Germany reacted to international pressure. Both in the Federal Republic and in Belgium new export controls have been promulgated since the conference. These developments explain why these proceedings have not been published earlier, as we wanted to include the latest legislative measures. We are extremely grateful to Joachim Badelt of the Berghof-Stiftung in Berlin for writing - at short notice - the second chapter After the Imhausen/Rabta Case late last year. In the second part of this book, which contains the actual proceedings of the conference, the chapter Belgium as a Transiting Country in the Imhausen-Rabta Affair has also been updated.
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I have accepted the nuclear winter scenario ever since the possibility was first raised in the mid 1980s by eminent scientists like Paul R. Ehrlich, Carl Sagan and many others. They also launched the debate a few years after Luis and... more
I have accepted the nuclear winter scenario ever since the possibility was first raised in the mid 1980s by eminent scientists like Paul R. Ehrlich, Carl Sagan and many others. They also launched the debate a few years after Luis and Walter Alvarez suggested that a massive meteor strike killed off the dinosaurs some 65 million years ago. This theory contained many elements that were to become central in a nuclear winter scenario. They also launched the debate when the Reagan administration was openly considering limited nuclear warfare. Like Seth Baum I accept that nuclear weapons still occupy a central position in the military doctrine of several nations and that, as a consequence, their removal from military arsenals is not a given. Alternative options to security must therefore be identified and developed. After all, nobody will be served well by an increased risk of non-nuclear war. If armament is about the assimilation of a particular type of technology into military doctrine, then disarmament’s main purpose is to remove it again. Disarmament is the continuation of security policies through alternative, non-prohibited means. These may include diplomacy, alliance politics, security guarantees and reliance on verification tools, but also the replacement of the arms category by other types of non-prohibited weaponry. In an arms control setting, in which levels of armament are managed by mutual consent, reductions can similarly be compensated by armament in other areas. Baum explores the latter track. However, he errs by entertaining options that are unambiguously proscribed under international law His concerns about the future of humanity have led him to consider chemical or biological weapons as deterrence substitutes. The suggestion implies an intellectual acceptance of the prior abrogation of the Biological and Toxin and Chemical Weapons Conventions in order to avoid the (hypothetical) risk of a nuclear winter. This clearly sits awkward with him, but his overwhelming fears for the future of humankind prevent him from rejecting the thought.
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In November 2019, a new series of annual one-week meetings began to eliminate non-conventional arms – essentially nuclear weapons, and to a lesser extent chemical and biological weapons (CBW) – from the arsenals in the Middle East. It... more
In November 2019, a new series of annual one-week meetings began to eliminate non-conventional arms – essentially nuclear weapons, and to a lesser extent chemical and biological weapons (CBW) – from the arsenals in the Middle East. It followed the acceptance of Egypt’s proposal for a new conference by the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on 22 December 2018. The new Conference derives its mandate from the Resolution on the Middle East, adopted at the 1995 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Besides expanding the original idea of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) to one that would also cover CBW, it also requires the regional disarmament initiative to be verifiable. This enlarged scope for regional disarmament in the Middle East presents significant challenges for the negotiating parties. While the NWFZ primarily addressed security relationships with Israel, chemical weapons and their past and present use in the Middle East affect other regional fault lines. This article traces how CBW were inserted into the objective of a NWFZ for the Middle East. It then discusses the legal regimes governing CBW, their status in the region and implications for a regional zone exempt from non-conventional weaponry. The demand for effective verification poses multiple challenges because of the processes in the CBW disarmament treaties. The paper finally discusses steps the Conference could consider for building trust and confidence while negotiating the regional treaty framework.
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... For reasons first articulated before the BWC was negotiated, devising verification procedures for the bioweapons ban remains a ... 2545, <www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib/TNA12-TuckerZilinskas.pdf>; and Margaret Kosal,... more
... For reasons first articulated before the BWC was negotiated, devising verification procedures for the bioweapons ban remains a ... 2545, <www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib/TNA12-TuckerZilinskas.pdf>; and Margaret Kosal, Nanotechnology for Chemical and Biological Defense ...
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ABSTRACT
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Si l’armement est un processus par lequel un materiel militaire donne est assimile par la doctrine militaire d’un pays, alors le desarmement est d’abord et surtout la disparition dudit materiel de la doctrine militaire. Le desarmement... more
Si l’armement est un processus par lequel un materiel militaire donne est assimile par la doctrine militaire d’un pays, alors le desarmement est d’abord et surtout la disparition dudit materiel de la doctrine militaire. Le desarmement bilateral et multilateral peut avoir lieu lorsqu’un type particulier d’armement s’est vu conferer des fonctions doctrinales equivalentes dans les pays concernes. Mais une telle equivalence doctrinale peut etre fugace, et si elle vient a disparaitre, les chances du desarmement en seront compromises. Tels sont les defis que cet article se propose d’evoquer en se concentrant sur la Convention sur les armes biologiques et les toxines et sur la Convention sur les armes chimiques.
