Counter Radicalization

This paper presents new findings about individual disengagement from violent extremism in a Western context. Despite enormous investment of the last two decades in responses to terrorism, the exit and reintegration processes of extremists back into the community are not well understood. Whilst most extremists struggle with the transition back into society, most eventually move on with their lives, becoming citizens again. Most do so unassisted. Therefore, studying the phenomenon of natural disengagement is a critical avenue to understanding why people choose to leave, how they leave, how they reconnect and what areas of their lives undergo change in doing so. Fifteen themes emerged directly from the transcripts of 22 interviews with former extremists from a range of different ideological backgrounds. These themes clustered into five domains which collectively represent the phenomenological essence of disengagement from extremism, including subsequent re-engagement with society. A key finding is that sustained disengagement is actually about the proactive, holistic and harmonious engagement the person has with wider society afterwards. Building on existing empirical research, this paper proposes a tentative five-domain, three-level model of disengagement called the Pro-Integration Model.

Existing literature on terrorism and counterterrorism (CT) has overwhelmingly focused on the strategic and operational policies of major Western states such as the USA and the UK. It is predominantly based upon theoretical reflections, which draw on both International Relations and other disciplines, and empirical analyses, which offer up case studies and regional overviews. Alex P. Schmid, a leading expert on terrorism studies, has identified, in Perspectives on Terrorism, that the CT policies of states and groups of states have received relatively little attention by experts in all fields.

It is for this reason that this edited book has been assembled. There has been little concentration on how terrorism has been a truly global phenomenon and how others have responded to this threat. The majority of titles, especially those about CT policies in the post-9/11 period, show that there is a compelling need for a multifaceted and comprehensive investigation of all aspects of CT, in which equal attention is given to state and non-state perspectives and approaches in all regions of the world.

Most terrorists ultimately end up in prison, yet remarkably little is known about what happens behind the prison walls and even less about when those individuals are eventually released back into society. This book provides readers with an up-to-date, informed and accessible account of what is known about terrorists and extremists in prison, what are the genuine risks and dangers, and what are the critical issues and insights in terms of management and reform. In doing so, it strips away many of the myths and media panics which have so often dominated discussions of this vital issue.

In the week I took writing this review, Beirut, Paris and Bamako were attacked by terrorists claiming to act in the name of Islam. In the days following the attacks, a mosque was burnt down in Canada and multiple European countries recorded a spike in hate crime against Muslims, as far-right organizations continued to mobilize crowds across the continent. Radicalization has become a central issue...

Our understanding of the risk assessment of terrorist and extremist prisoners is in its infancy, yet this is clearly a critical issue. How can one tell if a prisoner is still dangerous or not? What are valid measures to assess risk and what type of evidence is worth examining? In considering risk assessment of terrorists and extremists in prison settings there are a range of essential issues to consider.  Crucially, not all terrorist and extremist prisoners are the same and factors which apply clearly to one individual will not apply equally strongly to others. As a result, effective risk assessment processes need to be nuanced. This chapter highlights the range of issues which are likely to be of most use when considering risk assessment in the context of a terrorist prisoner, and also identifies what sources of information can provide the necessary insight to inform this assessment.

Preoccupation with the effort to fight extremist propaganda in an increasingly complex information environment has produced an overwhelming amount of literature from professors, practitioners, policymakers, and pundits. The problem of terrorist messaging is easily defined; solutions, in the form of effective counter-narrative strategies and the tools to disseminate them, are much harder to come by. Kurt Braddock's "Weaponized Words: The Strategic Role of Persuasion in Violent Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization" takes this on, providing well-researched and relatively jargon-free guidelines to the development of persuasive counter-narratives and the use of emerging communications technologies to fight back.

Terrorism, radicalization and violent extremism dominate sociological, political and cultural concerns in today's polarized social and political world. However, the role of governments and issues relating to state terrorism and the counter-terror state remain important considerations. This book presents an understanding of the concept of Countering Violent Extremism from a critical terrorism studies perspective using case studies from different countries while examining the issues it raises. Extremism and violence do not emerge in a vacuum – nor do the policies that counter these concerns. There are no simple solutions to violent extremism but the fixation on ideology can do more harm than good.

This chapter explores some of the dilemmas that arise in using uncertainty as a lens to interpret societal problems and issues. Using several cases to open up discussion we argue that it is vitally important to understand the historical, political and cultural context in which debates about risk, uncertainty and (in)security materialise. Arguing for a re-specified, context-specific account, we seek to unravel dominant understandings of uncertainty in three domains: cyber security, counter-radicalisation strategy and mechanisms for coping in the aftermath of structural violence. While acknowledging the value of uncertainty as an heuristic device, we argue that established units of sociological analysis – such as power and ideology – remain important explanatory concepts in understanding institutional actions and policy drivers.

Going Dark. The secret social lives of extremists is a real page turner. It is a well structured book that gives the reader basic information on how the global far right and radical Islamists use digital media in their (meta)political battle. It is a perfect introduction to the dark corners of the world, but don't expect it to do more than that.

This report highlights core contours of jihadist recruitment in Turkey and unpacks key push-pull factors that motivate individuals to fight with jihadist groups in Iraq and Syria. It concludes by offering insight into how Turkey’s government is framing the problem.  The report draws on leading research about Turkish fighter recruitment, first-hand examination of Turkish language jihadist propaganda from relevant groups, and face-to-face conversations with representatives of the Turkish government.

Prezentul studiu adresează problema spinoasă a rolului religiei în dezvoltarea radicalismului cu care se confruntă lumea de azi. Înmulțirea actelor terorise în ultima vreme a dat naștere unor întrebări precum: este religia sursa violenței? Creșterea fundamentalismelor religioase poate fi corelată cu o creștere a radicalizării? Are terorismul un substrat religios, sau cauzele lui primare trebuie căutate în altă parte? Care sunt cele mai eficiente strategii de deradicalizare? În acest material se vor urmări câteva voci influente din domeniul științelor sociale, în special Gilles Kepel și Olivier Roy și se va evidenția direcția spre care se îndreaptă cercetarea din domeniul științelor sociale în analiza și interpretarea fenomenului.

El terrorismo de etiología yihadista no surge de la nada, sino que por el contrario nace y se desarrolla a través de un proceso denominado " radicalización hacia la violencia o radicalización violenta ", que es la realidad a la que responde el modelo que presentamos.

El presente artículo constituye una introducción sobre los indicadores de radicalización que se ponen de manifiesto en los sujetos que atraviesan los procesos de radicalización violenta. Pero lo novedoso de este modelo, desarrollado por Tahir Mahmood, consiste en fundamentar científicamente la explicación del mismo como representativo de un proceso dinámico y multifactorial de radicalización, a diferencia de lo que, hasta el momento, se ha llevado a cabo en esta materia sobre la base de un mero conocimiento práctico construido a partir de meras experiencias particulares. Así pues, el objetivo consiste no solamente en explicar el proceso, sino en que los propios usuarios puedan entender el proceso cognitivo que atraviesa un sujeto que se halla inmerso en un proceso de esta índole, sin otra finalidad que la loable pretensión de detectar dicho fenómeno en sus primeros estadios y revertir el propio proceso de radicalicación, lo cual requerirá del compromiso de todos los agentes involucrados.

Para más información, se pueden poner en contacto con nosotros a través de las direcciones de correo electrónico que figuran al pie del artículo.