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Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Shortly afterwards, it escalated a decade-old, low-level disinformation campaign about biological activities in Ukraine funded by the United States that Russia claims violate the 1972 Biological... more
Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Shortly afterwards, it escalated a decade-old, low-level disinformation campaign about biological activities in Ukraine funded by the United States that Russia claims violate the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). Using documents supposedly recovered from captured Ukrainian laboratories, Russia presented its case to the public and several times to the United Nations Security Council. It then triggered BWC provisions to convene a formal consultative meeting (FCM) of states parties and to lodge a complaint with the Security Council. This paper describes how Russia sustained its low-level information warfare strategy against Ukraine before taking its accusations to the Security Council for the first time in 2022. It analyses how BWC states parties addressed the allegations in the FCM and how Security Council members blocked Russia's attempt to set up an international investigation. It considers several implications for the BWC of Russia's manoeuvres and the international community's responses. The paper ends with recommendations for the European Union (EU) aimed at helping the EU in its efforts to main tain BWC-related disarmament and non-proliferation standards and in countering disinformation.
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Article V of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) foresees in consultation and cooperation among states parties to address any problem concerning the implementation of the disarmament treaty. The First BTWC Review... more
Article V of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) foresees in consultation and cooperation among states parties to address any problem concerning the implementation of the disarmament treaty. The First BTWC Review Conference (1980) agreed on the concept of a consultative meeting at the expert level and the Second and Third Review Conferences (1986 and 1991 respectively) developed and consolidated procedures to concretely implement Article V. Under them, a state party can also request clarification about an issue of concern in relation to the objective or application of one or more treaty provisions. Such a request, a state party should address to the BTWC co-depositaries, namely the Russian Federation (as successor to the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom and the United States. Furthermore, states parties have repeatedly reaffirmed at review conferences – most recently at the 8th Review Conference (2016) – that any allegation of a breach of the BTWC obligation should receive a specific and timely response from the state concerned.
On 29 June 2022, the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations in Geneva sent a Note verbale to its UK counterpart reiterating its ‘outstanding questions to the United States and Ukraine concerning the fulfilment of their obligations under the Convention in the context of operation of biological laboratories in the Ukrainian territory’. Because it received no replies from the US and Ukraine in bilateral consultations, it thus requested the convening of a formal consultative meeting to be held in Geneva from 18 to 22 July. Following an informal meeting on 27 July, this consultative meeting, to be chaired by Ambassador György Molnár of Hungary, will open formally on 26 August and then take place on 5, 6, 7 and 9 September (the 8th being a UN holiday).
This is only the second time a state party has called for a formal Article V consultative meeting since the BTWC’s entry into force 47 years ago. In 1997 Cuba requested such a meeting following its allegation that the previous year the US had released insect pests from a plane crossing the island resulting in serious economic damage. While today the US is again the subject of an accusation, the situation is considerably different. First, one depositary state is accusing another depositary state of a significant treaty breach. Second, both countries are permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC). And finally, questions can be raised how Russia may or can proceed if the forthcoming consultative meeting fails to allay its concerns. Article VI, 1 foresees in the lodging of a complaint to the UNSC. However, Moscow already brought the matter three times before the UNSC earlier this year. In each instance, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) affirmed that it has no indications to support Russia’s allegations of BTWC violations by the US or Ukraine.
On 29 June 2022, the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations in Geneva sent a Note verbale to its UK counterpart reiterating its ‘outstanding questions to the United States and Ukraine concerning the fulfilment of their obligations under the Convention in the context of operation of biological laboratories in the Ukrainian territory’. Because it received no replies from the US and Ukraine in bilateral consultations, it thus requested the convening of a formal consultative meeting to be held in Geneva from 18 to 22 July. Following an informal meeting on 27 July, this consultative meeting, to be chaired by Ambassador György Molnár of Hungary, will open formally on 26 August and then take place on 5, 6, 7 and 9 September (the 8th being a UN holiday).