The present study, developed in the framework of the project YEIP (Youth Empowerment Innovation Project), intends to give an overview, about policies, programmes, and stakeholders related to the prevention of youth radicalization in Portugal. This report constitutes the first step of this ambitious 36-month project, involving organizations from seven countries (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Sweden and UK), which intends to produce an innovative model to tackle youth radicalization, based on the positive psychology.
A reflection on the concept of radicalization and its meaning at national level introduces the study. The common assumption of this concept in Europe doesn´t seem to be so relevant in the actual Portuguese context.
The mapping of the legal framework for preventing youth radicalization, including laws, decrees and ministerial resolutions, and of the programmes, initiatives and projects implemented at national level, focused in school and online environments, allowed to reflect on the national state-of-art, in terms of prevention of radicalization of youth and openness to the implementation of positive psychology-based innovative approaches.
The analysis of the panorama was clear, in Portugal there isn’t a harmonized and national policy, preventing youth radicalization and inspired in positive psychology approaches, neither in schools, neither online.
The fact that the country does not deal directly with terrorist threats, as well as the fact that the most problematic schools are endowed with a high level of autonomy when structuring prevention (and reaction) measures to these problems, are some of the factors that can explain this current scenario. However, although there is no uniform national plan with preventive measures, it is clear that there is a high interest and sensitivity of the educational community towards positive psychology. Projects in schools, which are still embryonic and emerging, have already proved the relevance of developing this type of initiatives in Portugal.
Keywords: prevention, radicalization, violence, Youth, schools, positive psychology.

The Norwegian Mentoring Scheme (NMS) has now been running for six years, and was evaluated for the first time by the end of 2018. This paper dwells on the results of this evaluation, published in Norwegian in February 2019 (Orban, 2019). These results were obtained through access to primary sources from the Directorate of Norwegian Correctional Service (DNCS) and from the NMS’ archives, as well as through semi-structured interviews. Eight were conducted with participants in the scheme. Nine were conducted with their mentors. One particular feature of the NMS is the use of mentors from civil society with different backgrounds in order to engage sentenced radical prisoners and to moderate behaviors and discourses. Twenty interviews were conducted with prison staff working with participants in the program, prison wardens and designers of the NMS. All interviews took place from March 2017 to October 2018. Due to high prison security measures, it was not possible to conduct more than one interview per mentee during the evaluation period. Interviews with both mentees and mentors averaged between 1.5 and 2 hours and were exclusively focused on how participation in the NMS was experienced by both groups. This chapter suggests that good targeting of mentors and mentees and trust building are critical factors to create appropriate conditions for change. Despite shortages, unexpected geopolitical developments and economic constraints, the first results of the NMS review were promising. However, the efficiency of the trust model to prevent recidivism into terrorism has yet to be confirmed in the long term. Aside from the work done on influencing behaviors and mindsets, mentors compensated for the lack of management of radicalized inmates in the prison system by providing a humanized form of support. In that sense,
this study also suggests that the NMS might have less in common with deradicalization interventions than with existing reintegration measures that seek to empower prisoners to change their lifestyle and to prevent recidivism into crime.

Commissioned by the Georgian Centre for Strategy and Development (GCSD) as a component of a four-year multi-tier programme on ‘Enhancing the Capacity of Georgia in Preventing Violent Extremism and Radicalization’ funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Norway, this Handbook was developed to facilitate Georgia’s ‘Permanent Interagency Commission on Elaboration of the National Counterterrorism Strategy (CNCS)’ Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) policy development and cooperative programming processes.

In a field crowded with documentation and narratives on diverse P/CVE approaches, this Handbook’s objective is to focus the audience’s attention on counter-terrorism and P/CVE best practice at international and European levels. At the same time, the Handbook enables practitioners from state institutions to sustain institutional P/CVE knowledge and to develop capacity to address P/CVE issues across Georgian society. The Handbook can also be used for training purposes, as well as by other stakeholders to develop their own capacity to implement projects aimed at understanding and limiting the threat of violent extremism.

Beginning with an introduction to the evolution of terrorism over the last fifty years, the Handbook outlines the challenges of terrorism to democratic states, and the legal and policy dimensions of effective counter-terrorism and extremism prevention. The Handbook then addresses specific thematic issues, including institutional frameworks for P/CVE, cooperation between state and society, radicalization prevention, the return of foreign terrorist fighters and their families, and broader counter-terrorism and P/CVE communication challenges. Placing an emphasis on developing original material and incorporating a variety of relevant and easily accessible best practice materials, the aim across all seven chapters is to ensure that a ‘Whole-of-Society’ approach to P/CVE issues is emphasised in a user-friendly format.

Against the background of fifty years of terrorism, democratic societies are still exposed to a variety of risks posed by local and strategic terrorism. Although waves of terrorism occur in peaks and troughs, as contested and ungoverned spaces continue to harbour often well-funded and supplied terrorist and insurgent groups, social and technological developments compound the significant risks posed by even small terrorist movements and cells. To counter these threats, the legal and policy framework for counter-terrorism and counter-extremism programming will continue to evolve, not least to disrupt online terrorist recruitment, communication, and radicalization activities, and also to limit the transit of terrorists across international travel networks. In this context, every democratic society faces the dual challenge of maintaining their preparedness to counter terrorist threats, and to adapt their P/CVE approaches to contain new or persistent terrorist threats.

In the interim, Georgia, as with other European democracies, will remain exposed to a variety of counter-terrorism and P/CVE challenges. Limiting Georgia’s exposure to international terrorist networks, creating effective counter-terrorism policy, ensuring effective P/CVE practice, and enhancing Georgia’s cooperative security efforts will require further development of existing P/CVE capacities, particularly in terms of maintaining substantive institutional and multi-stakeholder approaches to terrorist and radicalization threats. In so doing, Georgia will continue to contribute to European and international security.

Analysis of IS/Daesh propaganda on Twitter between the end of 2015 and the beginning of 2016. Its supporters are called "fanboys" and they are as important as its mujahideen: they are "network warriors" or "media warriors" and all of them constitute a "radicalisation echo chamber" that fosters a widespread dissemination of IS extremist message.
In this work, IS narrative of hatred is compared with a counternarrative that aims to weaken its message and show its flaws. The latter narrative is made up by many global initiatives against radicalisation and violent extremism, which are gathered and promoted every year by UE organisation Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN). 

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Il lavoro di ricerca tratta il tema della propaganda jihadista dello Stato Islamico (o Daesh) svolta attraverso il social network Twitter. Per tre mesi, a cavallo tra il 2015 e il 2016, sono stati raccolti in forma automatizzata i tweet in lingua inglese e francese pubblicati da 156 account, selezionati in base alla presenza di segnali di evidente sostegno verso l’organizzazione (immagini, video, commenti che esprimono posizioni estremiste). Oggi, imbattersi nei profili dei combattenti non è più così facile come un tempo, perché i quadri dell’organizzazione hanno proibito loro di comunicare sui social, per evitare di diffondere informazioni sensibili, ad esempio la loro posizione geografica, come è capitato più volte. L’analisi si è quindi concentrata sui sostenitori, o fanboy, di Daesh, i quali non sono meno importanti dei membri effettivi, come si deduce anche dal titolo del mio lavoro, che li identifica come «combattenti della rete». Questi individui sono la chiave del successo della sua propaganda, perché permettono all’organizzazione di dare risonanza ai propri atti e di illustrarli nella forma più vantaggiosa. Insieme costituiscono una struttura complessa, una comunità virtuale e internazionale, che è stata definita «camera di risonanza della radicalizzazione». Infatti, senza di loro, questa organizzazione probabilmente non avrebbe acquisito una tale rilevanza e un tale seguito. Alla narrativa di IS si oppone la contronarrativa che deriva da diverse iniziative contro la radicalizzazione e il terrorismo, raccolte e promosse ogni anno dall'organo UE Radicalisation Awareness Network.

This collective book examines the issues of the role of women in social and political processes.  The authors consider the following questions:  the development of civil society, the problems of modern gender policy in the North Caucasus, the opportunities and examples of women's self-organization in traditional society in the context of history and the current state, the role of women in radical and extremist groups.