This is only the second time a state party has called for a formal Article V consultative meeting since the BTWC’s entry into force 47 years ago. In 1997 Cuba requested such a meeting following its allegation that the previous year the US had released insect pests from a plane crossing the island resulting in serious economic damage. While today the US is again the subject of an accusation, the situation is considerably different. First, one depositary state is accusing another depositary state of a significant treaty breach. Second, both countries are permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC). And finally, questions can be raised how Russia may or can proceed if the forthcoming consultative meeting fails to allay its concerns. Article VI, 1 foresees in the lodging of a complaint to the UNSC. However, Moscow already brought the matter three times before the UNSC earlier this year. In each instance, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) affirmed that it has no indications to support Russia’s allegations of BTWC violations by the US or Ukraine.
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By Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack A WORKING PAPER SERIES ON THE HISTORY OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ISSUE # 4 Following Iraq’s defeat after its aggression against Kuwait, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted resolutions 687 (1991) and... more
By Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack
A WORKING PAPER SERIES ON THE HISTORY OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ISSUE # 4
Following Iraq’s defeat after its aggression against Kuwait, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted resolutions 687 (1991) and 715 (1991). They foresaw verification activities based on two pillars: disarmament validation and ongoing monitoring. Disarmament validation sought to verify that all prohibited weapons, items, materials and facilities in Iraq were destroyed or rendered harmless. The second pillar consisted of establishing and operating ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) to continuously ascertain that Iraq did not divert non-proscribed assets to reconstitute or start prohibited activities.
In her conclusions, Kraatz-Wadsack writes that from 1995 to 1998, UNSCOM established and operated an effective biological monitoring system that deterred Iraq from restarting proscribed activities. Although it was the first one ever, UNSCOM succeeded in achieving the objectives of its monitoring mandate as no evidence has ever been uncovered of any prohibited biological activity in Iraq during the period of monitoring.
The monitoring and verification experience in Iraq illustrates that in-country verification, especially through on-site inspections could generate more timely and more accurate information than from any other source and could also serve as the strongest deterrent to proscribed activities.
A WORKING PAPER SERIES ON THE HISTORY OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ISSUE # 4
Following Iraq’s defeat after its aggression against Kuwait, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted resolutions 687 (1991) and 715 (1991). They foresaw verification activities based on two pillars: disarmament validation and ongoing monitoring. Disarmament validation sought to verify that all prohibited weapons, items, materials and facilities in Iraq were destroyed or rendered harmless. The second pillar consisted of establishing and operating ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) to continuously ascertain that Iraq did not divert non-proscribed assets to reconstitute or start prohibited activities.
In her conclusions, Kraatz-Wadsack writes that from 1995 to 1998, UNSCOM established and operated an effective biological monitoring system that deterred Iraq from restarting proscribed activities. Although it was the first one ever, UNSCOM succeeded in achieving the objectives of its monitoring mandate as no evidence has ever been uncovered of any prohibited biological activity in Iraq during the period of monitoring.
The monitoring and verification experience in Iraq illustrates that in-country verification, especially through on-site inspections could generate more timely and more accurate information than from any other source and could also serve as the strongest deterrent to proscribed activities.
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By Robert Mathews A WORKING PAPER SERIES ON THE HISTORY OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ISSUE # 3 In the optimistic days following the conclusion of the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1992, the CWC was seen... more
By Robert Mathews
A WORKING PAPER SERIES ON THE HISTORY OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ISSUE # 3
In the optimistic days following the conclusion of the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1992, the CWC was seen as something of a case study for future approaches to arms control and disarmament. After the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the CWC was the second multilateral treaty designed to destroy an entire class of weapons, but the first to include a comprehensive verification system. Together with the euphoria following the end of the Cold War, this success generated a sense of optimism about concluding new arms control treaties and improving existing treaties.
Thus, many within the disarmament community felt that the time was right to negotiate a legally binding instrument that would strengthen the BTWC, agreed twenty years earlier with no verification measures. They intended to use the CWC verification provisions as a ‘blueprint’ for a verification mechanism to be included in a broader legally binding protocol to the BTWC. This negotiation process commenced with the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint (VEREX). Following the 1994 Special Conference, states parties established an Ad Hoc Group (AHG) to negotiate a legally binding protocol to the BTWC.
When the AHG began its work in January 1995, some negotiators were sufficiently optimistic to consider that they might conclude the protocol prior to the Fourth BTWC Review Conference, scheduled for late 1996. Notwithstanding, more than 6 years later, in August 2001, the AHG negotiations had come to a grinding halt without an agreed protocol. And subsequent efforts by some BTWC states parties to recommence negotiations, including during the Seventh Review Conference in 2011, have also failed to succeed.
This article commences with a review of the negotiation of the BTWC, including the early rationalisations that led to a BTWC without verification provisions. It then briefly discusses the unsuccessful efforts to strengthen the BTWC through the efforts to negotiate a protocol which would have included verification provisions. Next, it considers the unsuccessful attempts of several states parties to have this divisive issue reconsidered in the lead-up to and during the Seventh BTWC Review Conference in 2011. The article finally considers whether there may be value in attempting to revisit these issues during the 9th Review Conference scheduled for 2022, more than 25 years after the establishment of the AHG, with the aim of either achieving a strengthened BTWC through a protocol, or whether states parties should consider less ambitious procedures to strengthen the convention.
A WORKING PAPER SERIES ON THE HISTORY OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ISSUE # 3
In the optimistic days following the conclusion of the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1992, the CWC was seen as something of a case study for future approaches to arms control and disarmament. After the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the CWC was the second multilateral treaty designed to destroy an entire class of weapons, but the first to include a comprehensive verification system. Together with the euphoria following the end of the Cold War, this success generated a sense of optimism about concluding new arms control treaties and improving existing treaties.
Thus, many within the disarmament community felt that the time was right to negotiate a legally binding instrument that would strengthen the BTWC, agreed twenty years earlier with no verification measures. They intended to use the CWC verification provisions as a ‘blueprint’ for a verification mechanism to be included in a broader legally binding protocol to the BTWC. This negotiation process commenced with the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint (VEREX). Following the 1994 Special Conference, states parties established an Ad Hoc Group (AHG) to negotiate a legally binding protocol to the BTWC.
When the AHG began its work in January 1995, some negotiators were sufficiently optimistic to consider that they might conclude the protocol prior to the Fourth BTWC Review Conference, scheduled for late 1996. Notwithstanding, more than 6 years later, in August 2001, the AHG negotiations had come to a grinding halt without an agreed protocol. And subsequent efforts by some BTWC states parties to recommence negotiations, including during the Seventh Review Conference in 2011, have also failed to succeed.
This article commences with a review of the negotiation of the BTWC, including the early rationalisations that led to a BTWC without verification provisions. It then briefly discusses the unsuccessful efforts to strengthen the BTWC through the efforts to negotiate a protocol which would have included verification provisions. Next, it considers the unsuccessful attempts of several states parties to have this divisive issue reconsidered in the lead-up to and during the Seventh BTWC Review Conference in 2011. The article finally considers whether there may be value in attempting to revisit these issues during the 9th Review Conference scheduled for 2022, more than 25 years after the establishment of the AHG, with the aim of either achieving a strengthened BTWC through a protocol, or whether states parties should consider less ambitious procedures to strengthen the convention.
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In November 2019, a new series of annual one-week meetings began to eliminate non-conventional arms – essentially nuclear weapons, and to a lesser extent chemical and biological weapons (CBW) – from the arsenals in the Middle East. It... more
In November 2019, a new series of annual one-week meetings began to eliminate non-conventional arms – essentially nuclear weapons, and to a lesser extent chemical and biological weapons (CBW) – from the arsenals in the Middle East. It followed the acceptance of Egypt’s proposal for a new conference by the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on 22 December 2018. The new Conference derives its mandate from the Resolution on the Middle East, adopted at the 1995 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Besides expanding the original idea of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) to one that would also cover CBW, it also requires the regional disarmament initiative to be verifiable. This enlarged scope for regional disarmament in the Middle East presents significant challenges for the negotiating parties. While the NWFZ primarily addressed security relationships with Israel, chemical weapons and their past and present use in the Middle East affect other regional fault lines. This article traces how CBW were inserted into the objective of a NWFZ for the Middle East. It then discusses the legal regimes governing CBW, their status in the region and implications for a regional zone exempt from non-conventional weaponry. The demand for effective verification poses multiple challenges because of the processes in the CBW disarmament treaties. The paper finally discusses steps the Conference could consider for building trust and confidence while negotiating the regional treaty framework.
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In November 2019, a new series of annual one-week meetings began to eliminate non-conventional arms – essentially nuclear weapons, and to a lesser extent chemical and biological weapons (CBW) – from the arsenals in the Middle East. It... more
In November 2019, a new series of annual one-week meetings began to eliminate non-conventional arms – essentially nuclear weapons, and to a lesser extent chemical and biological weapons (CBW) – from the arsenals in the Middle East. It followed the acceptance of Egypt’s proposal for a new conference by the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on 22 December 2018. The new Conference derives its mandate from the Resolution on the Middle East, adopted at the 1995 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Besides expanding the original idea of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) to one that would also cover CBW, it also requires the regional disarmament initiative to be verifiable. This enlarged scope for regional disarmament in the Middle East presents significant challenges for the negotiating parties. While the NWFZ primarily addressed security relationships with Israel, chemical weapons and their past and present use in the Middle East affect other regional fault lines. This article traces how CBW were inserted into the objective of a NWFZ for the Middle East. It then discusses the legal regimes governing CBW, their status in the region and implications for a regional zone exempt from non-conventional weaponry. The demand for effective verification poses multiple challenges because of the processes in the CBW disarmament treaties. The paper finally discusses steps the Conference could consider for building trust and confidence while negotiating the regional treaty framework.