The form of Islam normatively understood and practised in Malaysia, i.e. Malaysian Islam, has undergone myriad changes since the 1970s as a result of gradual Salafization. Powered by Saudi Arabian largesse and buoyed by the advent of the Internet, this new wave of Salafization has eclipsed an earlier Salafi trend that spawned the Kaum Muda reformist movement. Recent surveys suggest that there has been a rise in the level of extremism among Muslims in Malaysia. While the majority is far from being enamoured by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Wahhabi-Salafi doctrine that ISIS claims to represent in unadulterated form does appeal to many of them following the decades-long Salafization of Islam in the country. This tallies with media reports on increasing numbers of Malay-Muslim youth harbouring an attraction towards radical Islamist movements such as ISIS. Salafization, referring to a process of mindset and attitudinal transformation rather than the growth of Salafi nodes per se, is not restricted to individuals or groups identified as “Salafi”, but rather affects practically all levels of Malay-Muslim society, cutting across political parties, governmental institutions and non-state actors. It has resulted in Islamist, rather than Islamic, ideals increasingly defining the tenor of mainstream Islam in Malaysia, with worrying consequences for both intra-Muslim and inter-religious relations. Responses to the Wahhabi-Salafi onslaught from the Malay-Muslim ruling elite in Malaysia have been ambivalent, and have had weak counteracting effects on the Salafization process.

Certaines attaques commises sous le sceau du djihadisme ont été le fait de personnes inscrites durablement dans la délinquance et dont l’engagement radical a pu apparaître comme une « réponse » à des situations d’impasse biographique. Quelle est la place de l’engagement radical et de la violence dans ces trajectoires ? Quelles sont les spécificités de ces trajectoires par rapports à ceux qui sortent de la délinquance ? Cet entretien avec le sociologue Fabien Truong aborde ces questions à travers ses recherches.

Interviewer: Oliver J. Smith (psychology student at Cambridge University) //

Dr Florence Gaub is a Senior Analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies where she heads the Middle East and North Africa programme. In her work, she focuses on conflict, strategy and security, with particular emphasis on Iraq, Lebanon and Libya; she also works on Arab military forces more generally, conflict structures and geostrategic dimensions of the Arab region. Dr Gaub wrote a paper called, ‘The Cult of ISIS’ which was published in Survival: Global Politics and Strategy in early 2016. Oliver Smith asked Dr Gaub about the links that can be made between cults and terrorist groups, and the strategic implications of these links.

Il caso studio   il primo in Italia che riguarda un’attività di cosiddetta de-radicalizzazione nei confronti di un ragazzo coinvolto in attività eversive dell’estrema destra neo-nazista. Il percorso intrapreso nasce nel quadro del progetto europeo “Exit Europe”, che ha coinvolti i partner di 5 paesi nella logica di integrare gli interventi di P/CVE (Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism).
In #ReaCT2022 - 3  Rapporto sul terrorismo e il radicalismo in Europa - N. 3, Anno 3, p. 35-36 ISSN 2813-1037 (print) ISSN 2813-1045 (online)
Copyright 2022 by START InSight Sagl editore, Lugano (Svizzera)

Warum ist rechtsextreme Rhetorik so gefährlich? In den letzten Jahren haben sich Wissenschaftler wie auch politische Entscheidungsträger darum bemüht, den Zusammenhang von extremistischer Online-Kommunikation und dem Anstieg rechtsextremer Gewalt aufzudecken. Insbesondere die Frage, welche Rolle die sozialen Medien bei der Verbreitung von Hassrede und in Radikalisierungsprozessen spielen, hat dabei viel Aufmerksamkeit auf sich gezogen. Allerdings ohne die Triebkräfte der Gewalt wirklich identifizieren zu können. Indem wir uns dem Konzept der „gefährlichen Rede“ zuwenden, gehen wir einen Schritt zurück von dieser Frage nach den Effekten rechtsextremer Online-Kommunikation. Stattdessen untersuchen wir deren logische Funktionsweise, um die vorgelagerten Prozesse zu beleuchten, die Hass konstituieren und Gewalt legitimieren. Konkret untersuchen wir, wie in den sozialen Medien eingesetzte rechtsextreme Narrative Emotionen mobilisieren, welche die Akzeptanz oder gar Anwendung von Gewalt vorbereiten. Die argumentativen Strukturen zweier Anti-Einwanderungskampagnen in Deutschland analysierend, arbeiten wir ein Netzwerk von Narrativen heraus, in denen Erzählungen der Bedrohung – unterstützt von Erzählungen der Verschwörung und Ungleichheit – zu einer größeren Geschichte von nationalem Untergang und Erwachen konvergieren. Durch die Konstruktion einer Situation kollektiver Selbstverteidigung wird Gewalt zu einer logischen Option, auch wenn gewaltsames Handeln nicht explizit vorgeschlagen wird. Gegennarrative Bemühungen sollten sich daher nicht nur auf Hassrede konzentrieren, sondern auch die Opfermythen in den Blick nehmen, die konstitutiv für (gewalttätige) palingenetische Fantasien sind.

Listening to the podcast one is left with a sense of disbelief: how is it possible that a letter widely considered to be fraudulent, which emerged in the context of local discontent in schools, could not only lead to a witch hunt against Muslim school teachers but also foment national hysteria about the presence of Muslims in Britain?

Right-wing extremism has been the subject of many studies over the years, especially in contemporary times in which many commentators have argued there is a global resurgence in support for the extreme-right. Despite this, very few studies have been conducted on the extreme-right in New Zealand and previous studies are very outdated. Of the international studies that have been conducted on right-wing extremism only a small minority are empirically based as most scholars prefer to avoid the many challenges and difficulties which accompany empirical inquiry in the subject. Furthermore, only a minority of previous empirical studies have focused on lives of the individuals who come to join the extreme-right. This thesis examines why and how individuals come to join extreme-right groups, what motivates them to stay within these groups, and why many of them eventually come to leave. These questions were investigated by conducting a qualitative method of inquiry into the life histories of six former New Zealand right-wing extremists. A number of social factors were identified as having influenced the participants to join, stay within, and eventually leave extreme-right groups in New Zealand. These social factors were not uniform across all the participants who were also determined to be generally influenced by a combination of factors rather any singular factor. The influencing affect that these social factors had on the participants can be understood with several theoretical explanations which were applied to the findings. Furthermore, the study gave rise to some new theoretical ideas which can improve upon how involvement in right-wing extremism is understood and aid future inquiry into the subject. Overall the study enhances our understanding of individual involvement in right-wing extremism and provides insight into the extreme-right scene in New Zealand.

The phenomena of radicalisation today develop and change at high speed, with their extreme forms manifested globally. The destructive dimensions of (violent) Islamist or right-wing radicalisation have become dramatically visible in Europe posing serious challenges to European societies at large. This report aims to address a knowledge gap with regard to how and to what extent internationally observed radicalisation processes are manifested in Bulgaria. Four different forms of radicalisation are investigated, including Islamist radicalisation, right-wing and left-wing radicalisation, as well as football hooliganism. The report provides policy makers and the expert community with a systematic overview of the main risks to which the Bulgarian society is exposed, as well as of the main actors and ideas, the repertoire of actions and the groups at risk associated with radicalisation. The report outlines recommendations for improvement of the policy and institutional response with regard to radicalisation by way of monitoring and prevention measures as well as multi agency collaboration and community engagement.

This paper examines the short-lived rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt after the Arab Spring and argues that the Muslim Brotherhood had abandoned Islamist values without embracing democratic ideals. It identifies a pathway to reform for the Brotherhood  if it is serious about democratization. The paper insists that the failure of democracy in Egypt is not a judgement on the compatibility of Islam and democracy.

This report focuses on the case of Greece, where the phenomenon of radicalisation has been present throughout the period from the mid-1970s. Greece displays one of the most persistent problems of terrorism in Europe, raising anew the question of why extremist and revolutionary organisations continue to emerge and be active in democracies. Since the 2010, right wing and left wing extremism and radicalisation have intensified, especially in the context of a deepening social and economic crisis. The report provides a background study on radicalisation in Greece and the various forms that it takes, as a basis to bridge existing knowledge gaps on the subject. It provides and overview of past and current radicalisation trends. The national background study aims to first, identify and assess the legal and institutional responses to the processes of radicalisation that may lead to acts of violence and second, to review and analyse trends (ideas, actors, actions, motivations and root causes) in three strands of radicalisation (right and left wing, Islamist radicalisation and football hooliganism).