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In the early 20th century, the emerging branch of military history picked up on the possible role of Mongol artillery in the Black Death #pandemic . As de Mussi was the only source for such a claim, authors established the plausibility of... more
In the early 20th century, the emerging branch of military history picked up on the possible role of Mongol artillery in the Black Death #pandemic . As de Mussi was the only source for such a claim, authors established the plausibility of the allegation by focussing on three areas, namely the availability of the military technology capable of launching cadavers over city walls, the commonality of catapulting cadavers in medieval siege #warfare, and the geography surrounding Caffa that precluded the natural introduction of the plague into the city by rats.
Although those researchers initially assumed de Mussi’s presence in the Crimean trading post, later they determined that his location did not materially affect their focus of interest, namely the claim of early biological warfare. However, establishing the plausibility of certain circumstances that might have enabled a certain event to take place still does not prove that the event happened.
The second issue of Historical Notes looks deeper into the claim that the catapulting of human or animal corpses was a fairly common practice in medieval warfare aiming to provoke disease outbreaks in besieged castles or cities. European, Muslim and Asian literary sources mention the use of body parts and cadavers as artillery projectiles without suggesting that it ever became conventionalised as a method of combat. Passages may point to a singular incident or describe a small barrage. Overall, the sparsity of references suggests a rare practice.
The opportunity to project body parts or whole cadavers depended on then available weapon technology. Two types of trebuchet are central to the present discussion, namely the mangonel or traction trebuchet using rope pullers, and the counterweight trebuchet relying on gravity for dropping the counterpoise.
All descriptions of hurtling body parts before the 14th century concern heads of decapitated individuals. This is essentially an expected situation because of the limited throw weight of mangonels. With one exception, no narrative suggesting the projecting of complete corpses precedes the start of the Hundred Years’ War in 1337. By then, counterweight trebuchets were attaining their maximal destructive power.
Although those researchers initially assumed de Mussi’s presence in the Crimean trading post, later they determined that his location did not materially affect their focus of interest, namely the claim of early biological warfare. However, establishing the plausibility of certain circumstances that might have enabled a certain event to take place still does not prove that the event happened.
The second issue of Historical Notes looks deeper into the claim that the catapulting of human or animal corpses was a fairly common practice in medieval warfare aiming to provoke disease outbreaks in besieged castles or cities. European, Muslim and Asian literary sources mention the use of body parts and cadavers as artillery projectiles without suggesting that it ever became conventionalised as a method of combat. Passages may point to a singular incident or describe a small barrage. Overall, the sparsity of references suggests a rare practice.
The opportunity to project body parts or whole cadavers depended on then available weapon technology. Two types of trebuchet are central to the present discussion, namely the mangonel or traction trebuchet using rope pullers, and the counterweight trebuchet relying on gravity for dropping the counterpoise.
All descriptions of hurtling body parts before the 14th century concern heads of decapitated individuals. This is essentially an expected situation because of the limited throw weight of mangonels. With one exception, no narrative suggesting the projecting of complete corpses precedes the start of the Hundred Years’ War in 1337. By then, counterweight trebuchets were attaining their maximal destructive power.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
The spectre of the deliberate use of disease in war has long haunted humankind. The biological warfare threat became more realistic after the terrorist attacks against New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. Not only did the... more
The spectre of the deliberate use of disease in war has long haunted humankind. The biological warfare threat became more realistic after the terrorist attacks against New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. Not only did the terrorists demonstrate that they were prepared to murder large numbers of people indiscriminately, they also exposed the vulnerability of many societies. The sense of vulnerability was increased by attacks in the United States with letters containing anthrax bacteria, which killed several people and infected many more. Against this background the Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Bio- logical) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC) convened in Geneva on 19 November 2001. One of its main tasks was to evaluate the functioning of the treaty in the light of scientific and technological developments. Biotechnology has expanded rapidly in the past three decades—offering the prospect of a better quality of life—but it can be applied to design new types of bio- logical weapons (BW). This raises concern as to whether the BTWC is sufficiently comprehensive to cover these developments.