L’ascesa di IS in un vasto territorio tra Siria e Iraq e la competizione innescatasi all’interno della galassia jihadista della vecchia al-Qaida sembrano attivare dinamiche di concorrenza/coesistenza che hanno conseguenze molto rischiose per un’intera area geopolitica affetta da un’instabilità che già costituiva un terreno fertile per la proliferazione di gruppi radicali. La minaccia, che sta assumendo sempre più connotazioni di territorialità, sembra coinvolgere in particolare un vasto spazio di prossimità – che va dai Balcani sino al Maghreb – di grande interesse per l’UE e l’Italia in particolare.
Nella prima parte il Rapporto analizza la natura di questa minaccia e la sua reale portata, osservando quelle aree geopolitiche di permeabilità alla stessa in relazione agli attori locali e agli interessi italiani. Nella seconda si approfondiscono le implicazioni per la nostra politica estera e di difesa e sicurezza in senso ampio, cercando di fornire alcuni spunti di policy nell’ottica dell’azione internazionale dell’Italia.

Radicalisation, prévention, désengagement, dé-radicalisation : quatre mots-clés intrinsèquement liés, devenus, dans les sphères académiques, étatiques et sociétales concernées, des termes courants depuis les attentats du 11 septembre 2001. Face aux attaques terroristes récentes en France et ailleurs, ainsi qu’au vu de la participation croissante de djihadistes européens dans le conflit en Syrie et en Iraq, les sociétés européennes sont amenées à traiter le phénomène d’une façon plus globale pour remédier à cette situation dangereuse. Nous avons tenté avec ce rapport une analyse qualitative des différents mesures et programmes de prévention, dé-radicalisation et désengagement mis en œuvre dans trois pays européens avec des modèles politiques et sociétaux différents : l’Allemagne, la Grande Bretagne et le Danemark. Notre but était d’éclairer les diverses approches de la société civile ainsi que des institutions étatiques, de recenser les similarités et différences stratégiques existantes dans les trois pays et d’évaluer leur efficacité et durabilité. Dans ce sens ce travail constitue d’une part un aperçu international et général des différents projets de prévention et dé-radicalisation. D’autre part, il met l’accent sur des thèmes plus spécifiques et essentiels, dont la dé-radicalisation en prison, l’intégration des communautés musulmanes locales dans le travail de la prévention et de la dé-radicalisation et le rôle des femmes. L’objectif est d’identifier ainsi les initiatives les plus prometteuses pour la France ainsi que les problèmes récurrents qui y sont liés.

Max Ward, “Thinking Like a State: Policing Dangerous Thought in Imperial Japan, 1900-1945,” Positions: Asia Critique, Vol. 30, No. 1 (February 2022), pp. 35-60.

This article explores one of the primary ways the Japanese police increasingly intervened into everyday life in prewar Japan: the policing of so-called “dangerous thought” (kiken shisō). The article traces the process in which the objective of policing politics transformed from an emphasis on political organizations, their activities, publications, and assemblies in the 1900s to the policing of individuals ostensibly harboring “dangerous ideas” that were deemed threatening to state and capital—what the police came to categorize as “thought crime” (shisō hanzai) by the late 1920s. Once “dangerous thought” was identified as a target of policing in the late 1920s, police agencies began to develop a kind of intellectual history - what I call "thinking like a state" - to explain the origin of dangerous ideas and their spread in the changing socioeconomic conditions in imperial Japan. In the process, the police also reflected on their unique function between Japanese society and the imperial state, and continually invoked something they called the “spirit of the police” (keisatsu seishin) as the prime mover of police power, although what this spirit symbolized changed over time.