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The changing relationship between the West and the Soviet Union contributed directly to the origination and unfolding of the Kuwait crisis. The rapidly receding threat from the East also demanded a major review of the Western military... more
The changing relationship between the West and the Soviet Union contributed directly to the origination and unfolding of the Kuwait crisis. The rapidly receding threat from the East also demanded a major review of the Western military posture on the one hand and political consultation between governments and organisations on the other. Not in the least, institutional survival of many structures, both active or in virtual hibernation, was at stake. The second Gulf war caught them unprepared to play a significant role. In 1990, the new Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals had two platforms for consultations between East and West, namely the Council of Europe and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Neither contributed significantly to the management of the Kuwait crisis. In fact, that management was - except for the USSR’s specific role - characterised by a US-led division of labour with each Western country participating individually. Even the United Kingdom and France had little choice but to place themselves under American command. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) played an atypical role during the entire crisis. Created specifically to meet military aggression from Communist East Europe, its application of force was territorially limited. NATO-led operations were thus only conceivable in case of Iraqi attacks against Turkey and then only to restore Turkey’s territorial integrity. Nonetheless, divisions assigned to NATO and stationed in Germany participated in the liberation of Kuwait. Always remaining under national control, their transfer to the Gulf, in a sense, compared with Washington’s relocation of troops and equipment to the Vietnam theatre of war more than two decades earlier. Bilateral agreements with NATO partners furthermore enabled the United States to mount air strikes against Iraq from within Europe. By contrast, the smaller European NATO member-states had to coordinate their military contribution within the West European Union (WEU), whose charter did not impose any territorial limitations on interventions. If anything, the Gulf crisis proved that the complexity of consultations among the different, but partially overlapping political and security organisations may constitute a serious handicap should Europe ever be forced to respond decisively to an external security threat.
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Chemical-warfare weapons (CWW) proliferation began topping the security agenda during the past decade and was, in the words of one analyst, "rapidly becoming the most serious threat to world peace". The newly perceived threat led to an... more
Chemical-warfare weapons (CWW) proliferation began topping the security agenda during the past decade and was, in the words of one analyst, "rapidly becoming the most serious threat to world peace". The newly perceived threat led to an explosion of learned and not-so-learned analyses. Yet, virtually nobody deemed it necessary to define what actually constitutes CWW proliferation. Such an observation is even more striking because these authors discuss the attraction of CWW under certain circumstances as well as the number and identity of states suggested by officials based on classified, and therefore essentially unverifiable, information. Moreover, they often propose policy alternatives to counter the developing threat. Must we therefore assume a common understanding or consensus of what proliferation is? The debate originated and evolved in a highly ideologized environment of growing political pressure as well as heavy opposition in the United States to resume CWW production. East-West relations had deteriorated significantly. US allegations of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) activities by the Soviet Union and its client states were either taken as proof of wilful Soviet deceit in international relations and disarmament negotiations or met with considerable scepticism. The coincidence of US allegations of CBW in Third World conflicts and the domestic debate to begin the production of binary chemical munitions was not lost on Europe either, resulting in much suspicion regarding Washington's agenda. It is hardly conceivable that such a climate of opposing views could nurture any common understanding of the proliferation phenomenon. Yet such an assumption appears to exist.
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Biological weapons (BW) in the hands of terrorists could potentially cause countless casualties in an epidemic beyond control. However, this worst nightmare scenario has never happened. A critical reason is the complexity of the armament... more
Biological weapons (BW) in the hands of terrorists could potentially cause countless casualties in an epidemic beyond control. However, this worst nightmare scenario has never happened. A critical reason is the complexity of the armament dynamic – acquisition of appropriate pathogen strains, their cultivation and production, storage – and dissemination. Each step poses complex scientific and technical challenges. Each step poses considerable risks to whoever manipulates such pathogens, whether to develop and produce them or to spread them among the target population. There are other disease agents that pose less of a threat to humans or ones that can infect animals and plants. And terrorists may target the food chain anywhere between the farm and consumer. Human loss would be much less in such alternative scenarios.
From the perspective of the armament dynamic, the threat of terrorism with infectious disease appears much lower. Breaking down the development and acquisition process into its constituent steps contributes to the realisation that an error made at one stage will be carried over to the next stage and accumulates with any previous errors. This helps to explain why all major BW acquisition attempts by terrorist entities have so far ended in failure. A second explanation resides in the question terrorists must ask themselves: what marginal benefits may BW offer over other weaponry in pursuing their objectives? Given the risks, complexities, and uncertainties about the outcome, they may conclude that any potential gains may not be worth the while.
However, reassuring such a conclusion might be, the possibility of a major incident can never be excluded. Knowledge about the armament process and its different stages offers multiple opportunities to increase the barriers to terrorist or criminal acquisition of BW. In addition, many of those counterterrorism measures will also contribute to the reduction of risks related to accidental release of harmful pathogens.
NATO countered the military threat posed by chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons during the Cold War. Soon after the terrorist strikes against New York and Washington in September 2001 and the mail-delivered anthrax spores shortly thereafter, it took the steps to address the possibility of terrorism with CBRN agents. Since then, it has gradually expanded the institutions and procedures to build capacities to defend and protect against such agents and provide assistance in case of a major terrorist threat or incident, or disaster involving CBRN materials in a member state or one of the partner countries. The pandemic spread of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome - Corona Virus 2 (SARS-COV-2) and its worldwide social and economic disruption has renewed concerns within the political and military structures of the Alliance about possible state or non-state actor interest in BW. The outbreak has also demonstrated NATO’s capacity to respond to requests by members and partner countries for emergency assistance.
This chapter looks at the contribution of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), a global disarmament treaty, and associated actions by the international community to the prevention of terrorism with BW. Because states party to the BTWC have the obligation to transpose the treaty prohibitions into domestic legislation and regulations, they play the primary role in the prevention of terrorism with BW.
As all NATO members are also parties to the BTWC, the chapter considers how NATO’s strategy of deterrence and defence against terrorism with BW, and its support and assistance programmes correspond with the BTWC obligations and policies agreed by the parties to the convention. Besides the provisions outlining the core prohibitions, this chapter will consider two articles in depth, namely Article IV on transposing the international obligations into domestic laws and regulations, and Article VII on emergency assistance if a state party faces a threat in consequence of a treaty violation, including a BW attack.
From the perspective of the armament dynamic, the threat of terrorism with infectious disease appears much lower. Breaking down the development and acquisition process into its constituent steps contributes to the realisation that an error made at one stage will be carried over to the next stage and accumulates with any previous errors. This helps to explain why all major BW acquisition attempts by terrorist entities have so far ended in failure. A second explanation resides in the question terrorists must ask themselves: what marginal benefits may BW offer over other weaponry in pursuing their objectives? Given the risks, complexities, and uncertainties about the outcome, they may conclude that any potential gains may not be worth the while.
However, reassuring such a conclusion might be, the possibility of a major incident can never be excluded. Knowledge about the armament process and its different stages offers multiple opportunities to increase the barriers to terrorist or criminal acquisition of BW. In addition, many of those counterterrorism measures will also contribute to the reduction of risks related to accidental release of harmful pathogens.
NATO countered the military threat posed by chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons during the Cold War. Soon after the terrorist strikes against New York and Washington in September 2001 and the mail-delivered anthrax spores shortly thereafter, it took the steps to address the possibility of terrorism with CBRN agents. Since then, it has gradually expanded the institutions and procedures to build capacities to defend and protect against such agents and provide assistance in case of a major terrorist threat or incident, or disaster involving CBRN materials in a member state or one of the partner countries. The pandemic spread of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome - Corona Virus 2 (SARS-COV-2) and its worldwide social and economic disruption has renewed concerns within the political and military structures of the Alliance about possible state or non-state actor interest in BW. The outbreak has also demonstrated NATO’s capacity to respond to requests by members and partner countries for emergency assistance.
This chapter looks at the contribution of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), a global disarmament treaty, and associated actions by the international community to the prevention of terrorism with BW. Because states party to the BTWC have the obligation to transpose the treaty prohibitions into domestic legislation and regulations, they play the primary role in the prevention of terrorism with BW.
As all NATO members are also parties to the BTWC, the chapter considers how NATO’s strategy of deterrence and defence against terrorism with BW, and its support and assistance programmes correspond with the BTWC obligations and policies agreed by the parties to the convention. Besides the provisions outlining the core prohibitions, this chapter will consider two articles in depth, namely Article IV on transposing the international obligations into domestic laws and regulations, and Article VII on emergency assistance if a state party faces a threat in consequence of a treaty violation, including a BW attack.
Research Interests:
It is with great pride that COE-DAT presents volume 2 of “Good Practices in Countering Terrorism (GP CT Vol.2).” This project launched in 2020 to address current issues and research in the field of counterterrorism. Within this scope,... more
It is with great pride that COE-DAT presents volume 2 of “Good Practices in
Countering Terrorism (GP CT Vol.2).” This project launched in 2020 to address current
issues and research in the field of counterterrorism. Within this scope, the GP CT Vol.2
is the latest initiative aimed at practical solutions to counter-terrorism policy problems
with innovative best practices proven in the field.