Somalia has been a hotspot for terrorism and instability since
the early 1990s. Al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda affiliate in Somalia,
has been successful in carrying out a number of deadly attacks
outside of Somalia and enticing non-Somali foreign fighters,
Somali-Kenyans included, to its ranks. Relying on primary
research interviews with sixteen Kenyan al-Shabaab members
and their family members, this article highlights psychological,
physical, emotional, and financial rewards of joining the terrorist group. In addition to better understanding the trajectory of
joining and abandoning the terrorist group, the findings suggest the need to consider using defector and insider voices to
denounce violent extremist and terrorist groups.

The paper delves into the topic of radicalization, counter-radicalization and deradicalization of Muslims residing in Italy. My pivotal research question stems from what I define as the Italian “exceptionalism”, that is the emergence of two factors which single out the country case-study: a modest presence of Muslim radicalized individuals; the absence of jihadi terrorist attacks in the country. In the first section, I will briefly sketch the main sociological features of either foreign or national Muslims living in Italy. Followingly, after a short historical focus on the shift from a first phase of jihadism in Italy to a second one of Italian homegrown jihadism, I will investigate the wide set of hypotheses related to the root causes of jihadi radicalization and to the Italian immunity from jihadi terrorist attacks. I argue that some hermeneutical keys might be embedded in the Italian international strategy toward the Mediterranean and the Arab-Islamic world and in the traditional catholic heritage of the country, home of the Holy See. The two variables, which I propose on a theoretical plan without a further empirical test, are likely to reduce the possibility of violent and agonistic narratives against Rome, despite the apocalyptic propaganda of the Islamic State. Finally, I will present a three-pronged strategy underpinned on some strategies to counter the process of radicalization in Italy.

Jihadist attacks have sent sporadic tremors through European societies for over 25 years. The ferocity of terrorist acts has also stunned Muslim communities. Now social networking provides a platform for dissenting Islamic voices critical of cultural and religious norms that fail to counter violent radicalisation or serve to indulge it.

Cet article revient sur la manière dont la notion de "radicalisation", récusée par les autorités françaises à la fin des années 2000 est devenue en quelques années une catégorie d'action publique stabilisée. Deux pistes sont explorées pour comprendre ce basculement. La première concerne la constitution de la « lutte contre la radicalisation » comme enjeu européen – c’est-à-dire dans et par certaines institutions européennes – et ses effets sur les manières de voir et de faire de représentants de l’Etat français en la matière. La seconde renvoie davantage à des luttes politiques et bureaucratiques nationales, dans lesquelles les services de renseignement, notamment après l’affaire Merah en 2012, ont vu leur monopole de la gestion de l’islam dit « radical » contesté par de nouveaux entrants prenant position sur le terrain de la prévention.

Longtemps considéré comme un facteur explicatif du faible nombre d’attentats terroristes en France au cours des deux dernières décennies, le dispositif antiterroriste français apparaît sous pression au lendemain des attentats de janvier 2015. Restées jusqu’ici relativement hermétiques à une approche dite « douce » en matière de lutte contre l’extrémisme violent, les autorités françaises vont opérer à partir de cette période une inflexion avec l’émergence progressive d’une action publique de prévention de la radicalisation . Face aux limites d’un paradigme antiterroriste qui peine à saisir les nouveaux avatars de la menace jihadiste et une demande sociale qui requiert la mise en œuvre de solutions par les pouvoirs publics, se met en place, non sans une série de tâtonnements et de débats, un champ d’action publique inédit.

Until his death in a U.S. drone strike in August 2015, Junaid Hussain was the Islamic State's most prolific English-language social media propagandist, working to incite and guide sympathizers in the United Kingdom, United States, and beyond to launch terrorist attacks. Before joining the jihad in Syria, Hussain was part of a hacking collective in the United Kingdom, focusing much of his attention on perceived injustices against Muslims. In many respects, he was well integrated into British society with his family home in a leafy suburb of Birmingham. A spell in prison contributed to his radicalization and his decision to move to Syria, where he married fellow extremist Sally Jones.