This project, in cooperation with TOBB University of Economics and Technology,
was published by terrorism experts, academics, and practitioners. The aim of this project
is to provide critical thinking in the field of CT, an inherently sensitive subject, and
to create an interactive platform of expertise on effective methods, strategies, national
responses and alternative models.
As stated in NATO 2030 document, Allies agreed to step up NATO efforts to build
the capacity of alliance partners in areas like CT. Each of NATO’s member stability is
significantly vital for alliance security. Previous experiences reveal that prevention is
always a better option when we compare with intervention. Recent conflicts in Ukraine
with Russia once again emphasized the emergency of this issue.
In this context, COE-DAT organized a series of workshops, which increased
information sharing and demonstrated progressive research on current issues in the fight
against terrorism, including Terrorism Experts Conference 2021. This project, which
emerged because of this hard work, aimed to develop and synchronize CT policies at
the national level, but also to provide for future studies and research. Without a doubt,
these practices will not work in all environments, as terrorism varies by region and
circumstances. However, COE-DAT submits that these can be used as an inspiration in
the development of effective counter-terrorism policies and efforts.
COE-DAT believes that this book will be an inspiration and lead up to more “good
practices” combining the conceptual and operational aspects of counter-terrorism in the
coming years. COE-DAT is committed that this series will continue to be updated in
future endeavors
Countering Terrorism (GP CT Vol.2).” This project launched in 2020 to address current
issues and research in the field of counterterrorism. Within this scope, the GP CT Vol.2
is the latest initiative aimed at practical solutions to counter-terrorism policy problems
with innovative best practices proven in the field.
This project, in cooperation with TOBB University of Economics and Technology,
was published by terrorism experts, academics, and practitioners. The aim of this project
is to provide critical thinking in the field of CT, an inherently sensitive subject, and
to create an interactive platform of expertise on effective methods, strategies, national
responses and alternative models.
As stated in NATO 2030 document, Allies agreed to step up NATO efforts to build
the capacity of alliance partners in areas like CT. Each of NATO’s member stability is
significantly vital for alliance security. Previous experiences reveal that prevention is
always a better option when we compare with intervention. Recent conflicts in Ukraine
with Russia once again emphasized the emergency of this issue.
In this context, COE-DAT organized a series of workshops, which increased
information sharing and demonstrated progressive research on current issues in the fight
against terrorism, including Terrorism Experts Conference 2021. This project, which
emerged because of this hard work, aimed to develop and synchronize CT policies at
the national level, but also to provide for future studies and research. Without a doubt,
these practices will not work in all environments, as terrorism varies by region and
circumstances. However, COE-DAT submits that these can be used as an inspiration in
the development of effective counter-terrorism policies and efforts.
COE-DAT believes that this book will be an inspiration and lead up to more “good
practices” combining the conceptual and operational aspects of counter-terrorism in the
coming years. COE-DAT is committed that this series will continue to be updated in
future endeavors
It is a privilege to share the second volume of “Good Practices in Counter Terrorism”, the results of the efforts of a group of highly respected researchers and practitioners. In order to address the current issues and the bourgeoning... more
It is a privilege to share the second volume of “Good Practices in Counter Terrorism”, the results of the efforts of a group of highly respected researchers and practitioners. In order to address the current issues and the bourgeoning discussions in the field of counter terrorism (CT), in early 2020, the NATO Centre of Excellence for the Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) initiated the “Good Practices in Counter Terrorism” project with the academic support of TOBB Economics and Technology University (TOBB ETU). This living project has been produced by members of the pool of visiting lecturers at the COE DAT, the accumulated human resources of the center through years of engagement with academics and practitioners. Within this framework, we, as COE DAT and TOBB Economics and Technology, organized a series of workshops in which current issues in CT were addressed by relevant experts. Upon the conclusion of the discussions and based on the latest research and experience of our experts, we published the first volume of “Good Practices in Counter Terrorism” in early 2021. Following the same structure, and initiated in early 2021, the second volume of the series is the final outcome of a one-year endeavor which has built an interactive platform of expertise on the effective methods, strategies, national responses, and alternative models in CT. We hope that this timely contribution will offer a comprehensive and multi-sectoral approach to support efforts in the CT domain through inspiring various actors in their ongoing endeavors to develop, professionalize and synchronize CT policies at the national level.